The Right Reverend Father in God

EDWARD STILLINGFLEET D.D.

late Lord Bishop of Worcester.

Obijt March 27. 1699. *Ætatis Suæ 63.*

ORIGINES SACRAE:

OR

A Rational Account of the Grounds

OF

NATURAL and REVEAL'D

RELIGION.

The SEVENTH EDITION.

To which is now added

Part of another BOOK upon the ſame Subject

Written *A. D.* MDCXCVII.

Publiſh'd from the AUTHOR's Own

MANUSCRIPT.

By the Right Reverend Father in GOD,

EDWARD STILLINGFLEET, D. D.

Late Lord Biſhop of *Worceſter.*

CAMBRIDGE,

Printed at the Univerſity-Preſs, for HENRY MORTLOCK,
at the Sign of the *Phœnix* in St. *Paul's* Church-yard. 1702.

BRITISH MUSEUM

ORIGINES SACRAE:

OR A

Rational Account of the Grounds

OF THE

CHRISTIAN FAITH,

AS TO THE

TRUTH

AND

Divine Authority

OF THE

SCRIPTURES,

And the Matters therein contain'd.

By EDWARD STILLINGFLEET, M. A.

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2 Pet. 1. 26. *For we have not followed cunningly deviſed Fables, when we made known to you the power and coming of our Lord Jeſus Chriſt, but were eye-witneſſes of his Majeſty.*

Neque religio ulla ſine ſapientia ſuſcipienda eſt, nec ulla ſine religione probanda ſapientia. Lactant. de falſ. relig. cap. 1.

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By EDWARD STILLINGFLEET, M.A.

And the Marginal Notes contain'd.

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CAMBRIDGE.

Phœnicia Inferiora. Lucan. de bell. civil. cap. 1.

Nec mihi tertia nihil hac Lybica fertilior ora, nec alla hac arbore

plus curas vitæ-contineri, &c. hic Mantiæ.

cur mundo fruor? to how the Power and Coming of our Lord Jesus Christ,

1 Pet. 1. 20. For our parts not followed cunningly devised Fables, when

To his moſt Honor'd FRIEND

And PATRON,

Sr. ROGER BOURGOINE,

Knight and Baronet.

SIR,

IT was the early felicity of *Moſes*, when expos'd in an Ark of *Nilotic papyre*, to be adopted into the favor of ſo great a Perſonage as the Daughter of *Pharaoh:* Such another Ark is this Vindication of the Writings of that Divine and Excellent Perſon expos'd to the World in; and the greateſt ambition of the Author of it is, to have it receiv'd into your Patronage and Protection. But altho' the Contexture and Frame of this Treatiſe be far below the excellency and worth of the ſubject (as you know the Ark in which *Moſes* was put, *was of bulruſhes daubed with ſlime and pitch*) yet when You pleaſe to caſt your eye on the matter contain'd in it, you will not think it beneath your Favor, and unworthy your Protection. For if Truth be the greateſt preſent which GOD could beſtow, or Man receive (according to that of *Plutarch*, Ὡς οὐδὲν ἀνθρώπῳ λαβεῖν μεῖζον, ἢ χαρίζεσθαι θεῷ σεμνότερον ἀληθείας) *Plutarch. de Iſid. & Oſir.* then certainly thoſe Truths deſerve our moſt ready acceptance, which are in themſelves of greateſt importance, and have the greateſt evidence that they come from GOD. And altho' I have had the happineſs of ſo near relation to You, as to know how little You need ſuch diſcourſes which tend to ſettle the Foundations of Religion, which you have rais'd ſo happy a Superſtructure upon; yet withal I conſider what particular kindneſs the Souls of all good Men bear to ſuch deſigns, whoſe end is to aſſert and vindicate the Truth and Excellency of Religion. For thoſe who are enrich'd themſelves with the ineſtimable Treaſure of true Goodneſs and Piety are far from that envious temper, to think nothing valuable but what they are the ſole poſſeſſors of; but ſuch are the moſt ſatisfy'd themſelves, when they ſee others not only

admire but enjoy what they have the higheſt eſtimation of. Were all who make a ſhew of Religion in the World really ſuch as they pretend to be, Diſcourſes of this nature would be no more ſeaſonable, than the commendations of a great Beauty to one who is already a paſſionate admirer of it; but on the contrary we ſee how common it is for Men firſt to throw Dirt in the face of Religion, and then perſuade themſelves it is its natural Complexion; they repreſent it to themſelves in a ſhape leaſt pleaſing to them, and then bring that as a Plea why they give it no better entertainment.

It may juſtly ſeem ſtrange, that true Religion, which contains nothing in it but what is truly Noble and Generous, moſt rational and pleaſing to the Spirits of all good Men, ſhould yet ſuffer ſo much in its eſteem in the World, thro' thoſe ſtrange and uncouth vizards it is repreſented under. Some accounting the life and practice of it, as it ſpeaks ſubduing our Wills to the Will of GOD (which is the ſubſtance of all Religion) a thing too low and mean for their Rank and Condition in the World; while others pretend a quarrel againſt the Principles of it, as unſatisfactory to Human Reaſon. Thus Religion ſuffers with the Author of it between two Thieves; and it is hard to define which is more injurious to it, that which queſtions the Principles, or that which deſpiſeth the Practice of it. And nothing certainly will more incline Men to believe that we live in an Age of Prodigies, than that there ſhould be any ſuch in the Chriſtian World, who ſhould account it a piece of Gentility to deſpiſe Religion, and a piece of Reaſon to be *Atheiſts*. For if there be any ſuch thing in the World as a true height and magnanimity of Spirit, if there be any ſolid Reaſon and depth of Judgment, they are not only conſiſtent with, but only attainable by a true generous Spirit of Religion. But if we look at that which the looſe and profane World is apt to account the greateſt Gallantry, we ſhall find it made up of ſuch pitiful ingredients, which any skilful and rational Mind will be aſham'd to plead for, much leſs to mention them in competition with true Goodneſs and unfeign'd Piety. For how eaſy is it to obſerve ſuch who would be accounted the moſt high and gallant Spirits, to quarry on ſuch mean preys, which only tend to ſatisfy their brutiſh appetites, or fleſh Revenge with the Blood of ſuch who have ſtood in the way of that airy title, *Honor!* Or elſe they are ſo little apprehenſive

prehenſive of the inward worth and excellency of Human Nature, that they ſeem to envy the gallantry of Peacocks, and ſtrive to outvy them in the gayety of their Plumes; ſuch who are, as *Seneca* ſaith, *ad ſimilitudinem parietum extrinſecus culti*, who imitate the Walls of their Houſes in the fairneſs of the outſides, but matter not what rubbiſh there lies within. The utmoſt of their ambition is to attain *enervatam felicitatem qua permadeſcunt animi*, ſuch a felicity as evigorates the Soul by too long ſteeping, it being the nature of all terreſtrial pleaſures, that they do Ἐκτήκειν καὶ ἀνυγραίνειν τὸ φρονεῖν, by degrees *conſume Reaſon*, by *effeminating* and *ſoftening* the *Intellectuals*. Muſt we appeal then to the judgment of *Sardanapalus* concerning the nature of Felicity, or inquire of *Apicius* what Temperance is? or deſire that *Sybarite* to define Magnanimity, who fainted to ſee a Man at hard labor?

Or doth now the conqueſt of Paſſions, forgiving Injuries, doing good, Self-denial, Humility, Patience under croſſes, which are the real expreſſions of Piety, ſpeak nothing more noble and generous than a luxurious, malicious, proud, and impatient Spirit? Is there nothing more becoming and agreeable to the Soul of Man, in exemplary Piety, and a Holy well-ordered Converſation, than the lightneſs and vanity (not to ſay rudeneſs and debaucheries) of thoſe whom the World accounts the greateſt Gallants? Is there nothing more graceful and pleaſing in the ſweetneſs, candor, and ingenuity of a truly Chriſtian temper and diſpoſition, than in the revengeful, implacable Spirit of ſuch whoſe Honor lives and is fed by the Blood of their Enemies? Is it not more truly honorable and glorious to ſerve that God who commands the World, than to be a ſlave to thoſe paſſions and luſts which put Men upon continual hard ſervice, and torment them for it when they have done it? Were there nothing elſe to commend Religion to the Minds of Men, beſides that tranquillity and calmneſs of Spirit, that ſerene and peaceable temper which follow a good Conſcience where-ever it dwells, it were enough to make Men welcom that Gueſt which brings ſuch good entertainment with it. Whereas the amazements, horrors, and anxieties of Mind, which at one time or other haunt ſuch who proſtitute their Conſciences to a violation of the Laws of God, and the Rules of rectify'd Reaſon, may be enough to perſuade any rational Perſon, that Impiety is the greateſt folly, and Irreligion, madneſs.

It cannot be then but matter of great pity to conſider that any Perſons, whoſe Birth and education hath rais'd them above the common People of the World, ſhould be ſo far their own enemies, as to obſerve the Faſhion more than the Rules of Religion, and to ſtudy Complements more than Themſelves, and read Romances more than the ſacred Scriptures, *which alone are able to make them wiſe unto ſalvation.*

But SIR, I need not mention theſe things to You, unleſs it be to let you ſee the excellency of your choice, in preferring true Virtue and Piety above the Ceremony and Grandeur of the World. Go on, SIR, to value and meaſure true Religion, not by the uncertain meaſures of the World, but by the infallible dictates of GOD himſelf in his ſacred Oracles. Were it not for theſe, what certain foundation could there be for our Faith to ſtand on? and who durſt venture his Soul, as to its future condition, upon any Authority leſs than the infallible veracity of GOD himſelf? What certain directions for practice ſhould we have, what Rule to judg of Opinions by, had not GOD out of his infinite Goodneſs provided and preſerved this authentic Inſtrument of his Will to the World? What a ſtrange Religion would Chriſtianity ſeem, ſhould we frame the Model of it from any other thing than the Word of GOD? Without all controverſy the diſeſteem of the Scriptures upon any pretenſe whatſoever, is the decay of Religion, and thro' many windings and turnings leads Men at laſt into the very depth of Atheiſm. Whereas the frequent and ſerious converſing with the Mind of GOD in his Word is incomparably uſeful, not only for keeping up in us a true notion of Religion (which is eaſily miſtaken, when Men look upon the face of it in any other glaſs than that of the Scriptures) but likewiſe for maintaining a powerful ſenſe of Religion in the Soul of Men, and a due valuation of it, whatever its eſteem or entertainment be in the World. For tho' the true genuine Spirit of Chriſtianity (which is known by the purity and peaceableneſs of it) ſhould grow never ſo much out of credit with the World, yet none who heartily believe the Scripture to be the Word of God, and that the Matters reveal'd therein are infallibly true, will ever have the leſs eſtimation of it. It muſt be confeſs'd that the credit of Religion hath much ſuffer'd in the Age we live in thro' the vain pretenſes of many to it, who have only acted a part in it, for the ſake of ſome private intereſts of their own. And

it

it is the uſual *Logic* of *Atheiſts*, *Crimine ab uno Diſce omnes*; if there be any hypocrites, all who make ſhew of Religion are ſuch; on which account *the Hypocriſy of one Age makes way for the Atheiſm of the next.* But how unreaſonable and unjuſt that Imputation is, there needs not much to diſcover, unleſs it be an argument there are no true Men in the World, becauſe there are ſo many Apes which imitate them; or that there are no Jewels, becauſe there are ſo many counterfeits. And bleſſed be GOD, our Age is not barren of inſtances of real goodneſs and unaffected Piety; there being ſome ſuch generous Spirits as dare love Religion without the dowry of Intereſt, and manifeſt their affection to it in the plain dreſs of the Scriptures, without the paint and ſet-offs, which are added to it by the ſeveral contending parties of the Chriſtian World. Were there more ſuch noble Spirits of Religion in our Age, *Atheiſm* would want one of the greateſt pleas which it now makes againſt the truth of Religion; for nothing enlarges more the Gulf of *Atheiſm*, than that Μέγα χάσμα, *wide paſſage* which lies between the Faith and Lives of Men pretending to be Chriſtians. I muſt needs ſay there is nothing ſeems more ſtrange and unaccountable to me, than that the practice of the unqueſtionable duties of *Chriſtianity* ſhould be put out of countenance, or ſlighted by any who own, profeſs, and contend for the Principles of it. Can the profeſſion of that be honorable, whoſe practice is not? *If the Principles be true, why are they not practis'd? If they be not true, why are they profeſs'd?*

You ſee, SIR, to what an unexpected length my deſire to vindicate the Honor as well as Truth of Religion, hath drawn out this preſent Addreſs. But I may ſooner hope for your pardon in it, than if I had ſpent ſo much paper after the uſual manner of Dedications, in repreſenting You to Your ſelf, or the World. SIR, I know You have too much of that I have been commending, to delight in Your own deſerv'd Praiſes, much leſs in Flatteries, which ſo benign a ſubject might eaſily make one's pen run over in. And therein I might not much have digreſs'd from my deſign, ſince I know few more exemplary for that rare mixture of true Piety, and the higheſt Civility together, in whom that ineſtimable Jewel of Religion is plac'd in a moſt ſweet, affable, and obliging temper. But

altho'

altho' none will be more ready on any occaſion with all gratitude to acknowledg the great obligations You have laid upon me; yet I am ſo far ſenſible of the common vanity of *Epiſtles Dedicatory*, that I cannot ſo heartily comply with them in any thing, as in my hearty prayers to the Almighty for your good and welfare, and in ſubſcribing my ſelf,

SIR,

Your moſt humble

June 5. 1662.

and affectionate Servant,

ED. STILLINGFLEET.

THE

THE PREFACE TO THE READER.

IT is neither to ſatisfy the importunity of Friends, nor to prevent falſe Copies (which and ſuch like excuſes I know are expected in uſual Prefaces) that I have adventured abroad this following Treatiſe: but it is out of a juſt reſentment of the affronts and indignities which have been caſt on Religion, by ſuch who account it a matter of judgment to disbelieve the Scriptures, and a piece of wit to diſpute themſelves out of the poſſibility of being happy in another World: When yet the more acute and ſubtile their arguments are, the greater their ſtrength is againſt themſelves; it being impoſſible there ſhould be ſo much wit and ſubtilty in the Souls of Men, were they not of a more excellent Nature than they imagin them to be. And how contradictious is it for ſuch Perſons to be ambitious of being cry'd up for Wit and Reaſon, whoſe deſign is to degrade the rational Soul ſo far below her ſelf, as to make her become like the Beaſts that periſh! If now the weight and conſequence of the ſubject, and the too great ſeaſonableneſs of it (if the common fame of the large ſpread of Atheiſm *among us be true) be not ſufficient Apology for the publiſhing this Book, I am reſolv'd rather to undergo thy cenſure, than be beholding to any other. The intendment therefore of this Preface is only to give a brief account of the ſcope, deſign, and method of the following Books, altho' the view of the Contents of the Chapters might ſufficiently acquaint thee with it. How far I have been either from tranſcribing, or a deſign to excuſs out of the hands of their admirers, the ſeveral Writings on the behalf of Religion in general, or Chriſtianity in particular (eſpecially* Mornay, Grotius, Amyraldus, *&c.) may eaſily appear by comparing what is contain'd in their Books and this together. Had I not thought ſomething might be ſaid, if not more fully and rationally, yet more ſutably to the preſent temper of this Age, than what is already written by them, thou hadſt not been troubled with this Preface, much leſs with the whole Book. But as the Tempers and Genius's of Ages and Times alter, ſo do the arms and weapons which* Atheiſts *imploy againſt Religion: the moſt popular pretenſes of the* Atheiſts *of our Age, have*

been the irreconcilableneſs of the account of Times in Scripture, with that of the learned and ancient Heathen Nations; the inconſiſtency of the belief of the Scriptures with the Principles of Reaſon; and the account which may be given of the Origin of things from Principles of Philoſophy without the Scriptures: Theſe three therefore I have particularly ſet my ſelf againſt, and directed againſt each of them a ſeveral Book. In the firſt I have manifeſted that there is no ground of credibility in the account of ancient times given by any Heathen Nations different from the Scriptures, which I have with ſo much care and diligence inquir'd into, that from thence we may hope to hear no more of Men before Adam *to ſalve the Authority of the Scriptures by, which yet was intended only as a deſign to undermine them; but I have not thought the frivolous pretenſes of the Author of that* Hypotheſis *worth particular mentioning, ſuppoſing it ſufficient to give a clear account of things without particular citation of Authors, where it was not of great concernment for underſtanding the thing it ſelf. In the ſecond Book I have undertaken to give a rational account of the grounds, why we are to believe thoſe ſeveral Perſons, who in ſeveral Ages were imploy'd to reveal the Mind of* God *to the World; and with greater particularity than hath yet been us'd, I have inſiſted on the Perſons of* Moſes, *and the Prophets, our Savior and his Apoſtles, and in every of them manifeſted the rational evidences on which they were to be believ'd, not only by the Men of their own Age, but by thoſe of ſucceeding Generations. In the third Book I have inſiſted on the matters themſelves which are either ſuppos'd by, or reveal'd in the Scriptures; and have therein not only manifeſted the certainty of the foundations of all Religion, which lye in the Being of* God *and Immortality of the Soul, but the undoubted truth of thoſe particular accounts concerning the Origin of the Univerſe, of Evil, and of Nations, which were moſt liable to the* Atheiſts *exceptions, and have therein conſider'd all the pretenſes of Philoſophy Ancient or Modern, which have ſeem'd to contradict any of them; to which* (mantiſſæ loco) *I have added the Evidence of Scripture-Hiſtory in the remainders of it in Heathen Mythology, and concluded all with a Diſcourſe of the excellency of the Scriptures. Thus having given a brief view of the Deſign and Method of the whole, I ſubmit it to every free and unprejudic'd judgment. All the favor then I ſhall requeſt of thee is, to read ſeriouſly, and judg impartially; and then I doubt not but thou wilt ſee as much reaſon for Religion as I do.*

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ORIGINES SACRAE:

BOOK I.

CHAP. I.

The Obscurity and Defect of Ancient History.

I. II. III. IV. *The knowledg of* Truth *proved to be the most natural perfection of the Rational Soul;* V. *Yet* Error *often mistaken for Truth: the Accounts of it.* VI. *Want of Diligence in its search;* VII. VIII. *The Mixture of Truth and Falshood: Thence comes either rejecting Truth for the Error's sake, or embracing the Error for the Truth's sake;* IX. *The first instanced in Heathen Philosophers,* XIII. *The second in Vulgar Heathen.* X. XI. XII. *Of* Philosophical Atheism, *and the grounds of it.* XIV. *The History of* Antiquity *very obscure.* XV. *The Question stated, where the true History of Ancient Times is to be found? in Heathen Histories, or only in Scripture?* XVI. *The want of Credibility in* Heathen Histories *asserted and proved by the general Defect for want of timely Records among Heathen Nations; the reason of it shewed from the first Plantations of the World.* XVII. *The manner of them discovered. The Original of* Civil Government. XVIII. *Of* Hieroglyphics. XIX. *The use of* Letters *among the* Greeks *no elder than* Cadmus; XX. *His Time enquired into: no elder than* Joshua: XIX. *The Learning brought into* Greece *by him.*

ENQUIRIES after Truth have that peculiar commendation above all other designs, that they come on purpose to gratify the most noble Faculty of our Souls, and do most immediately tend to advance the highest perfection of our Rational Beings. For all our most laudable endeavors after knowledg now, are only the gathering up of some scattered Fragments of what was once an entire Fabric, and the recovery of some precious Jewels which were lost out of sight, and sunk in the shipwrack of Humane Nature. That saying of *Plato, That all Knowledg is Remembrance, and all Ignorance Forgetfulness,* is a certain and undoubted truth; if by Forgetfulness be meant the Loss, and by Remembrance the Recovery of those notions and conceptions of things which the Mind of Man once had in its pure and primitive State, wherein the Understanding was the truest Microcosm, in which all the Beings of the inferior World were faithfully represented according to their true, native, and genuine

Perfections. God created the Soul of Man not only capable of finding out the Truth of things, but furniſhed him with a ſufficient κριτηριον or Touchſtone to diſcover Truth from Falſhood, by a Light ſet up in his Underſtanding, which if he had attended to, he might have ſecured himſelf from all Impoſtures and Deceits. As all other Beings were created in the full poſſeſſion of the agreeable Perfections of their ſeveral Natures, ſo was Man too; elſe God would have never cloſed the Work of Creation with thoſe words,
Gen. 1. 31. *And God ſaw all that he had made, and behold it was very good,* that is, endued with all thoſe Perfections which were ſuitable to their ſeveral Beings. Which Man had been moſt defective in, if his Underſtanding had not been endow'd with a large ſtock of Intellectual knowledg, which is the moſt natural and genuine Perfection belonging to his Rational Being. For Reaſon being the moſt raiſed Faculty of Humane Nature, if that had been defective in its diſcoveries of Truth, which is its proper object, it would have argued the greateſt maim and imperfection in the Being it ſelf. For if it belongs to the perfection of the Senſitive Faculties to diſcern what is pleaſant from what is hurtful, it muſt needs be the perfection of the Rational to find out the difference of Truth from Falſhood. Not as tho' the Soul could then have had, any more than now, an actual notion of all the Beings in the World coexiſting at the ſame time, but that it would have been free from all deceit in its Conceptions of things, which were not cauſed through inadvertency.

II. Which will appear from the ſeveral aſpects Man's Knowledg hath, which are either upwards towards his Maker, or abroad on his Fellow Creatures. If we conſider that Contemplation of the Soul which fixes it ſelf on that infinite Being which was the cauſe of it, and is properly θεωρια; it will be found neceſſary for the Soul to be created in a clear and diſtinct knowledg of him, becauſe of Man's immediate obligation to obedience unto him. Which muſt neceſſarily ſuppoſe the knowledg of Him, whoſe Will muſt be his Rule: for if Man were not fully convinced in the firſt moment after his Creation of the Being of Him, whom he was to obey, his firſt work and duty would not have been Actual Obedience, but a Search whether there was any ſupreme, infinite, and eternal being or no; and whereon his Duty to him was founded, and what might be ſufficient declaration of his Will and Laws, according to which he muſt regulate his obedience. The taking off all which doubts and ſcruples from the Soul of Man, muſt ſuppoſe him fully ſatisfied upon the firſt free uſe of Reaſon, that there was an Infinite Power and Being which produced him, and on that account had a right to command him in whatſoever he pleaſed, and that thoſe commands of his were declared to him in ſo certain a way, that he could not be deceived in the judging of them. The clear knowledg of God will further appear moſt neceſſary to Man in his firſt Creation, if we conſider that God created him for this end and purpoſe, To enjoy converſe, and an humble familiarity with Himſelf; he had then ἐμφυτον ἀπὸ τοῦ εἶναι τὸν συνεῖναι τοιοῦτον, in the language of *Clemens Alexandrinus*, *Converſe with God was as natural to him as his Being was.* For Man, as he came firſt out of God's Hands, was the Reflection of God him-

Clemens *Protrept.* p. 63.

himſelf on a dark Cloud, the Iris of the Deity; the ſimilitude was the ſame, but the ſubſtance different: Thence he is ſaid to be created after the Image of God. His knowledg then had been more intellectual than diſcurſive; not ſo much imploying his Faculties in the operoſe deductions of Reaſon (the pleaſant toyl of the Rational Faculties ſince the Fall) but had immediately imploy'd them about the ſublimeſt objects; not about Quiddities and Formalities, but about Him who was the fountain of his Being, and the center of his Happineſs. There was not then ſo vaſt a difference between the Angelical and Humane life: the Angels and Men both fed on the ſame dainties; all the difference was, They were in the ὑπερῶον, the upper room in Heaven, and Man in the ſummer parlor in Paradiſe. Gen. 1. 26.

III. If we take a view of Man's knowledg as it reſpects his fellow Creatures, we ſhall find theſe were ſo fully known to him on his firſt Creation, that he needed not to go to School to the wide World to gather up his conceptions of them. For the right exerciſe of that Dominion which he was inſtated in over the Inferior World, doth imply a particular knowledg of the Nature, Being and Properties of thoſe things which he was to make uſe of, without which he could not have improved them for their peculiar ends. And from this knowledg did proceed the giving the Creatures thoſe proper and peculiar Names which were expreſſive of their ſeveral Natures. For as *Plato* tells us, οὐ πάνυ δημιουργὸν ὀνομάτων εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μόνον ἐκεῖνον τὸν ἀποβλέποντα εἰς τὸ τῇ φύσει ὄνομα ὃν ἑκάστῳ: *The Impoſition of Names on things belongs not to every one, but only to him that hath a full proſpect into their ſeveral Natures.* For it is moſt agreeable to Reaſon, that Names ſhould carry in them a ſuitableneſs to the things they expreſs; for Words being for no other end but to expreſs our Conceptions of things, and our Conceptions being but εἰκόνες ἐ ὁμοιώματα πραγμάτων, as the ſame Philoſopher ſpeaks, *The Reſemblances and Repreſentations of the things*, it muſt need follow, that where there was a true knowledg, the Conceptions muſt agree with the Things; and Words being to expreſs our Conceptions, none are ſo fit to do it, as thoſe which are expreſſive of the ſeveral Natures of the things they are uſed to repreſent. For otherwiſe all the uſe of Words is to be a meer Vocabulary to the Underſtanding, and an Index to Memory, and of no further uſe in the purſuit of knowledg, than to let us know what Words men are agreed to call things by. But ſomething further ſeems to be intended in their firſt Impoſition, whence the *Jews* call it הברלת המינים as *Mercer* tells us, *a Separation and Diſtinction of the ſeveral kind of Things:* and *Kircher* thus paraphraſes the Words of *Moſes*; *And whatſoever* Adam *called every living creature, that was the Name thereof: i. e.* ſaith he, *Fuerunt illis vera & germana Nomina & rerum Naturis propriè accommodata.* But however this be, we have this further evidence of that Hight of knowledg which muſt be ſuppoſed in the firſt Man, that as he was the Firſt in his Kind, ſo he was to be the Standard and Meaſure of all that followed, and therefore could not want any thing of the due perfections of Humane Nature. And as the *Shekel* of the Sanctuary was, if not double to others, (as Men ordinarily miſtake) yet of a full and exact weight, becauſe it was to be

Plato *in* Cratylo.

Mercerus *in Gen.* 2, 19.

Kircher *Oedip. Ægypt.* Tom. 2. Claſſ. 2. cap. 1.

the Standard for all other weights (which was the cauſe of its being kept in the Temple) ſo if the Firſt Man had not double the proportion and meaſure of knowledg which his Poſterity hath, if it was not running over in regard of Abundance, yet it muſt be preſſed down and ſhaken together in regard of weight; elſe he would be a very unfit Standard for us to judge by, concerning the due and ſuitable Perfections of Humane Nature.

IV. But we need not have run ſo far back as the Firſt Man, to evince the knowledg of Truth to be the moſt natural Perfection of the Soul of Man; for even among the preſent ruines of Humane Nature, we may find ſome ſuch noble and generous Spirits, that diſcern ſo much beauty in the face of Truth, that to ſuch as ſhould enquire what they find ſo attractive in it, their anſwer would be the ſame with *Ariſtotle*'s in a like caſe, it was πρωωτημα, *the Queſtion of thoſe who never ſaw it.* For ſo pleaſing is the enquiry, and ſo ſatisfactory the finding of Truth after the ſearch, that the reliſh of it doth far exceed the greateſt Epicuriſm of *Apicius*, or the moſt coſtly entertainments of *Cleopatra*; there being no Guſt ſo exquiſite as that of the Mind, nor any Jewels to be compared with Truth. Nor do any perſons certainly better deſerve the name of Men, than ſuch who allow their Reaſon a full employment, and think not the Erectneſs of Man's Stature a ſufficient diſtinction of him from Brutes. Of which thoſe may be accounted only a higher ſpecies, who can patiently ſuffer the impriſonment of their Intellectuals in a dungeon of Ignorance, and know themſelves to be Men only by thoſe characters, by which *Alexander* knew himſelf not to be a God, by their pronenеſs to Intemperance and Sleep. So ſtrange a *Metempſychoſis* may there be without any change of Bodies; and *Euphorbus* his Soul might become a Brute, without ever removing its lodging into the Body of an Aſs. So much will the Soul degenerate from it ſelf, if not improved; and in a kind of ſullenneſs ſcarce appear to be what it is, becauſe it is not improved to what it may be.

V. But, you'll ſay, if this knowledg of Truth be ſo great, ſo natural, ſo valuable a Perfection of Human Nature, whence comes ſo much of the World to be over-run with Ignorance and Barbariſm? whence come ſo many pretenders to Knowledg, to court a Cloud inſtead of *Juno?* to pretend a love to Truth, and yet to fall down and worſhip Error? If there were ſo great a ſympathy between the Soul and Truth, there would be an impatient deſire after it, and a moſt ready embracing and cloſing with it. We ſee the Magnet doth not draw the Iron with greater force, than it ſeems to run with impatience into its cloſeſt embraces. If there had been formerly ſo intimate an acquaintance between the Soul and Truth, as *Socrates* fanſied of Friends in the other World, there would be an harmonious cloſure upon the firſt appearance, and no divorce to be after made between them?

True, but then we muſt conſider there is an intermediate ſtate between the former acquaintance, and the renewal of it, wherein all thoſe remaining Characters of mutual knowledg are ſunk ſo deep, and lie ſo hid, that there needs a new fire to be kindled to bring forth thoſe latent Figures, and make them again appear legible. And when once thoſe tokens are produced of the former Friendſhip,

ſhip, there are not more impatient longings, nor more cloſe embraces between the touched Needle and the Magnet, than there are between the Underſtanding and diſcovered Truth. But then withall, we are to conſider that they are but few whoſe Souls are awakened out of that Lethargy they are fallen into in this degenerate condition: the moſt are ſo pleaſed with their Sleep, that they are loth to diſturb their reſt; and ſet a higher price upon a lazy Ignorance, than upon a reſtleſs Knowledg. And even of thoſe, whoſe Souls are as it were between ſleeping and waking, what by reaſon of the remaining confuſion of the ſpecies in their Brains, what by the preſent dimneſs of their Sight, and the hovering uncertain Light they are to judg by, there are few that can put a difference between a meer Phantaſm and a real Truth. Of which theſe rational accounts may be given, *viz.* Why ſo few pretenders to Knowledg do light on Truth.

VI. (1.) First, *Want of an impartial diligence in the ſearch of it.* Truth now muſt be ſought, and that with care and diligence, before we find it; Jewels do not uſe to lie upon the ſurface of the Earth: High-ways are ſeldom paved with Gold; what is moſt worth our finding, calls for the greateſt ſearch. If one that walks the Streets ſhould find ſome ineſtimable Jewel, or one that travels the Road meet with a bag of Gold, it would be but a ſilly deſign of any to walk the Street, or travel the Road, in hopes to meet with ſuch a purchaſe to make them rich. If ſome have happily light on ſome valuable Truths, when they minded nothing leſs than them, muſt this render a Diligence uſeleſs in inquiries after ſuch? No: Truth, tho' ſhe be ſo fair and pleaſing as to draw our affections, is yet ſo modeſt as to admit of being courted; and, it may be, deny the firſt ſuit, to highten our importunity. And certainly nothing hath oftener forbid the Banns between the Underſtanding and Truth inquired after, than Partiality and Preoccupation of Judgment, which makes Men enquire more diligently after the Dowry than the Beauty of Truth; its correſpondency to their Intereſts, than its evidence to their Underſtandings. An uſeful Error hath often kept the keys of the Mind for free admiſſion, when important Truths, but contrary to mens Preconceptions or Intereſt, have been forbidden entrance. Prejudice is the wrong byaſs of the Soul, that effectually keeps it from coming near the mark of Truth; nay, ſets it at the greateſt diſtance from it. There are few in the World that look after Truth with their own Eyes, moſt make uſe of Spectacles of others making, which makes them ſo ſeldom behold proper lineaments in the face of Truth; which the ſeveral tinctures from Education, Authority, Cuſtom and Prediſpoſition do exceedingly hinder men from diſcerning.

VII. (2.) Another Reaſon why there are ſo few who find Truth, when ſo many pretend to ſeek it, is, *That near reſemblance which Error often bears to Truth.* It hath been well obſerv'd, that Error ſeldom walks abroad the World in her own raiments; ſhe always borrows ſomething of Truth, to make her more acceptable to the World. It hath been always the ſubtilty of grand Deceivers to graft their greateſt Errors on ſome material Truths, to make them paſs more undiſcernible to all ſuch who look more at the Root on which they ſtand, than on the Fruits which they bring forth. It will

hereafter appear how moſt of the groſſeſt of the Heathen Errors have, as *Plutarch* ſaith of the *Egyptian* Fables, ἀμυδρὰς ἴσως ἐμφάσεις τῆς ἀληθείας, *ſome faint and obſcure reſemblances of Truth*; nay more than ſo, as moſt pernicious weeds are bred in the fatteſt ſoils, their moſt deſtructive Principles have been founded on ſome neceſſary and important Truths. Thus Idolatry doth ſuppoſe the Belief of the exiſtence of a Deity; and Superſtition the Immortality of the Souls of Men. The Devil could never have built his Chapels, but on the ſame ground whereon God's Temples ſtood; which makes me far leſs wonder than many do, at the meeting with many expreſſions concerning theſe Two grand Truths in the Writings of ancient Heathens; knowing how willing the Devil might be to have ſuch Principles ſtill owned in the World, which by his depraving of them, might be the nouriſhers of Idolatry and Superſtition. For the general knowledge of a Divine Nature, ſuppoſing men ignorant of the true God, did only lay a foundation to
IV. (a) erect his idolatrous Temples upon; and the Belief of the Soul's ſurviving the Body after death, without knowledg of the true way of attaining Happineſs, did make men more eager of embracing thoſe Rites and Ceremonies, which came with a pretenſe of ſhewing the way to a bleſſed Immortality.

VIII. Which may be a moſt probable reaſon, why Philoſophy and Idolatry did increaſe ſo much together as they did; for tho' right Reaſon fully improved, would have overthrown all thoſe curſed and idolatrous practices among the Heathens; yet Reaſon only diſcerning ſome general Notions without their particular application and improvement, did only diſpoſe the moſt ordinary ſort of people to a more ready entertainment of the moſt groſs Idolatry. For hereby they diſcerned the neceſſity of ſome kind of Worſhip, but could not find out the right way of it; and therefore they greedily followed that which was commended to them, by ſuch who did withal agree with them in the common Sentiments of Humane Nature: Nay, and thoſe Perſons themſelves who were the great maintainers of the ſublimer Notions concerning God and the Soul of Man, were either the great Inſtruments of advancing that horrid Superſtition among them, as *Orpheus* and *Apollonius*, or very forward complyers with it, as many of the Philoſophers were. Altho' withall it cannot be denied to have been a wonderful diſcovery of Divine Providence, by theſe general Notions to keep waking the inward Senſes of mens Souls, that thereby it might appear when Divine Revelation ſhould be manifeſted to them, that it brought nothing contrary to the common Principles of Human Nature, but did only rectifie the depravations of it, and clearly ſhew men that way which they had long been ignorantly ſeeking after. Which was the excellent ad-
VII. (a) vantage the Apoſtle made of the Inſcription on the Altar at *Athens*
Act. 17. 23. to the Unknown God; *Whom*, ſaith he, *ye ignorantly ſerve, him I declare unto you.* And which was the happy uſe the Primitive learned Chriſtians made of all thoſe Paſſages concerning the Divine Nature, and the Immortality of the Souls of Men, which they found in the Heathen Writers, thereby to evidence to the World that the main *Poſtulata* or Suppoſitions of Chriſtian Religion were granted by their own moſt admired men: and that

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Chriſtianity did not raſe out, but only build upon thoſe common Foundations, which were entertained by all who had any Name for Reaſon.

IX. Tho' this, I ſay, were the happy effect of this building Errors on common Truths to all that had the advantage of Divine Revelation to diſcern the one from the other; yet as to others who were deſtitute of it, they were liable to this twofold great inconvenience by it. (1.) Firſt, *for the ſake of the apparent rottenneſs of the Superſtructures, to queſtion the ſoundneſs of the Foundations on which they ſtood.* And this I doubt not was the caſe of many conſiderative Heathens, who obſerving that monſtrous and unreaſonable way of Worſhip obtaining among the Heathen, and not being able by the ſtrength of their own Reaſon, thro' the want of Divine Revelation, to deduce any certain inſtituted Worſhip, they were ſhrewdly tempted to renounce thoſe Principles, when they could not but abhor the Concluſions drawn from them; for there is nothing more uſual than for men who exceedingly deteſt ſome abſurd Conſequence they ſee may be drawn from a Principle ſuppoſed, to reject the Principle it ſelf for the ſake of that Conſequence; which it may be doth not neceſſarily follow from it, but thro' the ſhortneſs of their own Reaſon doth appear to them to do ſo. Thus when the intelligent Heathen did apparently ſee that from the Principles of the Being of God, and the Immortality of Souls, did flow all thoſe unnatural and inhumane Sacrifices, all thoſe abſurd and ridiculous Rites, all thoſe execrable and profane Myſteries; out of a loathing the immoralities and impieties which attended theſe, they were brought to queſtion the very truth and certainty of thoſe Principles which were capable of being thus abuſed.

X. And therefore I am very prone to ſuſpect the Apology uſually made for *Protagoras*, *Diagoras*, and ſuch others of them who were accounted Atheiſts, to be more favourable than true, *viz.* That they only rejected thoſe Heathen Deities, and not the Belief of the Divine Nature. I ſhould think this account of their reputed Atheiſm rational, were it any ways evident that they did build their Belief of a Divine Nature, upon any other grounds than ſuch as were common to them with thoſe whoſe worſhip they ſo much derided. And therefore when the Heathens accuſed the Chriſtians of Atheiſm, I have full and clear evidence that no more could be meant thereby than the rejection of their way of Worſhip; becauſe I have ſufficient aſſurance from them that they did believe in a Divine Nature, and an inſtituted Religion moſt ſuitable to the moſt common received Notions of God, which they owned in oppoſition to all Heathen Worſhip. Which I find not in the leaſt pretended to by any of the forementioned perſons, nor any thing of any different way of Religion aſſerted, but only a deſtruction of that in uſe among them.

XI. And altho' the caſe of *Anaxagoras Clazomenius*, and the reſt of the *Ionic* Philoſophers, might ſeem very different from *Diagoras*, *Theodorus*, and thoſe beforementioned, becauſe altho' they denied the Gods in vulgar repute to be ſuch as they were thought to be (as *Anaxagoras* call'd the Sun μύδρον διάπυρον, *a mere globe of fire*, for which he was condemned at *Athens* to baniſhment, and fined five

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Voſſ. de Idololat. c. 1.

Talents; yet the Learned *Voſſius* puts in this Plea in his behalf, That he was one that aſſerted the Creation of the World to flow from an eternal Mind:) altho' therefore, I ſay, the caſe of the *Ionic* Philoſophers may ſeem far different from the others, becauſe of their aſſerting the Production of the World (which from *Thales Mileſius* was conveyed by *Anaximander* and *Anaximenes* to *Anaxagoras*) yet to one that throughly conſiders what they underſtood by their Eternal Mind, they may be ſooner cleared from the imputation of Atheiſm, than Irreligion. Which two certainly ought in this caſe to be diſtinguiſhed; for it is very poſſible for men, meeting with ſuch inſuperable difficulties about the caſual concourſe of Atoms for the production of the World, or the eternal exiſtence of Matter, to aſſert ſome Eternal Mind, as the firſt Cauſe of theſe things, which yet they may imbrace only as an Hypotheſis in Philoſophy to ſolve the Phænomena of Nature with, but yet not to make this Eternal Mind the object of adoration. And ſo their aſſerting a Deity was only on the ſame account as the Tragedians uſed to bring in their Θεὸς ἀπὸ μηχανῆς, when their Fables were brought to ſuch an iſſue, and perplexed with ſo many difficulties, that they ſaw no way to clear them again, but to make ſome God come down upon the Stage to ſolve the difficulties they were ingaged in; or, as *Seneca* ſaith of many great Families, when they had run up their Genealogies ſo high that they could go no further, they then fetched their Pedigree from the Gods: So when theſe Philoſophers ſaw ſuch incongruities in aſſerting an infinite and eternal Series of Matter, they might by this be brought to acknowledg ſome active Principle which produced the World, tho' they were far enough from giving any religious worſhip to that Eternal Mind.

XII. Thus even *Epicurus* and his Followers would not ſtick to aſſert the Being of a God, ſo they might but circumſcribe him within the Heavens, and let him have nothing to do with things that were done on Earth. And how uncertain the moſt dogmatical of them all were, as to their opinions concerning the Being and Nature of their Gods, doth fully appear from the large Diſcourſes of *Tully* upon that ſubject: where is fully manifeſted their variety of opinions and mutual repugnancies, their ſelf-contradictions and inconſtancy in their own Aſſertions; which hath made me ſomewhat inclinable to think that the reaſon why many of them did to the world own a Deity, was, that they might not be Martyrs for Atheiſm: Which *Tully* likewiſe ſeems to acknowledg, when ſpeaking of the puniſhment of *Protagoras* for that Speech of his; *De diis neque ut ſint, neque ut non ſint, habeo dicere: Ex quo*, ſays he, *equidem exiſtimo tardiores ad hanc ſententiam profitendam multos eſſe factos, quippe cum pœnam ne dubitatio quidem effugere potuiſſet.* So that for all the verbal aſſerting of a Deity among them, we have no certain evidence of their firm belief of it, and much leſs of any worſhip and ſervice they owed unto it. And tho', it may be, they could not totally excuſs the Notions of a Deity out of their minds, partly thro' that Natural Senſe which is engraven on the Souls of Men; partly, as being unable to ſolve the difficulties of Nature without a Deity; yet the obſerving the notorious vanities of Heathen Worſhip, might make them look upon it as a mere

Cicero *de Nat. Deor. l.* 1. *c.* 63.

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Philoſophical ſpeculation, and not any thing that had an influence upon the government of mens lives: For, as in Nature, the obſerving the great mixture of Falſhood and Truth, made the *Academics* deny any certain κριτήριον, or *Rule of judging Truth*; and the *Sceptics* take away all certain Aſſent: ſo the ſame conſequence was unavoidable here, upon the ſame principle. And that made even *Plato* himſelf ſo ambiguous and uncertain in his Diſcourſes of a DEITY; ſometimes making him an eternal Mind, ſometimes aſſerting the whole World, Sun, Moon, Stars, Earth, Souls and all, to be Gods, and even thoſe that were worſhip'd among the Heathens, as *Tully* tells us out of his *Timæus* and *De Legibus*; which, as *Velleius* the *Epicurean* there ſpeaks, *Et per ſe ſunt falſa & ſibi invicem repugnantia.* This is the firſt inconvenience following the mixture of truth and falſhood, *For the ſake of the falſhood to queſtion the truth it ſelf it was joyned with.*

The other is as great which follows, when truth and falſhood are mixed, *For the ſake of the Truth to embrace the Falſhood.* XIII. (2.) Which is a Miſtake as common as the other, becauſe men are apt to think, that things ſo vaſtly different as Truth and Falſhood could never blend or be incorporate together; therefore when they are certain they have ſome truth, they conclude no falſhood to be joyned with it. And this I ſuppoſe to have been the caſe of the more credulous and vulgar Heathen, as the other was of the Philoſophers; for they, finding Mankind to agree in this, not only that there is a GOD, but that he muſt be worſhip'd, did without ſcruple make uſe of the way of worſhip among them, as knowing there muſt be ſome, and they were ignorant of any elſe. And from hence they grew to be as confident believers of all thoſe Fables and Traditions on which their Idolatry was founded, as of thoſe firſt Principles and Notions from which the neceſſity of divine Worſhip did ariſe. And being thus habituated to the belief of theſe things; when Truth it ſelf was divulged among them, they ſuſpected it to be only a corruption of ſome of their Fables. This *Celſus* the *Epicurean* on all occaſions in his Books againſt the *Chriſtians* did fly to. Thus he ſaith the building of the Tower of *Babel*, and the confuſion of Tongues, was taken from the Fable of the *Aloïdæ* in *Homer*'s *Odyſſeis*; the ſtory of the Floud, from *Deucalion*; Paradiſe, from *Alcinöus* his Gardens; the burning of *Sodom* and *Gomorrah*, from the Story of *Phaëthon*. Which *Origen* well refutes, from the far greater antiquity of thoſe relations among the *Jews*, than any among the *Greeks*: and therefore the corruption of the tradition was in them, and not in the *Jews*. Which muſt be our only way for finding out which was the original, and which the corruption; by demonſtrating the undoubted antiquity of one beyond the other, whereby we muſt do as *Archimedes* did by the Crown of *Hiero*, find out the exact proportions of Truth and Falſhood which lay in thoſe heathen fables.

Orig. c. Celſ. l. 4. p. 174, 179.

And this now leads to the third Account, Why truth is ſo hardly diſcerned from error, even by thoſe who ſearch after it, which is *The great obſcurity of the Hiſtory of Ancient Times*, which ſhould decide the Controverſie. For there being an univerſal agreement in ſome common principles, and a frequent reſemblance in particular traditions, we muſt of neceſſity, for the XIV.

clearing the truth from its corruption, have recourſe to ancient Hiſtory, to ſee if thereby we can find out where the Original tradition was beſt preſerved, by what means it came to be corrupted, and whereby we may diſtinguiſh thoſe corruptions from the Truths to which they are annexed. Which is the deſign and ſubject of our future diſcourſe, *viz.* To demonſtrate that there was 'a certain original and general tradition preſerved in the world 'concerning the eldeſt Ages of the World; that this tradition was 'gradually corrupted among the Heathens; that notwithſtanding 'this corruption there were ſufficient remainders of it to evidence 'its true original; that the full account of this tradition is alone 'preſerved in thoſe books we call *Scriptures:* That where any other 'Hiſtory ſeems to croſs the report contained in them, we have ſuf-'ficient ground to queſtion their credibility; and that there is ſuffi-'cient evidence to clear the undoubted certainty of that hiſtory 'which is contained in the Sacred Records of Scripture. Wherein we ſhall obſerve the ſame method, which *Thales* took in taking the hight of the Pyramids, by meaſuring the length of their ſhadow; ſo ſhall we the hight and antiquity of Truth from the extent of the fabulous Corruptions of it. Which will be a work of ſo much the greater difficulty, becauſe the truth we purſue after takes cover in ſo great antiquity, and we muſt be forced to follow its moſt flying footſteeps thro' the dark and ſhady paths of ancient hiſtory. For tho' Hiſtory be frequently called the Light of Truth, and the Herald of Times, yet that Light is ſo faint and dim, eſpecially in Heathen Nations, as not to ſerve to diſcover the face of Truth from her counterfeit, Error; and that Herald ſo little skill'd, as not to be able to tell us which is of the elder Houſe. The reaſon is; tho' Truth be always of greater Antiquity, yet Error may have the more wrinkled face, by which it often impoſeth on ſuch who gueſs antiquity by deformity, and think nothing ſo old as that which can give the leaſt account of its own age. This is evidently the caſe of thoſe who make the pretenſe of ancient Hiſtory a plea for Infidelity, and think no argument more plauſible to impugn the certainty of Divine Revelation, than the ſeeming repugnancy of ſome pretended Hiſtories with the account of ancient time reported in the *Bible*. Which being a pretext ſo unworthy, and deſigned for ſo ill an end, and ſo frequently made uſe of, by ſuch who account Infidelity a piece of antiquity as well as of reaſon, it may be worth our while to ſhew, That the Scriptures are no more liable to be baffled with Reaſon, than to be confuted by Antiquity.

xv. In order therefore to the removing of this ſtumbling-block in our way, I ſhall firſt evince, *That there is no certain credibility in any of thoſe ancient hiſtories which ſeem to contradict the Scriptures*, nor any ground of reaſon why we ſhould aſſent to them, when they differ from the *Bible:* and then prove, That all thoſe undoubted characters of a moſt certain and authentic hiſtory are legible in thoſe records contained in Scripture. Whereby we ſhall not only ſhew the unreaſonableneſs of infidelity, but the rational evidence which our faith doth ſtand on as to theſe things. I ſhall demonſtrate the firſt of theſe, *viz.* That there is no ground of aſſent to any ancient hiſtories which give account of things

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different from the Scriptures, from theſe arguments; The apparent defect, weakneſs and inſufficiency of them as to the giving an account of elder times; The monſtrous confuſion, ambiguity and uncertainty of them in the account which they give; The evident partiality of them to themſelves, and inconſiſtency with each other. I begin with the firſt of theſe, the defect and inſufficiency of them to give ſuch an account of elder times as may amount to certain credibility: which if cleared, will of it ſelf be ſufficient to manifeſt the incompetency of thoſe records, as to the laying any foundation for a firm aſſent to be given to them. Now this defect and inſufficiency of thoſe hiſtories is either more general, which lies in common to them all; or ſuch as may be obſerved in a particular conſideration of the hiſtories of thoſe ſeveral Nations, which have pretended higheſt to antiquity.

The general defect is, *The want of timely records to preſerve their hiſtories in.* For it is moſt evident, that the trueſt hiſtory in the world is liable to various corruptions thro' length of time, if there be no certain way of preſerving it entire. And that, thro' the frailty of memory in thoſe who had integrity to preſerve it; through the gradual increaſe of barbariſm and ignorance, where there are no ways of inſtruction; and thro' the ſubtilty of ſuch, whoſe intereſt it may be to corrupt and alter that tradition. If we find ſuch infinite variety and difference in men's accounts, as to the hiſtories of their own times, when they have all poſſible means to be acquainted with the truth of them; what account can we imagin can be given, where there was no way of preſerving to poſterity the moſt authentic relation of former Ages? Eſpecially, it being moſt evident, that where any certain way of preſerving tradition is wanting, a People muſt ſoon degenerate into the greateſt ſtupidity and barbariſm: becauſe all will be taken up in minding their own petty concerns, and no encouragement at all given to ſuch public ſpirits, who would mind the credit of the whole Nation. For what was there for ſuch to employ themſelves upon, or ſpend their time in, when they had no other kind of learning among them, but ſome general traditions conveyed from father to ſon, which might be learned by ſuch who followed nothing but domeſtic employments? So that the Sons of *Noah*, after their ſeveral diſperſions and plantations of ſeveral Countries, did gradually degenerate into ignorance and barbariſm: For, upon their firſt ſetling in any Country, they found it employment ſufficient to cultivate the Land, and make habitations to live in, and to provide themſelves of neceſſities for their mutual comfort and ſubſiſtence. Beſides this, they were often put to removes from one place to another, where they could not conveniently reſide; which *Thucydides* ſpeaks much of as to the ancient ſtate of *Greece*: and it was a great while before they came to imbody themſelves together in Towns and Cities, and from thence to ſpread into Provinces, and to ſettle bounds and extents of their Territories. The firſt Age after the plantation of a Country being thus ſpent, the next ſaw it neceſſary to fall cloſe to the work of husbandry, not only to get ſomething out of the earth for their ſubſiſtence; but when by their diligence they had ſo far improved the ground, that they had not only enough for themXVI.

ſelves, but to ſpare to others, they then found out a way for commerce one with another by exchange. This way of traffic made them begin to raiſe their hopes higher, of enriching themſelves; which when ſome of them had done, they bring the poorer under their power, and reign as Lords over them; theſe rich, with their dependents, ſtrive to outvye each other; whence came wars and mutual contentions, till they who got the better over their adverſaries, took ſtill greater authority into their hands: thence at firſt every City almoſt, and adjacent Territory, had a King over it; which by conflicting with each other, at laſt brought ſeveral Cities and Territories under the power of one particular perſon, who thereby came to reign as ſole Monarch over all within his dominions.

XVII. For altho' there be ſome reaſon to think, that the Leaders of ſeveral Colonies had at firſt ſuperiority over all that went with them; yet there being evidence in few Nations of any continued ſucceſſion of Monarchs from the poſterity of *Noah*, and ſo great evidence of ſo many petty Royalties almoſt in every City (as we read of ſuch multitudes of Kings in the ſmall Territory of *Canaan*, when *Joſhua* conquered it,) this makes it at leaſt probable to me, that after the death of the firſt Leader, by reaſon of their poverty and diſperſedneſs of habitations, they did not incorporate generally into any Civil government under one head, but did riſe by degrees in the manner before ſet down; but yet ſo, that in the petty diviſions ſome prerogative might be given to him who derived his pedigree the neareſt from the firſt Founder of that plantation; which in all probability is the meaning of *Thucydides*, who tells us, when the riches of *Greece* began to increaſe, and their Power improved, Tyrannies were erected in moſt Cities, ὥσπερ δὲ ἦσαν ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς γέρασι πάλαι καὶ βασιλεῖαι, *for before that time Kingdoms with honors limited were hereditary*; for ſo the Scholiaſt explains it, πάλαι καὶ βασιλεῖαι διὰ τὸ πατέρων τοῖς παισὶ καὶ διαδοχὴν γίνους. This then being the ſtate and caſe of moſt Nations in the firſt ages after their plantation, there was no likelihood at all of any great improvement in knowledg among them; nay ſo far from it, that for the firſt ages, wherein they conflicted with poverty and neceſſity, there was a neceſſary decay among them, of what knowledg had been convey'd to them: becauſe their neceſſities kept them in continual employment; and after they conquered Them, they began to conquer each other: ſo that till ſuch time as they were ſettled in peace under eſtabliſhed Common-wealths, there was no leiſure nor opportunity for any Arts or Sciences to flouriſh, without which all certain hiſtories of their own former ſtate muſt vaniſh and dwindle into ſome fabulous ſtories. And ſo we find they did in moſt Nations; which thence are able to give no other account of themſelves, but that they ſprung out of the earth where they lived; from which opinion the *Athenians* uſed to wear of old their golden Graſhoppers, as *Thucydides* relates. What account can we then expect of ancient times from ſuch Nations which were ſo defective in preſerving their own Originals?

Thucyd. *l.* 1. *p.* 10. *Ed. Port.*

XVIII. Now this defectiveneſs of giving teſtimony of ancient times by theſe Nations, will further appear by theſe two conſiderations: *Firſt*, What ways there are for communicating knowledg to poſterity.

ſterity. *Secondly*, How long it was ere theſe Nations came to be Maſters of any way of certain communicating their conceptions to their Succeſſors. Three general ways there are whereby knowledg may be propagated from one to another; by repreſentative Symbols, by Speech, and by Letters. The firſt of theſe was moſt common in thoſe elder times, for which purpoſe *Clemens Alexandrinus* produceth the teſtimony of an ancient Grammarian *Dionyſius Thrax* in his Expoſition of the ſymbol of the Wheels: ἐσήμαινον γοῦν ὁ μὲν λέξεως μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ συμβόλων ἔνιοι τὰς πράξεις: *That ſome perſons made a repreſentation of their actions to others, not only by ſpeeeh, but by ſymbols too.* Which any one who is any ways converſant in the Learning of thoſe ancient times, will find to have been the chief way of propagating it (ſuch as it was) from one to another: as is evident in the Hieroglyphics of the *Ægyptians*, and the cuſtom of Symbols from thence derived among the *Grecian* Philoſophers, eſpecially the *Pythagoreans*. It was the ſolemn cuſtom of the *Ægyptians* to wrap up all the little knowledg they had, under ſuch myſtical repreſentations, which were unavoidably clog'd with two inconveniences very unſuitable to the propagation of knowledg, which were Obſcurity and Ambiguity. For it not only coſt them a great deal of time to gather up ſuch Symbolical things which might repreſent their conceptions; but when they had pitched upon them, they were liable to a great variety of Interpretations, as is evident in all thoſe remainders of them, preſerved by the induſtry of ſome ancient Writers. As in their κωμασιακὰ, or *golden Images of their Gods*, they had ingraved two Dogs, an Hawk and an Ibis. By the Dogs ſome underſtood the two Hemiſpheres, others the two Tropics; by the Hawk ſome underſtood the Sun, others the Æquinoctial; by the Ibis, ſome the Moon, others the Zodiac, as is evident in *Clemens*, who reports it. This way then is a moſt unfit way to convey any ancient tradition; by being both obſcure, ambiguous, and unable to expreſs ſo much as to give any certain light to future ages of the paſſages of the precedent.

Clem. Alexan. Strom. l. 5.

The other ways of conveying knowledg, are either by Speech, or by Letters. The firſt muſt be by ſome vocal Cabala, delivered down from father to ſon: but Words being of ſo periſhing a nature, and man's Memory ſo weak and frail in retaining them, it is neceſſary for a certain communication of knowledg, that ſome way ſhould be found out more laſting than Words, more firm than Memory, more faithful than Tradition: which could not otherwiſe be imagined, than that the Author of his own conceptions ſhould himſelf leave them to the view of all poſterity; in order to which, ſome way muſt be contrived whereby mens Voices might be ſeen, and mens Fingers ſpeak. But how to expreſs all kind of ſounds, with the ſeveral draughts of a pen, and to confine them within the compaſs of twenty-four letters, is deſervedly called by *Galileo*, *admirandarum omnium inventionum humanarum ſignaculum, the choiceſt of all humane inventions*. And had we no other evidence of the great obſcurity of ancient hiſtory, the great difference as to the firſt inventor of letters, would be a ſufficient demonſtration of it. For almoſt every Nation hath had a ſeveral Author of them: The *Jews* derive them from *Adam* or *Moſes*; the *Ægyptians* attribute their invention to *Thoyt* or *Mercury*; the *Grecians* to *Cadmus*,

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mus, the *Phœnicians* to *Taautus*, the *Latins* to *Saturn*, others to the *Æthiopians*: and leſt the *Pygmies* ſhould be without their enemies, ſome think they were found out *à gruum volatu*, from the manner of the flying of Cranes. Thus it hath happened with moſt Nations; what was firſt among themſelves, they thought to be the firſt in the world.

XX. But by whomſoever they were firſt invented, we are certain they were but lately in uſe in that Nation, which hath moſt vainly arrogated the moſt to it ſelf in point of Antiquity, and yet had the leaſt reaſon, I mean, the *Grecians*. Thence the Ægyptian Prieſt *Patenit* truly told *Solon*, *the Greeks were always children*, becauſe they had nothing of the antiquities of former ages. If we may believe *Joſephus*, they had no Writings earlier than *Homer*; but herein he is conceived to have ſerved his cauſe too much, becauſe of the Inſcription of *Amphitryo* at *Thebes* in the Temple of *Apollo Iſmenius* in the *Ionic* letters, and two others of the ſame age to be ſeen in *Herodotus*; and becauſe of the Writings of *Lycus*, *Orpheus*, *Muſæus*, *Oroebantius Troezenius*, *Thaletas*, *Meleſander*, and others. This we are certain of, the *Grecians* had not the uſe of letters among them 'till the time of *Cadmus* the *Phœnician*'s coming into *Greece*, whither he came to plant a Colony of *Phœnicians*, whence aroſe the ſtory of his purſuit of *Europa*, as *Conon* in *Photius* tells us.

Procl. in Tim. Plat.

Joſeph c. App. lib. 1.

Herodot. lib. 5.

V. Bochar. Geograph. Sacr. p. 2. l. 2. c. 20.

Conon apud Phot. Bibl. l. 37.

And it is very probable, which learned men have long ſince obſerved, that the name *Cadmus* comes from the *Hebrew* קדם *Kedem*, and may relate as an appellative either to his Dignity, as *Junius* in his *Academia* conjectures, or more probably to his Country, the Eaſt, which is frequently call'd *Kedem* in Scripture. Some have conjectured further, that his proper name was עג *Og*; upon what reaſon I know not, unleſs from hence, that thence by a duplication of the word came the *Greek* Ωγυγος, who ſeems to have been no other than *Cadmus*, as will appear by comparing their ſtories together. Only one was the name his memory was preſerved by at *Athens*, where the *Cadmeans* inhabited, as appears by the *Gephyræi*, who *Herodotus* tells us were *Phœnicians* that came with *Cadmus*; and others fanſie the *Academia* there was originally called *Cadmea*; and the name *Cadmus* was preſerved chiefly among the *Bœotians* in memory of the Country whence he came: it being likely to be impos'd by them upon his firſt landing in the Country; as many learned perſons conceive, the name of an *Hebrew* was given to *Abraham* by the *Canaanites*, upon his paſſing over the river *Euphrates*. On this account then it ſtands to reaſon, that the name which was given him as a ſtranger, ſhould be longeſt preſerved in the place where it was firſt impoſed. Or if we take קדם in the other ſenſe, as it imports Antiquity; ſo there is ſtill a higher probability of the affinity of the names of *Cadmus* and *Ogyges*; for it is certain, that the *Greeks* had no higher name for a matter of antiquity, than to call it Ωγυγιον, as the Scholiaſt on *Heſiod*, *Heſychius*, *Suidas*, *Euſtathius* on *Dionyſius*, and many others obſerve. And which yet advanceth the probability higher, *Lactatius* or *Lactantius* the Scholiaſt on *Statius*, tells us, the other *Greeks* had this from the *Thebanes*; for, ſaith he, *Thebani res antiquas Ogygias nominabant*. But that which puts it almoſt beyond meer proba-

Hiſt. l. 5.

Lactantius in Statii, Theb. l. 1.

probability, is, that *Varro*, *Festus*, *Pausanias*, *Apollonius*, *Æschylus*, and others make *Ogyges* the Founder of the *Bœotian Thebes*, which were thence called *Ogygiæ*; and *Strabo* and *Stephanus* further say, that the whole Country of *Bœotia* was called *Ogygia*: now all that mention the Story of *Cadmus*, attribute to him the founding of the *Bœotian Thebes*. And withall it is observable, that in the *Vatican* Appendix of the *Greek Proverbs*, we read *Cadmus* called *Ogyges*; Ὠγύγια κακὰ, ἐπὶ τῶν ὀχλήσεων. ἐπεὶ συνῆν Κάδμος τῇ Ὠγύγῃ. ἢ ἐπὶ τῶν δυσκόλων καὶ κακοήθων ἀνθρώπων. *Meursius* indeed would have it corrected, Κάδμου τῆς Ὠγύγου, as it is read in *Suidas*; but by the favour of so learned a man, it seems more probable that *Suidas* shoud be corrected by that; he bringing no other evidence of any such person as *Cadmus* a Son of *Ogyges*, but only that reading in *Suidas*; whereas we have discovered many probable grounds to make them both the same. That which I would now infer from hence is, the utter impossibility of the *Greeks* giving us any certain account of ancient times, when a thing so modern in comparison as *Cadmus* his coming into *Greece*, is thought by them a matter of so great antiquity, that when they would describe a thing very ancient, they described it by the name of *Ogyges*, who was the same with *Cadmus*. Now *Cadmus* his coming into *Greece*, is generally, by Historians, placed about the time of *Joshua*, whence some (I will not say how happily) have conjectured, that *Cadmus* and his company were some of the *Canaanites* who fled from *Joshua*, as others are supposed to have done into *Africa*, if *Procopius* his Pillar hath strength enough to bear such a conjecture. But there is too great a confusion about the time of *Cadmus* his arrival into *Greece*, to affirm any thing with any great certainty about it.

Vatic. App. Cent. 4. Prov. 52.

Meursius de Regno Att. Lib. 8. c. 5.

Yet those who disagree from that former Computation, place it yet lower. *Vossius* makes *Agenor Cadmus*'s Father contemporary with the latter end of *Moses*, or the beginning of *Joshua*; and so *Cadmus* his time must fall somewhat after. *Jac. Cappellus* placeth *Cadmus* in the third year of *Othoniel*. The Author of the *Greek* Chronicle, in the *Marmora Arundelliana*, makes his coming to *Greece* to be in the time of *Helen* the son of *Deucalion*; which *Cappellus* fixeth on the 73. of *Moses*, *A. M.* 2995. But Mr. *Selden* conceives it somewhat lower: and so it must be, if we follow *Clemens Alexandrinus*, who places it in the time of *Lynceus* King of the *Argives*, which he saith was ἑνδεκάτῃ ὕστερος Μωσέως γενεᾷ, *in the eleventh Generation after Moses*, which will fall about the time of *Samuel*: But tho' it should be so late, it would be no wonder it should be reckoned a matter of so great antiquity among the *Grecians*; for the eldest Records they have of any King at *Athens*, begin at the time of *Moses*, whose contemporary *Cecrops* is generally thought to be; for at *Cecrops* his time it is the Marble Chronicle begins. Now that the *Grecians* did receive their very Letters from the *Phœnicians* by *Cadmus*, is commonly acknowledged by the most learned of the *Greeks* themselves, as appears by the ingenuous confession of *Herodotus*, *Philostratus*, *Critias* in *Athenæus*, *Zenodotus* in *Laertius*, *Timon Phliasius* in *Sextus Empiricus*, and many others: so that it were to no purpose to offer to prove that, which they who arrogate so much to themselves, do so freely acknowledg. Which yet hath been done to very good purpose by

Vossius de Idol. l. 1. c. 13.

Strom. 1.

Joseph

Scalig. Not. in Euseb. Chron. n. 1617. Bochart Geogr. p. 3. l. 1. cap. 20.

Joseph Scaliger and *Bochartus*, and many others from the form of the Letters, the order and the name of them. It seems probable that at first they might use the form of the *Phœnician* Letters, in which *Herodotus* tells us the three old Inscriptions were extant; and *Diodorus* tells us, that the brass pot which *Cadmus* offered to *Minerva Lindia*, had an inscription on it in the *Phœnician* Letters: but afterwards the form of the Letters came by degrees to be changed, when for their greater expedition in writing they left the old way of writing towards the left hand, for the natural and expedite way of writing towards the right, by which they exchanged the sites of the strokes in several Letters, as it is observed by the fore-cited Learned Authors.

Scalig. ibid.

Not that the old *Ionic* Letters were nearer the *Phœnician*, and distinct from the modern, as *Jos. Scaliger* in his learned Discourse on the original of the *Greek* Letters conceives; for the *Ionic* Letters were nothing else but the full Alphabet of twenty-four, with the additions of *Palamedes*, and *Simonides Ceus*; as *Pliny* tells us, that all the *Greeks* consented in the use of the *Ionic* Letters: but the old *Attic* Letters came nearer the *Phœnician*, because the *Athenians*, long after the Alphabet was increased to xxiv, continued still in the use of the old 16, which were brought in by *Cadmus*; which must needs much alter the way of writing: for in the old Letters, they writ THEOS for Θεὸς, which made *Pliny*, with a great deal of learning and truth, say, that the old *Greek* Letters were the same with the *Roman*. Thence the *Greeks* called their ancient Letters Ἀττικὰ γράμματα, as appears by* *Harpocration* and *Hesychius*; not that they were so much distinct from others, but because they did not admit of the addition of the other eight Letters.

Plinii Hist. 7. cap. 57.

*V. Mauss. in Harpocr. Salmas. in Consecr. Templ. p. 30.

XXI. We see then the very Letters of the *Greeks* were no elder than *Cadmus*; and for any considerable Learning among them, it was not near so old. Some assert indeed that History began from the time of *Cadmus*; but it is by a mistake of Him for a younger *Cadmus*, which was *Cadmus Milesius*, whom *Pliny* makes to be the first Writer in Prose; but That he after attributes to *Pherecydes Syrius*, and History to *Cadmus Milesius*: and therefore I think it far more probable, that it was some writing of this latter *Cadmus*, which was transcribed and epitomized by *Bion Procóneseus*, altho' *Clemens Alexandrinus* seems to attribute it to the elder. We see how unable then the *Grecians* were to give an account of elder times, that were guilty of so much infancy and nonage, as to begin to learn their Letters almost in the noon-tide of the World, and yet long after this to the time of the first *Olympiad* all their relations are accounted fabulous. A fair account then we are like to have from them of the first antiquities of the World, who could not speak plain truth, 'till the World was above three thousand years old; for so was it when the *Olympiads* began.

Plin. Nat. Hist. l. 5. c. 29. l. 7. c. 57.

Clem. Strom. l. 6.

So true is the observation of *Justin Martyr*, ὡδὶν Ἕλλησι σαφὲς πρὸ τῶν Ὀλυμπιάδων ἀνεγράφη ἱστορία; *the Greeks had no exact history of themselves before the Olympiads*; but of that more afterwards.

This is now the first Defect which doth infringe the credibility of these Histories, which is *the want of timely and early records* to digest their own history in.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

Of the *Phœnician* and *Ægyptian* Hiſtory.

I. *The particular defect in the Hiſtory of the moſt learned Heathen Nations.* II. *Firſt the* Phœnicians. *Of* Sanchoniathon, *his Antiquity and Fidelity.* III. *Of* Jerom-baal, Baal-Berith. IV. *The Antiquity of* Tyre. Scaliger *vindicated againſt* Bochartus. V. Abibalus. VI. *The vanity of* Phœnician *Theology.* VII. *The imitation of it by the* Gnoſtics. VIII. *Of the* Ægyptian *Hiſtory.* IX. *The Antiquity and Authority of* Hermes Triſmegiſtus. X. *Of his Inſcriptions on Pillars, tranſcribed by* Manetho. XI. *His Fabulouſneſs thence diſcovered.* Terra Seriadica. XII. *Of* Seth's *Pillars in* Joſephus, *and an account whence they were taken.*

HAving already ſhewed a general defect in the ancient Heathen Hiſtories, as to an account of ancient times; we now come to a cloſer, and more particular conſideration of the Hiſtories of thoſe ſeveral Nations which have born the greateſt name in the world for learning and antiquity. There are four Nations chiefly which have pretended the moſt to antiquity in the learned World, and whoſe Hiſtorians have been thought to deliver any thing contrary to Holy Writ in their account of ancient times, whom on that account we are obliged more particularly to conſider; and thoſe are the *Phœnicians*, *Chaldæans*, *Ægyptians*, and *Græcians*; we ſhall therefore ſee what evidence of credibility there can be in any of theſe, as to the matter of antiquity of their Records, or their Hiſtories taken from them. And the credibility of an Hiſtorian depending much upon the certainty and authority of the Records he makes uſe of, we ſhall both conſider of what value and antiquity the pretended Records are, and particularly look into the age of the ſeveral Hiſtorians. As to the *Græcians*, we have ſeen already an utter impoſſibility of having ancient Records among them, becauſe they wanted the means of preſerving them, having ſo lately borrowed their Letters from other Nations. Unleſs as to their account of times they had been as careful, as the old *Romans* were, to number their years by the ſeveral *clavi* or *nails*, which they fixed on the Temple-doors: which yet they were not in any capacity to do; not growing up in an entire body, as the *Roman* Empire did; but lying ſo much ſcattered and divided into ſo many petty Republics, that they minded very little of concernment to the whole Nation. The other three Nations have deſervedly a name of far greater antiquity than any the *Græcians* could ever pretend to; who yet were unmeaſurably guilty of an impotent affectation of Antiquity; and arrogating to themſelves, as growing on their own ground, what was with a great deal of pains and induſtry gathered but as the gleanings from the fuller harveſt of thoſe Nations they reſorted to. Which is not

only true as to the greateſt part of their learning, but as to the account likewiſe they give of ancient times; the chief and moſt ancient Hiſtories among them being only a corruption of the Hiſtory of the elder Nations, eſpecially *Phœnicia* and *Ægypt*: for of theſe two *Philo Byblius* the tranſlator of the ancient *Phœnician* Hiſtorian *Sanchoniathon* ſaith, *they were* πυλαιότατοι τῶν Βαρβάρων, *the moſt ancient of all the Barbarians, from whom the others derived their Theology*; which he there particularly inſtanceth in.

Philo Bybl. apud Euſeb. Præp. Evang. l. 1. c. 8. p. 23. Ed. R. St.

II. We begin therefore with the *Phœnician* Hiſtory, whoſe moſt ancient and famous Hiſtorian is *Sanchoniathon*, ſo much admired and made uſe of by the ſhrewdeſt antagoniſt ever Chriſtianity met with, the Philoſopher *Porphyrius*. But therein was ſeen the wonderful Providence of God, that out of this *Eater* came forth *Meat*, and out of the *Lion*, *Hony*; that the moſt conſiderable teſtimonies by him produced againſt our Religion, were of the greateſt ſtrength to refute his own. For he being of too great Learning to be ſatisfied with the vain pretenſes of the *Græcians*, he made it his buſineſs to ſearch after the moſt ancient Records, to find out ſomewhat in them to confront with the antiquity of the Scriptures; but upon his ſearch could find none of greater veneration than the *Phœnician* Hiſtory, nor any Author contending for age with this *Sanchoniathon*. Yet when he had made the moſt of his Teſtimony, he was fain to yield him younger than *Moſes*, tho' he ſuppoſeth him elder than the *Trojan* Wars. And yet herein was he guilty of a moſt groſs ἀλλοιχία, not much exceding the *Græcians* in his skill in Chronology, when he makes *Semiramis* coexiſtent with the Siege of *Troy*: as is evident in his teſtimony produced at large by *Euſebius* out of his firſt *Book againſt the Chriſtians*; nay, he goes to prove the truth of *Sanchoniathon*'s Hiſtory by the agreement of it with that of *Moſes* concerning the *Jews*, both as to their Names and Places, ἱστορεῖ δὲ καὶ περὶ Ἰουδαίων ἀληθέστερα, ὅτι κατὰ τόπους καὶ κατὰ ὀνόματα αὐτῶν καὶ συμφωνότατα: whereby he doth evidently aſſert the greater Truth and Antiquity of *Moſes* his Hiſtory, when he proves the truth of *Sanchoniathon*'s from conſonancy with that.

Euſeb. Præp. Ev. l. 10. c. 8. p. 285.

III. Two things more *Porphyry* inſiſts on to manifeſt his credibility; the one I ſuppoſe relates to what he reports concerning the *Jews*, the other concerning the *Phœnicians* themſelves. For the firſt, that he made uſe of the Records of *Jerom-baal* the Prieſt of the God *Ieuo*, or rather *Iao*; for the other, that he uſed all the Records of the ſeveral Cities, and the ſacred Inſcriptions in the Temples. Who that *Jerom-baal* was, is much diſcuſſed among Learned men, the finding out of which hath been thought to be the moſt certain way to determine the age of *Sanchoniathon*. The learned *Bochartus* conceives him to be *Gideon*, who in Scriptures is called *Jerub-baal*, which is of the ſame ſenſe in the *Phœnician* language, only after their cuſtom changing one *b* into *m*, as in *Ambubajæ*, *Sambuca*, &c. But admitting the conjecture of this learned perſon concerning *Jerub-baal*, yet I ſee no neceſſity of making *Sanchoniathon* and him contemporary; for I no where find any thing mentioned in *Porphyry* implying that, but only that he made uſe of the Records of *Jerub-baal*, which he might very probably do at a conſiderable diſtance of time from him; whether by thoſe ὑπομνήματα, we mean the Annals written

Bochart. Geogr. Sac. p. 2. l. 2. c. 17.

written by him, or the Records concerning his actions; either of which might have given *Sanchoniathon* conſiderable light in the hiſtory either of the *Iſraelites* or *Phœnicians*. And it is ſo much the more probable, becauſe preſently after the death of *Gideon*, the *Iſraelites* worſhipped *Baal-berith*; by which moſt probably is meant the Idol of *Berith* or *Berytus*, the place where *Sanchoniathon* lived; by which means the *Berytians* might come eaſily acquainted with all the remarkable paſſages of *Jerub-baal*. Judg. 8. 33.

IV. But I cannot conceive how *Sanchoniathon* could be contemporary with *Gideon*, (which yet if he were, he falls 182 years ſhort of *Moſes*,) eſpecially becauſe the building of *Tyre*, which that Author mentions as an ancient thing (as hath been obſerved by *Scaliger*) is by our beſt Chronologers placed about the time of *Gideon*, and about 65 years before the deſtruction of *Troy*. I know *Bochartus*, to avoid this argument, hath brought ſome evidence of ſeveral places called *Tyrus* in *Phœnicia*, from *Scylax* his *Periplus*; but none that there was any more than one *Tyrus* of any great repute for antiquity. Now this *Tyrus* *Joſephus* makes but 240 years elder than *Solomon*'s Temple, and *Juſtin* but one year elder than the deſtruction of *Troy*. Neither can any account be given why *Sidon* ſhould be ſo much celebrated by ancient Poets, as *Strabo* tells us, when *Tyre* is not ſo much as mentioned by *Homer*; if the famous *Tyre* were of ſo great antiquity and repute as is pretended. It cannot be denied but that there is mention in Scripture of a *Tyre* elder than this we ſpeak of, *Joſhua* 19. 29. which ſome think to be that which was called *Palætyrus*, which *Strabo* makes to be 20 furlongs diſtant from the great *Tyre*; but *Pliny* includes *Palætyrus* within the circumference of *Tyre*, and ſo makes the whole circuit of the City to be 19 miles. It is not to me ſo certain to what place the name of *Palætyrus* refers, whether to any *Tyrus* before the firſt building of the great *Tyre*, or to the ruins of the great *Tyre* after its deſtruction by *Nebuchadnezzar*, compared with the new *Tyre*, which was built more inward to the Sea, and was after beſieged by *Alexander* the Great. It may ſeem probable that *Palætyrus* may relate to the ruins of the great *Tyre*, in that it was after included in its circuit, and chiefly becauſe of the prediction in *Ezekiel* 26. 4. *Thou ſhalt be built no more*; for the *Tyre* erected after, was built not on the Continent, but almoſt in the Sea. If ſo, then *Palætyrus* or the *old* famous *Tyrus* might ſtand upon a rock upon the brink of the Continent: and ſo the great argument of *Bochartus* is eaſily anſwered, which is, *that after it is mentioned in* Sanchoniathon's *Hiſtory*, *that* Hypſouranius *dwelt in* Tyre, *upon the falling out between him and his brother* Uſous, Uſous *firſt adventured* εἰς θάλασσαν ἐμπῆναι, *to go to Sea*, which, ſaith he, *evidently manifeſts that the* Tyre *mentioned by* Sanchoniathon *was not the famous Inſular* Tyrus, *but ſome other* Tyre. This argument, I ſay, is now eaſily anſwered, if the famous *Tyre* before its deſtruction by *Nebuchadnezzar* did ſtand upon the Continent; for then it might be the old famous *Tyre* ſtill, notwithſtanding what *Sanchoniathon* ſpeaks of the firſt venturing to Sea after *Tyre* was built. So then I conceive theſe ſeveral ages agreeable to the ſame *Tyre*; the firſt was when it was a high ſtrong rock on the ſea-ſide without many inhabitants; ſo I ſuppoſe it was when mentioned by *Joſhua*, as the bound of the tribe of *Aſher*. The

Scalig. Not. in Frag. Græc. p. 40.

Joſeph. Ant. l. 8.

Strabo l. 16.

Plin. Hiſt. Nat. l. 5. c. 19.

ſecond age was, when it was built a great City by the *Sidonians* upon the former place, and grew very populous and famous, which laſted 'till *Nebuchadnezzar*'s time; after this, tho' it were never built upon the Continent again, yet a little farther into the ſea, a new and goodly City was erected, which was *New Tyre*, and the remains on the continent ſide *Palætyrus*. Thus far then we have made good *Scaliger*'s opinion againſt *Bochartus*, that the famous *Sanchoniathon* is not ſo old as he is pretended to be.

V. Which will be further manifeſt, if that *Abibalus*, to whom *Sanchoniathon* is ſuppoſed to dedicate his Hiſtory, were the father to *Hiram*, contemporary with *Solomon*, as *Joſ. Scaliger* ſuppoſeth, who was 154 years after the deſtruction of *Troy*. In the *Tyrian* Dynaſties produced by *Scaliger* out of the *Phœnician* Annals, this *Abibalus* is the firſt who occurs, and is contemporary with *David*: *Sanchoniathon* then is of no great antiquity, if this were the time he lived in. But *Bochartus* well obſerves, that it is not ſpoken of *Abibalus* King of *Tyre*, but of *Abibalus* King of *Berytus*, whom we may allow to be ſomewhat nearer the time of *Moſes* than the other *Abibalus*, as the *Phœnician* Annals make it appear, as *Porphyry* tells us; but yet we find his antiquity is not ſo great as to be able to conteſt with *Moſes*, as *Porphyry* himſelf confeſſeth; altho' we may freely acknowledg him to be far elder than any of the *Greek* Hiſtorians; which is all *Voſſius* contends for, and ſufficiently proves: but we are far from yielding him contemporary with *Semiramis*, as *Porphyry* would have him, and yet makes him junior to *Moſes*, and to live about the time of the *Trojan* war, which is to reconcile the diſtance of near 800 years: ſuch miſerable confuſion was there in the beſt learned Heathens in their computation of ancient times.

Scal. Not. in Euſeb. Chr. p. 12. Scal. Can. Iſag. l. 2.

Voſſ. de Hiſt. Grac. l. 1. c. 1.

VI. Having thus cleared the Antiquity of *Sanchoniathon* and the *Phœnician* Hiſtory, we are next to conſider the Fidelity of it. This *Sanchoniathon* is highly commended for, both by *Porphyry*, and his Tranſlator into *Greek Philo Byblius*, who lived in *Adrian*'s time; and *Theodoret* thinks his name in the *Phœnician* language ſignifies φιλαλήθης, which *Bochartus* endeavours to fetch from thence, and conceives the name to be given him when he ſet himſelf to write his Hiſtory; and he wiſheth, and ſo do we, that he had been then *vir ſui nominis*, and made it appear by his writing that he had been a *Lover of truth*. *Philo* ſaith he was ἀνὴρ πολυμαθὴς καὶ πολυπράγμων, *a very learned and inquiſitive man*; but either he was not ſo diligent to enquire after, or not ſo happy to light on any certain Records; or if he did, he was not over-much a Lover of truth, in delivering them to the world. How faithful he was in tranſcribing his Hiſtory from his Records, we cannot be ſufficient judges of, unleſs we had thoſe books of *Taautus*, and the ſacred Inſcriptions, and the Records of Cities which he pretends to take his Hiſtory from, to compare them together. But by what remains of his Hiſtory, which is only the firſt Book concerning the *Phœnician* Theology, extant in *Euſebius*, we have little reaſon to believe his Hiſtory of the World and eldeſt times, without further proof than he gives of it, there being ſo much obſcurity and confuſion in it, when he makes a *Chaos* to be the firſt beginning of all things, and the Gods to come after; makes Ἀιὼν ἀγνὸς to be the ſon of *Chryſor* or *Vulcan*,

Vulcan, and again the ſame γηγενὴς *the man born of earth*, to be ſeveral generations after Αἰὼν and Πρωτόγονος who were the firſt mortal men; and yet from the two brethren Τιτὰν and Δημαρχος came two Gods, whereof one was called Ὠκεανὸς and the other Ὠκεανίνη and this latter was worſhipped with as much veneration as any of their Gods.

Yet from theſe things, as fooliſh and ridiculous as they are, it is very probable the *Gnoſtics* and the ſeveral ſubdiviſions of them might take the riſe of their ſeveral *Æones* and Συζυγίαι: for here we find Αἰὼν and Πρωτόγονος made two of the number of the Gods; but the reſt of the names they, according to their ſeveral ſects, took a liberty of altering according to their ſeveral fancies. This is far more probable to me, than that either *Heſiod*'s Θεογονία ſhould be the ground of them; or the opinion of a late *German* Divine, who conceives that *Philo Byblius* did in imitation of the *Gnoſtics*, form this holy ſtory of the *Phœnician* Theology. For altho' I am far from believing what *Kircher* ſomewhere tells us, that he had once got a ſight of *Sanchoniathon*'s Original Hiſtory (it being not the firſt thing that learned man hath been deceived in,) yet I ſee no ground of ſo much peeviſhneſs, as becauſe this Hiſtory pretends ſo much antiquity, we ſhould therefore preſently condemn it as a figment of the Tranſlator of it. For had it been ſo, the Antagoniſts of *Porphyry*, *Methodius*, *Apollinaris*, but eſpecially *Euſebius*, ſo well verſed in antiquities, would have found out ſo great a cheat. Altho' I muſt confeſs they were oft-times deceived with *Piæ Fraudes*; but then it was when they made for the Chriſtians, and not againſt them, as this did. But beſides a fabulous confuſion of things together, we have ſome things delivered concerning their Gods, which are both contrary to all natural notions of a Deity, and thoſe very common principles of Humanity, which all acknowledg. As when Κρόνος or *Saturn*, ſuſpecting his ſon *Sadidus*, deſtroyed him with his own hands, and warred againſt his father *Uranus*, and after deſtroyed him likewiſe, and buried his brother *Atlas* alive in the earth; which being taken, as *Philo Byblius* contends they ought to be, in the literal ſenſe, are ſuch incongruities to all notions of a divine nature, that it is the greateſt wonder there ſhould be any that ſhould believe there was any God, and believe theſe were Gods together.

VII.

Joh. Urſinus Exerc. 3. ſect. 1.

But altho' there be ſo many groſs fables and inconſiſtencies in this *Phœnician* Theology, that are ſo far from meriting belief in themſelves, that it were a ſufficient forfeiture of reaſon to ſay they were credible; yet when we have a greater light in our hands of divine revelation, we may in this dungeon find out many excellent remainders of the ancient tradition, tho' miſerably corrupted; as, concerning the Creation, the Original of Idolatry, the Invention of Arts, the Foundation of Cities, the Story of *Abraham*, of which in their due place. That which of all ſeems the cleareſt in this Theology, is the open owning the original of Idolatry to have been from the conſecration of ſome eminent perſons after their death, who had found out ſome uſeful things for the world while they were living: which the ſubtiler *Greeks* would not admit of, *viz.* that the perſons they worſhip'd were once Men; which made them turn all into Allegories and Myſtical ſenſes to blind that Ido-

latry they were guilty of the better among the ignorant: which makes *Philo Byblius* ſo very angry with the *Neoteric Græcians*, as he calls them, εἰς ἀν βεβιασμένως ἐκ τῶν ἀλληγορουμένων τὰς περὶ θεῶν μύθους ἐπ' ἀπαγορείας τῆ φυσικῆς ἀπαγγελίας: *That with a great deal of force and ſtraining they turned all the ſtories of the Gods into Allegories and Phyſical diſcourſes.* Which is all the ingenuity that I know is to be found in this *Phœnician* Theology, that therein we find a free ackowledgment of the beginning of the Heathen Idolatry: and therefore *Sanchoniathon* was as far from advancing *Porphyry*'s Religion, as he was in the leaſt from overthrowing the credibility of Chriſtianity.

Philo Bybl. ap. Euſeb. Prep. l. 1. c. 6. p. 23.

VIII. The next we come to then, are the *Ægyptians*; a people ſo unreaſonably given to fables, that the wiſeſt action they did, was to *conceal* their Religion; and the beſt offices their Gods had, was to *hold their fingers in their mouths*, to command ſilence to all that came to worſhip them. But we deſign not here any ſet diſcourſe concerning the vanity of the *Ægyptian* Theology, which yet was ſo monſtrouſly ridiculous, that even thoſe who were overrun with the height of Idolatry themſelves, did make it the object of their ſcorn and laughter. And certainly had we no other demonſtration of the greatneſs of Man's apoſtaſy and degeneracy, the *Ægyptian* Theology would be an irrefragable evidence of it: for who could but imagine a ſtrange lowneſs of ſpirit in thoſe, who could fall down and worſhip the baſeſt and moſt contemptible of creatures? Their Temples were the beſt Hieroglyphics of themſelves, fair and goodly ſtructures without, but within ſome deformed creatures enſhrined for veneration. But tho' the *Ægyptians* had loſt their credit ſo much as to matter of Religion; yet it may be ſuppoſed, that they who were ſo famed for wiſdom and antiquity, ſhould be able to give a full and exact account of themſelves thro' the ages of the world. And this they are ſo far from being defective in, that if you will believe them, they will give you an account of themſelves many thouſands of years before ever the world was made, but the peculiar vanity of their Chronology will be handled afterwards: That we now enquire into, is, what certain Records they had of their own antiquity, which might call for aſſent from any unprejudiced mind; whether there be any thing really anſwering that loud and unparalell'd cry of antiquity among the *Ægyptians*, whereby they will make all other Nations in compariſon of them, to be but of yeſterday, and to know nothing. We queſtion not now their pretence to wiſdom and learning, but are the more in hopes to meet with ſome certain way of ſatisfaction concerning ancient times, where learning is ſuppoſed to have flouriſhed ſo much, even when *Greece* it ſelf was accounted barbarous.

IX. The great baſis of all the *Ægyptian* Hiſtory depends on the credit of their ancient *Hermes*, whom out of their veneration they called *Triſmegiſtus*; for to him they aſcribe the firſt invention of their Learning, and all excellent Arts; from him they derive their hiſtory; their famous hiſtorian *Manetho* profeſſing to tranſcribe his Dynaſties from the pillars of *Hermes*. We ſhall therefore firſt ſee of what credit and antiquity *Hermes* himſelf was, and of what account particularly thoſe pillars were which uphold all the fabric of *Manetho* his Dynaſties. For *Hermes* himſelf the ſtory concerning him

him is ſo various and uncertain, that ſome have from thence queſtioned whether ever there were ſuch a perſon or no, becauſe of the ſtrangely different account that is given of him. *Cotta* in *Tully*, in order to the eſtabliſhing his Academical doctrine of withholding Aſſent, mentions no fewer than five *Mercuries*, of which, two he makes *Ægyptian*, one of them the *Hermes* we now ſpeak of, whom the *Ægyptians* call *Thoyth*, and was the Author both of their Laws and Letters. The *Ægyptians*, as appears by *Diodorus*, make him to be a ſacred Scribe to *Oſiris*, and to have inſtructed *Iſis*; and when *Oſiris* went upon any warlike expedition, he committed the management of affairs to him for his great wiſdom. The *Phœnicians* preſerve his memory among them too: for *Philo Byblius* ſaith, That *Sanchoniathon* deſcribed his Theology from the books of *Taautus*, whom the *Ægyptians* call *Thoyth*, who was the firſt inventor of Letters, and was a Counſellor to *Saturn*, whoſe advice he much relied on. What now muſt we pitch upon in ſo great uncertainties? How come the *Phœnician* and *Ægyptian* Theology to come both from the ſame perſon, which are conceived ſo much to differ from each other? If we make the ſtories of *Oſiris* and *Iſis* to be fabulous, and merely allegorical, as *Plutarch* doth, then *Mercury* himſelf muſt become an Allegory, and the Father of Letters muſt be an Hieroglyphic. If we admit the *Ægyptian* narrations to be real, and ſeek to reduce them to truth, and thereby make *Oſiris* to be *Mitſraim* the ſon of *Cham*, who firſt ruled in *Ægypt*, all that we can then affirm of *Hermes* is, That he might be ſome uſeful perſon, who had a great influence both upon the King and State, and did firſt ſettle the Nation in a politic way of government, whoſe memory on that account the *Ægyptians* might preſerve with the greateſt veneration; and when they were once fallen into that idolatry of conſecrating the memories of the firſt contributors to the good of mankind, they thought they had the greateſt reaſon to adore his memory, and ſo by degrees attributed the invention of all uſeful things to him. For ſo it is apparent they did, when *Jamblichus* tells us, The *Ægyptians* attributed all their books to *Mercury*, as the Father of them: becauſe he was reputed the father of wit and learning, they made all the off-ſprings of their brains to bear their father's name. And this hath been the great reaſon the world hath been ſo long time impoſed upon with varieties of books going under the name of *Hermes Triſmegiſtus*. For he was not the firſt of his kind, who in the early days of the Chriſtian world obtruded upon the world that *Cento* or confuſed mixture of the *Chriſtian*, *Platonic*, and *Ægyptian* doctrines, which is extant ſtill under the name of *Hermes Triſmegiſtus*; whoſe vanity and falſhood hath been ſufficiently detected by learned men. There were long before his time extant ſeveral *Mercurial* books, as they were called, which none of the wiſer Heathens did ever look on as any other than fables and impoſtures, as appears by *Porphyry*'s letter to *Anebo* the *Ægyptian* Prieſt, and *Jamblichus* his anſwer to it in his book of the *Ægyptian* Myſteries.

Cicero de Nat. Deor.

Jamblic. de Myſt. l. 1.

We have then no certainty at all, notwithſtanding the great fame of *Hermes*, of any certain records of ancient times, unleſs they be contained in thoſe ſacred Inſcriptions from whence *Manetho* took

X.

took his history. It must be acknowledged that the most ancient way of preserving any monuments of learning in those elder times, was by these Inscriptions on Pillars, especially among the *Ægyptians*, as is evident from the several testimonies of *Galen*, *Proclus*, *Jamblichus*, and the Author of the book called *Sapientia secundum Ægyptios*, adjoyned to *Aristotle*; who all concur in this, that whatever laudable invention they had among them it was inscribed on some Pillars, and those preserved in their Temples, which were instead of Libraries to them. *Manetho* therefore to make his story the more probable, pretends to take all his relations from these sacred Inscriptions; and as *Eusebius* tells us, translated the whole *Ægyptian* History into *Greek*, beginning from their Gods, and continuing his History down near the time of *Darius Codomannus*, whom *Alexander* conquered: for in *Eusebius* his *Chronica* mention is made of *Manetho* his History, ending the xvi^th^ year of *Artaxerxes Ochus*, which, saith *Vossius*, was in the second year of the 107^th^ *Olympiad*. This *Manetho Sebennyta* was High Priest of *Heliopolis* in the time of *Ptolemæus Philadelphus*, at whose request he writ his History, which he digested into three Tomes, the first containing the 11 Dynasties of the Gods and Heroes; the second, 8 Dynasties; the third 12; all containing, according to his fabulous computation, the sum of 53535 years. These Dynasties are yet preserved, being first epitomized by *Julius Africanus*, from him transcribed by *Eusebius* in his *Chronica*, from *Eusebius* by *Georgius Syncellus*, out of whom they are produced by *Jos. Scaliger*, and may be seen both in his *Eusebius*, and his *Canones Isagogici*.

Gal. l. 1. c. Iul. c. 1. Procl. in Tim. p. 31. Jamb. de Myst. c. 2. sect. 1. Sap. Sec. Ægypt. c. 1. s. 1.

Vossius de Hist. Græc. l. 1. c. 14.

XI. Now *Manetho*, as appears by *Eusebius*, voucheth this as the main testimony of his credibility, that he took his History, ἐκ τῶν ἐν τῇ Σηριαδικῇ γῇ κειμένων στηλῶν, ἱερᾷ διαλέκτῳ ὑπ' ἐκείνων γεγραμμένων καὶ μετὰ τὸν κατακλυσμὸν πάλιν ὑπὸ τοῦ πρώτου Ἑρμοῦ, τοῦ ἐπιλεγομένου μὲν Θωὺθ τοῦ πατρὸς Τάτ, ἐκ δὲ τῆς ἱερᾶς διαλέκτου εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα φωνὴν γραμμάσιν ἱερογλυφικοῖς ἐκδοθεισῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀγαθοδαίμονος τοῦ δευτέρου Ἑρμοῦ, παλαιὸς δὲ τοῦ Τάτ, ἐν ταῖς ἀδύτοις τῶν ἱερῶν Αἰγυπτίων; *from some pillars in the Land of* Seriad, *in which they were inscribed in the Sacred Dialect by the first* Mercury Thoyth, *and after the floud were translated out of the sacred dialect into the Greek tongue in Hieroglyphic Characters, and are laid up in books among the Reveſtries of the* Ægyptian *Temples, by* Agathodæmon, *the second* Mercury, *the Father of* Tat. Certainly this fabulous Author could not in fewer words have more manifested his own impostures, nor blasted his own credit more than he hath done in these; which it is a wonder so many learned Men have taken so little notice of, which have found frequent occasion to speak of *Manetho* and his Dynasties. This I shall make appear by some great Improbabilities, and other plain Impossibilities which are couched in them. The improbabilities

(1.) are, *first*, such Pillars, being in such a place as *Seriad*, and that place no more spoken of either by himself or by any other *Ægyptians*, nor any use made of these Inscriptions by any other but himself. As to this *terra Seriadica* where it should be, the very learned and inquisitive *Joseph Scaliger* plainly gives out, and ingenuously professeth his ignorance. For in his Notes on the Fragments of *Manetho* in *Eusebius*, when he comes to that ἐν τῇ γῇ Σηριαδικῇ, he only saith, *Quæ nobis ignota quærant studiosi.* But *Isaac Vossius*,

Voſſius, in his late Diſcourſes *De ætate mundi*, cries Εὕρηκα, and confidently perſuades himſelf that it is the ſame with *Seirah*, mentioned *Judges* 3.16. Indeed were there nothing elſe to be conſidered but affinity of names, it might well be the ſame: but that גְּלִילִים, which we render the *ſtone-quarries*, ſhould ſignify the Pillars of *Mercury*, is ſomewhat hard to conceive. The *Seventy* render it, as himſelf obſerves, Ἀ γλυπτά, by which they underſtand *graven Images*: So the word is uſed 2 *Chron.* 33. 19. *Deut.* 7. 5. *Iſai.* 10. 19. The vulgar *Latin* renders it, *ad locum Idolorum*; which were the certain interpretation, if *Chytræus* his conjecture were true, that *Eglon* had lately ſet up Idols there; but if it be meant of Pillars, I cannot but approve of *Junius* his interpretation, which I conceive bids faireſt to be the genuine ſenſe of the place, *viz.* that theſe Stones here were the Twelve ſtones pitched by *Joſhua* in *Gilgal* after the *Iſraelites* paſſed over *Jordan*; and theſe Stones are ſaid to be by *Gilgal*, *Judges* 3. 19. So that notwithſtanding this handſome conjecture, we are as far to ſeek for the Pillars of *Mercury* as ever we were, and may be ſo to the world's end. *Secondly*, the ſtanding of theſe Pillars during the Floud, which muſt be ſuppoſed certainly to have ſome ſingular virtue in them to reſiſt ſuch a torrent of Waters, which overthrew the ſtrongeſt built Houſes, and moſt compacted Cities. The plain Impoſſibilities are, *firſt*, that *Manetho* ſhould tranſcribe his Dynaſties from the beginning of the Hiſtory of *Ægypt*, to almoſt the time of *Alexander*, out of ſacred Inſcriptions of *Thoyth*, who lived in the beginning of the very firſt Dynaſty according to his own computation. Sure this *Thoyth*, was an excellent Prophet, to write an Hiſtory for above 50000 years to come, as *Manetho* reckons it. *Secondly*, it is as well ſtill, that this Hiſtory after the Floud ſhould be tranſlated into Hieroglyphic Characters. What kind of Tranſlation is that? we had thought Hieroglyphics had been repreſentations of Things, and not of Sounds and Letters, or Words: How could this Hiſtory have at firſt been written in any tongue, when it was in Hieroglyphics? Do Hieroglyphics ſpeak in ſeveral languages, and are they capable of changing their tongues? But *thirdly*, it is as good ſtill, that the ſecond *Mercury* or *Agathodæmon* did tranſlate this Hiſtory ſo ſoon after the Floud into *Greek*: Was the *Greek* tongue ſo much in requeſt ſo ſoon after the Floud, that the *Ægyptian* Hiſtory for the ſake of the *Greeks* muſt be tranſlated into their language? Nay, is it not evident from *Herodotus* and *Diodorus*, that the *Grecians* were not permitted ſo much as any commerce with the *Ægyptians*, till the time of *Pſammetichus*, which fell out in the 26th Dynaſty of *Manetho*, and about a Century after the beginning of the *Olympiads*. We ſee then how credible an Author *Manetho* is, and what truth there is like to be in the account of ancient times given by the *Ægyptian* Hiſtorians, when the chief of them ſo lamentably and ominouſly ſtumbles in his very entrance into it.

Scalig. Not. in gr. Euſeb. p. 408. Iſ. Voſſ. de at. mund. c. 10.

Joſh. 4. 19, 20, 21.

(2.)

(1.)

(2.)

(3.)

Herod. l. 2. Diod. l. 1. c. 67.

And yet as fabulous as this acount is, which *Manetho* gives of his taking his hiſtory from theſe Pillars before the Floud, I cannot but think that *Joſephus*, an Author otherwiſe of good credit, took his famous ſtory of *Seth*'s pillars, concerning Aſtronomical obſervations before the floud, from this ſtory of *Manetho*; and there-

fore I cannot but look upon them with as jealous an eye as on the other, altho' I know how fond the world hath been upon that moſt ancient monument, as is pretended, of learning in the world. *Du Bartas* hath writ a whole Poem on theſe Pillars, and the truth is, they are fitter ſubjects for Poets than any elſe, as will appear on theſe conſiderations. *Firſt*, how ſtrangely improbable is it, that the poſterity of *Seth*, who, as is pretended, did foreknow a deſtruction of the world to be by a Floud, ſhould buſy themſelves to write Aſtronomical obſervations on Pillars, for the benefit of thoſe who ſhould live after it? Could they think their pillars ſhould have ſome peculiar exemption above ſtronger ſtructures, from the violence of the rough and furious waters? If they believed the Floud abſolutely univerſal, for whom did they intend their obſervations? if not, to what end did they make them, when the perſons ſurviving might communicate their inventions to them? But, *Secondly*, if either one or both theſe pillars remained, whence comes it to paſs that neither the *Chaldæans*, nor any of the eldeſt pretenders to Aſtronomy, ſhould neither mention them, nor make any uſe of them? Nay, *Thirdly*, whence came the ſtudy of Aſtronomy to be ſo lamentably defective in thoſe ancient times, if they had ſuch certain obſervations of the heavenly bodies gathered by ſo much experience of the perſons who lived before the Floud? *Fourthly*, How comes *Joſephus* himſelf to neglect this remarkable teſtimony of the Scripture-hiſtory in his books againſt *Appion*, if he had thought it were ſuch as might be relyed on? *Fifthly*, How comes *Joſephus* ſo careleſly not to ſet down the place in *Syria* where theſe pillars ſtood, that inquiſitive perſons might have ſatisfy'd themſelves with the Sight of the pillar at leaſt, and what kind of characters thoſe obſervations were preſerved in? But now, if we compare this of *Joſephus* with *Manetho* his ſtory, we ſhall find them ſo exactly reſemble each other, that we may judge all thoſe pillars to have been taken out of the ſame quarry. Two things make it yet more probable: *Firſt*, The name of the place wherein they ſtood, which *Euſtathius* in *Hexaemeron* takes out of *Joſephus*, and calls Σειριάδα the very ſame place with that in *Manetho*. The other is the common uſe of the name of *Seth* among the *Ægyptians*, as not only appears by *Plutarch de Iſide & Oſiride*, but by this very place of *Manetho*; where it follows, ἐν βίβλῳ Σαώθεως, a book of his bearing the Title, which *Vettius Valens Antiochenus* tells us is not called Σαώθης, but Σήθ. Now therefore *Joſephus*, who frequently uſeth the teſtimony of Heathen Writers, and frequently of this *Manetho*, endeavoured to bring this fabulous relation of *Manetho* as near the truth as he could; therefore inſtead of *Thoyth* he puts *Seth*, and inſtead of the fabulous hiſtory of *Ægypt*, the inventions of the Patriarchs, and *Syria* inſtead of *Seriadica*, a Country too large to find theſe pillars in.

Vettius Val. apud Scal. not. Gr. p. 438.

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

Of the *Chaldæan* Hiſtory.

I. *The conteſt of Antiquity among Heathen Nations, and the ways of deciding it.* II. *Of the* Chaldæan *Aſtrology, and the foundation of Judicial Aſtrology.* III. *Of the* Zabii, *their Founder, who they were; no other than the old* Chaldees. IV. *Of* Beroſus *and his Hiſtory.* V. *An account of the fabulous Dynaſties of* Beroſus *and* Manetho; VI. *From the Tranſlation of the Scripture-hiſtory into Greek in the time of* Ptolemee. VII. *Of that Tranſlation and the time of it.* VIII. *Of* Demetrius Phalereus. Scaliger's *arguments anſwered.* IX. Manetho *writ after the Septuagint, proved againſt* Kircher; *his arguments anſwered. Of Rabbinical and Arabic Authors, and their little credit in matter of Hiſtory.* X. *The time of* Beroſus *enquired into; his Writing contemporary with* Philadelphus.

THE next whom our Enquiry leads us to, are the *Chaldæans*, a Nation of great and undoubted Antiquity, being in probability the firſt formed into a National Goverment after the Floud, and therefore the more capable of having theſe Arts and Sciences flouriſh among them, which might preſerve the memory of eldeſt times to the view of poſterity. And yet even among theſe who enjoyed all the advantages of eaſe, quiet, and a flouriſhing Empire, we find no undoubted or credible Records preſerved, but the ſame vanity as among the *Ægyptians*, in arrogating Antiquity to themſelves beyond all proportion of reaſon or ſatisfaction from their own Hiſtory, to fill up that vaſt meaſure of time with: which makes it moſt probable, what *Diodorus* obſerves of them, *That in things pertaining to their Arts, they made uſe of Lunar years of 30 days*; ſo they had need, when *Tully* tells us that they boaſted of obſervations of the Stars for 470000 years. It had been impoſſible for them to have been ſo extravagant in their accounts of themſelves, had they but preſerved the Hiſtory of their Nation in any certain Records. For want of which, the Tradition of the eldeſt times varying in the ſeveral families after their diſperſion, and being gradually corrupted by the policy of their Leaders, and thoſe corruptions readily embraced by the predominancy of ſelf-love in the ſeveral Nations, thence aroſe thoſe vain and eager conteſts between the *Chaldæans*, *Scythians*, *Ægyptians*, and *Æthiopians*, concerning the antiquity of their ſeveral Nations: which may be ſeen in *Diodorus*, and others: by which it moſt evidently appears that they had no certain hiſtory of their own Nations: for none of them inſiſt upon any Records, but only upon ſeveral pro-

Diodor. Bilioth. l. 1.

Cicero de Divin. l. 1.

probabilities from the nature of their Country, and the Climates they lived under. Neither need *Pſammetichus* have been put to that ridiculous way of deciding the controverſy by his two Infants bred up without any converſe with Men, concluding the language they ſpake would manifeſt the great antiquity of the Nation it belonged to: Whereas it is more than probable they had ſpoken none at all, had they not learned the inarticulate voice of the Goats they had more converſe with than Men. The making uſe of ſuch ways to decide this controverſy doth not only argue the great weakneſs of thoſe times as to natural knowledg; but the abſolute defect and inſufficiency of them, as to the giving any certain account of the ſtate of ancient times.

II. Of which the *Chaldæans* had advantages above all other Heathen Nations, not only living in a ſetled Country, but in or near that very place where the grand Anceſtors of the world had their chief abode and reſidence. Whereby we ſee how unfaithful a thing Tradition is, and how ſoon it is corrupted or fails, where it hath no ſure records to bottom its ſelf upon. But indeed it is the leſs wonder that there ſhould be a confuſion of Hiſtories, where there had been before of Tongues; and that ſuch whoſe deſign and memory God had blaſted before, ſhould afterwards forget their own original. But as if the *Chaldæans* had retained ſomething ſtill of their old aſpiring mind to reach up to Heaven, the only thing they were eminent for, and which they were careful in preſerving of, was ſome Aſtronomical obſervations, which *Tully* tells us *they had a great conveniency for, by reaſon of the plain and even ſituation of their Country*; whereby they might have a larger proſpect of the heavenly bodies, than thoſe who lived in mountainous Countries could have. And yet even for this (which they were ſo famous for, that the name *Chaldæans* paſſed for *Aſtrologers* in the *Roman* Empire) we have no great reaſon to admire their excellency in it, conſidering how ſoon their skill in Aſtronomy dwindled into that which by a great *Catachreſis* is called *Judicial* Aſtrology. The original of which is moſt evident among Them, as all other Heathen Nations, to have been from the Divinity which they attributed to the Stars; in which yet they were far more rational than thoſe who now admire that Art: For, granting their Hypotheſis, that the Stars were Gods, it was but reaſonable they ſhould determine contingent effects; but it is far from being ſo with Them who take away the foundation of all thoſe celeſtial Houſes, and yet attribute the ſame effects to them, which they did, who believed a Divinity in them. The *Chaldæans*, as *Diodorus* relates, ſet 30 Stars under the Planets; theſe they called Βηλαίους Θεούς; others they had as Princes over theſe, which they called τῶν Θεῶν Κυρίους; the former were as the privy Counſellors, and theſe the Princes over them, by whom in their courſes they ſuppoſed the courſe of the Year to be regulated. See then what a near affinity there was between Aſtrology and Divinity of the Stars, which makes *Ptolemee* call them *Atheiſts* who condemned Aſtrology, becauſe thereby they deſtroyed the the main of their Religion, which was the worſhiping the Stars for Gods. But it ſeems by *Strabo*, that one of the Sects of the *Chaldæans* did ſo hold to Aſtronomy ſtill, that they wholly rejected

Diodor. l. 2. Biblioth.

Ptolem. Tetrab. l. 1.

Strabo Geograph. l. 16.

jected *Genethlialogy:* which cauſed a great diviſion among the *Orchoëni* and *Borſippeni*, two Sects among them, ſo called from the places of their habitations.

III. And if we reckon the *Zabii* among the *Chaldæans*, as *Maimonides* ſeems to do, we have a further evidence of the Planetary Deities ſo much in requeſt among the *Chaldæans*; for the deſcription he gives of them is to this purpoſe, *That they had no other Gods but the Stars to whom they made Statues and Images, to the Sun Golden, to the Moon Silver, and ſo to the reſt of the Planets of the Metals dedicated to them. Thoſe Images derived an influence from the Stars to which they were erected, which had thence a faculty of foretelling future things*; which is an exact deſcription of the Σημεῖα or *Taliſmans* ſo much in requeſt among the Heathens; ſuch as the *Palladium* of *Troy* is ſuppoſed by learned men to have been. Theſe *Taliſmans* are by the *Jews* called *David's bucklers*, and are much of the ſame nature with the ancient *Teraphim*, both being accurately made according to the poſitions of the Heavens; only the one were to foretel future things, the other for the driving away ſome calamity. Concerning theſe *Zabii*, *Maimonides* tells us, *That the underſtanding their Rites would give a great deal of light to ſeveral paſſages of Scripture which now lie in obſcurity:* but little is ſuppoſed to be yet further known of them than what *Scaliger* hath ſaid, That they were the more Eaſtern *Chaldæans*; which he fetcheth from the ſignification of the word. Several of their Books are extant, ſaith *Scaliger*, among the *Arabians*, but none of them are yet diſcovered to the *European* world. *Salmaſius* thinks, theſe *Zabii* were the *Chaldæans* inhabiting *Meſopotamia*, to which is very conſonant what *Maimonides* ſaith, that *Abraham had his education among them. Saïd Batricides*, cited by Mr. *Selden*, *attributes the original of their Religion to the time of* Nahor, *and to* Zaradchath *the Perſian as the Author of it*; who is conceived to be the ſame with *Zoroaſter*, who in all probability is the ſame with the *Zertooſt* of the *Perſees*, a Sect of the ancient *Perſians* living now among the *Banyans* in the *Indies*. Theſe give a more full and exact account concerning the original, birth, education, and enthuſiaſms or revelations of their *Zertooſt*, than any we meet with in any *Greek* Hiſtorians; three books they tell us of which *Zertooſt* received by Revelation, or rather one book, conſiſting of three ſeveral tracts, whereof the firſt was concerning Judicial Aſtrology, which they call *Aſtoodeger*; the ſecond concerning *Phyſic*, or the knowledg of Natural things; the third was called *Zertooſt*, from the bringer of it, containing their Religious rites; the firſt was committed to the *Jeſopps* or *Magi*, the ſecond to *Phyſicians*, the third to the *Darooes* or Church-men, wherein are contained the ſeveral precepts of their Law; we have likewiſe the rites and cuſtoms of theſe *Perſees* in their worſhip of Fire, with many other particular rites of theirs, publiſhed ſome time ſince by one *Mr. Lord*, who was a long time reſident among them at *Surat*; by which we may not only underſtand much of the Religion of the ancient *Perſians*, but if I miſtake not, ſomewhat of the *Zabii* too. My reaſons are, becauſe the ancient *Zaradcha* or *Zoroaſter* is by *Saïd Batricides* made the Author of the *Zabii*, as we have ſeen already, who was undoubtedly the founder of the *Perſian* worſhip,

Maimon. More Nevo p. 3. c. 29.

V. Scaliger Ep. ad Caſaubon. & Ep. Gallic. Selden de Diis Syris, l. 1. c. 2. Salmaſ. de An. Clim. p. 578.

Selden de jure nat. & gent. l. 2. c. 7.

Am. Marc. Hist. l. 23. or rather a promoter of it among the *Persians*; for *Ammianus Marcellinus* tells us, that he was instructed in the rites of the *Chaldæans*, which he added to the *Persian* rites. Besides, their agreement in the chief point of Idolatry, the worship of the Sun, and consequently the πυρεῖα or Symbol of the Sun, the eternal Fire, is evident; which as far as we can learn, was the great and most early Idolatry of the Eastern Countries. And further we find God in *Leviticus* 26. 30. threatning to destroy their חמנים *their Images of the Sun*, some render it; but most probably by that word is meant the πυραιθεῖα, *the Hearths* where they kept their perpetual Fire, for those are חמנים from חמה, which is used both for the *Sun* and *Fire*. *V. Voss. Idol. l. 2. c. 9.* Now hence it appears that this Idolatry was in use among the Nations about *Palæstine*; else there had been no need of so severe a threatning against it: and therefore most probably the rites of the *Zabii* (which must help us to explain the reasons of some particular positive precepts in the *Levitical* Law relating to Idolatry) are the same with the rites of the *Chaldæans* and *Persians*, who all agreed in this worship of the Sun and Fire; which may be yet more probable from what *Maimonides* saith of them, *Gens Zabia erat gens quæ implevit totum orbem*; it could not be then any obscure Nation, but such as had the largest spread in the Eastern Countries, which could be no other than the ancient *Chaldæans*, from whom the *Persians* derived their worship. It may not seem altogether improbable that *Balaam* the famous Soothsayer was one of these *Zabii*, especially if according to *Salmasius* his judgment they inhabited *Mesopotamia*; for *Balaam*'s Country seems to be there; for it is said, *Num.* 22. 5. *that he dwelt in Pethor by the river*, i. e. saith the *Chaldee* Paraphrast, *in Peor of Syria by Euphrates*, which in Scripture is called *the river*, Esa. 8. 7. But from this great obscurity as to the history of so ancient and so large a people as these *Zabii* are supposed to be, we have a further evidence to our purpose of the defectiveness and insufficiency of the Eastern Histories as to the giving any full account of themselves and their own original.

IV. We are told indeed by some, that *Nabonassár* did burn and destroy all the ancient Records of the *Chaldæans* which they had diligently preserved among them before, on purpose to raise the greater reputation to himself, and blot out the memory of his usurpation, by burning the Records of all their own ancient Kings. Which is a conceit I suppose hath no other ground than that the famous *Æra* so much celebrated by Astronomers and others, did bear the name of *Nabonassár*. Which (if we should be so greedy of all empty conjectures, which tend to our purpose, as to take them for truths) would be a very strong evidence of the falshood and vanity of the *Chaldæans* in their great pretenses to Antiquity. But as the case stands in reference to their History, we find more evidence from Scripture to assert their just antiquity, than ever they are able to produce out of any undoubted Records of their own. Which yet hath been endeavoured by an Author both of some credit and antiquity, the true *Berosus*, not the counterfeit of *Annius*, whose vizard we shall have occasion to pull off afterwards. *Joseph. c. App. l. 1. Tatian. c. Gracos.* This *Berosus* was, as *Josephus* and *Tatianus* assure us, *a Priest of* Belus, *and a* Babylonian *born, but afterwards flourished in the Isle*

of

of Cos, *and was the first who brought the* Chaldæan *Astrology in request among the Greeks*; in honor to whose name and memory, the *Athenians* (who were never backward in applauding those who brought them the greatest News, especially if suitable to their former Superstition) erected a Statue for him with a gilded tongue. A good Emblem of his History, which made a fair and specious shew, but was not that within, which it pretended to be: especially where he pretends to give an account of the most ancient times, and reckons up his two Dynasties before the time of *Belus*: but of them afterwards. It cannot be denied but some Fragments of his history, which have been preserved from ruin by the care and industry of *Josephus*, *Tatianus*, *Eusebius* and others, have been very useful, not only for proving the truth of the history of Scripture to the Heathens; but also for illustrating some passages concerning the *Babylonian* Empire: as making *Nabopolassár* the father of *Nebuchadonosor*, of which *Scaliger* hath fully spoken in his Notes upon those Fragments. *Scaliger Append. ad l. de Emen. Temp.*

V. Far be it from me to derogate any thing even from prophane Histories, where they do not interfere with the Sacred History of Scripture; and it is certainly the best improvement of these to make them *draw water to the Sanctuary*, and to serve as smaller Stars to conduct us in our way, when we cannot enjoy the benefit of that greater Light of Sacred History. But that which I impeach these prophane histories of, is only an insufficiency as to that account of ancient times: wherein they are so far from giving light to sacred Records, that the design of setting of them up seems to be for casting a cloud upon them. Which may seem somewhat the more probable in that those monstrous accounts of the *Ægyptian* and *Chaldæan* Dynasties did never publicly appear in the world in the *Greek* Tongue, 'till the time that our sacred Records were translated into *Greek* at *Alexandria*. For 'till that time when this authentic history of the world was drawn forth from its privacy and retirement into the public notice of the world about the time of *Ptolemæus Philadelphus*, [being as it were lockt up before among the *Israelites* at *Judæa*] these vain pretenders to antiquity thought not themselves so much concerned to stand up for the credit of their own Nations. For 'till that time the credulous world, not being acquainted with any certain report of the creation and propagation of the world, was apt to swallow any thing that was given forth by those who were had in so great esteem as the *Chaldæan* and the *Ægyptian* Priests were. Because it was supposed that those persons, who were freed from other avocations, had more leisure to inquire into these things; and because of their mysterious hiding what they had from the vulgar, they were presumed to have a great deal more than they had. But now when the *Sun of Righteousness* was approching this Horizon of the world, and in order to that the Sacred Histories like a Day-star was to give the world notice of it, by which the former shadows and mists began to fly away, it concerned all those whose interest lay in the former ignorance of mankind, as much as they could, to raise all their *Ignes Fatui*, and whatever might tend to obscure that approching Light, by invalidating the credit of that which came to bespeak its acceptance.

VI. It is very obſervable, what gradations and ſteps there were in the world to the appearance of that Grand light, which came down from Heaven to direct us in our way thither; how the world not long before was awakened into a greater inquiſitiveneſs than ever before, how knowledg grew into repute, and what methods divine providence uſed to give the inquiſitive world a taſte of truth at preſent to ſtay their ſtomachs, and prepare them for that further diſcovery of it afterwards. In order to this that Nation of the *Jews* which was an incloſed garden before, was now thrown open, and many of the plants removed and ſet in foreign Countries, not only in *Babylon* (where even after their return were left three famous Schools of Learning, *Sora*, *Pombeditha*, and *Neharda*) but in *Ægypt* too, where multitudes of them by *Alexander*'s favour were ſettled at *Alexandria*, where they had opportunity to ſeaſon thoſe two great Fountains, whence the current of knowledg ran into the reſt of the world. And now it was not in *Jewry only that God was known*, but *He whoſe name was great in Iſrael* did make way for the knowledg of himſelf among all the Nations of the earth. And that All-wiſe God who directed the *Magi* by a ſtar to Chriſt, making uſe of their former skill in Aſtronomy to take notice of that ſtar which came now on a peculiar errand to them to lead them to their Saviour (the great God condeſcending ſo far to mankind, as to take advantage of particular inclinations, and to accommodate himſelf to them; for which purpoſe it is very obſervable that he appeared in another way to the Wiſe-men, than to the poor Shepherds) the ſame God made uſe of the curioſity and inquiſitiveneſs after knowledg, which was in *Ptolemæus Philadelphus* (which he is ſo much applauded for by *Athenæus* and others) to bring to light the moſt advantageous knowledg, which the world ever had before the coming of Chriſt in the fleſh. And that great Library of his erecting at *Alexandria* did never deſerve that title 'till it had lodged thoſe ſacred Records, and then it did far better than the old one of *Oſymanduas*, of which Hiſtorians tell us this was the Inſcription, Ἰατρεῖον ψυχῆς. *The ſhop of the Souls Phyſic.*

V. Caſaub. ad Athenæum, l. 5. c. 9.

VII. But this being a matter of ſo much concernment in order to our better underſtanding the original of theſe vaſt accounts of time among the *Chaldæans* and *Ægyptians*, and a ſubject not yet touched by any, we ſhall a little farther improve the probability of it, by taking a more particular account of the time when the Scriptures were firſt tranſlated, and the occaſion might thereby be given to theſe *Ægyptians* and *Chaldæans* to produce their fabulous account into the view of the world. Whether the Scriptures had been ever before tranſlated into the *Greek* language, (tho' it be aſſerted by ſome ancient Writers of the Church,) is very queſtionable, chiefly upon this account, that a ſufficient reaſon cannot be aſſigned of undertaking a new tranſlation at *Alexandria* if there had been any extant before. Eſpecially if all thoſe circumſtances of that tranſlation be true, which are commonly received and delivered down to us, with almoſt an unanimous conſent of the perſons who had greater advantages of knowing the certainty of ſuch things, than we can have at this great diſtance of time. And therefore certainly every petty conjecture of ſome modern, tho' learned men,

ought

ought not to bear ſway againſt ſo unanimous a tradition in a matter of fact, which cannot be capable of being proved, but by the teſtimony of former ages. And it is ſomewhat ſtrange that the ſingle teſtimony of one *Hermippus* in *Diogenes Laertius* (whoſe age and authority is ſomewhat doubtful) concerning only one Particular referring to *Demetrius Phalereus*, ſhould be thought of force enough among perſons of judgment as well as learning, to infringe the credibility of the whole ſtory delivered with ſo much conſent, not only by *Chriſtian*, but *Jewiſh* Writers; the teſtimony of one of which (every whit as conſiderable as *Hermippus*) viz. *Ariſtobulus Judæus* a *Peripatetical* Philoſopher, in an epiſtle to *Ptolemee Philometor*, doth plainly aſſert that which was ſo much queſtioned, concerning *Demetrius Phalereus*.

Diog. Laer. Vit. Demetrii.

Apud Euſ. præp. Ev. l. 13.

VIII.

But whatever the truth of all the particular circumſtances be, which I here enquire not after, nor the authority of that *Ariſtæus* from whom the ſtory is received, nor whether this Tranſlation was made by *Jews* ſent out of *Judæa*, or by *Jews* reſiding at *Alexandria*; it ſufficeth for our purpoſe that this Tranſlation was made before either the *Chaldæan* Dynaſties of *Beroſus*, or the *Ægyptian* of *Manetho*, were publiſhed to the world. In order to which it is neceſſary to ſhew in what time this Tranſlation was effected; and herein that channel of Tradition, which conveys the truth of the thing in one certain courſe, runs not with ſo even a ſtream concerning the exact time of it; all indeed agree that it was about the time of *Ptolemæus Philadelphus*, but in what years of his reign, is very dubious. *Joſeph Scaliger* who hath troubled the waters ſo much concerning the particular circumſtances of this Tranſlation, yet fully agrees that it was done in the time of *Ptolemæus Philadelphus*; only he contends with *Africanus* that it ſhould be done in the 132d *Olympiad*, which is in the 33d year of *Ptolemæus Philadelphus*; but *Euſebius* and *Jerom* place it in the very beginning of his reign, which I think is far more probable, and that in the time when *Ptolemæus Philadelphus* reigned with his Father *Ptolemæus Lagi:* for ſo it is moſt certain he did for two years before his father's death. By which means the great difficulty of *Scaliger* concerning *Demetrius Phalereus* is quite taken off; for *Hermippus* ſpeaks nothing of *Demetrius* his being out of favor with *Philadelphus* during his father's life, but that upon his father's death, he was baniſhed by him, and died in his baniſhment; ſo that *Demetrius* might have the overſight of the Library at *Alexandria*, and be the main inſtrument of promoting this Tranſlation, and yet thoſe things be after true which *Hermippus* ſpeaks, *viz.* when *Ptolemæus Lagi* or *Soter* was now dead. For it ſtands not to reaſon that during his father's life *Philadelphus* ſhould diſcover his diſpleaſure againſt *Demetrius*, it being conceived upon the advice given to his father for preferring the ſons of *Arſinoë* to the Crown before the ſon of *Berenice*. Moſt likely therefore it is that this Tranſlation might be begun by the means of *Demetrius Phalereus* in the time of *Philadelphus* his reigning with his father; but, it may be, not finiſhed till after the death of *Soter*, when *Philadelphus* reigned alone. And by this now we can perfectly reconcile that difference which is among the Fathers concerning the time when this Tranſlation was made. For *Irenæus* attributes it to the

Scaliger Animad. ad Num. Euſ. 1734.

V. Scaliger ib. Theocr. Schol. ad Idyl 17. Juſt. l. 16. Euſ. Chro. Gr.

time of *Ptolemæus Lagi*; *Clemens Alexandrinus* queſtions whether in the time of *Lagi* or *Philadelpus*; the reſt of the Chorus carry it for *Philadelphus*; but the words of *Anatolius* in *Euſebius* caſt it fully for both; for there ſpeaking of *Ariſtobulus*, he ſaith, *He was one of the Seventy who interpreted the Scriptures to* Ptolemæus Philadelphus *and his father, and dedicated his Commentaries upon the Law to both thoſe Kings. Hæc ſane omnem ſcrupulum eximunt*, ſaith *Voſſius upon producing this teſtimony, this puts it out of all doubt; and to the ſame purpoſe ſpeaks the learned *Jeſuit Petavius* in his Notes on *Epiphanius*.

Euſeb. Hiſt. Eccl. l. 7. c. 26.

** Voſſius de Hiſt. Grac. lib. 1. c. 12. Petav. ad Epiph. pag. 380.*

IX. Having thus far cleared the time when the tranſlation of the Scriptures into *Greek* was made, we ſhall find our conjecture much ſtrengthened, by comparing this with the age of the forementioned Hiſtorians, *Manetho* and *Beroſus*. *Manetho* we have already made appear to have lived in the time of *Ptolemæus Philadelphus*, and that, ſaith *Voſſius*, after the death of *Soter*. It is evident from what remains of him in *Euſebius* his *Chronica*, that he not only flouriſhed in the time of *Philadelphus*, but writ his hiſtory at the ſpecial command of *Philadelphus*, as manifeſtly appears by the remaining Epiſtle of *Manetho* to him, ſtill extant in *Euſebius*. This command of *Philadelphus* might very probably be occaſioned upon the view of that account, which the holy Scriptures, being then tranſlated into *Greek*, did give of the World, and the propagation of Mankind; upon which, we cannot imagine but ſo inquiſitive a perſon as *Philadelphus* would be very earneſt to have his curioſity ſatisfied, as to what the *Ægyptian* Prieſts (who had boaſted ſo much of antiquity) could produce to confront with the Scriptures. Whereupon the task was undertaken by this *Manetho*, High Prieſt of *Heliopolis*, whereby thoſe things which the *Ægyptian* Prieſts had to that time kept ſecret in their Cloiſters, were now divulged and expoſed to the judgment of the learned world; but what ſatisfaction they were able to give inquiſitive minds, as to the main ζητούμενον, or *matter enquired after*, may partly appear by what hath been ſaid of *Manetho* already, and by what ſhall be ſpoken of his Dynaſties afterwards.

Euſ. Chro. Gr. p. 6.

But all this will not perſuade *Kircher*; for, whatever *Scaliger*, nay, what *Manetho* himſelf ſaith to the contrary, He with the confidence and learning of a *Jeſuite* affirms, That this *Manetho* is elder than *Alexander* the Great. For theſe are his words, *Frequens apud priſcos hiſtoricos Dynaſtiarum Ægyptiacarum fit mentio, quarum tamen alium Authorem non habemus niſi Manethonem Sebennytam, Sacerdotem Ægyptium, quem ante tempora Alexandri, quicquid dicat Scaliger, in Ægypto floruiſſe comperio.* Certainly ſome more than ordinary evidence may be expected after ſo confident an affirmation; but whatever that perſon be in other undertakings, he is as unhappy a perſon in Philology, as any that have pretended ſo much acquaintance with it. One would think, he that had been twenty years, as he tells us himſelf, courting the *Ægyptian* Myſteries for compaſſing his *Oedipus*, ſhould have found ſome better arguments to prove an aſſertion of this nature, than meerly the teſtimony of *Joſephus*, the *Hebrew* book *Juchaſin*, and ſome *Arabic* Writers, not one of all which do mention the thing they are brought for, *viz. that* Manetho *was elder than* Alexander. All the buſineſs

Oedip. Ægypt. To. 1. Syn. c. 9.

is,

is, they quote him as an ancient Writer; but what then? The Author of the book *Juchaſin* was *Abraham Zachuth*, a *Jew* of *Salamanca*, who writ in the year of our Lord 1505. and this book was firſt printed at *Conſtantinople* 1556. Might not this man then well mention *Manetho* as an ancient Writer, if he flouriſhed above 1600 years before him, in the time of *Ptolemæus Philadelphus*? And what if ſome *Arabic* Writers mention him? Are they of ſo great antiquity and credit themſeves, that it is an evidence *Manetho* lived in *Alexander*'s time to be praiſed by them? It would be well, if *Kircher*, and other learned men, who think the world is grown to ſo great ſtupidity, as to believe every thing to be a jewel which is far fetched, would firſt aſſert and vindicate the antiquity and fidelity of their *Arabic* Authors, ſuch as *Gelaldinus*, *Abenephi*, and many others, before they expect we ſhould part with our more authentic Records of Hiſtory for thoſe fabulous relations which they are ſo full fraught withal. Were it here any part of my preſent buſineſs, it were an eaſy matter ſo to lay open the ignorance, falſity, and fabulouſneſs of thoſe *Arabians* whom that Author relies ſo much upon, that he could not be freed from a deſign to impoſe upon the world, who makes uſe of their teſtimony in matter of ancient times without a *Caveat*. I know none fit to believe theſe *Arabic* Writers as to theſe things, but thoſe who have faith enough to concoct the *Rabbins* in matter of Hiſtory; of whom *Origen* ſaith, πάνυ μὲν τῶν Ἰουδαίων τῶν νῦν μυθικὸς καὶ λῆρος. who are, as *Grotius* truly ſaith, *peſſimi hiſtoriæ Magiſtri; nam ex quo patria expulſi ſunt, omnis apud illos hiſtoria craſſis erroribus & fabulis eſt inquinata, quibus & proinde nihil credendum eſt, niſi aliunde teſtes acceſſerint*. And *Iſ. Caſaubon* paſſeth this ſharp but due cenſure upon them, *Rabbinis, ubi de lingua Hebraïca agitur & vocis alicujus proprietate, vel aliquo Talmudico inſtituto merito à Chriſtianis tribui non parum; ubi vero à verbis venitur ad res, aut ad hiſtoriam, vel rerum antiquarum veteris populi explicationem, niſi falli & decipi volumus, nihil admodum eſſe illis fidei habendum. Sexcentis argumentis hoc facile probarem, ſi id nunc agerem*. And in reference to their ancient Rites as well as Hiſtory *Joſeph Scaliger* hath given this verdict of them, *Manifeſta eſt Judæorum inſcitia, qui cum uſu veterum rituum etiam eorum cognitionem amiſerunt, ut multa quæ ad eorum ſacra & hiſtoriam pertinent, longe melius nos teneamus quam ipſi*. The ſame which theſe very learned perſons ſay of *Rabbinical*, may with as much truth be ſaid of theſe *Arabic* Writers, in matters of ancient hiſtory, which I have here inſerted, to ſhew the reaſon why I have thought the teſtimony of either of theſe two ſorts of perſons ſo inconſiderable in the matter of our future diſcourſe; which being hiſtorical, and that of the greateſt antiquity, little relief is to be expected from either of them in order thereto. But to return to *Kircher*. It is freely granted, that *Joſephus*, an Author of credit and age ſufficient to give his opinion in this caſe, doth very frequently cite *Manetho* in his *Ægyptian* Hiſtory; particularly in his learned books againſt *Appion*; but where he doth give the leaſt intimation of *Manetho* being elder than *Alexander*, I am yet to ſeek. But *Kircher* will not yet leave the matter ſo, but undertakes to give an account of the miſtake; which is, That there were two *Manetho*'s beſides, and both *Ægyptians*,

Origen. C. Celſ. l. 2.

Grotius Annot. in Matth. 24. 24.

Caſaub. Exercit. ad Baron. 16. S. 8.

Scaliger de Emend. Temp. l. 6.

ptians, mentioned by *Suidas*; one a *Mendesian*, who writ of the Preparation of the *Ægyptian* κῦφι, a kind of Perfume used by the *Ægyptian* Priests. The other a *Diospolitan*, who writ some Physiological and Astronomical Treatises, whose works he hears are preserved in the Duke of *Florence* his Library; and this was he (saith he) who lived in the times of *Augustus*, whom many by the equivocation of the name have confounded with the ancient Writer of the *Ægyptian* Dynasties. Is it possible so learned a *Jesuite* should discover so little judgment in so few words? For, *first*, who ever asserted the writer of the Dynasties to have lived in the time of *Augustus?* Yet, *secondly*, if that *Manetho* whom *Suidas* there speaks of lived in *Augustus* his time according to *Kircher*, then it must necessarily follow, that the Compiler of the Dynasties did: for it is evident to any one that looks into *Suidas*, that he there speaks of the same *Manetho*, for these are his words: Μανεθῶς, ὁ Διοσπόλεως ἀπ' Αἰγύπτου, ὁ Σεβεννύτης, φυσιολογικά, *&c.* Can any thing be more plain than that he here speaks of *Manetho Sebennyta*, who was the Author of the Dynasties, tho' he might write other things besides, of which *Suidas* there speaks? But *Kircher* very wisely, in translating *Suidas* his words, leaves out Σεβεννύτης, which decides the controversy, and makes it clear, that he speaks of the same *Manetho* of whom we have been discoursing. Thus it still appears that this *Manetho* is no elder than the time of *Ptolemee Philadelphus*, which was the thing to be proved.

x. Now for *Berosus*, altho' the *Chaldæans* had occasion enough given them before this time, to produce their Antiquities by the *Jews* converse with them in *Babylon*; yet we find this Author the first who durst adventure them abroad, such as they were, in *Greek*. Now that this *Berosus* published his History after the time mentioned, I thus prove. *Tatianus Assyrius* tells us that he writ the *Chaldaïc* History in three Books, and dedicated them to *Antiochus*, τῷ μὲν Σέλευκου τρίτῳ, as it is read in the fragment of *Tatianus*, preserved in *Eusebius*; but it must be acknowledged that in the *Paris* edition of *Tatianus*, as well as the *Basil*, it is thus read, κατ' Ἀλέξανδρον γεγονὼς, Ἀντιόχῳ τῷ μετ' αὐτὸν τρίτῳ, here it relates to the *third* from *Alexander*, in the other, to the *third* from *Seleucus*; Now if we reckon the *third* so as to take in the person from whom we reckon for the *first*, according to the reading in *Eusebius*, it falls to be *Antiochus* called Θεὸς; according to the other reading it falls to be *Antiochus Soter*; for *Seleucus* succeded *Alexander* in the Kingdom of *Syria*; *Antiochus Soter*, *Seleucus*; *Antiochus* Θεὸς, *Antiochus Soter*. But according to either of these readings, our purpose is sufficiently proved. For *Antiochus Soter* began to reign in *Syria* in the *sixth* year of *Ptol. Philadelphus* in *Ægypt*; *Antiochus* Θεὸς succeded him in the 22d year of *Philadelphus*; now the sooneſt that the history of *Berosus* could come forth, must be in the reign of *Antiochus Soter*, which according to our accounts is some competent time after the translation of the Scripture into *Greek*. But if it were not till the time of *Antiochus* Θεὸς, we cannot but imagine that the report of the account of ancient times in the Scriptures was sufficiently divulged before the publishing of this history of *Berosus*; and, it may be, *Berosus* might somewhat sooner than others understand all transactions at *Alexandria*, because the

Euseb. præ-Evang. l. 10. p. 289. ed. R. Steph.

V. Scal. de Emend. Temp. l. 5. p. 392.

place

place of his chief reſidence was where *Ptolemee Philadelphus* was born, which was in the Iſle of *Cos*. But *Voſſius* goes another way to work, to prove the time of *Beroſus*, which is this. He quotes it out of *Pliny* that *Beroſus* recorded the hiſtory of 480 years, which, ſaith he, muſt be reckoned from the Æra of *Nabonaſſár*. Now this began in the ſecond year of the 8th *Olympiad*, from which time if we reckon 480 years, it falls upon the latter end of *Antiochus Soter*; and ſo his Hiſtory could not come out before the 22d of *Ptolemee Philadelphus*, or very little before. Thus we have made it evident, That theſe two great Hiſtorians are younger even than the tranſlation of the Bible into *Greek*, by which it appears probable that they were provoked to publiſh their fabulous Dynaſties to the world. And ſo much to ſhew the inſufficiency of the *Chaldean* Hiſtory, as to the account of ancient times: Which we ſhall conclude with the cenſure of *Strabo*, a grave and judicious Author, concerning the antiquities of the *Perſians*, *Medes*, and *Syrians*; *which*, ſaith he, *have not obtained any great credit in the world*, διὰ τὴν τῶν συγγραφέων ἀπλότητα καὶ φιλομυθίαν, *becauſe of the ſimplicity and fabulouſneſs of their Hiſtorians*. From hence we ſee then that there is no great credibility in thoſe Hiſtories, which are impeached of falſhood by the moſt grave and judicious of Heathen Writers.

Voſſius de Hiſt. Grac. li. 1. c. 13. Plin. hiſt. nat. l. 7. c. 57.

Strab. l. 11.

CHAP. IV.

The defect of the *Grecian* Hiſtory.

I. *That manifeſted by three evident arguments of it.* (1.) *The fabulouſneſs of the Poetical age of* Greece. *The Antiquity of Poetry.* II. *Of* Orpheus *and the ancient Poets. Whence the Poetical Fables borrowed.* III. *The advancement of Poetry and Idolatry together in* Greece. IV. *The different cenſures of* Strabo *and* Eratoſthenes *concerning the Poetical age of* Greece; *and the reaſons of them.* V. (2.) *The eldeſt Hiſtorians of* Greece *are of ſuſpected credit. Of* Damaſtes, Ariſteus, *and others*; VI. *of moſt of their eldeſt Hiſtorians we have nothing left but their Names, of others only the Subjects they treated of, and ſome Fragments.* VIII. (3.) *Thoſe that are extant either confeſs their ignorance of eldeſt times, or plainly diſcover it. Of the firſt ſort are* Thucydides *and* Plutarch. IX. *Several evidences of the* Grecians *ignorance of the true original of Nations.* X. *Of* Herodotus *and his miſtakes.* XI. *The* Greeks *ignorance in Geography diſcovered, and thence their inſufficiency as to an account of ancient Hiſtory.*

DEſcend we now to the Hiſtory of *Greece*; to ſee whether the Metropolis of Arts and Learning can afford us any account of ancient times, that may be able to make us in the leaſt queſtion 1.

the account given of them in ſacred Scriptures. We have already manifeſted the defect of *Greece* as to Letters and ancient Records, but yet it may be pretended that her Hiſtorians, by the excellency of their wits and ſearching abroad into other Nations, might find a more certain account of ancient times, than other Nations could obtain. There is no body, who is any thing acquainted with the *Grecian* humor, but will ſay they were beholding to their Wits for moſt of their Hiſtories; they being ſome of the earlieſt Writers of Romances in the world, if all fabulous narrations may bear that name. But laying aſide at preſent all their Poetic *Mythology*, as it concerns their Gods, (which we may have occaſion to enquire into afterwards) we now examin only their credibility, where they pretend to be moſt hiſtorical. Yet how far they are from meriting belief even in theſe things, will appear to any that ſhall conſider; *firſt*, That their moſt ancient Writers were Poetical and apparently fabulous; *ſecondly*, That their eldeſt Hiſtorians are of ſuſpected credit even amongſt themſelves; *thirdly*, That their beſt Hiſtorians either diſcover or confeſs abundance of ignorance as to the hiſtory of ancient times. *Firſt*, That their firſt Writers were poetical, and apparently fabulous. *Strabo* undertakes to prove that Proſe is only an imitation of Poetry, and ſo Poetry muſt needs be firſt written. *For*, ſaith he, *at firſt Poetry only was in requeſt; afterwards in imitation of that*, Cadmus, Pherecydes, *and* Hecatæus *writ their hiſtories, obſerving all other laws of Poetry, but only the meaſures of it; but by degrees Writers began to take greater liberty, and ſo brought it down from that lofty ſtrain it was then in, to the form now in uſe: as the Comical ſtrain is nothing elſe but a depreſſing the ſublimer ſtyle of Tragedy.* This he proves becauſe ἄδειν did anciently ſignify the ſame with φράζειν; for Poems were only λόγοι μεμελισμένοι, Leſſons fit to be ſung among them: thence, ſaith he, is the original of the Ῥαψῳδίαι, &c. for theſe were thoſe Poems which were ſung ἐπὶ ῥάβδου, when they held a branch of Laurel in their hands, as *Plutarch* tells us they were wont to ſing *Homer*'s *Ilias*; others were ſung to the Harp, as *Heſiod*'s Ἔργα: beſides, ſaith *Strabo*, that Proſe is called ὁ πεζὸς λόγος, argues that it is only a bringing down of the higher ſtrain in uſe before. But however this were in general; as to the *Grecians*, it is evident that Poetry was firſt in uſe among them; for in their elder times when they firſt began to creep out of Barbariſm, all the Philoſophy and Inſtruction they had was from their Poets, and all couched in Verſe; which *Plutarch* not only confirms, but particularly inſtanceth in *Orpheus*, *Heſiod*, *Parmenides*, *Xenophanes*, *Empedocles*, and *Thales*; and hence *Horace de arte Poëtica* ſays of the ancient Poets before *Homer*,

Strabo l. 1.

Plutarch. Sympoſ.

Plutarch. de Pyth. Orac. p. 403.

> ——*fuit hæc ſapientia quondam*
> *Publica privatis ſecernere, ſacra profanis:*
> *Concubitu prohibere vago: dare jura maritis:*
> *Oppida moliri: leges incidere ligno.*
> *Sic honor & nomen divinis vatibus atque*
> *Carminibus venit.*

Heinſ. Diſſ. in Heſ. cap. 6.

From hence, as *Heinſius* obſerves, the Poets were anciently called Διδάσκαλοι; and the ancient ſpeeches of the Philoſophers containing matters

matters of Morality, were called Ἀσματα καὶ Ἀδόμενα, of which many are mentioned in their Lives by *Diogenes Laërtius*; in the ſame ſenſe were *Carmina* anciently uſed among the *Latines* for Precepts of Morality, as in that collection of them, which goes under the name of *Cato*, (which ſome think to be an ancient piece, but with a falſe inſcription, but *Boxhornius* thinks it to be of ſome Chriſtians doing in the decay of the *Roman* Empire,) *Si Deus eſt animus, nobis ut Carmina dicunt. Carmina*, ſaith *Heinſius*, i. e. *dicta Philoſophorum; cauſa eſt, quia dicta illa brevia, quibus ſententias ſuas de Deo deque reliquis includebant,* ἀδόμενα *dicebant*, i. e. *Carmina.* *Boxhorn. Qu. Rom. c. 14.*

II. When Poetry came firſt into requeſt among the *Grecians*, is ſomewhat uncertain; but this is plain and evident, that the intention of it was not meerly for inſtruction, but as *Strabo* expreſſeth it, δημαγωγεῖν καὶ ψυχαγωγεῖν ἐπὶ τὰ πλήθη, *the more gently to draw the people on to idolatry.* For as he ſaith, *it is impoſſible to perſwade women and the promiſcuous multitude to religion by meer dry reaſon or philoſophy,* ‘ἀλλὰ δεῖ ἐκ λόγῳ δεισιδαιμονίας, τοῦτο δ' οὐκ ἄνευ μυθοποιΐας καὶ πλασμάτων; *but for this,* ſaith ‘he, *there is need of ſuperſtition, and this cannot be advanced without ſome fables and wonders.* For, ſaith he, *the Thunderbolts, Shields, Tridents, Serpents, Spears attributed to the Gods are meer fables, and ſo is all the ancient Theology; but the Governers of the Commonwealth made uſe of theſe things, the better to aw the ſilly multitude, and to bring them into better order.* I cannot tell how far this might be their end, ſince theſe things were not brought in ſo much by the ſeveral Magiſtrates, as by the endeavour of particular Men, who thought to raiſe up their own eſteem among the vulgar by ſuch things, and were imployed by the great Deceiver of the world as his grand inſtruments to advance Idolatry in it. For which we are to conſider, that altho' there were groſs Ignorance, and conſequently Superſtition enough in *Greece* before the Poetic age of it, yet their ſuperſtitious and idolatrous worſhip was not ſo licked and brought into form, as about the time of *Orpheus*, from whom the Poetic age commenceth: who was as great an inſtrument of ſetting up Idolatry, as *Apollonius* was afterwards of reſtoring it, being both perſons of the higheſt eſteem and veneration among the heathen. Much about the ſame time did thoſe live in the world who were the firſt great promoters of Superſtition and Poetry, as *Melampus*, *Muſæus*, *Arion Methymnæus*, *Amphion* of *Thebes*, and *Eumolpus Thrax*, none of whom were very diſtant from the time of *Orpheus*. Of whom *Clemens Alexandrinus* thus ſpeaks, πρόσχημα μουσικῆς λυμαινόμενοι τὸν βίον σοφίσματι ἰατρικῷ τινὶ γοητείας——τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐπὶ τὰ εἴδωλα χειραγωγοῦσι πρῶτοι. *Theſe under a pretenſe of Muſic and Poetry corrupting the lives of men, did by a kind of artificial Magic firſt draw them on to the practiſe of Idolatry.* For the novelty and pleaſingneſs of Muſic and Poetry did preſently inſinuate it ſelf into the minds of men, and thereby drew them to a venerable eſteem both of the perſons and practiſes of thoſe who were the Authors of them. So *Conon* in *Photius* tells us that *Orpheus* was excedingly acceptable to the people for his skill in Muſic, which the *Thracians* and *Macedonians* were much delighted with: From which aroſe the fable of his drawing trees and wild beaſts after him, becauſe *Clem. Al. Protreptic. p. 3.* *Phot. Bibl. Cod. 186. ſect. 45.*

becauſe his Muſic had ſo great an influence upon the civilizing that people, who were almoſt grown rude thro' Ignorance and Barbariſm: and ſo *Horace* explains it,

Horat. Ep. ad Piſon.

Sylveſtres homines ſacer interpreſque Deorum
Cædibus & victu fœdo deterruit Orpheus,
Dictus ab hoc lenire Tigres rabidoſque Leones.

This *Orpheus* by *Mythologiſts* is uſually called the ſon of *Calliope*, but may with better reaſon be called the Father of the whole Chorus of Muſes, than the Son of one of them; ſince *Pindar* calls him Πατὴρ ἀοιδᾶς, and *John Tzetzes* tells us he was called the ſon of *Calliope*, ὡς καλλιλογίας ποιητικῆς εὑρετὴς καὶ ὑμνων τῶν εἰς τοὺς θεούς, *as the inventor of poetical elegancy, and the ſacred Hymns which were made to the Gods:* (which the old *Romans* called *Aſſamenta*) and *Juſtin Martyr* calls him ὁ πολυθεότητος πρῶτον διδάσκαλον, *the firſt teacher of Polytheiſm and Idolatry.*

Schol. in Heſiod. p. 8.

Paraneſ. 1.

III. For this *Orpheus* having been in *Ægypt*, as *Pauſanias*, *Diodorus*, and *Artapanus* in *Euſebius* all confeſs, he brought from thence moſt of the Magical rites and ſuperſtitious cuſtoms in uſe there, and ſet them up among the *Grecians*; ſo *Diodorus* acknowledgeth in the ſame place; and it is likewiſe evident by what *Ariſtophanes* ſaith in his Βάτραχοι,

Pauſ. Eliac. 2.
Diod. Bibl. lib. 1.
Euſ. Præp. l. 10.

Ariſtoph. Ran. Act. 4. ſc. 2.

Ὀρφεὺς μὲν ἡμᾶς πλείστας θ' ἡμῶν κατέδειξε, φόνων τ' ἀπέχεσθαι.

Orpheus *firſt inſtructed them in the ſacred myſteries, and to abſtain from ſlaughter:* which is to be underſtood of the Θυσίαι, *the killing of beaſts in ſacrifice*, which probably was in uſe among them before, as a remainder of ancient tradition, till *Orpheus* brought his *Ægyptian* doctrine into requeſt among them. The myſteries of *Oſiris*, ſaith *Diodorus*, were tranſplanted into *Greece* under the name of *Dionyſus* or *Bacchus*, and *Iſis* under *Ceres* or *Magna Mater*, and the puniſhment and pleaſures after this life from the rites of Sepulture among them; *Charon*'s wafting of Souls, from the lake *Acheruſia* in *Ægypt*, over which they were wont to ſend the dead bodies. *Pauſanias* tells us, that the *Spartans* derived the worſhip of *Ceres Chthonia* from *Orpheus*, and the *Æginetæ* the worſhip of *Hecate*. Beſides which he inſtituted new rites and myſteries of his own, in which the initiated were called Ὀρφεοτελεσταί: and required a moſt ſolemn oath from all of them never to divulge them, which was after obſerved in all thoſe prophane myſteries which in imitation of theſe were ſet up among the *Greeks*. *Strabo* thinks the myſteries of *Orpheus* were in imitation of the old *Cotyttian* and *Bendidian* myſteries among the *Thracians*; but *Herodotus* with more probability parallels them and the *Dionyſian* with the *Ægyptian*, from which we have already ſeen that *Orpheus* derived His; who is conceived by *Georgius Cedrenus* and *Timotheus* in *Euſebius*, to have lived about the time of *Gideon* the Judge of *Iſrael*; but there is too great confuſion concerning his age, to define any thing certainly about it. Which ariſeth moſt from the ſeveral perſons going under this name, of which, beſides this, were in all probability

Pauſ. Lac. p. 95. Corinth. p. 72.
Vide Cal. Rhod. Ant. Lect. l. 15. p. 9.
Strab. l. 10.
Herod. Euterp. p. 134. Ed. H. St.

bility two more; the one an Heroic Poet, called by *Suidas*, *Cicones*, or *Arcas*, who lived two ages before *Homer*, and he that goes under the name of *Orpheus*, whose Hymns are still extant, but are truly ascribed to *Onomacritus* the *Athenian*, by *Clemens Alexandrinus*, *Tatianus Assyrius*, *Suidas*, and others; who flourished in the times of the *Pisistratidæ* at *Athens*. We are like then to have little relief for finding out of truth in the Poetic age of *Greece*, when the main design of the Learning then used was only to insinuate the belief of Fables into the people, and by that to awe them into Idolatry. *Suid. in Ὀρφ.*

IV. If we come lower down to the succeeding Poets, we may find Fables increasing still in the times of *Homer*, *Hesiod*, and the rest, which made *Eratosthenes*, a person of great judgment and learning (whence he was called *alter Plato*, and πίνδαλος, and τὸ βῆτα, because he carried, if not the *first*, yet the *second* place in all kind of Literature) condemn the ancient Poetry as γραώδη μυθολογίαν, *a company of old Wives tales*, which were invented for nothing but to please silly people, and had no real learning or truth at all in them. For this, tho' he be sharply censured by *Strabo*, in his first book, who undertakes to vindicate the Geography of *Homer* from the exceptions of *Eratosthenes*; yet himself cannot but confess that there is a very great mixture of old fables in all their Poets, *which is*, saith he, *partly to delight the people, and partly to aw them. For the minds of men being always desirous of novelties, such things do hugely please the natural humors of weak people; especially if there be something in them that is* θαυμασὸν & παραδοξὸς, *very strange and wonderful, it increaseth the delight in hearing it;* ὅπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ μανθάνειν φίλτρον, *which draws them on to a desire of hearing more of it. And by this means*, saith he, *are children first brought on to learning, and all ignorant persons are kept in aw; nay, and the more learned themselves* (partly for want of reason and judgment, and partly from the remainder of those impressions which these things made upon them when they were children) *cannot shake off that former credulity which they had as to these things.* By which discourse of *Strabo*, tho' intended wholly by him in vindication of poetic Fables, it is plain and evident what great disservice hath been done to Truth by them, by reason they had no other Records to preserve their ancient History but these fabulous Writers. And therefore supposing a mixture of truth and falshood together, which *Strabo* contends for; yet what way should be taken to distinguish the true from the false; when they had no other certain Records? And besides, he himself acknowledgeth how hard a matter it is even for wise men to excuss those fabulous narrations out of their minds, which were insinuated into them by all the advantages which prejudice, custom and, education could work upon them. Granting then there may be some truth at the bottom of their fabulous narrations;

Ὡς δ' ὅτε τὸν χρυσὸν ἀνὴρ ἀργύρῳ ἀνήρ, *Homer. Odyss. 3.*

which may be gilded over with some pleasant tales, as himself compares it; yet how shall those come to know that it is only gilded, that never saw any pure metal, and did always believe that it was

what it ſeemed to be? Had there been any Κριτήριον, or Touch-ſtone to have differenced between the one and the other, there might have been ſome way for a ſeparation of them; but there being none ſuch, we muſt conclude, that the fabulous narrations of Poets inſtead of making truth more pleaſant by their fictions, have ſo adulterated it, that we cannot find any credibility at all in their narrations of elder times, where the truth of the ſtory hath had no other way of conveyance but thro' their fictions.

V. But tho' Poets may be allowed their liberty for repreſenting things to the greateſt advantage to the palates of their Readers, yet we may juſtly expect, when men profeſs to be Hiſtorical, they ſhould deliver us nothing but what upon ſtricteſt examination may prove undoubted truth. Yet even this were the *Greeks* far from; for

Strab. l. 1. *Strabo* himſelf confeſſeth of their eldeſt Hiſtorians, Καὶ οἱ πρῶτοι δὲ ἱστορικοὶ καὶ φυσικοὶ μυθογράφοι, *their firſt Hiſtorians both of perſons and things were fabulous.* *Diodorus* particularly inſtanceth in their eldeſt Hiſtorians, as *Cadmus Mileſius*, *Hecatæus*, and *Hellanicus*, and condemns them for fabulouſneſs. *Strabo* condemns *Damaſtes Sigeenſis* for vanity and falſhood, and wonders at *Eratoſthenes* for making uſe of him; yet this man is of great antiquity among them, and his teſtimony uſed by Authors of good credit, as *Dionyſius Halicarnaſſenſis*, *Plutarch*, and others. Nay, *Pliny* profeſſeth to follow him, and ſo he doth *Ariſteas Proconneſius* in his *Arimaſpia*, which may render the credit of his Hiſtory very ſuſpicious; with whom it was a ſufficient ground of credibility to any ſtory, That he found it in ſome *Greek* Authors. *Strabo* reckons *Damaſtes* with *Euhemerus Meſſenius* and *Antiphanes Bergæus*; which latter was ſo noted a lyar, that from him, as *Stephanus* tells us, Βιργαΐζειν was uſed as a proverb for *to ſpeak never a word of truth.* *Ariſteas Proconneſius* lived in the time of *Cyrus*, and writ a Hiſtory of the *Arimaſpi*, in three Books, who ſeems to have been the Sir *John Mandevil* of *Greece*, from his ſtories of the *Arimaſpi* with one eye in their foreheads, and their continual fighting the *Gryphens* for gold; yet the ſtory was taken upon truſt by *Herodotus*, *Pliny*, and many others; tho' the experience of all who have viſited thoſe northern Climats do ſufficiently refute theſe follies. *Strabo* ſaith of this *Ariſteas*, that he was ἀνὴρ γοητικὸς οὐδενὸς ἀποδεὴς, *one inferior to none for juggling*, which cenſure was probably occaſioned by the common ſtory of him, that he could let his ſoul out of his body when he pleaſed and bring it again; yet this Juggler did *Celſus* pitch on to confront with our bleſſed *Saviour*, as *Hierocles* did on *Apollonius*: ſo much have thoſe been to ſeek for Reaſon, who have ſought to oppoſe the doctrine of Faith.

V. Caſaub. in Strab. l. 1. Voſſ. de hiſt. Græc. l. 4. c. 5.

Stephan. in Βίργη.

Strab. l. 13.

VI. But further, what credit can we give to thoſe Hiſtorians who have ſtriven to confute each other, and lay open one anothers falſhood to the world. Where was there ever any ſuch diſſonancy in the ſacred Hiſtory of Scripture? doth the Writer of one book diſcover the weakneſs of another? do not all the parts ſo exactly agree, that the moſt probable ſuſpicion could ever fall into the heart of an Infidel, is, that they were all written by the ſame perſon, which yet the ſeries of times manifeſts to have been impoſſible? But now, if we look into the ancient *Greek* Hiſtorians, we need no other teſtimony than themſelves to take away their credi-

credibility. The Genealogies of *Heſiod* are corrected by *Acuſilaus*, *Acuſilaus* is condemned by *Hellanicus*, *Hellanicus* accuſed of falſhood by *Ephorus*, *Ephorus* by *Timæus*, *Timæus* by ſuch who followed him, as *Joſephus* fully ſhews. Where muſt we then fix our belief? upon all in common? that is the ready way to believe contradictions: for they condemn one another of falſhood. Muſt we believe one, and reject the reſt? but what evidence doth that one give why he ſhould be credited more than the reſt? And their eldeſt Hiſtorians are acknowledged to be moſt fabulous: [which is a moſt irrefragable argument againſt the *Grecian* hiſtory:] For our only recourſe for deciding the controverſy among the younger Hiſtorians, muſt be to the elder: and there we are further to ſeek than ever; for the firſt ages are confeſſed to be Poetical, and to have no certainty of truth in them. So that it is impoſſible to find out any undoubted certainty of ancient times among the *Greek* Hiſtorians; which will be yet more evident when we add this, That there are very few extant of thoſe Hiſtorians, who did carry the greateſt name for Antiquity. *Joſeph. C. Appion. l. 1.*

VII. The higheſt Antiquity of the *Greek* Hiſtorians doth not much exceed the time of *Cyrus* and *Cambyſes*, as *Voſſius* hath fully demonſtrated in his learned Book, *De Hiſtoricis Græcis*, and therefore I ſhall ſpare particular enquiries into their ſeveral ages. Only theſe two things will further clear the inſufficiency of the *Greek* Hiſtory, as to an account of ancient times: *Firſt*, That of many of theſe old Hiſtorians we have nothing left but their mere names, without any certainty of what they treated. Such are *Siſyphus Cous*, *Corinnus*, *Eugeon Samius*, *Deïochus Proconneſius*, *Eudemus Parius*, *Democles Phigaleus*, *Ameleſagoras Chalcedonius*, *Xenomedes Chius*, and ſeveral others whoſe names are recorded by ſeveral Writers, and liſted by *Voſſius* among the Hiſtorians; but no evidence what ſubject of hiſtory was handled by them. *Secondly*, That of thoſe whoſe not only memories are preſerved, but ſome evidence of what they writ, we have nothing extant till the time of the *Perſian* war. For all that was writ before, is now conſumed by time, and ſwallowed up in that vaſt and all-devouring Gulph; in which yet their heads ſtill appear above the waters, to tell us what once they informed the world of. It cannot be denied, but if many of thoſe ancient Hiſtories were yet remaining, we might probably have ſome greater light into ſome matters of fact in the elder times of *Greece*, which now we are wholly to ſeek for, unleſs we think to quench our thirſt in the muddy waters of ſome fabulous Poets. For what is now become of the antiquities of *Ionia* and the city *Miletus* written by *Cadmus Mileſius*, ſuppoſed to be the firſt Writer of Hiſtory? where lie the *Genealogie* of *Acuſilaus Argivus?* where is now extant the *Hiſtory of the Gods* written by *Pherecydes Syrius*, *Pythagoras* his Maſter? or the *Chronica* of *Archilochus* who flouriſhed about the 20th *Olympiad?* or thoſe of *Theagenes Rheginus?* Where may we hope to meet with *Pherecydes Lerius* his *Attic Antiquities*, or his *Catalogue of Cities and Nations?* or *Hecatæus* his *Deſcription* of *Aſia*, and ſome ſuppoſe of *Libya* and *Europe* too? or the *Originals of Nations and Founders of Cities* written by *Hellanicus?* How may we come by the *Perſic*, *Greek* and *Ægyptian* Hiſtory of *Charon Lampſacenus*;

cenus; the *Lydian* Hiſtory of *Xanthus Lydius*; the *Samian* Antiquities of *Simmias Rhodius*; the *Corinthian* Hiſtory of *Eumelus Corinthius*; *Panyaſis* his Antiquities of *Greece*; the *Scythian* Hiſtory of *Anacharſis*; the *Phrygian* of *Diagoras*; the *Chaldaïc* and *Perſian* of *Democritus*; the *Sicilian* and *Italian* of *Hippys Rhegi-nus*; the *Telchiniac* Hiſtory of *Teleclides*? All theſe are now buried with many more in the rubbiſh of time, and we have nothing but meer ſceletons of them left, to tell us, that once ſuch perſons were, and thought themſelves concerned to give the world ſome account of their being in it. Whereby may be likewiſe ſeen the remarkable providence of God, concerning the Sacred hiſtory, which tho' of far greater antiquity than any of theſe, hath ſurvived them all, and is ſtill preſerved with us with as much purity and incorruption as a book paſſing thro' ſo many hands was capable of. But of that in its due place.

VIII. But yet if the *Greek* Hiſtorians that are yet extant, were of more undoubted credit than thoſe that are loſt, we might eaſily bear with our loſing ſome old ſtories, if we gained ſome authentic hiſtory by it accompliſhed in all its parts: but even this we are far from in the *Greek* Hiſtory; for the Hiſtorians themſelves do either confeſs their own ignorance of ancient times, or do moſt palpably diſcover it, which was the *third* and laſt conſideration touching the credibility of the *Grecian* Hiſtory. That moſt grave and accurate Hiſtorian *Thucydides* than whom ſcarce ever any *Grecian* diſcovered more an impartial love to the truth in what he writ, doth not only confeſs, but largely prove the impoſſibility of an exact account to be given of the times preceding the *Peloponneſian* War, in the entrance into his Hiſtory: *For*, ſaith he, *the matter preceding that time cannot now through the length of time be accurately diſcovered or found out by us.* All that he could find in the ancient ſtate of *Greece* was a deal of confuſion, unquiet ſtations, frequent removals, continual piracies, and no ſettled form of Commonwealth. What certain account can be then expected of thoſe times, when a moſt judicious Writer, even of *Athens* its ſelf, acknowledgeth ſuch a *Chaos* in their ancient Hiſtory? And *Plutarch*, a later Author indeed, but ſcarce behind any of them, if we believe *Taurus* in *A. Gellius*, for learning and prudence, dares not, we ſee, venture any further back than the time of *Theſeus*; for before that time, as he compares it, as Geographers in their Maps, when they have gone as far as they can, fill up the empty ſpace with ſome unpaſſable Mountains, or frozen Seas, or devouring Sands; ſo thoſe who give an account of elder times, are fain to inſert μυθικὰ & τερατώδη, ſome wonderful and tragical Stories, which (as he ſaith) have neither any truth nor certainty in them. Thus we ſee thoſe who were beſt able to judge of the *Greek* Antiquities, can find no ſure footing to ſtand on in them; and what baſis can we find for our Faith, where they could find ſo little for their Knowledge? And thoſe who have been more daring and venturous than theſe perſons mentioned, what a labyrinth have they run themſelves into? how many confuſions and contradictions have they involved themſelves in? ſometimes writing the paſſages of other Countries for thoſe of *Greece*, and at other times ſo confounding times, perſons and places, that one might think they had

had only a deſign upon the underſtandings of their Readers, to make them play at Blind-mans-buff in ſearching for the Kings of *Greece*.

But as they are ſo confuſed in their own Hiſtory, ſo they are as ignorant and fabulous when they dare venture over their own IX. threſholds and look abroad into other Countries; we certainly ow a great part of the lamentable ignorance of the true original of moſt Nations to the pitiful account the *Greek* Authors have given of them; which have had the fortune to be entertained in the world with ſo much eſteem and veneration, that it hath been thought learning enough to be acquainted with the account which they give of Nations. Which I doubt not hath been the great reaſon ſo many fabulous relations, not only of Nations but Perſons and ſeveral Animals never exiſting, have met with ſo much entertainment from the leſs inquiſitive world. The *Greek* Writers, it is evident, took up things upon truſt as much as any people in the world did, being a very weak and inconſiderable Nation at firſt: and afterwards the knowledg they had was generally borrowed from other Nations, which the wiſe men only ſuited to the temper of the *Greeks*, and ſo made it more fabulous than it was before. As it was certainly the great defect of the Natural Philoſophy of the *Greeks*, (as it hath been ever ſince in the world) that they were ſo ready to form Theories upon ſome Principles or Hypotheſes, which they only received by tradition from others, without fetching their knowledg from the experiments of Nature; and to theſe they ſuited all the phænomena of nature; and what was not ſuitable was re-ſted as monſtrous and anomalous: ſo it was in their Hiſtory, wherein they had ſome fabulous Hypotheſes they took for granted without enquiring into the truth and certainty of them, and to theſe they ſuit whatever light they gained in after-times of the ſtate of foreign Nations, which hath made Truth and Antiquity wreſtle ſo much with the corruption which eat into them thro' the pride and ignorance of the *Greeks*. Hence they have always ſuited the Hiſtory of other Nations with the account they give of their own; and where nothing could ſerve out of their own Hiſtory to give an account of the Original of other Nations, they (who were never backward at fictions) have made a Founder of them ſuitable to their own language. The truth is, there is nothing in the world uſeful or beneficial to mankind, but they have made ſhift to find the Author of it among themſelves. If we enquire after the original of Agriculture, we are told of *Ceres* and *Triptolemus*; if of Paſturage, we are told of an *Arcadian Pan*; if of Wine, we preſently hear of a *Liber Pater*: if of Iron inſtruments, then who but *Vulcan*? if of Muſic, none like to *Apollo*. If we preſs them then with the Hiſtory of other Nations, they are as well provided here: if we enquire an account of *Europe*, *Aſia*, or *Libya*; for the firſt we are told a fine ſtory of *Cadmus*'s Siſter; for the *ſecond* of *Prometheus*'s Mother of that name, and for the *third* of a Daughter of *Epaphus*. If we are yet ſo curious as to know the original of particular Countries; then *Italy* muſt find its name from a Calf of *Hercules*, becauſe ἰταλὸς in *Greek* will ſignify ſome ſuch thing; *Sardinia* and *Africa* muſt be from *Sardos* and *Afer* two ſons of *Hercules*; but yet if theſe will not ſerve, *Hercules* ſhall not want for children to people the world; for we hear

of *Scythes*, *Galatas*, *Lydus*, ſome other ſons of his, that gave names to *Scythia*, *Lydia*, and *Galatia*; with the ſame probability that *Media* had its name from *Medea*, and *Spain* and *Luſitania* from *Pan* and *Luſus*, two companions of *Bacchus*. If *Perſia* want a founder, they have one *Perſeus* an *Argive* ready for it; if *Syria*, *Babylonia*, and *Arabia* want reaſons of their names, the prodigal *Greeks* will give *Apollo* three ſons, *Syrus*, *Babylon* and *Arabs*, rather than they ſhall be heretical *Acephaliſts*. This vanity of theirs was univerſal, not confined to any place or age, but as any Nation or People came into their knowledg, their Gods were not ſo decrepit, but they might father one ſon more upon them, rather than any Nation ſhould be *filia Populi*, and want a father. Only the grave *Athenians* thought ſcorn to have any Father aſſigned them; their only ambition was to be accounted *Aborigines & genuini Terræ*, to be the eldeſt ſons of their *teeming mother the Earth*, and to have been born by the ſame equivocal generation that Mice and Frogs are, from the impregnated ſlime of the earth. Are we not like to have a wonderful account of ancient times from thoſe who could arrogate to themſelves ſo much knowledg from ſuch ſlender and thin accounts of the Originals of people which they gave, and would have the world entertain with the greateſt veneration upon their naked words? Have we not indeed great reaſon to hearken to thoſe who did ſo frequently diſcover their affection to Fables, and manifeſt their ignorance when ever they venture upon the hiſtory of other Nations?

X. The truth is, *Herodotus* himſelf (whom *Tully* calls the *Father of Hiſtory*, which title he deſerves at leaſt in regard of antiquity, being the eldeſt of the extant *Greek* Hiſtorians) hath ſtood in need of his Compurgators, who yet have not been able to acquit him of fabulouſneſs, but have ſought to make good his credit by recrimination, or by making it appear that *Herodotus* did not fully believe the ſtories he tells, but took them upon truſt himſelf, and ſo delivers them to the world. Some impute it to the ingenuity of *Herodotus*, that he calls his books of Hiſtory by the name of the *Muſes*, on purpoſe to tell his Readers they muſt not look for meer Hiſtory in him, but a mixture of ſuch relations, which tho' not true, might yet pleaſe and entertain his Readers. Tho' others think they were not ſo inſcribed by himſelf, but the names were given to them by the *Greeks* from the admiration his Hiſtory had among them. However this were, this we are certain, that *Herodotus* was not firſt ſuſpected of falſhood in theſe latter ages of the world, but even among the *Greeks* themſelves there have been found ſome that would undertake to make good that charge againſt him. For ſo *Suidas* tells us of one *Ælius Harpocration*, who writ a book on purpoſe to diſcover the falſhood of *Herodotus*, Περὶ τῆς κατηγορίας τῶν Ἡροδότου ἱστοριῶν. *Plutarch* his books are well known *Of the ſpight or malignity* of *Herodotus*, but the occaſion of that is ſufficiently known likewiſe, becauſe *Herodotus* had given no very favourable character of *Plutarch*'s Country. *Strabo* likewiſe ſeems to accuſe *Herodotus* much of nugacity and mixing prodigious fables with his Hiſtory; but, I confeſs, obſerving the grounds on which *Plutarch* inſiſts againſt *Herodotus*, I am very prone to think that the ground of the great pique in ſome of the *Greek* Writers againſt *Herodotus*, was,

Strabo l. 17.

was, that he told too many tales out of School, and had discovered too much of the Infancy of *Greece*, and how much the *Grecians* borrowed of the *Ægyptian* superstitions: which *Plutarch* expresly speaks of, that *Herodotus* was too much led aside, ὑπὸ Αἰγυπτίων ἀλαζονείας καὶ μυθολογίας τὸ σφοδρότερον ἐπιγόντα τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν ἱερῶν ἀνατρέπων. Altho' therefore *Herodotus* may not be much to blame in the things which the *Grecians* most charge him with, yet those who favour him most cannot excuse his palpable mistakes in some things, and ignorance in others. *Josephus* thinks he was deceived by the *Ægyptian* Priests in things relating to the state of their affairs, of which *Jos. Scaliger* gives many accounts; *Either*, saith he, *the persons who gave him his intelligence were ignorant themselves; or else, like true* Ægyptians, *they were cunning enough, and imposed upon* Herodotus *being a stranger and unacquainted with their artifices; or else he did not understand his Interpreter, or was deceived by him*; or lastly, Herodotus *might have so much of a* Grecian *in him, as to adulterate the true History with some fables of his own*; wherefore he rather adheres to *Manetho* than *Herodotus* as to the *Ægyptian* History: who yet elsewhere (I will not say with what constancy to himself) vouchsafes him this high *Elogium*, that he is, *Scrinium originum Græcarum & Barbararum, auctor à doctis nunquam deponendus.*

Plutarch. de Herod. Mal. p. 857.

Joseph. c. App. l. 1. Scal. Can. Isagog. l. 3.

Idem ad num. Eus. 1572.

XI. It cannot be denied but a great deal of very useful History may be fetched out of him; yet who can excuse his ignorance, when he not only denies there is an Ocean compassing the Land, but condemns the Geographers for asserting it? Unless this might be any plea for his ignorance in Geography, that he had so many great names besides him guilty of the same: Witness *Aristotle*'s suspicion that the *Indies* should be joyned to *Europe* about the Straights, where they feigned *Hercules* his Pillars to be. And the *Theræans* ignorance where any such place as *Libya* was, when the Oracle bid them plant a Colony there. Would it not have been worth one's while to have heard the great noise the Sun used to make every night when he douzed his head in the Ocean, as none of the most ignorant *Greeks* imagined? And to have seen the Sun about *Hercules* his Pillars to be a hundred times bigger than he appeared to them, as they commonly fansied. Was not *Alexander*, think we, well tutored in his Cosmography by his Master *Aristotle*, when he writ word to his Mother, he had found out the head of *Nilus* in the East *Indies?* as *Arrian* relates the story. No wonder then his Souldiers should mistake the mountain *Paropamisus* in the *Indies* for *Caucasus* near *Colchis*, when even their learned men thought *Colchis* the utmost boundary of the world on that side, as *Hercules* his Pillars on this. What a lamentable account then were they able to give of the most ancient times, who were so ignorant of the state of the world in their own time, when Learning was in its hight in *Greece*, and frequent discoveries daily made of the world, by the wars which were made abroad? *Eratosthenes* confesseth the *Grecians* were ignorant of a great part of *Asia* and the Northern parts of *Europe* before *Alexander*'s expedition; and *Strabo* confesseth as much of the Western parts of *Europe* till the *Roman* expeditions thither. *Palus Mæotis* and *Colchis*, saith he, were not fully known till the time of *Mithridates*,

Herod. l. 2. c. 5.

Arrian. Hist. Alex. l. 6.

Strabo l. 1.

dates, nor *Hyrcania*, *Bactriana*, and *Scythia*, till the *Parthian* wars. *Eratosthenes* mentions some who thought the *Arabian* Sea to be only a Lake. And it further argues their ignorance in Geography, that the later Geographers always correct the errors of the elder, as *Ptolemee* doth *Marinus*, *Eratosthenes* those before him, *Hipparchus Eratosthenes*, and *Strabo* not only both them, but *Eudoxus*, *Ephorus*, *Dicæarchus*, *Polybius*, *Posidonius*, and almost all that had writ before him. I insist on these things, not that I would destroy the credibility of any Humane history, where the Authors are guilty of any mistakes (for that were to take away the credit of all Humane History) but to shew how insufficient those Historians are to give us a certain account of the original of Nations, who were so unacquainted with the state of those Nations which they pretend to give an account of. For where there is wanting Divine Revelation (which was not pretended by any *Greek* Historians; and if it had, had been easily refuted) there must be supposed a full and exact knowledg of all things pertaining to that which they pretend to give an account of; and if they discover apparent defect and insufficiency (which hath been largely manifested as to them, in the precedent discourse) we have ground to deny the credibility of those Histories upon the account of such defect and insufficiency. So much then will abundantly suffice for the making good the first argument against the credibility of Profane Histories, as to the account which they give of Ancient times, different from the Word of God.

CHAP. V.

The general uncertainty of Heathen Chronology.

I. *The want of credibility in Heathen History further proved from the uncertainty and confusion in their accounts of Ancient times. That discovered by the uncertain form of their Years.* II. *An enquiry into the different forms of the Ægyptian Years; the first of thirty Days,* III. *The second of four Months; of both Instances given in the Ægyptian history.* IV. *Of the Chaldæan accounts, and the first Dynasties mentioned by* Berosus, *how they may be reduced to probability.* V. *Of the Ægyptian Dynasties of* Manetho. *Reasons of accounting them fabulous, because not attested by any credible authority, and rejected by the best Historians.* VI. *The opinion of* Scaliger *and* Vossius, *concerning their being contemporary, propounded,* VII. *and rejected with reasons against it.* VIII. *Of the ancient division of* Ægypt *into* Nomi *or Provinces, and the number of them, against* Vossius *and* Kircher.

1. THe next thing to manifest how little there is of credibility in the account of ancient times, reported by the histories of heathen Nations, is, the uncertainty, confusion and ambiguity in the

the account they give of thoſe times. If we ſuppoſe them not defective as to their records, if yet we find the account given ſo perplexed, ambiguous and confuſed, that we can find no certainty of the meaning of it, we have very little reaſon to entertain it with any certain aſſent unto it. Now this will be made evident by theſe things. 1. The uncertainty of their Chronology, whereon their whole account depends. 2. The multitude of Impoſtures taken from ancient hiſtories. 3. The uncertain meaning of thoſe Characters wherein their ancient hiſtories were preſerved. I begin with the great uncertainty of the heathen Chronology, which will be manifeſted by two things: *Firſt*, the uncertain form of their years: *Secondly*, the want of certainty of their ἀφετηρίαι, or certain fixed *Epocha's* from which to derive their account of ancient times. *Firſt*, the uncertain form of their years; this of it ſelf is ſufficient to deſtroy the credibility of their accounts of antiquity, if it be manifeſted that they had different forms of years in uſe among them; and it be uncertain to which to refer their accounts they give; for if years be ſometimes lunar, ſometimes ſolar, and ſometimes but of thirty days, ſometimes of four months, ſometimes of three hundred and ſixty days, ſometimes three hundred ſixty five, ſometimes four times three hundred ſixty five in their *tetraëteris*, ſometimes eight times in their *octaëteris*, ſometimes more, what certainty can we poſſibly have which of them to fix their accounts to? Eſpecially when they only give them in general, and never tell us which of them they mean, which may make it ſhrewdly ſuſpicious, that their intent is only to impoſe on our underſtandings, and not to deal fairly and truly with us. We ſhall therefore ſo much explain the different form of their years, as thereby to ſhew what uncertainties we are left to by them: Where we meddle not with their Tropical and Aſtronomical years, but chiefly thoſe which were in civil uſe among the ſeveral Nations we ſpeak to. A year is nothing elſe but a Syſtem of days, and is therefore capable of as great variety, as days are in being joyned together; but uſually there were ſome other leſſer Syſtems of days than thoſe which are called years, out of which the other doth reſult. Such is the ἑπτάημερον, or the week, which, as *Joſeph Scaliger* ſaith, was *res omnibus Orientis populis ab ultima uſque antiquitate uſitata, a thing in continual uſe among the Eaſtern Nations*, tho' it be but of late reception into the parts of *Europe*, and no elder than Chriſtianity among them. Among the *Romans* was uſed an ὀκτάημερον, which was for the ſake of the *Nundinæ*; returning every ninth day. The *Mexicans*, as *Scaliger* tells us, reckon all by a τεσσαρεσδεκάημερον. *a Syſtem of thirteen days.* Next to theſe were their Months; which were either Lunar or Solar. The Lunar were either from the Moon's return to the ſame point of the Zodiac again, called περίοδος σελήνης, which was leſs than twenty eight days; but this was of no uſe in civil computations; or elſe from one conjunction of the Moon with the Sun to another, which was called σύνοδος σελήνης; or elſe from the firſt phaſis of the Moon, the ſecond day after its *coïtus*, called φάσις and ἀπόκρυσις σελήνης; ſome, as the *Grecians*, reckoned their Lunar Months from the *coïtus*, as *Scaliger* proves out of *Vitruvius*; others from the *phaſis*, as ſome Eaſtern Nations did; as the *Jews* began their obſervation of the New Moons from the firſt *phaſis* or appearance of her after the

Scaliger de Emend. Temp. l. 1.

 coïtus.

coïtus. The Solar Months were either natural, ſuch as were defined by the Sun's paſſage from one ſign of the *Zodiac* to another; or civil, whereby the Months were equally divided into 30 days apiece, as in the *Grecian* and *Ægyptian* year.

II. Having thus far ſeen of what the year conſiſts, we now proceed to ſhew that the ancient Nations did not obſerve one conſtant certain form of year among them, but had ſeveral in uſe, to which their accounts may be referred. And becauſe the *Ægyptians* are ſuppoſed to have been beſt skilled as to the form of the year, according to that of *Macrobius*, *Anni certus modus apud ſolos ſemper Ægyptios fuit:* We ſhall particularly demonſtrate the variety of years in uſe among them: By which we ſhall ſee what great uncertainty there is in their accounts of their Dynaſties. For firſt it is evident that the time of 30 days was among the ancient *Ægyptians* accounted a year, for which we have the teſtimony of *Plutarch* in *Numa*. Αἰγυπτίοις δὲ μηνιαῖος ἦν ὁ ἐνιαυτὸς, εἶτα τετράμηνος; *The Ægyptians had at firſt a year conſiſting of one month, and after of four:* So *Varro* in *Lactantius* gives an account of the great Age of ſome men in ancient times, who are ſuppoſed to have lived a 1000 years; *Ait enim apud Ægyptios pro annis menſes haberi, ut non Solis per* 12 *ſigna circuitus faciat annum, ſed Luna quæ orbem illum ſigniferum* 30 *dierum ſpacio illuſtrat*. It is then evident that this year of thirty days was in uſe among the *Ægyptians*; the only ſcruple is whether it was uſed in their ſacred accounts or no; and that it was, we have a pregnant teſtimony in *Plutarch* in the forecited place; ſpeaking of the *Ægyptians* great pretenſe to antiquity, he gives this account of it; πλῆθος ἀριθμῶν ἐστὶν ἐπὶ ταῖς γενεαλογίαις καταφέρουσιν, ἅτε τὰς μῆνας εἰς ἔτη τῶν ἀριθμοῦντες; *They reckon an infinite number of years in their accounts, becauſe they reckon their months inſtead of years.*

Macrob. Saturn. l. 1. c. 12.

Lactant. de Origin. l. 2. c. 12.

According to this computation, it will be no difficult matter to reduce the vaſt accounts of the *Ægyptian* antiquity to ſome proportion, and to reconcile their exorbitant Dynaſties with ſobriety and truth, eſpecially as to the account given of them by *Diodorus Siculus*; for ſo *Diodorus* gives in their accounts, that the Gods and Hero's reigned in *Ægypt* for the ſpace of near 18000 years, and the laſt of them was *Orus* the ſon of *Iſis:* From the reign of Men in *Ægypt* he reckons about 9500 years to the time (if we admit of *Jacob. Cappellus* his correction of πενταετείων for πεντακισχιλίων in *Diodorus*) of his entrance into *Ægypt*, which was in the 180 *Olympiad*. Now as the aforeſaid learned Author obſerves, *Diodorus* came into *Ægypt*, *A. M.* 3940. *V. C.* 694. the mortal Men then had reigned in *Ægypt* 9500 years, which taking it for theſe Lunar years of 30 days, makes of *Julian* years 780. the Hero's and Gods 18000 months, that is of *Julian* years 1478; from theſe two ſumms together are gathered 2258 years, which being deducted from the year of the world 3940, falls in the year of the world 1682 about which time *Miſraim*, who was the great hiſtorical *Oſiris* of *Ægypt* (ſo called by a light variation of his former name) might be well ſuppoſed to be born; for that was in the year of *Noah* 630; and ſo *Orus* might be born, who was the ſon of *Oſiris*, about the year of the world 1778. Between whoſe time and *Alexander* the great his Conqueſt of *Ægypt*, the

Diodor. lib. 1.

Hiſt. ſacr. & Exot. A. M. 1682.

the *Ægyptians* as the ſame *Diodorus* tells us, reckon little leſs than 23000 years: Now acccording to this computation of 30 days for a year, we may reconcile this to truth too; for from 1778 to 3667 of the world, which falls upon the 417 year of *Nabonaſſár*, there is an interval of 1889 years, which makes of theſe Lunar years of 30 days, ſaith *Cappellus*, 22996 and 15 days, which comes very near, if not altogether, up to the *Ægyptian* Computation: So when the *Ægyptians*, according to *Diodorus*, make no leſs than 10000 years diſtance between their *Hercules* and *Hercules Bœotius*, the ſon of *Alcmena*, it muſt be underſtood of theſe Lunar years; for granting what the *Ægyptians* ſay, that *Hercules Bœotius* lived but one generation before the *Trojan* war, and ſo his time to fall out about 2783, reckoning now backward from thence, and deducting from that year of the world 10000 months of 30 days, or *Julian* years 831, and 130 days, the time of the *Ægyptian Hercules* will fall about the firſt year of the world, 1962, about which time we may well ſuppoſe him to live or die. And according to this computation we are to underſtand what the *Ægyptians* told *Herodotus*, that from their firſt King or Prieſt of *Vulcan*, till the time of *Sethos* (in whoſe time *Sennacherib* attempted the conqueſt of *Ægypt*) there had been paſſed 341 *Generations*, and as many Kings and High-Prieſts, and 11340 years, reckoning three Generations to make up a Century. But now, if we underſtand this prodigious computation according to this form of years, we may ſuſpect the *Ægyptians* of an intention to deceive *Herodotus* and the credulous *Greeks*, but yet not impeach them of direct falſhood, it being thus reconcilable to truth. For according to this account 100 years makes 3000 days, and a generation 1000; ſo many days the Kings or Prieſts of *Vulcan* may be allowed to reign; ſo 340 generations of 1000 days apiece, make up 340000 days, to which, if we add the 200 days which *Sethos* had now reigned upon *Sennacherib*'s invaſion, we have 340200 days, which makes up of theſe years of 30 days apiece 11340, which is the number aſſign'd by *Herodotus*. *Jacobus Cappellus* thinks the *Epocha* from whence theſe years are to be reckoned, is from *A. M.* 2350, when *Mephres* began to reign in *Ægypt*, from whence if we number theſe 340200 days, or 11340 monthly years, which makes up of *Julian* years 931, and 152 days, the number falls *A. M.* 3282; about which time in probability *Sennacherib* invaded *Ægypt*. Thus we ſee by making uſe of thoſe Lunar years, that it is poſſible to reconcile ſome of the *Ægyptian* extravagant accounts to ſome probability and conſiſtency with truth; but however we ow very little thanks to the *Ægyptians* for it, who deliver theſe things in groſs, without telling us which years they mean, and thereby evidence their intent to deceive all who have ſo little wit as to be deceived by them.

Cappell. Hiſt. ſacr. & Exot. p. 198.

III.

The next kind and form of the *Ægyptian* year, was that which conſiſted of four equal Months, amounting to 120 days; the uſe of this kind of year among them is atteſted by *Plutarch* in the fore-cited place, and by *Diodorus*, who gives an account of this kind of year among the *Ægyptians*. *Solinus* ſeems to mention this as the only year in requeſt among the *Ægyptians*: and ſo S. *Auguſtin*, *perhibentur* Ægyptii *quondam tam breves annos habuiſſe*

Diod. l. 1. *Solin. Polyhiſt. c.* 3. *Auguſt. de Civ. Dei, l.* 12. *c.*10.

ut quaternis menſibus finirentur. This renders then the *Ægyptian* accounts yet more uncertain, and only leaves us to gueſs with the greateſt probability of reaſon, what form of year was meant by them in their computations. So when *Diodorus* ſpeaks ſo much in favor of the old *Ægyptian* Kings and Laws, and produceth this from the *Ægyptian* Prieſts, as the beſt evidence of the excellent temper of their Government, that they had Kings of their own Nation for the ſpace of 4700 years, till the time of *Cambyſes* his inroad into *Ægypt*, which was in the third year of the 63 *Olympiad.* Now beſides the apparent contradiction of theſe accounts to the other already explained, if we take them in groſs, as the *Ægyptians* give them, it is evident this can be no otherwiſe true, than by taking theſe accounts in that form of years now mentioned by us. For theſe 4700 years, taking them for 120 days apiece, make up of *Julian* years 1544, which being deducted from the year of the world 3475, which was the time when *Cambyſes* invaded *Ægypt*, the remainder is *A. M.* 1931, about which time we may fix the death of *Orus*, from whom their proper Kings commenced. And of theſe years, *Voſſius* tells us, we are to underſtand what they report of the long lives of their ancient Kings, when they attribute to each of them the ſpace of 300 years: as when they attribute a 1000, and more to their eldeſt Kings, we are to underſtand them of ſimple Lunar years of 30 days, by which theſe *Gigantic* meaſures of the term of their lives, may without the help of *Procruſtes* be cut ſhort according to the proportion of Men's ordinary age in thoſe eldeſt times. So when *Diodorus* reckons from the death of *Proteus* to his own time *A. M.* 3940, 3400 years, it muſt be underſtood of theſe years of four equal months; for ſo thoſe 3400 years make up of *Julian* years 1117, which being deduced from 3940, the remainder is 2823, about which year of the world *Proteus* may be ſuppoſed to live, which was about the time of the *Judges* in *Iſrael.*

Diod. l. 1.

Voſſius de Idolat. l. 1. *c.* 28.

IV. Neither was this only the *Ægyptians* way, but in probability the ancient *Chaldæans* obſerved the ſame, which may be a ground likewiſe of thoſe unmeaſurable accounts among them in their firſt Dynaſties, as is evident in the Fragments of *Abydenus* and *Apollodorus* out of *Beroſus*, where the times of their firſt Kings are reckoned not by years, but Σάρους, Νέρους, and Σώσους; now according to them every Σάρος contained 3600 years, Νῆρος 600, Σῶσος 60. Now who can imagine that *Alorus* and the ten Kings from him to *Xiſuthrus* ſhould reign 120 *Sari* as their computation is, which reckoning for every *Saros* 3600 years, makes up 432000 years? A very fair ſum for the *Chaldæan* Dynaſties before the time of *Xiſuthrus*, by whom in probability *Noah* was by them underſtood. There have been only two ways thought on of dealing with theſe computations; either rejecting them as wholly fabulous, and founded on no evidence or records of Hiſtory, as we have ſeen already; only they might retain (being ſo near the place of the ſettlement of *Noah* and his poſterity after the floud) the memory not only of the floud (of which it is evident they had ſeveral remainders preſerved in their Traditions) but likewiſe of the ages of men preceding the floud, wherein they were right, reckoning from *Alorus* the firſt to *Xiſuthrus*, i. e. from *Adam* to *Noah*, ten Generations; but

but as to the names of thoſe ten perſons, and the times they lived in, being wholly ignorant thro' the unfaithfulneſs of tradition, they took their liberty not only of coyning names, but of ſetting what age to them they pleaſed themſelves. And to this purpoſe *Scaliger* obſerves that ſome of their firſt Kings are reckoned before the floud, which ſaith he, is denied by *Georgius Syncellus* without any ſhew of reaſon. Thus far then we may admit of the *Chaldæan* Dynaſties as to ſome part of the Tradition, but rejecting their names and computations as fabulous. The other way of explaining theſe Dynaſties, is by the ſeveral ways of computation among them: For the learned Monks, *Panodorus* and *Anianus*, underſtand thoſe vaſt ſums, not of years, but days, and ſo make a *Saros* to contain 120 months of 30 days apiece, which ſaith *Scaliger*, make ten *Chaldee* years, and a *Nirus* 20 equal months, and a *Soſos* two: according to which computation the 100 *Sari* make but 1200 years. But this computation of theirs is rejected by *Georgius Syncellus*, becauſe he ſuppoſeth *Euſebius* ſo well verſed in theſe things, that he would never have ſet them down for years, if the *Chaldæans* had not underſtood them ſo, and therefore he would not trouble himſelf in reducing Fables to true Hiſtory, as he expreſſeth it, whoſe words are at large produced by *Scaliger* in the fore-cited place. And it will appear more neceſſary to reject thoſe *Chaldæan* Computations, if we take the ſums of their years in the ſenſe which *Salmaſius* gives of them in the Preface to his Book, *De annis Climactericis* (from whom *Pyrerius* the Author of the *Præadamites* hath borrowed moſt of his Arguments as to theſe things.) According to him then, every Σάρος contained no leſs than 6000 years, as the *Toman* among the *Perſians* contained 10000: but becauſe that learned man hath only given us his *reperi Scriptum*, without any certain foundation for ſo large an account of thoſe ſumms, we ſhall take them in as favourable a ſenſe as we can. In order to which a very learned man of our own hath found a third interpretation of the Σάρος, in the *Chaldee* accounts, from a correction of *Suidas* by the MS. in the *Vatican* Library, according to which he thus reads the words, οἱ γὰρ μὲν σάρους ποιοῦσιν ἐνιαυτοὺς βοκβ' καὶ τὴν Χαλδαίων ψῆφον, εἴπερ ὁ σάρος ποιεῖ μῆνας Σελληνιακοὺς σκβ', οἵτινές γίνονται ἐν ἐνιαυτοῖς ἓξ μῆνες ἑξ: *And ſo the ſenſe*, ſaith he, *is clear*; Σάρος *according to the* Chaldee *account comprehends* 222 *months, which come to eighteen years and ſix months; therefore* 120 Σάρους *make* 2220 *years, and therefore* (he adds) *for* βοκβ'. *I read, leaving out the laſt* β, βσκ'. Now according to this ſenſe of 120 *Sari* to comprehend the ſumm of 2220 years, it will be no difficult matter to reduce the fragment of *Beroſus* concerning the ten Kings before the floud reigning 120 *Sari*, to ſome degree of probability: As to which I ſhall only ſuppoſe theſe two things. *Firſt*, that the ancient *Chaldæans* had preſerved among them ſome Tradition of the number of the chief perſons before the flood; for we find them exactly agreeing with the Scriptures as to the number, tho' differing as to the names of them, which may be ſeen in the Fragments of *Africanus*, preſerved in *Euſebius* his *Greek Chronica*. *Secondly*, that *Beroſus* from whom *Apollodorus* and *Alexander Polyhiſtor* deliver theſe computations, might, as to the account of the times of thoſe perſons, follow the tranſlation of the *Septuagint*. For I have already made it evident that *Beroſus* did not publiſh his

Scal. Not. in Gr. Euſeb. p. 406.

D. Pearſon on the Creed, p. 115. 1. edit.

Euſeb. p. 9.

his Hiſtory till after the *Septuagint* was abroad; now according to the computation of the *Septuagint* of the ages before the floud, theſe 120 *Sari* of the ten Kings will not much diſagree from it. For theſe make 2220 years of theſe ten perſons, and the *Septuagint* in all make 2242; ſo that if inſtead of βσκβ' in *Suidas*, we only read it βσμβ', we have the exact computation of the *Septuagint* in theſe 120 *Sari*; but of this let the learned judge.

v. We now come to the *Ægyptian* Dynaſties of *Manetho*, as to which I doubt we muſt be fain to take the ſame courſe that *Euſebius* did with the *Chaldæan*, μὴ συμβιβάζειν τὸ ψευδὲς τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, *not to trouble our ſelves overmuch in ſeeking to reconcile fables to truth.* Great pains is taken by ſome very learned men to reduce the diſorderly Dynaſties of *Manetho* to ſome probable account; but I muſt confeſs upon an impartial Examination of them, that I think they have ſtriven, if not to make an *Æthiopian* white, yet an *Ægyptian* to ſpeak truth concerning his own Country, which are almoſt of an equal impoſſibility. *Joſeph Scaliger* who firſt in this latter age of the world produced them into the light out of *Georgius Syncellus*, hath a more favourable opinion of them, than of the *Ægyptian* Hiſtory of *Herodotus*, *Diodorus* and others, but upon what account I cannot imagine. Is it becauſe four Dynaſties, according to his own computation, exceed the Creation of the world according to the true account? for which he is fain to make uſe of his *Tempus prolepticum* and *Julian* period, which reacheth 764 years beyond the age of the world, and was invented by him from the multiplication of the great *Cycle* into the *Indiction*, i. e. of 532 into 15. Or is it becauſe forſooth *Manetho* hath digeſted all into better order, and reckoned up the ſeveral Dinaſties which lay confuſed in other Authors? but this only ſhews him a more cunning impoſtor who ſaw the former accounts given by others would not ſerve the turn, and therefore pretends to more exactneſs and diligence, that he might more eaſily deceive his Readers. But ſetting aſide thoſe things which have been ſaid already concerning *Manetho*, I have theſe things which make me reject his Dynaſties as fabulous: *Firſt*, the vaſt difference between *Manetho* his accounts and all others who have written the *Ægyptian* Hiſtory, in the order and names of Dynaſties. Where do we ever read of the ſeveral Dynaſties of the *Thinites*, *Memphites*, *Soïtes*, *Dioſpolitans* and many others, but in himſelf? It is very ſtrange that neither *Herodotus*, nor *Eratoſthenes*, nor *Diodorus*, who have all written a ſucceſſion of the *Ægyptian* Kings, ſhould neither by their own induſtry, nor by all the intereſt they had in *Ægypt*, get any knowledg of theſe methodically digeſted Dynaſties. Beſides, had there been any hiſtorical certainty in theſe Dynaſties of *Manetho*, whence comes it to paſs that they ſhould be ſo ſilently paſſed over by thoſe who were *Ægyptian* Prieſts themſelves, and undertook to write the Hiſtory of *Ægypt*? Such were *Chæremon*, who was an ἱερογραμματεὺς, *a ſacred Scribe*, and *Ptolemæus Mendeſius* who was an *Ægyptian* Prieſt, as *Euſebius* tells us, and comprehended the Hiſtory of *Ægypt* in three books. Now had this Hiſtory been ſo authentical as is pretended, whence come ſo many and great contradictions between them? inſomuch that * *Joſephus* ſaith, *If that which they report were true it were impoſſible*

* *Joſeph. c. App. l. 1.*

possible they should so much differ; but they labour in the invention of lyes, and write neither agreeably to the truth nor to one another. So that it is next to a miracle almost to see how prodigiously fond of these Dynasties *Kircher* is, and what pains he hath taken to no purpose about them; *scio multos esse*, saith he, *qui hujusmodi Dynastias meras nugas & commenta putant*; very true; but why is not he of the same mind too? he confesseth himself to have been so once; but since he hath conversed more with the Oriental traditions, he hath found them not to be so fabulous as many make them. It seems then the *Basis* of the *Ægyptian* Dynasties as well before the floud as after, must lie in this Oriental Tradition; a thing, which some, to shew their great skill in those Eastern Languages, are grown very fond of. But as far as I can yet see, they sail to *Ophir*, not for *Gold*, but *Peacocks*; and the next Legend the world hath should be called *Legenda Orientalis*. For can any thing be more irrational, absurd and fabulous, than those *Arabic* Traditions which that Author scrapes as much for, as *Æsop*'s Cock did on the dunghil? but there is no jewel to be found among them; Unless we should take those fifteen hard names of men for such which by the *Arabic* Writers are said to have succeeded each other in *Ægypt* before the floud, *viz. Nacraus, Nathras, Mesram, Henoah, Arjak, Hasilim, Husal, Tatrasan, Sarkak, Schaluk, Surith*, (who they say built the Pyramids) *Hugith, Manaus, Aphrus, Malinus, Abn Ama Pharaun*, in whose time they say the floud came. But should we be so little befriended by reason as to grant all this, what advantage will this be to *Manetho*, who speaks not of Kings, but whole Dynasties? so that it still appears these Dynasties are fabulous, not being attested by any credible witnesses. *Secondly*, All those who profess to follow *Manetho*, differ strangely from one another, as *Josephus, Africanus, Eusebius, George the Sincellus* of the Patriarch *Tarasius*: and *Scaliger*, who hath taken so much pains in digesting of them, yet he is condemned by others since; and *Isaac Vossius* gives a particular caution to his Reader, *In his Dynastiis compingendis nequaquam esse sequendum ordinem & calculum* Scaligeri. What should be the reason of this diversity, but that they thought them not so authentic, but they might cut off, alter and transpose, as they saw occasion? which is most plain and evident in *Eusebius*, who makes no difficulty of cutting off one whole Dynasty, and dividing another into two, only to reconcile the distance between *Thuoris*, the Ægyptian King, and *Teutamus*, the Assyrian Emperor, and the destruction of *Troy*; and therefore leaves out four Assyrian Kings, and a whole Dynasty of the Ægyptians, to make a *synchronism* between those three.

Kircher. Oed. Ægyp. To. 1. Synt. 1. c. 9.

Is. Vossius de ætate Mundi, cap. 10.

VI. But yet there hath been something very fairly offered to the world, to clear the truth, if not *Manetho*, in order to his Dynasties, *viz.* that the subtle *Ægyptian*, to inhance the antiquity of his own Country, did take implicite years for solid, and place those in a succession which were contemporary one with another; This indeed is a very compendious way to advance a great sum of years with a very little charge: Wherein he hath done, saith *Cappellus*, as if a *Spaniard* in the *Indies* should glory of the antiquity of the Dynasties of *Spain*, and should attribute to the Earls of *Barcelona* 337 years, to the Kings of *Arragon* 498, to the Kings of

Cappell. Hist. sacr. & exot. A. M. 3308.

of *Portugal* 418, to the Kings of *Leon* 545, of *Caſtile* 800 years, and yet all theſe Dynaſties riſe from the year of our Lord 717, when the *Saracens* firſt entred *Spain*. There are very few Nations, but will go near to vie antiquity with the *Ægyptians*, if they may thus be allowed to reckon ſucceſſively all thoſe petty Royalties which anciently were in moſt Nations; as might be particularly inſtanced in moſt great Empires, that they gradually riſe from the ſubduing and incorporating of thoſe petty Royalties into which the ſeveral Nations were cantonized before. And there ſeems to be very ſtrong ground of ſuſpicion that ſome ſuch thing was deſigned by *Manetho*, from the 32d Dynaſty which is of the *Dioſpolitan Thebans*; for this Dynaſty is ſaid to begin from the tenth year of the 15th Dynaſty of the *Phœnician* Paſtors in the time of *Saites*: now, which is moſt obſervable, he that begins this Dynaſty, is of the very ſame name with him who begins the very firſt Dynaſty of *Manetho*, who is *Menes*, and ſo likewiſe his ſon *Athothis* is the ſame in both: Which hath made many think, becauſe *Menes* is reckoned firſt, not only in both theſe, but in *Diodorus*, *Eratoſthenes* and others, that this *Menes* was he who firſt began the Kingdom of *Ægypt*, after whoſe time it was divided into ſeveral Dynaſties. Which makes *Scaliger* ſay, *Illa vetuſtiſſima regna fuerunt inſtar latrociniorum; ubi vis, non lex aut ſucceſſio aut ſuffragia populi reges in ſolio regni collocabant*. This opinion of the coexiſtence of theſe Dynaſties is much embraced by *Voſſius* both Father and Son, and by the Father made uſe of to juſtify *Scaliger* from calumniators, who made as tho' *Scaliger* did in effect overthrow the authority of the Scriptures by mentioning with ſome applauſe the Dynaſties of *Manetho*.

Scalig. can. Iſag. l. 3.

Ger. Voſſ. Idol. l. 1. c. 28.

Iſ. Voſſ. de æt. mund. c. 10.

VII. But to this opinion, how plauſible ſoever it ſeems, I offer theſe exceptions. *Firſt*, As to that *Menes* who is ſuppoſed to be the firſt Founder of the Ægyptian Kingdom, after whoſe death it is ſuppoſed that *Ægypt* was divided into all theſe Dynaſties; I demand who this *Menes* was; was he the ſame with him whom the Scripture calls *Miſraim*, who was the firſt Planter of *Ægypt?* this is not probable, for in all probability His name muſt be ſought among the Gods, and not the Mortals that reigned. If we ſuppoſe him to be any other after him, it will be hard giving an account how he came to have the whole power of *Ægypt* in his hands, and ſoon after him it ſhould be divided. For Kingdoms are oft-times made up of thoſe petty Royalties before; but it will be very hard finding inſtances of one perſon's enjoying the whole power, and ſo many Dynaſties to ariſe after his deceaſe, and to continue coexiſtent in peace and full power ſo long as theſe ſeveral Dynaſties are ſuppoſed to do. Beſides, is it not very ſtrange, that no Hiſtorian ſhould mention ſuch a former diſtribution of ſeveral Principalities ſo anciently in *Ægypt?* But that which to me utterly overthrows the coexiſtence of theſe Dynaſties in *Ægypt*, is, by comparing with them what we find in Scripture of greateſt antiquity concerning the Kingdom of *Ægypt*; which I cannot but wonder that none of thoſe learned men ſhould take notice of. When the Ægyptian Kingdom was firſt founded, 'tis not here a place to enquire; but it is evident that, in *Abraham*'s time, there was a *Pharaoh*, King of *Ægypt* (whom Archbiſhop *Uſher*

Usher thinks to have been *Apophis*) not *Abimelech* the first King of *Ægypt*, as *Constantinus Manasses* reports in his Annals (by a ridiculous mistake of the King of *Gerar* for the King of *Ægypt*.) This *Pharaoh* was then certainly King of all the Land of *Ægypt*, which still in Scripture is called the *Land of Misraim* from the first Planter of it: and this was of very great antiquity; and therefore *Funccius* (tho' improbably) thinks this *Pharaoh* to have been *Osiris*, and *Rivet* thinks *Misraim* might have been alive till that time; here then we find no Dynasties coexisting, but one Kingdom under one King. If we descend somewhat lower, to the times of *Jacob* and *Joseph*, the evidence is so undoubted of *Ægypt*'s being an entire Kingdom under one King, that he may have just cause to suspect the eyes either of his body or his mind that distrusts it. For what more evident, than that *Pharaoh* who preferred *Joseph*, was *King of all the Land of* Ægypt? *Were not the seven years of famine over all the land of* Ægypt? *Gen.* 41. 55. *Was not* Joseph *set by* Pharaoh *over all the land of* Ægypt? *Gen.* 41. 41, 43, 45. *And did not* Joseph *go over all the land of* Ægypt *to gather corn? Gen.* 41. 46. *Nay did he not buy all the land of Ægypt for* Pharaoh? *Gen.* 47. 20. Can there possibly be given any fuller evidences of an entire Kingdom, than these are, that *Ægypt* was such then? Afterwards we read of one King after another in *Ægypt* for the space of nigh two hundred years, during the children of *Israel*'s slavery in *Ægypt*; and was not he, think we, King over all *Ægypt*, in whose time the children of *Israel* went out thence? And in all the following History of Scripture, is there not mention made of *Ægypt* still as an entire Kingdom, and of one King over it? Where then is there any place for these contemporary Dynasties in *Ægypt?* No where that I know of, but in the fancies of some learned men. Gen. 12.

VIII. Indeed there is one place that seems to give some countenance to this opinion; but it is in far later times than the first Dynasties of *Manetho* are suppos'd to be in, which is in *Isai.* 19. 2. Where God saith, *He would set the* Ægyptians *against the* Ægyptians, *and they shall fight every one against his brother, city against city, and kingdom against kingdom.* Where it seems that there were several Kingdoms then existent among the *Ægyptians*; but the *Septuagint* very well renders it νομὸς ἐπὶ νομόν. Now νομὸς among the *Ægyptians*, as *Epiphanius* and others tell us, notes τὴν ἑκάστης πόλεως περιοχὴν ἢ τεῖχος, *the precincts of every great City*, such as our Counties are, and therefore *Pliny* renders νομοὶ by *præfecturæ*; these were the several Provinces of *Ægypt*, of which there were thirty six in *Ægypt*, ten in *Thebais*, ten in *Delta*, the other sixteen in the midland parts; so that by kingdom against kingdom, no more is meant than one Province being set against another. *Isaac Vossius* thinks the number of the ancient *Nomi* was twelve, and that over every of these was a peculiar King; and that this number may be gathered from the Dynasties of *Manetho*, setting aside the Dynasties of the *Persians*, *Æthiopians*, and *Phœnicians: viz.* the *Thinites*, *Memphites*, *Elephantines*, *Heracleopolitans*, *Diospolitan Thebans*, the lesser *Diospolitans*, *Xoites*, *Tanites*, *Bubastites*, *Saïtes*, *Mendesians*, and *Sebennytes:* and so that *Ægypt* was anciently a *Dodecarchy*, as *England* in the *Saxons* time was a *Heptarchy*. But

as it already appears, there could be anciently no such *Dodecarchy* in *Ægypt*; so it is likewise evident that this distribution of *Ægypt* into *Nomi* is a later thing, and by most Writers is attributed to *Sesoosis* or *Sesostris*, whom *Josephus* supposed to be *Sesack* King of *Ægypt*, contemporary with *Rehoboam*. Indeed if we believe *Gelaldinus* the *Arabic* Historian cited by *Kircher*, the most ancient distribution of *Ægypt* was into four parts. *Misraim* held one part to himself, and gave his Son *Copt* another, *Esmun* a third, and *Atrib* a fourth part; which division the same Author affirms to have continued till the time of *Joseph*, who made a new distribution of the whole Land: After him *Sesostris* divided the whole into thirty several *Nomi*; so *Kircher* will needs have it, that of the three several parts of *Ægypt*, each might have for some mystical signification its ten *Nomi*, of which every one had its distinct and peculiar God it worship'd, and a particular Palace in the Labyrinth, and a peculiar *Sanhedrin* or Court of Justice belonging to it. But it evidently appears by that vain-glorious *Oedipus*, that it is a far easier matter to make new Mysteries, than to interpret old ones, which as it might be easily discovered in the main foundations whereon that structure stands, so we have some evidence of it in our first entrance into it, in this part of the *Chorography* of *Ægypt*. For from whence had he this exact division of *Ægypt* into thirty *Nomi*, ten of which belonged to the upper *Ægypt*, or *Thebais*, ten to *Delta*, or the lower *Ægypt*, and the ten remaining to the midland Country? Hath he this from *Ptolemee*, whose Scheme of the several *Nomi* he publisheth? No, *Ptolemee* and *Pliny* by his own confession afterwards add many other to these, as *Omphile*, *Phanturites*, *Tanites*, *Phatnites*, *Neut*, *Heptanomos*, &c. Hath he it from *Strabo*, whose authority he cites for it? No such matter. For *Strabo* saith expresly, that *Thebais* had ten *Nomi*, *Delta* ten, and the midland sixteen; only some are of opinion, saith he, that there were as many *Nomi* as Palaces in the Labyrinth, which were toward thirty; but yet the number is uncertain still. We see by this, how ominous it is for an *Oedipus* to stumble at the threshold, and how easy a matter it is to interpret Mysteries, if we may have the making of them. We see then no evidence at all for these contemporary Dynasties of *Manetho*; which yet if we should grant, would be a further argument of the uncertainty of heathen *Chronology*, when among them implicite years are given out to the world for solid; so that which way soever *Manetho* his Dynasties be taken, they will prove the thing in hand, whether we suppose them at least most part fabulous, or should grant he had taken those in succession to each other, which were coexistent with one another.

Vid. Boch. Geogr. p. 1. l. 4. c. 4.

Kircher Oedip. Ægypt. To. 1. Syntag. 1. c. 4

Idem Synt. 1. c. 2. p. 7.

Strab. l. 17.

CHAP.

CHAP. VI.

The uncertain Epocha's of Heathen Chronoloy.

I. *An account of the defect of Chronology in the eldeſt times. Of the Solar Year among the* Ægyptians, *the original of the Epacts, the antiquity of Intercalation among them. Of the ſeveral Canicular Years; the difference between* Scaliger *and* Petavius *conſidered. The certain Epocha's of the* Ægyptian *Hiſtory no elder than* Nabonaſſar. II. *Of the* Grecian *accounts. The fabulouſneſs of the Heroical age of* Greece. III. *Of the ancient* Grecian *Kingdoms. The beginning of the* Olympiads. IV. *The uncertain Origins of the Weſtern Nations. Of the* Latin *Dynaſties. The different* Palilia *of* Rome. *The uncertain reckoning* Ab Urbe condita. V. *Of impoſtures as to ancient Hiſtories. Of* Annius, VI. Inghiramius, *and others.* VII. *Of the characters uſed by Heathen Prieſts.* VIII. *No ſacred characters among the* Jews. IX. *The partiality and inconſiſtency of heathen Hiſtories with each other. From all which the want of credibility in them as to an account of ancient times is clearly demonſtrated.*

THe next thing to evidence the uncertainty of the heathen *Chronology*, is, the want of certain *Parapegmata*, or ſome fixed periods of time, according to which the account of times muſt be made. For if there be no certain *Epocha's* by which to reckon the ſucceſſion of ages, the diſtanced of intervals, and all intervening accidents, we muſt of neceſſity fluctuate in continual uncertainties, and have no ſure foundation to bottom any account of ancient times upon. The great reaſon of this defect, is, the little care which thoſe who lived in the eldeſt times had to preſerve the memory of any ancient tradition among themſelves, or to convey it to poſterity in ſuch a way as might be leaſt liable to impoſture. Of all kinds of Learning, *Chronology* was the moſt rude in eldeſt times; and yet that is well called by *Scaliger*, *The life and ſoul of Hiſtory*, without which *Hiſtory* is but a confuſed lump, a mere *Mola*, an indigeſted piece of fleſh, without life or form. The ancient accounts of the world were merely from year to year, and that with abundance of obſcurity, uncertainty and variety: ſometimes going by the courſe of the Moon; and therein they were as mutable as the Moon her ſelf, how to conform the year regularly to her motion: and it was yet greater difficulty to regulate it by the courſe of the Sun, and to make the accounts of the Sun and Moon meet. There was ſo much perplexity and confuſion about the ordering of a ſingle year, and ſo long in moſt Nations before they could bring it into any order, that we are not to expect any fixed periods by which to find out the ſucceſſion of ages 1.

among them. Among the *Ægyptians* who are ſuppoſed moſt skilful in the account of the year, it was a long time before they found out any certain courſe of it. It is agreed by moſt, that when the Ægyptian Prieſts had found out the form of the year by the courſe of the Sun (which is attributed by *Diodorus* to the *Heliopolitan* Prieſts) yet the year in common uſe was only of 360 days, which in any great period of years muſt needs cauſe a monſtrous confuſion, by reaſon that their Months muſt of neceſſity by degrees change their place, ſo that in the great Canicular year of 730 *Thoyth*, which was the beginning of the Summer *Solſtice* in the entrance into that period, would be removed into the midſt of Winter, from whence aroſe that Ægyptian fable in *Herodotus*, that in the time of their eldeſt Kings, the Sun had twice changed his riſing and ſetting; which was only cauſed by the variation of their Months, and not by any alteration in the courſe of the Sun. Which defect the Ægyptian Prieſts at laſt obſerving, ſaw a neceſſity of adding five days to the end of the year w^ch^ thence were called ἐπαγόμεναι, which implies they were not anciently in uſe among them, being afterwards added to make up the courſe of the year. Which the *Ægyptians* give an account of, as *Plutarch* tells us under this fable: *Mercury being once at dice with the Moon, he got from her 72^d^ part of the year, which he after added to the 360 days which were anciently the days of the year, which they called* ἐπαγόμεναι, *and therein celebrated the Feſtivals of their Gods.* Thence the names of the ſeveral ἐπαγόμεναι were taken from the Gods; the firſt was called Ὄσιρις, it being celebrated in honor of him; the ſecond, Ἀρουήρις, by which *Scaliger* underſtands *Anubis*, but *Voſſius* more probably the ſenior *Orus*; the third to *Typho*; the fourth to *Iſis*; the fifth to *Nephtha* the wife of *Typho*, and ſiſter to *Iſis*. This courſe of the year *Scaliger* thinks that the *Ægyptians* repreſented by the Serpent called Νειλὸς, being deſcribed in a round circle biting ſome part of his tail in his mouth; whereby, ſaith he, they would have it underſtood that the form of the year was not perfect without that adjection of five days to the end of the year: For to this day, ſaith he, the *Coptites* and ancient *Ægyptians* call the end of the year Νειλὸς. It ſeems that afterwards they underſtood likewiſe the neceſſity of intercalation of a day every fourth year, for the ſake of the redundant quadrant each year above 365 days; which courſe of four years they called Canicular year, becauſe they obſerved its defect in that time one whole day from the riſing of the Dog-ſtar: and beſides that they called Ἡλιακὸν ἔτος, and Ἔτος κυνικὸς, *& luſtrum Sothiacum*, from Σῶθις the Dog-ſtar: but *Cenſorinus* denies any uſe of intercalation among the *Ægyptians* in their civil year, altho' their Sacred and Hieroglyphical years might admit of it. And upon this ground, I ſuppoſe the controverſy between thoſe two learned perſons, *Scaliger* and *Petavius*, concerning the antiquity of Intercalation among the *Ægyptians* may be reconciled. For on the one ſide it is apparent, that the ordinary or civil year did want intercalation, by this teſtimony of *Cenſorinus*; *Eorum annus civilis ſolos habet dies 365 ſine ullo intercalari; itaque quadriennium apud eos uno circiter die minus eſt quam naturale quadriennium*; and thence, ſaith he, it comes to paſs, that in 1461 years, which was the great *Heliacal* year, it returns to the ſame beginning; for then the Dog-ſtar ariſeth again

Diodor. l. 1. c. 50.

Herod. Euterp. Vide Scaliger. de Emend. Temp. l. 3. p. 195.

Plutarch de Iſide & Oſiride.

Voſſ. de Idol. l. 1. c. 28.

Cenſorin. de die Nat. c. 18.

V. Petav. de doctr. Temp. l. 3. c. 2.

again upon the first day of the month *Thoyth*, as it did at the beginning of this great Canicular year; and that this kind of civil year did continue among them in the time of *Censorinus* (which was of the *Dionysian* account 238) appears by this, that he saith in the year wherein he wrote his book the *New-moon* of *Thoyth* was before the seventh day of the Calends of *July*, whereas a hundred years before, it was before the 12 of the Calends of *August*; whence it is evident, that the *Julian* year, whatever some learned men pretend to the contrary, was not in ordinary use among the *Ægyptians* in that time; and that *Sosigenes* when he corrected the *Roman* Account, and brought in the form of the *Julian* year, did not take his pattern from the Ægyptian year, but from the *Grecians* of *Alexandria*, who did make use of the Quadrant added to the 365 years, which the *Ægyptians* did not, as appears further by the Golden circle in the monument of *Osimanduas* (which *Diodorus* speaks of out of *Hecatæus Milesius*) which was of 365 cubits compass, and divided into so many segments for every day with the observations of the rising and setting of the several Stars, and the effects portended by them. And the reason why this year continued in civil use among the *Ægyptians*, is well assigned by *Geminus*, that the *Ægyptians* according to a superstitious observation they had, would needs have their Festivals run through every day in the year. But now on the other side, it is as evident that by continual observation the wisest of the Ægyptian Priests did discern the necessity of intercalation, and that there wanted six hours in every year to make it compleat, which every four years would make the intercalation of a day necessary; so much by *Diodorus* is affirmed of the *Theban* Priests, who were the best Astronomers; and by *Strabo* both of the *Theban* and *Heliopolitan*; and so likewise *Horapollo*, whose work was to interpret the more abstruse learning of the Ægyptian Priests: *When* (saith he) *the* Ægyptians *would express a year, they name a Quadrant, because from one rising of the star* Sothis *to another, the fourth part of a day is added, so that the year consists of* 365 *days*; (and a quadrant must be added, because of the antecedents and consequents) therefore every fourth year they reckon a supernumerary day. How unjustly *Petavius* hath charged *Scaliger* with falshood in reference to this testimony of *Horapollo*, meerly because the citation did not appear in that Chapter mentioned by *Scaliger* in the Book which *Petavius* used, hath been already observed by learned men. Whereupon *Vossius* condemns *Petavius* of strange incogitancy, because in three Editions mentioned by him, *Scaliger*'s citation was right: but *Conringius* hath since pleaded in behalf of *Petavius*, that he might make use of the Edition of *Causinus* distinct from the other three; whereby we see how small a matter will beget a feud between learned men, especially where prejudice hath lodged before; as is too evident in *Petavius* his rough dealing on all occasions, with that very deserving person *Joseph Scaliger*. But to return, from hence by degrees the *Ægyptians* proceded to make greater periods of years (as *Eudoxus* carried his *Octaeteris* into *Greece* from the Canicular year of the *Ægyptians*) they framed from this a great Canicular year, which had as many years as *Julian* hath days; and lastly, the greatest Canicular year, which comprehended

Kircher Oed. Ægyt. To. 3. Class. 7. c. 2.

Diod. l. 1. c. 49.

Geminus de sphæra cap. 6.

Diodor. l. 1. c. 50. Strab. l. 17. Horapollo Hieroglyp. l. 1. c. 5.

Voss. de Idol. l. 1. c. 28.

Conring. de Hermet. Med. c. 12.

four of the greater, and consisted of a period of 1461 years. But thus we see, that the great periods of years among them rise gradually, as they grow more skilful in the understanding the nature of the year; and that they had anciently no certain periods to govern themselves by in their computation of ancient times. Nay the *Ægyptians* have not, as appears, any certain *Epocha* to go by, elder than the Ægyptian years of *Nabonassár*, and afterwards from the death of *Alexander*, and *Ptolemee Philadelphus*, and *Augustus* his Victory at *Actium*.

II. If from the *Ægyptians* we remove our discourse unto the *Grecians*, we are still plunged into greater uncertainties, it being acknowledged by themselves that they had no certain succession of time before the *Olympiads*. To which purpose the testimony of *Varro* in *Censorinus* is generally taken notice of, distributing time into three parts, reckoning two of them to be unknown and fabulous, and the historical part of time to begin with the first *Olympiad*. Indeed *Scaliger* and some others are loth to reject all that second part of time as fabulous, which was in the interval between *Deucalion*'s flood and the *Olympiads*; and therefore they had rather call it Heroical, tho' much corrupted with fables, and to think that it was historical as to persons, but fabulous as to the actions of those persons. But granting this; yet we are wholly to seek for any certain account of the succession of time and persons for want of some certain *Epocha's*, which like the Pole Star should guide us in our passage thro' that vast Ocean of the *Grecian* History. It must be confessed that some of the learned Heathens have taken a great deal of pains this way to find out some certain Periods to fix on in the time before the *Olympiads*; as *Philochorus*, *Apollodorus*, and *Dionysius Halycarnassensis*, and others, who out of their skill in Astronomy sought to bring down some certain intervals between the destruction of *Troy*, and the first *Olympic* games of *Pelops*, restored by *Hercules* and *Atreus*. But granting that their *Epocha's* were fixed and certain, that the destruction of *Troy* was upon the 23 of *Thargelion*, the 11th month of the *Attic* account, and that the *Olympic* game fell out answerably to the ninth of our *July*, and these things were evidently proved from Astronomical observations; yet how vast an account of time is lost quite beyond the siege of *Troy?* And besides that, as to all other accidents in the Intervals between these two *Epocha's* which could not be proved by Celestial observations concurrent with them, they were left at a very great uncertainty still; only they might guess whether they approached nearer to one *Epocha* then the other by the series of Families and their Generations (three of which made a Century of years) whereby they might come to some conjectures, but could not arrive at any certainty at all.

Scalig. not. in Can Isagog. l. 3.

III. But that which is most to our purpose is, that all the History of the original of *Greece*, the foundations of their several Kingdoms, the succession of their first Kings, and all that comes under the name of the History of their ancient times, is clearly given over by their own most skilful Chronologers, as matters out of the reach of any clear evidence. Thence comes such great differences concerning the antiquity of their ancient Kingdoms; the *Argolic* Kingdom by *Dionysius Halycarnass.* is supposed to be the eldest,

eldeſt, and the *Attic* younger than it by 40 Generations, which according to their computation comes to a 1000 years, which is impoſſible; and yet the *Arcadians*, who gave themſelves out to be elder than the Moon, are ſuppoſed to be younger by him than the Graſhoppers of *Athens* by nine Generations; and the *Phthiotica*, under *Deucalion*, younger than *Arcadica* by 42 Generations, which *Scaliger* might well ſay were impoſſible and inconſiſtent. The *Sicyonian* Kingdom is by moſt ſuppoſed to be of greateſt antiquity among the *Grecians*, from which *Varro* began his Hiſtory, as S. *Auſtin* tells us; and yet as to this, *Pauſanias* only reckons the names of ſome Kings there, without any ſucceſſion of time among them; and yet as to thoſe names *Africanus* (and *Euſebius* from him) diſſent from *Pauſanias*; and which is moſt obſervable, *Homer* reckons *Adraſtus*, who is the 23d in the account of *Africanus*, to be the firſt that reigned in *Sicyon*, whoſe time was after the inſtitution of the *Olympic* Game by *Pelops*: of him thus *Homer*,

Auguſt. de Civit. Dei, l. 16. c. 2.

Καὶ Σικυῶν᾽ ὃς ἄρ᾽ Ἀδρήστου πρῶτ᾽ ἐμβασίλευσεν.

Homer. Iliad. 2.

whereby he expreſſeth *Adraſtus* to be the firſt King of *Sicyon*; and not as *Scaliger* would interpret it, that *Adraſtus* was firſt King of the *Sicyonians*, before he was of the *Argives*; for in the time of *Adraſtus* at *Sicyon*, either *Atreus*, or *Thyeſtes* was King of the *Argives*: for in the ſecond year of *Phæſtus* and *Adraſtus* his ſuppoſed predeceſſor in *Sicyon*, *Atreus* reſtored the *Olympic* Game of *Pelops*, in the 41 year of their reign, and they reigned at *Argi* 65 years: Now that *Phæſtus* at *Sicyon* is ſuppoſed to reign but eight years; and therefore the reign of *Adraſtus* at *Sicyon* fall in with that of *Atreus* and *Thyeſtes* at *Argi* or *Mycenæ*. Thus we ſee now, how uncertain the account of times was before the beginning of the *Olympiads* among the *Grecians*, which is fully acknowledged by *Diodorus*, and the very reaſon given which we here inſiſt on, Διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἀδιάπτωτον παρειληφέναι περὶ τούτων πιστόμφορον. *That there was no certainty in the ancient Grecian hiſtory, becauſe they had no certain term* (which he calls *parapegma*; as others *Epocha*; and *Cenſorinus*, *Titulus*) *from whence to deduce their accounts.* But now from the time of the *Olympiads* (i. e. from the firſt of them after their reſtoration by *Iphitus*, wherein the names of the Conquerors were ingraven in braſs Tablets for the purpoſe) the ſucceſſion of time is moſt certain and hiſtorical among the *Grecians*; by which account we have from thence a certain way of commenſurating the ſacred and prophane Hiſtory. All the difficulty is in what year of ſacred Hiſtory the *Olympiads* began, which *Scaliger* thus finds out. *Cenſorinus* writes (in the year of *Chriſt* 238 which was of the *Julian* period 4951.) that, that year was from the firſt *Olympiad* of *Iphitus* 1014, the firſt *Olympiad* was of the *Julian* period 3938. which was according to our learned Primate *A. M.* 3228, and the 35 of *Uzziah* King of *Judah*, or the 34, as *Cappellus* thinks: So that from henceforward we have a clear account of times, which we have demonſtrated to have been ſo uncertain before.

Scaliger de Emend. Temp. l. 5.

If we come to the *Greeks* further into theſe *European* parts, we ſhall find as much darkneſs and obſcurity as to ancient times, if IV.

not

not more, than in thoſe already diſcours'd of. For the truth is, the account of times before the *Romans* in *Italy*, *Germany*, old *Gallia* or *Britain*, are ſcarce fit to be diſcourſed of under any head than that of impoſture. Not that I think thoſe Nations had lain in a perpetual ſleep, till the *Romans* waked them into ſome kind of civility but that they had no certain way of conveying down the tranſactions of their own and former times to the view of poſterity. On which account we may juſtly reject all thoſe pretended ſucceſſions of Kings here in *Britain* from *Gomer* and *Brute* as fabulous. And it will be the leſs wonder it ſhou'd be ſo in thoſe then accounted barbarous Nations, when even among thoſe who were the Planters of knowledg and civility among others, the account of their ancient times is ſo dark, confuſed, and uncertain. As it would ſufficiently appear to any that would take the pains to examine the ſucceſſion of the two firſt Dynaſties among the *Latines*; the firſt before *Æneas* his coming into *Italy*; and the ſecond of the *Æneadæ* after. And certainly it will be ſufficient ground to queſtion the account of times before; if in the third Dynaſty, when the ſucceſſion ſeems ſo clear, and ſo certain an *Epocha* as the building of *Rome*, to deduce their accounts from their Chronology be uncertain, which I ſhall briefly ſpeak to. For altho' *Porcius Cato* have in *Dionyſius* the honour of finding out the firſt *Palilia* of the City of *Rome* (which was the Feaſt obſerved to the honour of the Goddeſs *Pales* in the time of which, the foundations of *Rome* were laid) yet there appears no great certainty in his undertaking; for therein he was after contradicted by the learned *Roman*, *Varro*. *Dionyſius* tells us that *Cato* found by the *Cenſors* Tables the exact time from the expulſion of the Kings, to the time of the City's being taken by the *Gaules*; from which time to his own, he could not miſs of it from the *Faſti Conſulares*; ſo that it cannot be denied but that *Cato* might have a certain account of times from the *Regifugium* to the time he writ his *Origines*. But what certainty *Cato* could have from the firſt *Palilia* of the City to the expulſion of *Tarquin*, we cannot underſtand. For the ſucceſſion of Kings muſt needs be very uncertain, unleſs it be demonſtrated from ſome public monuments, or certain records, or ſome public actions certainly known to have fallen out preciſely in ſuch a year of their ſeveral Reigns. Now none of theſe do occur in the *Roman* Hiſtory, in all that interval from the *Palilia* to the *Regifugium*; ſo that not only the whole interval, but the time of every particular King's Reign, are very uncertain. And therefore *Varro* being deſtitute of any demonſtration of that time, had recourſe to *L. Tarrutius Firmanus*, to ſee if by his skill in Aſtronomy he could certainly find out the firſt *Palilia* of *Rome*: His anſwer was, that he found that the City was built in the time of an Eclipſe of the Sun, which was in the third year of the ſixth *Olypiad*; according to which account *Varro* proceded, and thence aroſe the difference between the *Palilia Catoniana* and *Varroniana*; the latter falling out in the 23d of *Iphitus*, the other in the 24th. But if we believe *Joſeph Scaliger*, there could not be an Eclipſe of the Sun, at the time affirmed by *Tarrutius*: But yet granting an Eclipſe of the Sun then, what certainty can we have of the ſucceſſion of the ſeveral Kings afterwards, without

Scaliger de Emend. Temp. l. 5. p. 388.

without which there can be no certain computation *ab Urbe condita?* If then the *Romans*, who had ſo great advantage of knowing times, and were withal ſo inquiſitive concerning the building of their city (which was a thing of no very remote diſtance) could attain to no abſolute certainty about it, what certainty can we expect as to an account of far ancienter times, either from them or others, when they had no Cenſors Tables, nor *Faſti Conſulares* to be guided by? And thus much may ſerve to ſhew the great uncertainty of heathen Chronology, as to the giving an account of ancient times.

V. And yet were it only an uncertainty as to Chronology, we might better bear with it; for the miſtake merely in computation of times were not ſo dangerous (any further than the credibility of the Hiſtory depends on the computation, as in point of antiquity) if we were but certain that the perſons and actions related of them were ſuch as they are reported to be. But that which adds much to the confuſion and uncertainty of heathen Hiſtory, is, the frequency of impoſtures, which are more hard to be diſcovered, in that there are no authentic Hiſtories of thoſe times extant, which hath both given occaſion to variety of impoſtures, and much hindred their diſcovery. For the curioſity of men leading them back into a ſearch after ancient times, it makes them exceeding credulous in embracing whatever pretends to give them any conduct thro' thoſe dark and obſcure paths of ancient Hiſtory. And the world hath never been wanting of ſuch as would be ready to abuſe the ſimple credulity of well-meaning, but leſs wary men; but thoſe ages have been moſt *feracious* in the production of ſuch perſons, which have pretended to more learning than they had. The pretenſe of Learning made ſuch perſons appear, and the want of it made them not be diſcovered. Thus it was not only of old among the *Chaldæan* and *Ægyptian* Prieſts, and the *Grecian* Poets and Hiſtorians, of whom we have ſpoken already; but even among thoſe who might have learned more truth from the Religion they profeſſed, than to think it ſtood in need of their lyes. For there can be no greater diſparagement offered to truth, than to defend it with any thing but it ſelf, nothing laying truth ſo open to ſuſpicion, as when falſhood comes to be its advocate. And a falſe teſtimony diſcovered, doth more prejudice to a good cauſe, than it could any ways advantage it, were it not diſcovered. And therefore their labours have been as ſerviceable to the world who have diſcovered Impoſtures, as thoſe who have directly maintained truth againſt its open oppoſers; thoſe being ſo much more dangerous, in that they appear in the diſguiſe of truth, and therefore are with more difficulty diſcovered. Such a one was that *Ignis fatuus* that appeared in a kind of twilight in the *Chriſtian* world between the former darkneſs of Barbariſm, and the approaching light of knowledg; I mean *Annius Viterbienſis*, who like *Hannibal* in paſſing the *Alps*, not finding a way ready to his mind, ſets himſelf to burning the woods, and firing the rocks, and diſſolving them with vinegar to make a paſſage thro' them: So *Annius* being beſet in thoſe ſnowy and gray headed *Alps* of ancient Hiſtory, and finding no way clear for him according to his fancy, he labours to burn down all certain Records, to eat thro' the

credit of undoubted Authors, to make a more free paſſage for his own Hiſtory, which he deduceth ſuitably to Scripture for the concurrent teſtimony of the eldeſt Hiſtorians. To which purpoſe, a new *Beroſus*, *Manetho*, *Philo*, *Metaſthenes* (as he miſtook for *Megaſthenes*) and *Xenophon* muſt put on a grave diſguiſe, and walk abroad the world with a mantle of Antiquity about their ſhoulders, altho' they wear nothing elſe but airy Phantaſms, covered over with the *Cowl* of the Monk of *Viterbo*. For being himſelf ſomewhat more verſed in the Hiſtory of thoſe elder times than generally perſons were in the age he lived in, he made that unhappy uſe of his skill, to play the Mountebank with his Learning; and to abuſe the credulity of thoſe who have better ſtomachs than palates, and ſooner ſwallow down the compoſitions that are given them, than find out the ingredients of them. Thus *Annius* puts a good face on his New-old Authors, bids them be bold and confident, and they would fare the better. And the truth is, they tell their ſtory ſo punctually in all circumſtances, in thoſe things which had no certain conveyance to poſterity, that that were ſufficient ground to any intelligent perſon to queſtion their authority. But leſt his Authors ſhould at any time want an Interpreter to make out their full meaning, he ſets himſelf a large Commentary upon them, and certainly he was the fitteſt perſon in the world to do it; for, *cujus eſt condere, ejus eſt interpretari*; none ſo fit to explain *Annius*, as *Annius* himſelf. The whole ſtory of this impoſture, how he made the Inſcriptions himſelf, and hid them underground, how they were digged thence and brought to *Annius*; how *Annius* cauſed them to be ſent to the Magiſtrates, and after publiſhed them in the equipage they are in, is at large related by that learned Biſhop * *Antonius Auguſtinus*, from *Latinus Latinius*.

* *Anton. Auguſt. Dialog.* 11.

VI. From a like quarry to this, came out thoſe other famous Inſcriptions, walking under the ſpecious title of *Antiquitatum Etruſcarum fragmenta*, wherein, beſides many palpable incongruities to the cuſtoms of thoſe eldeſt times, diſcovered partly by *Leo Allatius* in his Diſcourſe concerning them, there are ſo many particular ſtories and circumſtances related concerning *Noah*'s being in *Italy*, and other things ſo far beyond probability of Reaſon, that it is a wonder there are yet any perſons pretending to Learning, who ſhould build their diſcourſes upon ſuch rotten and ſandy foundations as theſe Inſcriptions are. But tho' *Ixion* might, *Jupiter* would never have been deceived with a *Cloud* inſtead of *Juno*; ſo, tho' perſons unacquainted with the lineaments of Truth, may be eaſily impoſed on with appearances inſtead of her: yet ſuch perſons who have ſagacity enough to diſcern the air of her countenance from the paint of forgeries, will never ſuffer themſelves to be over-reached by ſuch vain pretenders. But theſe Impoſtors are like the Aſtrologers at *Rome*, ever baniſhed, and yet ever there; and ſo theſe are ever exploded by all lovers of truth, yet always find ſome to applaud and entertain them. Altho' it be more difficult to do ſo now in the preſent light of Knowledg, and all advantages for Learning, than it was in thoſe elder times, when the heathen Prieſts pretended to the Monopoly of Learning among themſelves, and made it one of their great deſigns to keep all others in dependance on themſelves, thereby to keep up their veneration

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the better among the people. And therefore all the Records they had of Learning or Hiſtory, were carefully lockt up, and preſerved among the Prieſts; and leaſt at any time others might get a view of them, they were ſure to preſerve them in a peculiar Character diſtinct from that in civil and common uſe. By which means the heathen Prieſts had all imaginable opportunities and conveniences for deceiving the ſilly people, and thereby keeping them in an obſequious ignorance, which is never the Mother of any true Devotion, but of the greateſt Superſtition.

VII. It is well known of the *Ægyptian* Prieſts, that the ſacred Characters of their Temples were ſeldom made known to any but ſuch as were of their own number and family, (the Prieſthood being there hereditary) or ſuch others as by long converſe had inſinuated themſelves into their ſociety, as ſome of the *Greek* Philoſophers and Hiſtorians had done. And yet we have ſome reaſon to think they were not over-free and communicative to ſome of them, by the ſlender account they give of ſeveral things, which are ſuppoſed to be well known among the *Ægyptians*. That the *Phœnician* Prieſts had their peculiar and ſacred Characters too, is evident from the words of *Philo Byblius* concerning *Sanchoniathon*, if we take *Bochartus* his Expoſition of them: He tells us that his Hiſtory was compared, ὃς ἐκ τῶν ἀδύτων ἐυρήμασιν, ἀποκρύφοις Ἀμμωνίων γράμμασιν ἃ οὐκ ἦν πᾶσι γνώσιμα, *with the Inſcriptions in the Temples written in the Ammunean letters, which are known to few: Literæ Ammuneorum* (ſaith *Bochartus*) *ſunt literæ Templorum, literæ in ſacris exceptæ.* For חמה is the Sun, thence חמן the *Temple of the Sun*, whom the *Phœnicians* worſhip'd as their principal Deity, under the name of *Beel-ſamen, the Lord of Heaven.* The ſame Author tells us out out of *Diogenes Laertius*, of a Book of *Democritus*, περὶ τῶν ἐν Βαβυλῶνι ἱερῶν γραμμάτων· by which it is evident that the *Babylonian* Prieſts had their ſacred Characters too: And of a Teſtimony of *Theodoret* of all the *Grecian* Temples, Ἐν ταῖς Ἑλληνικαῖς ναοῖς ἴδιοι τινὲς ἦσαν χαρακτῆρες γραμμάτων, οἳς ἱερογλυφικὰς ἐπωνύμουν, *That they had ſome peculiar Characters which were called ſacred.* But that learned Author thinks there is no neceſſity of underſtanding it peculiarly of the *Grecians*, becauſe the *Greek* Fathers called all Heathens by the name of *Greeks:* but if ſo, the teſtimony is the larger, and amounts to an univerſal teſtimony of the heathen Temples.

Diod. l. 3.

Euſeb. præpoſ. Evang. l. 1. c. 10.

Bochart. Greogr. ſac. p. 2. l. 2. c. 17.

Quæſt. in Gen. 1.

VIII. Neither was this only peculiar to them, if we believe ſome perſons of greater Learning than Judgment, who attribute this diſtinction of ſacred and vulgar Characters to the *Jews* as well as others, but without any probability of reaſon. For theſe learned men being ſtrongly poſſeſſed with the opinion of the modern *Jews* concerning the antiquity of the preſent *Hebrew* Characters, and finding themſelves preſſed not only with the teſtimony of ſome ancient *Rabbins*, but with the ſtronger evidence of the ancient *ſhekels* about *Solomon*'s time, inſcribed with the *Samaritan* letters, have at laſt found this Evaſion, that the *Samaritan* letters were in vulgar uſe; but the preſent Characters were then ſacred, and not made common till after the time of the Captivity. But this ſeems to be a meer ſhift, found out by ſome modern *Jews*, and greedily embraced by their followers, becauſe thereby they are in hopes to

evade the ſtrength of the contrary arguments, which otherwiſe they can find no probable ſolution of. And a meer ſhift it will appear to be, to any one that conſiders on how little ground of reaſon it ſtands: For none of thoſe reaſons which held for ſuch a diſtinction of Characters among the Heathens, can have any place among the *Jews*. For it was never any part of God's deſign to have the Law kept from the peoples view. Truth is never ſo fearful of being ſeen abroad; it is only falſhood that walks under diſguiſes, and muſt have its hiding-places to retreat to: Nay, God expreſly commanded it as a duty of all the *Jews*, to ſearch and ſtudy his Law, which they could not do, if it were locked up from them in an unknown Character. Did not God himſelf promulge it among the people of *Iſrael* by the miniſtry of *Moſes?* Did he not command it to be *as frontlets between their eyes*, and *ſigns upon their hands*: not that *Phylacteries* ſhould be made of the Law to wear, as the *Phariſees* interpreted it, and others from them have miſtaken; but that they ſhould have the Law in continual remembrance, as if it were always between their eyes, and ingraven upon their hands. Again, if we ſuppoſe the Law to be among the people, but in the vulgar character, I would fain know, what ſanctity, majeſty, and authority there was in that character more than in the words and matter? and if there were, how comes the vulgar uſe of it to be no where forbidden? and how durſt *Ezra*, as is ſuppoſed, after the Captivity, profane ſo ſacred a thing by expoſing it to common uſe? But granting them yet further, that it was lawful, but not uſeful, to make uſe of that ſacred Character; I demand then, how comes that diſuſe to continue ſo punctually till the time of *Ezra*, and that it ſhould never be divulged before? when there was ſo great reaſon to make it common, ſince the ſquare letters are leſs operoſe, more expedite and facile, than the *Samaritan*, which is, when time ſerves, uſed as a plea for their great antiquity. But yielding yet more, that the ſacred Character was only uſed for the authentic copy of the Law, which was to decide all differences of other copies (which ſome run to as their laſt ſhift) I appeal to any man's reaſon, whether this be not the moſt improbable of all? For how could ſuch a copy be the Judge of all others, which could not be read or underſtood by thoſe who appealed to it? Or was the knowledg and reading of this Character peculiar to the High Prieſt, and conveyed down as a *Cabala* from one to another? but how many incongruities would follow hence, in caſe one High Prieſt ſhould die before his Son was capable of underſtanding the Letters, and ſo that ſacred Treaſure muſt needs be loſt; or had they it all by inſpiration, and underſtood the ſacred Character by *Urim* and *Thummim?* Thus every way, this opinion among the *Jews* is preſſed with inconveniences, but it was moſt ſuitable to the heathen Prieſts to maintain a *Meum* and *Tuum* between their own Character and the vulgar. For hereby they prohibited all prying into their myſteries by any, but thoſe who had the ſame intereſt with themſelves, and therefore were unlikely to diſcover any thing that might leſſen their reputation. Whereas, had there been nothing but truth in their Records, or that truth had been for their

Exod. 13. 16. Deut. 6. 8.

intereſt,

intereſt, what need had there been of ſo great reſervedneſs and privacy? but when the diſcovery of truth would undeceive the world, it was their intereſt to lock it up, and to give out ſuch things to the vulgar, which might advance themſelves and pleaſe them; which artifices of theirs give no ſmall ground to queſtion the credibility of their Hiſtories.

IX. Eſpecially if we add what we promiſed in the laſt place, to ſhew the want of credibility in the report of ancient times among them, which was not only defectiveneſs, and uncertainty, but apparent partiality to themſelves, and inconſiſtency with each other. How evident is it in all theſe Nations we have ſpoken to, how much they ſtrive to inhance the reputation of their own Nation, and to that end blend the Hiſtory of other Nations with their own, to make theirs ſeem the greater? How much do the *Ægyptians* tell us of the excellency of their ancient Laws and Government? and yet how evident is it, from their own Hiſtories, that no ſuch Laws were obſerved by their Kings as they ſpeak of? Can we think that ſuch Kings as *Chemmis* and the reſt of them, who built thoſe vaſt ſtructures of the Pyramids, and employed Myriads of men for ſo many years for the doing of them, would be content to be ſo dieted by their Laws, as *Hecatæus* and *Diodorus* tell us they were to be? Nay it ſeems to be very ſuſpicious, that the great enterprizes of their famous *Seſooſis* are meerly fabulous; and ſome think, an attributing to themſelves, what was done by the *Aſſyrian* Emperor in his time. By which we may gueſs, what to think of the great conqueſts of *Oſiris* and *Iſis*, and their ſubduing almoſt the whole world to them. And it is moſt evident how partial the *Ægyptians* are in diſſembling their greateſt loſſes; as is clear in the ſtory of the conqueſt of *Pharao Necho* by *Nebuchadnezzar*, Jer. 46. 12. of which there is not the leaſt mention in *Herodotus* or *Diodorus*. But on the contrary, *Herodotus* tells us this *Necos*, as he calls him, conquered the *Syrians* at *Magdalos*; and the ſtory of *Vaphres* and *Amaſis* in him ſeems to be only a diſguiſe of *Nebuchadnezzar*'s conqueſt; only leſt men ſhould think them conquered by a Foreigner, they make *Amaſis* to be an *Ægyptian Plebeian*. Again, what a vaſt number of Cities doth *Diodorus* tell us of, that were in *Ægypt* in their eldeſt times? no leſs than 18000, when yet himſelf confeſſeth in the time of *Ptolemæus Lagi*, there were reckoned but ſomewhat above 3000 Cities, and then *Ægypt* was the moſt populous that ever it had been. How probable doth this ſound, that in thoſe eldeſt times ſuch vaſt multitudes of Cities ſhould be erected? But the truth is, it is not unſuitable to their opinion of the production of the firſt men; which were cauſed, they ſay, by the heat of the Sun, and the mud of *Nilus*; and it is certain then they might be the moſt populous Nation in the world: for there could be no defect as to either efficient or material cauſe, there being mud enough to produce Myriads, and the Sun hot enough to impregnate it. The partiality of other Nations hath been already diſcourſed of in our paſſage; and ſo likewiſe hath their mutual repugnancy to, and inconſiſtency with, each other: Which yet might be more fully manifeſted from the contradictions in reference to the Ægyptian Hi-

Herodot. lib. 2.

Diodor. l. 1.

ſtory betwen *Manetho*, *Herodotus*, *Diodorus*, *Dicæarchus*, *Eratoſthenes*, and all who have ſpoken of it: as to the *Aſſyrian* Empire between *Herodotus*, *Diodorus*, and *Julius Africanus*: as to the *Perſian* Empire between *Herodotus* and *Cteſias*, and thoſe in no inconſiderable things, as is evident in *Photius* his *Excerpta* out of him. Among the *Grecians* we have already diſcover'd it as to their Hiſtory and Geography; and if we ſhould enter into their *Theology*, and the Hiſtory of that, we ſhould find their other differences inconſiderable, if compared with theſe. Of which we may partly make a conjecture by the incredible ſpite that is born by the graveſt *Greek* Authors, as *Strabo*, *Plutarch*, and others, towards *Euhemerus Siculus*, for offering to deliver the hiſtory of *Jupiter*, which he ſaith, he tranſcribed from the *Golden Pillar in the Temple of* Jupiter Triphyllius *in* Panchotis.

But I ſuppoſe enough hath been diſcovered already, to prove that there is no credibility in any of thoſe Heathen Hiſtories, which pretend to give an account of ancient times; there being in all of them ſo much defect and inſufficiency, ſo great uncertainty and confuſion, ſo much partiality and inconſiſtency with each other. It remains now that I proceed to demonſtrate the credibility of that account of ancient times, which is reported in the Sacred Scriptures, which will be the ſecond part of our Task.

ORIGINES

ORIGINES SACRAE:

Book II.

CHAP. I.

The certainty of the Writings of *Moses*.

In order to the proving the truth of Scripture-history, several Hypotheses laid down. I. *The first concerns the reasonableness of preserving the ancient History of the World in some certain Records, from the importance of the things,* II. *and the inconveniences of meer Tradition or constant Revelation.* III. *The second concerns the certainty that the Records under* Moses *his name, were undoubtedly his. The certainty of a matter of fact enquired into in general, and proved as to this particular* IV. *by universal Consent,* V. *and settling a Common-wealth upon his Laws.* VI, VII. *The impossibility of an Impostor as to the Writings of* Moses *demonstrated. The pleas to the contrary largely answered.*

HAVING sufficiently demonstrated the want of credibility in the account of the ancient times, given by those Nations who have made the greatest pretense to Learning and Antiquity in the World, we now proceed to evince the credibility and certainty of that account which is given us in Sacred Scriptures: In order to which I shall premise these following Hypotheses. 1.

First, It stands to the greatest reason, that an account of things so concerning and remarkable, shou'd not be always left to the uncertainty of an oral Tradition; but shou'd be timely entred into certain Records, to be preserv'd to the memory of posterity. For it being of concernment to the World, in order to the Establishment of Belief, as to future things, to be setled in the Belief, that all things past were manag'd by Divine Providence; there must be certain Records of former Ages, or else the mind of Man will be perpetually hovering in the greatest uncertainties: Especially where there is such a mutual dependance and concatenation of one thing with another, as there is in all the Scripture-history. For take away but any one of the main Foundations of the *Mosaical* History, all the Superstructure will be exceedingly weakned, if it doth not fall quite to the ground. For Man's obligation to Obedience unto God, doth necessarily suppose his Original to be from him; his hearkning to any proposals of favor from God, doth suppose his Apostasy and Fall; God's designing to shew mercy and *Hypoth.* 1.

and favor to fallen Man, doth ſuppoſe that there muſt be ſome way whereby the Great Creator muſt reveal himſelf as to the Conditions on which fallen Man may expect a recovery; the revealing of theſe Conditions in ſuch a way whereon a ſuſpicious (becauſe guilty) Creature may firmly rely, doth ſuppoſe ſo certain a recording of them, as may be leaſt liable to any ſuſpicion of impoſture or deceit. For altho' nothing elſe be in it ſelf neceſſary from God to Man, in order to his Salvation, but the bare revealing in a certain way the Terms on which he muſt expect it; yet conſidering the unbounded Nature of Divine Goodneſs, reſpecting not only the good of ſome particular Perſons, but of the whole Society of Mankind, it ſtands to the greateſt reaſon that ſuch a Revelation ſhou'd be ſo propounded, as might be with equal certainty convey'd to the community of Mankind. Which cou'd not with any ſuch evidence of credibility be done by private and particular Revelations (which give ſatisfaction only to the inward Senſes of the partakers of them) as by a public recording of the matters of Divine Revelation by ſuch a Perſon who is enabled to give the World all reaſonable ſatisfaction, that what he did was not of any private deſign of his own head; but that he was deputed to it by no leſs than Divine Authority. And therefore it ſtands to the higheſt reaſon, that where Divine Revelation is neceſſary for the certain requiring of Aſſent, the matter to be believ'd ſhou'd have a certain uniform conveyance to Mens minds, rather than that perpetually new Revelations ſhou'd be requir'd for the making known of thoſe things; which being once recorded, are not liable to ſo many impoſtures, as the other way might have been under pretended Revelations. For then Men are not put to a continual Trial of every Perſon pretending Divine Revelation, as to the evidences which he brings of Divine Authority, but the great matters of concernment being already recorded and atteſted by all rational evidence as to the truth of the things, their minds therein reſt ſatisfy'd without being under a continual heſitancy, leſt the Revelation of one ſhou'd contradict another.

II. For ſuppoſing that God had left the matters of Divine Revelation unrecorded at all, but left them to be diſcover'd in every Age by a Spirit of Prophecy, by ſuch a multitude as might be ſufficient to inform the World of the truth of the things; we cannot but conceive that an innumerable company of croaking *Enthuſiaſts* wou'd be continually pretending Commiſſions from Heaven, by which the minds of Men wou'd be left in continual diſtraction, becauſe they wou'd have no certain infallible Rules given them, whereby to difference the good and evil Spirit from each other. But now ſuppoſing God to inſpire ſome particular Perſons, not only to reveal, but to record Divine Truths, then whatever evidences can be brought atteſting a Divine Revelation in them, will likewiſe prove the undoubted certainty and infallibility of thoſe writings, it being impoſſible that Perſons employ'd by a God of truth, ſhou'd make it their deſign to impoſe upon the World; which gives us a rational account, why the wiſe God did not ſuffer the Hiſtory of the World to lie ſtill unrecorded, but made choice of ſuch a Perſon to record it, who gave abundant evidence to the World that he acted no private deſign, but was peculiarly

employ'd

employ'd by God himſelf for the doing of it, as will appear afterwards. Beſides, we find by our former Diſcourſe, how liable the moſt certain Tradition is to be corrupted in progreſs of time, where there are no ſtanding Records, tho' it were at firſt deliver'd by Perſons of undoubted credit. For we have no reaſon to doubt, but that the Tradition of the old World, the Flood and the conſequences of it, with the nature and worſhip of the true God, were at firſt ſpread over the greateſt part of the World in its firſt Plantations; yet we ſee how ſoon for want of certain conveyance, all the ancient Tradition was corrupted and abus'd into the greateſt Idolatry. Which might be leſs wonder'd at, had it been only in thoſe parts which were furtheſt remote from the ſeat of thoſe grand Tranſactions; but thus we find it was even among thoſe Families who had the neareſt reſidence to the place of them, and among thoſe Perſons who were not far off in a lineal deſcent from the Perſons mainly concern'd in them; as is moſt evident in the Family out of which *Abraham* came (who was himſelf the tenth from *Noah*) yet of them it is ſaid, *That they ſerved other Gods.* Joſh. 24. 2. How unlikely then was it, that this Tradition ſhou'd be afterwards preſerv'd entire, when the People God had peculiarly choſen to himſelf, were ſo mix'd among the *Ægyptians*, and ſo prone to the Idolatries of the Nations round about them, and that even after God had given them a written Law atteſted with the greateſt Miracles? What wou'd they have done then, had they never been brought forth out of *Ægypt* by ſuch Signs and Wonders, and had no certain Records left to preſerve the memory of former Ages? Thus we ſee how much it ſtands to the greateſt reaſon, that ſo memorable things ſhou'd be digeſted into Sacred Records.

Secondly, *We have as great certainty that* Moſes *was the Author of the Records going under his name, as we can have of any matter of fact done at ſo great a diſtance of time from us.* Hypoth. 2. We are to conſider that there are two very diſtinct Queſtions to be thought of, concerning a Divine Revelation to any Perſon at a conſiderable diſtance of time from us; and thoſe are what evidences can be given that the matters recorded are of a true Divine Revelation; and what evidence we have of the truth of the matter of fact, that ſuch things were recorded by ſuch Perſons. They who do not carefully diſtinguiſh between theſe two Queſtions, will ſoon run themſelves into an inextricable Labyrinth, when they either ſeek to underſtand themſelves, or explain to others the grounds on which they believe the Scriptures to be the Word of God. The firſt ſtep in order to which, muſt be the proving the undoubted certainty of the matter of fact, or the truth of the Hiſtory, that ſuch Perſons were really exiſtent, and did either do or record the things we ſpeak of: After this ſucceeds the other, to prove not only the real exiſtence of the things, but that the Perſons who recorded the things, were aſſiſted by an Infallible Spirit; then there can be no reaſon at all to doubt, but thoſe Records are the Word of God. The firſt of theſe, is, that which at preſent we enquire after, the certainty of the matter of fact, that the Records under the name of *Moſes* were undoubtedly his. And here it will be moſt unreaſonable for any to ſeek for further evidence and demonſtra-

tion of it, than the matter to be prov'd is capable of. But if they ſhou'd, I ſuppoſe we have ſufficient reaſon to demonſtrate the folly of ſuch a demand, and that on theſe accounts.

1. Whoever yet undertook to bring matters of fact into Mathematical demonſtrations, or thought he had ground to queſtion the certainty of any thing that was not prov'd in a Mathematical way to him? who wou'd ever undertake that *Archimedes* was kill'd at *Syracuſe*, by any of the Demonſtrations he was then about? or that *Euclide* was the undoubted Author of the *Geometry* under his name? or do Men queſtion theſe things for want of ſuch Demonſtrations? Yet this is all we at preſent deſire, only the ſame liberty here which is us'd in any thing of a like nature.

2. I demand of the Perſon who denies this Moral certainty to be ſufficient for an aſſent, whether he doth queſtion every thing in the World, which he was not preſent at the doing of himſelf? If he be peremptorily reſolv'd to believe nothing but what he ſees, he is fit for nothing but a Voyage to *Anticyræ*, or to be ſoundly purg'd with *Hellebore*, to free him from thoſe cloudy humors that make him ſuſpect the whole World to be an impoſture. But we cannot ſuppoſe any Man ſo deſtitute of Reaſon, as to queſtion the truth of every matter of fact which he doth not ſee himſelf; if he doth then firmly believe any thing, there muſt be ſuppos'd ſufficient grounds to induce him to ſuch a belief. And then what ground can there be to queſtion the certainty of ſuch things, which have as great evidence as any of thoſe things have, which he moſt firmly believes? and this is all we deſire from him.

3. Do we not ſee that the moſt concerning and weighty actions of Mens lives, are built on no other foundation than this Moral certainty? yet Men do not in the leaſt queſtion the truth of the thing they rely upon: As is moſt evident in all Titles to Eſtates deriv'd from Anceſtors, either by Donation or Purchaſe: In all Trading, which go's upon the Moral certainty, that there are ſuch places as the *Indies*, or *France* or *Spain*, &c. In all Journeyings, that there is ſuch a place, as that I am going to, and this is the way thither; for theſe we have but this Moral certainty; for the contrary to both theſe are poſſible, and the affirmatives are indemonſtrable. In eating and drinking there is a poſſibility of being poiſoned by every bit of meat, or drop of drink; do we therefore continually doubt, whether we ſhall be ſo or no? Chiefly this is ſeen in all natural affection and piety in Children towards Parents, which undoubtedly ſuppoſe the truth of that, which it was impoſſible they cou'd be witneſſes of themſelves, their coming out of their Mothers wombs. And doth any one think this ſufficient ground to queſtion his Mother, becauſe the contrary is impoſſible to be demonſtrated to him? In ſhort, then, either we muſt deſtroy all Hiſtorical Faith out of the World, and believe nothing (tho' never ſo much atteſted) but what we ſee our ſelves, or elſe we muſt acknowledg, that a Moral certainty is a ſufficient foundation for an undoubted aſſent, not ſuch a one *cui non poteſt ſubeſſe falſum*, but ſuch a one *cui non ſubeſt dubium*, *i. e.* an *Aſſent undoubted*, tho' not infallible. By which we ſee what little reaſon the *Atheiſt* on one ſide can have to queſtion the truth of the Scriptures, as to the Hiſtory of it; and what little ground the *Papiſts* on

on the other ſide have to make a pretenſe of the neceſſity of Infallibility, as to the propoſal of ſuch things where Moral certainty is ſufficient, that is, to the matter of fact.

Which I now come to prove, as to the ſubject in hand; *viz.* That the Writings of *Moſes* are undoubtedly his. Which I prove by a two-fold Argument: 1. *An univerſal conſent of Perſons, who were beſt able to know the truth of the things in queſtion.* 2. *The ſetling of a Commonwealth upon the Laws deliver'd by* Moſes. 1. The univerſal conſent of Perſons moſt capable of judging in the caſe in hand. I know nothing the moſt ſcrupulous and inquiſitive mind can poſſibly deſire in order to ſatisfaction, concerning any matter of fact, beyond an Univerſal Conſent of ſuch Perſons who have a greater capacity of knowing the truth of it than we can have: And thoſe are all ſuch Perſons who have liv'd neareſt thoſe times when the things were done, and have beſt underſtood the Affairs of the times, when the things were pretended to be done. Can we poſſibly conceive, that among the People of the *Jews*, who were ſo exceedingly prone to tranſgreſs the Law of *Moſes*, and to fall into Idolatry, but if there had been any the leaſt ſuſpicion of any falſity or impoſture in the Writings of *Moſes*, the ring-leaders of their revolts wou'd have ſufficiently promulged it among them, as the moſt plauſible plea to draw them off from the worſhip of the true God? Can we think that a Nation and Religion ſo maligned as the *Jewiſh* were, cou'd have eſcaped diſcovery, if there had been any deceit in it, when ſo many lay in wait continually to expoſe them to all contumelies imaginable? Nay, among themſelves in their frequent Apoſtaſies, and occaſions given for ſuch a pretenſe, how comes this to be never heard of, nor in the leaſt queſtioned, whether the Law was undoubtedly of *Moſes* his writing or no? What an excellent plea wou'd this have been for *Jeroboam's* Calves in *Dan* and *Bethel*: for the *Samaritans* Temple on Mount *Gerizim*, cou'd any the leaſt ſuſpicion have been rais'd among them, concerning the authenticneſs of the fundamental Records of the *Jewiſh* Commonwealth? And which is moſt obſervable, the *Jews* who were a people ſtrangely ſuſpicious and incredulous, while they were fed and cloathed by Miracles, yet cou'd never find ground to queſtion this. Nay, and *Moſes* himſelf, we plainly ſee, was hugely envied by many of the *Iſraelites* even in the Wilderneſs, as is evident in the conſpiracy of *Corah* and his complices, and that on this very ground, That he took too much upon him; how unlikely then is it, that amidſt ſo many enemies he ſhou'd dare to venture any thing into public Records, which was not moſt undoubtedly true; or undertake to preſcribe a Law to oblige the People to poſterity? Or that after his own Age any thing ſhou'd come out under his name, which wou'd not be preſently detected by the Emulators of his glory? What then, is the thing it ſelf incredible? ſurely not, that *Moſes* ſhou'd write the Records we ſpeak of. Were not they able to underſtand the truth of it? What? not thoſe, who were in the ſame Age, and convey'd it down by a certain Tradition to poſterity? Or did not the *Iſraelites* all conſtantly believe it? What? not they, who wou'd ſooner part with their Lives and Fortunes, than admit any variation or alteration as to their Law? IV.

v. Well, but if we ſhou'd ſuppoſe the whole *Jewiſh* Nation partial to themſelves, and that out of honor to the memory of ſo great a Perſon as *Moſes*, they ſhou'd attribute their ancient Laws and Records to him: Which is all that Infidelity it ſelf can imagine in this caſe; yet this cannot be with any ſhadow of Reaſon pretended. For,

1. Who were thoſe Perſons, who did give out this Law to the *Jews* under *Moſes* his name? Certainly they, who undertake to contradict that which is receiv'd by common conſent, muſt bring ſtronger and clearer Evidence, than that on which that conſent is grounded; or elſe their Exceptions deſerve to be rejected with the higheſt indignation. What Proof can be then brought, that not only the *Jewiſh* Nation, but the whole Chriſtian World hath been ſo lamentably befool'd to believe thoſe things with an undoubted aſſent, which are only the contrivances of ſome cunning Men?

2. At what time cou'd theſe things be contriv'd? Either while the memory of *Moſes* and his actions were remaining, or afterwards. Firſt, How cou'd it poſſibly be, when his memory was remaining? for then all things were ſo freſh in their memories, that it was impoſſible a thing of this univerſal nature cou'd be forged of him. If after, then I demand, whether the People had obſerv'd the Law of *Moſes* before or no? if not, then they muſt certainly know it at the time of its promulgation to be counterfeit; for had it been from *Moſes*, it wou'd have been obſerv'd before their times; if it was obſerv'd before, then either continually down from the time of *Moſes*, or not? If continually down, then it was of *Moſes* his doing, if we ſuppoſe him to have had that Authority among the People, which the Objection ſuppoſeth; if not, then ſtill the nearer *Moſes* his time, the more difficult ſuch a counterfeiting cou'd be; becauſe the Conſtitutions which *Moſes* had left among them, wou'd have remain'd in their memories, whereby they wou'd eaſily reject all pretenſes and connterfeits.

3. How can we conceive the Nation of the *Jews* wou'd have ever embraced ſuch a Law, had it not been of *Moſes* his enacting among them in that ſtate of time when he did? For then the People were in fitteſt capacity to receive a Law, being grown a great People, and therefore neceſſary to have Laws; newly delivered from bondage, and therefore wanting Laws of their own; and entring into a ſetled ſtate of Commonwealth, which was the moſt proper ſeaſon of giving Laws.

vi. Theſe conſiderations make it ſo clear, that it is almoſt impoſſible to conceive the Nation of the *Jews* cou'd have their Laws given to them but at the time of their being in the Wilderneſs, before they were ſetled in *Canaan*. For ſuppoſe we at preſent, to gratify ſo far the Objection, that theſe Laws were brought forth long after the conſtitution of the Government and the National ſettlement, under *Moſes* his name; how improbable, nay how impoſſible is it to alter the fundamental Laws of a Nation after long ſettlement? what confuſion of intereſts doth this bring? what diſturbance among all ſorts of People, who muſt be diſſeis'd of their rights, and brought to ſuch ſtrange unwonted cuſtoms, ſo ſeemingly againſt their intereſts, as many of the Conſtitutions among the *Jews* were? For can we imagine, that a People always devoted to their own intereſt,

tereſt, wou'd after it had been quietly ſetled in their Land, by Conſtitutions after the cuſtom of other Nations, preſently under a pretenſe of a copy of Laws found (that were pretended to be given by one in former Ages of great eſteem, call'd *Moſes*) throw open all their former incloſures, and part with their former Laws, for theſe of which they have no evidence, but the words of thoſe that told it them? We have a clear inſtance for this among the *Romans*; altho' there were great evidence given of the undoubted certainty, that the Books found in *Numa*'s grave by *Petilius* were his, yet becauſe they were adjudg'd by the Senate to be againſt the preſent Laws, they were without further enquiry adjudg'd to be burnt. Was not here the greateſt likelihood that might be, that theſe ſhou'd have taken place among the *Romans*, for the great veneration for wiſdom which *Numa* was in among them, and the great evidence that theſe were certain remainders of his, wherein he gave a true account of the ſuperſtitions in uſe among them? yet leſt the ſtate ſhou'd be unſetled by it, they were prohibited ſo much as a public view, when the *Prætor* had ſworn they were againſt the eſtabliſhed Laws. Can we then conceive the *Jewiſh* Nation wou'd have embraced ſo burdenſom and ceremonious a Law as *Moſes*'s was, had it been brought among them in ſuch a way as the Books of *Numa*, tho' with all imaginable evidence, that it was undoubtedly his, eſpecially when they were engag'd to the obſervation of ſome Laws or Cuſtoms already, by which their Commonwealth had been eſtabliſh'd? And withal theſe Laws of *Moſes* ſeeming ſo much againſt the intereſt and good husbandry of a Nation, as all the neighbour Nations thought, who for that accuſed them to be an idle and ſlothful People, as they judg'd by their reſting wholly one Day in ſeven, the great and many ſolemn Feaſts they had, the repairing of all the Males to *Jeruſalem* thrice a Year; the Sabbatical Years, Years of *Jubilee*, &c. Theſe things were apparently againſt the intereſt of ſuch a Nation, whoſe great ſubſiſtence was upon paſturage and agriculture. So that it is evident theſe Laws reſpected not the outward intereſt of the Nation, and ſo cou'd not be the contrivance of any Politicians among them, but did immediately aim at the honor of the God whom they ſerv'd, for whom they were to part even with their civil intereſts: The doing of which by a People generally taken notice of for a particular love of their own concernments, is an impregnable argument theſe Laws cou'd not take place among them, had they not been given by *Moſes* at the time of their unſettlement, and that their future ſettlement did depend upon their preſent obſervation of them; which is an evidence too that they cou'd be of no leſs than Divine original: Which was more than I was to prove at preſent.

VII. Were not theſe Writings undoubtedly *Moſes*'s; whence ſhou'd the neighbour Nations about the *Jews*, notwithſtanding the hatred of the *Jewiſh* Religion, retain ſo venerable an opinion of the wiſdom of *Moſes*? The *Ægyptians* accounted him one of their *Prieſts* (which notes the eſteem they had of his learning) as appears by the teſtimonies produced out of *Chæremon* and *Manetho* by *Joſephus*. *Diodorus Siculus* ſpeaks of him with great reſpect among the famous Legiſlators, and ſo doth *Strabo*, who ſpeaks

Joſeph. C. App. l. 1.
Diod. l. 1.
Strabo Geograph. 16.

in commendation of the Religion eſtabliſh'd by him. The teſtimony of *Longinus* is ſufficiently known, that *Moſes was no man of any vulgar wit* (οὐκ ὁ τυχὼν ἀνὴρ) *Chalcidius* calls him *ſapientiſſimus Moſes* (altho' I muſt not diſſemble that *Chalcidius* hath been, I think, undeſervedly reckoned among heathen Writers, tho' he comments on *Plato*'s *Timæus*, it being moſt probable that he was a Chriſtian *Platoniſt*, which might more probably make *Vaninus* call him *circumforaneum blateronem*) but tho' we exempt *Chalcidius* out of the number of thoſe Heathens, who have born teſtimony to the wiſdom of *Moſes*, yet there are number enough beſides him produced by *Juſtin Martyr*, *Cyril*, and others, whoſe evidence is clear and full to make us undoubtedly believe, that there cou'd never have been ſo univerſal and uninterrupted a Tradition concerning the Writings and Laws of *Moſes*, had they not been certainly his, and convey'd down in a continual ſucceſſion from his time to our preſent age. Which will be yet more clear, if we conſider in the ſecond place, That the National Conſtitution and ſettlement of the *Jews*, did depend on the truth of the Laws and Writings of *Moſes*. Can we have more undoubted evidence, that there were ſuch Perſons as *Solon*, *Lycurgus*, and *Numa*, and that the Laws bearing their names were theirs, than the Hiſtory of the ſeveral Commonwealths of *Athens*, *Sparta*, and *Rome*, who were governed by thoſe Laws? When Writings are not of general concernment, they may be more eaſily counterfeited; but when they concern the Right, Privileges, and Government of a Nation, there will be enough whoſe intereſt will lead them to prevent impoſtures. It is no eaſy matter to forge a *Magna Charta*, and to invent Laws; Men's caution and prudence is never ſo quick-ſighted as in matters which concern their Eſtates and Freeholds. The general intereſt of Men lies contrary to ſuch impoſtures, and therefore they will prevent their obtaining among them. Now the Laws of *Moſes* are incorporated into the very Republic of the *Jews*, and their ſubſiſtence and Government depends upon them, their Religion and Laws are ſo interwoven one with the other, that one cannot be broken off from the other. Their Right to their temporal poſſeſſions in the land of *Canaan* depends on their owning the Sovereignty of God who gave them to them; and on the truth of the Hiſtory recorded by *Moſes* concerning the Promiſes made to the Patriarchs. So that on that account it was impoſſible thoſe Laws ſhou'd be counterfeit on which the welfare of a Nation depended, and according to which they were governed ever ſince they were a Nation. So that I ſhall now take it to be ſufficiently proved, that the Writings under the name of *Moſes* were undoubtedly his; for none, who acknowledg the Laws to have been his, can have the face to deny the Hiſtory, there being ſo neceſſary a connexion between them; and the Book of *Geneſis* being nothing elſe but a general and very neceſſary introduction to that which follows. I deny not but the Hiſtory of *Moſes* might, according to the Tradition of the *Jews*, and the Belief of others, be reviſed by *Ezra*, or the Men of the great Synagogue after the *Jew*'s return from Captivity, as appears by the names of Places, and other paſſages not ſuitable to the time of *Moſes*; but I utterly deny that the *Pentateuch* was not of *Moſes* his penning, or that it

Longin. de ſublim.

V. Voſſ. de Idol. l. 2. c. 45.

V. Grot. de Ver. Relig. Chr. l. 2.

was only a Collection out of the Diaries and Annals of the Nation: For throughout the Scripture the very historical passages are attributed to *Moses*, and in all probability the *Samaritan Pentateuch* bears date before the Captivity; by which it still appears that those Books are truly the Books of *Moses*.

CHAP. II.

Moses his certain knowledg of what he writ.

I. *The third Hypothesis concerns the certainty of the matter of* Moses *his History, that gradually proved: First,* Moses *his knowledg cleared, by his education, and experience, and certain information.* II. *His education in the wisdom of* Ægypt; *what that was.* III. *The old* Ægyptian *learning enquired into;* IV. *the conveniences for it.* V. *Of the* Ægyptian *Priests,* Moses *reckoned among them for his knowledg.* VI. *The Mathematical, Natural, Divine, and Moral learning of* Ægypt. VII. *their Political wisdom most considerable.* VIII. *The advantage of* Moses *above the Greek Philosophers, as to wisdom and reason.* Moses *himself an eye-witness of most of his history:* IX. *the certain uninterrupted tradition of the other part among the* Jews, *manifested by rational evidence.*

HAving thus far cleared our way, we come to the third Hypothesis, which is, *There are as manifest proofs of the undoubted truth and certainty of the History recorded by* Moses, *as any can be given concerning any thing which we yield the firmest assent unto.* Here it must be considered, that we proceed in a way of rational evidence to prove the truth of the thing in hand, as to which, if in the judgment of impartial Persons the arguments produced be strong enough to convince an unbyassed mind: It is not material, whether every wrangling *Atheist* will sit down contented with them. For usually Persons of that inclination, rather than judgment, are more resolved against light, than inquisitive after it, and rather seek to stop the chinks at which any light might come in, than open the Windows for the free and cheerful entertainment of it. It will certainly be sufficient to make it appear, that no Man can deny the truth of that part of Scripture which we are now speaking of, without offering manifest violence to his own faculties, and making it appear to the World, that he is one wholly forsaken of his own Reason: which will be satisfactorily done, if we can clear these things: *First,* That it was morally impossible *Moses* shou'd be ignorant of the things he undertook to write of, and so be deceiv'd himself. *Secondly,* That it was utterly impossible he shou'd have any design in deceiving others in reporting it. *Thirdly,* That it is certain from all rational evidence, that

I. *Hypoth.* 3.

that he hath not deceiv'd the World, but that his Hiſtory is undoubtedly true. *Firſt*, That it was morally impoſſible *Moſes* ſhou'd be deceiv'd himſelf, or be ignorant of the things which he writ of. Two things are requiſite to prevent a Man's being deceiv'd himſelf. *Firſt*, That he be a Perſon of more than ordinary judgment, Wiſdom, and Knowledg. *Secondly*, That he have ſufficient information concerning the things he undertakes to write of. If either of theſe two be wanting, it is poſſible for a Man of integrity to be deceiv'd; for an honeſt Heart hath not always an *Urim* and *Thummim* upon it; nor is Fidelity always furniſh'd with the acuteſt intellectuals. The ſimplicity of the Dove is as liable to be deceiv'd its ſelf, as the ſubtilty of the Serpent is to deceive others; but where the wiſdom of the Serpent is, to prevent being deceiv'd, and the Dove's innocency in not deceiving others, there are all the qualifications can be deſir'd in any one who undertakes only to tell the truth. *Firſt* then, that *Moſes* was a Perſon of a great Underſtanding, and ſufficiently qualify'd to put a difference between Truth and Falſhood, will appear, *Firſt*, from the ingenuity of his Education, *Secondly*, from the ripeneſs of his Judgment, and greatneſs of his Experience when he penned theſe things.

Firſt, We begin with his Education. And here we require at preſent no further aſſent to be given to what is reported concerning *Moſes* in Scripture, than what we give to *Plutarch*'s Lives, or any other relations concerning the actions of Perſons who lived in former Ages. Two things then we find recorded in Scripture concerning *Moſes* his Education; *That he was brought up in the Court of* Ægypt, and *that he was skilled in all the learning of the* Ægyptians; and theſe Two will abundantly prove the ingenuity of his Education, *viz.* That he was a Perſon both converſant in civil Affairs, and acquainted with the abſtruſer parts of all the *Ægyptian* Wiſdom.

Heb. 11. 25.
Act. 7. 22.

II. And I confeſs there is nothing to me which doth advance ſo much the repute of the ancient *Ægyptian* Learning, as that the Spirit of God in Scripture ſhou'd take ſo much notice of it, as to ſet forth a Perſon (otherwiſe renowned for greater accompliſhments) by his skill in this. For if it be below the wiſdom of any ordinary Perſon, to ſet forth a Perſon by that which in its ſelf is no matter of commendation; how much leſs can we imagine it of that infinite wiſdom which inſpired *Stephen* in that Apology which he makes for himſelf againſt the *Libertines*, who charged him with contempt of *Moſes* and the Law? And therefore certainly this was ſome very obſervable thing, which was brought in as a ſingular commendation of *Moſes*, by that perſon whoſe deſign was to make it appear how high an eſteem he had of him. And hence it appears that Learning is not only in its ſelf a great accompliſhment of human nature, but that it ought to be looked upon with veneration, even in thoſe who have excellencies of a higher nature to commend them. If a Pearl retains its excellency when it lies upon a dunghil, it can certainly loſe nothing of its luſtre by being ſet in a Crown of gold; if Learning be commendable in an *Ægyptian*, it is no leſs in *Moſes*, where it is enamell'd with more noble perfections, than of it ſelf it can reach unto. All the queſtion is,

Whether

Whether the ancient Learning of the *Ægyptians* was ſuch as might be ſuppos'd to improve the Reaſon and Underſtanding of Men to ſuch an height, as thereby to make them more capable of putting a difference between Truth and Falſhood? Whether it were ſuch an overflowing *Nilus* as wou'd enrich the Underſtandings of all thoſe who were in a capacity to receive its Streams? The truth is, there want not grounds of ſuſpicion, that the old *Ægyptian* Learning was not of that elevation which the preſent diſtance of our Age makes us apt to think it was. And a learned Man hath in a ſet Diſcourſe endeavoured to ſhew the great defects that there were in it: Neither can it, I think, be deny'd, but according to the reports we have now concerning it, ſome parts of their Learning were frivolous, others obſcure, a great deal Magical, and the reſt ſhort of that improvement, which the acceſſion of the parts and induſtry of after Ages gave unto it. But yet it is again as evident, that ſome parts of Learning were invented by the *Ægyptians*, others much improved, and that the *Greeks* did at firſt ſet up with the ſtock they borrow'd out of *Ægypt*, and that Learning chiefly flouriſh'd there, when there was (I had almoſt ſaid) an *Ægyptian* darkneſs of Ignorance overſpreading the face of *Greece* as well as other Nations.

Conring. de Hermet. Medic. c. 10, 11, 12.

III. Which will appear by theſe conſiderations, The great antiquity of their repute for Learning, the great advantages they had for promoting it, and the parts of Learning moſt in uſe among them. This tho' it may ſeem a digreſſion here, will yet tend to promote our deſign, by ſhewing thereby how qualify'd and accompliſh'd *Moſes* was to deliver to the World an Hiſtory of ancient times. If we believe *Macrobius*, there was no people in the World cou'd vye for Learning with the *Ægyptians*, who makes *Ægypt* in one place, *the Mother of all Arts*, and in another, the *Ægyptians, omnium Philoſophiæ diſciplinarum parentes, The fathers of all the Philoſophic Sciences*; he derives elſewhere the original of all *Aſtronomy* from them, *quos conſtat primos omnium cœlum metiri, & ſcrutari auſos:* tho' it be more probable that the Nativity even of Aſtronomy it ſelf was firſt calculated by the *Chaldæans*, from whom it was convey'd to the *Ægyptians*. He likewiſe appropriates all divine knowledg to them, where he ſaith they were *Soli rerum divinarum conſcii*, and after calls *Ægypt divinarum omnium diſciplinarum compotem*. It is ſufficiently notorious what great repute the *Ægyptian* Learning hath been in, with ſome in our latter times, in that our Chymiſts look upon it as the greateſt honor to their profeſſion, that they think they can claim kindred of the old *Ægyptian* Learning, and derive the pedigree of their Chymiſtry from the old *Ægyptian Hermes*. But that vain pretenſe is ſufficiently refuted by the fore-mentioned learned Man *Conringius*, in his Tract on this ſubject, *de Hermetica Medicina*. *Franciſcus Patricius* profeſſeth himſelf ſo great an admirer of the old *Ægyptian* Learning, that he thought it wou'd be no bad exchange, if the *Peripatetic* Philoſophy were extruded, and the old *Ægyptian* received inſtead of it. But the World is now grown wiſer, than to receive his *Hermes Triſmegiſtus* for the Author of the old *Ægyptian* Philoſophy, the credit of his Author being for ever blaſted, and the doctrine contained in the Books under his

Macrob. Saturn l. 1. *cap.* 15. *in Somn. Scip. lib.* 1. *c.* 19.

Ibid. c. 21.

Id. Saturn. l. 1. *c.* 14. *l.* 7, *c.* 13.

name, manifeſted to be a mere *Cento*, a confus'd mixture of the *Chriſtian*, *Platonic*, and *Ægyptian* doctrine together. So that we cou'd hardly maintain the juſtneſs of the repute of the ancient *Ægyptian* Learning from any thing now extant of it; but yet we ſee no reaſon to queſtion it, eſpecially ſince it is ſo honorably ſpoken of in Sacred Writ, and ſeems in it to have been made the ſtandard and meaſure of humane Wiſdom. For which we have this obſervable teſtimony, that when the Wiſdom of *Solomon* is ſpoken of with the greateſt advantage and commendation, it is ſet forth with this character, *that it exceeded the wiſdom of all the children of the Eaſt Country, and all the wiſdom of* Ægypt. Whence it is moſt natural and eaſy to argue, That certainly their learning muſt be accounted the greateſt at that time in the World, or elſe it cou'd not have been inferred, that *Solomon* was wiſer than all men, becauſe his wiſdom excelled theirs, unleſs we ſuppoſe their wiſdom to have been the greateſt in that Age of the World, when the wiſdom of *the Græcians* (altho' in that time *Homer* is ſuppoſed to flouriſh) was not thought worthy the taking notice of. We ſee from hence then, as from an irrefragable teſtimony, that the wiſdom of the *Ægyptians* anciently was no trivial *Pedantry*, nor mere ſuperſtitious and Magical Rites, but that there was ſome thing in it ſolid and ſubſtantial, or it had not been worth triumphing over by the wiſdom of *Solomon*: It being true of that, what *Lipſius* ſaith of the *Roman* Empire, *Quicquid dignum vinci videbatur, vicit; cætera non tam non potuit quam contempſit*; it was an argument of ſome great worth, that it was overtopp'd and conquer'd by it.

1 King. 4. 29. 30, 31.

Lipſius de Magnitud. Rom. l. 1. c. 3.

IV. Thus we ſee how juſt the repute of the ancient *Ægyptian* Learning is from teſtimony, and we ſhall find as great reaſon for it, when we conſider the great advantages the *Ægyptians* had for promoting of Learning among them. Two ways Men come to knowledg, either by Tradition from others, or by Obſervation of their own; what the *Ægyptians* had the firſt way, will be ſpoken to afterwards; we now conſider the latter of theſe. All Knowledg ariſing from Obſervation, muſt be either of thoſe Sciences which immediately conduce to the benefit of Men's lives, or ſuch whoſe end is to improve Men's rational faculties in the knowledg of things. The former neceſſity will put Men upon the finding out, the latter require *ſeceſſum & otia*, freedom from other imployments, a mind addicted to them, and induſtry in the ſtudy of them, and a care to preſerve their inventions in them. The ſtudy of *Geometry* among the *Ægyptians*, ow'd its original to Neceſſity; for the river *Nile* being ſwell'd with the ſhowers falling in *Æthiopia*, and thence annually overflowing the Country of *Ægypt*, and by its violence overturning all the marks they had to diſtinguiſh their Lands, made it neceſſary for them upon every abatement of the flood to ſurvey their Lands, to find out every one his own by the quantity of the ground upon the ſurvey. The neceſſity of which put them upon a more diligent enquiry into that ſtudy, that thereby they might attain to ſome exactneſs in that, which was to be of ſuch neceſſary, conſtant and perpetual uſe. Thence we find the invention of Geometry particularly attributed by *Herodotus*, *Diodorus*, *Strabo* and others, to the *Ægyptians*. This skill of theirs

Vid. Ariſt. Metaph. 1. l. 6, 1.

Herodot. lib. 2. Diodor. l. 1. Strabo l. 17. Cœl. Rhod. l. 18. c. 34.

they

They after improved into a greater benefit, *viz.* the conveying the water of *Nile* into thoſe places where it had not overflown to ſo great a height, as to give them hopes of an enſuing plenty; which they did by the artificial cutting of ſeveral Channels for that end, wherein, ſaith *Strabo*, the *Ægyptians Art and Induſtry out-went Nature it ſelf.* By this likewiſe they obſerv'd the height of the overflowing of the river, whereby they knew what harveſt to expect the following year; which they did by a Well near *Memphis* (from the uſe of it call'd Νειλομέτριον) upon the walls of which were the marks of ſeveral cubits, which they obſerve and publiſh it to all, that they might provide themſelves accordingly. We ſee what grounds there are, even from profit and advantage, to make us believe that the *Ægyptians* were skilled in Geometry, and the knowledg relating thereto.

V. And for the promoting of all other knowledg, whoſe end is Contemplation, the very conſtitution of their Commonwealth did much conduce thereto: For thereby it was provided that there ſhou'd always be a ſufficient number of perſons freed from all other Employments, who might devote themſelves to a ſedulous enquiry into the natures of things. Such were the Ægyptian Prieſts, who by the peculiar nature of the Ægyptian ſuperſtitions, were freed from that burdenſome ſervice of ſacrificing beaſts, which the Prieſts of other Nations were continually employ'd about, and ſo they enjoy'd not only an eaſy but a very honorable employment; for they were the perſons of the greateſt honor, eſteem, and authority among the *Ægyptians*, of which rank, as far as I can find, all were accounted, who where not Souldiers, Husbandmen, or Artificers. For *Strabo* mentions no Nobility at all in *Ægypt* diſtinct from the Prieſts; for he divides the whole Common-wealth into Souldiers, Husbandmen and Prieſts. And telling us that the other two were employ'd about matters of War, and the King's revenues in Peace, he adds, οἱ δὲ ἱερεῖς τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ἤσκουν καὶ ἀστρονομίαν, ὁμιλητικοὶ πρὸς βασιλέων ἦσαν, *The Prieſts minded the ſtudy of Philoſophy and Aſtronomy, and convers'd moſt with their Kings:* And after, ſpeaking of their Kings being ſtudy'd in their Arts, as well as others of the Prieſts, he adds, μεθ' ὧν τῷ αὐτῷ πλείων ὁ βίος, *with whom they ſpent moſt of their lives.* Agreeable to this, *Plutarch* tells us, that the Kings themſelves were often Prieſts; and adds out of *Hecatæus*, that the Kings us'd to drink wine by meaſure, ἱερεῖς ὄντες, *becauſe they were Prieſts*; for as he ſaith, the Kings of *Ægypt* were choſen, either out of the rank of Prieſts or Souldiers, ἑκατέρου δὲ τοῦ μὲν ἀνδρείαν, τοῦ δὲ σοφίαν γένους ἀξιώματι καὶ ἰσχύϊ ὄντος· *thoſe two orders being of the greateſt honor, the one for valor, and the other for wiſdom*; and if the King were choſen out of the Souldiers, he was preſently entred among the Prieſts, to learn their Myſtical Sciences. *Diodorus* ſeems to reckon ſome great perſons after the Prieſts, and diſtinct from the Souldiery; but if he means by theſe any other than ſome of the other two profeſſions, I muſt ſay, as *Caſaubon* doth in another caſe of *Diodorus*, *Sane* Strabonis *auctoritas multis Siculis apud me prævalet.* Diodorus *his teſtimony not to be weighed with* Strabo's. From whence we may underſtand the reaſon why that *Potipherah*, whoſe Daughter *Joſeph* married, is called כֹּהֵן, which ſome render the Prieſt, others the *Prince of On*; but theſe two we ſee are

Strab. l. 17.

Plutarch. de Iſid. & Oſir.

Diod. l. 1.

Caſaub. Not. in Strabo l. 17.

Gen. 41. 45.

very consistent, their Priests being their great Princes; and *Heliopolis*, or *On*, of which *Potipherah* was Prince or Priest, being the chief Seat and University of the Priests of *Ægypt*. Now it is evident from *Clemens Alexandrinus*, that the *Ægyptians* did not communicate their Mysteries promiscuously to all, but only to such as were in succession to the Crown, or else to those of the Priests and their Children, who were most apt and fit for them, both by their diet, instruction, and family. For this was unalterably observed among them, that there was a continued succession of a profession in their several families, both of Priests, Souldiers, and Husbandmen, whereby they kept their several orders without any mixture or confusion, which is confess'd both by *Herodotus* and *Diodorus*: So that by this Constitution Learning was among them confin'd to the Priests, which highly advanceth the probability of that Tradition, preserv'd among the *Ægyptians* concerning *Moses* (which likewise strongly proves our present design) *viz. Manetho*'s Records, as *Josephus* tells us, that *Moses* was one of the Priests at *Heliopolis*, and that his name among them was *Osarsiphus*, who changing his name, was call'd *Moses*; and in the time of *Amenophis* conducted the leprous people out of *Ægypt* (so the *Ægyptians* out of their hatred of the *Israelites* call them.) And *Chæremon*, another Ægyptian Priest in the same Author, calls *Moses* a Scribe, and *Joseph* (by whom probably he means *Joshua*) a sacred Scribe, and saith that the Ægyptian name of *Moses* was *Tisithen*, and of *Joseph*, *Poteseph*. Now this tradition did in all probability arise from the repute of *Moses* his learning and wisdom; which being among them proper to their Priests, they thence ascrib'd that name to him, altho' probably he might come to the knowledg of all their Mysteries, from the relation he had to *Pharaoh*'s daughter.

Clem. Alex. Strom. l. 5.

Herodot. l. 1.
Diod. l. 1. c. 71.

Joseph. l. 1. C. App.

VI. We come now to consider the parts of the Ægyptian Learning, in which the Scripture tells us *Moses* was skill'd: This by *Philo Judæus* is branched into *Arithmetic*, *Geometry*, *Music*, and *Hieroglyphical Philosophy*: But *Sixtus Senensis* more comprehensively from *Diodorus*, *Diogenes Laertius*, and others, divides it into four parts, *Mathematical*, *Natural*, *Divine* and *Moral*. Their skill in the Mathematical parts of Learning hath been partly shew'd already, and might be more largely from that skill in them, which the *Grecians* gain'd from the *Ægyptians*, as both *Iamblichus* and *Porphiry* speak of *Pythagoras*, that he gain'd his skill in Geometry chiefly from the *Ægyptians*: for these as *Porphiry* saith, of a long time had been very studious of Geometry, as the *Phœnicians* of Arithmetic, and the *Chaldæans* of Astronomy. But *Iamblichus* (and I think deservedly) takes notice of the τὸ δυσπρόσοδον. the *difficult access* of the Ægyptian Priests, especially as to acquaintance with their Mysteries; and so *Strabo* calls them, μυστικὰς ἐ δυσμεθόδους, such who concealed their learning under many Symbols, and were not easily drawn to unfold it. And yet we might think the two and twenty years time, which *Pythagoras* is thought to have spent among them, had been enough to have insinuated himself into their utmost acquaintance, and to have drawn from them the knowledg of their greatest Mysteries; but yet we have no great reason to think he did, if we believe the story in *Diogenes Laertius* of his

Philo Jud. de vita Mosis.
Sixt. Senen. l. 2. p. 39.

Iambl. de vita Pyth. l. 1. 29.
Porphyr. de vit. Pyth. p. 182.

Strabo l. 17.

his ſacrificing an *Hecatomb* for the finding out that Demonſtration, which is now contain'd in the 47 propoſition of the firſt of *Euclide*. Yet this did not abate the *Græcians* eſteem of the *Ægyptians* Mathematical Learning; for in *Plato*'s time, *Eudoxus Cnidius* went into *Ægypt* on purpoſe to acquire it; and *Democritus* his boaſt, that none of the *Arſepedonaptæ* in *Ægypt* (ſo their Prieſts were call'd, as *Clemens Alexandrinus* and *Euſebius* tell us, who relate the ſtory) exceeded him in the Mathematics, proves at leaſt inferred, that they were then in greateſt eſteem for them. Their great skill in Aſtronomy is atteſted by *Diodorus*, *Strabo*, *Herodotus*, and others, and by their finding out the courſe of the year by the motion of the Sun, which was the invention of the *Heliopolitan* Prieſts. How much they valued Geography, appears from *Clemens* his deſcription of the ἱερογραμματεὺς, or *ſacred Scribe*, in the ſolemn proceſſion; for he was requir'd to be skilful in Hieroglyphics, Coſmography, Geography, the motions of the Planets, the Chorography of *Ægypt*, and deſcription of the *Nile*. *Euſtathius* in his Notes on *Dionyſius*, attributes the invention of Geographical Tables to *Seſoſtris*, who cauſed the Lands he had conquered to be deſcribed in Tables, and ſo communicated to the *Ægyptians*, and from them to others. Their skill in Natural Philoſophy cou'd not be very great, becauſe of their Magic and Superſtition, whereby they were hindred from all experiments in thoſe Natural things, which they attributed a Divinity to; but they ſeem to have been more exact and curious in Natural Hiſtory; for any prodigies, or any thing that was anomalous in Nature, they did, ſaith *Strabo*, φιλοπερίεργόν τι ἀναφέρειν εἰς τὰ ἱερὰ γράμματα, *with a great deal of curioſity inſert in their ſacred Records*; and *Herodotus* adds, *that more things of that nature are obſerved by them than by any other Nation*; which, ſaith he, they not only diligently preſerve, but frequently compare together, and from a ſimilitude of prodigies gather a ſimilitude of events. But that which gain'd the *Ægyptians* the greateſt repute abroad, ſeems to have been their early skill in *Phyſic*, which is ſo much ſpoken of by *Homer*, *Plato*, *Herodotus*, *Plutarch*, *Diogenes Laertius*, and others, that it were impertinent troubling a Reader's patience with the proof of that which is ſo generally confeſs'd. A great evidence of the antiquity of this ſtudy among them is (if *Manetho* may be ſo far credited) that *Athotis*, the ſecond King of the firſt Dynaſty of the *Thinites*, was a Phyſician himſelf, and writ ſome Books of *Anatomy*; and the ſecond King of the third Dynaſty of the *Memphites*, was, for his skill in *Phyſic*, honored among them by the name of *Æſculapius*. *Pliny* affirms it to have been the cuſtom of their Kings to cauſe dead bodies to be diſſected, to find out the nature of Diſeaſes; and elſewhere tells us, that the original of *Phyſic* among them was from the relation of thoſe who by any remedy were cured of any Diſeaſe, which for a memorial to poſterity were recorded in their Temples. Their Hieroglyphical and Myſtical Learning hath made the greateſt noiſe in the world and the leaſt of Subſtance in it; which whoever will not be convinced of without peruſal of *Kircher*'s *Oedipus Ægyptiacus*, will at laſt find it fully done to his hand by the ſucceſſleſs endeavors of that otherwiſe learned Man. I cannot think any rational Man cou'd think that ſtudy worth his

Clem. Al. Strom. l. 1. Euſ. Præp. l. 10. c. 2.

Diodor. l. 1. c. 49, 50. Strab l. 17. Herodot. l. 2. Clemens Strom. l. 6. p. 631. ed. Par.

Plin. Nat. hiſt. l. 19. c. 5. l. 29. c. 1.

pains, which at the higheſt can amount but to a conjecture; and when it is come to that with a great deal of pains, it is nothing but ſome ordinary and trivial obſervation. As in that famous Hieroglyphic of *Dioſpolis*, ſo much ſpoken of by the Ancients, where was a Child to expreſs coming into the World, an old Man for going out of it, an Hawk for God, an *Hippopotamus* for Hatred, and a Crocodile for Impudence; and all to expreſs this venerable *Apophthegm, O ye that come into the World, and that go out of it, God hates impudence.* And therefore certainly this kind of Learning deſerves the higheſt form among the *difficiles Nugæ*; and all theſe Hieroglyphics put together, will make but one good one, and ſhou'd be for *Labour loſt.*

VII. There is yet one part of Learning more among them, which the *Ægyptians* are eſteemed for, which is the Political and Civil part of it, which may better be called Wiſdom, than moſt of the foregoing; two things ſpeak much the wiſdom of a Nation, good Laws, and a prudent management of them: their Laws are highly commended by *Strabo* and *Diodorus*; and it is none of the leaſt commendations of them, that *Solon* and *Lycurgus* borrowed ſo many of their Conſtitutions from them; and for the prudent management of their Government, as the continuance of their State ſo long in peace and quietneſs, is an invincible demonſtration of it; ſo the report given of them in Scripture adds a further teſtimony to it; for therein the King of *Ægypt* is called the Son of the Wiſe, as well as the Son of ancient Kings; and his Counſellors are called *wiſe Counſellors of* Pharaoh, and the *wiſe Men*; whereby a more than ordinary prudence and policy muſt be underſtood. Can we now imagine ſuch a perſon as *Moſes* was, bred up in all the ingenuous Literature of *Ægypt*, converſant among their wiſeſt perſons in *Pharaoh*'s Court, having thereby all advantages to improve himſelf, and to underſtand the utmoſt of all that they knew, ſhou'd not be able to paſs a judgment between a mere pretence and Impoſture, and real and important Truths? Can we think that one who had intereſt in ſo great a Court, all advantages of raiſing himſelf therein, ſhou'd willingly forſake all the pleaſures and delights at preſent, all his hopes and advantages, for the future, were he not fully perſuaded of the certain and undoubted truth of all thoſe things which are recorded in his Books? Is it poſſible a Man of ordinary wiſdom ſhou'd venture himſelf upon ſo hazardous, unlikely and dangerous employment, as that was *Moſes* undertook, which cou'd have no probability of ſucceſs, but only upon the belief that that God who appeared unto him, was greater than all the Gods of *Ægypt*, and cou'd carry on his Deſign by his power, maugre all the oppoſition which the Princes of the world cou'd make againſt it? And what poſſible ground can we have to think that ſuch a perſon, who did verily believe the truth of what God revealed unto him, ſhou'd dare to write any otherwiſe than as it was revealed unto him? If there had been any thing repugnant to common Reaſon in the hiſtory of the Creation, the Fall of Man, the univerſal Deluge, the propagation of the World by the Sons of *Noah*, the Hiſtory of the *Patriarchs*, had not *Moſes* rational faculties as well as we? nay, had he them not far better improved than any of ours are?

Iſa. 19. 11, 12.

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and was not he then able to judg what was ſuitable to Reaſon, and what not? and can we think he wou'd then deliver any thing inconſiſtent with Reaſon or undoubted Tradition then, when the Ægyptian Prieſts might ſo readily and plainly have triumphed over him, by diſcovering the falſhood of what he wrote? Thus we ſee that *Moſes* was as highly qualify'd as any of the acuteſt heathen Philoſophers cou'd be, for diſcerning Truth from Falſhood; nay, in all probability he far excelled the moſt renowned of the *Grecian* Philoſophers in that very kind of Learning wherewith they made ſo great noiſe in the World, which was originally Ægyptian, as is evident in the whole ſeries of the *Grecian* Philoſophers, who went Age after Age to *Ægypt*, to get ſome ſcraps of that Learning there, which *Moſes* cou'd not have but full meals of, becauſe of his high place, great intereſt, and power in *Ægypt*. And muſt thoſe hungry Philoſophers then become the only Maſters of our Reaſon, and their Dictates be receiv'd as the ſenſe and voice of Nature, which they either receiv'd from uncertain Tradition, or elſe deliver'd in oppoſition to it, that they might be more taken notice of in the World? Muſt an αὐτὸς ἔφα be confronted with, *Thus ſaith the Lord?* and a few pitiful Symbols vye authority with Divine Commands? and *Ex nihilo nihil fit* be ſooner believ'd than, *In the beginning God created the Heavens and the Earth?* What irrefragable evidence of Reaſon is that ſo confident a preſumption built upon, when it can ſignify nothing without this *Hypotheſis*, That there is nothing but Matter in the World? and let this firſt be prov'd, and we will never ſtick to grant the other. I may confidently ſay, the great gullery of the world hath been, taking philoſophical Dictates for the ſtandard of Reaſon, and unprov'd *Hypotheſes* for certain Foundations for our diſcourſe to rely upon. And the ſeeking to reconcile the Myſteries of our Faith to theſe, hath been that which hath almoſt deſtroy'd it, and turn'd our Religion into a mere philoſophical Speculation. But of this elſewhere. We ſee then that inſiſting merely on the accompliſhment and rational perfections of the perſons who ſpeak, we have more reaſon to yield credit to *Moſes* in his Hiſtory, than to any Philoſophers in their ſpeculations.

VIII. And that which in the next place ſpeaks *Moſes* to be a perſon of wiſdom, and judgment, and ability to find out truth, was his Age and Experience when he deliver'd theſe things to the World. He vented no crude and indigeſted conceptions, no ſudden and temerarious fancies, the uſual iſſues of teeming and juvenile Wits; he liv'd long enough to have experience to try, and judgment to diſtinguiſh a mere outſide and varniſh, from what was ſolid and ſubſtantial. We cannot then have the leaſt ground of ſuſpicion, that *Moſes* was any ways unfit to diſcern Truth from Falſhood, and therefore was capable of judging the one from the other.

But tho' perſons be never ſo highly accompliſht for parts, learning, and experience, yet if they want due information of the certainty of the things they deliver, they may be ſtill deceiv'd themſelves; and if they preſerve it for poſterity, be guilty of deceiving others. Let us now therefore ſee whether *Moſes* had not as great advantages for underſtanding the truth of his Hiſtory, as he had judgment

ment to discern it. And concerning all those things contained in the four last Books of his, to his own death, it was impossible any shou'd have greater than himself, writing nothing but what he was *pars magna* himself of, what he saw and heard, and did; and can any testimony be desired greater than his whose actions they were, or who was present at the doing of them; and that not in any private way, but in the most public capacity? For altho' private persons may be present at great actions, yet they may be guilty of mis-representing them, for want of understanding all circumstances precedent, and subsequent, or for want of understanding the designs of the chief instruments of action: but when the person himself, who was the chief in all, shall undertake to write an exact History of it, what evidence can be desired more certain than that is, that there cou'd be no defect as to information concerning what was done? The only scruple then that can be made, must be concerning the passages of former times which *Moses* relates. And here I doubt not but to make it appear, that insisting only on all that can be desired in a bare Historian (setting aside Divine Revelation) he had as true and certain information of the History of those former Ages, as any one can have of things at that distance from themselves; and that is, by a certain uninterrupted tradition of them, which will appear more clear and evident in that Nation of which *Moses* was, than in any other Nation in the World: and that on these two accounts: First, *The undoubted lineal descent from Father to Son in the Jewish Nation.* Secondly, *Their interest lying so much in the preserving this Tradition entire.*

IX. First, *That there was a certain unmixed lineal descent from Father to Son in the Jewish Nation:* the great cause of most of the confusion in the Tradition of other Nations, was the frequent mixing of several Families one with another; now that God might as it were on purpose satisfy the World of the *Israelites* Capacity to preserve the Tradition entire, he prohibited their mixture by Marriages with the people of other Nations and Families. So that in *Moses* his time it was a very easy matter to run up their lineal descent as far as the Flood, nay, up to *Adam*; for *Adam* conversed sometimes with *Lamech*, *Noah*'s Father; for *Lamech* was born *A. M.* 874. *Adam* died 930. so that 56 years, according to that computation, were *Adam* and *Lamech* contemporary. Can we then think *Noah* ignorant of the ancient Tradition of the World, when his Father was so long *co-ævous* with *Adam*; and *Mathuselah* his Grand-father, who was born *A. M.* 687. died not till *A. M.* 1656. according to our most learned *Primate* of *Armagh*, *i. e.* was 600 years contemporary with *Noah*. *Sem* his Son was probably living in some part of *Jacob*'s time, or *Isaac*'s at least; and how easily and uninterruptedly might the general Tradition of the ancient History be continued thence to the time of *Moses*, when the number of Families agreeing in this Tradition was increased, and withal incorporated by a common ligament of Religion? I demand then, where can we suppose any ignorance or cutting off this general Tradition in so continued a succession as here was? Can we imagine that the Grand-children of *Jacob* cou'd be ignorant of their own pedigree, and whence they came into

into *Ægypt?* can we think a thing ſo late and ſo remarkable as the account of their coming thither, ſhou'd be forgotten, which was attended with ſo many memorable circumſtances, eſpecially the ſelling and advancement of *Joſeph*, whoſe memory it was impoſſible ſhou'd be obliterated in ſo ſhort a time? Cou'd *Jacob* be ignorant of the Country whence his Grand-father *Abraham* came? eſpecially when he lived ſo long in it himſelf, and married into that branch of the Family that was remaining there, when he had ſerved his Uncle *Laban?* Cou'd *Abraham*, when he was contemporary with *Sem*, be ignorant of the truth of the Floud, when *Sem*, from whom he derived himſelf, was one of the perſons who eſcaped it in the Ark? Cou'd *Sem* be ignorant of the actions before the Floud, when *Adam*, the firſt Man, lived ſo near the the time of *Noah?* and, cou'd *Noah* then be ignorant of the Creation and the fall of Man? Thus we ſee it almoſt impoſſible, that any age among them then cou'd be ignorant of the paſſages of the precedent, which they were ſo few Generations removed from, that they cou'd with eaſe derive themſelves from the Firſt Man. What then can we ſay? that any of theſe had a deſign of deceiving their poſterity, and ſo corrupted the Tradition? beſides, that it cou'd be hardly poſſible at that time, when there were ſo many remaining teſtimonies of former times; what end can we imagin that any parents ſhou'd have in thus deceiving their Children, or what advantage ſhou'd come to them by ſuch a deceit? Nay, I ſhall now manifeſt in the ſecond place, That the whole intereſt of their Children lay in preſerving this Tradition certain and entire. For their hopes of poſſeſſing *Canaan* and title to it, depended upon the promiſe made unto *Abraham* 400 years before; which wou'd not only keep awake their ſenſe of Divine Providence, but wou'd make them careful during their Bondage to preſerve their Genealogies, becauſe all the Right they cou'd plead to their poſſeſſions in *Canaan*, was from their being of *Abraham*'s Seed. And beſides this, on purpoſe to be a memorial to them of paſſages between God and *Abraham*, they had in their fleſh a badge of Circumciſion, which wou'd ſerve to call to mind thoſe tranſactions which had been between God and their Fore-fathers. Theſe things then do fully demonſtrate, that inſiſting only on Rational Evidence, the *Iſraelites* were the moſt certain conſervators of the ancient Hiſtory of the World; and can we think, that *Moſes* who was the Ruler among them, ſhou'd not fully underſtand thoſe things which every *Iſraelite* cou'd ſcarce be ignorant of, and might correct the miſtakes of *Moſes* in his Hiſtory, if he had been guilty of any ſuch? Theſe things I ſuppoſe have made the firſt propoſition evident, That it was morally impoſſible *Moſes* ſhou'd be deceived himſelf, or be ignorant of the things which he reports to others, both becauſe he had abilities ſufficient to diſcover Truth from Falſhood, and fufficient information of the paſſages of former times.

CHAP. III.

Moſes his fidelity and proved.

I. Moſes *conſidered as an Hiſtorian, and as a Law-giver; his fidelity in both proved; clear evidences that he had no intent to deceive in his Hiſtory, freedom from private intereſt, impartiality in his relations, plainneſs and perſpicuity of ſtile.* II. *As a Law-giver, he came armed with Divine Authority, which being the main thing, is fixed on to be fully proved from his actions and writings.* III. *The power of Miracles the great evidence of Divine Revelation. Two grand Queſtions propounded. In what caſes Miracles may be expected, and how known to be true. No neceſſity of a conſtant power of Miracles in a Church:* IV. *Two caſes alone wherein they may be expected. When any thing comes as a Law from God, and when a Divine Law is to be repealed. The neceſſity of Miracles in thoſe caſes as an evidence of Divine Revelation aſſerted.* V. VI. VII. *Objections anſwered. No uſe of Miracles when the Doctrine is ſettled and owned by Miracles by the firſt Revelation. No need of Miracles in reformation of a Church.*

I. THe ſecond Propoſition contains the proof of *Moſes* his fidelity, That he was as far from having any intent to deceive others, as he was from being deceived himſelf. Two ways *Moſes* muſt be conſidered, as an Hiſtorian, and as a Law-giver; the only inducement for him to deceive as an Hiſtorian, muſt be ſome particular intereſt which muſt draw him aſide from an impartial delivery of the truth; as a Law-giver, he might deceive, if he pretended Divine Revelation for thoſe Laws which were only the iſſues of his own Brain, that they might be received with a greater veneration among the people, as *Numa Pompilius* and others did. Now if we prove that *Moſes* had no intereſt to deceive in his Hiſtory, and had all rational evidence of Divine Revelation in his Laws, we ſhall abundantly evince the undoubted fidelity of *Moſes* in every thing recorded by him. We begin then with his fidelity as an Hiſtorian; and it being contrary to the common intereſt of the World to deceive and be deceived, we have no reaſon to entertain any ſuſpicions of the veracity of any perſon where we cannot diſcern ſome peculiar intereſt that might have a ſtronger byaſs upon him than the common intereſt of the World. For it is otherwiſe in Morals than in Naturals; for in Naturals, we ſee that every thing will leave its proper intereſt to preſerve the common intereſt of Nature; but in Morals, there is nothing more common than deſerting the common intereſt of Mankind, to ſet up a peculiar intereſt againſt it: It being the trueſt deſcription of a Politician, that he is one who makes himſelf the centre, and the whole World his circum-

circumference; that he regards not how much the whole World is abuſed, if any advantage doth accrue to himſelf by it. Where we ſee it then the deſign of any perſon to advance himſelf or his poſterity, or to ſet up the credit of the Nation whoſe Hiſtory he writes, we may have juſt cauſe to ſuſpect his partiality, becauſe we then find a ſufficient inducement for ſuch a one to leave the common road of Truth, and to fall into the paths of deceit. But we have not the leaſt ground to ſuſpect any ſuch partiality in the Hiſtory of *Moſes*; for nothing is more clear than that he was free from the ambitious deſign of advancing himſelf and his poſterity, who notwithſtanding the great honor he enjoy'd himſelf, was content to leave his poſterity in the meaneſt ſort of attendance upon the Tabernacle. And as little have we ground to think he intended to flatter that Nation, which he ſo lively deſcribes, that one wou'd think he had rather a deſign to ſet forth the frowardneſs, unbelief, unthankfulneſs, and diſobedience of a Nation towards a gracious God, than any ways to inhance their reputation in the world, or to ingratiate himſelf with them by writing this Hiſtory of them. Nay, and he ſets forth ſo exactly the leſſer failings and groſſer enormities of all the Anceſtors of this Nation, whoſe acts he records, that any impartial Reader will ſoon acquit him of a deſign of flattery, when after he hath recorded thoſe faults, he ſeeks not to extenuate them, or bring any excuſe or pretenſe to palliate them. So that any obſerving Reader may eaſily take notice, that he was carried on by a higher deſign than the common people of Hiſtorians are; and that his drift and ſcope was to exalt the goodneſs and favor of God, towards a rebellious and obſtinate people. Of which there can be no greater nor more lively demonſtration, than the Hiſtory of all the tranſactions of the *Jewiſh* Nation, from their coming forth of *Ægypt*, to their utter ruin and deſolation. And *Moſes* tells them as from God himſelf, *it was neither for their number, nor their goodneſs, that God ſet his love upon them, but he loved them, becauſe he loved them*, *i.e.* no other account was to be given of his gracious dealing with them, but the freeneſs of his own bounty, and the exuberancy of his goodneſs towards them. Nay, have we not cauſe to admire the ingenuity as well as veracity of this excellent perſonage, who not only lays ſo notorious a blot upon the ſtock of his own Family *Levi*, recorded ſo punctually the inhumanity and cruelty of him, and *Simeon* in their dealings with the *Sechemites*; but likewiſe inſerts that curſe which was left upon their memory for it, by their own Father at his deceaſe! And that he might not leave the leaſt ſuſpicion of partiality behind him, he hath not done as the Statuary did, (who engraved his own name ſo artificially in the Statue of *Jupiter*, that one ſhou'd continue as long as the other,) but what the other intended for the praiſe of his skill, *Moſes* hath done for his ingenuity, that he hath ſo interwoven the Hiſtory of his own failings and diſobedience with thoſe of the Nation, that his ſpots are like to continue as long as the whole web of his Hiſtory is like to do. Had it been the leaſt part of his deſign to have his memory preſerved with a ſuperſtitious veneration among the *Jews*, how eaſy had it been for him to have left out any thing that might in the leaſt entrench upon his reputation? but we find him very ſecure and careleſs in that

Deut. 7. 7, 8.

Gen. 34. 25.

Gen. 49. 5, 6, 7.

particular; nay, on the other ſide, very ſtudious and induſtrious in depreſſing the honor and deſerts of Men, and advancing the power and goodneſs of God. And all this he doth, not in an affected ſtrain of *Rhetoric*, whoſe proper work is *impetrare fidem mendacio*, and as *Tully* ſomewhere confeſſeth, *To make things ſeem otherwiſe than they are*; but that innate ſimplicity and plainneſs, and yet withal with that *Imperatoria brevitas*, that Majeſty and Authority, that it is thereby evident he ſought not to court acceptance, but to demand belief: Nor had any ſuch pitiful deſign of pleaſing his Readers with ſome affected phraſes, but thought that Truth it ſelf had preſence enough with it, to command the ſubmiſſion of our Underſtandings to it.

II. Eſpecially when all theſe were delivered by ſuch a one who came ſufficiently armed with all motives of credibility and inducements to aſſent, by that evidence which he gave, that he was no pretender to Divine Revelation, but was really imploy'd as a peculiar inſtrument of State under the God and Ruler of the whole World. Which if it be made clear, then all our further doubts muſt preſently ceaſe, and all impertinent diſputes be ſilenced, when the Supreme Majeſty appears impowering any perſon to dictate to the World the Laws they muſt be governed by. For if any thing be repugnant to our Rational Faculties, that is, that God ſhou'd dictate any thing but what is moſt certainly true, or that the Governor of the World ſhou'd preſcribe any Laws, but ſuch as were moſt juſt and reaſonable. If we ſuppoſe a God, we cannot queſtion veracity to be one of his chiefeſt Attributes, and that it is impoſſible the God of truth ſhou'd imploy any, to reveal any thing as from him, but what was undoubtedly true. So that it were an argument of the moſt groſs and unreaſonable incredulity, to diſtruſt the certainty of any thing which comes to us with ſufficient evidence of Divine Revelation, becauſe thereby we ſhew our diſtruſt of the veracity of God himſelf. All that we can deſire then, is only reaſonable ſatisfaction concerning the evidence of Divine Revelation in the perſon whoſe words we are to credit, and this our gracious God hath been ſo far from denying Men, that he hath given all Rational Evidence of the truth of it. For it implying no incongruity at all, to any notions of God or our ſelves, that God ſhou'd, when it pleaſes him, ſingle out ſome inſtrument to manifeſt his will to the World; our enquiry then leads us to thoſe things which may be proper Notes and Characters of ſuch a perſon who is employ'd on ſo high an Embaſſy. And thoſe are chiefly theſe two, If his actions be ſuch as cou'd not flow from the power of mere Natural Cauſes; and, If the things he reveals be ſuch as cou'd not proceed from any created Underſtanding. *Firſt* then, for his Actions, theſe ſtriking moſt upon our outward Senſes, when they are any thing extraordinary, do tranſmit along with the impreſſions of them to the Underſtanding, an high opinion of the perſon that doth them: whereas the mere height of knowledge, or profoundneſs of things diſcovered, can have no ſuch preſent power and influence upon any, but ſuch as are of more raiſed and inquiſitive minds. And the World is generally more apt to ſuſpect its ſelf deceived with Words, than it can be with Actions; and hence Miracles, or the doing of things above the reach of Nature, hath been always

embraced

embraced as the greateſt teſtimony of Divine Authority and Revelation. For which there is this evident Reaſon, That the courſe of Nature being ſetled by Divine Power, and every thing acting there by the force of that Power it receiv'd at firſt, it ſeems impoſſible that any thing ſhou'd really alter the ſeries of things, without the ſame Power which at firſt produced them. This then we take for granted, That where-ever ſuch a Power appears, there is a certain evidence of a Divine Preſence going along with ſuch a Perſon who enjoys it. And this is that which is moſt evident in the actions of *Moſes*, both as to the Miracles he wrought both in *Ægypt* and the Wilderneſs, and his miraculous deliverance of the *Iſraelites* out of *Ægypt*, this latter being as much above the reach of any merely Civil Power, as the other above Natural.

We therefore come to the Rational Evidence of that Divine Authority whereby *Moſes* acted, which may be gathered from that Divine Power which appeared in his Actions, which being a matter of ſo great weight and importance (it being one of the main Baſes whereon the Evidence of Divine Revelation, as to us, doth ſtand) and withal of ſo great difficulty and obſcurity, (cauſed thro' the preferring ſome Parties in Religion, above the common intereſt of it) it will require more care and diligence to ſearch what influence the Power of Miracles hath upon the proving the Divine Commiſſion of thoſe who do them. Whether they are ſuch undoubted Credentials, that where-ever they are produced, we are preſently to receive the Perſons who bring them, as Extraordinary Embaſſadors from Heaven, employ'd on ſome peculiar Meſſage to the Sons of Men? For the full ſtating of this important Queſtion, two things muſt be cleared: *Firſt*, In what caſes Miracles may be expected as Credentials to confirm an immediate Commiſſion from Heaven? *Secondly*, What Rational Evidences do attend thoſe Miracles, to aſſure us they are ſuch as they pretend to be?

III. *Firſt*, For the cauſes wherein theſe Miracles are to be expected as inducements to, or confirmations of our Faith, concerning the Divine Imployment of any perſons in the World. And here I lay down this as a certain Foundation, That a power of Miracles is not conſtantly and perpetually neceſſary in all thoſe who manage the affairs of Heaven here on Earth, or that act in the name of God in the World. When the Doctrine of Faith is once ſetled in Sacred Records, and the Divine Revelation of that Doctrine ſufficiently atteſted, by a Power of Miracles in the revealers of it, What imaginable neceſſity or pretext can there be contrived for a power of Miracles, eſpecially among ſuch as already own the Divine Revelation of the Scriptures? To make then a power of working Miracles to be conſtantly reſident in the Church of God, as one of the neceſſary Notes and Characters of it, is to put God upon that neceſſity which common Nature is freed from, *viz.* of multiplying things without ſufficient cauſe to be given for them; and to leave Men's Faith at a ſtand, when God hath given ſufficient teſtimony for it to rely upon. It is a thing too common and eaſy to be obſerved, that ſome perſons out of their eagerneſs to uphold the intereſt of their own party, have been fain to eſtabliſh it upon ſuch grounds, which when they are ſufficiently ſearched

to the bottom, do apparently undermine the common and ſure Foundations whereon the Belief of our common Chriſtianity doth mainly ſtand. It were eaſy to make a large Diſcourſe on this Subject, whereby we may rip open the wounds that Chriſtianity hath receiv'd, thro' the contentions of the ſeveral parties of it; but this imputation cannot with ſo much reaſon be faſten'd on any party, as that which is nailed to a pretended Infallible Chair; for which we need no other inſtance, than this before us. For while the leaders of that party make a Power of Miracles to be a neceſſary Note of the true Church, they unavoidably run Men upon this dangerous precipice, not to believe any thing as a matter of Faith, where they find not ſufficient Miracles to convince them that is the true Church which propounds it to them. Which neceſſarily follows from their acknowledg'd principles; for it being impoſſible, according to them, to believe any thing with a Divine Faith, but what is propounded by the Church as an infallible Guide; and it being impoſſible to know which is this infallible Guide, but by the Notes and Characters of it, and one of thoſe Notes, being a Power of Miracles, I cannot find out my Guide but by this Power; and this Power muſt be preſent in the Church, (for nothing of former Ages concerning Faith, as the Miracles of *Chriſt*, his Reſurrection, &c. is to be believ'd, but on the Church's account) and therefore where Men do not find ſufficient conviction from preſent Miracles, to believe the Church to be an infallible Guide, they muſt throw off all Faith concerning the Goſpel; for as good never a whit, as never the better. And therefore it is no wonder *Atheiſm* ſhou'd be ſo thriving a plant in *Italy*; nay under, if not within the walls of *Rome* it ſelf, where inquiſitive Perſons do daily ſee the jugglings and impoſtures of Prieſts in their pretended Miracles, and from thence are brought to look upon Religion its ſelf as a mere impoſture, and to think no *Pope* ſo infallible, as he that ſaid, *Quantum nobis profuit hæc de Chriſto fabula?* Such horrid conſequences do Men drive others, if not bring themſelves, to, when they employ their parts and induſtry rather to uphold a corrupt intereſt, than to promote the Belief of the acknowledg'd principles of Chriſtian Faith. But as long as we aſſert no neceſſity of ſuch a power of Miracles to be the Note of any true Church, nor any ſuch neceſſity of an infallible Guide, but that the Miracles wrought by *Chriſt* and his Apoſtles, were ſufficient evidences of a Divine Spirit in them; and that the Scriptures were recorded by them to be an infallible Rule of Faith, here we have more clear reaſon as to the primary motives and grounds of Faith, and withal the infallible veracity of God in the Scriptures, as the laſt reſolution of Faith. And while we aſſert ſuch an infallible Rule of Faith, delivered to us by ſuch an unanimous conſent from the firſt delivery of it, and then ſo fully atteſted by ſuch uncontroulable Miracles, we cannot in the leaſt underſtand to what end a power of Miracles ſhou'd now ſerve in the Church, eſpecially among thoſe who all believe the Scriptures to be the Word of God. Indeed before the great harveſt of Converts in the primitive times were brought in, both of *Jews* and *Gentiles*, and the Church fully ſettled in receiving the Canon of the Scriptures univerſally, we find God did continue this power among them; but after the Books of the

New Teſtament were generally embraced as the Rule of Faith among Chriſtians, we find them ſo far from pretending to any ſuch Power, that they reject the pretenders to it, ſuch as the *Donatiſts* were, and plead upon the ſame accounts, as we do now againſt the neceſſity of it. We ſee then no reaſon in the world for Miracles to be continued where the Doctrine of Faith is ſettled, as being confirmed by Miracles in the firſt Preachers of it.

IV. There are only theſe two caſes then, wherein Miracles may juſtly and with reaſon be expected. *Firſt*, When any perſon comes as by an extraordinary commiſſion from God to the World, either to deliver ſome peculiar meſſage, or to do ſome more than ordinary ſervice. *Secondly*, When ſomething that hath been before eſtabliſh'd by Divine Law, is to be repealed, and ſome other way of worſhip eſtabliſh'd inſtead of it. *Firſt*, When any comes upon an extraordinary meſſage to the World, in the name of, and by commiſſion from God, then it is but reaſon to require ſome more than ordinary evidence of ſuch Authority. Becauſe of the main importance of the duty of giving credit to ſuch a perſon, and the great ſin of being guilty of rejecting that Divine Authority which appears in him. And in this caſe we cannot think that God wou'd require it as a Duty to believe, where he doth not give ſufficient arguments for Faith, nor that he will puniſh perſons for ſuch a fault, which an invincible ignorance was the cauſe of. Indeed God doth not uſe to neceſſitate Faith, as to the act of it, but he doth ſo clearly propound the object of it, with all arguments inducing to it, as may ſufficiently juſtify a Believer's choice in point of reaſon and prudence, and may leave all Unbelievers without excuſe. I cannot ſee what account a Man can give to himſelf of his Faith, much leſs what Apology he can make to others for it, unleſs he be ſufficiently convinced in point of the higheſt reaſon, that it was his duty to believe; and in order to that conviction, there muſt be ſome clear evidence given, That what is ſpoken hath the impreſs of Divine Authority upon it. Now what convictions there can be to any ſober mind concerning Divine Authority in any perſon without ſuch a Power of Miracles going along with him, when he is to deliver ſome new Doctrine to the World to be believ'd, I confeſs I cannot underſtand. For altho' I doubt not but wherever God doth reveal any thing to any perſon immediately, he gives demonſtrable evidence to the inward ſenſes of the Soul, that it comes from himſelf; yet this inward ſenſe can be no ground to another perſon to believe his Doctrine Divine, becauſe no Man can be a competent judge of the actings of another's ſenſes; and it is impoſſible to another perſon to diſtinguiſh the actings of the Divine Spirit from ſtrong impreſſions of fancy by the force and energy of them. If it be ſaid, *That we are bound to believe thoſe, who ſay they are fully ſatisfy'd of their Divine Commiſſion.* *Object.* *Anſw.* I anſwer *Firſt*, This will expoſe us to all deluſions imaginable; for if we are bound to believe them becauſe they ſay ſo, we are bound to believe all which ſay ſo; and none are more confident pretenders to this than the greateſt deceivers, as the experience of our Age will ſufficiently witneſs. *Secondly*, Men muſt neceſſarily be bound to believe contradictions; for nothing is more ordinary, than for ſuch confident pretenders to a Divine Spirit, to contradict one

one another, and it may be, the ſame perſon in a little time, contradict himſelf: and muſt we ſtill be bound to believe all they ſay? If ſo, no Philoſophers wou'd be ſo much in requeſt, as thoſe *Ariſtotle* diſputes againſt in his *Metaphyſics*, who thought a thing might be, and not be, at the ſame time. *Thirdly*, The ground of Faith at laſt will be but a mere human teſtimony, as far as the perſon who is to believe is capable of judging of it. For the Queſtion being, Whether the perſon I am to believe hath Divine Authority for what he ſaith, What ground can I have to believe that he hath ſo? Muſt I take his bare affirmation for it? If ſo, then a mere humane teſtimony muſt be the ground of Divine Faith, and that which is laſt reſolv'd into: If it be ſaid, *That I am to believe the Divine Authority by which he ſpeaks, when he ſpeaks in the name of God:* I anſwer, The Queſtion will again return, how I ſhall know he ſpeaks this from Divine Authority? and ſo there muſt be a progreſs *in infinitum*, or founding Divine Faith on a mere humane teſtimony, If I am to believe Divine Revelation merely on the account of the perſon's affirmation who pretends to it. For in this caſe it holds good, *Non apparentis & non exiſtentis eadem eſt ratio*; if he be divinely inſpired, and there be no ground inducing me to believe that he is ſo, I ſhall be excuſed, if I believe him not, if my wilfulneſs and lazineſs be not the cauſe of my unbelief.

v. If it be ſaid, *That God will ſatisfy the minds of good Men concerning the truth of Divine Revelation.* I grant it to be wonderfully true; but all the Queſtion is *de modo*, how God will ſatisfy them? whether merely by Inſpiration of his own Spirit in them, aſſuring them that it is God that ſpeaks in ſuch perſons; or by giving them Rational Evidence, convincing them of ſufficient grounds to believe it. If we aſſert the former way, we run into theſe inconveniences: *Firſt*, We make as immediate a Revelation in all thoſe who believe, as in thoſe who are to reveal Divine Truths to us; for there is a new Revelation of an object immediately to the mind; *viz. That ſuch a perſon is inſpired of God*; and is not after the common way of the Spirit's illumination in Believers, which is by enlightning the faculty, without the propoſition of any new object, as it is in the work of Grace: So that according to this opinion, there muſt be immediate Inſpiration as to that act of Faith, whereby we believe any one to have been divinely inſpired, and conſequently to that whereby we believe the Scriptures to be the Word of God. *Secondly*, Doth not this make the faireſt plea for Men's unbelief? For, I demand, Is it the duty of thoſe who want that immediate Illumination to believe or no? If it be not their duty, Unbelief can be no ſin to them; if it be a duty, it muſt be made known to be a duty; and how can that be made known to them to be a duty, when they want the only and neceſſary means of Inſtruction in order to it? Will God condemn them for that, which it was impoſſible they ſhou'd have, unleſs God gave it them? And how can they be left inexcuſable, who want ſo much as rational inducements to Faith? for of theſe I now ſpeak, and not of efficacious perſuaſions of the Mind, when there are rational arguments for Faith propounded. But, *Laſtly*, I ſuppoſe the caſe will be clear'd, when we take notice what

ourſe God hath always taken to give all rational ſatisfaction to the minds of Men, concerning the perſons whom he hath imploy'd in either of the foremention'd caſes. *Firſt*, for thoſe who have been imploy'd upon ſome ſpecial meſſage and ſervice for God, he hath ſent them forth ſufficiently provided with manifeſtations of the Divine Power whereby they acted; as is moſt clear and evident in the preſent caſe of *Moſes*, *Exodus* 4. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. where *Moſes* puts the caſe to God, which we are now debating of. Suppoſing, ſaith he, that I ſhou'd go to the *Iſraelites* and tell them, God had appear'd to me, and ſent me to deliver them, and they ſhou'd ſay, God had not appear'd unto me; how ſhou'd I ſatisfy them? God doth not reject this objection of *Moſes* as ſavouring of unbelief, but preſently ſhews him how he ſhou'd ſatisfy them, by cauſing a Miracle before his face, *turning his rod into a ſerpent*; and God gives this as the reaſon of it, *verſ.* 5. *That they may believe that the Lord God of their Fathers, the God of* Abraham, *the God of* Iſaac, *and the God of* Jacob, *hath appeared unto thee.* It ſeems God himſelf thought this wou'd be the moſt pregnant evidence of God's appearing to him, if he wrought Miracles before their faces. Nay, leſt they ſhou'd think one ſingle Miracle was not ſufficient, God in the immediate following verſes adjoyns two more, which he ſhou'd do in order to their ſatisfaction; and further, *verſ.* 21. God gave him a charge to do all thoſe wonders before *Pharaoh*, which he had put into his hand: and accordingly we find *Pharaoh* preſently demanding a Miracle of *Moſes*, *Exodus* 7. 9. which accordingly *Moſes* did in his preſence, tho' he might ſuppoſe *Pharaoh*'s demand not to proceed from deſire of ſatisfaction, but from ſome hopes that for want of it, he might have rendred his credit ſuſpected among the *Iſraelites*.

VI. Indeed after God had delivered his people, and had ſetled them in a way of ſerving him according to the Laws delivered by *Moſes*, which he had confirm'd by unqueſtionable Miracles among them, we find a caution laid in by *Moſes* himſelf, againſt thoſe which ſhou'd pretend ſigns and wonders to draw them off from the Religion eſtabliſh'd by the Law of *Moſes*. And ſo likewiſe under the Goſpel, after that was eſtabliſh'd by the unparalell'd Miracles of our Savior and the Apoſtles, we find frequent cautions againſt being deceiv'd by thoſe who came with pretences of doing great Miracles. But this is ſo far from infringing the credibility of ſuch a Teſtimony which is confirm'd by Miracles, that it yields a ſtrong confirmation to the truth of what I now aſſert. For the Doctrine is ſuppos'd to be already eſtabliſh'd by Miracles, according to which we are to judge of the ſpirits of ſuch pretenders. Now it ſtands to the greateſt reaſon, that when a Religion is once eſtabliſh'd by uncontrolled Miracles, we ſhou'd not hearken to every whiffling Conjurer that will pretend to do great feats, to draw us off from the truth eſtabliſh'd. In which caſe, the ſureſt way to diſcover the Impoſture is, to compare his pretended Miracles with thoſe true and real ones which were done by *Moſes* and *Chriſt*; and the ground of it is, becauſe every perſon is no competent judg of the truth of a Miracle; for the Devil, by his power and ſubtilty, may eaſily deceive all ſuch as will be led by the noſe by him, in expectation of ſome wonders to be done by him. And therefore

Deut. 13. 1, 2, 3.

as long as we have no ground to queſtion the certainty of Miracles which were wrought by *Chriſt* or *Moſes*, I am bound to adhere to the Doctrine eſtabliſh'd by thoſe Miracles, and to make them my rule of judging all perſons who ſhall pretend to work Miracles: Becauſe, 1. I do not know how far God may give Men over to be deceiv'd by lying wonders, who will not receive the truth in the love of it; *i. e.* thoſe that think not the *Chriſtian Religion* ſufficiently confirm'd by the Miracles wrought at the firſt promulgation of it. God in juſtice may permit the Devil to go further than otherwiſe he cou'd, and leave ſuch perſons to their own credulity, to believe every impoſture and illuſion of their ſenſes for true Miracles. 2. That Doctrine which was confirm'd by undoubted Miracles, hath aſſur'd us of the coming of Lying Wonders, whereby many ſhou'd be deceiv'd. Now this part of the Doctrine of the Goſpel is as certainly true as any of the reſt; for it was confirm'd by the ſame Miracles that the other was; and beſides that, the very coming of ſuch Miracles is an evidence of the truth of it, it falling out ſo exactly according to what was foretold ſo many hundred years ſince. Now if this Doctrine be true, then am I certain the intent of theſe Miracles is to deceive, and that thoſe are deceiv'd who hearken to them; and what reaſon then have I to believe them? 3. To what end do theſe Miracles ſerve? Are they to confirm the truths contain'd in Scripture? But what need they any confirmation now, when we are aſſur'd by the Miracles wrought by *Chriſt* and his *Apoſtles*, that the Doctrine by them preach'd came from God? and ſo hath been receiv'd upon the credit of thoſe Miracles ever ſince. Were theſe truths ſufficiently prov'd to be from God before or no? If not, then all former Ages have believ'd without ſufficient ground for Faith; if they were, then what ground can there be to confirm us in them now? Certainly God, who never doth any thing but for very great purpoſes, will never alter the courſe of Nature, merely for ſatisfaction of Men's vain curioſities.

VII. But it may be it will be ſaid, It was ſomething not fully reveal'd in Scripture which is thus confirm'd by Miracles: but where hath the Scripture told us, that any thing not fully reveal'd therein, ſhou'd be afterwards confirm'd? Was the Scripture an infallible rule of Faith, while this was wanting in it? Did *Chriſt* and his Apoſtles diſcharge their places, when they left ſomething unreveal'd to us? Was this a Duty before theſe Miracles, or no? if it was, what need Miracles to confirm it? if not, *Chriſt* hath not told us all neceſſary conditions of Salvation. For whatever is required as a Duty, is ſuch, as the neglect of it runs Men upon damnation. *Laſtly*, Men's Faith will be left at continual uncertainties; for we know not according to this principle, when we have all that is neceſſary to be believ'd, or do all that is neceſſary to be practis'd in order to Salvation. For if God may ſtill make new Articles of Faith, or conſtitute new duties by freſh Miracles, I muſt go and enquire what Miracles are wrought in every place, to ſee I miſs nothing that may be neceſſary for me, in order to my happineſs in another World.

If Men pretend to deliver any Doctrine contrary to the Scripture; then it is not only neceſſary that they confirm it by Miracles, but they muſt manifeſt the falſity of thoſe Miracles on

which

which that Doctrine is believ'd, or elſe they muſt uſe another Miracle to prove that God will ſet his Seal to confirm both parts of a contradiction to be true. Which being the hardeſt task of all, had need be prov'd by very ſufficient and undoubted Miracles, ſuch as may be able to make us believe thoſe are Miracles, and are not, at the ſame time, and ſo the ſtrength of the Argument is utterly deſtroy'd by the *medium* produc'd to prove it by.

By this Diſcourſe theſe Two things are clear; *Firſt*, That no pretenſes of Miracles are to be hearkn'd to, when the Doctrine we are to believe is already eſtabliſh'd by them, if thoſe Miracles tend in the leaſt to the derogation of the truth of what was eſtabliſh'd by thoſe former Miracles. *Secondly*, That when the full Doctrine we are to believe is eſtabliſh'd by Miracles, there is no neceſſity at all of new Miracles, for confirmation of any of the truths therein deliver'd. And therefore it is a moſt unreaſonable thing to demand Miracles of thoſe to prove the truth of the Doctrine they deliver, who do firſt ſolemnly profeſs to deliver nothing but what was confirm'd by Miracles in the firſt delivery of it, and is contain'd in the Scriptures of the Old and New Teſtament; and *ſecondly* do not pretend to any immediate Commiſſion from Heaven, but do nothing but what in their Conſciences they think every true Chriſtian is bound to do; much more all Magiſtrates and Miniſters, who believe the truth of what they profeſs, which is in their places to reform all Errors and Abuſes which are crept into the Doctrine or Practice of *Chriſtianity*, thro' the Corruption of Men or Times. And therefore it is a moſt unjuſt and unreaſonable demand of the *Papiſts*, when they require Miracles from our Firſt Reformers, to prove the truth of their Doctrine with. Had they pretended to have come with an immediate Commiſſion from Heaven to have added to the Doctrine of the Goſpel, there had been ſome plea for ſuch a demand; but it was quite otherwiſe with them: Their only deſign was, *to whip the buyers and ſellers out of the Temple*, to purge the Church from its abuſes: And altho' that by *Jerome* was thought to be one of our Savior's greateſt Miracles, yet this by us is conceiv'd to be no other than the duty of all Magiſtrates, Miniſters, and private Chriſtians; theſe by their prayers, Miniſters by their Doctrine, and Magiſtrates by their juſt Authority.

CHAP. IV.

The fidelity of the Prophets ſucceeding *Moſes*.

I. *An order of Prophets to ſucceed* Moſes, *by God's own appointment in the Law of* Moſes. II. *The Schools of the Prophets,* III. *the original and inſtitution of them.* IV. *The Cities of the Levites. The occaſion of their firſt inſtitution.* V. *The places of the Schools of the Prophets, and the tendency of the inſtitution there to a prophetical office.* VI. *Of the Muſic us'd in the Schools of the Prophets,* VII. *The Roman Aſſamenta, and the Greek Hymns in their ſolemn worſhip.* VIII. *The 2 ſorts of Prophets among the* Jews, *Leiger and extraordinary. Ordinary Prophets taken out of the Schools, prov'd by* Amos *and* Saul.

I. BUt altho' now under the Goſpel (the Revelation of God's Will being compleated by *Chriſt* and his Apoſtles) we have no reaſon either to expect new Revelations, or new Miracles for confirming the Old; yet under the Law, God training up his People by degrees till the coming of *Chriſt*, there was a neceſſity of a new ſupply of Divine Meſſengers (call'd *Prophets*) to prepare the People, and make way for the coming of *Chriſt*. As to whom theſe two things are conſiderable.

Firſt, Thoſe Prophets whoſe work was to inform the People of their duties, or to reprove them for their ſins, or to prepare them for the coming of the *Meſſias* (which were their chief tasks) had no need to confirm the truth of their doctrine or commiſſion from Heaven by the working of Miracles among them. And that on theſe two accounts.

Firſt, Becauſe God did not conſummate the Revelation of his Mind and Will to the *Jews* by the Miniſtry of *Moſes*, but appointed a ſucceſſion of Prophets to be among them, to make known his Mind unto them. Now, in this caſe, when the prophetical office was eſtabliſh'd among them, what neceſſity was there that every one that came to them upon an Errand from God, ſhou'd prove his Teſtimony to be true by Miracles, when in the diſcharge of his Office he deliver'd nothing diſſonant from the Law of *Moſes?* It is one argument God intended a ſucceſſion of Prophets, when he laid down ſuch Rules in his Law for the judging of them, whether they were truly inſpir'd or no, *Deut.* 18. 21, 22. And in that ſame place God doth promiſe a ſucceſſion of Prophets, *Deut.* 18. 15, 18. *A Prophet will the Lord God raiſe up unto thee like unto me; to him ſhall ye hearken.* Which words, tho' in their full and compleat ſenſe they do relate to *Chriſt* (who is the great Prophet of the Church) yet who ever attends to the full ſcope of the words, will eaſily perceive that the immediate ſenſe of them doth relate to an order of Prophets, which ſhou'd ſucceed *Moſes* among the *Jews*; between whom and *Moſes* there wou'd be a great ſimilitude as to their Birth, Calling, and Doctrine, tho' not a juſt equality, which is excluded, *Deut.* 34. 10, 11. and the chief reaſon why it is ſaid there that the other Prophets fell ſo much ſhort of *Moſes* is, in regard of the Signs and Wonders which he wrought, as is there largely expreſs'd. Nor may it ſeem ſtrange, that by a Prophet ſhou'd be underſtood an order or ſucceſſion

ceſſion of Prophets when it is acknowledg'd by moſt *Proteſtants*, that by ὁ Ἀντίχριστος, *the Antichriſt*, is underſtood a Rank and Succeſſion of ſeveral Perſons in the ſame name and function: And that it is to be underſtood in thoſe words concerning a ſucceſſion of Prophets, will appear by the occaſion of their being brought in; for ver. 14. God prohibits them to hearken after the manner of their Neighbour-nations, to Obſervers of times and Diviners, and then brings in the following words, *ver.* 15. as to the reaſon of that Prohibition, that *God would raiſe up a Prophet among themſelves like unto* Moſes, *and to him ſhould they hearken.* Now let any rational Man judg whether it were ſo probable an Argument to keep them from hearkning to Diviners of other Nations, that there ſhou'd be a Prophet ariſe 2000 years after like unto *Moſes*, as that he wou'd raiſe up a continued ſucceſſion of Prophets among themſelves, to whom they ſhou'd hearken. Thus *Origen* in his excellent Book againſt *Celſus*, ſhews the neceſſity of the Prophetical Office among the *Jews* from hence; *For*, ſaith he, *it being written in their Law that the Gentiles hearkened unto Oracles and Divinations; but God would not ſuffer it to be ſo among them, it preſently follows, A Prophet will the Lord God raiſe up in the midſt of thee*, &c. *Therefore*, ſaith he, *when the Nations round about them had their Oracles, and ſeveral ways of Divination, all which were ſtrictly prohibited among the* Jews, *if the* Jews *had no way of foreknowing things to come, it had been almoſt impoſſible, conſidering the great curioſity of humane nature, to have kept them from deſpiſing the Law of* Moſes, *or apoſtatizing to the heathen Oracles, or ſetting up ſomething like them among themſelves.* Which Interpretation of his ſeems to have a great deal of Reaſon, not only from the Coherence of the words here, but from the *Analogy* of many other Precepts of the Law of *Moſes*, which it is moſt certain have a reſpect to the cuſtoms of the Idolatrous Nations round about them. Another reaſon why it is moſt probable, that by this is underſtood a ſucceſſion of Prophets, is the charge which follows againſt falſe Prophets, and the Rules to diſcover them, *ver.* 20, 21, 22. which had not been ſo pertinent and coherent, if the oppoſition did not lie between the order of true Prophets among the *Jews*, and the falſe Prophets, which ſhou'd riſe up in the midſt of them. Ad that which yet further juſtifies this Interterpretation, is, that there is no other place in the whole *Pentateuch* which doth expreſly ſpeak of a ſucceſſion of Prophets, if this be not underſtood of it; and is it any ways probable a matter of ſo great moment and conſequence ſhou'd be wholly pretermitted? Eſpecially when we find it ſo exactly perform'd in the ſucceeding Ages of the Jewiſh Commonwealth; their immediate Ruler like Dictators at *Rome*, after *Moſes*'s death, being moſt rais'd up by immediate incitation and impulſe from God, and many of them inſpir'd with a Spirit of Prophecy. How ſhou'd the *Jews* have expected theſe, or obey'd them when they appear'd, had not God foretold it to them, and provided them for it by the Law of *Moſes*.

V. Arabic. verſ. & Calv. in loc. P. Fagium, Pet. Mart. Loc. Com. Claſſ. 1. cap. 3. Sect. 12.

Origen. con. Celſum, lib. 1.

Deut. 18. 14.

II. Neither did theſe Prophets ariſe ſingly among them, like blazing Stars, one in an Age, to portend future Events, but whole Conſtellations of them ſometimes appear'd together; yea, ſo many ſmaller Prophets were ſometimes united together, as made up a

perfect *Galaxy*, when they were entred into Societies, and became Schools of the Prophets; for ſuch we frequently read of in Scripture. The Original and Inſtitution of which may caſt a further light into our preſent deſign, and ſhew'd us the little reaſon the *Jews* cou'd have to expect Miracles from them to confirm their Doctrine, who were brought up in the knowledg of their Law, and were call'd out for their ſeveral Societies into the prophetical office by the immediate incitation of God himſelf. Which being ſo commonly known among them, there needed no ſuch extraordinary proofs to manifeſt the Divine Authority by which they were employ'd. Two things then we ſhall endeavor to clear: *Firſt*, The Original and Inſtitution of theſe Schools of the Prophets; and *Secondly*, That it was the ordinary courſe for the Prophets by employments to be taken forth of theſe Societies wherein they were educated. *Firſt*, for the Original and Inſtitution of theſe Schools of the Prophets. The firſt Seminaries, or places of Inſtitution among the *Jews*, were the Cities of the *Levites*, which were diſperſed up and down in the ſeveral Tribes of *Iſrael*; God thereby turning that into a Bleſſing, which was pronounc'd as a curſe upon *Levi* by his Father *Jacob*, viz. *that he ſhould be divided in* Jacob, *and ſcattered in* Iſrael. But tho' the fulfilling of that Prophecy might be the primary ground of that ſcattering, yet it is evident that God aim'd at ſome further good in it, both in reference to the *Levites* and the *Iſraelites*. *Lyra* undertakes to aſſign four reaſons of this Diſtribution of the Cities of the *Levites* among the Tribes. (1.) Becauſe if they had liv'd but in one Tribe, the Worſhip of God wou'd have ſeem'd to have been confin'd to that Tribe. (2.) Becauſe they wou'd have been a burden to that Tribe they had their habitations in. (3.) From the equity of being maintain'd by all who ſerv'd for all. (4.) Becauſe it was their office to teach the People, and therefore it was neceſſary they ſhou'd live among them. Theſe Reaſons are moſt of them oppos'd by *Abulenſis*, but defended by others. The laſt is that which moſt inſiſt on, it being the peculiar office of the *Levites* to teach the People; ſo 2 *Chron.* 35. 4. *And ſaid unto the Levites, qui erudiebant omnem Iſraelem*, as *Vatablus* renders it, *who taught all Iſrael*; and *Maſius* inſiſts on that as the great reaſon of their diſperſion, to be ready to teach the Law among the *Iſraelites*. But yet all thoſe who are agreed that Teaching the Law was the Duty of the *Levites*, are not yet agreed of the manner of that Teaching; for there being two parts of their Law, the one Ceremonial and Judicial, and the other Moral and Spiritual, the Queſtion is, Whether of theſe two did belong to, or was perform'd by the *Prieſts* and *Levites*. There are many who underſtand all that Office of Teaching, which belong'd to the *Prieſts* and *Levites* to be merely concerning the Ceremonial Law, *i. e.* deciding all Caſes and Controverſy which ſhou'd ariſe concerning their Ceremonial Worſhip, which in *Levit.* 10. 10. is call'd *putting a difference between holy and unholy, and between clean and unclean*. But it ſeems ſomewhat ſtrange that God ſhou'd take ſo great care about the Shell and Outſide of his Worſhip, and none at all for the Moral and Spiritual part of it, eſpecially when he had ſet apart a whole Tribe merely for his own ſervice, and freed them from all other employments, that they might have a greater

Gen. 49. 7.

Joſh. 21.

Abulenſis in Joſh. 21. c. 7, & 8. V. Sherlog. Antiq. Hebraic. l. 2. c. 3. ſ. 4. Maſius in Joſh. c. 14.

a greater liberty to attend upon the things relating to his ſervice; eſpecially when it is mention'd as the Duty of the *Prieſts* and *Levites, to teach all the ſtatutes which the Lord had ſpoken to them by the hand of* Moſes, and that *they ſhall teach* Jacob *thy ſtatutes, and* Iſrael *thy law.* Which notwithſtanding what *Abarbinel* and others ſay, muſt certainly comprehend as well the Moral as the Ceremonial part of *Moſes* his Law. And the *Prieſts lips are ſaid to preſerve knowledg: and God ſaith they ſhould ſeek the law at his mouth; for he is the meſſenger of the Lord of Hoſts.* Do theſe things import no more than mere deciding the caſes of the Ceremonial Law? But whatever God's intention in the inſtitution of the *Levites* was, we find not much in Scripture of what they did for the promoting the Moral and Spiritual part of Divine Worſhip; but it is no news to hear that Societies inſtituted for good and pious ends, ſhou'd degenerate from the firſt intention of the Founders of them; and thus it is probable it was with the *Levites*, who finding the moſt of their benefit and advantage to come in by the Ceremonial Caſes, might grow more negligent of the Moral part of Divine Service, which brought no ſecular emolument to them.

Lev. 10. 10. Deut. 33. 10. Mal. 2. 7.

III. And thence we read not of theſe Schools of the Prophets, which were Societies in order to Spiritual Inſtruction, till about the time of *Samuel*; and many think him to have been the firſt Author of them. For it is evident, that about his time the Prieſthood was grown to a great degeneracy, and Men thereby eſtranged from the Worſhip of God, ſo that there ſeem'd almoſt a neceſſity then of reſtoring ſome Societies, who might have a ſpecial eye to the Spiritual part of God's Worſhip and Service. The occaſion of the Inſtitution of them, ſeems to have been from the reſort which the People had to the high places for ſacrificing, during the captivity or uncertain abode of the *Ark of God*, after the deſolation of *Shiloh:* now the People reſorting to theſe places to perform their Solemnities, it was ſo order'd, that a company of Prophets ſhou'd be there reſident to *bleſs the ſacrifices*, and inſtruct the People. Two of theſe places with the Societies in them we find mention'd in the time of *Samuel.* The *firſt* mention'd 1 *Sam.* 10. 5, 10. which cannot be *Ramah*, altho' the *Syriac* and *Arabic* Verſions ſo render it. For *Samuel* had his own reſidence in *Ramah* whither *Saul* went to him, 1 *Sam.* 9. 18, 19. but in this Chapter we find *Samuel ſending Saul* on a journey from him beyond *Bethel*, and the plain of *Tabor*, and there tells him he ſhou'd meet with the *company of Prophets upon the hill of God*, ver. 5. Some think it was called the *Hill of God*, becauſe of its height, as *the Cedars of God*, and *the Mountains of God for the higheſt*; ſo *Tirinus* underſtands it, but *Menochius* far more probably, *quia in ea erat cœtus & veluti ſchola prophetarum.* The *Chaldee* Paraphraſt renders it, *ad collem in quo arca Domini.* *R. Solomon* makes this Hill to be *Kirjah-jearim*, and therefore call'd *the hill of God*; becauſe the *Ark* was there in the *houſe of* Abinadab *in the hill.* But *Lyra* thinks he hath prov'd, that before this time the *Ark* was remov'd from *Kirjah-jearim* to *Mizpah*; but *Abulenſis* more probably conceives it was never remov'd thither, and thinks this hill of God to be no other than *Gibeah* of *Benjamin*, where *Saul* inhabited; and thence the wonder

1 Sam. 9. 12, 13. 1 Sam. 7. 1. *Vid. Jun. in loc.*

wonder was the greater, to see him propheſy among thoſe who had known his former life and education. The other place is *Naioth* in *Ramah*, where was a *high place*, whither the People came to ſacrifice; this *Ramah* ſeems to have been the place of *Samuel*'s nativity, call'd *Ramathaim Sophim*, which the *Syriac* verſion renders *collis ſpecularum* (ſome who wou'd be ready to improve every thing for their purpoſe, wou'd think it was ſo call'd in alluſion to the imployment of the young Students there. So *Heinſius* conceives שרה צפים to be underſtood, *Numb.* 23. 14, the place of *Watchmen*, from which word ſaith he, without doubt, the *Greeks* deriv'd their σκοποι, who were wont in ſuch high places to obſerve the courſe and motions of the Heavens; But to paſs by ſuch frivolous conjectures.) It ſeems a great deal more probable, that this *Ramah* which the *Septuagint* by a light mutation of the initial letters, calls αρμαθαιμ, was the ſame with *Arimathæa*, the Town of *Joſeph* mention'd in the Goſpel. But the place where the School of the Prophets was, ſeems to have been, with greateſt conveniency, for a place of Education, at ſome diſtance from the Town. *Vatablus* conceives it was built in the fields of *Ramah*, and the word *Naioth*, ſaith *Pet. Martyr*, properly ſignifies *paſtures*, and ſome *remote places quæ fere ſunt ſtudiis aptiſſima*. The *Chaldee* Paraphraſt renders *Naioth* by בית אולפנא, *a College or School of prophetical Education:* Over this College *Samuel* himſelf was Preſident, as moſt underſtand that place, 1 *Sam.* 19. 20. *And when they ſaw the company of Prophets propheſying, and* Samuel *ſtanding as appointed over them; Jonathan* renders it, *Et Samuelem ſtantem docentem ſuper eos.* To which we may well apply the words of *Philo*, ſpeaking of the *Jewiſh* manner of Inſtruction, Ὁ μὲν ἡγεμὼν ὑφηγεῖται καὶ διδάσκει, οἱ δὲ ἐπιδιδόντες εἰς καλοκαγαθίαν καὶ βελτιουμένων ἕνεκα ἦθη καὶ τὸν βίον. *The Preſident going before and teaching, the reſt increaſing in goodneſs, and improving in life and manners.*

1 Sam. 19. 18, 20.
1 Sam. 1. 1.
Heinſ. Exercit. Sacra l. 1. c. 2.
Phil. Jud. de v. Moſ. l. 3.

IV. Neither can we think ſo good and uſeful an Inſtitution ſhou'd preſently degenerate, or be turn'd into another Channel; and therefore ſome conceive that the moſt noted Prophets to the time of *David* were the Preſidents of theſe Colleges; ſuch as beſides *Samuel* were *Helcana*, *Gad*, *Nathan*, *Heman*, and *Jeduthun*; and that they ſelected out the choiceſt and moſt hopeful of the young *Levites*, and here educated them, together with the *Nazarites* which came out of other Tribes. And it ſeems very probable, that in all the moſt noted high places whither they went to ſacrifice, there were ſuch Schools erected after the firſt Inſtitution of them. Thence we read of ſuch multitudes of the Prophets together, in the time of *Ahab*, 1 *Kings* 18. 4. for when *Jezabel* cut off the Prophets of the Lord, *Obadiah took an hundred, and hid them in caves*; certainly their number was very great, when an hundred might be ſav'd without miſſing. The chief places where they reſided, ſeem to have been *Bethel*, 2 *Kings* 2. 3. and *Jericho*, which was a large College; for therein we read of *fifty ſons of the Prophets ſtanding together out of their number*, 2 Kings 2. 5, 7, 15. and *Gilgal*, which had been *a place of Religion* from the firſt entrance into *Canaan*; there we find *the ſons of the Prophets ſitting before Eliſha*, 2 Kings 4. 38. It ſeems moſt probable that the purity of God's Worſhip among the ten Tribes after the defection in the

time

time of *Jeroboam* was preſerv'd by the Prophets in their *ſeveral Schools and places of habitation*; which hath ſufficient foundation in that place, 2 *Kings* 4. 23. where the *Shunamite*'s husband asks her *Wherefore ſhe would go to the man of God that day, ſeeing it was neither new-moon nor Sabbath.* Whereby it is both evident, that the Prophets did undertake the office of inſtructing the People on their ſolemn Feſtivals, and that it was their cuſtom to reſort to them for that end. Thus we ſee what care God took for the inſtruction of his People, in a time of ſo general an Apoſtaſy as that of the ten Tribes was, when the Church of God cou'd not be known by that conſtant Viſibility and outward Glory, which ſome ſpeak ſo much of, but was then clouded in obſcurity, and ſhrouded it ſelf under the Mantles of ſome Prophets which God continued among them, and that not by any lineal ſucceſſion neither, tho' the *Jews* wou'd fain make the gift of Prophecy to be a kind of *Cabala* too, and convey'd in a conſtant ſucceſſion from one Prophet to another. Neither were theſe Schools of the Prophets only in *Iſrael*, but in *Judah* likewiſe was God known, and his Name was great among theſe Schools there. In *Jeruſalem* it ſelf there was a College where *Huldah* the Propheteſs liv'd, 2 *Kings* 22. 14. ſome render *Miſhna in ſecunda urbis parte*; for *Jeruſalem* was divided into the Upper and Nether part of the City. *Abulenſis* and *Lyra* will have it refer to the three Walls of the City in which the three chief parts of it were compriz'd; in the *firſt*, the Temple and the King's Palace; in the *ſecond*, the Nobles and the Prophets Houſes; and in the *third*, the common People. *Joſephus* ſeems to favor the diviſion of the City into three parts; but *Pineda* thinks the *ſecond* part of the City was moſt inhabited by Artificers, and that the Prophets, and the Wiſe Men, and ſuch as frequented the Temple moſt, dwelt in the City of *David* within the firſt Wall; and therefore he conjectures that the College was upon Mount *Sion*, (and ſo properly call'd *Sion* College) and he explains that *Houſe*, which *Wiſdom is ſaid to have built, and hewn out her ſeven pillars*, Prov. 9. 1. by this College, which he ſuppoſeth was built by *Solomon* in Mount *Sion*, and thence ver. 3. *ſhe is ſaid to cry upon the higheſt places of the City.* Thus much may ſerve concerning the Original and Inſtitution of theſe Schools of the Prophets.

V. Manaſſ. Ben Iſrael Concil. in Exod. 9. 35.

Joſeph. de bell. Jud. l. 6. *c.* 6. *Pineda de reb. Solom. l.* 3. *c.* 28.

I now come to the *Second* thing promis'd concerning the Schools of the Prophets, which is, *That it was God's ordinary Method to call thoſe perſons out of theſe Schools, whom he did employ in the diſcharge of the Prophetical Office.* Two things will be neceſſary for the clearing of this: *Firſt*, What Tendency their Education in thoſe Schools had towards the fitting them for their Prophetical Office. *Secondly*, What Evidence the Scripture gives us that God call'd the Prophets out from theſe Colleges. The *firſt* of theſe is very requiſite to be clear'd, becauſe the Prophetical Office depending upon immediate Inſpiration, it is hard to conceive what influence any antecedent and preparatory diſpoſitions can have upon receiving the Prophetical Spirit. It is commonly known how much the generality of *Jewiſh* Writers do inſiſt on the neceſſity of theſe qualifications antecedent to a Spirit of Prophecy. 1. An excellent Natural Temper. 2. Good Accompliſhments both of

V.

Wit and Fortunes. 3. Separation from the World. 4. Congruity of place (which they make proper to *Judæa*) 5. Opportunity of time. 6. And Divine Inſpiration. Theſe are ſo largely diſcours'd of by many Learned Men from *Jewiſh* Writers, that it will be both tedious and impertinent to recite much of their Opinions concerning them: who, ſince they have loſt the gift of Prophecy, ſeem to have loſt too that Wiſdom and Natural Underſtanding, which they make one of the moſt neceſſary qualifications of a Prophet. It is not eaſy to imagine what ſubſerviency Riches cou'd have to a Prophetical Spirit, unleſs the *Jews* be of *Simon Magus* his Opinion, that theſe gifts of the Holy Ghoſt may be purchas'd with Money; and if ſo, they think themſelves in as likely a way to bid fair for a Prophetical Spirit, as any People in the World. Or is it that they think it impoſſible any without them ſhou'd have that free, cheerful and generous Spirit, which they make ſo neceſſary to a Prophetic Spirit, that it is an Axiome of great Authority with them, *Spiritus ſanctus non reſidet ſuper hominem mœſtum*: and they think *Eliſha* his fit of paſſion did excuſs his Prophetic Spirit from him, which he was fain to retrieve again with a fit of Muſic. There are only two ſorts of thoſe antecedent diſpoſitions which ſeem to bear any affinity with the Prophetic Spirit: And thoſe are ſuch as tended to the improvement of their Natural Faculties, and ſuch as tended to their advancement in piety, and conſequently to the ſubduing all irregular motions in their Souls: Not that either of theſe did concur by way of efficiency to the production of a Spirit of Prophecy (which is an opinion *Maimonides* ſeems very favorable to) but that God might make choice particularly of ſuch perſons, to remove all prejudices againſt them in thoſe they were ſent unto. For nothing cou'd poſſibly diſſatisfy them more concerning Divine Inſpiration, than if the perſon who pretended to it were of very weak and ſhallow intellectuals, or known to be of an irregular converſation. In order therefore to the fuller ſatisfaction of Men concerning theſe two qualifications, this Inſtitution of them in the Schools of the Prophets was of great ſubſerviency, becauſe therein their only Employment was to improve in knowledg, and eſpecially in true piety. This latter being the moſt neceſſary dipoſition, ſince the Apoſtle hath told us that the Prophets were *Holy men, who ſpake as they were moved by the Holy Ghoſt*. And in order to this, the greateſt part we can find of the exerciſes of thoſe who were educated in theſe Schools of the Prophets, were Inſtructions in the Law, and the ſolemn celebration of the praiſes of God: Which appears in Scripture to have been their chief employment as Prophets, and by which they are ſaid to propheſy: So at *Gibeah* at the Oratory there, *we find a company of Prophets coming down from the high place with a Pſaltery, a Tabret and Pipe, and a Harp before them, and propheſying*.

V. G. Vor. in Maim. fundam. leg. c. 7. Sect. 1. Mr. Smith of Prophecy, c. 8.

Maimon. More Nev. l. 2. c. 36.

2 Pet. 1. 21.

1 Sam. 10. 5.

VI. It may ſeem ſomewhat ſtrange to conſider what relation theſe Muſical Inſtruments had to the propheſying here mention'd. Are Muſical Notes like ſome Seeds Naturaliſts ſpeak of, which will help to excite a prophetic Spirit? Or do they tend to elevate the Spirits of Men, and ſo put them into a greater capacity of *Enthuſiaſm?* Or is it becauſe Muſic is ſo excellent for allaying the tumults of inward paſſions; and ſo fitting the Soul for the better enter-

entertainment of the Divine Spirit? Or was all this propheſying here ſpoken of nothing elſe but Vocal and Inſtrumental Muſic? So ſome indeed underſtand it, that it was only the praiſing God with ſpiritual Songs and Melody; wherein one as the *Præcentor* began a Hymn, which the reſt took from him and carry'd on. I confeſs it carries the faireſt probability with it, that this propheſying with Muſical Inſtruments was at their places and times of ſacrifice, an adjunct, if not a part of the ſolemn ſervice of God: which was manag'd chiefly by the Choir of the Sons of the Prophets which were reſident there, and were train'd up in all exerciſes of piety and devotion. But yet I cannot ſee any reaſon to think that all this propheſying was merely ſinging of Hymns, and playing upon their Muſical Inſtruments to them, as ſome imagine, becauſe there ſeems to be implied ſome immediate impulſes of a prophetic Spirit, by what *Samuel* ſaid to *Saul*, that when he came among the Prophets, *the Spirit of the Lord would come upon him, and he ſhould propheſy with them, and he ſhould become another man.* 1 Sam. 10. 6. What ſtrange impulſe and wonderful transformation was this merely for *Saul* to joyn with the Prophets in their praiſes of God? And this needed not ſo much admiration as follow'd there upon this action of *Saul*'s, that it ſhou'd become a Proverb, *Is* Saul *alſo among the Prophets?* 1 Sam. 10. 12. Certainly *Saul* was a very great hater of all ſpiritual Muſic before, if it became a Proverb merely for his being preſent at, or joyning with this company in ſinging their Hymns. Therefore others think that thoſe who are ſaid particularly to propheſy at theſe Muſic meetings, were ſome perſons as chief among the reſt, who having their ſpirits elevated by the Muſic, did compoſe Hymns upon the place by a Divine Energy inwardly moving their Minds. So that there were properly Divine Raptures in ſome of them, which tranſported them beyond the ordinary power of Fancy or Imagination, in dictating ſuch Hymns as might be ſutable for the deſign of celebrating the honor of God.

VII. Neither may it ſeem ſtrange that ſuch an *Enthuſiaſtic* Spirit ſhou'd ſeize on them only at ſuch ſolemn times, ſince we read in the New Teſtament of a like exerciſe of ſuch gifts in the Church of *Corinth*, 1 *Cor.* 14. 26. where we ſee in *coming together every one had a Pſalm, a Doctrine, a Tongue, a Revelation*, &c. Whereby it appears that they were inſpir'd upon the place; *etiam extemporales Hymni ſæpe ab afflatu erant*, as *Grotius* there obſerves; as we ſee it in frequent inſtances in Scripture, of *Simeon* and *Anna*, *Moſes* and *Miriam*, *Deborah* and *Iſaiah*; and in the Chriſtian Church after that Land-flood of Inſpired Gifts was much abated in the Church, they kept up a cuſtom much like to theſe *extemporal* Hymns, as appears evidently by *Tertullian*, *poſt aquam manualem & lumina ut quiſque de Scripturis ſanctis vel de proprio ingenio poteſt, provocatur in medium Deo canere*: After they had ended their Love-Feaſts, they begun their Hymns, which were either taken from the Scriptures, or of their own compoſition. Which *Pliny* takes notice of as a great part of the Chriſtian worſhip, that they did *ſecum invicem carmen Chriſto quaſi Deo dicere, they joyned in ſinging hymns to Chriſt as God.* Nay, we find ſomething very parallel to this preſerv'd among the ruins of the Heathen worſhip; ſuch were the *Aſſamenta* among the old *Romans*, which were peculiarly

Tertull. Apol. c. 59.

Plin. Ep. l. 10. Ep. 97.

ſung to the honor of ſome particular God; thence the *Aſſamenta Jamalia, Junonia, Minervia*, which were *privata poemata & carmina in ſingulos eos Deos conſcripta*, as the learned *Joſeph Scaliger* obſerves. So likewiſe the *Greeks* had their ſolemn Hymns to their Gods, ſome to the propitious Gods, which they call'd κλητικοὶ ὕμνοι, and the *Latins* properly *Indigitamenta*, and *Carmen calatorium*; others they had to their *Vejoves*, or *Lava lumina*, which they call'd ὕμνους ἀποτροπαίους the *Latins*, *Carmen Averruncale*; but beſides theſe, they had ſome peculiar to the ſeveral Deities, as ὑπήχους to *Diana*, παιᾶνα to *Apollo*, ἰὺλον to *Ceres*, *Dithyrambus* to *Bacchus*, *Adonidia* to *Adonis*, as *Proclus* tells us in his *Chreſtomathia*. And it is withal evident, that the Heathens thought ſome of their Prieſts inſpired while they were performing theſe ſolemn Devotions to the Gods (which probably was by *Satan*, as many other things in Heathen worſhip taken up in imitation of theſe inſpired Hymns, and Muſic us'd by the Sons of the Prophets) but their Hymns were ſo compos'd, as to be fit rather to tranſport Men beyond the power of their reaſon, than to compoſe and ſweeten it, which was ſuitable to the fanatic *Enthuſiaſm*, which was ſo common among them. So *Proclus* tells us that the *Io-Bacche* was βοώδεσι μὲν πολλὰ φερόμενα, *full* of *noiſe* and *din*; and the *Dithyrambus* was κακοτροπώτερον καὶ πολὺ τὸ εἰδωλοτύπες, μετὰ χειρὸς ἐμφάσεως, *a kind of extatic Morice-dance*, and their Prieſts were apprehended by them to be under a real *Enthuſiaſm*, at theſe ſolemnities. So the *Corybantes* are deſcrib'd rather like mad Men than mere *Enthuſiaſts* by *Strabo*; they were εἰδωλοποιοί τινες καὶ βακχικοὶ as he deſcribes them, *dancing about with their cymbals and drums, and arms and pipes*, (as tho' a *Bedlam* had been broke looſe among them) yet this was in high eſteem among them; for, as *Strabo* after ſaith, ὃ καὶ εἰδωλοποιικὸν ἐπίδοσιν τινα θείαν ἔχειν δοκεῖ, καὶ τῇ μανικῇ χόρει πλησιάζειν, *this Enthuſiaſm ſeemed to have a Divine touch with it, and to come very near to a prophetic ſpirit.*

Scalig. conj. in Varr. p. 121.

Proclus ap. Phot. Bibl. Cod. 239.

Strabo l. 10.

But tho' the propheſying with Muſic among the Sons of the Prophets, might be by ſome *Extemporary* Hymns immediately dictated by the *Præcentor* of the Chorus; yet we are not to imagine any ſuch frantic actions among them as were among the *Curetes* and *Corybantes*, it being always the Devil's temper to over-do, when he ſtrives to imitate, and inſtead of ſolemn and ſet devotions, to carry Men beyond all ſenſe and reaſon. The Spirit of God did never dictate any *Io-Bacche's* or *Dithyrambs* to tranſport and amuſe the ſpirits of Men; but thoſe ſweet Airs which might both compoſe and elevate the ſpirits of all that heard them. For in probability the ſpirits of all theſe Prophets were as Lutes tuned to the ſame height, that when the Spirit of God did ſtrike upon one of them, the reſt preſently anſwer'd to it, and ſo made up an entire Conſort among them. So *Menochius* thinks the Spirit of God not only moved the ſpirit of him who was the *Præcentor*, but the reſt likewiſe who joyn'd with him; and they are ſaid to propheſy, ſaith *Torniellus, forte quod non quaſcunque ſed Propheticas duntaxat cantiones præcinerent*; but from hence we clearly ſee what the great Employment was in theſe Schools of the Prophets, which, as the ſame Author expreſſeth, it was *ſtatis horis de rebus divinis diſſerere, & divinis laudibus vacare*; and thereby we underſtand what reference this Inſtitution had in order to the prophetical Office, becauſe

Torniellii Annal. ad An. Mun. 2945. Sect. 14.

because the Spirit of God did much appear among them, and all their Exercises tended to piety, and so did remove all prejudices from their persons, when God did send them abroad afterwards.

VIII. And so it is evident he frequently did, not to say always, for that were to put too great a restraint upon the boundless Spirit of God: For sometimes, as will appear afterwards, God sent the Prophets upon extraordinary messages, and then furnish'd them with sufficient Evidence of their Divine Commission, without being beholding to the Testimonials of the Schools of the Prophets. But besides these, God had a kind of Leiger-Prophets among his People; such were the most of those whom we read of in Scripture, which were no Pen-men of the sacred Scripture; such in *David*'s time we may conceive *Gad* and *Nathan*, and afterwards we read of many other Prophets and Seers among them, to whom the People made their resort: Now these in probability were such as had been train'd up in the prophetic Schools, wherein the Spirit of God did appear, but in a more fixed and setled way than in the extraordinary Prophets, whom God did call out on some more signal occasions, such as *Isaiah* and *Jeremiah* were. We have a clear foundation for such a distinction of Prophets in those words of *Amos* to *Amaziah*, Amos 7. 14, 15. *I was no Prophet, neither was I a Prophets son; but I was a herdsman, and a gatherer of sycamore fruits: And the Lord took me as I followed the flock; and the Lord said unto me, Go prophesy to my people* Israel. Some understand the first words, *I was not a Prophet*, that he was not born a Prophet, as *Jeremiah* was, not design'd and set apart to it from his Mother's womb; but I rather think by his not being a Prophet, he means he was none of those resident Prophets in the Colleges or Schools of them, not any of those who had led a prophetic life, and withdrawn themselves from converse with the world; nor *was I* (saith he) *the son of a Prophet*, *i. e.* not brought up in Discipleship under those Prophets, and thereby trained up in order to the prophetic function. *Non didici inter discipulos Prophetarum*, as *Pellican* renders it; *nec institutione qua filii Prophetarum quasi ad donum Prophetiæ à parentibus præparabantur*, saith *Estius*. *Non à puero educatus in Scholis Propheticis*; so *Calvin* and most other modern Interpreters understand it, as well as *Abarbinel* and the Jewish Writers. Whereby it is evident that God's ordinary way for the Prophets, was to take such as had been trained up and educated in order to that end, altho' God did not tie up himself to this method, but sometimes call'd one from the Court, as he did *Isaiah*; sometimes one from the herds, as here he did *Amos*, and bid them *go prophesy to the house of* Israel. There was then a kind of a standing College of Prophets among the *Israelites*, who shined as fixed Stars in the firmament; and there were others who had a most planetary motion, and withal a more lively and resplendent Illumination from the fountain of prophetic Light. And further it seems that the Spirit of Prophecy did not ordinarily seize on any, but such whose Institution was in order to that end, by the great admiration which was caus'd among the People at *Saul*'s so sudden prophesying, that it became a Proverb, *Is* Saul *also among the Prophets?* which had not given the least foundation for an Adage for a strange and unwonted thing, unless the most

1 Sam. 10. 12, 19, 24.

common appearances of the Spirit of Prophecy had been among those who were trained up in order to it. Thus I suppose we have fully cleared the first reason why there was no necessity for the ordinary Prophets, whose chief office was instruction of the People, to prove their commission by Miracles, because God had promis'd a succession of Prophets by *Moses*, and these were brought up ordinarily to that end among them; so that all prejudices were sufficiently remov'd from their persons without any such extraordinary power as that of Miracles.

CHAP. V.

The tryal of the Prophetical Doctrine.

I. *Rules of trying Prophets established in the Law of* Moses. II. *The punishment of pretenders. The several sorts of false Prophets. The case of the Prophet at* Bethel *discussed.* III. *The tryal of false Prophets belonging to the great Sanhedrin.* IV. *The particular rules whereby the doctrine of Prophets was judged. The proper notion of a Prophet, not foretelling future contingencies, but having immediate divine Revelation.* V. *Several Principles laid down for clearing the doctrine of the Prophets.* 1. *That immediate dictates of natural light are not to be the measure of divine Revelation. Several grounds for divine Revelation from natural light.* VI. 2. *Whatever is directly repugnant to the dictates of nature, cannot be of divine Revelation.* VII. 3. *No divine Revelation doth contradict a divine positive Law without sufficient evidence of God's intention to repeal that Law.* VIII. 4. *Divine Revelation in the Prophets, was not to be measured by the words of the Law, but by the intention and reason of it. The prophetical office a kind of Chancery to the Law of* Moses.

I. THe second Reason why those Prophets whose main office was instruction of the People, or merely foretelling future events, needed not to confirm their Doctrine by Miracles, is, because they had certain rules of tryal by their Law whereby to discern the false Prophets from the true. So that if they were deceiv'd by them, it was their own oscitancy and inadvertency which was the cause of it. God in that *Law* which was confirm'd by Miracles undoubtedly divine, had establish'd a Court of tryal for prophetic Spirits, and given such certain rules of procedure in it, that no Men needed to be deceiv'd, unless they wou'd themselves. And there was a greater necessity of such a certain way of tryal among them, because it cou'd not otherwise be expected but in a Nation where a prophetic Spirit was so common, there wou'd be very many pretenders to it, who might much endanger the Faith of the

the People, unleſs there were ſome certain way to find them out. And the more effectually to deter Men either from counterfeiting a prophetic Spirit, or from hearkening to ſuch as did, God appointed a ſevere puniſhment for every ſuch pretender, *viz.* upon legal conviction, that he be puniſhed with death. Deut. 18. 20. *But the Prophet which ſhall preſume to ſpeak a word in my name which I have not commanded him to ſpeak, or that ſhall ſpeak in the name of other Gods, ſhall ſurely die.* The *Jews* generally underſtand this of ſtrangling, as they do always in the Law, when the particular manner of death is not expreſſed. And therein a falſe Prophet and a Seducer were diſtinguiſhed each from other, that a mere Seducer was to be ſtoned to death under ſufficient teſtimony, *Deut.* 13. 6, 10. But the falſe Prophet is there ſaid in general only to be put to death, *Deut.* 13. 1, 5. The main difference between the Seducer and falſe Prophet was, that the Seducer ſought by cunning perſuaſions and plauſible arguments, to draw them off from the worſhip of the true God; but the falſe Prophet always pretended divine revelation for what he perſuaded them to, whether he gave out that he had that Revelation from the true God, or from Idols and falſe Gods. So that the mere pretence to divine Revelation was that which God wou'd have puniſhed with ſo great ſeverity. *V. Maimon. de Idol. c. 5. ſ. 1. & ibi Voſſium.*

II. The *Jews* tell us of three ſorts of Prophets who were to be puniſhed with death by Men, and three other ſorts who were reſerved to divine puniſhment: Of the firſt rank were theſe; 1. He that propheſied that which he had not heard, and for this they inſtance in *Zedekiah* the ſon of *Chenaanah*, who made him horns of iron, and ſaid, *Thus ſaith the Lord*, this was the Lying Prophet. 2. He that ſpeaks that which was revealed not unto him, but to another, and for this they inſtance in *Hananiah* the ſon of *Azur*, (but how truly I ſhall not determine) this was the Plagiary Prophet. 3. He that propheſied in the name of an Idol, as the Prophets of *Balaal* did, this was the Idol Prophet. Theſe three, when once fully convicted, were to be put to death. The other rank of thoſe which were left to God's hand conſiſted of theſe; 1. He that ſtifles and ſmothers his own prophecy, as *Jonas* did, by which it may ſeem that when the Divine Spirit did overſhadow the Underſtanding of the Prophets, yet it offered no violence to their Faculties, but left them to the free determination of their own Wills in the execution of their Office; but this muſt be underſtood of a lower degree of Prophecy; for at ſome times their Prophecies were *as fire in their bones*, that they were never at any reſt till they had diſcharged their Office. But withal by the example of *Jonas*, we ſee, that tho' the Spirit of Prophecy, like the Fire on the Altar, cou'd only be kindled from Heaven, yet it might be deſtroyed when it was not maintained with ſomething to feed upon; or when it met not with ſuitable entertainment from the Spirits of thoſe it fell upon, it might retreat back again to Heaven, or at leaſt lie hid in the embers, till a new blaſt from the Spirit of God doth ἀναζωπυρῶν, *retrieve* it into its former *heat* and *activity*. Thus it was with *Jonas*. 2. The other was, He that deſpiſed the words of a true Prophet; of ſuch God, ſaith, *Deut.* 18. 19. *And it ſhall come to paſs, that whoſoever will not hearken to my words which he ſhall ſpeak in my name, I will require it of him.* *V. Except. Gem. Sanhedr. c.* 10. *ſ.* 3. 1 King. 22. 11. Jer. 28. 11. Jer. 20. 9.

him. Which *Maimonides* explains by מיתה בידי שמים, *death by the hands of God*, which he thus distinguisheth from the *Cereth*, that he makes the death *per manus cœli*, to be less than the *Cereth*, because this latter continued in the Soul after death, but the other was expiated by death; but generally they interpret it of a sudden death, which falls upon the person. 3. The last is, He who hearkens not to the words of his own Prophecy; of which we have a most remarkable instance in Scripture, concerning the Prophet whom God sent to *Bethel* (whom *Tertullian* calls *Sameas*, the *Jews*, *Hedua*) whom God destroy'd in an unusual manner for not observing the command which God had given him, *not to eat bread nor drink water at* Bethel, *nor turn again by the way he came.* Neither was it any excuse to this Prophet, that the old Prophet at *Bethel told him that an Angel spake unto him by the word of the Lord, that he should turn back.* For, 1. Those whom God reveals his will unto, he gives them full assurance of it, in that they have a clear and distinct perception of God upon their own Minds; and so they have no doubt, but it is the Word of the Lord which comes unto them; but this Prophet cou'd have no such certainty of the Divine Revelation which was made to another, especially when it came immediately to contradict that which was so specially enjoyn'd him. 2. Where God commands a Prophet to do any thing in the pursuit of his Message, there he can have no ground to question whether God shou'd countermand it or no by another Prophet; because that was in effect to thwart the whole design of his Message. So it was in this action of the Prophet; for God intended his not eating and drinking in *Bethel* to testify how much he loathed and abominated that place since its being polluted with Idolatry. 3. He might have just cause to question the integrity of the old Prophet, both because of his living in *Bethel*, and not openly, according to his office, reproving their Idolatry, and that God shou'd send him out of *Judæa* upon that very errand, which wou'd not have seem'd so probable, if there had been true Prophets resident upon the place. 4. The thing he desired him to do, was not an act of that weight and importance, on which God us'd to send his Word to any Prophets, much less by one Prophet to contradict what he had said by another; and therefore *Tertullian* saith of him, *pœnam deserti jejunii luit*, God punish'd him for breaking his fast at *Bethel*; and therefore that Message of this Prophet seem'd to gratify more Man's carnal appetite, than usually the actions of Prophets did, which were most times matters of hardship and uneasiness to the flesh. 5. However all these were, yet he yielded too soon, especially having so much reason on his side as he had; being well assured that God had commanded him, he had reason to see some clear Evidence of a countermand, before he altered his mind: if he had seen any thing upon tryal which might have staggered his faith, he ought to have made his immediate recourse to God by Prayer for the settlement of his mind, and removal of this great temptation. But so easily to hearken to the words of a lying Prophet, which contradicted his own Message, argued either great Unbelief as to his own Commission, or too great Easiness and Inadvertency in being drawn aside by the old Prophet. And therefore God made that old Prophet himself in the midst of his

Maim. de fundam. legis, c. 9. s. 4. V. Abarbinel de Cereth. apud Buxtorf. de sponsi. & divort. p. 182.

1 King. 13. 9. Ver. 18.

Tertullian. de jejuniis, cap. 16.

his entertainment, as with a *Hand-writing againſt the wall*, to tell him *he was weighed in the ballance*, and *found too light*; and therefore his Life ſhou'd be taken from him. Thus we ſee how dangerous a thing it was either to counterfeit a Spirit of Prophecy, or to hearken to thoſe who did.

III. It is the generally received Opinion among the Jewiſh Doctors, that the cognizance and tryal of falſe Prophets did peculiarly belong to the great *Sanhedrin*. And that this was one end of its Inſtitution. So *Maimonides* after he has largely diſcourſed of the puniſhment of a Seducer, and ſpeaking of that of a falſe Prophet, he lays this down as a ſtanding Rule among them, אין דנין נביא חשקר אלא בבית של ע"א *No falſe Prophet was to be judged but in the Court of Seventy one*; which was the number of the great *Sanhedrin*. And there is ſomething looks very like this in the proceedings of the People of *Iſrael* againſt the Prophet *Jeremiah*; for the People, the Prieſts and the Prophets, they laid hold on him; and immediately after we read that the Princes of *Judah* (by whom *Grotius* underſtands the *Senators* of the great *Sanhedrin*) *they came up from the King's houſe to the houſe of the Lord, and ſat down in the entry of the new gate of the Lord's houſe*; which probably was the place where the great *Sanhedrin* ſat) where after a particular Examination of *Jeremiah*, they acquit him as a *perſon not worthy to die* upon a counterfeiting Prophecy, but declare *that he ſpake unto them in the name of the Lord*. And in this ſenſe *Grotius* likewiſe underſtands what is ſaid of *Zedekiah* concerning *Jeremiah* to the Princes of *Judah* afterwards, *Behold he is in your hand; for the King is not he that can do ought againſt you*; *i. e.* ſaith *Grotius*, *In manibus Synedrii cujus eſt judicare de Propheta vero aut falſo*. And to this many make thoſe words of our Savior refer, *That it is impoſſible a Prophet ſhould periſh out of* Jeruſalem, becauſe the ſeat of the great *Sanhedrin* was in *Jeruſalem*; and ſo elſewhere our Savior ſaith, *O Jeruſalem, Jeruſalem, thou that killeſt the Prophets, and ſtoneſt them which are ſent unto thee*: becauſe there it was the true Prophets were deſtroy'd as tho' they had been falſe ones, and God's own Meſſengers puniſhed with the death of Seducers, which was Lapidation. And on this very account many are of opinion that our Savior was condemned by the *Sanhedrin* at *Jeruſalem*; which is ſuppoſed to have been aſſembled in the houſe of *Caiaphas* the High Prieſt, when *Chriſt* was carried thither for Examination; which ſome think to have been at his Lodgings in the Temple, others at his Palace in the City. For we read that the Chief Prieſts, and the Elders, and all the Council were met together at the High Prieſt's Palace in order to our Savior's Tryal. The next Morning they were met early together again in order to the further ſcanning of this buſineſs; but they ſeem not to examine *Chriſt* concerning a true Spirit of Prophecy, but concerning his being the *Meſſias*, and calling himſelf *the Son of God*; and ſo they would ſeem rather to proceed upon the Law againſt Blaſphemy, than that againſt falſe Prophets.

Maimon. de Idololat. c. 5. ſ. 11.

Jer. 26. 8.

Ver. 10.

V. Grot. in loc. & Seld. de Syn. l. 2. c. 15. ſ. 4. & l. 3. c. 6. ſ. 4.

Jer. 26. 16.

Jer. 3. 6.

Luk. 13. 33.

Matth. 23. 70.

Matth. 26. 59.

Matth. 26. 63.

IV. But that which was the greateſt ſecurity of the People againſt the impoſture of falſe Prophets, was the certain Rules of judging them which were laid down in the Law of *Moſes*: which may be

comprehended under these two Heads, such as concern their Doctrine, or such as concern their Predictions. *First*, such as concerned the Prophets Doctrine, which shou'd especially be looked after, because the main office of a Prophet was to be *interpres & internuncius divinæ voluntatis*, to be *a revealer of God's Will to Men.* For the primary Notion of a Prophet doth not lie in foretelling future events, but in declaring and interpreting to the world the Mind of God, which he receives by immediate Revelation from himself. So that the receiving what he makes known by immediate Revelation, is that which formally constitutes a Prophet; but it is wholly extrinsecal and accidental what time his prophecy respects, whether past, present, or to come; but because future contingencies are the furthest out of the reach of humane understanding, therefore the predictions of such have been chiefly looked on as the chief Note and Character of a Prophet, as being apprehended to be the strongest evidence of Divine Revelation. And hence it is in Scripture that the Patriarchs as *Abraham* and others are called Prophets, not because of any prediction uttered by them, but because of the frequency of immediate Divine Revelations among them. And hence likewise those in the New Testament who expounded the Scriptures by immediate Inspiration, are call'd Prophets; and this was the Ἀποκάλυψις spoken of by the Apostle, the Exposition of the hidden Mysteries of the Old Testament by an immediate Inspiration. And there is no word in the *Hebrew* for a Prophet, which may not equally respect all differences of time, but every one doth import immediate Inspiration; for נביא properly is one *qui revelat abscondita*; ראה a *Seer* chiefly respects the clear representation of the intellectual species by the *lumen propheticum* to the understanding, and חוה carries an equal indifferency to all circumstances of time.

Psal. 105. 15.
Gen. 20. 7.
1 Cor. 14. 26.
Vide Alstedii Trifol. proph. p. 53.

V. This being then the chief notion of a Prophet, whatever he declared as the Mind and Will of God, must be searched and examined, to see what consonancy it hath thereto. For the question which *Moses* supposeth, is founded upon clear and evident reason, *And if thou shalt say in thine heart, How shall we know the Word which the Lord hath not spoken?* For it being plain that there may be false Prophets as well as true, we had need of some certain rules to judg of what is delivered for Divine Revelation. For the clearing of which important Question, I lay down these principles.

Deut. 18. 21.

1. *The immediate dictates of natural light are no sufficient standard to judg of Divine Revelation by.* I mean not in reference to consonancy or repugnancy to natural light, but in reference to the extent and latitude of Divine Revelation, *i. e.* that natural light doth not contain in it whatever may be known of God or of his Will; and that upon these reasons: 1. It implies no repugnancy to any dictate of nature, that God shou'd reveal any thing more of his Mind and Will, than is contained in the light of nature. 2. Nature reacheth, as to matters concerning Religion, no further than the obligation to Duty, but leaves the particular determination of the manner of obedience to divine positive Laws, as is clear in reference to the time, place, and particular duties of worship. 3. Nature owning an universal obligation to the Will of God in whatever

ever he ſhall command, doth ſuppoſe a power in God to command what he pleaſeth. 4. Nature is ſenſible of its own decays; and the imperfection of its own light, and therefore ſeems rather to require further illumination than to put any bar againſt it. 5. Man's happineſs being a free gift of God's, it ſtands to the higheſt reaſon that he ſhou'd have the preſcribing of the conditions which are in order to it; now theſe conditions being the reſults, not of God's nature, but of his arbitrarious Will, it is impoſſible that natural light cou'd ever reach to the full diſcovery of them. 6. It hath been the general ſenſe of all Nations in the World, that God may reveal more of his Will than Nature can reach unto; which ſenſe diſcovers it ſelf in two things. 1. Praying to their ſeveral Gods for direction. 2. Hearkening after pretended Oracles, which the Devil cou'd never have had that advantage of deceiving the World by, had it not been for this general ſenſe of Mankind, that there wanted ſome particular Revelation from God to make Men happy. So then this may be aſſumed as a principle, That God may reveal more of his Mind and Will to Mankind, than he hath done by the dictates of mere natural light and reaſon.

VI. 2. *Whatever ſpeaks a direct repugnancy to any of the fundamental dictates of nature, cannot be of Divine Revelation.* For thoſe being founded, not upon any poſitive or arbitrary Will, but upon thoſe inward impreſſions which are derived from the Divine Nature its ſelf, it cannot in reaſon be ſuppoſed that God ſhou'd commiſſion any to enervate his own Fundamental Law; and ſo by one Will to contradict another. *Placitum Regis* muſt never ſtand againſt the *Placita Coronæ:* Thoſe things which depend upon Fundamental and Eſtabliſhed Laws, hold good againſt any poſitive ſentence or declaration of a Prince's Will; Becauſe he is ſuppoſed to have bound up himſelf by the eſtabliſhed Laws; and therefore any thing elſe which comes from him, contrary to them, is ſuppoſed not to be the Will of the Prince, but of the perſons perſuading him to it. But this now cannot be ſuppoſed in God, that he ſhou'd be any ways drawn to caſſate the Obligation of what is imprinted upon the Souls of Men as his own Law. But yet we muſt diſtinguiſh between nulling the general Obligation, and altering the particular nature of any thing which depends upon that general Law; the *firſt* in any caſe is impoſſible, that any Divine Revelation ſhou'd make it not to be Man's Duty to obey his Maker, or not to be a ſin to commit Murder, to lye, or to ſteal from another; but there may come a particular Revelation from God to alter the reſpects and nature of ſuch things as do immediately depend upon his own dominion; as the lives of perſons and the properties of things are; and thus God did reveal to *Abraham* that he ſhou'd go and ſacrifice his Son, which had been no murder, when done upon God's immediate command, and a ſacrifice to himſelf, and therefore wou'd have been acceptable as a teſtimony of entire obedience (which God did accept without the act) and ſo the *Iſraelites* taking the *Ægyptians* Jewels, and diſpoſſeſſing the *Canaanites*, did depend upon God's immediate diſpoſal of theſe things to them, which otherwiſe had been a ſin in them, and no doubt was ſo to any that were unſatisfy'd whether God had immediately commanded it or no. Or from hence to

infer any general rule, is no doubt a breach of Divine Commands, and contrary to his Nature and Will.

VII. 3. *Where God hath eſtabliſhed a poſitive Law, preſcribing a form and manner wherein he will be worſhipped, it is ſufficient evidence of a falſe Prophet, to go about to null the obligation of that Law; unleſs there be as great evidences given, that God did intend the eſtabliſhing a new Law by that Perſon, as he did at firſt the inſtitution of the old by the hand of* Moſes. This latter clauſe is inſerted, to ſhew that the ſucceeding of the Doctrine of *Chriſt*, into the place of the Law of *Moſes*, doth not bear any repugnancy to the *Hypotheſis* laid down, there being greater evidences of God's intending the aboliſhing the Ceremonial Law by the Goſpel of *Chriſt*, than there were of the eſtabliſhment of it by *Moſes*. But of thoſe afterwards. I now only ſpeak of ſuch as upon the mere pretence of Divine Revelation, ſhou'd deſtroy any precept of an eſtabliſhed poſitive Law; and this, as far as we can find, was the great Rule the *Jews* went by; if any thing were ſpoken by any Prophet, contrary to the Law of *Moſes*, or tending to the alteration of the worſhip of God eſtabliſhed thereby, he was accounted a falſe Prophet. The modern *Jews* to juſtify themſelves in their own Belief, as to the Doctrine of *Chriſt*, extend this further than the Law doth; for they enlarge it to all the precepts of the Ceremonial Law; whereas God in the Law ſeems to limit it to the Moral Law, and chiefly inſiſts on the three firſt precepts of the *Decalogue*; and therefore condemns ſuch a *one* as *ſpake in the name of the Lord, when he had not commanded them*, Deut. 18. 20. and ſuch *endeavoured to bring in idolatry*, Deut. 13. 1, 2, 3. where tho' the falſe Prophet ſhou'd offer to do ſigns and wonders before them, yet if his intention were to draw them to worſhip falſe Gods, they were not to hearken unto him. And therefore *Maimonides*, where he largely diſputes about the truth of Prophecies, lays this down as a certain Rule: *Si Propheta ſurrexerit, atque magna miracula aut prodigia fecerit, & adlaboraverit falſitatis convincere prophetiam* Moſis *M. N. iſtum non audimus, quia certò novimus prodigium præſtigiis aut incantationibus productum eſſe*, as *Vorſtius* renders him. *If a Prophet do never ſo great Miracles, and ſeeks to convince* Moſes *of falſhood, we are not to hearken to him; for we know that they are not done by the power of God, but by the illuſion of the Devil.* And elſewhere he tells us, that if any pretends to prophecy בשם עבויים *in the name of Idols, they muſt not ſo much as diſpute with him, nor anſwer him, nor deſire any Signs or Miracles from him; and if of himſelf he ſhews any, we are not to regard or mind them; for*, ſaith he, *whoever doth but doubt in his mind concerning them, he breaks that Command, And thou ſhalt not hearken to the words of that prophet.* So that the Doctrine once eſtabliſhed, ought to be our moſt certain Rule, according to which we muſt judge of all pretenders to Miracles, if their deſign be to draw Men off from God's Word, we are not to hearken to what they either ſay or do.

Maimon. de fund. leg. c. 8. ſ. 7.

Idem de Idololat. leg. c. 5. ſ. 9.

Deut. 13. 3.

VIII. 4. *The Doctrine of thoſe Prophets who ſeek not to introduce Idolatry, muſt not be meaſured by a ſtrict conformity to the words of* Moſes *his Law, but to the main reaſon and intention of it.* The great reaſon of this is, becauſe God did not intend the *Jews* ſhou'd always

always reſt in the *Pædagogy* of the Ceremonial Law, but ſent them Prophets to train them up by degrees, and to fit them for a ſtate of better perfection; and therefore it wou'd be very unreaſonable to judge whether they were true Prophets or no, exactly by that which they came gradually to wean them from; which were all one, as to try one whether he were grown a Man or no, by the Swadling-clouts he wore when he was a Child. God tempered the Ceremonial Law much according to the condition and capacity of the perſons it was preſcribed to, and therefore the Sanctions of it did immediately reſpect their temporary concerns; but we are not to think the end of that diſpenſation was to be merely a Covenant for the Land of Promiſe; but as the Cherubims in the Temple did always look towards the Mercy-ſeat, ſo did this whole *œconomy* look towards the coming of the *Meſſias*. But it was with the generality of the *Jews*, as it is with ignorant people, who looking up to the Heavens, cannot fancy the Stars to be any bigger than they ſeem to them; but *Aſtronomers* by the help of their *Optic-tubes* and *Teleſcopes*, do eaſily diſcern the juſt magnitude of them; ſo the *Jews* ordinarily thought there was no more in theſe Types and Shadows, than was viſibly repreſented to them; but ſuch as had the help of the Divine Spirit (the beſt *Teleſcope* to diſcern the *Day-ſtar* from on high with) cou'd eaſily look thro' thoſe Proſpectives, into the moſt glorious Myſteries of the Goſpel of *Jeſus Chriſt*. Theſe Types being like triangular Priſmes, that muſt be ſet in a due light and poſture, before they can repreſent that great variety of Spiritual Myſteries which was contained in them. Now the great office of the Prophet was to adminiſter this Light to the people, and to direct them in thoſe excellent pieces of Perſpective, wherein by the help of a Prophetic-glaſs, they might ſee the Son of God fully repreſented to their view. Beſides this, the prophetical office was a kind of Chancery to the Moſaic Law, wherein the Prophets did interpret the *Pandects* of the Law *ex æquo & bono*, and frequently ſhewed in what caſes God did diſpenſe with the outward letter of it, to exalt the more the inward ſenſe and reaſon of it. Hence the Prophets ſeem many times to ſpeak contemptibly of the outward preſcribed Ceremonies, when their intent is not to condemn the obſervation of them, but to tell the people there were greater things which God looked at, than the outward obſervation of ſome Ceremonial precepts, and that God wou'd never accept of that by way of commutation for real and internal goodneſs. Hence the Prophets by their own practice, did frequently ſhew that the Law of *Moſes* did not ſo indiſpenſibly oblige Men, but that God wou'd accept of thoſe actions which were performed without the regularity required by the Law of *Moſes*; and thus he did of ſacrificing upon high places, not only before the building of the Temple, but ſometimes after, as he accepted of the ſacrifice of *Elijah* on Mount *Carmel*, even when high places were forbidden. Which the *Jews* are become ſo ſenſible of, that they grant that a true Prophet may ſometimes command ſomething to be done in violation of the Law of *Moſes*, ſo he doth not draw people to Idolatry, nor deſtroy the obligation of *Moſes* his Law. But this they reſtrain to שעה לפי something done in caſe of neceſſity, and that it ſhou'd not paſs

Pſal. 50. 8. 51. 16. Iſa. 1. 11, 13. 66. 3. Jer. 7. 21, 22, 23.

1 Kings 18. 38.

Vid. Jarchi Deut. 18. 21. *Et Vorſt. ad Maim. de fund c.* 9. *ſ.* 5, 6, 7.

into a precedent or a perpetual Law; and therefore their rule is לפי שעה שימעינו לו בכל. *The prophet was to be hearkened to in every thing he commanded in a case of necessity.* By this it is clear that the Prophets were not to be try'd by the Letter of the Law of *Moses*, but by the end and the reason of it. Thus much I suppose will make it clear what Rules the people had to try the Prophets Doctrine by, without Miracles.

CHAP. VI.

The Tryal of Prophetical Predictions and Miracles.

I. *The great difficulty of trying the truth of prophetical Predictions from* Jer. 18. 7, 8, &c. *Some general* Hypotheses *promised for the clearing of it.* II. *The first concerns the grounds why Predictions are accounted an evidence of Divine Revelation. Three Consectaries drawn thence.* III. *The second, the manner of* God's *Revelation of his Will to the Minds of the Prophets. Of the several degrees of Prophecy.* IV. *The third is, that* God *did not always reveal the internal purposes of his Will unto the true Prophets.* V. *The grand Question propounded, How it may be known when Predictions express* God's *decrees, and when only the series of causes. For the first several rules laid down.* 1. *When the Prediction is confirm'd by a present Miracle.* 2. *When the things foretold exceed the probability of second causes.* VI. 3. *When confirm'd by* God's *oath.* VII. 4. *When the Blessings foretold are purely spiritual.* VIII. *Three rules for interpreting the Prophecies which respect the state of things under the Gospel.* IX. *When all circumstances are foretold.* 6. *When many Prophets in several ages agree in the same predictions.* X. *Predictions do not express* God's *unalterable purposes, when they only contain comminations of judgments, or are predictions of temporal Blessings.* XI. *The case of the* Ninevites, Hezekiah, *and others, opened.* XII, XIII. *Of repentance in* God, *what it implies.* XIV. *The Jewish objections about predictions of temporal Blessings answered.* XV. *In what cases Miracles were expected from the Prophets: when they were to confirm the truth of their Religion. Instanced in the Prophet at* Bethel, Elijah, Elisha *and* Moses *himself;* XVI. *whose divine authority that it was proved by Miracles, is demonstrated against the modern* Jews, *and their pretences answered.*

I. THe next thing which the Rules of Tryal concerned, was the predictions of the Prophets. Concerning which God himself hath laid down this General Rule, *Deut.* 18. 22. *When a Prophet speaketh in the name of the Lord, if the thing follow not, nor come*

come to pass, that is the thing which the Lord hath not spoken, but the Prophet hath spoken it presumptuously; thou shalt not be afraid of him. *Grotius* understands this place of the Prophet's telling the people he wou'd do some Miracles to confirm his Doctrine; but, if those Miracles were not done as he said, it was an evident demonstration of a false Prophet. It is certain it was so; for then his own mouth told him he was a lying Prophet; but these words seem to refer rather to something future than present, and are therefore generally understood concerning the truth of predictions; which was a matter of very difficult tryal, in regard of the goodness or the justice of God, so frequently interposing between the prediction and the event. That place which makes it so difficult to discern the truth of a prediction by the event, is *Jer.* 18. 7, 8, 9, 10. *At what instant I shall speak concerning a Nation, and concerning a Kingdom, to pluck up, and to pull down, and to destroy it; If that Nation against whom I have pronounced, turn from evil, I will repent of the evil I had thought to do unto them; And at what instant I shall speak concerning a Nation, and concerning a Kingdom, to build and to plant it; if it do evil in my sight, that it obey not my voice, then will I repent of the good wherewith I said I would benefit them.* By which place it seems clear, that even after the predictions of Prophets, God reserved a liberty to himself, either to repent of the evil or the good that was foretold concerning any people; how then can the fidelity of a Prophet be discovered by the event when God may alter the event, and yet the Prophet be a true Prophet? This being a case very intricate and obscure, will call for the more diligence in the unfolding of it: In order to which, we shall first premise some general *Hypotheses*, and then come to the particular resolution of it. The general *Hypotheses* will be concerning the way and method of God's revealing future contingencies to the Prophets, without which it will be impossible to resolve the particular emergent cases concerning predictions.

II.

1. *Hypoth.* *The prediction of future events is no further an argument of a prophetic Spirit, than as the foreknowledg of those things is supposed to be out of the reach of any created understanding*; and therefore God challengeth this to himself in Scripture, as a peculiar prerogative of his own, to declare the things that are to come, and thereby manifests the Idols of the *Gentiles* to be no Gods, *because they could not shew to their worshippers the things to come*, Isa. 44. 6, 7. From this *Hypothesis* these three Consectaries follow:

1. That the events that are foretold, must be such as do exceed the reach of any created Intellect; for otherwise it cou'd be no evidence of a Spirit of true Prophecy; so that the foretelling of such events as depend upon the series of Natural Causes, or such as tho' they are out of the reach of Human Understanding, yet are not of the Diabolical, or such things as fall out casually true, but by no certain grounds of prediction, can none of them be any argument of a Spirit of Prophecy.

2. That where there were any other evidences, that the Prophet spake by Divine Revelation; there was no reason to wait the fulfilling of every particular prophecy before he was believed as a Prophet. If so, then many of God's chiefest Prophets cou'd not have

have been believed in their own Generations; becauſe their Prophecies did reach ſo far beyond them, as *Iſaiah*'s concerning *Cyrus*, the Prophet at *Bethel* concerning *Joſias*; and all the prophecies concerning the Captivity and Deliverance from it, muſt not have been believed till fulfilled, that is, not believed at all; for when prophecies are accompliſhed, they are no longer the objects of Faith, but of ſenſe. Where then God gives other evidences of Divine Inſpiration, the credit of the Prophet is not ſuſpended upon the minute accompliſhment of every event foretold by him. Now it is evident there may be particular Divine Revelation of other things beſides future contingencies, ſo that if a reaſon may be given, why events once foretold may not come to paſs, there can be no reaſon why the credit of any prophecy ſhou'd be invalidated on that account; becauſe every event is not exactly correſpondent to the prediction. It is moſt certain that whatever comes under Divine Knowledg, may be divinely revealed; for the manifeſtation which is cauſed by any light, may extend it ſelf to all things to which that light is extended: but that light which the Prophet ſaw by was a Divine Light, and therefore might equally extend it ſelf to all kind of objects; but becauſe future contingencies are the moſt remote from humane knowledg, therefore the foretelling of theſe hath been accounted the great evidence of a true Prophet; but yet there may be a knowledg of other things in a lower degree than future contingencies, which may immediately depend upon Divine Revelation; and theſe are,

1. Such things which cannot be known by any particular Man, but yet are certainly known by other Men; as the preſent knowledg of things done by perſons at a remote diſtance from them: thus *Eliſha* knew what *Gehazi* did, when he followed *Naaman*; and thus the knowledg of the thought of another's heart depends upon immediate Divine Revelation, whereas every one may certainly know the thought of his own heart; and therefore to ſome thoſe things may be matters of ſenſe or evident demonſtration, which to another may be a matter of immediate Revelation.

2 King. 5. 26.

1 Cor. 14. 25.

2. Such things as relate not to future contingencies, but are matters of Faith exceeding the reach of humane apprehenſion; ſuch things as may be known when revealed, but cou'd never have been found out without immediate Revelation; ſuch all the Myſteries of our Religion are, the Myſtery of the *Trinity*, *Incarnation*, *Hypoſtatical Union*, the Death of the Son of God for the pardon of the ſins of Mankind. Now the immediate Revelation of either of theſe two ſorts of objects ſpeaks as much a truly Prophetical Spirit, as the prediction of future contingencies. So that this muſt not be looked on as the juſt and adequate rule to meaſure a Spirit of prophecy by; becauſe the ground of judging a prophetical Spirit by that, is common with other things without that, ſeeing other objects are out of the reach of human Underſtanding as well as future events, and therefore the diſcovery of them muſt immediately flow from Divine Revelation.

3. The Revelation of future events to the Underſtanding of a Prophet, is never the leſs immediate, altho' the event may not be correſpondent to the prediction. So that if it be manifeſted that

God

God immediately reveal ſuch future contingencies to a Prophet, he wou'd be nevertheleſs a true Prophet whether thoſe predictions took effect or no. For a true Prophet is known by the truth of Divine Revelation to the perſon of the Prophet, and not by the ſucceſs of the thing, which, as is laid down in the *Hypotheſis*, is no further an evidence of a true Prophet, than as it is an argument *à poſteriori* to prove Divine Revelation by. If then the alteration of events after predictions be reconcilable with the truth and faithfulneſs of God, there is no queſtion but it is with the truth of a prophetical Spirit, the formality of which lies in immediate Revelation.

III. 2. *Hypoth.* *The Prophets cou'd not declare any thing more to the people than was immediately revealed unto themſelves.* What was preſently revealed, ſo much they knew, and no more, becauſe the Spirit of prophecy came upon them *per modum impreſſionis tranſeuntis*, as the Schools ſpeak, and not *per modum habitus*; the *lumen propheticum* was in them, not as *lumen in corpore lucido*, but as *lumen in aëre*; and therefore the Light of Revelation in their Spirits depended upon the immediate irradiations of the Divine Spirit. The Prophets had not always a power to propheſy when they wou'd themſelves; and thence it is ſaid, when they propheſy'd, that the *Word of the Lord came unto them.* And therefore the Schools determine, that a Prophet upon immediate Revelation did not know *omnia prophetabilia* (as they ſpeak in their barbarous language) *all things* which *God might reveal*; the reaſon whereof *Aquinas* thus gives; *The ground*, ſaith he, *of the connexion of divers objects together is ſome common tie or principle, which joyns them together; as charity or prudence is in moral vertues; and the right underſtanding of the principles of a ſcience, is the ground why all things belonging to that ſcience are underſtood; but now in Divine Revelation, that which connects the objects of Divine Revelation is God himſelf; now becauſe he cannot be fully apprehended by any human intellect, therefore the underſtanding of a Prophet cannot comprehend all matters capable of being revealed, but only ſuch as it pleaſeth God himſelf freely to communicate to the Prophet's underſtanding by immediate Revelation.* This is further evident by all thoſe different degrees of illumination and prophecy, which the *Jews* and other Writers ſpeak ſo much of, *viz.* of Dreams and Viſions, the inſpirations of the Holy Spirit, the *Gradus Moſaicus*, the External Voice, &c. Now in every one of theſe degrees the Prophet cou'd go no further than his preſent Revelation extended; and therefore *Aquinas* determines, That the Underſtandings of the Prophets were *inſtrumenta deficientia reſpectu principalis agentis*, *i. e.* that in prophetical illumination the Mind of the Prophet was ſo moved by the Spirit of God, as an inſtrument in the hand of an Artificer, which bears no proportion with the skill of the workman: And therefore the Mind of a Prophet is moved ſometimes only to apprehend the thing repreſented (which they call *Inſtinctus Divinus*, of which they ſay a Prophet may have no certainty whether it comes from God or no) ſometimes it is moved ſo far as to know certainly that this Revelation is from God (this they call *Lumen Propheticum*;) ſometimes a Prophet may be moved to ſpeak thoſe things which he fully underſtands; ſo it was with

2. 2. *q.* 171. *art.* 2.—4.

2. 2. *q.* 173. *art.* 3.

moſt of the true Prophets; but ſometimes Men may be moved to ſpeak that which they underſtand not, as is plain in *Caiaphas*, and probable in *Balaam*. Sometimes a thing was repreſented to the Fancy of one, without any poſſibility of underſtanding the meaning of thoſe imaginary ſpecies, as in *Pharaoh*'s and *Nebuchadnezzar*'s Dreams; and to another may be given the true judgment of thoſe motions of Fancy without the repreſentation of the things to them, as in *Joſeph* and *Daniel*. Now in theſe and many other different impreſſions of this prophetical Spirit, the Prophets, to whom the things were revealed, cou'd go no further than the degree of the Revelation made to them did extend.

IV. 3. Hypoth. *God did not always reveal to the Prophets the internal counſels and decrees of his own Will, but often only the method and ſeries of his providence in the adminiſtration of things in the world.* Which is the ground of that threefold diſtinction of prophecy in the Schools, into *Prophetia prædeſtinationis*, *Prophetia præſcientiæ*, and *Prophetia comminationis*; which is taken from the ordinary Gloſs upon *Matth.* 1. where they are thus explain'd; *The Prophecy of Predeſtination* is, when the event depends wholly upon God's Will, without any reſpect to ours, as the prophecy of the *Incarnation of Chriſt*; and the *Prophecy of Preſcience* is of ſuch things as depend upon the liberty of Man's Will; and the *Prophecy of Commination* only denotes God's denunciations of heavy judgments againſt a people. But *Aquinas* doth better reduce the two former to one, and the ground of the difference is to be fetched from the different ways whereby God knows things in the world; which is either as they are in their cauſes, and ſo they note the order and ſeries of things in the world, with the mutual reſpects and dependencies they have upon one another, and this refers to God's adminiſtration of things in the world; or elſe God looks upon them as they are in themſelves, or according to his own poſitive determinations of them; and now in this ſenſe they are unalterable; but in the other they are not; but God may alter thoſe reſpects of things when he pleaſeth. Now tho' theſe different manners of knowledg can never be conceiv'd ſeparate from one another in the Divine Underſtanding, yet in the Revelation made to the Mind of a Prophet, they may be disjoyn'd from each other, becauſe God doth not always reveal things in the higheſt degree to the Prophets; for no free Agent doth always act as far as he can. And therefore prophetical Revelation is ſometimes a repreſentation of God's internal Decrees, and then they always take effect; and ſometimes only the order of Cauſes and Effects, and they may admit of an alteration, and the prophecy nevertheleſs be true, becauſe then it referr'd only to the ſeries of Cauſes in the world, according to which the Events wou'd follow, if God himſelf did not interpoſe. Theſe things being thus premis'd, we come to particular Reſolutions, which muſt ariſe from the Evidences that may be given when prophetical predictions did expreſs God's internal purpoſe and decree, and when only the order of the Cauſes in the world; for in theſe latter it is apparent that events might not anſwer predictions, and yet the Prophet be a true Prophet: which is a matter of greater difficulty, *viz.* to find out the exact differences of theſe two, till the event hath made it apparent which

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came from God's unalterable purpoſe, and which not. But tho' it be a ſubject little ſpoken to either by *Jewiſh* or *Chriſtian* Writers, yet we are in hopes there may be ſome ſuch clear Notes of diſtinction diſcovered between them, even *à priori*, which may ſufficiently clear God's faithfulneſs, and the Prophet's truth, tho' the event be not always correſpondent to the words of a prediction.

I begin then with the evidences that may be given when predictions do flow from internal purpoſe and decree. V.

1. *Every prediction confirm'd by a preſent Miracle, doth not expreſs merely the order of cauſes, but the determinations of God's will,* becauſe there can be no ſufficient reaſon given why the order of cauſes in Nature ſhou'd be altered to expreſs the dependences of things on each other; for herein a Miracle wou'd rather tend to weaken than ſtrengthen Faith, becauſe the end of the Miracle wou'd be to confirm their Faith as to events following upon their cauſes; but now the *medium* us'd for that end ſeems to prove the contrary, *viz.* That God can alter the ſeries of cauſes when he pleaſes himſelf, by working Miracles, and therein going contrary to the courſe of Nature; and therefore a Miracle ſeems to be a very incongruous argument in this, becauſe its ſelf is an evidence that may be, which it comes to prove ſhall not be. But when Prophets come to declare the internal purpoſes of the Will of God concerning future contingencies, no argument can be more ſuitable to demonſtrate the truth of what is ſpoken, than the working of a preſent Miracle, for this demonſtrates to the ſenſes of Men, that however unlikely the event may be to them which is foretold, yet with God all things are poſſible, and that it is very unlikely God wou'd ſend ſuch a Meſſenger to declare a falſhood, whom he entruſted with ſo great a power as that of working Miracles. Thus it was in that remarkable prophecy concerning *Joſias* by the Man of God at *Bethel*, 260 years before his Birth, which tho' it were to come to paſs ſo long after, God confirm'd it by a Sign, which was *the rending of the Altar, and the pouring out of the aſhes upon it, and the withering of* Jeroboam's *hand*. We cannot therefore in reaſon think that God wou'd ſet ſo clear a Seal to any Deed which he did intend himſelf to cancel afterwards. 1 King. 13. 3.

2. *Predictions expreſs God's inward purpoſe, when the things foretold do exceed all probabilities of ſecond cauſes*; in which cauſe tho' thoſe words of *Tertullian* ſeem very harſh, *credo quia impoſſibile*; yet taking that Impoſſibility as relating to ſecond cauſes, and the ground of Faith to be ſome divine prediction, we ſee what reaſon there may be for them: For the more unlikely the thing is to be effected by ſecond cauſes, the greater evidence is it, that the Prophets in foretelling it did not reſpect the mere order of things in the world, but the unalterable counſels of the will of God, which therefore wou'd certainly have their timely accompliſhments. When therefore any Prophets did foretel things above the reach of Natural cauſes, and thoſe things did not come to paſs, it was a certain evidence of a falſe Prophet, as the contrary was of a true one; for none cou'd know ſo long before-hand ſuch things as were above all human power, but ſuch to whom God himſelf, who alone was able to effect them, did reveal and communicate the knowledg of them. And hence we ſee in Scripture thoſe pre-

dictions which have ſeemed the greateſt improbabilities with them, have had the moſt punctual accompliſhments, as the *Iſraelites* returning out of *Ægypt* at the end of 430 years; their deliverance by *Cyrus* after the Captivity in *Babylon*, which ſeemed ſo improbable a thing, that when God ſpeaks of it, he uſhers it in with this preface, *That he fruſtrateth the tokens of the lyers, and maketh the deviners mad, but confirmeth the word of his ſervant, and performeth the counſel of his meſſengers, that ſaith to Jeruſalem, Thou ſhalt be inhabited*, &c. The more unlikely then the thing was to come to paſs, the greater evidence there was in ſo clear a prophecy of it ſo long before (above 100 years) and ſo exact a fulfilling of it afterwards preciſely at the expiring of the LXX years from the firſt Captivity.

Gal. 3. 17. Iſa. 44. 25, 26, 28.

VI. 3. *Predictions concerning future events, which are confirmed by an oath from God himſelf, do expreſs the immutable determinations of God's will.* For which we have the greateſt aſſurance we can deſire from that remarkable expreſſion of the Apoſtle to the *Hebrews*, Heb. 6. 17, 18. *Wherein God willing more abundantly to ſhew to the heirs of promiſe the immutability of his counſel, confirmed it by an oath, that by two immutable things in which it was impoſſible for God to lye, we might have a ſtrong conſolation*, &c. Wherein the Apoſtle obviates and removes all doubts and miſpriſions, leſt God after the declaring of his Will ſhou'd alter the event foretold in it, and that he doth, both by ſhewing that God had made an abſolute promiſe, and withal to prevent all doubts, leſt ſome tacite condition might hinder performance, he tells us that God had annexed his oath to it, which two things were the moſt undoubted evidences of the immutability of God's counſel. The word ἀνύσιμος here us'd, doth in Scripture often note the fruſtrating of Mens hopes and expectations; ſo it is us'd *Heb.* 3. 17. ἀνύσιμος ἦρχεν ἐλαίας, we render it the *labour of the Olive ſhall fail.* So Hoſ. 9. 2. καὶ ὁ οἶνος ἀνύσιμος αὐτοῖς, *and the new Wine ſhall fail in her.* Thus the meaning here is, that by two immutable things in which it is impoſſible God ſhou'd fruſtrate the expectations of Men, or alter the events of things after he had declared them. For God's oath is an evident demonſtration of the immutability of his Will in all predictions to which this is annexed, and doth fully exclude that which the Scripture calls repenting in God, that is, doing otherwiſe than the words did ſeem to expreſs, becauſe of ſome tacite conditions underſtood in them. So we find *Pſal.* 89. 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36. *If they break my ſtatutes, and keep not my commandments, then will I viſit their tranſgreſſion with the rod, and their iniquity with ſtripes; nevertheleſs my loving kindneſs will I not utterly take from him, nor ſuffer my faithfulneſs to fail; my covenant will I not break; nor alter the thing that is gone out of my lips. Once have I ſworn by my holineſs, that I will not lye unto* David. *His ſeed ſhall endure for ever, and his throne as the Sun before me.* Wherein we ſee what way God takes to aſſure us of the immutability of his Covenant with his people, by the oath which he adjoyns to his promiſes; whereby God doth moſt fully expreſs the unalterable determinations of his own Will, in that he ſwears by his own Holineſs that he wou'd not lye unto *David*, i. e. that he wou'd faithfully perform what he had promis'd to him. And therefore *Tertullian* well

ſaith,

ſaith, *Beati ſumus quorum cauſa Deus jurat, ſed miſeri & deteſtabiles ſi ne juranti quidem credimus.* It is happy for us believing Creatures, that God ſtoops ſo low as to confirm his Covenant with an oath; but it will be ſad and miſerable for ſuch as dare not venture their Faith upon it, when God hath annex'd his oath unto it. It is thought by Expoſitors, that there is a peculiar emphaſis in thoſe words, אחת נשבעתי *Once have I ſworn*, thereby noting the irrevocable nature of God's oath, that there is no need of repetition of it as among Men, becauſe when once God ſwears by himſelf it is the higheſt demonſtration that no conditions whatever ſhall alter his declared purpoſe. And therefore the Council of *Toledo* well explains the different nature of God's Oath, and his Repentance in Scriptures; *Jurare namque Dei eſt à ſe ordinata nullatenus convellere; pœnitere vero eadem ordinata cum voluerit immutare;* God is ſaid to ſwear when he binds himſelf abſolutely to performance: and to repent, when things fall out contrary to the declaration of God's Will concerning them; for ſo it muſt be underſtood to be only *mutatio ſententiæ*, and not *conſilii*, that the alteration may be only in the things, and not in the eternal purpoſe of God. But ſince it is evident in Scripture, that many predictions do imply ſome tacite conditions, and many declarations of God's Will do not expreſs his internal purpoſes, it ſeem'd neceſſary in thoſe things which God did declare to be the irrevocable purpoſes of his Will, there ſhou'd be ſome peculiar mark and character ſet upon them for the confirmation of his people's Faith, and this we find to be the annexing an oath to his promiſes. Thus it is in that grand Inſtrument of peace between God and his people, the covenant of Grace, wherein God was pleas'd ſo far to ſtrengthen the Faith of his people in it, that he ratifies the articles of peace therein contain'd, but eſpecially the Act of Grace, on his own part with an oath, thereby to aſſure them it was never his purpoſe to repeal it, nor to fail of performance in it. For we are not to think that an oath lays any greater obligation upon God for performance, than the mere declaration of his Will; it being a part of immutable juſtice, and conſequently neceſſarily imply'd in the Divine Nature to perform promiſes when once made; but God's Oath reſpects us, and not himſelf, *viz.* that it might be a teſtimony unto us that God's Will thereby declar'd is his eternal and unchangeable Will, and ſo the mercies thereby promis'd are ſure mercies; ſuch as are ἀμεταμέλητα, *without any repentance on God's part.*

Concil. Toled. 8. *c.* 2.

Iſa. 55. 3.

VII. 4. *Predictions made by the Prophets concerning Bleſſings merely ſpiritual, do expreſs God's internal purpoſe, and therefore, muſt have their certain accompliſhment in the time prefix'd by the Prophets.* The grand reaſon of this propoſition, is, that the beſtowing of Bleſſings merely ſpiritual, doth immediately flow from the Grace and Favor of God, and depend not upon conditions on our part, as procuring cauſes of them, and therefore there can be no account given why God ſhou'd ſuſpend the performance of ſuch promiſes, which wou'd not more ſtrongly have held why he ſhou'd not have made any ſuch promiſes at all. And therefore when we ſee that notwithſtanding the higheſt demerits, God made ſuch free promiſes, we can have no reaſon to think that any other demerits in-

terpoſing between the promiſes and performance, ſhou'd hinder the accompliſhment of them: unleſs it be inſerted in the promiſes themſelves, which is contrary to the nature of free promiſes: Upon this ground all the promiſes relating to the Goſpel ſtate, and to the Covenant of Grace therein contain'd, muſt have their due accompliſhment in the time and manner prefix'd by the Prophets; and therefore the *Jews* are miſerably blind when they ſuppoſe the reaſon why the promiſe of the *Meſſias* is yet deferr'd after ſo long expectation of him, is, the ſins of their people; for this ſeems to ſuppoſe that God's promiſe of the *Meſſias* did depend upon their own righteouſneſs and worthineſs above all other people, which if it doth, they are like to be the moſt miſerable and deſperate people the world hath: and beſides, if God's intuition of ſin makes him defer the coming of the *Meſſias*, his foreſight of ſin wou'd have hinder'd him from ever promiſing a *Meſſias* to come: but this was ſo far from being a hindrance of God's promiſe, that the main end of the coming of the *Meſſias* was *to make reconciliation for iniquity, and to make an end of ſin, and to bring in everlaſting righteouſneſs*. And we ſee where-ever the Prophets inſiſt on the Covenant of Grace, the promiſe contain'd in it is *the blotting out of tranſgreſſions*, and *remembring ſins no more*, and that merely on the account of God's free Love and for his own Name's ſake: This can be no reaſon then why predictions concerning ſpiritual Bleſſings ſhou'd not have their exact accompliſhment, becauſe there can be no bar againſt free Love, and the beſtowing of ſuch Mercies which do ſuppoſe the greateſt unworthineſs of them, as Goſpel Bleſſings do.

Dan. 9. 24.

VIII. The great difficulty lies in explaining the prophetical phraſes concerning the Goſpel ſtate, which ſeem to intimate a greater advancement and flouriſhing of peace and holineſs therein, than hath as yet been ſeen in the Chriſtian World; which gives the *Jews* the greater occaſion to imagin that the ſtate ſo much ſpoken of by the Prophets, is not yet eſtabliſhed in the World. But all the difficulty herein ariſeth from the want of conſideration of the Idiotiſms of the prophetical language, eſpecially where it reſpects the ſtate of things under the Goſpel, concerning which, we may obſerve theſe following Rules.

1. *The Prophets under the Old Teſtament, when they ſpeak of things to come to paſs in the New, do ſet them forth by the repreſentation of ſuch things as were then in uſe among themſelves*; thus the ſpiritual Worſhip of the Goſpel is propheſy'd of, under the notion of the legal Worſhip among the *Jews*; the converſion of *Ægypt* to the Goſpel, is foretold *Iſaiah* 19. 19, 21. by the ſetting up an Altar, and *offering ſacrifice to the Lord*: and the *Converſion of the Gentiles* in general, by the *offering up of incenſe*, Mal. 1. 11. and the ſervice of God under the Goſpel, is ſet forth by *going up to* Jeruſalem, *and keeping the feaſt of Tabernacles there*, Zach. 14. 16. and the *plentiful effuſion of the Spirit of God in the miraculous gifts*, which attended the preaching of the Goſpel, is ſet forth by the Prophet, *Joel* 2. 28. by *propheſying, and dreaming dreams, and ſeeing viſions*; not that theſe things ſhou'd really be under Goſpel times; but that the Prophets meaning might be the better underſtood by thoſe he ſpake unto, he ſets forth the great meaſure of

gifts and Goſpel light under thoſe things which were accounted as the higheſt attainments among themſelves. So the great meaſure and degree of holineſs which was to be under Goſpel times, is ſet forth by the Prophet *Zachary*, Zach. 14. 20. by the placing of the Motto which was among the *Jews* only upon the *High Prieſt's forehead*, that this ſhou'd be ſo common under the Goſpel, that even *the bells of the horſes ſhould bear it*, *i. e.* thoſe things which ſeem moſt remote from a ſpiritual uſe, ſhou'd be devoted to it, as the Bells were, which were commonly hang'd upon their war-horſes in thoſe mountainous Countries; and in the latter part of that verſe, the height and progreſs of Goſpel holineſs is deſcrib'd under that phraſe, *That the pots in the Lords houſe ſhould be as bowls before the Altar*, *i. e.* ſhou'd be advanc'd from a lower and more ignoble ſervice, to a higher and more ſpiritual degree of holineſs. Now the *Jews* when they obſerve theſe and many other prophetical paſſages relating to the time of the *Meſſias* to run in the old ſtrain of the Law, they preſently conclude that the *Meſſias* muſt not innovate any thing concerning their way or worſhip, but only be ſome great Prince to give them temporal deliverances, and ſo expound all theſe Texts in a literal ſenſe, which were only expreſs'd in ſuch a ſtrain, the better to help the capacities of thoſe they ſpake them to.

2. *Things abſolutely foretold to come to paſs in Goſpel times in a general manner, are to be underſtood comparatively in reference to what was before.* For when the meaſure of their grace or knowledg was ſo far above what was then among the *Jews*, that there was ſcarce any proportion between them, the Prophets made uſe of ſuch expreſſions to ſet it forth by, which might raiſe up the dull apprehenſion of the *Jews* to conceive the juſt meaſure and fulneſs of it. Thus when the Prophets foretel the grand increaſe of ſpiritual knowledg in Goſpel times, they do it in this phraſe, *They ſhall not teach every man his neighbour, and every man his brother, ſaying, Know the Lord, for all ſhall know me from the leaſt to the greateſt*, Jer. 31. 33. Where it was far from the Prophet's meaning to exclude all uſe of teaching under the Goſpel, (which is contrary to the end of all the Ordinances of the Goſpel) but becauſe teaching doth commonly ſuppoſe great ignorance, he ſets forth the abundance of knowledg which ſhou'd be then, by the excluſion of that which doth imply it. So when it is ſaid that *they ſhall all be taught of God*, the meaning is not, that every one that lives in the Goſpel ſtate, ſhou'd be thus effectually taught by the Spirit of God; but that the number of ſuch under the Goſpel, ſhou'd ſo far exceed thoſe under the Law, that they cou'd hardly apprehend the diſproportion between them, unleſs it had been ſet forth in ſo large an expreſſion. Which leads me to the next Rule.

3. *Things foretold as univerſally or indefinitely to come to paſs under the Goſpel, are to be underſtood as to the duty of all, but as the event only of God's choſen people.* Thus when there is ſo great peace propheſy'd to be in Goſpel times, that then *men ſhould beat their ſwords into plow-ſhares, and ſpears into pruning-hooks; that the Wolf ſhould lie down with the Lamb, and Leopard with the Kid; that Nation ſhould not lift up ſword againſt Nation, nor learn war* Iſa. 2. 4. 11. 6, 7.

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any more; with many others to the ſame purpoſe; all theſe ſpeeches are to be underſtood of what the nature and deſign of the Goſpel tends to, and what is the duty of all that profeſs it, and what wou'd effectually be in the Chriſtian world, did all that profeſs the Chriſtian Doctrine, heartily obey the Dictates of it; and ſo far as the Goſpel doth prevail upon any, it ſo far cicurates their wild and unruly natures, that of furious Wolves they become innocent Lambs, and of raging Lions, tender Kids; ſo far from hurting and injuring others, that they dare not entertain any thoughts of ill-will or revenge towards their greateſt enemies. And thus we may ſee, that notwithſtanding the ſeeming repugnancies of the prophecies of the Old Teſtament concerning the ſtate of the New, with the events which have been obſerv'd in it, yet that all thoſe predictions which concern'd the beſtowing of the ſpiritual Bleſſings which concern'd the Goſpel ſtate, have had their punctual accompliſhment in the ſenſe they were intended.

IX. 4. *Predictions concerning future events where not only the thing its ſelf is foretold, but the ſeveral circumſtances of perſons, time, and place enumerated, are to have their due accompliſhment, and conſequently expreſs God's inward purpoſes.* For thoſe promiſes or comminations which are capable of alteration by ſome tacite conditions imply'd in them, do moſt commonly run in general terms; or elſe are ſpoken by way of immediate addreſs to the perſons concern'd in order to the ſtirring them up the more to the duty God aims at by thoſe comminations; as when *Jonas* limited the *Ninevites* deſtruction to forty days. But when prophecies are recorded, not by way of commination but mere prediction, and particular circumſtances ſet down, it ſtands to reaſon that ſuch prophecies muſt have their certain accompliſhment; and that *firſt*, becauſe God by ſetting down the circumſtances wou'd give them greater evidences that the predictions came from himſelf; as when the Prophet at *Bethel* not only foretold the deſtruction of the Altar there, but particularly named the Man that ſhou'd do it. viz. *Joſias*. So when God by *Iſaiah* call'd *Cyrus* by name, it was doubtleſs a great confirmation to them, that the deliverance of the *Jews* ſhou'd be by that perſon. *Secondly*, becauſe the circumſtances are intended for Land-marks to know the certainty of the accompliſhment of the prophecy. For when they find the circumſtances fall out exactly according to the prediction, they have no ground to queſtion the accompliſhment of the prophecy. And hence it was that in the grand prophecy of the coming of the *Meſſias* all particular circumſtances were ſo long before foretold. The firſt dawning of his day being to *Adam* after his fall, when the nature he ſhou'd be born of was foretold, *viz.* not Angelical but Human, of the ſeed of the Woman. To *Abraham* it was further revealed of what Nation of Mankind, *viz.* from his Poſterity; to *Jacob* at what time, when the *Scepter ſhould be departed from* Judah; and from what Tribe, *viz.* his own; to *Iſaiah* of what perſon in that Family, a Virgin; to *Micah* in what place, *viz. Bethlehem*; and to *Daniel* at what preciſe time, toward the expiring of his ſeventy weeks; which according to the moſt probable computation of them did commence from the ſeventh year of *Artaxerxes Longimanus*, and ſo the 490 years expired near upon our Saviour's paſſion. Now certainly

certainly the particular enumeration of all theſe circumſtances ſpoken of ſo long before, and falling out ſo exactly, cou'd not but give the greateſt conviction and evidence, that our bleſſed Savior was that perſon ſo much ſpoken of by the Prophets, in whom all theſe ſeveral lines did meet as in their center.

5. Laſtly, *Predictions then expreſs divine purpoſes when many Prophets in ſeveral ages concur in the ſame predictions*; becauſe it is hardly ſeen but all thoſe tacite conditions which are ſuppos'd in general promiſes or comminations may be alter'd in different ages; but when the conditions alter, and the predictions continue the ſame, it is a ſtronger evidence it is ſome immutable counſel of God which is expreſs'd in thoſe predictions. And in this caſe one prediction confirms the foregoing, as the *Jews* ſay of Prophets; *One Prophet that hath the teſtimony of another Prophet, is ſuppos'd to be true*; but it muſt be with this ſuppoſition, that the other Prophet was before approv'd to be a true Prophet. Now both theſe meet in the prophecies concerning our Savior; for to him bear all the Prophets witneſs; and in their ſeveral ages they had ſeveral things reveal'd to them concerning him; and the uniformity and perfect harmony of all theſe ſeveral prophecies by perſons at ſo great diſtance from each other, and being of ſeveral intereſts and imployments, and in ſeveral places, yet all giving light to each other, and exactly meeting at laſt in the accompliſhment, do give us yet a further and clearer evidence, that all thoſe ſeveral beams came from the ſame Sun, when all thoſe ſcattered Rays were at laſt gathered into one Body again at the appearance of the Sun of Righteouſneſs in the World.

Thus have we now cleared when predictions are expreſſive of God's internal purpoſes; by obſervation of which Rules we may eaſily reſolve the other part of the difficulty, when they only expreſs the ſeries and dependencies of things which wou'd have their iſſue and accompliſhment, if God by his immediate hand of Providence did not cut off the entail of effects upon their natural cauſes. Now as to theſe prophecies which concern things conſidered in themſelves, and not preciſely as they are in the counſel of God, we are to obſerve theſe Rules. X.

1. *Comminations of judgments to come do not in themſelves ſpeak the abſolute futurity of the event, but do only declare what the perſons to whom they are made are to expect, and what ſhall certainly come to paſs, unleſs God by his mercy interpoſe between the threatning and the event.* So that comminations do ſpeak only the *debitum pœnæ*, and the neceſſary obligation to puniſhment; but therein God doth not bind up himſelf as he doth in abſolute promiſes; the reaſon is becauſe comminations confer no right to any, which abſolute promiſes do; and therefore God is not bound to neceſſary performance of what he threatens. Indeed the guilt, or obligation to puniſhment is neceſſary, where the offence hath been committed to which the threatning was annexed; but the execution of that puniſhment doth ſtill depend upon God's arbitrarious Will, and therefore he may ſuſpend or remove it upon ſerious addreſſes made to himſelf in order to it. For ſince God was pleas'd not to take the preſent forfeiture of the firſt grand tranſgreſſion, but made ſuch a relaxation of that penal Law, that con-

dition of pardon were admittable, notwithſtanding ſentence paſs'd upon the malefactors, there is ſtrong ground of preſumption in Humane Nature that God's forbearance of Mankind notwithſtanding ſin, doth ſuppoſe his readineſs to pardon offenders upon their repentance, and therefore that all particular threatnings of judgments to come, do ſuppoſe incorrigibleneſs in thoſe they are pronounc'd againſt: Upon which the foundation of hope is built, that if timely repentance do intervene, God will remove thoſe judgments which are threatned againſt them.

XI. And this was certainly the caſe of the *Ninevites* upon *Jonas* his preaching among them. For when the threatning was ſo peremptory, *Yet forty days, and* Nineve *ſhall be deſtroyed*, all the hope they cou'd have of pardon muſt be from the general perſuaſions of Men's Souls of God's readineſs to remove judgments upon repentance. For otherwiſe there had been no place for any thing but deſpair, and not the leaſt encouragement to ſupplicate the Mercy of God, which we ſee they did in a moſt ſolemn manner after they were convinc'd theſe comminations came from God himſelf by the mouth of his Prophet. Some think that *Jonas* together with the threatning of judgment did intermix exhortations to repentance; but we can find no probability at all for that on theſe two accounts: Firſt, *Jonas* then wou'd not have been ſo unwilling to have undertaken this meſſage; for as far as we can ſee, the harſhneſs of it was the main reaſon he ſought to have avoided it by flying to *Tarſhiſh*. Secondly, *Jonas* wou'd have had no pretence at all for his anger and diſpleaſure at God's pardoning *Nineve*; which is moſt probably conceiv'd to have been, becauſe the *Ninevites* might now ſuſpect him to be no true Prophet, becauſe the event anſwer'd not his prediction. Now there had been no reaſon at all for this, if he had mix'd promiſes together with his threatnings; for then nothing wou'd have fall'n out contrary to his own predictions. And therefore it ſeems evident that the meſſage *Jonas* was ſent with, was only the commination of their ſpeedy ruin, which God did on purpoſe to awaken them the ſooner, and with greater earneſtneſs to repentance, when the judgment was denounc'd in ſo peremptory a manner; altho' it ſeems *Jonas* had before ſuch apprehenſions of the *merciful nature of God*, and his readineſs to pardon, that he might ſuppoſe God's intention by this ſevere denunciation of judgment, might be only to take occaſion upon their repentance, to ſhew his goodneſs and bounty to them. But this was no part of his inſtructions, which he durſt not go beyond in his preaching, whatever his private opinion might be; for the Prophets were to utter no more in their preaching or particular meſſages than was in their commiſſion, and were not to mix their own words with the Word of the Lord.

Jonah 3. 4.

Jonah 4. 2.

XII. And by this we may further underſtand the denunciation of death to *Hezekiah* by the Prophet *Iſaiah*, *Set thy houſe in order, for thou ſhalt die and not live*. I queſtion not but the Prophet reveal'd to *Hezekiah* as much as God had reveal'd to him (for to ſay as *Molinæus* doth, that the Prophet ſpake theſe words of his own head, before he fully underſtood God's mind, is very harſh and incongruous) but God might at firſt diſcover to *Iſaiah* not his internal purpoſe, but what the nature of the diſeaſe wou'd bring him

Iſa. 38. 1.

Molin. Vates, l. 1. c. 26.

him to (unleſs his own immediate hand of Providence interpos'd) which meſſage he wou'd have *Iſaiah* carry to *Hezekiah* for the tryal of his Faith, and exciting him to the more lively acts of Grace, and for a further demonſtration of God's goodneſs to him in prolonging his Life beyond humane probability and the courſe of Second Cauſes. Now what repugnancy is there to the truth and faithfulneſs of God, that God ſhou'd conceal from his Prophets in their Meſſages the internal purpoſes of his Will, and in order to the doing good to Men ſhou'd only reveal what wou'd certainly have come to paſs unleſs himſelf had otherwiſe determin'd it. And thus the repentance which is atttributed to God in reference to theſe denunciations of judgments, is far from importing any real mutation in the internal purpoſes of God (a rock ſome have ſplit themſelves upon) but it only ſignifies the outward changing of the Scene towards Men, and acting otherwiſe than the words of the Prophets did ſeem to import; and all the alteration is in the outward diſcovery of his Will, which is certainly far from being any colluſion in God: Unleſs we muſt ſuppoſe God ſo bound up, that he hath no liberty of uſing his own methods for bringing Men to repentance, or for tryal of his People's graces, but muſt in every inſtance of his Word declare nothing but his own internal purpoſes, which is contrary to the general method of God's dealing with the World, which is, to govern Men by his own Laws, and thereby to awaken them to duty, and deter from ſin by his annex'd threatnings, without revealing any thing of his internal purpoſes concerning the ſtate and condition of any particular perſons at all; which threatnings of his, tho' pronounced with the greateſt ſeverity, do not ſpeak God's inward reſolutions as to any particular perſon, but what all muſt expect if they continue impenitent and incorrigible. For the only conditions imply'd in theſe threatnings being repentance, it neceſſarily follows, that where that is wanting, theſe Hypothetical comminations are abſolute predictions of what ſhall certainly come to paſs on all thoſe who are deſtitute of the condition ſuppos'd in them.

XIII. So that where any comminations are pronounced by any in a prophetical way concerning any perſon or people, and no alteration happen at all in them, but they continue impenitent and incorrigible, there the not coming of them to paſs may be a token of a falſe Prophet. For in this caſe the only tacite condition imply'd in theſe threatning prophecies is ſuppos'd to be wanting, and ſo the comminations muſt be underſtood as abſolute predictions: Now in thoſe comminations in Scripture, which are abſolutely expreſs'd, but conditionally underſtood, we find ſomething interpoſing, which we may rationally ſuppoſe was the very condition underſtood. As *Abimelech*'s reſtoring of *Sarah* was the ground why the ſentence of death after it was denounced, was not executed upon him: So *Ahab*'s Humiliation, *Hezekiah* his earneſt Prayer, the *Ninevites* Repentance, all interpos'd between ſentence and execution, whereby we may be fully ſatisfy'd of the reaſon why theſe denunciations did not take effect: But where the perſons continue the ſame after threatnings that they were before, there is no reaſon why the ſentence ſhou'd be ſuſpended, unleſs we ſhou'd ſuppoſe it to be a mere effect of the patience and long-

Gen. 20. 8.

1 King. 21. 19.

ſuffering of God, leading Men to repentance and amendment of life: Which is the ground the *Jews* give, why the not fulfilling of denunciations of judgment was never accounted ſufficient to prove a Man a falſe Prophet; to which purpoſe theſe words of *Maimonides* are obſervable in his *Jeſude Thorah*, where he treats particularly on the ſubject of Prophecies: *If a Prophet foretel ſad things, as the death of any one, or famine, or war, or the like; if theſe things come not to paſs, he ſhall not be accounted a falſe Prophet; neither let them ſay, Behold he hath foretold, and it comes not to paſs; for our bleſſed God is ſlow to anger, and rich in mercy, and repenteth of the evil; and it may be that they repent, and God may ſpare them, as he did the Ninevites, or defer the puniſhment, as he did* Hezekiah's. Thus we ſee that prophetical comminations do not expreſs God's internal purpoſes, and therefore the event may not come to paſs, and yet the Prophet be a true Prophet.

Maim. de fund. leg. c. 10. ſ. 6.

XIV. 2. *Predictions concerning temporal bleſſings, do not always abſolutely ſpeak the certainty of the event, but what God is ready to do, if they to whom they are made continue faithful to him:* For which we have ſufficient ground from that place of *Jeremiah* 18. 9, 10. *At what inſtant I ſhall ſpeak concerning a Kingdom, to build and to plant it; if it do evil in my ſight, that it obey not my voice, then will I repent of the good wherewith I ſaid I would benefit them.* So *Iſaiah* 1. 19, 20. *If ye be willing and obedient, ye ſhall eat the good of the land; but if ye refuſe and rebel, ye ſhall be devoured with the ſword; for the mouth of the Lord hath ſpoken it.* Whereby we ſee it evident, that all Promiſes of Temporal Bleſſings are not to be taken abſolutely, but with the condition of obedience. But this the *Jews* can by no means digeſt, whoſe Rule is, that all prophecies of good things to come muſt neceſſarily come to paſs, or he was no true Prophet who ſpake them: For, ſaith *Maimonides, Whatever good thing God hath promiſed, altho' it be promiſed under a condition, he never revokes it; and we never find that God repented him of any good thing promis'd, but in the deſtruction of the firſt Temple, when God had promis'd to the righteous, they ſhou'd not die with the wicked; but he repented him of his words.* But it is very plain to any one that conſiders the *Jewiſh* Interpretations of Scripture, that in them they have always an eye to themſelves, and will be ſure not to underſtand thoſe Scriptures which ſeem to thwart their own intereſt, as is moſt apparent in the preſent caſe; for the grand reaſon why the *Jews* inſiſt ſo much on the punctual accompliſhment of all Promiſes of good to be the ſign of a true Prophet is, to uphold their own intereſt in thoſe Temporal Bleſſings which are propheſy'd of concerning them in the Old Teſtament; altho' one wou'd think the want of correſpondency in the event in reference to themſelves, might make them a little more tender of the honor of thoſe Prophecies which they acknowledg to be divine; and have appear'd to be ſo in nothing more than the full accompliſhment of all thoſe threatnings which are denounced againſt them for their diſobedience, even by the mouth of *Moſes* himſelf, *Deut.* 28. from the 15th to the end. Can any thing be more plain and evident, than that the enjoyment of all the privileges conferr'd upon them, did depend upon the condition of their continuing faithful to God's Covenant? The only place of Scripture

Ibid. ſ. 7, 8.

pture produced by them with any plauſibility, is that *Jer.* 28. 9. *The Prophet which prophecieth of peace, when the word of the Prophet ſhall come to paſs, then ſhall the Prophet be known that the Lord hath truly ſent him.* For reconciling of which place with thoſe already mention'd, we are to underſtand that here was a particular conteſt between two Prophets, *Hananiah* and *Jeremiah*; *Jeremiah* he foretold evil to come, tho' unwillingly, *ver.* 6. *Hananiah* he prophecied peace. Now *Jeremiah*, according to God's peculiar directions and inſpiration, appeals to the event to determine whoſe prophecy was the trueſt: Now, ſaith *Jeremiah*, if the prophecy of *Hananiah* concerning peace be fulfill'd, then he is the true Prophet, and I the falſe. And in this caſe when two Prophets propheſy contrary things, it ſtands to reaſon that God will not reveal any thing by the mouth of his own Prophet which ſhall not infallibly come to paſs, that thereby the truth of his own Prophet may be fully manifeſted. Beſides *Jeremiah* refers not merely to the event foretold, but gives a ſudden ſpecimen of his own truth in another prophecy concerning the death of *Hananiah*, which was punctually accompliſh'd the ſame year, *ver.* 17. And which is moſt conſiderable to our purpoſe, both theſe Prophets conſidered the ſame people under the ſame circumſtances, and with the ſame conditions; and ſo *Jeremiah*, becauſe of their incorrigibleneſs, foretels deſolation certainly to come; notwithſtanding this, *Hananiah* foretels peace and ſafety, which was contrary directly to God's method of proceeding, and ſo the falſity of his prophecy wou'd infallibly be diſcovered by the event. So that notwithſtanding this Inſtance, it appears evident, that predictions of temporal Bleſſing do ſuppoſe conditions, and ſo have not always the event fulfilled, when the people do not perform their condition of obedience. And thus we have now laid down the Rules whereby the truth of prophecies was to be judg'd; by which it appears what little need the conſtant Prophets had to appeal to Miracles to manifeſt the certainty of Divine Revelation in them. So we have finiſhed our firſt Propoſition concerning the manner of trying Divine Revelation in the Prophets God ſent among his people.

We now come to the ſecond general Propoſition concerning the Prophets. *Thoſe Prophets whom God did imploy upon ſome extraordinary meſſage for confirming the truth of the Religion eſtabliſhed by him, had a power of Miracles conferred upon them in order to that end.* So that we muſt diſtinguiſh the ordinary imployment of Prophets, which was either Inſtruction or Prediction of future events among God's own people, from their peculiar meſſages when they were ſent to give evidence to the truth of that way of Religion which was then ſetled by God's own appointment. Now the Prophets generally did ſuppoſe the truth of their Religion as owned by thoſe they were ſent to, and therefore it had been very needleſs imploying a power of Miracles among them to convince them of that which they believed already. For we never read among all the revolts of the people of the *Jews*, that they were lapſed ſo far as totally to reject the Law of *Moſes*, (which had been, to alter the conſtitution of their Common-wealth) altho' they did enormouſly offend againſt the precepts of it, and that in thoſe things wherein the honor of God was mainly concerned, as is moſt plain XV. 2. *Prop.*

in their frequent and groſs Idolatry: Which we are not ſo to underſtand as tho' they wholly caſt off the worſhip of the true God, but they ſuperinduced (as the *Samaritans* did) the worſhip of Heathen Idols with that of the God of *Iſrael*. But when the revolt grew ſo great and dangerous that it was ready to ſwallow up the true worſhip of God, unleſs ſome apparent evidence were given of the falſity of thoſe Heathen mixtures, and further confirmation of the truth of the eſtabliſhed Religion, it pleaſed God ſometimes to ſend his Prophets on this peculiar meſſage to the main inſtruments of this revolt: as is moſt conſpicuous in that dangerous deſign of *Jeroboam*, when he out of a politic end ſet up his two Calves in oppoſition to the Temple at *Jeruſalem*; and therein it was the more dangerous in that in all probability he deſigned not the alteration of the worſhip it ſelf, but the eſtabliſhment of it in *Dan* and *Bethel*. For his intereſt lay not in drawing of the people from the worſhip of God, but from his worſhip at *Jeruſalem*, which was contrary to his deſign of cantonizing the Kingdom, and taking the greateſt ſhare to himſelf. Now that God might confirm his peoples Faith in this dangerous juncture of time, he ſends a Prophet to *Bethel*, who by the working of preſent Miracles there, *viz. the renting the Altar and withering of* Jeroboam's *hand*, did manifeſt to them that theſe Altars were diſpleaſing to God, and that the true place of worſhip was at *Jeruſalem*. So in that famous *Fire-Ordeal* for trying the truth of Religion between God and *Baal* upon Mount *Carmel* by *Elijah*, God was pleas'd in a miraculous way to give the moſt pregnant teſtimony to the truth of his own worſhip, by cauſing a *fire* to come down from Heaven and *conſume the ſacrifice*, by which the Prieſts of *Baal* were confounded, and the people confirmed in the Belief of the only true God: for preſently upon the ſight of this Miracle the people fall on their faces and ſay, *The Lord he is God, the Lord he is God*. Whereby we plainly ſee what clear evidence is given to the truth of that Religion, which is atteſted with a power of Miracles. Thus the Widow of *Sarepta* which was in the Countrey of *Zidon*, was brought to believe *Elijah* to be a true Prophet by his raiſing up her Son to Life. And the Woman ſaid to *Elijah*, *Now by this I know that thou art a Man of God, and that the word of the Lord by thy mouth is truth*. So we ſee how *Naaman* was convinc'd of the true God by his miraculous cure in *Jordan* by the appointment of *Eliſha*, *Behold now I know that there is no God in all the earth, but in* Iſrael; by which inſtances it is demonſtrable that either the Faith of all theſe perſons was built upon weak and inſufficient grounds, or that a power of Miracles is an evident confirmation of the truth of that Religion which is eſtabliſh'd by them. For this we ſee was the geat end for which God did imploy any of his Prophets to work Miracles, *viz.* to be as an evident demonſtration of the truth of what was revealed by him. So that this power of Miracles is not meerly a motive of credibility, or a probable inducement to remove prejudice from the perſon, as many of our Divines ſpeak, but it doth contain an evident demonſtration to Common Senſe of the truth of that Religion which is confirm'd by them.

1 King. 12. 27.

1 King. 13. 2.

1 King. 18. 38.

1 King. 18. 39.

1 King. 17. 24.

2 King. 5. 15.

And

And thus we aſſert it to have been in the caſe of *Moſes*, the truth of whoſe meſſage was atteſted both among the *Ægyptians*, and the *Iſraelites* by that power of Miracles which he had. But herein we have the great Patrons of *Moſes* our greateſt enemies, *viz.* the preſent *Jews*; who by reaſon of their enmity to the Doctrine of CHRIST, which was atteſted by unparalell'd Miracles, are grown very ſhy of the Argument drawn from thence: Inſomuch that their great Dr. *Maimonides* lays down this for a confident Maxim, משה רבנו לא האמינו בו ישראל מפני האותות: *The Iſraelites did not believe in* Moſes *our Maſter for the ſake of the Miracles which he wrought.* Did they not? the more ſhame for them: and if they did, the more ſhame for this great *Rabbi* thus to belye them. But the reaſon he gives for it is, *Becauſe there may remain ſome ſuſpicion in ones mind, that all Miracles may be wrought by a power of Magic* or *Incantation:* Say ye ſo? what, when *Moſes* confounded all the Magicians in *Ægypt*, and made themſelves who were the moſt cunning in theſe things confeſs it was the finger of GOD, and at laſt give out as not able to ſtand before *Moſes?* might one ſtill ſuſpect all this to be done by a Magical power? *Credat Judæus Apella, non ego.* This is much like what another of their Doctors ſays, whom they call the Divine Philoſopher, that *Eliſha* his raiſing the Child to Life, and curing *Naaman*'s Leproſy; and *Daniel*'s eſcaping the Lions, and *Jonas* out of the Whale's Belly, might all come to paſs by the influence of the Stars, or by *Pythoniſm.* Very probable! but it is moſt true which *G. Vortius* there obſerves of the *Jews, Nihil non nugaciſſimi mortalium fingunt ne cogantur agnoſcere virtute ac digito quaſi ipſius Dei Jeſum noſtrum effeciſſe miracula ſua.* All their deſign in this is, only to leſſen the Miracles of our Bleſſed Savior, and to derogate all they can from the Belief of them. Hence they tell us, that nothing is ſo eaſy to be done as Miracles; the mere recital of the *Tetragrammaton* will work wonders, and that by this *Jeremiah* and our Savior did all their Miracles: It is well yet that he did no more than one of their own Prophets had done before him; but where I wonder do we read that ever the pronouncing of four Letters raiſed one from the dead, who had lain four days in the grave? or by what power did *Chriſt* raiſe himſelf from the dead; (which was the greateſt Miracle of all) cou'd his dead Body pronounce the *Tetragrammaton* to awaken its ſelf with? But *Maimonides* further tells us, that the Miracles which *Moſes* wrought among the *Iſraelites* were merely for neceſſity, and not to prove the truth of his Divine Commiſſion, for which he inſtanceth in dividing the Red ſea, the raining of Manna, and the deſtruction of *Corah* and his complices. But ſetting aſide that theſe two latter were the immediate hand of GOD, and not Miracles done by *Moſes*; yet it is evident that the intent of them was to manifeſt a Divine Preſence among them: and in the tryal of *Corah* *Moſes* appeals to GOD's immediate Providence to manifeſt whether GOD had immediately imploy'd him or no. For it is evident by the Text, that the main charge they laid againſt *Moſes*, was ambition and uſurpation; *Is it a ſmall thing, ſay they, that thou haſt brought us up out of a Land that floweth with milk and honey, to kill us in the wilderneſs, except thou make thy ſelf altogether a prince over*

XVI.

Maim. de fund. leg. c. 8. ſ. 1.

Joſ. Albo. l. 1. c. 18.

Numb. 16. 13.

over us? Whereby it is evident they thought that *Moſes* acted out of a private deſign, and aimed at his own honor and authority; which was an imputation of the higheſt nature that cou'd be alledged againſt him. Now ſee how *Moſes* proceeds to clear himſelf, (which is ſufficient to ſtop the mouths of theſe incredulous *Jews*) for he lays the greateſt evidence of his Divine Commiſſion upon a preſent Miracle. And *Moſes* ſaid, *Hereby ſhall ye know that the Lord hath ſent me to do all theſe works; for I have not done them of mine own mind; If theſe men die the common death of all men, then the Lord hath not ſent me*, &c. Can any thing be more plain than that the only intent of this Miracle was to make it appear, that *Moſes* took not his office upon him, but was immediately ſent and imploy'd by God in what he did. But that which will put an end to this controverſy is God's giving *Moſes* a power to work Miracles for that very end that the *Iſraelites* ſhou'd believe him, *Exodus* 8. 8, 9. And can we think they wou'd have ever left *Ægypt* as they did, and followed *Moſes* into the wilderneſs, unleſs they had been fully convinced he was a deliverer ſent from God? It is true (that which the *Jews* ſpeak ſo much of) the *ſtatio in monte Sina* was a great confirmation both to their own Faith and to *Moſes* his, according to what God had told him, *Exod.* 3. 12. but yet it follows not hence they had no firm bottom for their Faith to ſtand on before (for then they might have been drowned in the Red ſea as well as the *Ægyptians*) but God knowing their incredulity and readineſs to diſobey his Law, did at the promulgation of it teſtify to their eyes and ears his own preſence in the midſt of them. And this certainly was one of the greateſt Miracles of all: and therefore to oppoſe this to the evidence that is produced by Miracles is only to oppoſe a power of working Miracles to a power of doing them. So vain and empty then, ſo falſe and fallacious, yea ſo directly contrary to Holy Scripture is that *Axiome* of the *Jews*, *Prophetiæ veritas non confirmatur miraculis*: for Miracles are ſufficient evidences of Divine Revelation in any whom God imploys, to all but ſuch as are reſolved not to believe them; and as one well ſaith, *Pertinaciæ nullum remedium poſuit Deus; God never works Miracles to convince obſtinate Atheiſts and wilful Infidels.* This now is the firſt caſe wherein Miracles are to be expected, which is, when God imploys any upon an extraordinary meſſage, to be as credentials to confirm their Divine Commiſſion.

V. 28, 29.

Exod. 19. 9.

CHAP.

CHAP. VII.

The eternity of the Law of *Moſes* diſcuſſed.

I. *The ſecond caſe wherein Miracles may be expected, when a Divine poſitive Law is to be repealed, and another way of worſhip eſtabliſhed inſtead of it. The poſſibility in general of a repeal of a Divine Law aſſerted; the particular caſe of the Law of* Moſes *diſputed againſt the* Jews: II. *the matter of that Law proved not to be immutably obligatory; becauſe the ceremonial precepts were required not for themſelves, but for ſome further end; that proved from* Maimonides *his confeſſion:* III. *the precepts of the Ceremonial Law frequently diſpenſed with while the Law was in force. Of the Paſſover of* Hezekiah, *and ſeveral other inſtances.* IV. *It is not inconſiſtent with the wiſdom of* God *to repeal ſuch an eſtabliſhed Law.* Abravanel's *arguments anſwered.* V. *Of the perfection of the Law of* Moſes, *compared with the Goſpel.* VI. *Whether* God *hath ever declared he wou'd never repeal the Law of* Moſes. VII. *Of adding to the precepts.* VIII. *Of the expreſſions ſeeming to imply the perpetuity of the Law of* Moſes. *Reaſons aſſigned why thoſe expreſſions are uſed, tho' perpetuity be not implyed.* IX. *The Law of* Moſes *not built upon immutable reaſon, becauſe many particular precepts were founded upon particular occaſions, as the cuſtoms of the* Zabii; X. *many ceremonial precepts thence deduced out of* Maimonides; XI. *and becauſe ſuch a ſtate of things was foretold, with which the obſervation of the Ceremonial Law wou'd be inconſiſtent.* XII. *That largely diſcovered from the prophecies of the Old Teſtament.*

I Now come to the ſecond caſe wherein Miracles may be juſtly expected, which is, *When ſomething which hath been before eſtabliſhed by Divine Law, is to be repealed, and ſome other way of Worſhip to be ſet up inſtead of it.* Two things are very neceſſary to be ſpoken to for the clearing of this Propoſition: Firſt, *Whether a Law once eſtabliſhed by God himſelf be capable of a repeal*; Secondly, *What neceſſity there is of Miracles to manifeſt God's intention of repealing a former Law.* Theſe Two contain the main foundation of the Diſpute between the *Jews* and Us, *viz. Whether the Law of* Moſes *was ever to be laid aſide, and whether the Miracles of our Bleſſed Savior were ſufficient evidences of God's intention by him to repeal the former Law eſtabliſhed by* Moſes? I begin with the *firſt*, Whether a Divine Law in general or the Law of *Moſes* in particular may be abrogated or repealed, after God himſelf hath made it evident that the promulgation of it was from himſelf. This muſt be confeſſed the ſtrongeſt and moſt plauſible plea the preſent *Jews*

have for their Infidelity, and therefore the eternity of the Law of *Moſes* is made by them one of the fundamental Articles of their preſent Creed, and is pleaded for with the greateſt ſubtilty by their great *R. Abravanel*, who ſpends his whole 13th Chapter *de capite fidei* upon it, but with what ſucceſs, will be ſeen in our clearing of it. There are but three things can be ſuppoſed as the grounds why a Law once promulged by God himſelf, ſhou'd not be capable of Repeal; and thoſe are either firſt, *Becauſe the things themſelves commanded in that Law are of ſuch nature, that they are not capable of being diſpenſed with:* Or ſecondly, *that it is not conſiſtent with the wiſdom of God to repeal a Law once eſtabliſhed:* Or thirdly, *that the reaſon of the Law continuing always the ſame, it would argue mutability in God to revoke that Law, and eſtabliſh another inſtead of it:* If we can therefore demonſtrate, *That the matter of the Law of* Moſes *is of a poſitive and mutable nature, that is ſuitable to the wiſdom of God to alter it*, and *that ſufficient account in reaſon may be given for the alteration of it*; Then there can be no imaginable neceſſity that a Law once having God for its Author, muſt therefore derive from him an eternal and immutable obligation.

II. Firſt then as to the matter of the Law; and here it muſt be ſuppos'd, that in the matter of Controverſy between us and the *Jews*, the queſtion is not of any of thoſe things which are therefore commanded, becauſe they are intrinſecally good, as the precepts of the Natural or Moral Law; but of thoſe things which are therefore only good, becauſe God commands them, *i. e.* things merely poſitive, whoſe worth and value ariſeth not from the intrinſic weight of the things, but from the external impreſs of Divine Authority upon them. Now it is no queſtion on either hand whether God may require theſe things or no; nor whether theſe things will be acceptable unto God, ſo long as he requires them; but whether, when once required, the obligation to them can never ceaſe. Such kind of things among the *Jews* we ſuppoſe all the Rites and Ceremonies of the Law to be; *viz.* Circumciſion, Diſtinction of Meats and Days, Cuſtoms of ſacrificing, and ſuch like, and whatever other Laws reſpected them as a diſtinct and peculiar Commonwealth. All theſe we ſay are ſuch as do not carry an immutable obligation along with them; and that on theſe accounts.

1. Firſt, *Becauſe theſe things are not primarily required for themſelves, but in order to ſome further end.* Things that are required upon their own account, carry an indiſpenſable obligation in them to their performance; but where things are commanded not for themſelves, but the Legiſlator doth expreſs ſome particular grounds of requiring them, there the end and intention of the Legiſlator is the meaſure of their obligation. To which purpoſe *Maimonides* excellently ſpeaks, when he ſays, *That the particular manner of worſhip among the* Jews, *as ſacrifices and oblations, were ſecundum intentionem ſecundam Dei, God's ſecundary intention and deſign; but prayer, invocation, and the like, were nearer God's primary intention: Now*, ſaith he, *for the firſt, they are no further acceptable to God, than as all the circumſtances of time, place, and perſons are obſerved, which are preſcribed by God himſelf; but the latter are acceptable in any perſon, time, or place. And for this cauſe*, ſaith he, *it is that*

Maimon. More Nev. p. 3. c. 32.

that we find the Prophets often reproving men for their too great ſedulity in bringing oblations, and inculcating this to them, that God did not intend theſe as the principal inſtances of his worſhip, and that God did not need any of theſe things. So 1 *Sam.* 15. 22. *Behold to obey is better than ſacrifice, and to hearken, than the fat of rams:* Iſa. 1. 11. *To what purpoſe is the multitude of your ſacrifices unto me? ſaith the Lord.* And eſpecially *Jerem.* 7. 22, 23. *For I ſpake not to your fathers, nor commanded them in the day that I brought them forth out of the land of Ægypt, concerning burnt-offerings; but this thing I commanded them, ſaying, Obey my voice, and I will be your God, and ye ſhall be my people.* Of which words *Maimonides* ſaith, *Scrupulum moverunt omnibus, quos mihi videre aut audire contigit;* For ſay they, How can it be that God did not command them concerning Sacrifices, when a great part of the Law is about them: But *Maimonides* well reſolves the doubt thus, *That God's primary Intention, and that which he thiefly looked at, was obedience; but God's Intention in ſacrifices and oblations, was only to teach them the chief thing, which was obedience.* This then is of the number of thoſe things which are ſpoken abſolutely, but to be underſtood comparatively; as, *I will have mercy and not ſacrifice. My doctrine is not mine, but his that ſent me. It is not you that ſpeak, but the Holy Ghoſt,* &c. So that we ſee all the goodneſs which is in theſe things, is convey'd into them by that which is morally good, which is obedience; and God did never regard the performance of thoſe Laws any further than as it was an expreſſion of obedience, and it was conjoyn'd with thoſe other moral duties which were moſt agreeable to the Divine Nature. And in this ſenſe many underſtood that difficult place, *Ezek.* 20. 25. *And I gave them* חקים לא טובים *ſtatutes that were not good,* i. e. ſay they, *comparatively with theſe things which were ſimply and in themſelves good;* to which purpoſe they give this Rule: *Aliquid negatur ineſſe alicui, quod alterius comparatione exiſtimatur exiguum.* But I rather think that which the *Chaldee* Paraphraſt ſuggeſts, and others explain further, to be the meaning of that place, *viz.* that by the Precepts that were not good, is meant the cruel and tyrannical impoſitions of thoſe enemies God for their ſins did deliver them over to, which were far from being acceptable to them, which is frequently the ſenſe of Good in Scripture. Thus we ſee one reaſon why the Ceremonial Precepts do not in themſelves imply an immutable obligation, becauſe they are not commanded for themſelves, but in order to a further end.

III. 2. *Becauſe God hath frequently diſpenſed with the Ceremonial Precepts when they were in greateſt force, if the end of them cou'd be attained without them.* Thus the Precept of Circumciſion ſlept during the *Iſraelites* travels in the Wilderneſs. Thus *David* ate of the *Shew-bread,* which is expreſly forbidden in the Law; the *Jews* think to evade this by diſtinguiſhing between the Bread of Confeſſion in the *Euchariſtical* Offering, mentioned *Leviticus* 7. 13. and the proper *Shew-bread:* Now they ſay *David* eat only of the Firſt, and not of the Second; but this is *Gloſſa Aurelianenſis,* which overthrows the Text; for it is expreſly ſaid, that the ground why the Prieſt gave him Holy Bread, was becauſe there was none there but לחם הפנים, *the ſhew-bread,* 1 *Sam.* 21. 6. A like violation Exod. 29. 33.

of the Law without reproof, is commonly ſuppoſed by the *Jews* to have been in the ſiege of *Jericho*, *viz.* in the caſe of the *Sabbath*. But it is more plain in that *Anamalous Paſſover* obſerved by *Hezekiah*, which many of the *Jews* themſelves acknowledg was not obſerved as the *Second Paſſover*, provided by the Law to be celebrated on the 14th day of the *ſecond month by thoſe who were debarred of the firſt for their legal uncleanneſs*; but they ſuppoſe it to have been intended for the *Legal Paſſover*; only becauſe the fourteenth of *Niſan* was paſſed before the Sanctification of the *Temple was finiſhed*, leſt they ſhou'd celebrate none at all that year, they tell us that *Hezekiah* with the conſent of the Rulers, did make an Intercalation that year of a whole Month, and ſo *Niſan* was reckoned for the ſecond *Adar*, and *Jiar* for *Niſan*, from whence they ſay that *Hezekiah* did intercalate *Niſan* in *Niſan*, that is, added another *Niſan* to the firſt. But where do we read any ſuch thing permitted in the Law as the celebrating the Firſt *Paſſover* the 14th of the ſecond Month? But granting that it was obſerved as a ſecond *Paſſover*, becauſe of the want of Legal Sanctification both in Prieſts and People; yet we find great irregularities in the obſervation of it; for it is expreſly ſaid, *That a multitude of the people had not cleanſed themſelves, yet they did eat the Paſſover otherwiſe than it was written.* And yet it is ſaid upon *Hezekiah's prayer, that the Lord hearkned to* Hezekiah, *and healed every one.* So that we ſee God himſelf did diſpenſe with the ſtrict Ceremonial Precepts of the Law, where Men did look after the main and ſubſtantial parts of the worſhip God required from them. Nay God himſelf hath expreſly declared his own Will to diſpenſe with the Ritual and Ceremonial Law, where it comes to ſtand in competition with ſuch things as have an internal Goodneſs in them, when he ſaith, *He deſired mercy and not ſacrifice, and the knowledg of God more than burnt-offerings.* Thus we plainly ſee that the Ceremonial Law, however poſitive it was, did yield as to its obligation, when any thing that was Moral, ſtood in competition with it. And ſo the *Jews* themſelves ſuppoſe an open violation of the Judicial Law to have been in the hanging up of *Saul's* Sons, a long time together, directly contrary to *Deut.* 21. 23. which they conceive to have been from the 16 of *Niſan* to the 17 of *Marcheſvan*, which is as much as from our *March* to *September*, whereas the Law ſaith expreſly that the *body of one that is hanged ſhall not remain all night upon the tree, but thou ſhalt in any wiſe bury him that day.* One of the *Jewiſh Rabbies*, as *G. Vorſtius* tells us, is ſo troubled at this, *That he wiſheth that place in* Samuel *expunged out of Scripture, that the Name of God might be ſanctified.* But whether this were done עַל פִּי הַבּוֹרֵא, *by the command of the Oracle or no*, or whether only by a general Permiſſion, we ſee it was *acceptable unto God*; for upon that the *Gibeonites famine* was *removed, and God was intreated for the land.* Thus we have now proved that there is no immutable and indiſpenſable obligation which ariſeth from the things themſelves.

Numb. 9. 11.

2 Chron. 29. 17.

Vid. Selden de Anno civili Jud. cap. 9.

2 Chron. 30. 18.

Ver. 20.

Hoſ. 6. 6.

2 Sam. 21. 9, 10.

Vorſt. Not. in Abrav. c. 13.

IV. Secondly, It is no way inconſiſtent with the Wiſdom of God to repeal ſuch a Law when once eſtabliſhed. The main argument of that learned *R. Abravanel*, whereby he wou'd eſtabliſh the eternity of the Law of *Moſes*, is fetched from hence, *That this Law*

Abravanel Roſh. Amanana, c. 13.

was

was the result of the Wisdom of God, who knows the suitableness of things he appoints to the ends he appoints them for; as God hath appointed bread to be the food of Man's body: Now we are not to enquire why God hath appointed bread and no other thing to be the food of Man; no more, saith he, *are we to enquire why God hath appointed this Law rather than another for the food of our Souls; but we are to rest contended with the counsels of God, tho' we understand not the reason of them.* This is the substance of that Argument, which he more largely deduceth. To which we answer, that his Argument holds good for Obedience to all God's positive Precepts of what kind or nature soever they be, so long as we know their Obligation to continue; but all the question is, whether every positive Precept must always continue to oblige. And thus far his similitude will hold good, that whatever God doth command, we are to look upon it to be as necessary to our Souls, as bread to our Bodies; but hence it follows not that our Souls must be always held to the same positive Precepts, any more than our Bodies to the same kind of food. Nay, as in our Bodies we find some kind of food always necessary, but the kind of it to alter according to age, health, and constitutions; so we say some kind of Divine Revelation is always necessary; but God is graciously pleased to temper it according to the age and growth of his People; so he fed them as with Milk in their Non-age, with a Ritual and Ceremonial Law, and trained them up by degrees under the Nursery of the Prophets, till the Church was grown to age, and then God fed it with the strong Meat, which is contained in God's Revelation of his Will by the Gospel of his Son. And therein was abundantly seen God's πολυποίκιλος σοφία, his *variegated Wisdom*, that he made choice of such excellent and proportionable ways to his People's capacity to prepare them gradually for that full and compleat Revelation, which was reserved for the time of the appearance of the true *Messias* in the World. For can any thing be more plain than the gradual progress of Divine Revelation from the beginning of the World? That fair resemblance and portraicture of God himself, and his Will upon his Word (if I may so express it) had its Ground-work laid upon Man's first Apostasy, in the Promise made *Gen.* 3. 15. whereon some further lines were drawn in the times of the Patriarchs, but it had its ὑπογραφία, it was shadowed out the most in the Typical and Ceremonial Law, but was never filled up to the life, nor had its perfect ζωγραφία, 'till the Son of God himself appeared unto the World. If then it be inconsistent with the Wisdom of God to add any thing to the Law of *Moses*, why not to the Revelation made to *Adam* or the Patriarchs? or especially to the seven Precepts of *Noah*, which they suppose to have been given to all Mankind after the Flood? If it were not repugnant to the Wisdom of God to superadd Rituals and Ceremonials to Morals and Naturals, why shall it be to take down the scaffolds of Ceremonies, when God's Spiritual Temple the Church of God is come to its full height? Is there not more reason that Rituals shou'd give place to Substantials, than that such shou'd be super-induced to Morals?

There are only two things can be pleaded by the *Jews* why it shou'd be more repugnant to the Wisdom of God to add to the Law of *Moses*, than to any former Revelation, which are the v.

greater perfection they ſuppoſe to be in this Revelation above others, and that God in the promulgation of it did expreſs that he wou'd never alter it. But both theſe are manifeſtly defective and inſufficient, in order to the end for which they are produced. For *firſt*, what evidence is there that the Law of *Moſes* contained ſo great perfection in it, as that it was not capable of having any additions made to it by God himſelf? We ſpeak not now of the perfection of the Moral Law, which it is granted contained in it the foundation of all poſitive Precepts; for this
Pſal. 19. 10. we never contend for the abrogation of, but the Ritual Law is that we meddle with; and is it poſſible any Men ſhou'd be ſo little befriended by Reaſon as to think this to be the utmoſt pitch of what God cou'd reveal to the World, as to the way of his own Worſhip? Let any indifferent rational Perſon take the Precepts of the Goſpel, and lay them in the balance with thoſe of the Ceremonial Law, and if he makes any ſcruple of deciding on which ſide the over-weight lies, we may have cauſe to ſuſpect him forſaken of that little Reaſon which gave him the name of Man. Let but the fifth of *Matthew* be laid againſt the whole book of *Leviticus*, and then ſee whether contains the more excellent Precepts and more ſuitable to the Divine Nature? I ſpeak not this to diſparage any thing which had once God for the Author of it, but to let us ſee how far God was from the neceſſity of Natural Agents to act to the height of his ſtrength in that diſcovery of his Will. God is wiſe as well as righteous in all his ways; as he can command nothing but what is juſt; ſo he will command nothing but what is good, nay excellent in its kind. But tho' all the Stars be in the ſame Firmament, *yet one Star differs from another in glory*; tho' they may be all Pearls, yet ſome may be more *Orient* than others are; every place of Holy Scripture may have its Crown, but ſome may have their *Aureolæ*, a greater excellency, a fuller and larger capacity than the other hath; every parcel of Divine Revelation may have ſome perfection in its kind, yet there may be ſome *monſtra perfectionis*, in *Scaliger*'s expreſſion that may far out-vye the Glory and Excellency of the reſt. Can we think the miſts and umbrages of the Law cou'd ever caſt ſo glorious a Light as the Sun of Righteouſneſs himſelf in his Meridian Elevation? As well may we think a dark ſhady paſſage more magnificent and glorious than the moſt princely Palace, a Picture drawn in charcoal more exquiſite and curious than the lines of *Apelles*, ſome imperfect rudiments more exact and accurate than the moſt elaborate work, as go about to compare the Law of *Moſes* with the Goſpel of Jesus Christ in point of excellency and perfection. Let the *Jews* then boaſt never ſo much of their *gradus Moſaicus*, and how much it exceeds the degree of Revelation in other Prophets, we know if his light be compar'd with what the Goſpel communicates, *Moſes* himſelf ſaw but as in a glaſs darkly, and not in *ſpeculo lucido*, as the *Jews* are wont to ſpeak. We honor *Moſes* much, but we have learnt to honor him at whoſe Tranſfiguration he was preſent more; neither can that be thought any diſparagement to him, who accounted *the reproach of Chriſt greater riches than the treaſures of Ægypt*.

But

But it may be, tho' the Law in its ſelf be not ſo abſolutely perfect, yet God may have declared he will never alter it, and then it is not conſiſtent with Divine Wiſdom to repeal it. Very true: God will never alter what he hath ſaid he will not; but where is it that he hath thus bound up himſelf? Is it in that noted place to this purpoſe, *Thou ſhalt not add thereto nor diminiſh from it?* So indeed *Maimonides* argues; but therein more like a *Jew* than himſelf; and yet one of his own Nation therein far more ingenuous than he, gives a moſt ſufficient anſwer to it, which is *R. Joſ. Albo*, whoſe words are thus produced by *Vorſtius* and others; *The Scripture only admoniſheth us, that we ſhould not add to nor diminiſh from God's commands according to our own wills; but what hinders*, ſaith he, *but God himſelf may according to his own Wiſdom add or diminiſh what he pleaſeth?* But are they in good earneſt when they ſay God bound up himſelf by this Speech? whence came then all the Prophetical Revelations among the *Jews?* did theſe add nothing to the Law of *Moſes*, which was as much the Will of God when revealed by them, as any thing was revealed by *Moſes* himſelf? or will they ſay that all thoſe things were contained for the ſubſtance in the Law of *Moſes*, as to what concerned practice? Very true; but not in the Ceremonial, but the Moral Law; and ſo we ſhall not ſtick to grant that the whole duty of Man may be reduced to that. But if adding to the Precepts be the doing of God's Commands in another way than he hath preſcribed, and diminiſhing from them be merely not to do what God hath commanded, as ſome conceive, then theſe words are ſtill more remote from the ſenſe affixed on them by the incredulous *Jews*. For why may not God himſelf add to his own Laws, or alter the form of them, altho' we are always bound directly to follow God's declared will? May not God enlarge his own Will, and bring his Scholars from the Rudiments of their non-age to the higher knowledg of thoſe who are full grown? or muſt the World of neceſſity do that which the old *Roman* ſo much abhorred, *ſeneſcere in elementis*, *wax gray in learning this A, B, C?* or was the Ceremonial Law like the *China* Characters, that the World might ſpend its Age in conning of them? But it appears that there was no other meaning in that ſtrict prohibition, than that Men ſhou'd not of their own heads offer to find out new ways of worſhip as *Jeroboam* did, but that God's Revelation of his own Will in all its different degrees was to be the adequate Rule of the way and parts of his own worſhip. And I wou'd fain know of the *Jews* whether their own ſevere and ſtrict Prohibitions of things not at all forbidden in the Law of God, and that on a religious account, as סייג לתורה *a boundary to the Law*, come not nearer the adding to God's Law, than God's own further declaration of his Will doth? All the diſpute then muſt be, not whether God may add to his own Law, but whether the Goſpel be a prohibited addition to the Law of *Moſes*; that is, whether it be only the invention of Men, or it be the expreſs declaration of the Will of God? As to which controverſy, he is no true Chriſtian who dare not readily joyn iſſue with them, and undertake to prove by all the Arguments by which they believe the Law of *Moſes* to have been of Divine Revelation, that the Goſpel of *Chriſt* is a clear Manifeſtation of the Will of God. But of that afterwards.

VI. Deut. 12. 32. *Maimon. de fund. leg. c. 9. ſ. 1. Ikkarim l. 3. c. 14.*

From

VII. From hence it is evident that God hath not by this place tied up himſelf from any further Manifeſtation of his Mind beyond the Law of *Moſes*; but it may be they may put a greater confidence in thoſe expreſſions which ſeem neceſſarily to imply a perpetual and unalterable obligation in the Law of *Moſes*: For, ſaith the late learned *Rabbi Manaſſe Ben Iſrael*, *If by ſuch expreſſions as thoſe are uſed in Scripture which ſeem to import the perpetuity of the Law of* Moſes, *ſomewhat elſe ſhould be meant than they ſeem to expreſs; what did* Moſes *and the Prophets in uſing them but lay a ſtumbling-block in the ways of Men, whereas they might have ſpoken clearly, and told us there ſhould a time come when the Ceremonial Law ſhould oblige no longer?* This being a charge of ſo high a nature, muſt not be diſmiſt without a particular enquiry into the expreſſions which are the ground and reaſon of it. The places moſt inſiſted on by the *Jews*, are *Deut.* 29. 29. *Things which are revealed belong to us and to our Children* עד עולם *for ever.* So *Levit.* 23. 14. the precept of offering the firſt fruits is there called חקת עולם *a ſtatute for ever*; and that of the *Paſſover*, *Exod.* 12. 17. where the ſame expreſſion is uſed. From hence they infer that no alteration can happen as to the Ceremonial Law, ſince God himſelf hath declared that it ſhall continue for ever. To this common argument of the *Jews*, it is in general reply'd, That the word in which the main force of the argument lies, doth not cary with it an abſolute perpetuity, but it ſignifies according to the ſubject it is joyned with. So when it is apply'd to God, it ſignifies Eternity, not ſo much from the mere importance of the word, as from the neceſſary exiſtence of the Divine Nature. Thence *Maimonides* himſelf can ſay, *Proinde ſciendum eſt quod Olam non neceſſario ſignificet æternitatem, niſi ei conjungatur Ed* (עד *vel* ער) *idque vel poſt illud ut Olam vaed, vel ante Ad Olam.* Altho' this Rule of his hath no certainty at all in it, as appears from his Collection of it, which is becauſe it is ſaid, *Pſal.* 10. 16. *The Lord he is King Olam vaed, for ever and ever:* but as I ſaid already, that is not from the ſignification of the word, but the nature of the thing. And it is moſt plain in Scripture that עולם is ſo far from implying a neceſſary perpetuity, that it is apply'd to ſuch things as can have no long duration, as *Exod.* 21. 6. *and he ſhall ſerve him,* לעולם, that is, (as the *Jews* themſelves expound it) *to the nex Jubilee, tho' it were near or far off.* So 1 *Sam.* 1. 22. where *Samuel* is ſaid *to abide before the Lord* וראעולם *for ever*, where we find *Maimonides* his *Ad Olam* in a ſenſe very far ſhort of Eternity; this is ſo plain that the formerly cited *R. Joſeph Albo* doth in terms confeſs it, and produceth a multitude of other places to the ſame purpoſe. For which tho' he be ſufficiently cenſured by his Brethren, yet we may ſee there may be ſome ingenuity left in a *Jewiſh Rabbi*, even in the grand diſpute concerning the Eternity of the Law of *Moſes*.

Manaſſ. Concil. in Levit. 9. 7.

Maimon. More Nev. p. 2. *c.* 28.

VIII. All the difficulty now is to aſſign ſome rational accounts why ſuch Precepts which God did not intend ſhou'd be always obligatory, yet ſhou'd be enforced upon them in ſuch expreſſions which may ſeem at leaſt to imply a Perpetuity. Of which theſe may be given. Firſt, *That theſe Precepts to which theſe expreſſions are annexed, ſhou'd not be looked on as mere ambulatory Laws that did only concern them in their travels thro' the Wilderneſs, and not con-*

tinue obligatory when they were ſetled in Canaan. For which purpoſe we are to obſerve, That tho' all the Laws were given in one body in the Wilderneſs, yet the obligation to all of them did not commence at the ſame time, neither were they to continue for the ſame duration; theſe three ſorts of Precepts may be obſerved among them; firſt, ſuch as concerned them only in their preſent condition, as that about the Tabernacle, which was then a moveable Temple among them, ſuitable to their condition; but when they were ſetled, God was to have a ſetled Houſe too. So that Precept of going without *the camp*, Deut. 32. 12. had an immediate reſpect to their Peregrination. *Secondly*, Such Precepts as were given them, but they were not bound to perform them 'till their ſetlement in *Canaan*, *as driving out the Canaanites*, Numb. 33. 52. *building the Temple in the place which God ſhou'd chooſe, erecting Judicatories in their ſeveral Cities, chooſing a King*, &c. *Thirdly*, There were ſuch Precepts as concern them where-ever they were, whether in the Wilderneſs or in *Canaan*; now theſe are the Precepts which are ſaid to be perpetual. This is the account given of it by *H. Grotius*; but becauſe this may be liable to ſome Exceptions, I therefore add, *Secondly*, That the reaſon of thoſe expreſſions being annexed to the Precepts of the Ceremonial Law, is, *Becauſe they were to continue obligatory 'till ſuch a remarkable period of time came which ſhould alter the ſtate of things among them.* And ſuch a period of time the coming of the *Meſſias* is by themſelves ſuppoſed to be, when in their famous computation they make three *Epocha's*, Before the Law, Under the Law, and the Coming of the *Meſſias*. And it is evident yet by them, that they do ſtill expect a wonderful alteration of the ſtate of things when the *Meſſias* comes; doth it not therefore ſtand to reaſon that לעולם ſhou'd be added to ſuch things which were to continue 'till ſo great alteration as ſhou'd be on the coming of the *Meſſias*, eſpecially if the Coming of the *Meſſias* had been deferred ſo long as they falſly ſuppoſe it to be? But however, granting that a new ſeries of times or עולם is to commence from the *Meſſias*, there is very great reaſon why that expreſſion ſhou'd be added to thoſe things which were to continue as long as the עולם did, *i. e.* 'till *Meſſias* came, which we freely ackowledg. And in this ſenſe is לעולם often taken for ſuch a duration of things which had ſome remarkable period to conclude it, as in the caſe of the *Jubilee*, in the Servant mentioned, and the ſpecial employment which God called *Samuel* to, in this caſe, as to the event, or the end of his life in *Hannah*'s deſignation, when ſhe ſaid he ſhou'd attend upon the Lord for ever. *Thirdly*, Theſe Precepts are ſaid *to endure for ever, which would ſtill have continued obligatory, unleſs* God *himſelf had altered the obligation of them by a new Revelation of his Will.* For in this caſe it is moſt certain that all poſitive Precepts coming immediately from God, do carry with them an unalterable obligation, unleſs the Legiſlator himſelf do in as evident a way repeal them as he did once eſtabliſh them; that is in ſuch Laws which depend merely upon God's Poſitive and Arbitrary Will. For in this caſe God allows none to alter any thing concerning his Law; but indiſpenſable obedience is our duty 'till God himſelf repeal his former Laws. And this we aſſert to be the caſe of the Goſpel. So that it appears plainly that it im-

Grot. de Verit. Rel. Chriſt. l. 5. ſ. 7.

plies nothing inconsistent with the Wisdom of God to repeal an established Positive Law, tho' some expressions to prejudiced minds seem to imply a perpetuity in it.

IX. We come therefore to the third thing which may make a Positive Law unalterable, which is, when the reason of it is immutable; for then, say they, it wou'd argue mutability in God to repeal it. If we can therefore make it evident that the Ceremonial Law was not established on an immutable Reason, and that the Reason on which it was established doth suppose a state of things to come, in which it shou'd expire, then there cannot be the least pretence of mutability in God on the repeal of such a Law. First, *That it was not established upon an immutable Reason*: The immutable Reason of a Law must either be fetched from the nature of the things commanded, or the grounds of the establishing of it; we have already proved that the nature of the Positive Precepts of the Ceremonial Law do not carry in them an intrinsecal goodness. And here the Sophistry of the *Jews* is apparently discovered, that when they are pressed with this, they take sanctuary in the *Decalogue*, or some Spiritual Precepts, which comprehend in them the general foundation of the Law; as *Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart*, &c. whereas these are very remote from the matter in controversy, which concerns not what Precepts were moral in their Law, but what were purely ceremonial; which were so far from being founded on an immutable Reason, that the particular occasions of the giving of many of them, is particularly assigned them by their own Writers; especially in the main parts of the Ceremonial Worship of God among them, the reasons of which *Maimonides* saith may be deduced from the Customs of the *Zabaists*, the knowledg of whose Opinions and Customs, he tells us, is *porta magna ad reddendas præceptorum causas, gives much light to the Law of* Moses; and particularly of himself, he saith, *Quòd multarum legum rationes & causæ mihi innotuerint ex cognitione fidei, rituum & cultus Zabiorem*; that he came to the right understanding of many of the Laws of *Moses* by his knowledg in the Rites and Customs of these *Zabaists*. Granting therefore the *Hypothesis* of this learned *Rabbi*, that the Precepts of the Law had most of them a particular respect to the idolatrous Customs of these People; what will hence follow but only this, that the reason of the Ceremonial Precepts did respect the Customs in use when they were given, and so are not founded upon an immutable Reason? And the more the Precepts are whose Reason is to be fetched from hence, the more plain and evident is the thing we intended by it, *viz. That the Ceremonial Law is not founded upon an unalterable Reason.*

Maimon. More Nev. l. 3. c. 29.

X. Now from this one head of the idolatrous Customs of those Nations about them hath that learned Author deduced the Reasons of very many of the most obscure Commands of the Ceremonial Law: As that concerning *rounding the corner of their heads*, which *Herodotus* tells us was the Custom of the *Arabians*, and others of the *Babylonian* Priests; by both which the *Zabii* may be meant, the superstition of the *Zabii* being *Chaldæan*, as I have shewed already, and their Name, as some conceive, from *Saba* the Son of *Chus*, whose posterity were seated in *Arabia*, near to the

Levit. 19. 27. V Voss. in Maimon. de Idololat. c. 12.

the Red Sea; and that which confirms this opinion, is, that the *Sabeans* did, as *Philoſtorgius* ſaith, *Worſhip the Sun and Moon*, as the *Zabaiſts* did in *Maimonides*; and withal *Bochartus* makes it evident from *Strabo*, that ſome of the *Babylonians* called *Gerrhæi*, poſſeſſed themſelves of the Country of the *Sabeans*, whereby this originally *Chaldaic* ſuperſtition might ſpread its ſelf in theſe parts near the confines of *Judæa*, which might be the cauſe why all thoſe Rites, which were uſed by theſe idolatrous People, are ſo ſeverely forbidden to the *Jews*: God thereby ſetting up a Wall of Separation between his People and the Nations round about them, by making the Cuſtom of the *Jews* almoſt *Antipodes* to theirs; as thoſe of *Japan* are to them of *China*. Upon the ſame ground it is ſuppoſed that other Precept was made againſt *wearing a garment of linnen and woollen*, becauſe the idolatrous Prieſts *uſed to go ſo cloathed*, as *Maimonides* tells us out of their Books, and likewiſe that prohibition of a *woman's wearing the armour of a man, and a man's wearing the garments of a woman*, is very probably ſuppoſed to have had its original from that idolatrous Cuſtom mentioned by the ſame Author, *Ut vir geſtet Veſtimentum muliebre coloratum quando ſtat coram ſtella Veneris; ſimiliter ut mulier induat loricam & arma bellica quando ſtat coram ſtella Martis*; but that Author doth not deny a further Reaſon to be couched in it for the preſervation of public honeſty. Many other Precepts are drawn from the ſame fountain by that ſame Author, as *the ſowing of divers ſeeds in the ſame ground; the forbidding the eating of the fruit of their trees for the firſt three years after they came to* Canaan; that being the furtheſt time wherein the trees of their own plantation wou'd begin to bear in that Country. Now it was the Cuſtom of all thoſe idolatrous People, that the firſt time any tree did bear, part of the fruit was to be burnt up in an offering to the Idol, and the other part eaten in the Idol-Temple; or elſe they ſuppoſed their trees wou'd never proſper: Now in oppoſition to this, God bids them bring the fruit of the Fourth year to him, and eat of the Fifth themſelves, *that it may yield unto you the increaſe thereof*. So the Idolaters threatned all Parents that their Children wou'd never live, unleſs they *cauſed them to paſs thro' the fire*; from which Cuſtom *Maimonides* ſaith, *Some even in his time would take the children that were new born, and move them up and down over a fire wherein odoriferous ſmells were caſt*. Thence comes that ſtrict Prohibition of *giving the children to* Moloch, which was by that Cuſtom of paſſing thro' the fire. To this ſame Head, the ſame Author refers that of *not eating the member of a living creature*, which we render *fleſh with the life thereof*; which was forbidden, as he elſewhere tells us, not only for avoiding cruelty, but becauſe the *Heathen Nations were wont in their idolatrous Feaſts to take a member off from a living creature, and eat it afterwards*; and in them likewiſe he ſuppoſeth they uſed the *boiling the fleſh and the milk together, which*, ſaith he, *beſides that it affords a moſt groſs nouriſhment, ſavors of their idolatrous practices too; and therefore*, ſaith he, *it is obſervable that twice where this Precept is mentioned, it follows that of the ſolemn appearance of the males at* Jeruſalem *thrice a year, whereby it ſeems to be imply'd that this action had relation to ſome great ſolemnity*. Theſe and ſeveral other

Bochart. Phaleg. l. 4. c. 8.

Levit. 19. 19. Maimon. More Nev. l. 3. c. 37. Deut. 22. 5.

V. Selden. de Diis Syris, Synt. 2. cap. 4.

Lev. 19. 19. Lev. 19. 23.

Levit. 19. 24, 25.

Levit. 20. 2, 3. Gen. 9. 4.

Maimon. More Nev. p. 3. c. 48.

Exod. 23. 17, 19. 34. 26.

Precepts of the Law of *Moſes* are deduced by that very learned *Rabbi* from idolatrous Cuſtoms, as the occaſions of them; which ſeem to have the more reaſon in them, becauſe that God did in the general ſo ſtrictly *forbid the Jews to walk after the cuſtom of the Nations about them.* Thence *Origen* takes notice of the

Levit. 20. 23. Origen. contra Celſum, l. 4.

πὸ ξυνίζειν τῶν ἐθνῶν. καὶ τὸν ἰδιάζοντα καὶ αὐτὸς πολιτείαν; for which he ſaith, they ἀλοβεδλημένοι, *reproached by the Heathens, becauſe their Laws and Polity were ſo different from the Cuſtom of other Nations.* Thus we ſee then that many Precepts of the Ceremonial Law, were founded neither on the goodneſs of the things themſelves, nor on any unalterable reaſon, but were enforced on a peculiar reaſon on the People of the *Jews* at that time, as they were a People ſeparated from the reſt of the world for the worſhip of the true God. And for the other great offices wherein their Religion did ſo much conſiſt, *viz.* Sacrifices, Diſtinction of Meats, Obſervation of Feſtivals, Circumciſion, and ſuch like: The particular account and reaſon of them is either ſo evident in the Law its ſelf, or ſo fully acknowledg'd by their own Writers, that it is here ſuperfluous to inſiſt on them; eſpecially ſince ſo many have done that ſo largely already (particularly *Grotius*) whoſe labors I intend not to tranſcribe.

Grot. de veritate Rel. Chriſt. l. 5.

XI. I come therefore to the ſecond thing, which is, *That the Ceremonial Law was ſo far from being founded on an immutable reaſon, that while it was in its greateſt force ſuch a ſtate of things was plainly foretold, with which the obſervation of that Law would be inconſiſtent.* For which we are to conſider, that tho' the Law of *Moſes* ſeemed outwardly to reſpect the temporal advantages of the People embracing it in the Land of *Canaan*; yet there was a Spring of Spiritual Promiſes whoſe head was higher than *Jordan* was, that ran down from the Patriarchs, and was more fully opened to ſome of them, which tho' it ſeemed to run under ground in the midſt of the Ceremonial Obſervations of the Law; yet it frequently brake forth and opened its ſelf in the midſt of them, and by degrees in the Prophetical Age did make its ſelf a larger Channel, 'till in the time of the *Meſſias* by its force and violence it overthrew thoſe banks which ſtood in the way of it, and overſpread the face of the whole Earth. It is evident by the whole ſeries of the Scripture of the Old Teſtament, that God's ultimate intention was not to confine the ſaving Knowledg of his Will only to the *Jews*; for the great Promiſe to *Abraham* was, *That in his ſeed all the nations of the earth ſhould be bleſſed*; And as *Abraham rejoyced to ſee that day afar off*; ſo good *Jacob*, when he leaned on his *Jacob*'s Staff, took the height of that *Day-Star from on high*, which tho' like ſome of the fix'd Stars, might not for ſome time be viſible to the inferior World; yet foretold the time when he ſhou'd deſcend into a lower Orb, and become conſpicuous in our Horiſon. And conſequently to his appearance in the World, wou'd be the drawing not ſo much the Eyes as the Hearts of the World to him; for no ſooner is it mentioned that *Shiloh comes when the Scepter departs from Judah*; but it immediately follows, *And to him ſhall the gathering of the people be.* Thus we ſee before ever the Law of *Moſes* came to incloſe the People of the *Jews* as *Gods peculiar people*, there was a deſign on foot, for inlarging the bound of God's Inheritance, and *making the uttermoſt parts of*

Gen. 49. 10.

the

the earth his Son's poſſeſſion. Can we then think that the Law which came afterwards, cou'd diſannul the Covenant made 430 years before, as the Apoſtle excellently reaſons? Can we believe the Moſaical diſpenſation was the utmoſt of what God did intend, when God had before promiſed that the Bleſſing of *Abraham* ſhou'd come upon us *Gentiles* alſo? To which purpoſe it is very obſervable, that *Abraham was juſtify'd not in circumciſion, but in uncircumciſion; for he received the ſign of circumciſion, a ſeal of the righteouſneſs of faith, being uncircumciſed, that he might be the father of all them that believe, though they be not circumciſed; that righteouſneſs might be imputed unto them alſo.* Whereby it is evident that the great Bleſſings promiſed to *Abraham*, did not reſpect him merely as Progenitor of the *Iſraelites*, but in a higher capacity, as *Father of the faithful*; and that the ground of his acceptance with God did not depend on any Ceremonial Rite, ſuch as Circumciſion was, God imputing his Faith for Righteouſneſs before his being circumciſed. But becauſe the time was not yet come wherein the grand Myſtery of Man's Salvation by the death of the Son of God was to be revealed; therefore when God called the Nation of the *Jews* from their bondage, he made choice of a more obſcure way of repreſenting this Myſtery to them thro' all the umbrages of the Law: And withal inforced his Precepts with ſuch terrible ſanctions of curſes to *all that continued not in all that was written in that Law to do it*, to make them the more apprehenſive that the ground of their acceptance with God, cou'd not be the performance of the Precepts of that Law, but they ought to breathe after that higher diſpenſation wherein the way and method of Man's Salvation ſhou'd be fully *revealed when the fulneſs of time was come.* Now therefore God left them under the Tutorage and *Pædagogy* of the Law, which ſpake ſo ſeverely to them, that they might not think this was all God intended in order to the happineſs of Men, but that he did reſerve ſome greater thing in ſtore to be enjoy'd by his People when they were come to Age.

Gal. 4. 17.

Rom. 4. 10, 11.

XII.

So that tho' the Ceremonies of the Law had not a Mouth to ſpeak out *Chriſt*; yet they had a Hand to point to him; for they were the ſhadow or dark repreſentation of that which was to be drawn afterwards to the greateſt life. And this was underſtood by all thoſe whoſe hearts were carried beyond the outward ſapleſs Letter of the Law, to the more inward and ſpiritual meaning of it, (there being an εἰσωτερικὴ and ἐξωτερικὴ in the Law as well as Philoſophy,) theſe Myſteries were too not ſo veiled and hidden, but all that were τέλειοι, *fully initiated*, might fully underſtand them; which made that true Spiritual *Cabala*, which was conſtantly preſerved among the *Iſraelites*, which was more largely commented on by the Prophets of ſucceeding Ages; whoſe care it was to unlock this *Cabala*, and to raiſe up the hearts of the People in a higher expectation of the great things which were to come. Thence we not only read of the ſolemn Prayer of the Church of the *Jews*, that the knowledg of God might be *diſperſed over all the Nations of the earth*, but we have many Prophecies *that when the mountain of the Lord's houſe ſhou'd be exalted, all nations ſhould flow unto it: that from the riſing of the Sun to the going down thereof, God's name ſhall be great among the Gentiles, and in every place in-*

Pſal. 67. 2.

Iſaiah 2. 2.

Mal. 1. 11.

cenſe ſhould be offered to his name, and a pure offering, for his name ſhall be great among the Heathen. That the Inſcription on the High-Prieſt's Forehead, *Holineſs to the Lord*, ſhou'd by reaſon of the large diffuſion of a Spirit of Holineſs in the days of the Goſpel,

Zach. 14. 20. *be ſet upon the bells of Horſes, that the pots in the Lord's houſe ſhould be as the bowls before the Altar, i. e.* that when the Levitical Service ſhou'd be laid aſide, and that Holineſs, which was that appropriated to the Prieſts and Inſtruments of the Temple, ſhou'd be diſcerned in thoſe things which ſeemed moſt remote from it. That

Pſal. 110. 4, 5, 6. a *Prieſthood after another order than that of* Aaron *ſhould be eſtabliſhed*, viz. *after the order of* Melchiſedec; and that he that was the *Prieſt after this order, ſhould judg among the Heathen, and wound*

Ver. 3. *the heads over many Countries; that in the day of his power the People* ſhou'd (not be frighted to obedience with thunder-claps and earth-quakes, as at Mount *Sinai*) but ſhou'd come and *yield themſelves* as a *free-will offering* unto him, and yet their number be as great as the *drops of the dew which diſtil in the morning*. That

Iſa. 66. 21. *God out of other Nations would take unto himſelf for Prieſts and*

Hag. 2. 7. *for Levites; that the deſire of all Nations ſhould ſpeedily come; that*

Mal. 3. 1. *the Meſſenger of the Covenant ſhould come into his Temple*; nay, that

Dan. 9. 24. *ſeventy weeks are determined upon thy people, and upon thy holy City;*

26, 27. *that then the Viſion and Prophecy ſhould be ſealed up; that the Sacrifice and Oblation ſhould be cauſed to ceaſe; that the City and the Sanctuary ſhould be deſtroyed, and the end thereof ſhall be with a flood, and unto the end of the War deſolations are determined; that after threeſcore and two weeks* Meſſias *ſhould be cut off, but not for himſelf; that by him tranſgreſſion ſhould be finiſhed, and reconciliation for iniquity ſhould be made, and everlaſting righteouſneſs ſhould be brought in.* And leſt all theſe things ſhou'd be apprehended to be only a higher advancing of the Levitical Worſhip, and the way of external Ceremonies, God expreſly ſaith, *That he would make*

Jer. 31. 31. 32. *a new Covenant with the houſe of* Iſrael, *and with the houſe of* Judah; *not according to the Covenant that I made with their Fathers, in the day I took them by the hand to bring them out of the Land of Ægypt, which my Covenant they brake, although I was an huſband to them, ſaith the Lord: But this ſhall be the Covenant that I will make with the houſe of* Iſrael *after thoſe days, ſaith the Lord; I will put my Law in their inward parts, and write it in their hearts, and will be their God, and they ſhall be my people.* Can any one that now conſiders ſeriouſly the ſtate of things thus deſcribed as it ſhou'd come to paſs, ever imagin that the Levitical Service was ever calculated for this State? Was God's Worſhip to be confin'd to his Temple at *Jeruſalem*, when all the Nations of the earth ſhou'd come to ſerve him? Was the High-Prieſt to make an Atonement there, when an order of Prieſthood different from the *Aaronical* ſhou'd be ſet up? Muſt the Tribe of *Levi* only attend at the Temple, when God ſhou'd take the Prieſts and *Levites* out of all Nations that ſerve him? What wou'd become of the magnificence and glory of the Temple, when both City and Sanctuary ſhall be deſtroy'd, and that muſt be within few prophetical Weeks after the *Meſſias* is cut off? And muſt the Covenant God made with the *Iſraelites* continue for ever, when God expreſly ſaith, he wou'd make a New one, and that not according to the Covenant which

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he made with them then? It is so evident then, as nothing can well be more, that under the Old Testament, such a state of Religion was describ'd and promis'd, with which the Levitical Worship wou'd be inconsistent; and so that the Ceremonial Law was not at first established upon an immutable Reason, which was the thing to be proved.

CHAP. VIII.

General *Hypotheses* concerning the truth of the Doctrine of CHRIST.

I. *The great prejudice against our Savior among* Jews *and Heathens, was the meanness of his appearance. The difference of the Miracles at the delivery of the Law and Gospel.* II. *Some general* Hypotheses *to clear the subserviency of Miracles to the Doctrine of* CHRIST. 1. *That where the truth of a Doctrine depends not on Evidence, but Authority, the only way to prove the truth of the Doctrine, is to prove the Testimony of the Revealer to be infallible. Things may be true which depend not on Evidence of the things. What that is, and on what it depends. The uncertainty of Natural Knowledg.* III. *The Existence of* GOD, *the foundation of all certainty. The certainty of matter of Faith proved from the same Principle. Our knowledg of any thing supposeth something incomprehensible.* IV. *The certainty of Faith as great as that of Knowledg; the grounds of it stronger. The Consistency of Rational Evidence with Faith. Yet objects of Faith exceed Reason; the absurdities following the contrary opinion.* VI. *The uncertainty of that which is called Reason.* VII. *Philosophical Dictates no standard of Reason. Of Transubstantiation and Ubiquity,* &c. *why rejected as contrary to Reason. The foundation of Faith in matters above Reason.* VIII. *Which is infallible Testimony; that there are ways to know which is infallible, proved.* 2. Hypoth. *A Divine Testimony the most infallible. The resolution of Faith into* GOD's *veracity as its formal object.* IX. 3. Hypoth. *A Divine testimony may be known, tho' God speak not immediately. Of Inspiration among the* Jews, *and Divination among the Heathens.* XII. 4. Hypoth. *The Evidence of a Divine Testimony must be clear and certain.* XIII. *Of the common motives of Faith, and the obligation to faith arising from them. The original of Infidelity.*

HAving now cleared that the Law of *Moses* was capable of a repeal, I come to the second Enquiry, *Whether the Miracles of our Savior did give a sufficient Evidence of his power and Authority* 1.

rity to repeal it. I ſhall not (to prevent too large an excurſion) inſiſt on any other Evidences of our Savior's being the promiſed *Meſſias*, but keep cloſe to the matter of our preſent debate, concerning the Evidence which ariſeth from ſuch a power of Miracles as our Savior had in order to his eſtabliſhing that Doctrine which he came to publiſh to the World. The great ſtumbling-block in reference to our Bleſſed Savior among both the *Jews* and learned *Heathens*, was the meanneſs of his appearance in the World, not coming attended with that ſtate and magnificence, which they thought to be inſeparable from ſo Great a Perſon. The *Jews* had their ſenſes ſo poſſeſſed with the Thundrings and Lightnings on Mount *Sinai*, that they cou'd not imagin the ſtructure of their Ceremonial Worſhip cou'd be taken down with leſs noiſe and terror than it was erected. And withal collecting all thoſe paſſages of the Old Teſtament, which ſeemed to foretel ſuch glorious things of the days of the *Meſſias*, (which either refer to his ſecond Coming, or muſt be underſtood in a Spiritual ſenſe) they having their Minds oppreſſed with the ſenſe of their preſent calamities, apply'd them wholly to an external Greatneſs, whereby they might be deliver'd from the Tyranny of the *Roman* Power. The *Heathens*, as appears by *Celſus* and others, thought it very ſtrange, that the Son of God ſhou'd appear in the World with ſo little Grandeur, and have no greater Train than twelve ſuch obſcure Perſons as the Apoſtles were. For, ſaith *Celſus*, ὥσπερ ὁ ἥλιος πάντα τὰ ἄλλα φωτίζων πρῶτος αὐτὸς δείκνυσι, ὅτως ἐχρῆν πεποιηκέναι τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ· *As the Sun, which enlightens all other things, doth firſt diſcover himſelf, ſo it was fitting the Son of God ſhould do when he appeared to the World.* And ſo we ſay he did to all ſuch whoſe Minds were not blinded thro' obſtinacy and wilful ignorance. For altho' this Son of Righteouſneſs was pleas'd for the better carrying on his deſign in the World to wrap up himſelf in a cloud, yet his Glory cou'd not be confin'd within it, but did break thro' that dark veil of his Human Nature, and did diſcover it ſelf in a moſt clear and convincing manner. His appearances indeed were not like thoſe upon Mount *Sinai*, becauſe his deſign was not to amuſe Men with the Glory of his Majeſty, and to terrify them from Idolatry, (which was a great reaſon of thoſe dreadful *Phænomena* at the delivery of the Law) but he came to draw all Men to him by the Power and Energy of his Grace, and therefore afforded them all Rational Convictions in order to it. And therefore the quality of our Savior's Miracles was conſiderable, as well as the greatneſs of them. The intent of them all was to do good, and thereby to bring the World off from its ſin and folly, to the embracing of that holy Doctrine which he came to publiſh to the World.

Apud Orig. l. 2.

II. Now that ſuch a Power of Miracles in our Savior had the greateſt ſubſerviency to the giving full and convincing Evidence that he was the Perſon he declared himſelf to be, and that his Doctrine was thereby ſo clearly atteſted, that it was nothing but obſtinacy, which cou'd withhold aſſent, will appear by theſe following *Hypotheſes* which I lay down in order to the proving it.

1. *Hypoth.* *Where the truth of a Doctrine depends not on the Evidence of the things themſelves, but on the Authority of him that reveals it, there the only way to prove the Doctrine to be true, is to prove the Teſtimony*

ſtimony of him that revealed it to be infallible. Several things are neceſſary to be proved for the clearing this Propoſition.

1. *That it is not repugnant to Reaſon, that a Doctrine ſhould be true which depends not upon the Evidence of the thing it ſelf.* By evidence of the thing I underſtand ſo clear and diſtinct a Perception of it, that every one who hath the uſe of his rational Faculties, cannot but upon the firſt apprehenſions of the Terms yield a certain aſſent to it; as That the whole is greater than a part; That if we take away equal things from equal, the remainder muſt be equal. Now we are to obſerve, that as to all theſe common Notices of Human Nature which carry ſuch Evidence with them, the certainty of them lies in the Propoſition as it is an act of the Mind abſtracted from the things themſelves; for theſe do not ſuppoſe the Exiſtence of the things; but whether there be any ſuch things in the World or no as Whole or Parts, the Underſtanding is aſſured that the Idea of the whole carries more in its repreſentation than that of a part does. This is the great Reaſon of the certainty and evidence of *Mathematical* truths, not as ſome imagin, becauſe Men have no intereſt, or deſign, in thoſe things, and therefore they never queſtion them, but becauſe they proceed not upon ſenſible but abſtracted matter, which is not liable to ſo many doubts as the other is: for that a Triangle hath three Angles no Man queſtions; but whether ſuch ſenſible parts of Matter make a Triangle, may be very queſtionable. Now that the truth of Beings, or the certainty of Exiſtence of things cannot be ſo certain as *Mathematical* Demonſtrations, appears from hence: becauſe the manner of conveyance of theſe things to my Mind cannot be ſo clear and certain as in purely Intellectual operations, abſtracted from exiſtent Matter. For the higheſt Evidences of the Exiſtence of things muſt be either the judgment of Senſe, or clear and diſtinct perception of the Mind: now proceeding in a mere Natural way, there can be no infallible certainty in a either of theſe; For the Perception of the Mind in reference to the exiſtence of things being cauſed ſo much thro' thoſe *Ideas* or *Phantaſms* which are conveyed to the Underſtanding thro' the impreſſions of Senſe, if theſe may be demonſtrated to be fallacious, I may well queſtion the certainty of that, which I am certain I have been deceived by; ſuppoſing then I ſhou'd queſtion the truth of every thing which is conveyed in an uncertain way to my Mind, I may ſoon outgo even *Pyrrho* himſelf in real *Scepticiſm*. Neither can I conceive how clear and diſtinct perception of any thing, tho' not coming thro' the ſenſes, doth neceſſarily infer the exiſtence of the thing; for it only implies a Non-repugnancy of it to our Natural Faculties, and conſequently the bare poſſibility of it. For otherwiſe it were impoſſible for us to have a clear perception of any thing any longer than it exiſts; nay, than we know it to exiſt; for Exiſtence or Non-exiſtence is all one to the Underſtanding, while it is not aſſured of either. And it is withal evident that things imaginary may clearly affect the Mind as well as real, for I may have as real and diſtinct Perception of a *Phœnix* in my Mind, as of a *Partridge*; doth it therefore follow that the one is really exiſtent as well as the other? and it will be a very hard matter to aſſign a certain difference between Imagination and pure Intellection in ſuch things, which tho' not actually

existent, yet imply no repugnancy at all to the Faculties of Mens Minds. It is evident then, that there cannot be so great certainty of the existence of things as there may be of *Mathematical* Demonstrations.

III. And if that Principle be supposed as the foundation of all *Physical* certainty as to the Being of things, *viz.* That there is a God, who being infinitely good, will not suffer the Minds of Men to be deceived in those things which they have a clear and distinct perception of (without which supposition we cannot be assured of the certainty of any operations of the Mind, because we cannot know but we were so made, that we might be then most deceived, when we thought our selves most sure:) If this Principle, I say, be supposed as the foundation of all certain Knowledg, then from it I infer many things which are very much advantageous to our certainty in matters of Faith.

1. *That the foundation of all certainty lies in the necessary existence of a Being absolutely perfect.* So that unless I know that there is a God, I cannot be assured that I know any thing in a certain manner; and if I know there is a God, I must necessarily apprehend him to be absolutely perfect; because the grounds of my Knowledg, that there is a God, are from those absolute perfections, which there are in him; and if I cou'd suppose him not absolutely perfect, I must suppose him not to be God; for that is necessarily imply'd in his Definition. Now then if all certainty doth suppose the existence of a Being so absolutely perfect, I must, before I can know any thing certainly, conclude that there is an infinity of Knowledg, Wisdom, Power and Goodness in this God; for those are things which all who understand them will grant to be perfections; and if they be in God, they must be absolute, *i. e.* infinite. And if they be infinite, it necessarily follows that they must transcend our apprehensions; so that now we have gained this Principle in order to Faith, that we must grant something to be unconceivable before we can come certainly to know any thing. From whence it follows that those who will not believe any thing to be true, because it is above their apprehensions, must deny the foundation of all certainty, which (as we have proved) doth suppose something to be infinite, or above our capacity to comprehend.

IV. 2. *That we have as great certainty of whatever is revealed to us from God, as we can have of the truth of any thing which we most clearly understand.* For the truth of Knowledg depending on this supposition, That there is a God, whose goodness will not suffer us to be deceiv'd in the things we clearly understand; there is the same foundation for the act of Faith as for that of Knowledg, *viz.* That God will not suffer us to be deceiv'd in matters which himself hath reveal'd to us. Nay, there seems to be greater on these accounts. *First*, That there is not so great danger to be deceiv'd in reference to objects of sense, as there is in reference to objects of Divine Revelation: because objects of sense make a continual impression upon the organs of sense; and as to these things we see the whole World agrees in them so far as they are necessary to life, and withal they bear a greater correspondency to the present state of imperfection which the Soul is now in: but now matters of Divine Revelation are of a more sublime and spiritual nature,

ture, which Mens Minds on that account are more apt to doubt of, than of things obvious to ſenſe; and withal they call the Mind ſo much off from ſenſe, that on theſe accounts the proneneſs to doubt is greater, and therefore the foundation of Certainty from God's not ſuffering us to be deceiv'd muſt be ſtronger. *Secondly*, There is not ſo great danger in being deceiv'd as to matters of ſenſe or knowledg, as there is in things of Divine Revelation. For we ſee, granting ſenſe to be deceiv'd, and that we have no certainty at all in natural things, yet affairs of Life are managed ſtill; Men's outward welfare depends not on the judgment of ſenſe; the Merchant hath never the leſs gold in his Ship, becauſe his ſenſe deceives him in judging that the Earth moves from him, when the Ship moves from it. The Sun doth never the leſs enlighten the World, tho' our Senſes be all of *Epicurus* his Mind, that the Sun is no bigger than he ſeems to be; but now as to matters of Divine Revelation, they are things of the moſt unſpeakable weight and importance, which depend upon our believing or disbelieving them. And therefore if the Goodneſs of God be ſuch as it will not ſuffer us to be deceiv'd in our judgment of material and ſenſible Beings; how much leſs in reference to the foundation of our certainty as to things divinely reveal'd? We ſee then what Rational Evidence there is not only conſiſtent with, but neceſſarily imply'd in the foundation of Faith, even as great as in any thing which we do moſt perfectly know; ſo that the in-evidence, which is ſo much ſpoken of as an ingredient of the nature of Faith, muſt not be underſtood of the foundation whereon the act of Faith doth ſtand, but of the condition of the object, which being a matter of Divine Revelation, is a thing not obvious to our Senſes. In which ſenſe the Apoſtle ſpeaks, that Faith is ἐλπιζομένων ὑπόστασις, πραγμάτων ἔλεγχος οὐ βλεπομένων, *The firm expectation of things hoped for, and ſtrong conviction of things which are not ſeen:* In which words, as *Eraſmus* obſerves, is contain'd only an high *Encomium* of Faith, and no dialectical Definition of it; *viz.* that Faith ſoars above things of ſenſe or preſent enjoyment; yea, tho' the objects of it be never ſo remote from either, yet where there is ſufficient Evidences of Divine Revelation, Faith boggles at no difficulties, but is firmly reſolv'd that that God who hath reveal'd theſe things, can and will bring them to paſs in his own time. There is not then any ſuch contrariety between the foundation of Faith and Knowledg, as the Schoolmen have perſuaded the World; we ſee both of them proceed on the ſame foundation of certainty; all the difference is, Faith fixeth on the veracity of God immediately in reference to a Divine Teſtimony; Knowledg proceeds upon it, ſuppoſing no Divine Revelation as to the things it doth diſcover.

3. We hence infer, That if the certainty of our Knowledg depends on this Principle, That God will not ſuffer us to be deceiv'd, then we are bound to believe whatever God doth reveal to us, tho' we may not be able to comprehend the nature of the things revealed. For as to theſe things, we have the ſame ground of certainty which we have as to any Natural Cauſes; for as to them, we now ſuppoſe from the former Principles, that ſetting aſide the exiſtence of God, we cou'd have no certainty of them, but that the formal Reaſon of our certainty is reſolv'd into this, That God's V.

Goodneſs will not ſuffer the Underſtanding to be deceiv'd as to theſe things: the ſame I ſay as to Spiritual Myſteries reveal'd by God; the ground of our certainty lies not in the Evidence of the things, but in the undoubted veracity of God, who hath reveal'd them. All that I can imagin poſſible to be reply'd to this, is, That God's veracity aſſures us in Natural Cauſes that we are not deceiv'd, only where we have a clear and diſtinct perception of the things, but now in matters above our Reaſon to comprehend, there can be no clear and diſtinct Perception. To this I anſwer,

Firſt, It is evident in the foundation of all certainty of Knowledg, that there may be a clear and diſtinct Perception of that which we cannot comprehend, *viz.* of a Being abſolutely perfect; for if we have not a clear and diſtinct Perception of God, the foundation of all certainty is deſtroy'd, which is the neceſſary Exiſtence of ſuch a Being; and he that ſhall ſay he cannot have a clear Perception of God without comprehending him, doth contradict himſelf; for if he be a Being infinite, he muſt be incomprehenſible; therefore there may be clear Perception, where the object it ſelf is above our capacity. Now whatever foundation there is in Nature for ſuch a Perception without Comprehenſion; that and much more is there in ſuch things as are reveal'd by God, tho' above our Apprehenſion: For the Idea of God upon the Soul of Man cannot be ſo ſtrong an Evidence of the Exiſtence of a Being above our Apprehenſion, as the Revelation of matters of Faith is, that we ſhou'd believe the things ſo reveal'd, tho' our Underſtandings loſe themſelves in ſtriving to reach the natures of them, and the manner of their Exiſtence.

Secondly, That which is the only foundation of a ſcruple in this caſe, is a Principle moſt unreaſonable in it ſelf, That we are to embrace nothing for truth, tho' divinely reveal'd, but what our Reaſon is able to comprehend as to the nature of the thing, and the manner of its exiſtence; on which account the Doctrine of the *Trinity*, *Incarnation*, *Satisfaction*, and conſequently the whole Myſtery of the Goſpel of Christ muſt be rejected as incredible, and that on this bare pretence, becauſe altho' many expreſſions in Scripture ſeem to import all theſe things, yet we are bound to interpret them to another ſenſe, becauſe this is incongruous to our Reaſon. But altho' *Chriſtianity* be a Religion which comes in the higheſt way of Credibility to the Minds of Men, altho' we are not bound to believe any thing but what we have ſufficient reaſon to make it appear that it is reveal'd by God; yet that any thing ſhou'd be queſtioned whether it be of Divine Revelation, merely becauſe our Reaſon is to ſeek, as to the full and adequate conception of it, is a moſt abſurd and unreaſonable pretenſe: And the Aſſertors of it muſt run themſelves on theſe unavoidable abſurdities.

Firſt, Of believing nothing either in Nature or Religion to be true, but what they can give a full and ſatisfactory account of, as to every mode and circumſtance of it. Therefore let ſuch Perſons firſt try themſelves in all the appearances of Nature; and then we may ſuppoſe they will not believe that the Sun ſhines till they have by demonſtrative Arguments prov'd the undoubted truth of the *Ptolemaic* or *Copernican Hypotheſis*; that they will never give credit to the flux and reflux of the Sea, till they clearly reſolve the

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doubts which attend the ſeveral opinions of it. That there is no ſuch thing as Matter in the World, till they can ſatisfactorily tell us how the Parts of it are united; nor that there are any Material Beings, till they have reſolv'd all the perplexing difficulties about the ſeveral Affections of them; and that themſelves have not ſo much as a rational Soul, till they are bound to ſatisfy us of the manner of the union of the Soul and Body together. And if they can expedite all theſe, and many more difficulties about the moſt obvious things (about which it is another thing to frame handſom and conſiſtent *Hypotheſes*, than to give a certain account of them) then let them be let looſe to the matters of Divine Revelation; as to which yet (if they cou'd perform the other) there were no reaſon for ſuch an undertaking; for that were,

Secondly, To commenſurate the Perfections of God with the narrow capacity of the human Intellect; which is contrary to the natural Idea of God; and to the manner whereby we take up our conceptions of God: for the Idea of God doth ſuppoſe Incomprehenſibility to belong to his Nature; and the manner whereby we form our Conceptions of God, is, by taking away all the imperfections we find in our ſelves, from the Conception we form of a Being abſolutely perfect, and by adding Infinity to all the Perfections we find in our own Natures. Now this method of proceeding doth neceſſarily imply a vaſt diſtance and diſproportion between a finite and infinite Underſtanding. And if the Underſtanding of God be infinite, why may not he diſcover ſuch things to us, which our ſhallow Apprehenſions cannot reach unto? What ground or evidence of Reaſon can we have that an infinite Wiſdom and Underſtanding, when it undertakes to diſcover matters of the higheſt nature and concernment to the World, ſhou'd be able to deliver nothing but what comes within the compaſs of our imperfect and narrow Intellects? And that it ſhou'd not be ſufficient that the matters reveal'd do none of them contradict the prime Reſults or common Notions of Mankind (which none of them do) but that every particular mode and circumſtance, as to the manner of exiſtence in God, or the extent of his omnipotent Power, muſt paſs the ſcrutiny of our Faculties, before it obtains a *placet* for a Divine Revelation?

VI. *Thirdly*, It muſt follow from this Principle, That the Pretenders to it muſt affirm the Rules or Maxims which they go by in the judgment of things, are the infallible ſtandard of Reaſon: Elſe they are as far to ſeek in the judgment of things as any others are. They muſt then, to be conſiſtent with their Principle, affirm themſelves to be the abſolute Maſters of Reaſon: Now Reaſon conſiſting of Obſervations made concerning the natures of all Beings, for ſo it muſt be conſidered, as it is a Rule of judging, (*viz.* as a *Syſtem* of infallible Rules collected from the natures of things) they who pretend to it, muſt demonſtrate theſe general Maxims according to which they judg, to be collected from an univerſal undoubted Hiſtory of Nature, which lies yet too dark and obſcure for any to pretend to the full Knowledg of, and wou'd be only a demonſtration of the higheſt Arrogance after ſo many ſucceſſleſs endeavors, of the moſt ſearching Wits in any ſociety of Perſons to uſurp it to themſelves, eſpecially if ſuch Perſons are ſo far

from ſearching into the depths of Nature, that they ſuffer themſelves very fairly to be led by the Noſe by the moſt Dogmatical of all Philoſophers; and that in ſuch Principles which the more inquiſitive World hath now found to be very ſhort, uncertain and fallacious. And upon ſevere enquiry we ſhall find the grand Principles which have been taken by theſe adorers of Reaſon, for almoſt the ſtandard of it, have been ſome *Theories* which have been taken up merely from obſervation of the courſe of Nature by ſuch Perſons, who ſcarce own'd any hand of Providence in the World. Now it cannot otherwiſe be conceiv'd but that theſe *Theories* or Principles formed from ſuch a narrow inſpection into the natures of things, muſt make ſtrange work when we come to apply thoſe things to them, which were never look'd at in the forming of them: Whence came thoſe two receiv'd Principles, That nothing can be produc'd out of nothing; That there is no poſſible return from a privation to a habit, but from thoſe Philoſophers who believ'd there was nothing but matter in the World; or if they did aſſert the Exiſtence of a God, yet ſuppoſed him unconcerned in the Government of the World. Whence come our Maſters of Reaſon to tell us, That the Soul cannot ſubſiſt after death without the Body? from what Philoſophy was this derived? certainly from that which was very loth to acknowledg the immortality of the Soul of Man: and any one who ſtrictly obſerves the cloſe coherence of the Principles of the *Peripatetic* Philoſophy will find very little room left for an eternal Being to interpoſe it ſelf in the World; and therefore ſome have ſhrewdly obſerv'd that *Ariſtotle* ſpeaks more favorably of the Being of God in his *Exoterics*, than in his *Acromatics*, which all that know the reaſon of the Names, will gueſs at the reaſon of. I demand then, Muſt the received Principles of Philoſophy, and thoſe ſhort imperfect *Theories*, which were formed more from Tradition than Experience, by the ancient *Greeks*, be taken from the ſtandard of Reaſon or no? If they muſt, we may ſoon forſake not only the ſublimer Myſteries of the *Trinity*, *Divinity* of Christ, *Reſurrection*, &c. but we ſhall ſoon ſhake hands with *Creation*, *Providence*, if not *Immortality* of *Souls*, and the Being of God himſelf. If theſe things be diſown'd as the ſtandard of Reaſon, let us know what will be ſubſtituted in the room of them; and what Laws our Faith muſt be try'd by. Are they only *Mathematical* Demonſtrations, or the undoubted common Notions of Human Nature, which whoſoever underſtands aſſents to them? let any of the forementioned Myſteries be made appear to contradict theſe, and we will readily yield up our ſelves captives to Reaſon: But in the mean time let no *jejune* unproved *Hypotheſes* in *Philoſophy*, be ſet as Judges over matters of Faith, whoſe only warrant for that office muſt be *Stat pro ratione voluntas*. Let the Principles we proceed by, be firſt manifeſted to be collected from a moſt certain and univerſal inſpection into the nature of all Beings, let the manner of proceſs be ſhewed how they were collected (leſt they labour with the common fault of the *Chymiſts*, of eſtabliſhing *Hypoſtatical* Principles from the Experiments of ſome particular Bodies, which others do as evidently refute) and laſtly, let it be made appear that theſe Principles, thus collected, will ſerve indifferently for all Beings, ſpiritual as well as material, infinite, as well as finite,

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and when this Task is exactly perform'd, we will make room for Reaſon to ſit upon the Bench, and bring the Scripture as the priſoner to its Bar.

VII. *Fourthly*, According to this Principle, what certainty can we have at all of any thing we are to believe? who hath fixed the bounds of that which Men call Reaſon? how ſhall we know that thus far it will come, and no further? If no Banks be raiſed againſt it to keep it in its due Channel, we may have cauſe to fear it may in time overthrow not only the *Trinity*, *Incarnation*, *Reſurrection of the dead*, but all other Articles of the Creed too. What Preſcription can be pleaded by one ſort of Men for Reaſon more than for another? One will not believe this Article of his Faith, becauſe againſt his Reaſon; and why not another reject another Article on the ſame pretenſe? for whatever the ground of Unbelief be, if it be but baptized by the name of Reaſon, it muſt by this Principle paſs uncontrouled. If a ſullen Philoſopher ſhall tell us, that the Notion of an immaterial ſubſtance contradicts his Reaſon as much as the *Trinity* doth theirs, and that the Univerſe is nothing elſe but a Syſtem of Bodies; by what Artifice will our Maſter of Reaſon purge away all that black Choler, that ſo clouds his Mind, that he cannot ſee the Notion of a Spirit thro' it? And ſuch a one will make a hard ſhift, but he will reconcile his Opinion with Scripture too; and therefore why ſhou'd he be bound up to Mens Explications of Scripture, when there is no neceſſity, that he can ſee, of underſtanding it in any other way than his own? If another ſhou'd come and tell us, that we muſt be all *Anthropomorphites*, and that otherwiſe the Scripture were not intelligible; ſhall not this Man put in for Reaſon too? Nay, *laſtly*, if another ſhall come and ſpeak out, and tell us Religion is but a device of ſubtle Men, that all things come to paſs thro' chance, that the World was made by a fortuitous concourſe of *Atoms*, and that all are fools which are not *Atheiſts*, and and that it is impoſſible to apprehend the Being of a GOD, and therefore by the ſame Reaſon that they reject ſome Myſteries of Religion, he rejects the foundation of all; becauſe an infinite Being is incomprehenſible: whither now hath our Reaſon carried us? while we pretend to reject any thing as divinely revealed, merely on that account, that it is above our Reaſon? But it may be reply'd, *On what account then do we reject the Doctrine of* Tranſubſtantiation, *and the ubiquity of the Body of* CHRIST, *as repugnant to Reaſon, if we do not make Reaſon judge in matters of Faith?* I anſwer, 1. We reject theſe opinions not only as repugnant to Reaſon, but as inſufficiently proved from Scripture; whereas we here ſuppoſe (it not being our preſent buſineſs to prove it) that the ſeveral Doctrines of the *Trinity*, *Incarnation*, *Reſurrection of Bodies*, &c. are only rejected on that account, that tho' Scripture ſeems to ſpeak fair for them, yet it is otherwiſe to be interpreted, becauſe ſuppoſed to be repugnant to Reaſon. 2. Thoſe Doctrines before mentioned are eminently ſerviceable to promote the great end of the Goſpel, and are inlaid in the very foundation of it, as that of the *Trinity*, and *Divinity* of CHRIST; but theſe we now mention are no ways conduceable to that end, but ſeem to thwart and overthrow it; and *Tranſubſtantiation* eſtabliſheth

ſheth a way of Worſhip contrary to the Goſpel. 3. All the foundation of *Tranſubſtantiation* is laid upon ambiguous places of Scripture, which muſt of neceſſity have ſome Tropes and Figures in them; but the Doctrine of the *Trinity* is not only contained in plain Scripture, but is evidenced by viſible appearance, as particularly at the Baptiſm of our Savior. 4. There is far greater ground why we ſhou'd reject *Tranſubſtantiation* and *Ubiquity*, as inconſiſtent with Reaſon, than that they ſhou'd the *Trinity*, on this account, becauſe the grounds of Reaſon on which we reject thoſe opinions, are fetched from thoſe eſſential and inſeparable properties of Bodies, which are inconſiſtent with thoſe opinions; now theſe are things within the reach of our Underſtandings (in which caſe God himſelf ſometimes appeals to Reaſon) but it is quite another caſe, when we ſearch into the incomprehenſible Nature of God, and pronounce with confidence that ſuch things cannot be in God, becauſe we cannot comprehend them; which gives a ſufficient anſwer to this objection. The ſubſtance then of this Diſcourſe is, that whatever Doctrine is ſufficiently manifeſted to be of Divine Revelation, is to be embraced and believed as undoubtedly true, tho' our Reaſon cannot reach to the full apprehenſion of all the Modes and Circumſtances of it. So that as to theſe ſublime Myſteries our Faith ſtands upon this twofold bottom. *Firſt*, That the Being, Underſtanding, and Power of God doth infinitely tranſcend ours, and therefore he may reveal to us matters above our reach and capacity. *Secondly*, That whatever God doth reveal is undoubtedly true, tho' we may not fully underſtand it; for this is a moſt undoubted Principle, That God cannot and will not deceive any in thoſe things which he reveals to Men. Thus our firſt Suppoſition is cleared, That it is not repugnant to Reaſon, that a Doctrine may be true, which depends not on the evidence of the thing it ſelf.

The Second is, *That in matters whoſe truth depends not on the evidence of the things themſelves, infallible teſtimony is the fulleſt demonſtration of them.* For theſe things not being of *Mathematical* evidence, there muſt be ſome other way found out for demonſtrating the truth of them. And in all thoſe things whoſe truth depends on Teſtimony, the more creditable the Teſtimony is, the higher Evidence is given to them; but that Teſtimony which may deceive, cannot give ſo pregnant an Evidence as that which cannot; for then all imaginable objections are taken off. This is ſo clear, that it needs no further Proof; and therefore the Third follows.

That there are certain ways whereby to know that a Teſtimony delivered is infallible; and that is fully proved by theſe two Arguments. 1. That it is the duty of all thoſe to whom it is propounded to believe it; now how cou'd that be a duty in them to believe, which they had no ways to know whether it were a Teſtimony to be believed, or no? 2. Becauſe God will condemn the World for Unbelief: In which the Juſtice of God's proceeding doth neceſſarily ſuppoſe that there were ſufficient Arguments to induce them to believe, which cou'd not be, unleſs there were ſome certain way ſuppoſed whereby a Teſtimony may be known to be infallible. Theſe three things now being ſuppoſed, *viz.* That a Doctrine may be true which depends not on evidence of Reaſon; that the greateſt demon-

demonstration of the truth of such a Doctrine, is its being delivered by infallible Testimony; and that there are certain waies whereby a Testimony may be known to be infallible: Our first Principle is fully confirmed, which was, *That where the truth of a Doctrine depends not on Evidence of Reason, but on the Authority of him that reveals it, the only way to prove the Doctrine to be true, is to prove the Testimony of him that reveals it to be infallible.*

VIII. 2. *Hypoth.*

The next Principle or *Hypothesis* which I lay down, is, *That there can be no greater evidence that a Testimony is infallible, than that it is the Testimony of God himself.* The truth of this depends upon a common Notion of Human Nature, which is the Veracity of God in whatever way he discovers himself to Men; and therefore the ultimate Resolution of our Faith, as to its formal object, must be alone into the Veracity of God revealing things unto us; for the *Principium certitudinis*, or foundation of all certain assent can be fetched no higher, neither will it stand any lower than the infallible Verity of God himself; and the *Principium patefactionis*, or the ground of discovery of Spiritual truth to our Minds must be resolved into Divine Testimony, or Revelation. These two then not taken asunder, but joyntly, *God, who cannot lye, hath revealed these things*, is the only certain foundation for a Divine Faith to rest it self upon. But now the particular exercise of a Divine Faith lies in a firm assent to such a particular thing as divinely reveal'd; and herein lies not so much the Testimony, as the peculiar energy of the Spirit of God in inclining the Soul to believe peculiar objects of Faith, as of Divine Revelation. But the general ground of Faith, which they call the formal object, or the *ratio propter quam credimus*, is the general infallibility of a Divine Testimony. For in a matter concerning Divine Revelation, there are two great Questions to be resolved: The first is, Why I believe a Divine Testimony with a firm assent? The Answer to that is, Because I am assur'd, that whatever God speaks is true: the other is, Upon what grounds do I believe this to be a Divine Testimony? the resolution of which, as far as I can understand, must be fetch'd from those rational Evidences, whereby a Divine Testimony must be distinguish'd from one merely Human and fallible. For the Spirit of God in its workings upon the Mind, doth not carry it on by a brutish impulse, but draws it by a Spiritual discovery of such strong and persuasive grounds to assent to what is reveal'd, that the Mind doth readily give a firm assent to that which it sees such convincing Reason to believe. Now the strongest Reason to believe, is the manifestation of a Divine Testimony; which the Spirit of God so clearly discovers to a true Believer, that he not only firmly assents to the general foundation of Faith, the Veracity of God, but to the particular object propounded, as a matter of Divine Revelation. But this latter Question is not here the matter of our Discourse; our Proposition only concerns the general foundation of Faith, which appears to be so rational and evident, as no Principle in Nature can be more. For if the Testimony on which I am to rely be only God's, and I be assur'd from Natural Reason, that his Testimony can be no other than infallible, wherein doth the certainty of the foundation of Faith fall short of that in any *Mathematical* demonstration? Upon which account

a Divine Teſtimony hath been regarded with ſo much veneration among all who have own'd a Deity, altho' they have been unacquainted with any certain way of Divine Revelation. And the reaſon why any rejected ſuch a Teſtimony among the *Heathens*, was either, becauſe they believ'd not a *Deity*; or elſe that the particular Teſtimonies produced were mere frauds and impoſtures, and therefore no Divine Teſtimony, as it was given out to be. But the Principle ſtill remain'd indiſputable, that on ſuppoſition the Teſtimony were what it pretended to be, there was the greateſt reaſon to believe it, altho' it came not in ſuch a way of probation, as their Sciences proceeded in. From which Principle aroſe that ſpeech of *Tully*, which he hath tranſlated out of *Plato's Timæus*; *Ac difficillimum factu à Diis ortis fidem non habere, quanquam nec argumentis nec rationibus certis eorum ratio confirmetur.* By which we ſee what a preſumption there was of Truth, where there was any evidence of a Divine Teſtimony. And no doubt upon the advantage of this Principle it was the Devil gain'd ſo great credit to his Oracles; for therein he did the moſt imitate Divine Revelation. From hence then we ſee what a firm bottom Faith in the general ſtands upon, which is nothing ſhort of an infallible Divine Teſtimony: other things may conduce by way of ſubſervieney for the diſcovery of this; but nothing elſe can be a ſure foundation for a Divine Faith, but what is a Teſtimony of God himſelf.

Fragm. Cicer.

IX. 3. *Hypoth.* *A Teſtimony may be known to be divine and infallible, tho' God himſelf do not ſpeak in an immediate way.* By being known, I do not mean the firm perſwaſion of a Mind inlightned by the Spirit of God, but that there are ſufficient Evidences *ex parte rei*, to convince Men of it, which are not wilfully blind and obſtinate, *i. e.* that the ground of unbelief in any cannot be imputed to the defect of ſufficient Motives to Faith, but to their own perverſneſs and prejudice in not diſcerning them. Now that God may reveal and declare his Mind to the World, not in an immediate way, but by ſome Inſtruments he may make uſe of to that end, is not only evident from the great ſutableneſs of ſuch a way to the conditions of the Perſons he ſpeaks to, but from the general perſuaſion of the World concerning the poſſibility of Inſpiration. The *Jews* are ſo far from denying this, that it is the very foundation of their Religion as well as ours; God diſcovering the moſt of his Will to them by the Prophets, or by Perſons divinely inſpir'd. And this general conſent of all other Nations, that there is ſuch a Principle as Divination in the World, doth make it evident, that it carries no repugnancy at all to Natural Light, ſuppoſing that there is a God, that he ſhou'd reveal his Mind by ſome particular Perſons unto the World. For which purpoſe the teſtimony of *Tully* in the entrance of his Books *de Divinatione*, is very conſiderable.

Cicero l. 2. de Divin. *Vetus opinio eſt jam uſque ab Heroicis ducta temporibus, eaque & populi Romani & omnium gentium firmata conſenſu, verſari quandam inter homines divinationem, quam Græci* [illegible] *appellant*, i. e. *præſenſionem & ſcientiam rerum futurarum*; and ſoon after adds, *gentem quidem nullam video neque tam humanam atque doctam, neque tam immanem atque barbaram, quæ non ſignificari futura, & à quibuſdam intelligi, prædicique poſſe cenſeat.* He makes it appear to be an univerſal ſentiment of all Nations in the World, and inſtanceth

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particularly in the *Assyrians*, *Ægyptians*, *Cilicians*, *Pisidians*, *Pamphylians*, *Grecians*, *Romans*, *Etrurians*, and others. It is true indeed he after mentions some Philosophers who deny'd it; but they were most part the followers of *Epicurus*, who deny'd any *Providence*, and therefore might well take away *Divination*: but if *Xenophanes Colophonius* had any followers who asserted the one, and deny'd the other (as *Tully* seems to intimate that he was alone in that persuasion) yet we may probably suppose the reason of their rejecting it might be the Impostures which went under the name of *Divination* among them; which are excellently discover'd by that Prince of *Roman* Philosophers as well as Orators, in his second Book of *Divination*: But it is apparent by the same Author, that the generality of Philosophers consented with the People in this persuasion, as the Followers of those three great Sects of *Socrates*, *Pythagoras* and *Aristotle*, were all approvers of it; but of all Persons the *Stoics* were the most zealous contenders for it, especially *Chrysippus*, *Diogenes Babylonius*, *Antipater* and *Possidonius*. Some indeed rejected some ways of *Divination*, yet embraced others, as *Dicæarchus* and *Cratippus*, who rejected all but Dreams and Ecstasies; but in the general we find these two Principles went together among them, the existence of a *Deity*, and the certainty of *Divination*; so that from *Divination* they prov'd a *Deity*, and from a *Deity Divination*. *Si sunt genera divinandi vera, esse Deos; vicissimque si Dii sint, esse qui divinent*, as *Quintus Cicero* there speaks: and at last thus triumphs in the multitude of his witnesses, *An dum bestiæ loquantur exspectamus, hominum consentiente auctoritate contenti non simus?* It may not be amiss to produce the chief Argument on which the *Stoics* insisted to prove the necessity of *Divination*, supposing the existence of a *Deity*. *If there be Gods*, say they, *and they do not reveal to Men things to come; it either is because they do not love them, or because they do not know themselves what shall come to pass, or they think it is of no concernment to Men to know future things, or that it doth not become their Majesty to reveal them, or that they cannot reveal them to Men if they would: but neither is it true that they do not love Men; for the Gods are of a bountiful nature, and friends to Mankind; neither can they be ignorant of future things, because they are appointed and decreed by them; neither is it of no concernment to Men to know future things; for that makes them more cautious if they know them; neither is it repugnant to their Majesty to reveal them, for nothing is more noble than bounty and doing good; and they must needs know these things; therefore they may make them known to others; and if they do make them known, there must be some way whereby to know that they do so; or else they signifie them to no purpose.* If now instead of the knowledg of future contingencies, and the multitude of their Gods, they had insisted on the discovery and revelation by the true God of those ways, which may lead Men to eternal Happiness; that Argument had been strong and convincing, which as it stands is sophistical and fallacious. So that it is very plain, that not only a possibility of *Divination* was acknowledg'd by those who wanted Divine Revelation, but that this *Divination* did not arise from mere Natural Causes, but from an *afflatus Divinus*, and a *concitatio quædam animi*, as they there speak, which imports

nothing ſhort of Divine Inſpiration. Nay the opinion of this was ſo common among them, that they thought any extraordinary Perſons had ſomething of Divine Enthuſiaſm in them, as *Tully* elſewhere tells us, *Nemo vir magnus ſine aliquo afflatu Divino unquam fuit.* Altho' then theſe Heathens were greatly miſtaken as to thoſe things they took for a Divine *Afflatus* and *Divination*, yet we cannot conceive ſo general a Senſe ſhou'd be imprinted on the minds of Men of ſuch a thing as that was, were it not a thing highly conſonant to Principles of Reaſon, that God ſhou'd communicate his mind to the World by the inſpiration of ſome Perſons. And therefore I conceive that *Cicero* and his Brother *Quintus*, who manage that excellent diſpute of *Divination* between them, have divided the Truth between them too. For on the one ſide *Quintus* evidently proves the poſſibility of the thing, the conſequence of it upon the acknowledgment of a Deity, and the general conſent of Mankind in the owning of it; and on the other ſide *Tully* himſelf excellently lays open the vanity, folly, and uncertainty, not only of the common waies of *Divination*, but of the Oracles which were in ſuch great eſteem among the Heathens. And altho' *Tully* doth ſo ſharply and ſarcaſtically anſwer the Argument from the common conſent of Men; *quaſi vero quidquam ſit tam valde, quam nihil ſapere, vulgare; as though nothing Men did more generally agree in, than in being Fools:* yet as it is evident that the ground of that Scoff was from the ſeveral manners of *Divination* then in uſe, ſo it cannot be thought to be a general impeachment of Human Nature in a thing ſo conſequent upon the being of a God, which as himſelf elſewhere proves, is as clear from reaſon as from that *Teſtimonium gentium in hac una re non diſſidentium*, as the Chriſtian *Cicero*, *Lactantius* ſpeaks, *The conſent of Nations, which ſcarce agree in any thing elſe, but that there is a God.* That which we now inferr from hence is, That God may make known his Mind in a way infallible, tho' not immediate; for in caſe of Inſpiration of mere Men, it is not They ſo much which ſpeak, as God by them; and in caſe that God himſelf ſhou'd ſpeak thro' the veil of Human Nature, the Teſtimony muſt needs be infallible, tho' the appearance of the Divinity be not viſible

Cicero l. 2. de Nat. Deorum.

Lactant. de falſ. relig. cap. 2.

X. *Hyp. 4.* *Thoſe evidences whereby a Divine Teſtimony may be known, muſt be ſuch as may not leave Mens minds in ſuſpenſe, but are of their own nature convincing proofs of it.* For altho' as to the event ſome may doubt, and others disbelieve the Teſtimony ſo prov'd; yet it is ſufficient for our purpoſe, that in the nature of the things (ſuppoſing them to be ſuch as we ſpeak of) they are ſufficient for the eviction that the Teſtimony atteſted by them is divine and infallible. I know it is a great diſpute among many, whether thoſe things, which are uſually call'd the common Motives of Faith, do of their own nature only induce a probable perſuaſion of the truth of the Doctrine as probable which they are join'd with, or elſe are they ſufficient for the producing a firm aſſent to the Doctine as true? I grant they are not demonſtrative ſo as to inforce aſſent; for we ſee the contrary by the experience of all Ages; but that they are not ſufficient foundation for an unprejudic'd Mind to eſtabliſh a firm aſſent upon, is a thing not eaſie to be granted; chiefly upon

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this account, that an obligation to believe doth lie upon every one to whom theſe evidences of a Divine Teſtimony are ſufficiently diſcover'd. And otherwiſe of all ſins the ſin of Unbelief, as to God revealing his mind, were the moſt excuſable and pardonable ſin; nay, it wou'd be little leſs than a part of prudence; becauſe what can it be accounted but temerity and imprudence in any to believe a Doctrine as true, only upon probable inducements? and what can it be but wiſdom to with-hold aſſent upon a mere Veriſimilitude? conſidering what the *Lyrick* Poet hath long ſince truly told us;

ἢ πόπη ἢ βεβαίῳ φρένα
ὑπὲρ τὸν ἀληθῆ λόγον
δεδαιδαλμένοι ψεύδεσι ποικίλοις
ἐξαπατῶντι μῦθοι.

Pindar Olymp. Od. 1.

That a Falſhood may frequently ſeem truer to common underſtandings than Truth it ſelf: and as *Menander* ſpeaks, τὸ πιθανὸν ἰσχυρὸν ἀληθείας ἴσως οὐδὲν μεῖζον, ἢ πιθανώτερον ὄχλῳ, *that a mere veriſimilitude may have more force on vulgar minds than Truth hath.* If therefore there be no evidences given ſufficient to carry the minds of Men beyond mere probability, what ſin can it be in thoſe to disbelieve who cannot be obliged to believe as true what is only diſcover'd as probable? I cannot therefore ſee how an obligation to believe a Divine Teſtimony is conſiſtent with their opinion, who make the utmoſt which any outward evidences can extend to, to be only the bare credibility of the Doctrine atteſted by them. I can very well ſatisfie my ſelf with the ground and reaſon why the more ſubtle Wits of the Church of *Rome* do aſſert this; for if nothing elſe can be produced by all motives of Faith but only a probable perſuaſion of the Truth of Chriſtian Doctrine, then here comes in the faireſt pretenſe for the Infallibility of their Church: for otherwiſe they tell us we can have no foundation for a Divine Faith; for how can that be a foundation for Divine Faith, which can reach no higher than a Moral Inducement, and beget only a probable perſuaſion of the credibility of the Doctrine of Chriſt? But on what account thoſe who diſown the Infallibility of the Church of *Rome* in the propoſal of matters of Faith, ſhou'd yet conſent with thoſe of it in an *Hypotheſis* taken up in probability, merely out of ſubſerviency to that moſt advantageous piece of the myſtery of Iniquity, is not eaſie to reſolve. Unleſs the overfondneſs of ſome upon the Doctrine of the Schools, more than of the Goſpel, hath been the occaſion of it. For how agreeable can that opinion be to the Goſpel, which ſo evidently puts the moſt defenſive weapons into the hands of Unbelief? For doubtleſs in the judgment of any rational Perſon, a mere probable perſuaſion of the credibility of the Doctrine of Chriſt, where an aſſent to it as true is requir'd, can never be look'd on as an act of Faith: for if my aſſent to the Truth of the thing be according to the ſtrength of the Arguments inducing me to believe, and theſe Arguments do only prove a probability of Divine Teſtimony, my aſſent can be no ſtronger than to a thing merely probable; which is, that it may be, or not be true; which is not properly aſſent, but a ſuſ-

pending our judgments till ſome convincing Argument be produced on either ſide. And therefore according to this opinion thoſe who ſaw all the Miracles which Chriſt did, cou'd not be bound to believe in Chriſt, but only to have a favorable opinion of his Perſon and Doctrine, as a thing which tho' not evidenc'd to be true by what he did, yet it was very piouſly credible; but they muſt have a care withal of venturing their Belief too far, only on ſuch Moral Inducements as Miracles were, for fear they ſhou'd go further than the force of the Arguments wou'd carry them. Had not this opinion now, think we, been a very probable way to have converted the World upon the Preaching of Chriſt and his A-
Joh. 10, 38. poſtles; when Chriſt ſaith, *though ye believe not me, believe the works, that ye may know and believe that the Father is in me, and I in him?* Nay, ſaith this opinion, that is more than we are bound to do; tho' we ſee thy Works we are not bound to believe thy Teſtimony to be Divine and certainly true: but we will do all we are bound to do; we will entertain a favorable opinion of thy Perſon and Doctrine, and wait for ſomewhat elſe, but we do not well know what, to perſuade us to believe. When the Apoſtles
Heb. 2. 3, 4. preach the danger of Unbelief, becauſe *the doctrine of the Goſpel was confirmed by ſigns and wonders, and divers miracles and gifts of the Holy Ghoſt*; what a fair anſwer doth this opinion put into the mouths of Infidels, that notwithſtanding all theſe Signs and Wonders, they were never bound to believe the Goſpel as a certain Truth, and therefore they hope the danger is not ſo great in neglecting the Salvation promis'd by the Goſpel?

XI. I cannot conceive that Men otherwiſe learned and ſober, ſhou'd with ſo much confidence aſſert that the rational evidences of a Divine Teſtimony are inſufficient to prove a Doctrine true, unleſs it be from hence, that they find that notwithſtanding the ſtrongeſt evidences many Perſons continue in Unbelief. For ſay they, *If theſe Arguments were ſcientifical and demonſtrative*, (as they ſpeak) *of the truth of the Doctrine atteſted by them, then all perſons to whom they are propounded, muſt certainly believe.* But this is very eaſily anſwer'd; for we ſpeak not of internal, but outward Evidence; not of that in the Subject, but of the Object, or more fully of the Reaſon of the thing, and not the Event in us; for doubtleſs there may be undoubted Truth and Evidence in many things which ſome Perſons either cannot or will not underſtand. If *Epicurus* ſhou'd contend ſtill that the Sun and Stars are no bigger than they ſeem to be, will it hence follow that there can be no rational Demonſtration of the contrary? Nay, if the way of demonſtration be offer'd him, and Teleſcopes put into his hands, yet if he be reſolv'd to maintain his credit, and therefore his Opinion, and will not uſe the Teleſcopes, or ſuſpect ſtill they are intended only to deceive his ſight; what poſſible way will there be of convincing ſuch a Perſon, tho' the thing be in its ſelf demonſtrable? Now if the ſtrength of Prejudice or maintaining of Credit can prevail ſo much in matters of Mathematical evidence, to with-hold aſſent; what power may we think a corrupt Intereſt may have upon the Underſtanding, as to the Arguments which tend to prove the truth of that Doctrine, which is ſo repugnant to that carnal Intereſt which the heart is already devoted to! Our bleſſed

Savior

Savior hath himſelf given us ſo full an account of the original and cauſes of Unbelief in the perſons he convers'd with, that that may yield us a ſufficient Anſwer to this Objection. He tells us the ground of it was not want of light, nay, there was light ſufficient to convince any, but that thoſe to whom the light came *lov'd darkneſs rather than it, becauſe their deeds were evil.* Joh. 3. 19. *That they could not believe while they received honor one of another, and ſought not the honor which was of God only*, i. e. That they were ſo greedy of Applauſe from each other, that they wou'd not impartially ſearch into the truth of that Doctrine, which did touch their Sores ſo to the quick, that they had rather have them feſter upon them, than go to the trouble of ſo ſharp a cure. That the reaſon ſo few follow'd him was becauſe *the way was narrow and the gate ſtrait which men muſt go in at*; and therefore no wonder ſo few of the rich and proud Phariſees cou'd get in at it; they were partly ſo ſwell'd with a high opinion of themſelves, and partly ſo loaden with their riches, that they thought it was to no purpoſe for them to think of going in at ſo ſtrait a gate, while they were reſolv'd to part with neither. Joh. 5. 44. Mat. 7. 14.

That the final ground of the rejection of any, was not want of evidence to bring them to believe, nor want of readineſs in Chriſt to receive them if they did, but it was *a peeviſh, wilful, obſtinate, malicious ſpirit that they would not come to Chriſt*, nor believe his Doctrine (for thoſe import the ſame) but when the moſt convincing Miracles were us'd, they wou'd rather *attribute them to the Prince of Devils than to the power of God.* And tho' our Savior preſently by rational and demonſtrative Arguments did prove the contrary to their faces; yet we ſee thereby it was a Reſolution not to be convinced, or yield to the Truth, which was the cauſe why they did not believe. Joh. 5. 40. Matth. 11. 24. Now from this very inſtance of our Savior's proceedings with the *Phariſees* by rational Arguments, I demand, whether theſe Arguments of our Savior were ſufficient foundations for a Divine Aſſent to that Truth, that our Savior did not his Miracles by any Diabolical but by Divine power, or no? If they were, then it is evident that rational Evidence may be a foundation for Divine Faith, or that ſome motives to believe may be ſo ſtrong, as to be ſufficient evidence of the Truth and certainty of the Doctrine: If theſe Arguments were not ſufficient proofs of what our Savior ſpake, then welfare the *Phariſees*, it ſeems they ſaid nothing but what might be thus far juſtify'd, that the contrary to it cou'd not be demonſtrated. And if the evidence of our Savior's Miracles were ſo great, as ſome ſuppoſe, that the *Phariſees* cou'd not but be convinced that they were Divine; but out of their malice and envy they uttered this Blaſphemy againſt the Holy Ghoſt, to keep the people from following Chriſt; then we hence infer two things: *Firſt, How ſtrong an evidence there was in the Miracles of Chriſt*, when it convinced his moſt reſolute enemies that they were Divine. *Secondly, What power a corrupt Will may have over a convinced Underſtanding.* For altho' the Will may not hinder the conviction, yet it may ſoon ſtifle it, by ſuggeſting thoſe things to the Mind which may divert it from thoſe convictions of Truth; and ſeek to find out any ways to diſgrace it. It wou'd be no difficult task to diſcover in all thoſe inſtances

inſtances wherein the Unbelief of Men is diſcover'd in the New Teſtament, that the Perſons guilty of it did not proceed like rational Men, or ſuch as deſir'd Truth, but were wholly carried away thro' paſſion, intereſt, prejudice, diſaffection, or ſome other cauſe of that nature, which may give us a ſufficient account why thoſe perſons did not believe, altho' there might be clear and undoubted evidence to perſuade them to it. But altho' I aſſert that theſe rational evidences are ſufficient arguments of the truth of the Doctrine they come to manifeſt; yet I wou'd not be ſo underſtood, that I thereby reſolve all Religion into a mere act of Reaſon and Knowledg, and that no more power is requir'd in the Underſtanding to believe the Goſpel, than to believe a *Mathematical* Demonſtration: which is another Objection ſome lay in the way of this Opinion; but it is not difficult getting over it. For the ſufficiency which I attribute to rational Evidence, is not abſolute and ſimple, but *in ſuo genere*, as an objective Evidence. Notwithſtanding this, the whole work of the Spirit of God in its peculiar energy and way of operation upon the Soul, is left intire to it ſelf: But then when the Spirit works as to the planting of a truly Divine Faith, I do not think that it only perſuades the Soul of the truth of a Divine Teſtimony, but withal repreſents the truths reveal'd by that Teſtimony, with all that excellency and ſutableneſs that there is in them, that by the moſt agreeable, yet effectual influence of the Spirit upon the Soul, it cheerfully embraceth that Truth which is reveal'd, and cordially yields up its ſelf in obedience to it. This is the Divine Faith which the Scripture acquaints us with, and not ſuch a one as merely believes the truth of a Divine Teſtimony: and as to the production of this Faith, I acknowledg mere rational Evidence to be inſufficient, becauſe they proceed in two very different waies; the one is to ſatisfy Mens Minds in the truth of the Doctrine, the other is to bring them effectually to adhere unto it. The aſſerting of the one therefore doth no more tend to deſtroy the other, than the ſaying that a Teleſcope will help us to diſcover very much of the heavenly Bodies, doth imply that a blind Man may ſee them, if he makes but uſe of them. Altho' therefore the natural Man cannot ſavingly apprehend the things of God; yet there may be ſo much rational Evidence going along with Divine Revelation, that ſuppoſing Reaſon to be pure, and not corrupted and ſteep'd in Senſe as now it is, it wou'd diſcover Spiritual Evidence to be the moſt real and convincing Evidence. Thus far we have prov'd, *That where there is any infallible Teſtimony, there is ſufficient rational Evidence going along with it, to make it appear that it is from God.*

CHAP.

CHAP. IX.

The rational Evidence of the truth of Christian Religion from Miracles.

I. *The possibility of Miracles appears from* God *and Providence; the evidence of a Divine Testimony by them.* God *alone can really alter the course of Nature. The Devil's power of working Miracles consider'd. Of* Simon Magus, Apollonius. *The cures in the Temple of* Æsculapius *at* Rome, *&c.* II. God *never works Miracles, but for some particular end. The particular reasons of the Miracles of* Christ. *The repealing the Law of* Moses, *which had been setled by Miracles. Why* Christ *check'd the* Pharisees *for demanding a Sign, when himself appeals to his Miracles. The power of* Christ's *Miracles on many who did not throughly believe.* III. Christ's *Miracles made it evident that he was the* Messias, *because the Predictions were fulfill'd in him. Why* John Baptist *wrought no Miracles.* IV. Christ's *Miracles necessary for the overthrow of the Devil's Kingdom.* V. *Of the Demoniacs and Lunatics in the Gospel, and in the Primitive Church. The power of the Name of* Christ *over them largely prov'd by several Testimonies.* VI. *The evidence thence of a Divine Power in* Christ. VII. *Of counterfeit dispossessions. Of Miracles wrought among Infidels.* VIII. *Of the future state of the Church.* IX. *The necessity of the Miracles of* Christ, *as to the propagation of Christian Religion: that prov'd from the condition of the Publishers, and the success of the Doctrine. The Apostles knew the hazard of their employment, before they entred into it.* X. *The boldness and resolution of the Apostles notwithstanding this, compar'd with heathen Philosophers.* XI. *No motive cou'd carry the Apostles thro' their employment, but the truth of their Doctrine;* XII. *not seeking the honor, profit or pleasure of the World.* XIII. *The Apostles evidence of the truth of their Doctrine lay in being eye-witnesses of our Savior's Miracles and Resurrection.* XIV, XV, XVI, XVII, XVIII. *That attested by themselves; their sufficiency thence for preaching the Gospel.* XIX. *Of the nature of the Doctrine of the Gospel; contrariety of it to Natural Inclinations.* XX. *Strange success of it, notwithstanding it came not with human power: No Christian Emperor, till the Gospel universally preach'd.* XXI, XXII, XXIII, XXIV. *The weakness and simplicity of the instruments which preach'd the Gospel. From all which the great Evidence of the power of Miracles is prov'd.*

I. 5. *Hypoth.* *OF all rational Evidences which tend to confirm the truth of a Divine Teſtimony, there can be none greater than a power of working Miracles for confirmation that the Teſtimony which is reveal'd is infallible.* The poſſibility of a power of Miracles cannot be queſtion'd by any who aſſert a *Deity* and a *Providence*; for by the ſame Power that things were either at firſt produced, or are ſtill conſerv'd (which is equivalent to the other) the courſe of Nature may be alter'd, and things caus'd which are beyond the power of inferior Cauſes: For tho' that be an immutable Law of Nature as to *Phyſical* Beings, that every thing remains in the courſe and order wherein it was ſet at the Creation; yet that only holds till the ſame power which ſet it in that order ſhall otherwiſe diſpoſe of it. Granting then the poſſibility of Miracles, the ſubject of this *Hypotheſis* is: That a power of Miracles is the cleareſt Evidence of a Divine Teſtimony, which will appear from theſe following Conſiderations.

1. God *alone can really alter the courſe of Nature.* I ſpeak not of ſuch things which are apt only to raiſe admiration in us, becauſe of our unacquaintedneſs with the cauſes of them, or manner of their production, which are thence call'd *Wonders*, much leſs of mere juggles and impoſtures, whereby the Eyes of Men are deceiv'd; but I ſpeak of ſuch things as are in themſelves either contrary to, or above the courſe of Nature, *i. e.* that order which is eſtabliſh'd in the Univerſe. The Devil no queſtion may, and doth often deceive the World, and may by ſubtilty and the agility of his nature, perform ſuch things as may amuſe the Minds of Men, and ſometimes put them to it, to find a difference between them and real Miracles, if they only make their Senſes judges of them. And ſuch kind of Wonders, tho' they are but ſparingly done, and with a kind of ſecreſy (as tho' they were conſulting with *Catiline* about the burning *Rome*) yet the Devil wou'd have ſome (eſpecially when Ignorance and Superſtition are aſcendants) to keep up his intereſt in the World. Or elſe, when he is like to be diſpoſſeſs'd and thrown out of all, he tries his utmoſt to keep as many to him as may be: Thus when the Spirit of God appear'd in the Miracles of our Savior and his Apoſtles and the Primitive Church, he then conjur'd up all the infernal Powers to do ſomething parallel, to keep poſſeſſion of his idolatrous Temples, as long as he cou'd. Thus we find *Simon Magus* dogging the Apoſtles (as it were) at the heels, that by his Magic he might ſtagger the People concerning the Miracles wrought by the Apoſtles: After him *Apollonius* appear'd upon the Stage; but his wonders are ſuch pitiful things, compar'd with thoſe wrought by *Chriſt* or his Apoſtles, that it cou'd be nothing but malice in *Hierocles* to mention him in competition with *Chriſt*. But thoſe things which ſeem a great deal more conſiderable than either of theſe, were, The cure of a blind Man by *Veſpaſian* in *Ægyt*, mention'd by *Tacitus* and *Suetonius*, wherein there was a palpable imitation of our Savior's curing the blind Man in the Goſpel; for the Man told *Veſpaſian*, *Reſtituturum oculos ſi inſpuiſſet*, *That he ſhould receive his ſight by his ſpittle*: So *Spartianus* tells us of a Woman that was cur'd of her blindneſs by kiſſing the knees of the Emperor *Adrian*; and * *Boxhornius* hath

Sueton. Veſp. cap. 7.

* *Boxhorn. Qu. Rom. qu. 7.*

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produced an old Table in the Temple of *Æsculapius* at *Rome* of ſeveral diſeaſed perſons that were cured there: *A blind Man in the time of* Antoninus *was cured by this Oracle; he muſt come to the Altar, and kneel there; from the right ſide he muſt turn to the left, and put five fingers upon the Altar, and then lift up his hands and touch his eyes, and ſo was cured: Another called* Lucius *cured of the pain of his ſide, by mixing the aſhes of the Altar with the wine, and applying it to his ſide; another cured of ſpitting of blood by the kernel of a pine-apple and honey, uſed three days; a fourth cured of Blindneſs by the blood of a white cock and honey uſed three days upon his eyes.* Theſe are the moſt conſiderable of all the pretended Miracles done about that time, when the noiſe of the Chriſtian Miracles were ſpread ſo far and done ſo frequently, that they challenged the Heathens again and again to bring forth any perſon poſſeſs'd with a Devil; if he did not confeſs to them that he was a Devil, tho' he made the Heathens believe that he was a God, they were contented to leave their blood in the place.

For thus *Tertullian* ſpeaks in his *Apology* to them: *Edatur hic aliquis ſub tribunalibus veſtris, quem dæmone agi conſtet: juſſus à quolibet Chriſtiano loqui ſpiritus ille, tam ſe Dæmonem confitebitur de vero, quam alibi Deum de falſo: æque producatur aliquis ex iis qui de Deo pati exiſtimantur, qui aris inhalantes numen de nidore concipiunt, qui ructando curantur, qui anhelando profantur. Iſta ipſa Virgo cœleſtis pluviarum pollicitatrix, iſte ipſe Æſculapius Medicinarum demonſtrator, alias de morituris ſcordii & denatii & Aſclepiadoti ſubminiſtrator, niſi ſe Dæmones confeſſi fuerint, Chriſtiano mentiri non audentes, ibidem illius Chriſtiani procaciſſimi ſanguinem fundite. Quid iſto opere manifeſtius, quid hac probatione fidelius? ſimplicitas veritatis in medio eſt; virtus illi ſua aſſiſtit; nihil ſuſpicari licebit, magia aut aliqua fallacia fieri. Dictis non ſtetis, ſi oculi veſtri & aures permiſerint vobis.* In theſe very daring words, we ſee how the Chriſtians appeal'd to their Senſes, even with the hazard of their own lives, that they wou'd make even *Æſculapius* himſelf confeſs what he was, and by whoſe power all the cures were wrought upon the Dreamers in his Temples. And for the manner of the Devil's cures, the ſame Author explains it thus. *Lædunt primo, dehinc remedia præcipiunt ad miraculum nova, ſive contraria, poſt quæ deſinunt lædere, & curaſſe creduntur. They firſt poſſeſs the Bodies themſelves* (as Demoniacs were common in thoſe times) *and affect it with various diſtempers, afterwards upon uſing the ſtrange remedies preſcribed by* Æſculapius, *they forſake their ſtation, and the perſon is cured.* And for the cures perform'd by the Emperors, thoſe who conſider what various artifices were about that time uſed to procure an opinion of Divinity in the Emperors, will not much wonder that ſuch reports ſhou'd be ſpread of them, or that any perſons ſhou'd feign theſe diſtempers to give themſelves out to be cured by them. But granting ſomewhat wonderful in theſe, what are they, compar'd with thoſe done by *Chriſtians?* and who ever wou'd lay down his life to atteſt any of them? So that tho' the Devil by his ſubtilty may eaſily impoſe upon Spectators eyes, yet it was impoſſible for him by any power of his own to alter the courſe of Nature, or produce any real Miracle. For every true Miracle is a production of ſomething out of nothing

Tertull. Apol. c. 23.

Ibid. c. 22.

(which cannot be done by leſs than an omnipotent arm) and that either in the thing it ſelf, or the manner of producing it. In the thing it ſelf, when it is of that nature that it cannot be produced by any Second Cauſes, as the raiſing of the dead; in the manner of doing it, when tho' the thing lies within the poſſibility of Second Cauſes, yet it is perform'd without the help of any of them, as in the cure of diſeaſes without any uſe of means, *by a word ſpeaking, the touch of a garment*, &c. Now that all thoſe Miracles which were wrought in confirmation of the Chriſtian Doctrine were ſuch true and proper Miracles, will be diſcover'd afterwards.

II. 2. God *never alters the courſe of Nature, but for ſome very conſiderable end.* For otherwiſe when he did it, it wou'd not be taken notice of, nor thought to be an alteration of the order of Nature, but only ſome rare contingencies which lie hid in the order of Cauſes, but only break out at ſome times: of which ſort are all thoſe things which the ignorant World is apt to account as Prodigies. Of all which rare contingencies in Nature, I ſay, as the *Roman* Orator doth, *Si quod raro fit, id portentum putandum eſt, ſapientem eſſe portentum eſt; ſæpius enim mulum peperiſſe arbitror, quam ſapientem fuiſſe. If all rare contingencies be accounted prodigies, a wiſe Man is certainly the greateſt Prodigy.* But theſe are quite of another nature from true Miracles, which are immediately produced by a Divine Power, and intended for a confirmation of ſome Divine Teſtimony. There are now ſeveral weighty Reaſons, which might make Miracles neceſſary in the time of our Savior, as an Evidence of his Divine Authority and Power.

Cicero de Div. l. 2.

1. *That he came to take down that way of worſhip, which had been at firſt ſetled by a power of Miracles in* Moſes. God wou'd not be ſo much wanting to the Faith of that People, which had receiv'd their Law by Signs and Wonders from Heaven, but that there ſhou'd be as ſtrong an Evidence given to them, that the fulneſs of time was come when that diſpenſation was to have an end, and to give place to one more perfect, which was to be eſtabliſh'd inſtead of it. Upon which account the *Jews* might rationally enquire after a Sign, where any new Revelation was diſcover'd, which might null the obligation of any former Law: and when they enquire ſo much after a Sign, our Savior doth not reject the enquiry as in it ſelf unreaſonable, but as made in an unreaſonable manner; for they wou'd not be contented with the Miracles which our Savior wrought, which ſufficiently manifeſted a Divine Power; but all that they deſired was, *A Sign from Heaven*, i. e. ſuch as were done at the giving of the Law, the Thundring and Lightnings there; or, as the *raining of Manna in the wilderneſs*: Now our Savior juſtly checks this demand as importune and impudent; partly as knowing upon what account they asked it, merely to tempt him; and not out of any real deſire of ſatisfaction; and partly becauſe on that abundant Evidence which was given in the Miraculous cures which were wrought by him, which were more ſutable to that deſign of doing good in the World, than all the Thunder-claps on Mount *Sinai* were: neither were the People in a condition to be fed by *Manna* as they were in the Wilderneſs, God graciouſly ſuting the diſcoveries of his Power to the peculiar advantages of the People which they were made to, and the diſpenſation they uſher'd

Matth. 12. 38. 16. 1.

in. Thoſe terrible Signs at Mount *Sinai* being very ſutable to the ſeverity and rigor of the Law: and the gracious Miracles of our Savior to the ſweetneſs and grace of the Goſpel. And on this account our Savior charged the *Jews* with Hypocriſy, in requiring a σημεῖον, as ſomething above δύναμις, a *Prodigy* rather than a Miracle; *An evil and adulterous generation ſeeketh after a Sign, and there ſhall no Sign be given it but that of the Prophet* Jonas, *i. e.* this People which are ſo far from the Faith of *Abraham*, (and therefore are ſuppoſititious Children) that no Miracles which I do, will convince them, but they ſeek only to have their Humors gratify'd more than their Faith confirm'd by ſome Prodigy from Heaven, ſhall not by me be thus gratify'd; but having done enough already to perſuade them, if they had any heart to believe, inſtead of a Sign from Heaven, they ſhall have only one from the Earth, and that not ſo much intended for the converſion of ſuch wilful Unbelievers, as for the teſtifying my innocency to the World, *viz.* his Reſurrection from the dead. And ſo elſewhere when the *Jews* demand a Sign, it was upon the doing of that, which if they had attended to, had been a ſufficient Sign to them, *viz. his driving the buyers and ſellers out of the Temple:* Which being a thing permitted by the *Sanhedrin* and the *Prieſts*, how cou'd they think ſo mean a Perſon, in appearance, as our Savior was, cou'd ever have effected it, had it not been for a Divine Majeſty and Power which appear'd in him? It was not then the expectation of Miracles which our Savior rebuked in the *Jews*, but being unſatiſfy'd with the kind and nature of our Savior's Miracles. It was their hypocriſy and unbelief which *Chriſt* condemn'd, notwithſtanding the frequent Miracles which he wrought among them: For we plainly find our Savior very often appealing to his Miracles as the evidences of his Divine Commiſſion: *If I had not done the works among them which no man elſe did, they had not had ſin*, i. e. in not believing me. Whereby *Chriſt* both ſets forth the neceſſity of his working Miracles, in order to the conviction of the World, and the greatneſs of the Miracles which he wrought: he did thoſe no Man elſe had done, no not *Moſes* and *Elias*, in curing all manner of diſeaſes by the Word of his Mouth; and thoſe Miracles which they had done, he exceeded them in the manner of doing them. *Moſes* fed them with bread from Heaven; but *Chriſt* multiply'd on Earth ſome *few loaves* and *fiſhes*, to the *feeding* of *many thouſands*: *Elias* indeed raiſed one from the dead; but *Chriſt* raiſed more, and one after he had been *four days* in the *grave*. And upon this very evidence of our Savior's Miracles we find many believing on him. And even of thoſe who were not ſo far wrought upon as to become followers of CHRIST, as the only *Meſſias*, yet we find them ſo far perſuaded by the power of his Miracles, that they looked upon him as a great Prophet, or one that was ſent from GOD. So *Nicodemus*, who came firſt to CHRIST more as a rational Equirer than a Believer, yet we ſee he was *perſuaded that he was a teacher come from God, becauſe no man could do the miracles which Chriſt did, unleſs God were with him.* And before him many of the *Jews* at *Jeruſalem believed in his name when they ſaw the miracles which he did*; yet theſe perſons *Chriſt would not truſt himſelf with, becauſe he knew their hearts* were not ſubdued to his Doctrine, tho' their

Matth. 12. 39.

Joh. 2. 18.

Joh. 5. 36. 10. 25. Joh. 15. 20.

Joh. 1. 49. 2. 11.

Joh. 3. 2.

Joh. 2. 23.

underſtandings were convinced by his Miracles. And after this other of the *Jews* that looked not on him as the *Meſſias*, yet it is
Joh. 7. 31. ſaid they believ'd on him on the account of his Miracles. *And many of the people believed on him, and ſaid, When Chriſt cometh will he do more Miracles than theſe which this man hath done?* Altho' herein they were moſt unreaſonable in believing the Evidence, and not the Truth atteſted by it, in believing Chriſt to be one ſent from God by his Miracles, and yet not believing him to be the *Meſſias*, which was the thing atteſted by them. Not that mere Miracles wou'd prove the Perſon to be the *Meſſias* who did them, but the Miracles prov'd the Teſtimony to be Divine; now that which Chriſt deliver'd to them as a Divine Teſtimony, was his being the *Meſſias*, and therefore by the ſame reaſon they believed him to be ſent from God, they ought to have believed him to be the *Meſſias*; for one ſent from God cou'd never falſifie in the main of his Meſſage, as this was of our Savior's preaching. And hence it is obſervable our Savior did not ſhew forth his Divine Power till he entred upon his Office of Preaching; thereby making it appear he intended this as the great evidence of the truth of the Doctrine which he preached to them. And herein the blind man in the Goſpel ſaw more Truth and Reaſon than the whole Court of *Sanhedrin*, before which in probability he was convented about his Cure by Chriſt; for when they ſought to get ſomething out of him in diſparagement of our Savior's perſon and miracle, he ſharply and roundly tells them, when they ſaid
Joh. 9. 29, 30. they knew God ſpake to *Moſes, but for this fellow, we know not from whence he is*; *Why herein*, ſaith he, *is a marvelous thing, that ye know not from whence he is, and yet he hath opened mine eyes.*
ver. 33. *If this man were not of God, he could do nothing*; (as tho' he had ſaid) is it not plain that this man is imploy'd by God in the World by the Miracles which he doth? for otherwiſe God wou'd not ſo readily aſſiſt him in doing ſuch great Works;
Ver. 31. *for we know that God heareth not ſinners: but if any man be a worſhipper of God, and doth his will, him he heareth*; *i. e.* if this man pretended a Commiſſion from Heaven falſly (whereby he wou'd be the greateſt of Sinners) can we think God wou'd ſo miraculouſly aſſiſt him? but we know by our Law, if one comes with a Commiſſion from God, and draw men not to Idolatry, which is meant by a worſhipper of God; ſuch a one God is preſent with, and we are bound to believe him. And for this very miracle, or curing one born blind, was the like ever heard of before? did ever *Moſes* or the Prophets do it? Thus we ſee what ſtrong Rational Evidence there was in this Miracle of Chriſt in the judgment of this blind man, which he uter'd with ſo much reaſon before the Court of *Sanhedrin*, when he knew how like he was to be excommunicated for it; and yet this very perſon was as yet ignorant that Chriſt was the true *Meſſias*,
Ver. 36. as appears by the Sequel of the Chapter; but upon Chriſt's
Ver. 38. Revelation of himſelf to him, *he preſently believed on him.* How ſtrangely irrational were the *Jews* then in rejecting our Savior, when his Miracles not only exceeded thoſe of *Moſes* both in number and quality; but which was more, they ſaw themſelves the Miracles which Chriſt did, but they received thoſe of *Moſes* only upon the credit of their Fathers! And from the ſtrength of the

evidence ariſing from the power of Miracles it is that St. *Peter* tells the promiſcuous Aſſembly, *Act.* 2. 22. *That Jeſus of* Nazareth *was a man approved of God among them, by miracles, wonders and ſigns, which God did by him in the midſt of them, as they themſelves alſo knew.* He appeals to their own knowledg, which he wou'd not certainly have done, had it not been in a caſe beyond all diſpute among them. Which was a thing ſo notorious among them, that we find the *Phariſees* themſelves confeſſing it; *What do we? For this man doth many miracles:* Now then in a Nation whoſe Religion had been eſtabliſh'd by Miracles, and the certainty of the truth of it, among thoſe who then profeſs'd it, did depend ſo much upon the conſtant credit which the report of the Miracles done at the ſetling of their Law had among them; what cou'd be a more rational and convincing way of proceeding, than for our Savior to manifeſt by a greater Power of Miracles in himſelf the undoubted credentials of his Commiſſion from Heaven; and that he was the true *Meſſias*, which was foretold by their own moſt ſacred and authentical Records? Which will appear more. Joh. 11. 47.

III. *Becauſe the power of miracles did evidently declare that he was the very perſon promiſed.* For if the exact correſpondency of the event to the Predictions in a Nation owning them as Divine, be an undoubted evidence, that they are exactly fulfill'd; our Savior was moſt certainly the Perſon ſo often ſpoken of in the Old Teſtament. For many of the Prophecies of the Old Teſtament concerning the *Meſſias*, if they were not fulfill'd in Chriſt, in the conditions the *Jews* have been in ſince their diſperſion, (which fell out exactly according to the Prediction of Chriſt) it is impoſſible they ſhou'd be fulfill'd at all. So that either the Predictions muſt loſe their Divine Authority, or they muſt be accompliſhed in our bleſſed Savior. For as *Tertullian* ſharply ſays to the *Jews*, *Redde ſtatum Judææ quem Chriſtus inveniat, & alium contende venire; Let the people of the Jews be in their former condition, and then plead for a Meſſias to come.* For can any thing be more plain than that the *Meſſias* was to be born in *Bethlehem* of *Judæa?* but where is that now? and how long ſince the *Jews* enjoy'd any civil Polity there? What is become of the ſecond Temple, in the time of which the Deſire of all Nations ſhou'd come? Is not *Jeruſalem* already deſtroy'd, and the Oblation there long ſince ceaſed, which was to come to paſs ſo ſoon after the *Meſſias*, and did accordingly? Is not *the Scepter yet departed from* Judah, and *the Lawgiver from between his feet*, and is not *Shiloh* yet come? What ſtrange unintelligible Weeks were thoſe of *Daniel*, if they were extended to ſo indefinite; what certain ground cou'd from hence be gather'd of any time wherein their Accompliſhment was to be expected? But not to Expatiate on thoſe things which are already ſo largely prov'd beyond all poſſibility of contradiction, by the ancient and modern learned Writers againſt the *Jews:* To inſiſt therefore on our preſent buſineſs; are not the Prophecies concerning the Miracles which the *Meſſias* ſhou'd work, exactly fulfill'd in Chriſt? *Then the eyes of the blind ſhall be opened, and the ears of the deaf ſhall be unſtopped; then ſhall the lame man leap as an Hart, and the tongue of the dumb ſhall ſing.* He muſt be a great ſtranger in the Hiſtory of the New Teſtament that is to ſeek for Hyp. 2. Tertull. Cont. Judæos, c. 13. Iſa. 35. 5, 6.

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V. Grot. in Joh. 9. 32. an exact fulfilling of this Prophecy. Nay, and the *Jewiſh Midraſch*, upon *Pſal.* 146. 8. ſaith, that when *Meſſias comes, he ſhould open the eyes of the blind*; and the *Jews* themſelves often ſpeak of the great Miracles wich the *Meſſias* ſhou'd do when he appears; and therefore out of their own mouths will they be condemned, when the Miracles of Chriſt make it ſo evident that he was the true *Meſſias*. Hence when *John Baptiſt* ſent his Diſciples to Chriſt for them to be fully ſatisfy'd concerning him; he bids them tell

Mat. 11. 5. him, *the blind receive their ſight, and the lame walk, and the lepers are cleanſed, and the deaf hear, and the dead are raiſed up*, &c. as tho' the mentioning of theſe Miracles was ſufficient to make it appear to them who he was whom they came to inquire after. And therefore it is obſervable that *John Baptiſt* himſelf, tho' great-

Mat. 11. 9, 11. ter than the Prophets, nay, *than whom there was not a greater born of women*, by our Savior's own Teſtimony; yet of him it is ſaid,

Joh. 10. 41. *that he wrought no miracle:* of which no account can be given ſo probable and rational, as that God in his infinite Wiſdom was pleas'd ſo to order it, that the Evidence of our Savior's being the *Meſſias* might be made more clear by the Miracles which he wrought, that the minds of the People might not be diſtracted between *John* and *Chriſt*; he therefore reſerv'd the glory of Miracles wholly to the name of *Chriſt*, that there might be no pretenſe of Competition between *John* and *him*.

IV. Hyp. 3. Another reaſon of the neceſſity of Miracles in our Savior by way of Rational Evidence, is, *the overthrowing the power and kingdom of the Devil in the world*. For which purpoſe it is obſervable that the Devil had ſcarce ever greater power over the Bodies of Men as well as their Souls, than at that time; thence we read of ſuch a multitude of *Demoniacs* in the Goſpel. For it ſeems very harſh to interpret thoſe merely of Epileptical and Lu-

Mat. 4. 24. natic Perſons, both becauſe the δαιμονιζόμενοι, and σεληνιαζόμενοι, and ὠδυνολυομένους, are mention'd diſtinctly, and that it appears by the Primitive Church afterwards how frequent it was to eject the Devil out of poſſeſſed perſons. Nay, ſo far am I from thinking that the De-

Voſſius de Idolat. l. 2. c. 19. moniacs were mere Lunatics, that I rather think with *Voſſius* that the Lunatics were truly Demoniacs, only they were not conſtantly under the power of the Devil, but as their paroxiſms return'd upon them, the Devil loving to Fiſh in ſuch troubled Waters. And

Mat. 17. 14. Luke 9. 39. thence the ſame perſon is called a Lunatic in one place, who is called a Demoniac in another; becauſe he did *ruere in principiis lunationum*, as the *Arabic* verſion expreſſeth it; or as *Ruſticus Elpidius* more fully explains it,

Ruſt. Elpid. lib. 5.

Repſerat in medium rabies horrenda furoris
Dæmonis afflatu, propria qui peſte nocivus
Allidit captas fœdo diſcrimine mentes,
Menſtrua deciduos cum Luna recolligit ignes.

Theophylact is of opinion, that the *Jews* in the time of our Savi-

Mat. 8. 28. or ſuppos'd, that the Souls of dead men became Demons, and thence we read in Scripture of the Demoniacs among the Tombs: but it is far more probable which *Grotius* conceives, that the *Jews* were of opinion, that the Souls of dead men did hover up and down

down about their Bodies, and that these were so long under the Devils power, which many of the *Jews* to this day believe and make use of the instance of the *Pythoniss* raising *Samuel*; on which account the Devils, to favor an Opinion so advantageous to their Interest, might appear with greater terror and fury about their burying places, as we see they did in those possessed persons. But on whatever account it was, we find it evident that about the time of our Savior's appearance, and some time after, the truly ἐνεργούμενοι were very frequent; whether it were that the Devil by such frequent possessions of persons, and making them to do such strange things, might thereby endeavor to invalidate the evidence of our Savior's Miracles (from whence it is probable the *Pharisees* raised their Calumny, that Christ did Miracles by *Beelzebub*, because they saw so many strange appearances caus'd by possessed persons) or whether it were thro' the Admirable Providence of God, which might give Satan the greater liberty at that time, on purpose to heighten the glory of our Savior in dispossessing of him, and thereby to give the highest Rational Evidence, that his Power was of God, which tended so much to the destruction of the Kingdom of Satan.

V. And hence the Primitive Christians did so much triumph, and as it were insult over the Devil where-ever they found him, making him to remove his lodgings from possess'd persons, by a Writ of Ejection from the Name of Christ. Thence *Origen* rationally concludes that Christ had his Power given him from above, because at his very Name the Devils forsook the bodies which they had possess'd, Εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἦν αὐτῷ δεδομένη ἐξουσία, ἐκ ἂν καὶ δαίμονες τῷ ὀνόματι αὐτοῦ ἀπαγγελλομένῳ μόνον εἴκοντες ἀνεχώρουν ἀπὸ τῶν ὑπ' αὐτῶν πολεμουμένων. And he elsewhere tells us, that even the meanest sort of Christians without any Ceremony, but merely by their Prayers, did ordinarily eject the Devil out of mens bodies: ὡς ἐπίπαν γὰρ ἰδιῶται τὸ τοιοῦτον περαίνουσι, πιστεύσαντες τῷ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ χριστοῦ θεοῦ τὸ τῶν δαιμόνων εὐτελὲς καὶ ἀσθενὲς, ὃ πάντως διόμενον ἐφ' τὸ ἠπιηθῆναι ἢ εἶξαν ἐξελθεῖν ἀπὸ ψυχῆς ἀνθρώπου καὶ σώματος σοφοῦ τινὸς καὶ δυνατοῦ ἐν ταῖς λογικαῖς ἐφόδοις τῆς πίστεως ἀποδείξεσι. *Ordinary Christians*, saith he, *most commonly do this, the Grace of Christ by its word thereby discovering the contemptibleness and infirmity of the Devils, that in order to their Ejection they did not want any learned or experienced Christian.* And for this they appeal to the Heathens themselves, as appears not only by the challenge of *Tertullian* already mention'd, but by the Testimony of almost all of them who have writ against the Heathens in vindication of the Christian Religion. Thence *Minutius Felix*, *Hæc omnia sciunt plerique, pars vestrum, ipsos dæmonas de semetipsis confiteri, quoties à nobis tormentis verborum, & orationis incendiis de corporibus exiguntur. Ipse Saturnus & Serapis, & Jupiter, & quicquid dæmonum colitis, victi dolore quod sunt eloquuntur, nec utique in turpitudinem sui nonnullis præsertim vestrum assistentibus, mentiuntur. Ipsis testibus eos esse Dæmonas, de se verum confitentibus credite; adjurati enim per Deum verum & solum, inviti, miseri corporibus inhorrescunt; & vel exsiliunt statim, vel evanescunt gradatim, prout fides patientis adjuvat, aut gratia curantis aspirat.* Can we now think the Devil shou'd not only forsake his Tyranny over the bodies of men, but let go so advantageous a pillar of his Tyranny over the Consciences of men in Idolatrous worship, as the concealing himself was, had he not been forc'd to

Orig. c. Cels. l. 3.

Lib. 7.

Minut. Felix. p. 31. ed. Ouz.

it by a Power far greater than his own? So *Cyprian ad Demetrianum*, appeals to him being the Proconsul of *Africa*, about the same thing (who had written sharply against the Christians) for speaking of the Devils whom they worshipped in their Idols, O

Cyprian. ad Demetr. p. 12.

si audire eos velles & videre, quando à nobis adjurantur & torquentur Spiritualibus flagris & verborum tormentis de obsessis corporibus ejiciuntur, quando ejulantes & gementes voce humana, & potestate divina flagella & verbera sentientes, venturum judicium confitentur; veni & cognosce vera esse quæ dicimus: and a little after, *videbis sub manu nostra stare vinctos, & tremere captivos, quos tu suspicis & veneraris ut Dominos.* Did ever any of the Heathen Magicians (of which there were good store) extort such things from the Devils, as the Christians did, merely by their Prayers, and Invocations of the name of God and Christ? did they ever make them confess to be what they were, not only in possess'd bodies but in their Temples too? that was beyond the power of their *Ephesian* Letters, or any of their Magical Incantations. Did the Devils ever dread so much the Name of *Socrates* or *Aristides* as

Lactant. de justitia. lib. 5. c. 21.

they did that of God and Christ? Of which *Lactantius* thus speaks, *Quo audito tremunt, exclamant, & uri se verberarique testantur, & interrogati qui sint, quando venerint, quando in hominem irrepserint, confitentur sic extorti, & excruciati virtute divini numinis exultant; propter hæc verba & minas, sanctos & justos viros semper oderunt.* And even *Apollo* himself at the name of Christ trembled as much as ever the *Pythian* Propheteſs did in her greatest furies; so *Prudentius* tells us.

Prudent. Apotheos.

Torquetur Apollo
Nomine percussus Christi, nec fulmina verbi
Ferre potest; agitant miserum tot verbera linguæ;
Quot laudata Dei resonant miracula Christi.

To these we may add what *Firmicus* saith to the same purpose,

Firmicus de errore prof. relig.

Ecce Dæmon est quem colis; cum Dei & Christi ejus nomen audierit, contremiscit, & ut interrogantibus nobis respondeat trepidantia verba, vix se colligit; adhærens homini lacerat, uritur, vapulat, & statim de commissis sceleribus confitetur. By which Testimonies it appears what power over Satan, when he was in his Kingdom, the Christians by the power of Christ had; not as tho' the bare name of Christ had so great an efficacy in the ejection of Devils,

Origen. l. 1. c. Cels.

as *Origen* seems to be of opinion (in a discourse about the efficacy of Names, unworthy of so great a Philosopher) but that God might manifest to the World the truth that was contain'd in that Name, he did give a power to such as made use of it, of working Miracles by it. And thence we read in Scripture, that some who were not throughly Christians, but yet profess'd the Truth of the Gospel, and that what they did was for the honor of Christ, *had a power of casting out Devils and doing many wonderful things thro' his name.*

Matt. 7. 22.

VI. By these and many other Testimonies which might be produced out of the Primitive Church, we find an exact accomplishment of our Savior's promise to his Disciples when he took his leave of them: *And these signs shall follow them that believe, In*

Mark 16. 17.

my

my name ſhall they caſt out Devils, &c. This power then in the Primitive Church had a twofold Argument in it, both as it was a manifeſtation of the truth of the Predictions of our Savior, and as it was an Evidence of the Divine Power of *Chriſt*, when his Name ſo long after his Aſcenſion had ſo great a command over all the Infernal Spirits; and that ſo evidently, that at that time when the *Chriſtians* did as it were tyrannize over *Satan* ſo in his own territories, yet then the greateſt of his *Magicians* had no power to hurt the bodies of the *Chriſtians*, which is a thing *Origen* takes much notice of. For when *Celſus* ſaith from *Diogenes Ægyptius* that *Magic* cou'd *only hurt ignorant and wicked Men, and had no power over Philoſophers*; *Origen* replies, *firſt*, that *Philoſophy* was no ſuch charm againſt the power of *Magic*, as appears by *Mæragenes* who writ the Story of *Apollonius Tyaneus*, the famous Magician Philoſopher, who therein mentions how *Euphrates* and an *Epicurean* (οὐκ ἀγενεῖς φιλόσοφοι, *no vulgar Philoſophers*) were catched by the *Magic* of *Apollonius*, (and altho' *Philoſtratus* diſown this Hiſtory of *Mæragenes* as fabulous, yet he that thinks *Philoſtratus* for that, to be of any greater credit, is much deceived, of whom *Lud. Vives* gives this true Character, that he doth *magna Homeri mendacia majoribus mendaciis corrigere, Mend one hole and make three*,) but, ſaith *Origen*, as to the *Chriſtians*, this is undoubtedly true: Διαβεβαιούμεθα δὲ ἡμεῖς καὶ τῇ πείρᾳ θεραπεύοντες, ὅτι οἱ κατὰ χριστιανισμὸν ἀφ' οὗ τοῦ Ἰησοῦ ἡ ἐπὶ πᾶσι ἡγεμονίαν ἦν, καὶ βιοῦντες κατὰ τὸ εὐαγγέλιον αὐτοῦ ταῖς εὐσταχήτοις δὲ εὐχαῖς συνεχέστερον καὶ διόλου νυκτὸς καὶ ἡμέρας χρώμενοι, ἔτι μαγείᾳ ἔστι διαφόροις εἶσιν ἀλωτοί. *This*, ſaith he, *we are moſt certain of, and have found it by experience true, that thoſe who according to the Principles of Chriſtianity do worſhip God over all, thro' Jeſus, and do live according to the Goſpel, being conſtant in their ſolemn Prayers night and day, are not obnoxious to the power of any Magic or Devils whatſoever.* Now then if the Devil who had then ſo much power over others, had none upon the true followers of *Chriſt*; and if inſtead of that they had ſo great a commanding Power over the Devil even in things which tended moſt to his diſadvantage, not only diſlodging him out of Bodies, but out of his idolatrous Temples; what can be more evident, than that this power which was ſo efficacious for the overthrowing the Kingdom of *Satan*, muſt needs be far greater than the power of *Satan* is? For it is an undoubted Maxim in Natural Reaſon, That *whatever is put out of its former place by force and violence, is extruded by ſomething ſtronger than its ſelf*; for if the force on either ſide were equal, there cou'd be no diſpoſſeſſing of either; if any thing then be caſt out of its former poſſeſſion unwillingly, it is an undeniable proof there was ſome power greater than his who was diſpoſſeſſed. Now we cannot conceive, if there be ſuch malignant Spirits, as by many undeniable proofs it is evident there are, that they ſhou'd willingly quit their poſſeſſions to ſuch a Doctrine which tends to the unavoidable ruin of their Intereſt in the World: if then the power of this Doctrine hath overthrown the Devils Kingdom in the World, where-ever it hath been truly entertain'd, it muſt neceſſarily follow, that this power is far above the power of any damned Spirits. Now what folly and madneſs was it in the *Heathens* to worſhip thoſe for Gods, which they cou'd not but ſee, if they wou'd open their eyes, were under ſo great ſlavery to

Lud. Vives de trad. diſc. l. 5.

Origen. contr. Celſ. l. 6. p. 302.

a power above them, which cou'd make them confeſs what was moſt to their diſadvantage in the preſence of their great adorers?

VII. Neither ought the many Counterfeits and Impoſtures which have been in the World in this kind ſince the eſtabliſhment of Chriſtian Religion (among the advancers of particular intereſts and deſigns) make us ſuſpect the truth of thoſe things which were done in the firſt Ages of the Church of *Chriſt*. For, *firſt*, it ſtands to the greateſt Reaſon, that the ſtrongeſt Arguments for the truth of a Religion ought to be fetched from the Ages of its firſt appearance in the World; if then the Evidence be undoubted as to thoſe firſt times, we ought to embrace our Religion as true, whatever the impoſtures have been among thoſe who have apparently gone aſide from that purity and ſimplicity of the Goſpel, which had ſo great power. Then, *ſecondly*, if all that hath been done in this kind of ejecting Devils, where Chriſtianity is own'd, be acknowledg'd for impoſtures; one of theſe two things muſt be ſuppoſed as the ground of it: either that there was no ſuch thing as a real poſſeſſion by the Devil, or elſe there was no ſuch thing as a diſpoſſeſſing him. If the *firſt*, then hereby will be ſeen a confirmation of our former Argument, that where Chriſtianity is own'd, by the power of that, the Devil is more curb'd and reſtrain'd, than where it is not, or elſe is much over-run with ignorance and ſuperſtition. Of the latter, the Ages of the Chriſtian Church, from the 10th Century to the beginning of the 16th Current, are a clear Evidence; Of the *firſt*, all thoſe who have been converſant in the places where *Paganiſm* or groſs *Idolatry* do yet reign, will bring in their creditable Teſtimonies, how tyrannical the power of the Devil is yet among them. If it be not ſo then, where careful endeavors have been uſed for retrieving the ancient purity of Chriſtian Doctrine and Worſhip, we ought to impute it to the power of Him who is ſtronger than *Satan*, who where-ever he comes to dwell, doth diſpoſſeſs him of his former habitations. If the *ſecond* then be entertained as the ground of concluding all things as impoſtures, which are accounted diſpoſſeſſions of *Satan*, *viz.* that he never is really diſpoſſeſſed; then it muſt either be ſaid, that where he is once ſeized, there is no poſſibility of ejecting him; which is to ſay, that the Devil hath an abſolute and infinite power, and that there is no power greater than his, which is to own him for God; or elſe that God ſuffers him to tyranize where and how he will, which is contrary to Divine Providence, and the care God takes of the World, and of the good of Mankind; or elſe, *laſtly*, that thoſe Perſons who pretend to do it, are not ſuch Perſons who are armed ſo much with the power of *Chriſt*, nor poſſeſſed with ſuch a due Spirit of the Goſpel, which hath command over theſe infernal Spirits. And this in the caſes pretended by the great Juglers and Impoſtors of the Chriſtian World, the *Popiſh* Prieſts have been ſo notorious, that none of their party of any great faith or credit would ſtand to vouch them. And we have this impregnable Argument againſt all ſuch Impoſtures, that the matters which they by ſuch actions would give an Evidence to, being ſo vaſtly different from, if not in ſome things diametrically oppoſite to the firſt delivery and deſign of the Chriſtian Faith, it is inconſiſtent with the way uſed for the confirmation of Chriſtian Religion in the firſt publiſhing of it, to atteſt the truth of ſuch things by any real Miracles:

For

For ſo it would invalidate the great force of the Evidences of the truth of Chriſtianity, if the ſame Argument ſhou'd be uſed for the proving of that which in the judgment of any impartial Perſon was not delivered, when the truth of the Doctrine of *Chriſt* was confirmed by ſo many and uncontrouled Miracles. But hereby we ſee what unconceivable prejudice hath been done to the true primitive Doctrine of the Goſpel; and what ſtumbling-blocks have been laid in the way of conſiderative Perſons, to keep them from embracing the truly Chriſtian Faith, by thoſe who wou'd be thought the infallible Directors of Men in it, by making uſe of the Broad-ſeal of Heaven (ſet only to the truth of the Scriptures) to confirm their unwritten and ſuperſtitious ways of worſhip. For if I once ſee that which I looked on as an undoubted Evidence of Divine Power, brought to atteſt any thing directly contrary to Divine Revelation, I muſt either conclude that God may contradict himſelf by ſealing both parts of a contradiction, which is both blaſphemous, and impoſſible; or that that Society of Men which own ſuch things is not at all tender of the honor of Chriſtian Doctrine, but ſeeks to ſet up an intereſt contrary to it, and matters not what diſadvantage is done to the grounds of Religion by ſuch unworthy pretences: and which of theſe two is more rational and true, let every one's Conſcience judge. And therefore it is much the intereſt of the Chriſtian World to have all ſuch Frauds and Impoſtures diſcovered, which do ſo much diſſervice to the Chriſtian Faith, and are ſuch ſecret fomenters of *Atheiſm* and *Infidelity*. But how far that promiſe of our Savior, *That they which believe in his Name, ſhall caſt out Devils, and do many Miracles*, may extend even in theſe laſt Ages of the World to ſuch generous and Primitive-ſpirited Chriſtians, who out of a great and deep ſenſe of the truth of Chriſtianity and tenderneſs to the Souls of Men, ſhou'd go among *Heathens* and *Infidels* to convert them only to Christ (and not to a ſecular intereſt, under pretence of an infallible Head) is not here a place fully to enquire. I confeſs I cannot ſee any reaſon why God may not yet for the conviction of *Infidels*, employ ſuch a power of Miracles, altho' there be not ſuch neceſſity of it, as there was in the firſt propagation of the Goſpel, there being ſome Evidences of the power of Chriſtianity now, which were not ſo clear then, (as the overthrowing the kingdom of *Satan* in the World; the prevailing of Chriſtianity, notwithſtanding force uſed againſt it; the recovery of it from amidſt all the corruptions which were mixed with it; the conſent of thoſe parties in the common foundations of Chriſtianity, which yet diſagree from each other with great bitterneſs of Spirit,) tho' I ſay it be not of that neceſſity now, when the Scriptures are convey'd to us in a certain uninterrupted manner; yet God may pleaſe out of his abundant proviſion for the ſatisfaction of the Minds of Men, concerning the truth of Chriſtian Doctrine, to employ good Men to do ſomething which may manifeſt the power of Christ to be above the Devil's, whom they worſhip. And therefore I ſhou'd far ſooner believe the relation of the Miracles of *Xaverius* and his Brethren employ'd in the converſion of *Infidels*, than *Lipſius* his *Virgo Hallenſis* and *Aſprecollis*, cou'd it but be made evident to me that the deſign of thoſe Perſons had more of *Chriſtianity* than *Popery* in it; that is, that they

Matth. 16. 17.

went more upon a design to bring the Souls of the *Infidels* to Heaven, than to enlarge the Authority and Jurisdiction of the *Roman* Church.

VIII. But what-ever the truth of those Miracles, or the design of those persons were, we have certain and undoubted Evidence of the Truth of those Miracles, whereby Christianity was first propagated, and the Kingdom of Satan over-thrown in the World; Christ thereby making it appear that his Power was greater than the Devil's, *who had possession, because he over-came him, took from him all his armor wherein he trusted, and divided his spoils*; i. e. dispossess'd him of Mens Bodies, and his Idolatrous Temples, silenced his Oracles, nonplust his Magicians, and at last, when Christianity had overcome by suffering, wrested the worldly Power and Empire out of the Devil's hands, and employ'd it against himself. Neither may we think, because since that time the Devil hath got some ground in the world again by the large spread of *Mahometism*, and the general Corruptions in the Christian world, that therefore the other was no argument of Divine Power; because the truth of Christianity is not tied to any particular places; because such a falling away hath been foretold in the Scripture, and therefore the truth of them is prov'd by it; and because God himself hath threatned that those who will not receive the Truth in the love of it, shall be *given up to strong delusions*. Doth not this then instead of abating the strength of the Argument, confirm it more, and that nothing is fallen out in the Christian world, but what was foretold by those whom God employ'd in the converting of it? But we are neither without some fair hopes even from that Divine Revelation which was seal'd by uncontroul'd Evidence, that there may be yet a time to come when Christ will recover his Churches to their pristine Purity and Simplicity; but withall, I think we are not to measure the future Felicity of the Church by outward Splendor and Greatness (which too many so strongly fansie) but by a recovery of that true Spirit of Christianity which breathed in the first Ages of the Church, what-ever the outward condition of the Church may be: For if worldly greatness, and ease, and riches, were the first Impairers of the purity of Christian Religion, it is hard to conceive how the restoring the Church of Christ to its true Glory, can be by the advancing of that, which gives so great an occasion to Pride and Sensuality, which are so contrary to the design of Christian Religion; unless we suppose Men free from those Corruptions, which continual experience still tells the World the Rulers as well as Members of the Christian Society are subject to. Neither may that be wonder'd at, when such unevenness of parts is now discover'd in the great Luminaries of the World, and the Sun himself is found to have his *Maculæ*, as tho' the Sun had a purple Fever, or as *Kircher* expresseth it, *Ipse Phœbus, qui rerum omnium in universo naturæ Theatro aspectabilium longè pulcherrimus omnium opinione est habitus, hoc seculo tandem fumosa facie, ac infecto vultu maculis prodiit; diceres eum variolis laborare senescentem*: I speak not this as tho' an outward flourishing condition of the Church were inconsistent with its Purity; for then the way to refine it, were to throw it into the flames of Persecution; but that the advancement of the

Luk. 11. 21, 22.

Kircher. Propyl. Agonist. ad Oedipum, cap. 2.

flourishing

flouriſhing condition of the Church, is not merely by outward Pomp and Grandeur, and that the Purity of the Church is not inconſiſtent with a ſtate of outward difficulties, which the experience of the Primitive Church gives an irrefragable demonſtration of. Thus much may ſerve to ſhew the neceſſity of a Power of Miracles, conjoyned with the Chriſtian Doctrine, to manifeſt the truth of it by overthrowing the Kingdom of that great *Antichriſt* the Devil, who had uſurped ſo much Tyranny over the World.

IXt. The laſt Reaſon why a Power of Miracles was ſo neceſſary for confirming the Truth of the Goſpel, is, *becauſe the Goſpel was to be propagated over the World without any other rational evidence than was contained in the Miracles wrought for the confirmation of it.* Now the admirable ſucceſs which this Doctrine found in the World, conſidering all the Circumſtances of it, do make it clear what certainty there was that the Miracles which were wrought were true, and they were certain Evidences that the Doctrine atteſted by them was from God. Now this will appear from theſe two things:

1. *That no rational account can be given why the Apoſtles ſhould undertake to publiſh ſuch a Doctrine, unleſs they had been undoubtedly certain that the Doctrine was true, and they had ſufficient Evidence to perſuade others to believe it.*

2. *That no ſatisfactory account can be given, conſidering the nature of the Doctrine of Chriſt, and the manner of its propagation, why it ſhould meet with ſo great acceptance in the World, had there not been ſuch convincing Evidence as might fully perſuade Men of the truth of it.*

I begin with the *firſt, from the Publiſhers of this Doctrine in the World.* All that I here require by way of a *Poſtulatum* or Suppoſition, are only theſe two things, which no Man right in his wits I ſuppoſe will deny: 1. *That Men are ſo far rational Agents, that they will not ſet upon any work of moment and difficulty, without ſufficient grounds inducing them to it;* and ſo much the greater the work is, the more ſure and ſtedfaſt had the grounds need to be which they proceed upon. 2. *That the Apoſtles or firſt Publiſhers of the Chriſtian Doctrine were not men diſtracted, or bereft of their wits, but acted by principles of common ſenſe, reaſon and underſtanding, as other men in the World do:* Which if any one ſhou'd be ſo far beſide his wits as to queſtion, if he have but patience and underſtanding enough to read and conſider thoſe admirable Writings of theirs which are convey'd to us by as certain uninterrupted a Tradition as any thing in the world hath been, by that time he will ſee cauſe to alter his Judgment, and to ſay that *they are not mad, but ſpeak the words of the greateſt Truth and Soberneſs.* Theſe things ſuppoſed, I now proceed to the proving of the thing in hand, which will be done by theſe three things; Firſt, *That the Apoſtles could not but know how hazardous an employment the preaching of the Goſpel would be to them.* Secondly, *That no motive can be conceived ſufficient for them to undertake ſuch an employment, but the infallible Truth of the Doctrine which they preached.* Thirdly, *That the greateſt aſſurance they had themſelves of the Truth of their Doctrine, was by being eye-witneſſes of the Miracles of Chriſt.*

Firſt,

First, *That the Apoſtles could not but underſtand the hazard of their employment, notwithſtanding which they cheerfully undertook it.* That Men armed with no external Power, nor cried up for their Wit and Learning, and carrying a Doctrine with them ſo contrary to the general Inclinations of the World, having nothing in it to recommend it to Mankind but the Truth of it, ſhou'd go about to perſuade the World to part with the Religion they owned, and was ſetled by their Laws, and to embrace ſuch a Religion as called them off from all the things they loved in this World, and to prepare themſelves by Mortification and Self-denial for another World, is a thing to Human Reaſon incredible, unleſs we ſuppoſe them acted by a higher Spirit than Mankind is ordinarily acted by. For what is there ſo deſirable in continual Reproaches and Contumelies? what delight is there in Racks and Priſons? what agreeableneſs in Flames and Martyrdoms to make Men undergo ſome, nay all of theſe rather than diſown that Doctrine which they came to publiſh? Yet theſe did the Apoſtles cheerfully undergo in order to the Converſion of the World to the truth of that Doctrine which they deliver'd to it. And not only ſo, but tho' they did foreſee them, they were not diſcouraged from this undertaking by it. I confeſs, when Men are upon hopes of profit and intereſt in the World, engaged upon a deſign which they promiſe themſelves impunity in, having Power on their ſide, tho' afterwards things ſhou'd fall out contrary to their expectation, ſuch Perſons may die in ſuch a Cauſe, becauſe they muſt, and ſome may carry it out with more reſolution, partly thro' an innate fortitude of Spirit, heightned with the advantages of Religion, or an Enthuſiaſtic temper. But it is hard to conceive that ſuch Perſons wou'd have undertaken ſo hazardous an employment, if before-hand they had fore-ſeen what they muſt have undergone for it. But now the Apoſtles did fore-know that Bonds and Impriſonment, nay Death it ſelf muſt be undergone in a violent manner, for the ſake of the Doctrine which they preached; yet notwithſtanding all this, they go boldly and with reſolution on with their work, and give not over becauſe of any Hardſhips and Perſecutions they met withal. One of the chiefeſt of them, St. *Peter*, and as forward as any in preaching the Goſpel, had the very manner of his death foretold him by Chriſt himſelf, before his Aſcenſion; yet ſoon after we find him preaching Chriſt in the midſt of thoſe who had Crucify'd him, and telling them to their faces the greatneſs of their ſin in it, and appealing to the Miracles which Chriſt had done among them, and *bidding them repent and believe in him whom they had crucified, if ever they would be ſaved:* And this he did, not only among the People who gave their conſent to the Crucifying of Chriſt; but ſoon after, being convented together with *John*, before the Court of *Sanhedrin* (probably the very ſame which not long before had ſentenced Chriſt to death) for a Miracle wrought by them, with what incredible boldneſs doth he to their faces tell them of their Murdering of Chriſt; and withall, that there was no other way to ſalvation but by him whom they had Crucified! *Be it known unto you all* (ſaith *Peter* to the *Sanhedrin*) *and to all the people of* Iſrael, *that by the name of Jeſus Chriſt whom ye have crucified, whom God raiſed from the dead, even by him doth this man ſtand here before you whole. Neither is there ſalvation in any other: for there is none other name under Heaven given among men, whereby we muſt*

Joh. 21. 19.

Act. 2. 22, 23, 38.

Act. 3. 13, 14, 15, 19.

Act. 4. 5.

Act. 4. 10, 12.

must be saved. What an heroic freedom of Spirit appears in these words! what magnanimity and courage was there now in that Person, who durst in the face of this Court tell them of their Murther, and that there was no Salvation but by him whom they had Crucified! Well might they wonder at the boldness of the Men, who fear'd not the same Death which they had so lately brought their Lord and Master to.

X. Neither was this singly the case of *Peter* and *John*, but all the rest of the Apostles undertook their work with the same resolution and preparation of Spirit to undergo the greatest hardship in the World for the sake of the Truths they Preached. And accordingly as far as Ecclesiastical History can ascertain us of it, they did all but *John* (and that to make good the Prediction of Christ) suffer violent deaths by the hands of those who persecuted them merely for their Doctrine. And which is most observable, when Christ design'd them first of all for this work, he told them before-hand of reproaches, persecutions, all manner of hardships, nay of death it self, which they must undergo for his sake. All that he gave them by way of encouragement, was, that they cou'd only *kill the body* and not the *soul*, and therefore *that they should fear him only who could destroy both body and soul in Hell*; all the support they had, was an expectation in another World, and that animated them to go thro' all the hardships of this. Where do we ever read of any such boldness and courage in the most knowing Philosophers of the Heathens? with what faintness and misgiving of Mind doth *Socrates* speak in his famous discourse suppos'd to be made by him before his death? how uncertainly doth he speak of a State of Immortality? and yet in all probability *Plato* set it forth with all advantages imaginable. Where do we ever find that ever any of the great Friends of *Socrates* who were present at his death, as *Phædo*, *Cebes*, *Crito* and *Simmias*, durst enter the *Areopagus*, and condemn them there for the Murther of *Socrates*, tho' this wou'd be far short of what the Apostles did? Why were they not so charitable as to inform the World better of those grand Truths of the Being of God and Immortality of Souls, if at least they were fully convinced of them themselves? Why did not *Plato* at least speak out, and tell the World the Truth, and not disguise his discourses under feigned Names, the better to avoid Accusation and the Fate of *Socrates*? How doth he mince his excellent matter, and plays as it were at *Bo-peep* with his Readers, sometimes appearing and then pulling in his Horns again? It may not be an improbable conjecture that the death of *Socrates* was the foundation of the Academy: I mean of that cautelous Doctrine of with-holding Assent, and being both *pro* and *con*, sometimes of this side, and sometimes of that: for *Socrates*'s death hath made all his Friends very fearful of being too Dogmatical. And *Plato* himself had too much Riches, and withal too much of a Courtier in him to hazard the dear Prison of his Soul, *viz.* his Body, merely for an *æthereal vehicle*. He had rather let his Soul flutter up and down in *Terrestial Matter*, or the Cage it was pent up in, than hazard too violent an opening of it by the hands of the *Areopagus*. And the great *Roman* Orator, among the rest of *Plato*'s Sentiments, had learnt this too; for altho' in his discourses he hath many times sufficiently laid open the folly of the Heathen Worship and Theology, yet he knows not how to bring himself off safe enough with the

Joh. 21. 22.

Matt. 10. 17, 18, 21, 22, 28.

Plato in Phæd.

People; and will be ſure to be Dogmatical only in this, *That nothing is to be innovated in the Religion of a Commonwealth*, and that the *Cuſtoms of our Anceſtors are inviolably to be obſerved*. Which Principles, had they been true as they were ſafe for the Perſons who ſpake them, the Chriſtian Religion had never gain'd any entertainment in the World; for where-ever it came, it met with this potent Prejudice that it was look'd on as an Innovation, and therefore was ſhrewdly ſuſpected by the Governors of Common-wealths, and the Preachers of it puniſhed as factious and ſeditious Perſons; which was all the pretext the wiſe Politicians of the World had for their cruel and inhuman Perſecutions of ſuch multitudes of peaceable and innocent Chriſtians. Now when theſe things were fore-told by the Apoſtles themſelves before their going abroad ſo plainly, that with the ſame Faith they did believe the Doctrine they Preached to be true, they muſt believe that all theſe things ſhou'd come to paſs, what courage and magnanimity of Spirit was it in them thus to encounter dangers, and as it were court the Flames? Nay and before the time was come that they muſt die, to ſeal the Truth of their Doctrine, their whole Life was a continual Peregrination, wherein they were as ſo many *Jobs* in Pilgrimage, encountred with perils and dangers on every ſide; of which one of the moſt painful and ſucceſsful, St. *Paul*, hath given in ſuch a large Inventory of his perils, that the very reading of them were enough to undo a poor *Epicurean Philoſopher*, and at once to ſpoil him of the two Pillars of his Happineſs, the quietneſs of his Mind and eaſe of his Body. Thus we ſee what a hazardous imployment that was which the Apoſtles went upon, and that it was ſuch as they very well underſtood the difficulty of before they ſet upon it.

2. Cor. 6. 4, 5, 8, 9.

XI. Secondly, *We cannot find out any rational motive which could carry them through ſo hazardous an employment, but the full convictions of their minds of the undoubted truth and certainty of the Doctrine which they deliver'd.* We find before that no vulgar motives in the World cou'd carry them upon that deſign which they went upon; cou'd they be led by Ambition and Vain-glory, who met with ſuch Reproaches where-ever they went; and not only Perſecutions of the Tongue, but the ſharper ones of the Hands too? We never read of any but the Primitive Chriſtians who were ambitious of being Martyrs, and thought long till they were in the Flames: which made *Arrius Antonius* being Pro-conſul of *Aſia*, when Chriſtians in multitudes beſet his Tribunal and thronged in to be Condemn'd, ſay to them, ὦ δειλοὶ, εἰ θέλετε ἀποθνήσκειν, κρημνοὺς ἢ βρόχους ἔχετε. *O miſerable People, had not ye ways enough to end your lives at home, but ye muſt croud for an execution!* This was a higher ambition by far than any of thoſe *mancipia gloriæ*, thoſe *Chamæleons* that liv'd on the breath of Applauſe, the Heathen Philoſophers ever reached to, who were, as *Tertullian* expreſſeth it, *Homines gloriæ & eloquentiæ ſolius libidinoſi, unſatiable thirſters after the honor and eloquence of the world*; but the Spirit of a Chriſtian did ſoar too high to quarry on ſo mean a Prey. When the more ſober Heathens had taken a ſtricter notice of the Carriages and Lives of the Preachers of the Goſpel and all their genuine Followers, they inſtead of the common and rude name of Impoſtures, gave them a more civil title of *Philoſophers*, and looked upon their Doctrine as a ſublimer

Tertull. ad Scapul. c. 5.

Idem Apolog. c. 47.

limer kind of Philoſophy, *Non utique divinum negotium exiſtimant ſed magis Philoſophiæ genus*, as *Tertullian* tells us, becauſe the Philoſophers pretended ſo much to Moral Virtues which they ſaw the Chriſtians ſo excellent in; but as *Tertullian* there replies, *Nomen hoc Philoſophorum Dæmonia non fugat, The Devil was never afraid of a Philoſopher's beard*, nor were diſeaſes cured by the touch of a Philoſophic *pallium*. There was ſomething more Divine in Chriſtians than in the grave Philoſophers; and that not only in reference to their lives, and the Divine Power which was ſeen in them, but in reference to the truth and certainty of their Doctrine, it being a true Character given of both, by that ſame excellent Writer in behalf of the Chriſtians of his time: *Veritatem Philoſophi quidem affectant, poſſident autem Chriſtiani; What the Philoſophers deſired only, the Chriſtians enjoy*, which was *Truth:* and as he elſewhere more fully ſpeaks, *Mimice Philoſophi affectant veritatem, & affectando corrumpunt, ut qui gloriam captant; Chriſtiani eam neceſſario appetunt, & integri præſtant, ut qui ſaluti ſuæ curant. Truth is the Philopher's Miſtreſs, which by courting he vitiates and corrupts, looking at nothing but his own glory: but Truth is the Chriſtian's Matron, whoſe directions he obſerves and follows, becauſe he regards no glory but that to come.* And to let them further ſee what a difference there was between a *Chriſtian* and a *Philoſopher*, he concludes that Diſcourſe with theſe words. *Quid adeo ſimile Philoſophus & Chriſtianus? Græciæ Diſcipulus & cœli? famæ negotiator & vitæ? verborum & factorum operator? rerum ædificator & deſtructor? amicus & inimicus erroris? veritatis interpolator & integrator? furator ejus & cuſtos? As much diſtance* (ſaith he) *as there is between* Greece *and* Heaven, *between applauſe and eternal glory, between words and things, between building and deſtroying, between truth and error, between a plagiary and corrupter of truth, and a preſerver and advancer of it; ſo much is there between a Philoſopher and a Chriſtian.* The *Heathens* might ſuſpect indeed ſome kind of affinity between the firſt Preachers of the Goſpel and the ancient Sophiſts of *Greece*, becauſe of their frequent going from place to place, and pretending a kind of *Enthuſiaſm* as they did: but as much difference as there is between a *Knight-Errant* and *Hercules*, between a *Mountebank* and *Hippocrates*, that and much greater there is between a *Greek Sophiſt* and an *Apoſtle*. *Socrates* in *Plato*'s *Euthydemus* hath excellently diſcover'd the vanity and futility of thoſe Perſons under the Perſons of *Euthydemus* and *Dionyſodorus*, and ſo likewiſe in his *Protagoras*; their intent was only like the *Retiaries* in the *Roman* Spectacles, to catch their adverſaries in a Net, to intangle them with ſome captious Queſtion or other: but how vaſtly different from this was the deſign of the Apoſtles, who abhorr'd thoſe endleſs Contentions which then were in the heathen World; and came to ſhew them that *Truth* which was revealed, with an intent of making them better Men!

Ibid. c. 46.

Idem ad Nationes, l. 1. c. 4.

Idem Apol. c. 46.

XII. We ſee the Apoſtles were not carried forth by any mean and vulgar Motives, neither did they drive on any private ends of their own; all that they minded was the promoting of the Doctrine which they preached. Nay they accounted no hazards comparable with the advantage which the World enjoy'd thro' the propagation of the Chriſtian Religion. This ſhewed a truly noble and gene-

rous Spirit in them, which wou'd not be hinder'd from doing the World good, tho' they found ſo bad entertainment from it; yea they rejoyced in their greateſt ſufferings which they underwent in ſo good a cauſe; wherein thoſe Primitive Chriſtians who were the genuine followers of the Apoſtles, did ſo far imitate them, that, *Tertullian. Apol. c. 46.* *etiam damnati gratias agunt*, they gave the *Judges thanks* that they thought them worthy to loſe their Lives in a cauſe which they had reaſon to triumph in, tho' they died for it. And when any of them *Min. Felix.* were apprehended, they diſcover'd ſo little fear of puniſhment, *Ut unum ſolummodo quod non ante fuerint pœniteret, That nothing troubled them ſo much as that they had been Chriſtians no ſooner*, as one of their number ſpeaks. And when the *Heathens* uſually ſcoffed at them, and call'd them *Sarmentitii* and *Semaxii*, becauſe they were burn'd upon the Croſs, one of them in the name of the reſt an- *Tertullian. Apol. c. 5.* ſwers, *Hic eſt habitus victoriæ noſtræ, hæc palmata veſtis, tali curru triumphamus*; The Croſs was only their Triumphant-chariot, which carried them ſooner to Heaven. Now this courage and reſolution of Spirit which was ſeen in the firſt Planters of Chriſtianity in the World, made all ſerious and inquiſitive Perſons look more narrowly into thoſe things, which made Men ſlight ſo much the common bug-bears of Human Nature, ſufferings and death. *Id. ib.* *Quis enim non contemplatione ejus concutitur, ad requirendum quid intus in re ſit? quis non ubi requiſivit accedit? ubi acceſſit pati exoptat?* Theſe Sufferings made Men enquire; this Enquiry made them believe; that Belief made them as willing to ſuffer themſelves, as they had ſeen others do it before them. Thus it appear'd to be true in them, *Exquiſitior quæque crudelitas, illecebra magis eſt ſectæ; plures efficimur quoties metimur à vobis; ſemen eſt ſanguis Chriſtianorum; The cruelty of their enemies did but increaſe their number; the harveſt of their pretended juſtice was but the ſeed-time of Chriſtianity, and no ſeed was ſo fruitful as that which was ſteeped in the Blood of Martyrs.* Thence *Juſtin Martyr* ingenuouſly ſaith of himſelf, That while he was a *Platonic* Philoſopher, he derided and ſcoffed at the Chriſtians; but when he conſider'd their great courage and conſtancy in dying for their Profeſſion, he cou'd not think thoſe cou'd poſſibly be Men wicked and voluptuous, who when offers of Life were made them, wou'd rather chooſe death than deny CHRIST. By which he found plainly that there was a higher Spirit in *Chriſtianity* than cou'd be obtain'd by the ſublime Notions and Speculations of *Plato*, and that a poor ignorant Chriſtian wou'd do and ſuffer more for the ſake of CHRIST than any of the Academy in defence of their Maſter *Plato*. Now ſince all Men naturally abhor ſufferings, what is it which ſhou'd ſo powerfully alter the nature and diſpoſition of Chriſtians above all other Perſons, that they alone ſhou'd ſeem in that to have forgot Humanity, that not only with patience, but with joy they endur'd torments and abode the flames? What! were they all poſſeſſed with a far more than *Stoical Apathy*, that no ſenſe of pain cou'd work at all upon them? or were they all beſotted and infatuated Perſons that did not know what it was they underwent? It is true ſome of the more blind and wilful *Heathens* derided them as ſuch; but who were the more infatuated, let any ſober Perſon judge: they who ſlighted and rejected a Doctrine of ſo great concernment,

which

which came atteſted with ſo much reſolution and courage in the Profeſſors of it; or they who were ſo far perſuaded of the truth of it, that they wou'd rather die than deny it? *Dicimus & palam dicimus, & vobis torquentibus lacerati & cruenti vociferamur, Deum colimus per Chriſtum.* They were not aſhamed to believe in the Blood of CHRIST, even when their own Blood ran down before their Eyes, and confeſs CHRIST with their Mouths, when their Bodies were upon the rack. Certainly then there were ſome very powerful and convincing Arguments which buoyed up the Spirits of true Chriſtians in that deluge of Sufferings which they were to ſwim thro'; it muſt be a ſtrong and well-grounded Faith which wou'd hold out under ſo great Tryals, and they cou'd not be to ſeek for the moſt perſuaſive Motives to Faith, who were ſo ready to give an account to others of the Hope that was in them, and to perſuade all other Perſons to the embracing of it. With what face and confidence otherwiſe cou'd they perſuade Men to embrace a Doctrine ſo dangerous as that was, had there not been Motives ſufficient to bear up againſt the weight of Sufferings, and Arguments perſuaſive to convince them of the undoubted certainty of that Doctrine which they encouraged them to believe?

Tertullian. Apol. c. 21.

XIII. Now that which appears to have been the main ground of ſatisfaction to the Primitive Chriſtians as to the truth and certainty of the Doctrine of CHRIST, was this, That the Doctrine of the Goſpel was at firſt delivered to the World by thoſe Perſons, who were themſelves Eye-witneſſes of all the Miracles which our Savior wrought in confirmation of the truth of what he ſpake. They were ſuch Perſons who had been themſelves preſent, not only to hear moſt of our Savior's admirable diſcourſes when he was in the World, but to ſee all thoſe glorious things which were done by him, to make it appear that he was immediately ſent from GOD. Let us now appeal to our own Faculties, and examine a little what rational Evidence cou'd poſſibly be deſir'd, that the Doctrine of the Goſpel was true, which GOD did not afford to the World? What cou'd the Perſons who were the Auditors of our Savior deſire more as an Evidence that he came from GOD, than his doing ſuch things which were certainly above any created power, either Human or Diabolical, and therefore muſt needs be Divine? What cou'd other Perſons deſire more who were not preſent at the doing of theſe Miracles, but that the report of them ſhou'd be convey'd to them in an undoubted manner, by thoſe Perſons who were Eye-witneſſes of them, and made it appear to the World they were far from any intention of deceiving it? Now this makes the Apoſtles themſelves in their own Writings (tho' they were divinely inſpir'd) appeal to the rational Evidence of the truth of the things, in that they were deliver'd by them who were Eye-witneſſes of them. There St. *Peter* ſpeaks thus to the diſperſed *Jews*, οὐ γὰρ σεσοφισμένοις μύθοις ἐξακολουθήσαντες ἐγνωρίσαμεν ὑμῖν τὴν τοῦ Κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ δύναμιν καὶ παρουσίαν, ἀλλ' ἐπόπται γενηθέντες τῆς ἐκείνου μεγαλειότητος. *For we have not followed cunningly-deviſed fables, when we made known unto you the power and coming of our Lord Jeſus Chriſt, but were eye-witneſſes of his Majeſty.* The power and coming of CHRIST which the Apoſtle ſpeaks of, was not as ſome improbably conceive, either his general coming to Judgment upon the World, or his particular coming upon the

2 Pet. 1. 16.

Nation of the *Jews*; but by an *Hendyades*, by his power and coming is meant his powerful appearance in the World, whereby he mightily diſcover'd himſelf to be the Son of God. Now this, ſaith the Apoſtle, was no σεσοφισμένος μύθος, not like the *Heathen Mythology* concerning the παρουσίαι and ἐπιφανίαι of their Gods among them (which were ſo frequently believed among them, that *Dionyſius Halicarnaſſæus* condemns the *Epicureans*, becauſe they did deride τὰς ἐπιφανείας τῶν θεῶν, *the appearances of their Gods in the World*) now, ſaith the Apoſtle, aſſure your ſelves, this is no ſuch appearance of a God on Earth as that among the *Heathens* was; for, ſaith he, we our ſelves who declare theſe things were ἐπόπται, we fully underſtood this μέγα μυστήριον, *this great Myſtery of godlineſs, God manifeſt in the fleſh*, for we ſaw his μεγαλειότης, *that great Majeſty which attended him in all which he ſpake or did*; we ſaw all thoſe μεγαλεῖα τοῦ Θεοῦ, *the great things of God*, which were manifeſt in him, all thoſe miraculous operations which were wrought by him. Therefore as this was a great confirmation of the Faith of the Apoſtles themſelves that they ſaw all theſe things, ſo we ſee it was of great concernment to the World in order to their belief that the Goſpel was no cunningly-deviſed fable, in that it was delivered by ſuch who were ἐπόπται, *Eye-witneſſes* of what they declared. To the ſame purpoſe St. *John* ſpeaks *ad conciliandam fidem*, to make it appear how true what they delivered was, in the entrance of his Epiſtle; *That which was from the beginning, which we have heard, which we have ſeen with our Eyes, which we have looked upon, and our hands have handled of the word of life, (for the life was manifeſted, and we have ſeen it, and bear witneſs, and ſhew unto you that eternal life which was with the Father, and was manifeſted unto us) That which we have ſeen and heard, declare we unto you.* We ſee what great force and weight the Apoſtle lays upon this, that they delivered nothing but what they had ſeen and heard; as they heard the Doctrine of Christ, ſo they ſaw the Miracles which he wrought in confirmation of it. St. *Luke* likewiſe in the beginning of his Goſpel declares that he intended to write nothing but *what he had perfect underſtanding of from ſuch perſons who had been* αὐτόπται, *Eye-witneſſes and inſtruments themſelves in part of what was written*, for that is meant by ὑπηρέται τοῦ λόγου: *and thoſe things which were written*, he ſaith were πεπληροφορημένα ἐν ἡμῖν πράγματα, *things which are abundantly proved to be true*; for being Matters of Fact, there cou'd be no ſtronger proof of them, than by ſuch who were eye-witneſſes of what they ſpake. And this we find the Apoſtles themſelves very cautious about, in the choice of a new Apoſtle in the room of *Judas*. *Wherefore of theſe Men which have companied with us all the time that the Lord* Jeſus *went in and out among us, beginning from the Baptiſm of* John, *unto that ſame day that he was taken from us, muſt one be ordained to be a witneſs of his Reſurrection:* For, becauſe Christ *was mightily declared to be the Son of God by his Reſurrection from the dead*, (as that which was the great Seal of our Savior's being the Son of God) therefore we find the Apoſtles ſo frequently atteſting the truth of the Reſurrection of Christ, and that themſelves were eye-witneſſes of it. *This Jeſus*, ſaith *Peter*, *hath God raiſed up, whereof we all are witneſſes.* And again, *And killed the Prince of life, whom God hath*

Dionyſ. Halic. l. 2. pag. 128.

Act. 2. 11.

1 Joh. 1. 1, 2, 3.

Luk. 1. 1, 2, 3.

Act. 1. 21, 22.

Act. 2. 32. 3. 15.

hath raiſed up from the dead, whereof we are witneſſes; and both *Peter* and *John* to the *Sanhedrin*; *For we cannot but ſpeak the things which we have ſeen and heard.* And the whole College of Apoſtles afterwards, *And we are his witneſſes of theſe things, and ſo is alſo the Holy Ghoſt, whom God hath given to them that obey him.* In which words they give them that twofold rational Evidence which did manifeſt the undoubted truth of what they ſpake; for they deliver'd nothing but what themſelves were witneſſes of, and withal was declar'd to be true by the power of the Holy Ghoſt in the Miracles which were wrought by and upon Believers. Afterwards we read the ſum of the Apoſtles preaching, and the manner uſed by them to perſuade Men of the truth of it, in the words of *Peter* to *Cornelius* and his company, *How God anointed* Jeſus *of* Nazareth *with the Holy Ghoſt and with power, who went about doing good, and healing all that were oppreſſed of the Devil, for God was with him: And we are witneſſes of all things which he did both in the land of the* Jews *and in* Hieruſalem, *whom they ſlew and hanged on a tree: Him God raiſed up the third day, and ſhewed him openly, not to all the people, but unto witneſſes choſen before of God, even to us who did eat and drink with him after he roſe from the dead. And he commanded us to preach unto the people, that it is he which was ordained of God to be the judge of quick and dead.* By all which we ſee what care God was pleaſed to take for the ſatisfaction of the World in point of rational Evidence, as to the truth of the matters which were diſcover'd concerning our Savior *Chriſt*, becauſe he made choice of ſuch Perſons to be the Preachers and Writers of theſe things who were the beſt able to ſatisfy the World about them, *viz.* ſuch as had been eye-witneſſes of them.

4. 20. 5. 32. 10. 39, 40, 41, 42.

XIV. Now in order to the making it more fully evident what ſtrength there was in this Teſtimony given by the Apoſtles to the Miracles of *Chriſt*, we ſhall more fully manifeſt the rational Evidence which attended it in theſe following Propoſitions.

Prop. 1. *Where the truth of a Doctrine depends upon a matter of fact, the truth of the Doctrine is ſufficiently manifeſted, if the matter of fact be evidently proved in the higheſt way it is capable of.* Thus it is in reference to the Doctrine of *Chriſt*; for the truth of that is ſo interwoven with the truth of the ſtory of *Chriſt*, that if the Relations concerning *Chriſt* be true, his Doctrine muſt needs be Divine and Infallible. For if it be undoubtedly true, that there was ſuch a Perſon as *Chriſt* born at *Bethlehem*, who did ſo many Miracles, and at laſt ſuffered the death of the Croſs, and after he had lain three days in the Grave *roſe again* from the dead; what reaſon imaginable can I have to queſtion, but that the teſtimony of this Perſon was certainly Divine, and conſequently whatever he preached to the World was moſt certain and undoubted truth? So that if we have clear Evidence as to the truth of theſe paſſages concerning our Savior, we muſt likewiſe believe his Doctrine, which came atteſted with ſuch pregnant Evidences of a Divine Commiſſion which he had from God to the World. No Prince can think he hath any reaſon to refuſe audience to an Embaſſador, when he finds his Credentials ſuch as he may rely upon, altho' himſelf doth not ſee the ſealing of them; much leſs reaſon have we to queſtion the truth of the Doctrine of the Goſpel, if we have ſufficient Evidence of

of the truth of the matters of fact concerning *Christ*, in such a way as those things are capable of being proved.

Prop. 2. *The greatest evidence which can be given to a matter of fact, is the attesting of it by those persons who were eye-witnesses of it.* This is the foundation whereon the firmest Assent is built, as to any matter of fact; for altho' we conceive we have reason to suspect the Truth of a Story, as long as it is convey'd only in a general way, by an uncertain Fame and Tradition; yet when it comes to be attested by a sufficient number of credible Persons who profess themselves the eye-witnesses of it, it is accounted an unreasonable thing to distrust any longer the Truth of it; especially in these two cases. 1. *When the matter they bear witness to is a thing which they might easily and clearly perceive.* 2. *When many witnesses exactly agree in the same Testimony.*

1. *When the matter it self is of that nature that it may be fully perceived by those who saw it: i. e.* if it be a common Object of Sense. And thus it certainly was as to the Person and Actions of Jesus Christ. For he was of the same nature with Mankind; and they had as great Evidence that they convers'd with Jesus Christ in the Flesh, as we can have that we converse one with another. The Miracles of Christ were real and visible Miracles; they cou'd be no illusions of Senses, nor deceits of their Eyes; the Man who was born blind and cured by our Savior, was known to have been born blind thro' all the Country, and his Cure was after as public
Joh. 9. 26. as his blindness before, and acknowledged by the greatest Enemies
Luk. 7. 12. of Christ at the time of its being done. When Christ raised up the dead Man at *Naim*, it was before much People, and such Persons in probability who were many of them present at his Death. But lest there might be any suspicion as to him, that he was not really dead, the case is plain and beyond all dispute in *Lazarus*,
Joh. 11. 39. who had been to the knowledg of all persons thereabouts dead four days; here cou'd be no deceit at all when the Stone was rowl'd away, and *Lazarus* came forth in the presence of them all. And yet further the Death and Passion of our Savior was a plain object of sense done in presence of his greatest Adversaries. The Souldiers themselves were sufficient Witnesses of his being really dead, when they came to break his Bones, and spared him because they saw he was dead already. At his Resurrection the Stone was rowl'd away from the Sepulchre and no body found therein, altho' the Sepulchre was guarded by Souldiers, and the Disciples of Christ all so fearful, that they were dispersed up and down in several places. And that it was the same real Body which he rose withal, and no *aëreal vehicle*, appears by *Thomas*'s scrupulosity and
Joh. 20. 25, 27. unbelief, *who would not believe unless he might put his hands into the hole of his side, and see in his hands the print of the nails*; now our Savior condescending so far as to satisfy the incredulity of St. *Thomas*, hath made it thereby evident that the Body which our Savior rose from the Grave with, was the same individual Body which before was crucified and buried in the Sepulchre. And we find all the Apostles together upon our Savior's appearance to them after his Resurrection, so far from being credulous in embracing a Phantasm instead of Christ, that they suspected that it was either a mere Phantasm, or an evil Spirit which appeared among them;

upon

upon which it is ſaid, *They were terrified and affrighted, and ſuppoſed they had ſeen a ſpirit.* Which our Savior cou'd not beat them off from, but by appealing to the judgment of their Senſes, *Handle me and ſee; for a ſpirit hath no fleſh and bones as ye ſee me have;* and afterwards more fully to convince them, *he did eat in the midſt of them.* Now the more ſuſpicious and incredulous the Apoſtles themſelves at firſt were, the greater evidence is it how far they were from any deſign of abuſing the World in what they after preached unto it, and what ſtrong conviction there was in the thing it ſelf, which was able to ſatisfie ſuch ſcrupulous and ſuſpicious perſons. Luk. 24. 37. Ver. 39. Ver. 43.

2. *When many witneſſes concur in the ſame Teſtimony.* Nothing can diſparage more the Truth of a Teſtimony, than the counter-witneſs of ſuch who were preſent at the ſame actions; but when all the Witneſſes fully agree not only in the ſubſtance, but in all material circumſtances of the Story, what ground or reaſon can there be to ſuſpect a Forgery or Deſign in it; eſpecially when the perſons cannot by any Fears or Threatnings be brought to vary from each other in it? Thus it is in our preſent caſe, we find no real diſſent at all mention'd either as to the Birth, Miracles, Life, Death, or Reſurrection of Jeſus Christ; all the Witneſſes atteſt the ſame things, tho' writing in different places, and upon different occaſions; no alteration in any circumſtance of the Story, out of any deſign of pleaſing or gratifying any Perſons by it. Moſt of our Savior's Miracles, not only his Apoſtles, but the People and his very Enemies were witneſſes of, whoſe Poſterity to this day dare not deny the truth of ſuch ſtrange Works which were wrought by him. And for his Reſurrection, it wou'd be very ſtrange that five hundred Perſons ſhou'd all agree in the ſame thing, and that no Torments or Death cou'd bring any of them to deny the truth of it, had there not been the greateſt certainty in it.

There can be no reaſon to ſuſpect ſuch a Teſtimony which is given by eye-witneſſes, but either from queſtioning their knowledg of the things they ſpake of, or their fidelity in reporting them. Now there is not the leaſt ground to doubt either of theſe, in reference to thoſe perſons who gave Teſtimony to the World concerning the Perſon and Actions of our bleſſed Savior. XV. Prop. 3.

For *firſt, they were ſuch as were intimately converſant both with the perſon and actions of Jeſus Chriſt*; whom he had choſen and trained up for that very end, that they might be ſufficiently qualify'd to acquaint the World with the truth of things concerning himſelf after his Reſurrection from the Dead. And accordingly they follow'd him up and down whereſoever he went; they were with him in his Solitudes and Retirements, and had thereby occaſion to obſerve all his Actions, and to take notice of the unſpoted innocency of his Life. Some of his Diſciples were with him in his Transfiguration, others in his Agony and bloody Sweat, they heard the Expreſſions which came from his mouth; in all which he diſcover'd a wonderful ſubmiſſion to the Will of God, and a great readineſs of Mind to ſuffer for the good of the World. Now therefore the firſt thing cannot at all be queſtion'd, their means of knowing the truth of what they ſpake.

Neither, *ſecondly*, is there any *reaſon to ſuſpect their fidelity in*

reporting what they knew: For, 1. *The truth of this Doctrine wrought ſo far upon them, that they parted with all their worldly ſubſiſtence for the ſake of it.* Altho' their Riches were not great, yet their way of ſubſiſtence in the World was neceſſary; they left their Houſes, their Wives and Children, and all for Chriſt, and that not to gain any higher Preferments in this World (which had they done, it wou'd have rendred their deſign ſuſpicious to the curious and inquiſitive World) but they let go at leaſt a quiet and eaſie life, for one moſt troubleſome and dangerous. So that it is not, how much they parted withal, but how freely they did it, and with what cheerfulneſs they underwent Diſgraces, Perſecutions, nay Death it ſelf for the ſake of the Goſpel. Now can it be imagin'd, that ever Men were ſo prodigal of their Eaſe and Lives, as to throw both of them away upon a thing which themſelves were not fully aſſur'd of the Truth of? It had been the higheſt folly imaginable, to have deceiv'd themſelves in a thing of ſo great moment to them, as the truth of that Doctrine which they preached was; becauſe all their Hopes and Happineſs depended upon the truth of that Doctrine which they preached. And as *Tertullian* obſerves, *Non fas eſt ulli de ſua religione mentiri;* for, ſaith he, *He that ſays he worſhips any thing beſides what he doth, he denies what he doth worſhip, and transfers his worſhip upon another, and thereby doth not worſhip that which he thus denies;* Beſides what probability is there Men ſhou'd lie for the ſake of that Religion, which tells them that thoſe which do ſo will not receive the Reward which is promiſed to thoſe who cordially adhere unto it? Nay, they declar'd themſelves to be the moſt miſerable of all perſons *if their hopes were only in this preſent life.* Can we now think that any who had the common Reaſon of Men, wou'd part with all the contentments of this World, and expoſe themſelves to continual hazards, and at laſt undergo death it ſelf for the ſake of ſomething which was merely the Fiction of their own Brains? What ſhou'd make them ſo Sedulous and Induſtrious in preaching ſuch things, that they cou'd *ſay neceſſity was laid upon them, yea, wo was unto them if they preached not the Goſpel,* when yet they ſaw ſo many Woes attending them in the Preaching of it, had there not been ſome more powerful attractive in the beauty and excellency of the Doctrine which they preached, than any cou'd be in the Eaſe and Tranquillity of this preſent World? Thus we ſee the Fidelity of the Apoſtles manifeſted in ſuch a way as no other Witneſſes were ever yet willing to hazard theirs. And therefore *Origen* deſervedly condemns *Celſus* of a ridiculous Impertinency, when he wou'd parallel the Relations of *Herodotus* and *Pindarus* concerning *Ariſteus Proconneſius* with thoſe of the Apoſtles concerning Chriſt; For, ſaith he, *Did either of theſe two venture their lives upon the truth of what they writ concerning him, as the Apoſtles did to atteſt the truth of what they preached concerning our Lord and Savior Jeſus Chriſt?*

1 Cor. 15. 19.

1 Cor. 9. 16.

Origen. c. Celſum. l. 3. p. 127.

XVI. 2. The Fidelity of the Apoſtles is evident in their *manner of reporting the things which they deliver.* For if ever there may be any thing gather'd from the manner of Expreſſion, or the τὸ ἦθος τοῦ λόγου, concerning the particular Temper and Diſpoſition of the Perſon from whom it comes, we may certainly read the great Fidelity in the Apoſtles from the peculiar manner of their expreſſing themſelves to the World. Which they do, 1. *With*

1. *With the greateſt impartiality:* not declaring only what was glorious and admirable to the World, but what they knew wou'd be accounted fooliſhneſs by it. They who had ſought only to have been admir'd for the rare Diſcoveries which they brought to the World, wou'd be ſure to conceal any thing which might be accounted ridiculous; but the Apoſtles fixed themſelves moſt on what was moſt contemptible in the Eyes of the World, and what they were moſt mocked and derided for, that they delighted moſt in the preaching of, which was the Croſs of Chriſt. *Paul* was ſo much in love with this, which was a ſtumbling-block to the *Jews*, and fooliſhneſs to the *Greeks*, *that he valued the knowledg of nothing elſe in compariſon of the knowledg of Chriſt, and him crucified.* Nay he elſewhere ſaith, *God forbid that I ſhould glory ſave in the Croſs of Chriſt.* What now ſhou'd be the reaſon that they ſhou'd rejoyce in that moſt which was moſt deſpicable to the World, had not they ſeen far greater truth and excellency in it, than in the moſt ſublime ſpeculations concerning God or the Souls of Men in the School of *Plato*, or any other *Heathen* Philoſophers? That all Men ſhou'd be bound in order to their Salvation, to believe in one who was crucify'd at *Hieruſalem*, was a ſtrange Doctrine to the unbelieving World: but if the Apoſtles had but endeavor'd to have ſuted their Doctrine to the School of *Plato*, what rare Perſons might they have been accounted among the *Heathen* Philoſophers! Had they only in general terms diſcours'd of the Benignity of the Divine Nature, and the Manifeſtations of Divine Goodneſs in the World; and that, in order to the bringing of the Souls of Men to a nearer participation of the Divine Nature, the perfect Idea of true Goodneſs, and the expreſs Image of the Perſon of God, and the reſplendency of his Glory had veil'd himſelf in Human Nature, and had every where ſcatter'd ſuch beams of light and Goodneſs, as warm'd and invigorated the frozen Spirits of Men with higher ſentiments of God and themſelves, and raiſed them up above the feculency of this terreſtrial Matter to breath in a freſher air, and converſe with more noble objects, and by degrees to fit the Souls of Men for thoſe more pure illapſes of real Goodneſs, which might always ſatisfy the Soul's deſires, and yet always keep them up 'till the Soul ſhou'd be ſunning it ſelf to all eternity under the immediate beams of Light and Love: And that after this Incarnate Deity had ſpread abroad the wings of his Love for a while upon this lower World, 'till by his gentle heat and incubation he had quickned the more pliable World to ſome degree of a Divine Life, he then retreated himſelf back again into the ſuperior World, and put off that veil by which he made himſelf known to thoſe who are here confin'd to the priſons of their Bodies: Thus, I ſay, had the Apoſtles minded applauſe among the admired Philoſophers of the *Heathens*, how eaſy had it been for them to have made ſome conſiderable additions to their higheſt ſpeculations, and have left out any thing which might ſeem ſo mean and contemptible as the death of the Son of God! But this they were ſo far from, that the main thing which they preached to the World, was, the vanity of Human Wiſdom without *Chriſt*, and the neceſſity of all Mens believing in that *Jeſus* who was crucify'd at *Hieruſalem*.

1 Cor. 2. 2. Phil. 8. 3. Gal. 6. 14.

The Apoſtles indeed diſcover very much, infinitely more than ever the moſt lofty *Platoniſt* cou'd do, concerning the Goodneſs and Love of God to Mankind; but that wherein they *manifeſted*
Joh. 3. 16. *the love of God to the World*, was, *that he gave his only-begotten Son, that whoſoever believeth in him ſhould not periſh but have ever-*
Rom. 5. 8. *laſting life.* And that *herein was the love of God manifeſted, that*
1 Tim. 1. 15. *while we were yet ſinners, Chriſt died for us.* And that *this was the greateſt truth and worthy of all acceptation, that Jeſus Chriſt came into the World to ſave ſinners.* They never dreamt of any Divine Goodneſs which ſhou'd make Men happy without *Chriſt*: No, it was their deſign to perſuade the World that all the communications of God's Goodneſs to the World were wholly in and thro' *Jeſus Chriſt*; and it is impoſſible that any ſhou'd think otherwiſe, unleſs *Plato* knew more of the mind of God than our Bleſſed Savior, and *Plotinus* than St. *Paul.* Can we think now that the Apoſtles ſhou'd hazard the reputation of their own Wits ſo much, as they did to the World, and be accounted bablers, and fools, and mad-men, for preaching the way of Salvation to be only by a Perſon *crucify'd between two thieves at Hieruſalem*, had they not been convinced not only of the truth but importance of it, and that it concern'd Men as much to believe it, as it did to avoid eternal Miſery? Did St. *Paul* preach ever the leſs the Words of truth and ſoberneſs, becauſe he was told to his face, *that his learning had made him mad?* But if he was *beſides himſelf, it was for Chriſt*; and what wonder was it if the *Love of Chriſt* in the Apoſtle ſhou'd make him willing to loſe his reputation for him, ſeeing *Chriſt made himſelf of no reputation*, that he might be in a capacity to do us good? We ſee the Apoſtles *were not aſhamed of the Goſpel of Chriſt*, becauſe they knew *it was the power of God unto ſalvation*; and therefore neither in their preaching nor their Writings wou'd they omit any of thoſe paſſages concerning our Savior's death, which might be accounted the moſt diſhonorable to his Perſon. Which is certainly as great an Evidence of their fidelity as can be expected; which makes *Origen* ſay, that the Diſciples of *Chriſt* writ all things Φιλαλήθως καὶ εὐγνωμόνως, *with a great deal of candor and love of truth.* οὐκ ὑποκλέψαντες τὰ περὶ αὐτοῦ ἀναγράψαι ἰσχύσαν τὸ δοκοῦν τοῖς πολλοῖς αἰσχύνην τῷ λόγῳ τῶν χειρόνων φέρειν· *not concealing from the World thoſe paſſages of the Life of Chriſt, which would be accounted moſt fooliſh and ridiculous.*

Origen. contr. Celſum, l. 3.

2. *With the greateſt plainneſs and ſimplicity of ſpeech.* Such whoſe deſign is to impoſe upon the Minds of Men with ſome cunningly-deviſed fables, love as much ambiguity as ever *Apollo* did in his moſt winding *Oracles*, of whom it is ſaid,

Ambage nexa Delphico mos eſt Deo
Arcana tegere.

Servius in 4. Æneid. *Servius* tells us, that *Jupiter Ammon* was therefore pictur'd with Rams-horns, becauſe his anſwers had as many turnings and windings as they had. But the Horns which *Moſes* was wont to be pictur'd with, did only note the light and perſpicuity (from the ambiguity of קרן, which notes *the ſending forth of rays of light like a horn*,) and yet *Moſes* himſelf was veil'd in compariſon of the openneſs

openneſs and plainneſs of Speech which was in the Apoſtles. Impoſtors caſt a miſt of many dark and cloudy words before them; but when they are once brought into the open light, their vizard falls off, and their deformity appears. Such Perſons delight in ſoaring quite out of the apprehenſions of thoſe who follow them, and never think themſelves better recompenſed for their pains, than when they are moſt admired and leaſt underſtood. But never was Chriſtianity more diſhonored, than when Men brought it from its native ſimplicity and plainneſs, into a company of cloudy and inſignificant expreſſions, which are ſo far from making Men better underſtand the truth of it, that it was certainly the Devil's deſign by ſuch obſcure terms to make way for a Myſtery to be advanced, (but it was of Iniquity,) and ſoon after, we ſee the effect of it in another *Oracle* ſet up at *Rome* inſtead of *Delphos*; and all the pretence of it, was the obſcurity ſuppoſed in Scripture. What! Darkneſs come by the riſing of the Sun! Or is the Sun at laſt grown ſo beggarly, that he is fain to borrow light of the Earth? Muſt the Scripture be beholding to the Church for its clearneſs, and CHRIST himſelf not ſpeak intelligibly, unleſs the *Pope* be his Interpreter? Did CHRIST reveal to the World the way of Salvation, and yet leave Men to ſeek which was it, 'till a Guide never heard of in the Scripture come to direct them in the way to it? What ſtrange witneſſes were the Apoſtles, if they did not ſpeak the truth with plainneſs? How had Men been to ſeek as to the truth of Chriſtianity, if the Apoſtles had not declar'd the Doctrine of the Goſpel with all evidence and perſpicuity? Whom muſt we believe in this caſe, the *Apoſtles* or the *Roman Oracles?* The *Apoſtles* they tell us *they ſpeak with all plainneſs of ſpeech*, and for 2 Cor. 3. 12.
that end purpoſely lay ſide *all excellency of words* and *human wiſ-* 1 Cor. 2. 1,
dom, that Men might not be to ſeek for their meaning in a matter 4.
of ſo great moment; that *the Goſpel was hid to none but ſuch as* 1 Cor. 4.
are loſt, and whoſe eyes are blinded by the God of this World; that the 3, 4.
Doctrine revealed by them is a Light to direct us in our way to Heaven, and a Rule to walk by; and it is a ſtrange property of Light to be obſcure, and of a Rule to be crooked. But it is not only evident from the *Apoſtles* own affirmations, that they laid aſide all affected Obſcurity, ambiguous Expreſſions, and Philoſophical Terms, whereby the World might have been to ſeek for what they were to believe, but it is likewiſe clear from the very nature of the Doctrine they preached, and the deſign of their preaching of it. What need *Rhetoric* in plain Truths? or affected Phraſes in giving Evidence? How incongruous wou'd obſcure Expreſſions have been to the deſign of ſaving Souls by the fooliſhneſs of preaching? For if they had induſtriouſly ſpoken in their preaching, above the capacities of thoſe they ſpake to, they cou'd never have converted a Soul without a Miracle: for the ordinary way of converſion muſt be by the Underſtanding; and how cou'd that work upon the Underſtanding, which was ſo much above it? But, ſaith the Apoſtle, *We preach not our ſelves, but Chriſt Jeſus* 2 Cor. 4.
the Lord, and our ſelves your ſervants for Jeſus ſake. If they had 5.
ſought themſelves or their own Credit and Reputation, there might have been ſome reaſon that they ſhou'd have uſed the way of the *Sophiſts* among the *Greeks*, and by declamatory Speeches to

have inhanced their eſteem among the vulgar. But the *Apoſtles* diſown'd and rejected all theſe vulgar artifices of mean and low-ſpirited Men; they laid aſide all thoſe enticing words ἀνθρωπίνης
1 Cor. 2. 4. σοφίας *of the way of the Heathen Sophiſts*, and declar'd the Teſti-
2 Cor. 4. 2. mony of God with Spiritual Evidence; *they handled not the Word of God deceitfully, but by manifeſtation of the truth, commended themſelves to every Man's conſcience in the ſight of God:* Now what cou'd be ſo ſutable to ſuch a deſign, as the greateſt plainneſs and faithfulneſs in what they ſpake? We find in the Teſtimony of the
Origen. c. Celſ. l. 3. p. 135. *Apoſtles*, ἀδὲν νόθον καὶ κυβευτικὸν καὶ πεπλασμένον καὶ πανοῦργον, as *Origen* ſpeaks, *Nothing that is ſpurious or counterfeit, nothing ſavoring of the cunning craftineſs of ſuch as lie in wait to deceive; and*, ſaith he, *it is impoſſible to think that Men never bred up in the Sophiſtry of the Greeks, nor experienced in the Rhetorical inſinuations uſed among them, could ever be able ſo ſuddenly to perſuade the World to embrace that which had been a figment of their own Brains.* The truth is, the *Apoſtles* ſpeak like Men very confident of the truth of what they ſpeak, and not like ſuch who were fain to fetch in the help of all their *Topics*, to find out ſome probable Arguments to make Men believe that which it is probable they did not believe themſelves; which was moſt commonly the caſe of the great *Orators* among the *Heathens*. We find no Pedantic Flouriſhes, no flattering Inſinuations, no affected Cadencies, no ſuch great care of the riſing and falling of Words in the ſeveral Sentences; which make up ſo great a part of that which was accounted *Eloquence* in the *Apoſtles* time. Theſe things were too mean a prey for the Spirits of the *Apoſtles* to quarry upon; every thing in them was grave and ſerious, every Word had its due weight, every Sentence brim-full of Spiritual matter, their whole Diſcourſe moſt becoming the Majeſty and Authority of that Spirit which they ſpake by. And therein was ſeen a great part of the infinite Wiſdom of God in the choice he made of the Perſons who were to propagate the Doctrine of Christ in the World, that they were not ſuch who by reaſon of their great repute and fame in the World, might eaſily draw whole Multitudes to embrace their Dictates, but (that there might not be the leaſt foundation for an implicit Faith) they were of ſo mean rank and condition in the World, that in all probability their Names had never been heard of, had not their Doctrine made them Famous. To this purpoſe *Origen* excellently ſpeaks,

Origen. c. Celſ. l. 3. Οἶμαι δὲ τὸν Ἰησοῦν διὰ τοῦτο βεβουλῆσθαι διδασκάλοις τῆς ἑαυτοῦ διδασκαλίας χρῆσθαι τοιούτοις, ἵνα μηδεμίαν μὲν ἔχῃ χώραν ὑποψία πιθανῶν σοφισμάτων· λαμπρῶς δὲ τοῖς συνιέναι δυναμένοις ἐμφαίνηται, ὅτι τὸ ἄδηλον τῆς πεισμονῆς τῶν πραγμάτων, ἰσχύος πολὺ τὸ ἀφελὲς, ἀξιωθὲν θειοτέρας δυνάμεως, πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἀνυόσης, ἢπερ ἀνύειν δύναται δοκεῖ περιβολὴ λόγων, καὶ λέξεων σύνθεσις, καὶ μὴ διαιρέσεων καὶ πτυχολογίας Ἑλληνικῆς ἀκριβεία. *I am of opinion*, ſaith he, *that Jeſus did purpoſely make uſe of ſuch Preachers of his Doctrine, that there might be no place for ſuſpicion that they came inſtructed with the art of Sophiſtry; but that it be clearly manifeſt to all that would conſider it, that there was nothing of deſign in thoſe who diſcovered ſo much ſimplicity in their Writings, and that they had a more Divine Power which was more efficacious than the greateſt volubility of Expreſſions, or ornaments of ſpeech, or the artifices which were uſed in the Grecian compoſitions.*

3. The

3. The *Apoſtles* delivered their *Doctrine with the greateſt openneſs and freedom of ſpirit*; they did not give out one thing to the World, and another to their private Diſciples; but with great freedom and boldneſs declared their doctrine in the moſt public places, and before their greateſt enemies. They knew they were looked on as deceivers by the World, but yet they knew themſelves to be true, ὡς πλάνοι, καὶ ἀληθεῖς. This is the uſual requital good Men have from the World, that they are looked on as the greateſt deceivers of it; if it be ſo with others, they have much leſs cauſe to wonder at it, when even He, who by one Prophet is ſtiled *the deſire of Nations*, is by another ſaid *to be deſpiſed and rejected of Men*; and when CHRIST was in the World, he was called ὁ πλάνος, *the deceiver*; no wonder then if his Diſciples were accounted ſuch, altho' they manifeſted their veracity by their open carriage and free ſpeaking to the faces of their greateſt adverſaries. The *Apoſtles* neither feared the *Jews* skill in their Law, nor the wiſdom and ſubtilty of the *Greeks*: Saint *Paul* preacheth CHRIST openly among the *Jews* in their Synagogues, and among the *Athenians* he encounters the *Epicureans* and *Stoics*, and preacheth to them JESUS and the *Reſurrection*. If the *Apoſtles* had any thing of deceivers in them, as to the things they related concerning CHRIST, they wou'd not certainly have ſpoken with ſo much confidence concern- CHRIST in the preſence of thoſe who had been his murtherers; but we ſee they appeal'd to themſelves, as to the Miracles which he had wrought among them, and for his Reſurrection they were ready to lay down their Lives in giving Teſtimony to the truth of it. That his Body was gone, was evident; that the *Apoſtles* ſhou'd take it away was impoſſible, conſidering what a guard of Souldiers they had ſet upon it, and how timorous and fearful the *Apoſtles* were, that they fled upon CHRIST's being apprehended. Now what cou'd it be, cou'd make ſuch fearful Perſons afterwards ſo courageous and reſolute as they were, had there not been ſome more than ordinary power to convince and encourage them?

2 Cor. 6. 8.
Hag. 2. 7.
Iſa. 53. 3.
Matth. 27. 63.
Act. 17. 18.

4. The *Apoſtles* deliver their *Teſtimony with the greateſt particularity as to all circumſtances*. They do not change or alter any of them upon different Examinations before ſeveral Perſons; they all agree in the greateſt conſtancy to themſelves and uniformity with each other. As to matters of Indifferency, we find the *Apoſtles* very yielding and condeſcending; but as to any thing which concern'd their Teſtimony, moſt conſtant and reſolved. Had the Goſpel been ſome cunningly-contrived fancy, it had been impoſſible but ſo many different Perſons, in ſuch different places, and under ſuch different conditions, wou'd have varied as to ſome material circumſtance of it: Or elſe they wou'd have been ſo wiſe as to have deliver'd it in general terms, without inſiſting much upon ſuch particular circumſtances, which if they had been falſe, might have been very eaſily diſprov'd; but with what particular enumeration of circumſtances do the *Apoſtles* preach CHRIST to the World? *Peter* tells the *Jews* that it was *Jeſus of* Nazareth *whom he preached*; and leſt they ſhou'd think it was not the ſame Perſon who roſe again, with great boldneſs and freedom of Spirit he ſaith unto them, *Therefore let all the houſe of* Iſrael *know aſſuredly, that God hath made that ſame Jeſus whom ye have crucified, both*

Act. 2. 22.
2. 36.

both Lord and Chriſt. Yea, that ſame individual Perſon who was converſant in the World, and died upon the *Croſs, is now become a Prince and Savior, to give repentance to* Iſrael *and remiſſion of ſins.* If there had been any ground of ſuſpicion as to theſe things, who had been ſo able to diſprove them, or ſo ready to do it, as thoſe Perſons who had crucify'd him? For we cannot conceive but thoſe who had a hand in his death, wou'd endeavor by all poſſible means to diſprove his Reſurrection from the dead. For what a caſe were they like to be in, if thoſe things which the *Apoſtles* ſo confidently preached were true? If *Chriſt had all power now in his hands,* and *there were ſalvation in no other Name, but only in his whom they had crucify'd*, they were like to be in a moſt deſperate condition; therefore if any Men can be ſuppos'd inquiſitive after the truth of theſe circumſtances, no doubt theſe were: And if they cou'd have found the leaſt flaw in their Teſtimony, the World wou'd ſoon have ring'd of it; and the *Jews* who were then ſo much diſperſed abroad, would have divulg'd it into all parts, the *Apoſtles* wou'd have been told of it as they preached Christ in the *Synagogues.* And can we in any reaſon think, but thoſe *Jews* who perſecuted *Paul* as he preached in the *Synagogues* of *Aſia*, and afterwards impeach'd him ſo openly in *Jeruſalem*, wou'd there enquire into all the circumſtances concerning Christ, and all the other *Jews* wou'd write to their Friends at *Jeruſalem* to be fully inform'd of thoſe ſtrange things which were told them openly in all places in their *Synagogues* by Men of their own Nation and Language, concerning one *Jeſus* who was crucify'd and *roſe again* from the *dead?* Had there been now any ſo much as plauſible pretext that any of theſe circumſtances were not true, can we think but that a People ſo unmeaſurably given to their own ways and Traditions, wou'd in all places have vented any thing that might have tended to the diſparagement of Christ and his *Apoſtles?* But we ſee Malice it ſelf cou'd not find any flaw in the *Apoſtles* Teſtimony; for if it had, we ſhou'd certainly have heard of it, either from the *Jews*, or from the great oppoſers of *Chriſtianity* among the *Heathens*, who pretended to be curious and inquiſitive Perſons, ſuch as *Celſus*, *Julian*, *Hierocles* and *Porphyry* were. What reaſon can we have then in the leaſt to ſuſpect ſuch a Teſtimony, which paſſed ſo uncontrouled in that time when it was alone capable of being diſprov'd, and Mens Intereſt and Deſign wou'd put them ſo much upon it? The ſtrength of which will appear in the next Propoſition, which is,

Acts. 5. 31, 32.

XVII. Prop. 4. *No Teſtimony ought to be taken againſt a matter of fact thus atteſted, but from ſuch Perſons who had greater knowledg of the things atteſted, and manifeſt greater fidelity in reporting them.* It is eaſy to make it appear, that ſuppoſing any Perſons at that time had contradicted the Teſtimony of the *Apoſtles* concerning our Savior, yet there had been no reaſon in the world to have hearkned to their Teſtimony in oppoſition to that of the *Apoſtles*; and that on theſe accounts. 1. The *Apoſtles* witneſſed the *Affirmative*, which is more capable of being atteſted than any *Negative* can be. 2. The *Apoſtles* were more converſant with Christ than any other Perſons were, becauſe they were choſen for that very end by him to be conſtantly with him: cou'd any therefore be more capable of knowing the truth

truth of all particulars concerning CHRIST than theſe were? Had there been any ground of ſuſpicion concerning the deſign of CHRIST, why cou'd not the *Jews* prevail with *Judas* to diſcover it as well as to betray his Perſon? *Judas* had done but a good work, if CHRIST had been ſuch an Impoſtor as the *Jews* blaſphemouſly ſaid he was: what made *Judas* then ſo little ſatisfy'd with his work, that he grew weary of his Life upon it, and threw himſelf away in the moſt horrid deſpair? No Perſon certainly had been ſo fit to have been produced as a witneſs againſt CHSIST, as *Judas* who had been ſo long with him, and had heard his Speeches, and obſerv'd his Miracles; but he had not patience enough to ſtay after that horrid fact to be a witneſs againſt him: nay he was the greateſt witneſs at that time for him, when he who had betray'd him came to the *Sanhedrin* when conſulting about his death, and told them *that he had ſinned in betraying innocent blood.* Mat. 27. 4 What poſſible Evidence cou'd have been given more in behalf of our Savior than that was? When a Perſon ſo covetous as to betray his Maſter for *thirty pieces of ſilver*, was ſo weary of his bargain, that he comes and throws back the Money, and declares the Perſon innocent whom he had betray'd? And this Perſon too was ſuch a one as knew our Savior far better than any of the Witneſſes whom afterwards they ſuborn'd againſt him, who yet contradicted each other; and at laſt cou'd produce nothing which in the judgment of the heathen Governor cou'd make him judg CHRIST worthy of death. 3. The *Apoſtles* were freer from deſign than any counter-witneſs at that time cou'd be; we have already prov'd the *Apoſtles* cou'd not poſſibly have any other motive to affirm what they did, but full conviction of the truth of what they ſpake; but now if any among the *Jews* at that time had aſſerted any thing contrary to the *Apoſtles*, we have a clear account of it, and what motive might induce them to it; *viz.* the preſerving of their Honor and Reputation with the People, the upholding their Traditions, beſides their open and declar'd enmity againſt CHRIST without any ſufficient reaſon at all for it; now who wou'd believe the Teſtimony of the *Scribes* and *Phariſees* who had ſo great authority among the People, which they were like to loſe, if CHRIST's Doctrine were true, before that of the *Apoſtles* who parted with all for the ſake of CHRIST, and ventur'd themſelves wholly upon the truth of our Savior's Doctrine? 4. None ever did ſo much to atteſt the *Negative*, as the *Apoſtles* did to prove their Fidelity as to the *Affirmative*. Had ſufficient counter-witneſs been timely produced, we cannot think the *Apoſtles* would have run ſo many continual hazards in preaching the things which related to the Perſon and Actions of CHRIST. Did ever any lay down their Lives to undeceive the World, if the *Apoſtles* were guilty of abuſing it? 5. The number of ſuch Perſons had been inconſiderable in compariſon of thoſe who were ſo fully perſuaded of the truth of thoſe things which concern our Savior; who were all ready (as moſt of them did) to ſeal the truth of them with their Lives. Whence ſhou'd ſo many Men grow ſo ſuddenly confident of the truth of ſuch things which were contrary to their former Perſuaſions, Intereſt, Education, had they not been deliver'd in ſuch a

way, that they were assur'd of the undoubted truth of them? which brings me to the last Proposition, which is,

XVIII. Prop. 5. *Matters of fact being first believ'd on the account of eye-witnesses, and receiv'd with an universal and uncontrouled assent by all such persons who have thought themselves concern'd in knowing the truth of them, do yield a sufficient foundation for a firm assent to be built upon.* I take it for granted that there is sufficient foundation for a firm assent, where there can be no Reason given to question the Evidence; which that there is not in this present case, will appear from these following considerations.

1. *That the multitudes of those persons who did believe these things, had liberty and opportunity to be satisfy'd of the truth of them before they believ'd them.* Therefore no Reason or Motive can be assign'd, on which they shou'd be induced to believe these things, but the undoubted Evidence of Truth which went along with them. I confess in *Mahometism* a very great number of persons have for some Centuries of years continu'd in the Belief of the Doctrine of *Mahomet*; but then withal there is a sufficient account to be given of that, *viz. the power of the sword* which keeps them in awe, and strictly forbids all the Followers of *Mahomet* to dispute their Religion at all, or compare it with any other. Therefore I can no more wonder at this, than I do to see so great a part of the World under the Tyranny of the great *Turk:* Neither on the other side do I wonder that such a multitude of those professing Christianity shou'd together with it, believe a great number of erroneous Doctrines, and live in the practice of many gross Superstitions, because I consider what a strange prevalency Education hath upon softer Spirits and more easie Intellectuals, and what an awe an Inquisition bears upon timorous and irresolv'd Persons. But now when a great multitude of persons sober and inquisitive, shall contrary to the Principles of their Education, and without fear of any human Force, (which they before-hand see will persecute them) and after diligent enquiry made into the Grounds on which they believe, forsake all their former Persuasions, and resolvedly adhere to the truth of the Doctrine propounded to them, tho' it cost them their lives; if this give us not reason to think this Doctrine true, we must believe Mankind to be the most unhappy creatures in the World; that will with so much resolution part with all Advantages of this Life for the sake of one to come, if that be not undoubtedly certain, and the Doctrine proposing it infallibly true. It is an observable Circumstance in the propagation of Christian Religion, that tho' God made choice at first of persons generally of mean rank and condition in the World to be Preachers of the Gospel, God thereby making it appear that *our faith did not stand in the wisdom of men, but in the power of God,* and therefore *chose the weak things of the world to confound the strong*; yet soon after the Gospel was preached abroad in the World, we find persons of great place and reputation, of great parts and abilities engaged in the Profession of the Christian Faith. In the History of the *Acts* we read of *Sergius* a Proconsul, of *Dionysius* the *Areopagite* converted to the Faith, and in the following Ages of the Church many persons of great esteem for their

1 Cor. 2. 5. 1 Cor. 1. 27.

excellent

excellent Learning and Abilities; ſuch was *Juſtin Martyr*, one who before he became a Chriſtian, was converſant with all Sects of *Philoſophers*, *Stoics*, *Peripatetics*, *Pythagoreans*, and at laſt was a profeſs'd *Platoniſt* till he was converted from *Plato* to *Chriſt*, and then found that true which he ſpeaks of in his *Dialogue* with *Trypho*, that after all his enquiries into Philoſophy, ſpeaking of the Doctrine of CHRIST ταύτην μόνην ἄνευ λόγου φιλοσοφίαν ἀσφαλῆ τε καὶ σύμφορον, *I found this at laſt to be the only ſure and profitable Philoſophy.* And when *Trypho* after derides him as a Man of very eaſie Faith, who wou'd leave the Doctrine of *Plato* for that of CHRIST, (for it ſeems by him the *Jews* then had a more favorable Opinon of the State of *Platoniſts* than *Chriſtians*) *Juſtin* is ſo far from being mov'd with ſuch Reproaches, that he tells him he wou'd undertake to demonſtrate to him, ὅτι οὐ κενοῖς ἐπιστάμεθα μύθοις, οὐδὲ ἀναποδείκτοις λόγοις, ἀλλὰ πίστεως πνεύματος θείας τῇ δυνάμει βρύουσι, καὶ τερπνὴν χάριν: *That the Chriſtians did not give credit to empty Fables, and unprovable Aſſertions, but to ſuch a Doctrine as was full of a Divine Spirit and Power, and flouriſhed with Grace:* The proving of which is the ſubject of that diſcouſe. At *Alexandria* we meet with a Succeſſion of excellent Perſons, all which were not only Embracers themſelves, but Defenders of the Chriſtian Faith; for ſetting aſide there *Abilius*, *Juſtus*, *Cerdo*, *Eumenes*, *Marcus*, *Celadion*, *Agrippinus*, *Julianus*, *Demetrius*, and others who flouriſhed about the ſecond Century, I ſhall only fix on thoſe perſons, who were famous Enquirers after Truth, and noted for excellency in Heathen Learning; yet theſe perſons after all their enquiries found nothing to fix on but the Chriſtian Faith, and valu'd no other diſcovery of Truth in compariſon with that. Such was *Pantænus*, who as *Euſebius* tells us, was an excellent *Stoic* before he became a Chriſtian, and was after ſo eminent a one, that in imitation of the Apoſtles he went into *India* to convert the Inhabitants to the Chriſtian Faith, and at his return was made Rector of the School at *Alexandria*; which as the ſame Author tells us, was much frequented by ſuch who were ἐν λόγῳ καὶ τῇ κατὰ τὴν θείαν σοφίαν δυνατοί, *well ſkill'd in Human as well as Divine Learning.* How excellent *Pantænus* was in Human Learning, may appear in that *Origen* and *Hierome* both make his example their plea for their ſtudying of it. After him ſucceeded *Clemens Alexandrinus*, *Pantænus*'s Scholar, a perſon of great depth of learning and exquiſitely ſkill'd in all Heathen Antiquities, as appears by his remaining Writings. The learning of *Origen* is ſufficiently know, which was in ſuch great reputation in his own time, that not only Chriſtians but Philoſophers flock'd to his Lectures at *Alexandria* as *Euſebius* tells us, wherein he read the *Mathematics*, and other parts of Philoſophy as well as the Scriptures; and the ſame Author informs us that the Philoſophers did dedicate their Books to him, and ſometimes choſe him as Arbitrator between them in matters of Diſpute; and *Porphyry* himſelf in his Books againſt the Chriſtians vouchſafed a high *Encomium* of *Origen* for his excellent Learning. In *Origen*'s time *Heraclas* a Presbyter of *Alexandria* for five years together frequented the Schools of the Philoſophers, and put on the Philoſophic *pallium*, βιβλία τε ἑλλήνων καὶ κατὰ δύναμιν οὐ πάνυτην φιλολόγων, *and was very converſant in the Books of the Grecian Learning.* Beſides theſe we read of *Pierius* and *Achillas*

Juſtin. Dialog. cum Tryph. p. 125. ed. Par.

Euſeb. Hiſt. Eccl. l. 5. c. 10.

Ibid. l. 6. c. 20.

Ibid. l. 6. c. 18.

Ibid. l. 6. c. 20.

Nicephor. Hist. Eccl. l. 6. c. 35.

chillas two Presbyters of *Alexandria*, who were τῇ καθ' ἑκάστας παιδείᾳ καὶ φιλοσοφίᾳ δεδοκιμασμένοι, as *Nicephorus Caliſtus* ſpeaks, *Perſons well skilled in the Grecian Learning and Philoſophy*. If from *Alexandria* we go to *Cæſarea*, there we not only meet with a School of learning among the Chriſtians, but with perſons very eminent in all kinds of learning; ſuch were the famous *Pamphilus* and *Euſebius* ſo great an admirer of him, that ever ſince he is called *Euſebius Pamphili*. At *Antioch* was *Dorotheus* ἀνὴρ παντοίων λόγων καὶ παιδείας ἐλλογίμου, as *Nicephorus* ſpeaks, *a perſon verſed in all kind of ingenuous Literature*. *Anatolius* Biſhop of *Laodicea*, one verſed in *Geometry*, *Aſtronomy*, and all kind of *Philoſophy*, as well as the Doctrine of CHRIST. Thus we ſee how in thoſe early days of the *Greek* Church what excellent perſons many of thoſe were who were zealous Profeſſors of Chriſtianity; and concerning thoſe of the *Latin* Church, I ſhall only mention that Speech of St. *Auſtin* who was himſelf an inſtance of the ſame nature and a Star of the firſt magnitude among them. *Nonne aſpicimus quanto auro & argento & veſte ſuffarcinatus exierit de Ægypto Cyprianus Doctor ſuaviſſimus & Martyr beatiſſimus? quanto Lactantius? quanto Victorinus, Optatus, Hilarius? ut de vivis taceam: quanto innumerabiles Græci? quod prior ipſe fideliſſimus Dei ſervus Moſes fecerat, de quo ſcriptum eſt, quod eruditus fuerit omni ſapientia Ægyptiorum.* To whoſe Catalogue of learned perſons, among the *Latin* Chriſtians *Tertullian*, *Arnobius* and ſeveral others may be deſervedly added. But as St. *Auſtin* there well obſerves, *tho' the* Iſraelites *went rich out of* Ægypt, *yet it was their eating the Paſſover which ſaved them from deſtruction*; ſo tho' theſe were accompliſhed with thoſe perfections and riches of the Soul, the ornaments of Learning, yet it was their eating the true Paſſover which was CHRIST, by their adhering to his Doctrine, was that which wou'd be of more advantage to them, than all their Accompliſhments wou'd be. Now then ſince in the firſt Ages of the Chriſtian Church, we find not only innumerable multitudes of Perſons of great Integrity and Sobriety in their Lives embracing the Doctrine of CHRIST, but ſo many Perſons that were curious enquirers after the truth of things; we can certainly have no reaſon to diſtruſt ſuch a Teſtimony which was receiv'd in ſo unanimous a manner by perſons as able to judge of the truth of things, and as fearful of being deceiv'd in reference to them as any now in the World can be.

Idem lib. 6. c. 36.

S. Auguſtin. de doctr. Chriſtiana, l. 2. cap. 40.

XIX. 2. As this Teſtimony was receiv'd by perſons inquiſitive after the Truth of things, ſo *the Doctrine conveyed by it was a matter of the higheſt moment in the world:* and therefore we cannot conceive but perſons ordinarily inquiſitive about other things wou'd be more than ordinarily ſo about this, becauſe their eternal welfare and happineſs did depend upon it. All Perſons that are truly Religious, muſt at leaſt be allow'd to be perſons very inquiſitive after the ſtate and condition of their Souls when they ſhall be diſlodged from their Bodies. And if we do but grant this, can we in any reaſon think that ſuch a multitude of perſons in ſo many Ages ſhou'd continue venturing their Souls upon a Teſtimony which they had no aſſurance of the truth of? And that none of all theſe perſons, tho' Men otherwiſe Rational and Judicious, ſhou'd

ſhou'd be able to diſcover the Falſity of that Doctrine they went upon, if at leaſt any upon conſideration of it can imagine it to be ſo? It is not reconcilable with the general preſumption of Human Nature concerning Divine Providence and the Care God takes of the welfare of Men, to ſuffer ſo many perſons who ſincerely deſire to ſerve God in the way which is moſt pleaſing to him, to go on in ſuch a continual Deluſion, and never have it at all diſcover'd to them. If all Men then who have believ'd the Doctrine of Christ to be the only way to Salvation have been deceiv'd, either we muſt deny altogether a Divine Providence, or ſay the Devil hath more power to deceive Men than God hath to direct them, which is worſe than the former; or elſe aſſert that there are no ſuch things at all as either God or Devils, but that all things come to paſs by Chance and Fortune: and if ſo, it is ſtill more inexplicable why ſuch multitudes of rational and ſerious Men, and the moſt inquiſitive part of the World as to ſuch things ſhou'd all be ſo poſſeſs'd with the truth and certainty of theſe things; and the more prophane, wicked and ignorant any perſons are, the more prone they are to mock and deride them. If ſuch Men then ſee more into Truth and Reaſon than the ſober and judicious part of Mankind, let us bid adieu to Humanity and adore the Brutes, ſince we admire their judgment moſt who come the neareſt to them.

3. *The multitude of theſe perſons thus conſenting in this Teſtimony, could have no other engagements to this conſent, but only their firm perſuaſion of the truth of the Doctrine conveyed by it*; becauſe thoſe who unanimouſly agree in this thing are ſuch perſons, whoſe other designs and intereſts in this World differ as much as any Men's do. If it had been only a conſent of the *Jews*, there might have been ſome probable pretence to have ſuſpected a matter of Intereſt in it; but as to this thing, we find the *Jews* divided among themſelves about it; and the ſtiffeſt deniers of the truth of it, do yet inviolably preſerve thoſe ſacred Records among them, from which the Truth of the Doctrine of Christ may be undoubtedly prov'd. Had the Chriſtian Religion been enforced upon the World by the *Roman* Emperors at the time of its firſt promulgation, there wou'd have been ſome ſuſpicion of particular deſign in it; but it came with no other ſtrength but the evidence of its own Truth; yet it found ſudden and ſtrange entertainment among perſons of all Nations and Degrees of Men. In a ſhort time it had eaten into the heart of the *Roman* Empire, and made ſo large a ſpread therein, that it made *Tertullian* ſay, *Heſterni ſumus, & veſtra omnia implevimus, urbes, inſulas, caſtella, municipia, conciliabula, caſtra ipſa, tribus, decurias, palatium, ſenatum, forum; ſola vobis relinquimus Templa. We have but newly appeared*, ſaith he, *and yet we have filled all places with our Company, but only your Temples*; and before ſpeaking of the Heathens, *Obſeſſam vociferantur civitatem, in agris, in caſtellis, in inſulis Chriſtianos, omnem ſexum, ætatem, conditionem, etiam dignitatem tranſgredi ad hoc nomen quaſi detrimento mœrent. All ſorts and conditions of Men in all places, were ſuddenly become Chriſtians.* What common tye cou'd there be now to unite all theſe perſons together, if we ſet aſide the undoubted truth and

Tertull. Apol. c. 36.

Ibid. c. 1.

certainty of the Doctrine of Christ which was first preached to them by such who were Eye-witnesses of Christ's Actions, and had left sacred Records behind them, containing the substance of the Doctrine of Christ, and those admirable Instructions which were their only certain Guides in the way to Heaven?

4. *Because many persons do join in this consent with true Christians, who yet could heartily wish that the Doctrine of Chrianity were not true.* Such are all those persons who are sensual in their Lives, and walk not according to the Rules of the Gospel, yet dare not question or deny the Truth of it. Such who cou'd heartily wish there were no future State, nor Judgment to come, that they might indulge themselves in this World without fear of another; yet their Consciences are so far convinced of, and aw'd by the truth of these things, that they raise many perplexities and anxieties in their Minds which they wou'd most willingly be rid of; which they can never throughly be, till instead of having the name of Christians, they come to live the Life of Christians, and become experimentally acquainted with the Truth and Power of Religion. And withal we find that the more Men have been acquainted with the practice of Christianity, the greater Evidence they have had of the truth of it, and been more fully and rationally persuaded of it. To such I grant there are such powerful Evidences of the truth of the Doctrine of Christ by the effectual workings of the Spirit of God upon their Souls, that all other Arguments, as to their own satisfaction, may fall short of these. As to which, those Verses of the Poet *Dantes*, render'd into *Latin* by *F. S.* are very pertinent and significant; for when he had introduced the Apostle *Peter*, asking him what it was which his Faith was founded on, he answers,

Deinde exivit ex luce profunda
Quæ illic splendebat pretiosa gemma,
Super quam omnis virtus fundatur.

i. e. *That God was pleased by immediate revelation of himself, to discover that Divine Truth to the World whereon our Faith doth stand as on its sure foundation*; but when the Apostle goes on to enquire how he knew this at first came from God, his answer to that is,

——*larga pluvia*
Spiritus Sancti, quæ est diffusa
Super veteres & super novas membranas,
Est syllogismus ille qui eam mihi concluſit
Adeo acute, ut præ illa demonstratione
Omnis demonstratio alia mihi videatur obtusa.

i. e. *That the Spirit of God doth so fully discover it self both in the Old and New Testament, that all other Arguments are but dull and heavy if compared with this.* It is true they are so to a truly inlightned Conscience which discovers so much Beauty and Glory in the Scriptures, that they ravish the Soul, altho' it be unable to give so full an account of this unto others who want

the Eyes to ſee that Beauty with, which a Heart truly gracious hath. We ſee ordinarily in the World, that the attraction of Beauty is an unaccountable thing; and one may diſcern that which raviſheth him, which another looks on as mean and ordinary; and why may it not be much more thus in Divine objects which want Spiritual Eyes to diſcover them? Therefore I grant that good Men enjoy that ſatisfaction to their own Conſciences, as to the truth of the Doctrine of CHRIST, which others cannot attain to; but yet I ſay, that ſuch do likewiſe ſee the moſt ſtrong, rational and convincing Evidence which doth induce them to believe; which Evidence is then moſt convincing, when it is ſeconded by the peculiar Energy of the Spirit of GOD upon the Souls of true Believers. But yet we ſee that the power and force of the truth of theſe things may be ſo great, even upon ſuch Minds which are not yet moulded into the faſhion of true Goodneſs, that it may awe with its light and clearneſs, where it doth not ſoften and alter by its heat and influence. Now whence can it be that ſuch convictions ſhou'd ſtick ſo faſt in the Minds of thoſe who wou'd fain pull out thoſe piercing arrows, but that there is a greater power in them than they are Maſters of, and they cannot ſtand againſt the force whereby they come upon them; nor find any Salve to cure the wounds which are made within them, but by thoſe weapons which were the cauſes of them? And therefore when wicked Perſons under conflicts of Conſcience, cannot eaſe themſelves by direct *Atheiſm*, or finding reaſon to caſt off ſuch convictions by diſcerning any invalidity in the Teſtimony whereon the truth of theſe things depends, it is a certain Argument that there is abundant truth in that Teſtimony, when Men wou'd fain perſuade themſelves to believe the contrary, and yet cannot.

5. The truth of this conſent appears, *from the unanimity of it among thoſe Perſons who have yet ſtrangely differ'd from each other in many controverſies in Religion.* We ſee thereby this unanimity is no forced or deſign'd thing, becauſe we ſee the Perſons agreeing in this, do very much diſagree from each other in other things. And the ſame grounds and reaſons whereon they diſagree as to other things, wou'd have held as to theſe too, were there not greater evidence of the certainty of theſe things, than of thoſe they fall out about. It hath not yet become a Queſtion among thoſe who differ ſo much about the ſenſe of Scripture, whether the Scripture it ſelf be the Word of GOD, altho' the very accounts on which we are to believe it to be ſo, hath been the ſubject of no mean Controverſies. All the divided parts of the Chriſtian World do yet fully agree in the matters of fact, viz. *That there was ſuch a Perſon as* JESUS CHRIST, *and that he did many great Miracles, that he died on the Croſs at* Jeruſalem, *and roſe again from the dead*; now theſe contain the great foundations of *Chriſtian Faith*, and therefore the multitude of other Controverſies in the World ought to be ſo far from weakning our Faith, as to the truth of the Doctrine of CHRIST (which Men of weak judgments and *Atheiſtical* Spirits pretend) that it ought to be a ſtrong confirmation of it, when we ſee Perſons which ſo peeviſhly quarrel with each other about ſome inferior and leſs weighty parts of Religion, do yet unanimouſly conſent in the principal foundations of *Chriſtian Faith*,

Faith, and ſuch whereon the neceſſity of Faith and Obedience, as the way to Salvation, doth more immediately depend. And this may be one great Reaſon why the infinitely wiſe God may ſuffer ſuch lamentable Contentions and Diviſions to be in the Chriſtian World, that thereby inquiſitive Perſons may ſee that if Religion had been a mere Deſign of ſome few politic Perſons, the quarrelſom World (where it is not held in by force) wou'd never have conſented ſo long in the owning ſuch common Principles which all the other Controverſies are built upon. And altho' it be continually ſeen that in divided parties, one is apt to run from any thing which is receiv'd by the other, and Men generally think they can never run far enough from them whoſe Errors they have diſcover'd, that yet this Principle hath not carried any conſiderable party of the Chriſtian World (out of their indignation againſt thoſe great corruptions which have crept into the World under a pretence of Religion) to the diſowning the foundation of *Chriſtian Faith*, muſt be partly imputed to the ſignal hand of Divine Providence, and partly to thoſe ſtrong Evidences which there are of the truth of that Teſtimony which conveys to us the foundations of *Chriſtian Faith*. Thus we ſee now, how great and uncontrouled this conſent is, as to the matters of fact deliver'd down from the eye-witneſſes of them, concerning the Actions and Miracles of our Bleſſed Savior, (which are contain'd in the Scriptures as authentic Records of them,) and what a ſure foundation there is for a firm aſſent to the truth of the things from ſo univerſal and uninterrupted a Tradition.

XX. Thus far we have now manifeſted the neceſſity of the Miracles of Christ, in order to the propagation of *Chriſtianity* in the World, from the conſideration of the Perſons who were to propagate it in the World; the next thing we are to conſider, is, the admirable ſucceſs which the Goſpel met with in the World upon its being preached to it: Of which no rational account can be given, unleſs the Actions and Miracles of our Savior were moſt undoubtedly true. That the Goſpel of Christ had very ſtrange and wonderful ſucceſs upon its firſt preaching, hath been partly diſcover'd already, and is withal ſo plain from the long continuance of it in theſe *European* parts, that none any ways converſant in the Hiſtory of former Ages, can have any ground to queſtion it. But that this ſtrange and admirable ſucceſs of the Doctrine of Christ ſhou'd be an Evidence of the truth of it, and the Miracles wrought in confirmation of it, will appear from theſe two Conſiderations. 1. *That the Doctrine it ſelf was ſo directly contrary to the general inclinations of the World.* 2. *That the propagation of it was ſo much oppoſed by all worldly power.*

1. *That the Doctrine it ſelf was ſo oppoſite to the general inclinations of the World.* The Doctrine may be conſider'd either as to its *credenda*, or matters of Faith, or as to its *agenda*, or matters of Life and Practice; both theſe were contrary to the inclinations of the World; the former ſeem'd hard and incredible, the latter harſh and impoſſible.

1. The Matters of Faith which were to be believ'd by the World, were not ſuch things which we may imagin the vulgar ſort of Men wou'd be very forward to run after, nor very greedy to embrace.

1. *Be-*

1. *Becauſe contrary to the Principles of their Education, and the Religion they were brought up in;* the generality of Mankind is very tenacious of thoſe Principles and Prejudices which are ſucked in in the time of Infancy. There are ſome Religions one would think it were impoſſible that any rational Men ſhould believe them; but only on this account, becauſe they are bred up under them. It is a very great advantage any Religion hath againſt another, that it comes to ſpeak firſt, and thereby inſinuates ſuch an apprehenſion of its ſelf to the Mind, that it is very hard removing it afterwards. The Underſtanding ſeems to be of the nature of thoſe things which are *communis juris*, and therefore *primi ſunt poſſidentis*; when an Opinion hath once got poſſeſſion of the Mind, it uſually keeps out whatever comes to diſturb it. Now we cannot otherwiſe conceive but all thoſe Perſons who had been bred up under *Paganiſm* and the moſt groſs Idolatry, muſt needs have a very potent Prejudice againſt ſuch a Doctrine which was wholly irreconcilable with that Religion which they had been devoted to. Now the ſtronger the Prejudice is which is convey'd into Mens Minds by the force of Education, the greater ſtrength and power muſt there needs be in the Goſpel of CHRIST, which did ſo eaſily demoliſh theſe ſtrong holds, and captivate the Underſtandings of Men to the obedience of CHRIST. To which purpoſe *Arnobius* excellently ſpeaks in theſe words to the *Heathens*; *Sed non creditis geſta hæc. Sed qui ea conſpicati ſunt fieri & ſub oculis ſuis viderunt agi, teſtes optimi certiſſimique auctores, & crediderunt hæc ipſi, & credenda poſteris nobis haud exilibus cum approbationibus tradiderunt. Quinam iſti fortaſſe quæritis? gentes, populi, nationes & incredulum illud genus humanum. Quod niſi aperta res eſſet, & luce ipſa quemadmodum dicitur clarior, nunquam rebus hujuſmodi credulitatis ſuæ commodarent aſſenſum. An nunquid dicemus illius temporis homines uſque adeo fuiſſe vanos, mendaces, ſtolidos, brutos, ut quæ nunquam viderant vidiſſe ſe fingerent? & quæ facta omnino non erant falſis proderent teſtimoniis aut puerili aſſertione firmarent? Cumque poſſent vobiſcum & unanimiter vivere, & inoffenſas ducere conjunctiones, gratuita ſuſciperent odia & execrabili haberentur in nomine? Quod ſi falſa ut dicitis hiſtoria illa rerum eſt, unde tam brevi tempore totus mundus iſta religione completus eſt? Aut in unam coire qui potuerunt mentem gentes regionibus diſſitæ, ventis cœlique convexionibus dimotæ? Aſſeverationibus illectæ ſunt nudis, inductæ in ſpes caſſas, & in pericula capitis immittere ſe ſponte temeraria deſperatione voluerunt, cum nihil tale vidiſſent quod eas in hos cultus novitatis ſuæ poſſit excitare miraculo. Imo quia hæc omnia ab ipſo cernebant geri & ab ejus præconibus qui per orbem totum miſſi beneficia patris & munera ſanandis animis hominibuſque portabant, veritatis ipſius vi victæ, & dederunt ſe Deo, nec in magnis poſuere diſpendiis membra vobis projicere, & viſcera ſua lanianda præbere.* The ſubſtance of whoſe Diſcourſe is, that it is impoſſible to ſuppoſe ſo many Perſons of ſo many Nations to be ſo far beſotted and infatuated, as not only to believe a Religion to be true which was contrary to that they were educated in, but to venture their Lives as well as Eſtates upon it, had it not been diſcover'd to them in a moſt certain and infallible way by ſuch who had been eye-witneſſes of the Actions and Miracles of

Arnobius contr. gentes l. 1.

Apoid. lib. 2. p. 44. CHRIST and his *Apoſtles*. And as he elſewhere ſpeaks, *Vel hæc ſaltem fidem vobis faciant argumenta credendi, quod jam per omnes terras in tam brevi tempore & parvo immenſi nominis hujus ſacramenta diffuſa ſunt; quod nulla jam natio eſt tam barbari moris, & manſuetudinem neſciens, quæ non ejus amore verſa molliverit aſperitatem ſuam, & in placidos ſenſus aſſumpta tranquillitate migraverit; quod tam magnis ingeniis præditi Oratores, Grammatici, Rhetores, Conſulti juris ac Medici, Philoſophiæ etiam ſecreta rimantes, magiſteria hæc expetunt, ſpretis quibus paulo ante fidebant, &c.* Will not this perſuade the World what firm foundations the Faith of *Chriſtians* ſtands on, when in ſo ſhort a time it is ſpread over all parts of the World? that by it the moſt inhuman and barbarous Nations are ſoftn'd into more than civility? That Men of the greateſt Wits and Parts, *Orators*, *Grammarians*, *Rhetoricians*, *Lawyers*, *Phyſicians*, *Philoſophers*, who not? have forſaken their former ſentiments, and adhered to the Doctrine of CHRIST. Now, I ſay, if the power of Education be ſo ſtrong upon the Minds of Men to perſuade them of the truth of the Religion they are bred up under, (which *Atheiſtically* diſpos'd Perſons make ſo much advantage of,) this is ſo far from weakning the truth of *Chriſtianity*, that it proves a great confirmation of it, becauſe it obtain'd ſo much upon its firſt Preaching in the World, notwithſtanding the higheſt prejudices from Education were againſt it. If then Men be ſo prone to believe that to be moſt true, which they have been educated under, it muſt argue a more than ordinary Evidence and Power in that Religion which unſettles ſo much the Principles of Education, as to make Men not only queſtion the truth of them, but to renounce them, and embrace a Religion contrary to them.

XXI. Eſpecially when we withal conſider what ſtrong holds theſe Principles of Education were back'd with among the *Heathens*, when the Doctrine of CHRIST was firſt divulg'd among them, *i. e.* what plauſible pretences they had of continuing in the Religion which they were brought up in, and why they ſhou'd not exchange it for *Chriſtianity*; and thoſe were,

Tertull. ad Nat. l. 1. cap. 10. Symmach. ep. l. 10. ep. 61. Liban. orat. de Templis. 1. *The pretended Antiquity of their Religion above the Chriſtian*; the main thing pleaded againſt the *Chriſtians* was *divortium ab inſtitutis majorum*, that they thought themſelves wiſer than their Fore-fathers; and *Symmachus*, *Lybanius*, and others, plead this moſt in behalf of *Paganiſm*; *ſervanda eſt tot ſæculis fides, & ſequendi ſunt nobis parentes qui ſecuti ſunt feliciter ſuos*; their Religion pleaded Preſcription againſt any other, and they were reſolv'd to follow the ſteps of their Anceſtors wherein they thought themſelves happy and ſecure. *Cæcilius* in *Minutius Felix* firſt argues much againſt dogmatizing in Religion, but withal ſays it moſt becomes a lover of truth, *Majorum excipere diſciplinam, religiones traditas colere, deos quos a parentibus ante imbutus es timere; nec de numinibus ferre ſententiam, ſed prioribus credere.* So *Arnobius* tells us the main thing objected againſt the *Chriſtians* was *novellam eſſe religionem noſtram, & ante dies natam propemodum paucos, neque vos potuiſſe antequam & patriam linquere, & in barbaros ritus peregrinoſque traduci.* And *Cotta* in *Tully* long before laid this down as the main Principle of *Pagan* Religion,

Minutius Felix. p. 6.

Arnob. contra gentes l. 2. p 90.

Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. 3.

majoribus

majoribus noſtris etiam nulla ratione reddita credere, to believe the Tradition of our Fathers, altho' there be no evidence in reaſon for it: And after he had diſcover'd the vanity of the *Stoical* Arguments about Religion, concludes with this as the only thing he reſolv'd his Religion into, *Mihi unum ſatis erit, majores noſtros ita tradidiſſe, It is enough for me that it comes by tradition from our Fore-fathers.* *Lactantius* fully ſets forth the manner of pleading us'd by the *Heathens* againſt the *Chriſtians*, in point of Antiquity. *Hæ ſunt religiones quas ſibi à majoribus ſuis traditas, pertinaciſſime tueri ac defendere perſeverant; nec conſiderant quales ſint, ſed ex hoc probatas atque veras eſſe confidunt, quod eas veteres tradiderunt; tantaque eſt auctoritas vetuſtatis, ut inquirere in eam ſcelus eſſe dicatur.* The *Engliſh* is, They accounted Tration infallible, and knew no other way whereby to find the truth of Religion but by its conveyance from their Fore-fathers. How like herein do they ſpeak to thoſe who contend for the corruptions crept into the *Chriſtian Church?* who make uſe of the ſame pretences for them, *viz.* that they were deliver'd down from the Fathers; *tantaque eſt auctoritas vetuſtatis, ut inquirere in eam ſcelus eſſe dicatur; who are we who will ſee further than Antiquity?* But it is no wonder if Antiquity be accompany'd with dimneſs of ſight; and ſo it was undoubtedly as to the *Pagan* World; and as to the *Chriſtian* too, when ſuch a mixture of *Heatheniſm* came into it. And the very ſame Arguments by which the pleaders for *Chriſtianity* did juſtify the truth of their Religion, notwithſtanding this pretended Antiquity, will with equal force hold for a Reformation of ſuch inveterate abuſes, which under a pretence of Antiquity, have crept into the *Chriſtian Church.* *Nullus pudor eſt ad meliora tranſire,* ſaith *Ambroſe* in his Anſwer to *Symmachus, what ſhame is it to grow better? Quid facies?* ſaith *Lactantius, majoreſne potius an rationem ſequeris? Si rationem mavis, diſcedere te neceſſe eſt ab inſtitutis & auctoritate majorum: quoniam id ſolum rectum eſt, quod ratio præſcribit. Sin autem pietas majores ſequi ſuadet: fateris igitur & ſtultos illos eſſe qui excogitatis contra rationem religionibus ſervierint; & te ineptum qui id colas quod falſum eſſe conviceris.* Where Reaſon and mere Authority of Fore-fathers ſtand in competition, he is more a Child than a Man that knows not on which ſide to give his Suffrage. But with the greateſt ſtrength, and cleareſt reaſon *Arnobius* ſpeaks in this caſe. *Itaque cum nobis intenditis averſionem à Religione priorum, cauſam convenit ut inſpiciatis, non factum; nec quid reliquerimus opponere, ſed ſecuti quid ſimus potiſſimum contueri. When you charge us,* ſaith he, *that we are revolted from the Religion of our Fore-fathers, you ought not preſently to condemn the fact, but to examine the reaſons of it; neither ought you ſo much to look at what we have left, as what it is we have embraced. Nam ſi mutare ſententiam culpa eſt ulla vel crimen, & à veteribus inſtitutis in alias res novas voluntateſque migrare, criminatio iſta & vos ſpectat, qui toties vitam conſuetudinemque mutaſtis; qui in mores alios, atque alios ritus priorum condemnatione tranſiſtis.* If mere departing from the Religion of our Anceſtors be the great fault, all thoſe who own themſelves to be *Chriſtians*, were themſelves guilty of it when they revolted from *Heatheniſm.* If it be here ſaid that the caſe is different, becauſe there was ſuffi-

Lactant. de orig. Error. l. 2. c. 6.

Ambroſ. ep. c. Symmach.

Lactant. de orig. Error. l. 2. c. 6.

Arnobius contr. gent. l. 2.

cient reaſon for it, which there is not as to the corruptions of the *Chriſtian Church*; if ſo, then all the diſpute is taken off from the matter of fact, or the revolt to the cauſes inducing to it; and if the *Proteſtant* be not able as to the cauſes of our Separation from *Rome* to manifeſt that they were ſufficient, let him then be triumph'd over by the *Romaniſt*, and not before. I aſſert then, and that with much aſſurance of Mind, that the Principles of the Reformation are juſtifiable upon the ſame grounds of Reaſon, which the embracing *Chriſtianity* was, when Men of *Heathens* became *Chriſtians*; and that the Arguments made uſe of by the *Romaniſts* againſt our Separation from them, are ſuch as wou'd have juſtify'd a *Pagan* Philoſopher in not embracing *Chriſtianity*. For if it be unlawful for any party of Men, to divide from others in a matter of Religion which pretends Antiquity and Univerſality, it had been unlawful for a Philoſopher to have deſerted *Paganiſm*, as well as for a *Proteſtant* to depart from *Rome*. For according to the Principles of the *Romaniſts*, the judgment in the cauſe of the Separation, and of the truth of Religion lies in that party from which we depart; if we do now but apply this to the old *Roman* Senate or Emperors in the caſe of *Chriſtian Religion*, and dividing from *Heathen* Worſhip, we ſhall quickly ſee how eaſy a matter it will be to make *Chriſtianity* it ſelf a Schiſm, and the Doctrine of Christ the greateſt Hereſy. But as ſtrong as thoſe pretences were then, or have been ſince, the power of the Doctrine of Christ hath been ſo great, as to conquer them, and thereby to manifeſt, that it was of God, when ſuch potent Prejudices were not able to withſtand it. Of which *Antiquity* is the firſt.

2. *The large and univerſal ſpread of Pagan Religion*, when *Chriſtianity* came into the World: there was never ſo great *Catholiciſm*, as in *Heathen* Worſhip, when the *Apoſtles* firſt appear'd in the *Gentile* World. *Inde adeo per univerſa imperia, provincias, oppida, videmus ſingulos ſacrorum ritus gentiles habere, & Deos colere municipes*, ſaith *Cæcilius* in *Minutius Felix*. The great charge againſt the *Chriſtians* was *Novelliſm*, that they brought in a ſtrange and unheard of Religion. The common Queſtion was, *Where was your Religion before* Jesus *of* Nazareth? as it has been ſince, *Where was your Religion before* Luther? and the ſame anſwer which ſerv'd then, will ſtand unmovable now, *There where no other Religion is, in the Word of* God. For this was the weapon whereby the Primitive *Chriſtians* defended themſelves againſt the aſſaults of *Paganiſm*, and the Evidences they brought that the Doctrine preach'd by them, and contain'd in the Scriptures, was originally from God, were the only means of overthrowing *Paganiſm*, notwithſtanding its pretended Univerſality.

Minut. in Octav. p. 6.

3. *Settlement by Laws of Heathen Worſhip*. This was ſo much pretended and pleaded for, that as far as we can find, by the Hiſtory of the Primitive Church, the pretence on which the *Chriſtians* ſuffer'd, was Sedition, and oppoſing the eſtabliſh'd Laws. The *Chriſtians* were reckon'd *inter illicitas factiones*, as appears by *Tertullian*, among *Unlawful Corporations*; the Politicians and Statemen were all for preſerving the Laws; they troubled not themſelves much about any Religion, but only That which was ſettled by Law they ſought to uphold, becauſe the acting contrary to it might

Tertull. Apol. c. 38.

might bring ſome diſturbance to the civil State. There were ſeveral Laws which the *Chriſtians* were then brought under, and condemn'd for the breach of. 1. The Law againſt *Hæteriæ*, or *Conventicles*, as they were pleas'd frequently to ſtile the Meeting of *Chriſtians* together; thence the places where the *Chriſtians* aſſembled for worſhip, were commonly call'd *Conventicula*; *Ita appellabant loca*, ſaith *Heraldus*, *ubi congregabantur Chriſtiani oraturi, & verbi divini interpretationem accepturi, ac ſacras Synaxes habituri:* but *Elmenhorſtius* more ſhortly; *Conventicula loca ſunt ubi Chriſtiani congregati orare conſueverunt. The places where the Chriſtians did meet and pray together, were call'd Conventicles:* in *Baſilica Sicinnini ubi ritus Chriſtiani eſt conventiculum*, ſaith *Ammianus Marcellinus*; *cur immaniter conventicula dirui?* ſaith *Arnobius*; *qui univerſum populum cum ipſo pariter conventiculo concremavit*, as *Lactantius* likewiſe ſpeaks. Now the reaſon of the Name was, becauſe the Heathens judged theſe Aſſemblies of Chriſtians to be illegal Societies. For which we are to underſtand; that in the time of the *Roman* Emperors, when they grew ſuſpicious of their own ſafety, they ſeverely prohibited all thoſe *Sodalitia*, or Societies and Colleges, which were very much in uſe in the *Roman* Commonwealth, in imitation of the ἑταιρίαι in the Cities of *Greece*. Theſe were ſuch Societies of Perſons, which voluntarily confederated together either for ſome particular deſign, or for preſerving Love and Friendſhip among each other, and thence had their frequent Meetings in common together. Now the more numerous theſe were, and the more cloſely they confederated, the more jealous Eye the *Roman* Emperors had upon them, becauſe of ſome Clandeſtine deſign, which they ſuſpected might be carried on for diſturbance of the public Peace in ſuch ſuſpicious Meetings. Thence came out many particular Edicts of the Emperors againſt all ſuch kinds of Societies.

Herald. Obſervat. in Arnob. l. 4.

Am. Marc. Hiſt. l. 27. Arnob. l. 4. Lactant. l. 5. c. 11.

Now when the Chriſtians began to be ſomewhat numerous, and had according to the Principles of their Religion frequent Aſſemblies for Divine worſhip, and did confederate together by ſuch Symbols, of being waſhed with water, and eating and drinking together (which was all the Heathens apprehended by their uſe of Baptiſm, and the Lord's Supper) the Proconſuls and other Magiſtrates in their ſeveral Provinces bring the Chriſtians under theſe Edicts, and ſo puniſh'd them for the breach of the Laws. Which as appears by *Pliny*'s Epiſtle to *Trajan* was the only account on which the wiſer Heathens did proceed againſt the Chriſtians; for we ſee he troubled not himſelf much about the Truth and Evidence of Chriſtian Religion, but ſuch Perſons were brought before him; and after he had Interrogated them whether they were Chriſtians, or no, ſeveral times, if they perſiſted, he then puniſhed them, not ſo much for their Religion, as for their obſtinacy and contempt of Authority. For ſo much is imply'd in thoſe words of his, *Neque enim dubitabam, qualecunque eſſet quod faterentur, pervicaciam certe, & inflexibilem obſtinationem debere puniri: That whatever their Religion was, their obſtinacy and diſobedience deſerved puniſhment.* That which the Chriſtians now pleaded for themſelves, why they ſhou'd not be reckon'd among the Factions of the People, was that which they gave to *Pliny*, that all their fault

Plin. Epiſt. l. 10. ep. 97.

was, *Quod essent soliti stato die ante lucem convenire, carmenque Christo quasi Deo dicere secum invicem; seque sacramento non in scelus aliquod obstringere, sed ne furta, ne latrocinia, ne adulteria committerent, ne fidem fallerent, ne depositum appellati abnegarent.* That they were wont upon their solemn days to meet together for Divine Worship, and to covenant with each other only for the practice of those things which were as much for the good of Mankind as their own, viz. that they would not wrong and defraud others, as to their Bodies or Estates. And *Tertullian* approves of the Law against Factions, as *de providentia & modestia publica, ne civitas in partes scinderetur*, as wisely intended to prevent Seditions; but withal pleads, that the Society of Christians cou'd not be reckon'd *inter illicitas factiones*; for, saith he, *hæc coitio Christianorum merito sane illicita, si illicitis par; merito damnanda si quis de ea queritur eo titulo quo de factionibus querela est. In cujus perniciem aliquando convenimus? Hoc sumus congregati quod & dispersi; hoc universi quod & singuli; neminem lædentes, neminem contristantes; quum probi, quum boni coeunt, quum pii, quum casti congregantur, non est factio dicenda sed curia.* If, saith he, *the Societies of Christians were like others, there might be some reason to condemn them, under the head of Factions: but as long as we meet together for no Man's injury, that whether divided, or assembled, we are still the same, that we grieve and injure no body; when such a company of good Men meet together, it is rather a Council than a Faction.*

Tertull. Apol. c. 38.

2. Another Law the Christians were brought under, was, That against Innovations in Religion; thence it was laid so much to the charge of the Christians, that they did ζῆν παρανόμως, *go contrary to the establish'd Law*; as *Porphyry* said of *Origen*, because he was a Christian, he did χριστιανῶς ζῆν καὶ παρανόμως; and when he speaks of *Ammonius* revolting from *Christianity* to *Paganism*, ἐυθὺς πρὸς τὴν κατὰ νόμους πολιτείαν μετεβάλετο, *he turn'd to the way of Life, which was agreeable to the establish'd Laws.* Now Christianity was every where look'd on as a great Innovation, insomuch that the Christians were accused to be *legum, morum, naturæ inimici*, as *Enemies to Mankind as well as the Laws*, because they drew Men off from that way of Religion which Mankind had generally agreed in. Thence *Æmilianus* the Præfect of *Ægypt*, when he bids the Christians return to Paganism, he us'd these Expressions, ἐπὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν πρέπειαν· ἐπιλαθέσθαι δὲ τῶν παρὰ φύσιν, *to return to the common sense of Mankind, and to forget what was so much against it*, as he suppos'd Christianity to be. When *Paul* preached at *Athens*, his first Accusation was, that *he was a Preacher of strange Deities, because he preached to them Jesus and the Resurrection.* And *Demetrius* at *Ephesus* knew no such potent Argument against *Paul*, as that his Religion *destroyed the worship of* Diana, *whom all* Asia *and the world worship.* So that the Primitive Christians were then accounted the *Antipodes* to the whole World, on which account they were so severely dealt with; most Common-wealths observing the counsel of *Mecænas* to *Augustus*, in *Dio*, to be sure to have a watchful eye upon all Innovations in Religion, because they tend so much to the disturbance of the Civil State.

Tertull. Apol. c. 4.

Euseb. l. 6. Eccles. hist. cap. 19.

Euseb. Eccl. hist. l. 7. c. 11.

Act. 17. 18.

19. 27.

3. The Law of Sacrilege. Thence *Lactantius* calls their Laws, *Constitu-*

Conſtitutione Sacrilegæ. Quin etiam ſceleratiſſimi homicidæ contra pios jura impia condiderunt; nam & conſtitutiones Sacrilegæ, & diſputationes Juriſperitorum leguntur injuſtæ; and as he tells us, *Domitius Ulpianus* had collected all thoſe *Reſcripta nefaria* together, which concern'd the Chriſtians; from hence it was, Chriſtianity by *Pliny*, is called *amentia*, by *Tacitus exitiabilis ſuperſtitio*, by *Suetonius ſuperſtitio nova & exitiabilis*; ſo much did theſe three great Men agree, in condemning the beſt Religion in the World for madneſs, and new, and deteſtable Superſtition; the ground of the great *pique* was, the enmity declar'd by Chriſtians againſt the Idolatrous Temples, and Worſhip of the Heathens. *Lactant. l. 5. c. 11.* *Tacit. An. l. 15. Sueton. in Nerone.* *Plin. Ep. l. 10. ep. 97.*

4. The Law againſt Treaſon; for ſometimes they proceeded ſo high, as to accuſe the Chriſtians *læſæ Majeſtatis*, and thence they are commonly called *publici hoſtes, enemies to all civil Government*. Which they inferred from hence: 1. *Becauſe they would not ſacrifice for the Emperor's ſafety; Ideo committimus*, ſaith *Tertullian, in Majeſtatem Imperatorum, quia illos non ſubjicimus rebus ſuis; Quia non ludimus de officio ſalutis eorum, qui eam non putamus in manibus eſſe plumbatis.* The Accuſation for Treaſon lay in their refuſing to ſupplicate the Idols for the Emperor's welfare. 2. *Becauſe they would not ſwear by the Emperor's Genius.* Thence *Saturnius* ſaid to the Martyr, *Tantum jura per genium Cæſaris noſtri*, if he wou'd but ſwear by the *Genius* of *Cæſar*, he ſhou'd be ſav'd. Yet tho' they refus'd to ſwear by the Emperor's *Genius*, they did not refuſe to teſtify their Allegiance, and to ſwear by the Emperor's ſafety. *Sed & juramus*, ſaith *Tertullian, ſicut non per genios Cæſarum, ita per ſalutem eorum quæ eſt auguſtior omnibus geniis.* 3. *Becauſe they would not worſhip the Emperors as Gods*; which was then grown a common Cuſtom. *Non enim Deum Imperatorem dicam, vel quia mentiri neſcio, vel quia illum deridere non audeo, vel quia nec ipſe ſe Deum volet dici ſi homo ſit*, as the ſame Author ſpeaks. Nay the Primitive Chriſtians were very ſcrupulous of calling the Emperor *Dominus, hoc enim Dei eſt cognomen*, becauſe the name Lord was an Attribute of God's, and apply'd as his name to him in Scripture. The reaſon of this ſcrupuloſity was not, from any queſtion they made of the Sovereignty of Princes, or their obligation to obedience to them, (which they are very free in the acknowledgment of,) but from a jealouſie and juſt ſuſpicion that ſomething of Divine honour might be imply'd in it, when the Adoration of Princes was grown a Cuſtom. Therefore *Tertullian* to prevent miſ-underſtandings, ſaith, *Dicam plane Imperatorem Dominum, ſed more Communi, ſed quando non cogor ut Dominum Dei vice dicam.* They refus'd not the name in a common ſence, but as it imply'd Divine honour. *Herald. in Tertull. Apol. cap. 29.* *Tertull. Apol. c. 32.* *Ibid. c. 33.* *Ibid. c. 34*

5. *Becauſe they would not obſerve the public Feſtivals* of the Emperor's in the way that others did, which it ſeems were obſerved with abundance of Looſeneſs and Debauchery by all ſorts of Perſons; and as *Tertullian* ſmartly ſays, *Malorum morum licentia pietas erit; & occaſio luxuriæ religio deputabitur? Debauchery is accounted a piece of Loyalty, and Intemperance a part of Religion.* Which made the Chriſtians rather hazard the reputation of their *Ibid. c. 35.*

their Loyalty, than bear a part in ſo much Rudeneſs as was then us'd, and thence they abhorred all the ſolemn ſpectacles of the *Romans*; *Nihil eſt nobis*, ſaith the ſame Author, *dictu, viſu, auditu, cum inſania Circi, cum impudicitia Theatri, cum atrocitate arenæ, cum Xyſti vanitate. They had nothing to do either with the madneſs of the Cirque, or the immodeſty of the Theatre, or the cruelty of the Amphitheatre, or the vanity of the public Wreſtlings.* We ſee then what a hard Province the Chriſtians had, when ſo many Laws were laid as Bird-lime in their way to catch them, that it was impoſſible for them to profeſs themſelves Chriſtians, and not to run into a *præmunire* by their Laws. And therefore it cannot be conceiv'd that many out of affection of Novelty ſhou'd then declare themſelves Chriſtians, when ſo great hazards were run upon the profeſſing of it. Few ſoft-ſpirited Men, and lovers of their own eaſe, but wou'd have found ſome fine diſtinctions and nice evacuations to have reconcil'd themſelves to the public Laws by ſuch things which the Primitive Chriſtians ſo unanimouſly refus'd, when tending to Prophaneneſs or Idolatry. And from this diſcourſe we cannot but conclude with the Apoſtle *Paul, That the weapons* whereby the Apoſtles and Primitive Chriſtians *encountred* the *Heathen world, were not fleſhly or weak*, but exceeding ſtrong and powerful, in that they obtain'd ſo great a conqueſt over the Imaginations and carnal Reaſonings of Men (which were their ſtrong holds they ſecur'd themſelves in) as to make them readily to forſake their Heathen worſhip, and become chearful Servants to Christ. Thus we ſee the power of the Doctrine of Christ, which prevail'd over the Principles of Education, tho' back'd with pretended Antiquity, Univerſality, and Eſtabliſhment by civil Laws.

Tertull. cap. 38.

2. Cor. 10. 4. 5.

XXII. But this will further appear if we conſider that not only the matters of Faith were contrary to the Principles of Education, but becauſe many of them ſeem'd incredible to Men's natural Reaſon; that we cannot think Perſons wou'd be over-forward to believe ſuch things. Every one being ſo ready to take any advantage againſt a Religion which did ſo little flatter corrupt Nature either as to its power or capacity; inſomuch that thoſe who preached this Doctrine, declar'd openly to the World, that ſuch Perſons who wou'd judge of the Chriſtian Doctrine, by ſuch principles which mere natural Reaſon did proceed upon (ſuch one I ſuppoſe it is whom the Apoſtle calls ψυχικὸς ἄνθρωπος, one that own'd nothing but natural Reaſon, whereby to judge of Divine Truths) cou'd not entertain matters of Faith, or of Divine Revelation, becauſe ſuch things wou'd ſeem but folly to him that own'd no higher principle than Philoſophy, or that did not believe any Divine Inſpiration; neither can ſuch a one know them, becauſe a Divine Revelation is the only way to come to a thro' underſtanding of them: and a perſon who doth not believe ſuch a Divine Revelation, it is impoſſible he ſhou'd be a competent judge of the truth of the Doctrine of Christ. So that the only ground of receiving the Doctrine of the Goſpel is upon a Divine Revelation, that God himſelf by his Son and his Apoſtles, hath reveal'd theſe deep Myſteries to the World, on which account it is we are bound

1 Cor. 2. 14.

to

to receive them; altho' they go beyond our reach and comprehenſion. But we ſee generally in the Heathen World how few of thoſe did believe the Doctrine of CHRIST in compariſon, who were the great admirers of the Philoſophy, and way of Learning which was then cry'd up: the reaſon was, becauſe Chriſtianity not only contain'd far deeper Myſteries than any they were acquainted with, but deliver'd them in ſuch a way of Authority, commanding them to believe the Doctrine they preached on the account of the Divine Authority of the Revealers of it. Such a way of propoſal of Doctrines to the World the Philoſophy of the *Greeks* was unacquainted with, which on that account they derided, as not being ſuted to the exact method which their Sciences proceeded in. No doubt had the Apoſtles come among the *Greeks* μετὰ πολλῆς φαντασίας, with a *great deal of pomp and oſtentation*, and had fed Mens curioſities with vain and unneceſſary Speculations, they might have had as many Followers among the *Greeks* for their ſakes, as CHRIST had among the *Jews* for the ſake of the Loaves. But the matters of the Goſpel being more of inward worth and moment, than of outward pomp and ſhew, the vain and empty *Greeks* preſently find a quarrel with the manner of propoſing them; that they came not in a way of clear demonſtration, but ſtood ſo much upon Faith as ſoon as they were deliver'd. Thence *Celſus* and *Galen* think they have reaſon enough to reject the Laws of *Moſes* and CHRIST, becauſe *Celſus* calls them νόμους ἀναποδείκτους, *Galen Chriſtianity* ἀπιστίαν ἀναπόδεικτον, that they were ſuch Doctrines which require Faith and Obedience, without giving Mens reaſon an account of the things commanded. As tho' the Authority of a *Legiſlator* ſufficiently manifeſted, were not enough to inforce a Law, unleſs a ſufficient account were given of the thing requir'd to the purblind Reaſon of every individual Perſon acted by paſſions and private intereſts, as to the Juſtice and Equity of it. And ſo the primary obligation on Man's part to Faith and Obedience, muſt ariſe not from the evidence of Divine Authority, but of the thing it ſelf which is reveal'd, to the moſt partial judgment of every one to whom it is propos'd. Which thoſe who know how ſhort the ſtock of Reaſon is at the beſt in Men, and how eaſily that which is, is faſhion'd and moulded according to prejudices and intereſts already entertain'd, will look upon only as a deſign to comply with the carnal deſires of Men, in that thereby none ſhall be bound to go any further, than this blind and corrupted Guide ſhall lead them. Now theſe being the terms on which the Goſpel of CHRIST muſt have expected entertainment in the *Gentile* World, how impoſſible had it been ever to have found any ſucceſs among Men, had there not been ſufficient Evidence given by a power of Miracles, that however ſtrange and incredible the Doctrine might ſeem, yet it was to be believ'd, becauſe there was ſufficient means to convince Men that it was of Divine Revelation.

Orig. l. 1. c. Celſ. Gal. de diff. pulſ. lib. 2. c. 4.

XXIII. Neither were the matters of Faith only contrary to the inclinations of the World, but ſo were the precepts of Life, or thoſe things in Chriſtianity which concern'd practice. There are two things which are the main ſcope and deſign of Chriſtianity in reference to Mens Lives, and to take them off from their Sins, and

from the World; and of all things these are they which Mens hearts are so bewitch'd with. Now the precepts of the Gospel are such which require the greatest *purity of heart and life*, which call upon Men *to deny themselves, and all ungodliness, and wordly lusts, and to live soberly, and righteously, and godly in this present world*; that, *all that name the name of Christ must depart from iniquity*; that, *all true Christians must be cleansed from all filthiness of flesh and spirit, and must perfect holiness in the fear of God.* And the Gospel inforceth these precepts of Holiness with the most terrible Denunciations of the wrath of God on those who disobey them; that, *the Lord Jesus Christ shall be revealed from Heaven with his mighty Angels in flaming fire, taking vengeance on them that know not God, and that obey not the Gospel of Jesus Christ.* That, *the wrath of God is revealed from Heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men, who hold the truth in unrighteousness.* That, no persons who live in the habitual practice of any known sin, *shall inherit the Kingdom of God.* That, *no man should deceive them with vain words, for because of these things comes the wrath of God upon the Children of disobedience*; that Men do but vainly flatter themselves when they seek to reconcile unholy Lives with the hopes of future Happiness; for *without holiness no man shall see the Lord.* And then in reference to the things of this present Life which Men busie themselves so much about, the Gospel declares, that *they who love this world, the love of the Father is not in them*; that, *the friendship of this world is enmity with God; and whosoever will be a friend of the world is an enemy to God:* That *Christians must not set their affections on Earth, but on the things in Heaven*; That *the conversation of true Christians is in Heaven.* That, we ought not to *lay up our treasure on Earth, but in Heaven*; That, *we must not look at the things which are seen, but at the things which are not seen; for the things which are seen are temporal, but the things which are not seen are eternal.* Now the whole design of the Doctrine of Christ being to persuade Men to lead a Holy and Heavenly Life while they are in this World, and thereby to *be made meet to be partakers of the inheritance with the Saints in light*, can we think so many Men whose hearts were wedded to Sin, and the World, cou'd so suddenly be brought off from both without a Divine Power accompanying that Doctrine which was preached to them? And therefore the Apostle saith, οὐκ ἐπαισχύνομαι τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τοῦ χριστοῦ. *I am not ashamed of the Gospel of Christ*; i. e. tho' the Gospel of Christ be the only true Mystery, yet I do not by it as the Heathens are wont to do with their famous *Eleusinian* Mysteries, which were kept so secret by all the *Mystæ* and ἐπόπται; but saith he, *I know no reason I have to be ashamed of any thing in the Gospel, that I should labour its concealment to advance its veneration*; but the more public the Gospel is, the more it manifests its power; for thro' it God is pleas'd mightily to work, in order to the Salvation both of *Jew* and *Gentile*. And of all the success of the Gospel, that upon the Hearts and Lives of Men deserves the greatest consideration.

Matt. 5. 8, 16, 24. Tit. 2. 12. 2 Tim. 2. 19. 2 Cor. 7. 1. 2 Thes. 1. 7, 8. Rom. 1. 18. 1 Cor. 6. 9, 10. Gal. 4. 20. Ephes. 5. 5, 6. Heb. 12. 14. 1 Joh. 2. 14. Jam. 4. 4. Col. 3. 1, 2. Phil. 3. 20. Matt. 6. 20. 2 Cor. 4. 18. Col. 1. 12. Rom. 1. 16.

The

The great Efficacy and Power of the Gospel was abundantly seen in that great alteration which it wrought in all those who were the hearty embracers of it. The Philosophers did very frequently and deservedly complain of the great inefficacy of all their Moral Precepts upon the minds of Men, and that by all their Instructions, *politiora non meliora, ingenia fiunt*, Men improv'd more in Knowledg than Godness; but now *Christianity* not only inforced Duties on Men with greater Power and Authority: For the Scriptures do, as Saint *Austin* speaks, *Non tanquam ex Philosophorum concertationibus strepere, sed tanquam ex oraculis & Dei nubibus intonare*, not make some obstreperous clamors, like those *tinkling Cymbals*, the Philosophers, but awe the Souls of Men with the Majesty of that God from whom they came. Neither was it only a great and empty sound which was heard in the Preaching of the Gospel; but when God thundred therein, he broke down the *stately Cedars* and *shook the Wilderness*, and *made the Hinds to calve*, (as it is said of Thunder, call'd the *Voice of the Lord* in Scripture,) he humbl'd the Pride of Men, unsetled the Gentile World from its former foundations, and wrought great alterations on all those who hearkened to it. The whole design of the Gospel is couched in those words which Saint *Paul* tells us were spoken to him by Christ himself, when he appointed him to be an Apostle, *to open Mens eyes, and to turn them from darkness to light, and from the power of Satan unto God, that they may receive forgiveness of sins, and inheritance among them which were sanctified by faith in Christ.* And the efficacy of this Doctrine in order to these great ends, was abundantly seen in the preaching of that Apostle, who was so instrumental in converting the World to piety and sobriety, as well as to the Doctrine of *Christ*. What strange Persons were the *Corinthians* before they became *Christians!* for when the Apostle had enumerated many of the vilest Persons of the World, he presently adds, *And such were some of you; but ye are washed, but ye are sanctified, but ye are justified in the name of the Lord Jesus, and by the spirit of our God.* The more dangerous the distemper is, the more malignant its nature; the more inveterate its continuance, the greater the Efficacy of the remedy which works a cure of it. The power of Grace is the more seen in conversion, the greater the sins have been before it. It is an easy matter in comparison to remove a disease at its first on-set, of what it is to cure it when it becomes Chronical. The power of the Gospel wrought upon all sorts and kinds of Persons, to manifest to the World there was no distemper of Men's Souls so great, but there was a possibility of a Remedy for it; and not only so, but pregnant and visible instances were given of the Power and Efficacy of it. *For they themselves shew of us*, saith the Apostle, *what manner of entring in we had among you, and how ye turned to God from Idols, to serve the living and true God, and to wait for his Son from Heaven, whom he raised from the dead, even* Jesus, *which delivered us from the wrath to come.* Now that which manifests the exceeding great power and excellency of the Gospel, was, that it not only turn'd Men from one way of worship to another, which is a matter of no great difficulty, but that it turn'd Men together with that from their Lusts and Sensuality, to a holy and unblameable

Augusti. de Civit. Dei, l. 2. c. 19.

Psal. 29. 5, 8, 9.

Act. 26. 18.

1 Cor. 6. 10, 11.

1 Thess. 1. 9, 10.

Life. For Men being more in love with their Sins, than with their Opinions, it muſt needs be a greater power which draws Men from the practice of habitual Sins, than that which only makes them change their Opinions, or alter the way of worſhip they were brought up in. This is that which *Origen* throughout his Books againſt *Celſus* triumphs in as the moſt ſignal Evidence of a Divine power in the Doctrine of Christ, that it wrought ſo great an alteration on all that truly embraced it, that of vicious, debauched, and diſſolute, it made them temperate, ſober, and religious, ὅπου τοιούτους ἀνθρώπους ἐπιτρέφει ἀπὸ τ κάκιστα τῶν κακῶν, ἐπὶ τ καλῶ φύσιν μ σωφροσύνης κ τῶν λοιπῶν ἀρετῶν βίον. *The Doctrine of Chriſt did convert the moſt wicked Perſons who embraced it, from all their debaucheries, to a life moſt ſuitable to Nature and Reaſon, and to the practice of all Virtues.* Therefore certainly the Goſpel cou'd not want that commendation among all ingenuous Moraliſts, that it was the moſt excellent inſtrument in the World to reform the lives of Men, and to promote real goodneſs in it. When they cou'd not but take notice of ſo many Perſons continually ſo brought off from their follies and vain converſations, to a life ſerious, ſober, and unblameable; nay and ſome of the *Chriſtians* were of ſo much integrity and goodneſs, that their greateſt Enemies were forced to ſay that their only fault was, that they were *Chriſtians*. *Bonus vir Cajus Sejus, tantum quod Chriſtianus. A very good man, only a Chriſtian.* But one wou'd think this ſhou'd have made them have a higher opinion of *Chriſtianity*, when it did ſo ſuddenly make ſo many good Men in the World. Eſpecially when this power was ſo manifeſt on ſuch Perſons who were ſuppos'd uncapable of being reform'd by Philoſophy, young, illiterate, and mean-ſpirited Perſons; therefore it may be juſtly ſuppos'd that it was not by the ſtrength of their own Reaſon that this alteration was wrought within them, but by that Divine power which was able to tame the moſt unruly; to inſtruct the moſt ignorant, to raiſe up the moſt ſordid Perſons to ſuch a Generous temper, as to ſlight the good things of this life, in compariſon with thoſe to come. And ſo remarkable was the difference of life then between thoſe that were *Chriſtians*, and thoſe who were not (as there is ſtill between true *Chriſtians*, and mere Pretenders) that *Origen* dares *Celſus* to compare them in point of Morality with any other Societies in the World. αἱ μὲν τ θεῦ τοῖς Χριστῷ μαθητευθεῖσαι ἐκκλησίαι, ζωηξεταζόμεναι τοῖς ἐν περιοικίσι δήμων ἐκκλησίαις, ὡς φωστῆρες εἰσιν ἐν κόσμῳ· τίς γὰρ ἂν ὁμολογήσαι κὴ τὰς χείρους τῶν λεγ τῆς ἐκκλησίας, ἐν ζυγοστατ βελτίονων ἐλάττους, πολλῶν κρείττους τυγχάνειν τῶν ἐν τοῖς δήμοις ἐκκλησιῶν; *For the Churches of* God, *which are diſcipled to* Christ, *being compar'd with other Societies, ſhine among them like lights in the world. For who can but confeſs, that even the worſer part of the Chriſtian Churches exceeds the beſt of the popular Aſſemblies? For,* as he goes on, *the Church of* God *which is at* Athens, *that is* περιῳκισμένη καὶ εἰρηνική, *very quiet and peaceable, becauſe it ſeeks to approve it ſelf to* God; *but the popular Aſſembly at* Athens, *that is* στασιώδης, *ſeditious and quarrelſome, and in nothing comparable to the Church of* God *there. So it is, if we compare the Churches of* Corinth *and* Alexandria *with the Aſſemblies of the People there.* So that any candid Inquirer after Truth will exceedingly wonder (how ſuch fair Iſlands ſhou'd appear *nantes in gurgite vaſto*, in the midſt of ſuch a Sea of wickedneſs as it was in thoſe Cities) how theſe *Churches* of God ſhou'd be

Origen. c. Celſum, l. 2. p. 78, 85. lib. 1. p. 21.

Orig. contr. Celſ. l. 3. p. 128.

be planted in ſuch rude and profane places. So the ſame Author goes on to compare the Church's Senate with that of the Cities, the Church's Officers with theirs; and appeals to themſelves, that even thoſe among them who were moſt luke-warm in their Office, did yet far exceed all the City-Magiſtrates in all manner of Virtues. From whence he rationally concludes, εἰ δὲ ταῦτ' ἔστιν ἴσχι, πῶς οὐκ εὔλογον μὴ νομίζειν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ Ἰησοῦ τοσαῦτα δυνηθέντος, ὅτι οὐκ ἦν τυχοῦσα, θειότης ἂν εἶναι αὐτός; *If theſe things be ſo, how can it but be moſt rational to adore the Divinity of* JESUS, *who was able to accompliſh ſuch great things?* And that not upon one or two, but upon ſuch great multitudes as were then converted to the *Chriſtian Faith.* We read of one *Phædon*, and one *Polemon* brought from their debaucheries by *Socrates* and *Xenocrates*, but what are theſe compar'd with thoſe who were turn'd from their Sins to GOD by the Goſpel of CHRIST! καὶ ὥσπερ μὴ τῶν Ἕλλησιν, ἓς μὲν Φαίδων καὶ οὐκ οἶδα εἰ ἄλλος, καὶ εἷς Πολέμων, μεταβαλόντες ἀπὸ ἀσώτων καὶ μεθυσθέντων βίου, ἐφιλοσόφησαν· ὥσπερ δὲ τῶν Ἰησοῦ οἱ μόνοι τότε οἱ δώδεκα, ἀλλ' εἶτα καὶ πολλαπλασίους, &c. *The twelve Apoſtles were but the firſt-fruits of that plentiful Harveſt of Converts which followed afterwards.* And altho' *Celſus* (like an *Epicurean*) ſeems to deny the poſſibility of any ſuch thing as Converſion, becauſe cuſtomary ſins become a ſecond Nature, that no puniſhments can reform them; *Yet*, ſaith *Origen*, *herein he not only contradicts us* Chriſtians, *but all ſuch as were* ἡμῶν φιλοσοφήσαντες, *who own'd any generous principles of Philoſophy, and did not deſpair of recovering virtue, as a thing feaſible by human nature*; and gives inſtances *ad hominem*, to prove the poſſibility of the thing from the ancient Heroes, *Hercules* and *Ulyſſes*, from the two Philoſophers, *Socrates* and *Muſonius*, and the two famous Converts to Philoſophy, *Phædon* and *Polemon*. *But yet*, ſaith he, *theſe are not ſo much to be wondred at, that the eloquence and reaſon of the Philoſophers ſhou'd prevail on ſome very few perſons, but that the mean and contemtible language of the Apoſtles ſhou'd convert ſuch multitudes from intemperance to ſobriety, from injuſtice to fair-dealing, from cowardice to the higheſt conſtancy, yea ſo great as to lay down their lives for the ſake of virtue; how can we but admire ſo Divine a Power as was ſeen in it? And therefore*, ſaith he, *we conclude*, ὅτι τῷ θείῳ λόγῳ ἀμείψαι κακίαν φυσιώσασθαι ἐστιν οὐ μόνον οὐκ ἀδύνατον, ἀλλὰ καὶ οὐ πάνυ χαλεπόν. *That it is ſo far from being impoſſible, that it is not at all difficult for corrupt nature to be chang'd by the Word of* GOD. *Lactantius* excellently manifeſts that Philoſophy cou'd never do ſo much good in the World as *Chriſtianity* did, becauſe that was not ſuted at all to common capacities, and did require ſo much skill in the Arts to prepare Men for it, which it is impoſſible all ſhou'd be well skill'd in, which yet are as capable of being happy, as any others are. And how inefficacious the Precepts of Philoſophy were, appears by the Philoſophers themſelves, who were far from having command by them over their maſterleſs Paſſions, and were fain ſometimes to confeſs that Nature was too head-ſtrong to be kept in by ſuch weak Reins as the Precepts of Philoſophy were: *But*, ſaith he, *what great command Divine Precepts have upon the Souls of Men, daily experience ſhews. Da mihi virum qui ſit iracundus, maledicus, effrenatus; pauciſſimis Dei verbis, tam placidum quam ovem reddam. Da cupidum, avarum, tenacem; jam tibi eum liberalem dabo, & pecuniam ſuam plenis manibus largientem. Da timidum doloris ac mortis; jam cruces, & ignes, taurum contemnet.*

Origen. l. 1. p. 50.

Origen. l. 3. p. 150.

Lactant. de falſ. ſap. l. 3. c. 25.

Cap. 26.

Da libidinoſum, adulterum, ganeonem; jam ſobrium, caſtum, continentem videbis. Da crudelem, & ſanguinis appetentem; jam in veram clementiam furor ille mutabitur. Da injuſtum, inſipientem, peccatorem; continuo & æquus, & prudens, & innocens erit. In which words that elegant Writer doth by a Rhetorical Scheme ſet out the remarkable alteration which was in any who became true *Chriſtians*, that altho' they were paſſionate, covetous, fearful, luſtful, cruel, unjuſt, vicious, yet upon their being *Chriſtians*, they became mild, liberal, courageous, temperate, merciful, juſt and unblameable; which never any were brought to by mere Philoſophy, which rather teacheth the Art of Concealing vices, than of healing them. But now when *Chriſtianity* was ſo effectual in the cure of thoſe diſtempers, which Philoſophy gave over as beyond its skill and power, when it cur'd them with ſo great ſucceſs, and that not in a *Paracelſian* way, for them to relapſe afterwards with greater violence, but it did ſo throughly unſettle the *fomes morbi*, that it ſhou'd never gather to ſo great a head again; doth not this argue a power more than Philoſophical, and that cou'd be no leſs than Divine Power which tended ſo much to reform the World, and to promote true goodneſs in it?

XXIV. Thus we have conſider'd the contrariety of the Doctrine of *Chriſt* to Mens Natural Inclinations, and yet the ſtrange ſucceſs it had in the World, which in the laſt place will appear yet more ſtrange, when we add the almoſt *continual oppoſition it met with from worldly power and policy*. Had it been poſſible for a cunningly-deviſed fable, or any mere contrivance of Impoſtors to have prevail'd in the World, when the moſt potent and ſubtile Perſons bent their whole Wits and Deſigns for ſuppreſſing it? Whatever it were in others, we are ſure of ſome of the *Roman* Emperors, as *Julian* and *Diocleſian*, that it was their Maſter-deſign to root out and aboliſh *Chriſtianity*; and was it only the ſubtilty of the *Chriſtians* which made theſe Perſons give over their work in deſpair of accompliſhing it? If the *Chriſtians* were ſuch ſubtile Men, whence came all their Enemies to agree in one common calumny, that they were a company of poor, weak, ignorant, inconſiderable Men? and if they were ſo, how came it to paſs that by their power and wiſdom they cou'd never exterminate theſe Perſons; but as they cut them down, they grew up the faſter, and multiply'd by their ſubtraction of them? There was ſomething then certainly peculiar in *Chriſtianity*, from all other Doctrines, that it not only was not advanc'd by any civil power, but it got ground by the Oppoſition it met with in the World. And therefore it is an obſervable circumſtance, that the firſt Chriſtian Emperor (who acted as Emperor for *Chriſtianity*) viz. *Conſtantine* (for otherwiſe I know what may be ſaid for *Philippus*) did not appear in the World 'till *Chriſtianity* had ſpread it ſelf over moſt parts of the habitable World. God thereby letting us ſee, that tho' the civil Power, when become Chriſtian, might be very uſeful for protecting *Chriſtianity*, yet that he ſtood in no need at all of it, as to the Propagation of it abroad in the World. But we ſee it was quite otherwiſe in that Religion which had *Mars* its Aſcendant, viz. *Mahometiſm:* For like *Paracelſus* his *Dæmon*, it always ſate upon the pummel of the Sword, and made its way in the World merely by force and violence; and as its firſt conſtitution

had

had much of Blood in it, so by it hath it been fed and nourish'd ever since. But it was quite otherwise with the *Christian* Religion, it never thriv'd better than in the most barren places, nor triumph'd more, than when it suffer'd most; nor spread it self further, than when it encounter'd the greatest Opposition. Because therein was seen the great force and efficacy of the Doctrine of CHRIST, that it bore up Mens Spirits under the greatest miseries of Life, and made them with cheerfulness to undergo the most exquisite torments which the cruelty of Tyrants cou'd invent. The *Stoics* and *Epicureans* Boasts, that their wise Man wou'd be happy in the Bull of *Phalaris*, were but empty and *Thrasonical* words, which none wou'd venture the truth of by an experiment upon themselves. It was the *Christian* alone, and not the *Epicurean*, that cou'd truly say in the midst of torments, *Suave est & nihil curo*, and might justly alter a little of that common saying of the *Christians*, and say, *Non magna loquimur, sed patimur*, as well as *vivimus*; *The* Christians *did not speak great things, but do and suffer them.* And this gain'd not only great reputation of integrity to themselves, but much advanc'd the honor of their Religion in the World, when it was so apparently seen, that no force or power was able to withstand it. Will not this at least persuade you that our Religion is true, and from GOD, saith *Arnobius? Quod cum genera pœnarum tanta sint a vobis proposita Religionis hujus sequentibus leges, augeatur res magis, & contra omnes minas atque interdicta formidinum animosius populus obnitatur, & ad credendi studium, prohibitionis ipsius stimulis excitetur? ——Itane istud non divinum & sacrum est, aut sine Deo, eorum tantas animorum fieri conversiones, ut cum carnifices unci, aliique innumeri cruciatus, quemadmodum diximus, impendeant crediturus, veluti quadam dulcedine, atque omnium virtutum amore correpti, cognitas accipiant rationes, atque mundi omnibus rebus præponant amicitias Christi? That no fears, penalties, or torments, were able to make a* Christian *alter his profession, but he wou'd rather bid adieu to his Life than to his Savior.* This *Origen* likewise frequently takes notice of, when *Celsus* had objected the Novelty of *Christianity*; *The more wonderful it is* (saith *Origen*) *that in so short a time it shou'd so largely spread it self in the World; for if the cure of Mens Bodies be not wrought without Divine Providence, how much less the cure of so many thousands of Souls which have been converted at once to Humanity and* Christianity, *especially when all the Powers of the World were from the first engaged to hinder the progress of this Doctrine, and yet notwithstanding all this opposition,* ἐνίκησε, μὴ πφυκὼς κωλύεσθ ὡς λόγ Θεοῦ καὶ γνώμφ τοσούτων ἀνθρωπίνων ἰσχυρότερ, πάσης μὲν Ἑλλάδ, ἐπὶ πλεῖον δὲ τ βαρβάρου ἐκράτησε, καὶ μετέπεισε μυρίας ὅσας ψυχὰς ἐπὶ τὴν καθ' αὐτὸν θεοσέβειαν. *The Word of* GOD *prevail'd, as not being able to be stopt by Men, and became Master over all its enemies, and not only spread it self quite thro'* Greece, *but thro' a great part of the World besides, and converted an innumerable company of Souls to the true worship and service of* GOD. Thus we have now manifested from all the circumstances of the propagation of the Doctrine of CHRIST, what evidence there was of a Divine Power accompanying of it, and how useful the first Miracles were in order to it.

Arnob. l. 2. c. gentes.

Origen. l. 1. c. Cels. p. 21. Vid. etiam l. 2. p. 110.

CHAP.

CHAP. X.

The difference of true Miracles from falſe.

I. *The unreaſonableneſs of rejecting the Evidence from Miracles, becauſe of Impoſtures. That there are certain rules of diſtinguiſhing true Miracles from falſe, and Divine from Diabolical, prov'd from God's intention in giving a power of Miracles, and the Providence of God in the World.* II. *The inconvenience of taking away the rational grounds of Faith, and placing it on ſelf-evidence. Of the ſelf-evidence of the Scriptures, and the inſufficiency of that for reſolving the queſtion about the Authority of the Scriptures.* III. *Of the pretended Miracles of Impoſtors and falſe Chriſts,* as Barchochebas, David *el*-David *and others.* IV. *The Rules whereby to judge true Miracles from falſe.* 1. *True Divine Miracles are wrought to confirm a Divine Teſtimony.* V. *No Miracles neceſſary for the certain conveyance of a Divine Teſtimony: prov'd from the Evidences that the Scriptures cou'd not be corrupted.* VI. 2. *No Miracles Divine which contradict Divine Revelation. Of Popiſh Miracles.* VII. 3. *Divine Miracles leave Divine Effects on thoſe who believe them. Of the Miracles of* Simon Magus. VIII. 4. *Divine Miracles tend to the overthrow of the Devil's power in the World: the Antipathy of the Doctrine of Chriſt to the Devil's deſign in the World.* IX. 5. *The diſtinction of true Miracles from others, from the circumſtances and manner of their operation. The Miracles of Chriſt compar'd with thoſe of the Heathen Gods.* X. 6. *God makes it evident to all impartial judgments, that Divine Miracles exceed Created power. This manifeſted from the unparallell'd Miracles of* Moſes *and our Savior. From all which the rational evidence of Divine Revelation is manifeſted, as to the Perſons whom God imploys to teach the World.*

1. HAving thus far ſtated the caſes wherein Miracles may juſtly be expected as a rational Evidence of Divine Authority in the Perſons whom God imploys by way of peculiar meſſage to the World, and in the proſecution of this diſcourſe manifeſted the Evidences of Divine Authority in *Moſes* and the Prophets, and in our Savior and his Apoſtles; the only remaining queſtion concerning

concerning this ſubject, is, *How we may certainly diſtinguiſh true and real Miracles from ſuch as are only pretended and counterfeit?* For it being as evident that there have been Impoſtures and Deluſions in the World as real Miracles, the minds of Men will be wholly to ſeek when to rely upon the Evidence of Miracles as an argument of Divine Authority in thoſe perſons who do them, unleſs a way be found out to diſtinguiſh them from each other. But if we can make it appear, that, unleſs Men thro' weakneſs of Judgment or Incogitancy deceive themſelves, they may have certain Evidence of the truth of Miracles, then there can be nothing wanting as to the eſtabliſhment of their Minds in the truth of that Doctrine which is confirm'd by them. There hath been nothing which hath made Men of better Affections than Underſtandings, ſo ready to ſuſpect the ſtrength of the Evidence from Miracles concerning Divine Teſtimony, as the multitude of Impoſtures in the World under the name of Miracles, and that the Scripture it ſelf tells us we muſt not hearken to ſuch as come with lying wonders. But may we not therefore ſafely rely on ſuch Miracles which we have certain Evidence cou'd not be wrought but by Divine Power, becauſe forſooth the Devil may ſometimes abuſe the ignorance and credulity of unwary Men? or is it becauſe the Scripture forbids us to believe ſuch as ſhou'd come with a pretenſe of Miracles, therefore we cannot rely on the Miracles of CHRIST himſelf? Which is as much as to ſay, becauſe the Scripture tells us that we muſt not believe every Spirit, therefore we muſt believe none at all; or becauſe we muſt not entertain any other Doctrine beſide the Goſpel, therefore we have no reaſon to believe that. For the ground whereby we are aſſur'd by the Scriptures, that the Teſtimony of CHRIST was Divine, and therefore his Doctrine true, is becauſe it was confirm'd by ſuch Miracles as he did; now if that Argument were inſufficient which the Scriptures tell us was the great Evidence of CHRIST's being ſent from GOD, we cannot give our ſelves a ſufficient account in point of Evidence, on which we believe the Doctrine of the Goſpel to be true and Divine. But the only rational pretenſe of any ſcruple in this caſe muſt be a ſuppos'd uncertainty in our Rules of judging concerning the nature of Miracles; for there be no certain κριτηρια, or notes of difference, whereby to know Divine Miracles from Deluſions of Senſes and the Impoſtures of the Devil. I muſt confeſs that there is an apparent inſufficiency in the Evidence from Miracles; but if there be any certain Rules of proceeding in this caſe, we are to blame nothing but our Incredulity, if we be not ſatisfy'd by them. For the full clearing of this, I ſhall firſt *make it appear that there may be certain Evidence found out, whereby we may know true Miracles from falſe, and Divine from Diabolical.* And, Secondly, *Inquire into thoſe things which are the main notes of difference between them.* Firſt, *That there may be certain Evidence whereby to know the truth of Miracles.* I ſpeak not of the difference *ex parte rei* between Miracles, and thoſe called Wonders, as that the one exceeds the power of created Agents, and the other doth not; for this leaves the Inquirer as far to ſeek for ſatisfaction as ever; for granting that a Divine Power is ſeen in one, and not in the other, he muſt needs be ſtill diſſatisfy'd, unleſs it can

be made evident to him that ſuch things are from Divine Power, and others cannot be. Now the main diſtinction being placed here in the natures of the things abſtractly conſider'd, and not as they bear any Evidence to our Underſtandings, inſtead of reſolving doubts it increaſeth more; for, as for inſtance, in the caſe of the *Magitians* Rods turning into Serpents, as well as *Moſes*'s; what ſatisfaction cou'd this yield to any Spectator, to tell him, that in the one there was a Divine Power, and not in the other, unleſs it were made appear by ſome Evidence from the thing, that the one was a mere Impoſture, and the other a real Alteration in the thing it ſelf? I take it then for granted, that no general diſcourſes concerning the formal difference of Miracles and Wonders conſider'd in themſelves, can afford any rational ſatisfaction to an inquiſitive Mind; that which alone is able to give it, muſt be ſomething which may be diſcern'd by any judicious and conſiderative Perſon. And that God never gives to any a power of Miracles, but he gives ſome ſuch ground of ſatisfaction concerning them, will appear upon theſe two conſiderations.

1. *From God's intention in giving to any this power of doing Miracles.* We have largely made it manifeſt that the end of true Miracles is to be a confirmation to the World of the Divine Commiſſion of the Perſons who have it, and that the Teſtimony is Divine which is confirm'd by it. Now if there be no way to know when Miracles are true or falſe, this power is to no purpoſe at all; for Men are as much to ſeek for Satisfaction, as if there had been no ſuch things at all. Therefore if Men are bound to believe a Divine Teſtimony, and to rely on the Miracles wrought by the Perſons bringing it, as an Evidence of it, they muſt have ſome aſſurance that theſe Miracles cou'd not come from any but a Divine Power.

2. *From the Providence of God in the World;* which if we own, we cannot imagine that God ſhou'd permit the Devil, whoſe only deſign is to ruin Mankind, to abuſe the credulity of the World ſo far, as to have his lying Wonders paſs uncontroul'd; which they muſt do, if nothing can be found out as a certain difference between ſuch things as are only of Diabolical, and ſuch as are of Divine Power. If then it may be diſcover'd that there is a malignant Spirit which acts in the World and doth produce ſtrange things, either we muſt impute all ſtrange things to him, which muſt be to attribute to him an infinite Power, or elſe that there is a Being infinitely perfect which croſſeth this malignant Spirit in his Deſigns; and if ſo, we cannot imagine he ſhou'd ſuffer him to uſurp ſo much Tyranny over the minds of Men, as to make thoſe things paſs in the more ſober and inquiſitive part of the World for Divine Miracles, which were only Counterfeits and Impoſtures. If then the Providence of God be ſo deeply engaged in the diſcovering the deſigns of Satan, there muſt be ſome means of this diſcovery, and that means can be ſuppos'd to be no other in this caſe, but ſome rational and ſatisfactory Evidence, whereby we may know when ſtrange and miraculous things are done by Satan to deceive Men, and when by a Divine Power to confirm a Divine Teſtimony.

II. But how is it poſſible, ſay ſome, that Miracles ſhou'd be any ground on which to believe a Teſtimony Divine, when Christ himſelf hath told us, *That there ſhall ariſe falſe Chriſts, and falſe*

Mat. 24. 24.

false Prophets, and shall shew great signs and wonders; insomuch that if it were possible they should deceive the very elect? and the Apostle tells us *that the coming of Antichrist will be with all power and signs, and lying wonders.* How then can we fix on Miracles as an Evidence of Divine Testimony, when we see they are common to good and bad Men, and may seal indifferently either Truth or Falshood? To this I reply; 2 Thes. 2. 9.

1. Men are guilty of doing no small disservice to the Doctrine of Christ, when upon such weak and frivolous pretenses they give so great an advantage to Infidelity, as to call in question the validity of that which yielded so ample a Testimony to the truth of Christian Religion. For if once the rational grounds on which we believe the Doctrine of Christ to be true and Divine, be taken away, and the whole evidence of the Truth of it be laid on things not only derided by Men of Atheistical Spirits, but in themselves such as cannot be discern'd or judg'd of by any but themselves; upon what grounds can we proceed to convince an Unbeliever that the Doctrine which we believe is true? If they tell him, *That as light and fire manifest themselves, so doth the Doctrine of the Scripture* to those who believe it; it will be soon reply'd, that Self-evidence in a matter of Faith can imply nothing but either a firm persuasion of the Mind concerning the thing propounded; or else that there are such clear Evidences in the thing its self, that none who freely use their Reason can deny it. The first can be no Argument to any other person any further than the authority of the person who declares it to have such Self-evidence to him, doth extend it self over the mind of the other; and to ones self it seems a strange way of arguing, *I believe the Scriptures because they are true, and they are true because I believe them*; for Self-evidence implies so much, if by it be meant the persuasion of the Mind, that the thing is true: But if by self-evidence be further meant such clear Evidence in the matter propounded, that all who do consider it, must believe it; I then further inquire whether this Evidence doth lie in the naked proposal of the things to the Understanding; and if so, then every one, who assents to this Proposition, that the whole is greater than the part, must likewise assent to this, that the Scripture is the Word of God; or whether doth the Evidence lie, not in the naked Proposal, but in the efficacy of the Spirit of God, on the minds of those to whom it is propounded. Then, 1. The Self-evidence is taken off from the written Word which was the object, and remov'd to a quite different thing which is the efficient cause. 2. Whether then any Persons who want this efficacious operation of the Spirit of God, are or can be bound to believe the Scriptures to be God's Word? If they are bound, the duty must be propounded in such a way as may be sufficient to convince them that it is their duty; but if all the Evidence of the Truth of the Scripture lie on this Testimony of the Spirit, then such as want this, can have none at all. But if, lastly, by this Self-evidence be meant such an impress of God's authority on the Scriptures, that any who consider them as they ought, cannot but discern; I still further inquire, whether this impress lies in the positive assertions in Scripture that they are from God, and that cannot be unless it be made appear to be im-

poſſible that any Writing ſhou'd pretend to be from God when it is not; or elſe in the written Books of Scripture, and then let it be made appear that any one merely by the evidence of the Writings themſelves without any further Arguments can pronounce the *Proverbs* to be the word of God, and not the Book of *Wiſdom*; and *Eccleſiaſtes* to be Divinely inſpir'd, and not *Eccleſiaſticus*: or elſe the Self-evidence muſt be in the excellency of the Matters which are reveal'd in Scripture; but this ſtill falls very ſhort of reſolving wholly the queſtion, whether *the Scripture be the Word of God?* For the utmoſt that this can reach to is, that the things contain'd in Scripture are of ſo high and excellent a nature, that we cannot conceive that any other ſhou'd be the Author of them but God himſelf; all which being granted, I am as far to ſeek as ever what grounds I have to believe that thoſe particular Writings which we call the Scripture are the Word of God, or that God did immediately imploy ſuch and ſuch Perſons to write ſuch and ſuch Books: for I may believe the ſubſtance of the Doctrine to be of God, and yet not believe the Books wherein it is contain'd, to be a divine and infallible Teſtimony; as is evident in the many excellent Devotional Books which are in the World.

But yet further, if the only ground on which we are to believe a Doctrine Divine be the Self-evidencing Light, and power of it, then I ſuppoſe there was the ſame ground of believing a Divine Teſtimony when the Doctrine was declar'd without Writing, by the firſt Preachers of it. So that by this method of proceeding, the ground of believing Christ to be ſent as the *Meſſias* ſent from God, muſt be wholly and ſolely reſolv'd into this, that there was ſo much Self-evidence in this propoſition utter'd by Christ, *I am the light of the World*, that all the *Jews* had been bound to have believ'd him ſent from God, (for light manifeſts its ſelf,) altho' our Savior had never done any one Miracle, to make it appear that he came from God. And we cannot but charge our Savior on this account with being at a very unneceſſary expence upon the World in doing ſo many Miracles, when the bare naked affirmation that he was the *Meſſias*, had been ſufficient to have convinced the whole World. But is it conceivable then upon what account our Savior ſhou'd lay ſo much force on the Miracles done by himſelf in order to the proving his Teſtimony to be Divine, that he ſaith himſelf, *That he had a greater witneſs than that of* John, (who yet doubtleſs had Self-evidencing light going along with his Doctrine too,) *for the works which the Father hath given me to finiſh, the ſame works that I do, bear witneſs of me that the Father hath ſent me?* Can any thing be more plain, or have greater Self-evidence in it, than that our Savior in theſe words doth lay the evidence of his Divine Teſtimony upon the Miracles which he wrought, which on that account he ſo often appeals to, on this very Reaſon, *becauſe they bear witneſs of him; and if they would not believe him on his own Teſtimony, yet they ought to believe him for his works ſake?* Doth all this now amount only to a removing of Prejudices from the Perſon of Christ? which yet according to the tenor of the Objection we are conſidering of, it is impoſſible the power of Miracles ſhou'd do, if theſe Miracles may be ſo far done or counterfeited

Joh. 5. 36.

Joh. 19. 25, 38. 14. 11. 15. 24.

by

by false Christs, that we can have no certain evidence to distinguish the one from the other.

III. Which the objection pretends; and was the great thing wherein *Celsus* the *Epicurean* triumph'd so much, that *Christ should foretell that others should come and do Miracles which they must not hearken to*, and thence wou'd infer as from Christ's own confession that Miracles have in them οὐδὲν θεῖον, *nothing divine but what may be done by wicked Men:* πῶς δ' οὐ χεῖλιον δοκεῖ τὸ αὐτῶν ἔργων τὸ μὲν θεῖον, τὰς δὲ γοητικὰς ἐμφαίνειν; *Is it not a wretched thing*, saith he, *that from the same works one should be accounted a God, and others Deceivers?* Whereby those who wou'd invalidate the Argument from Miracles, may take notice how finely they fall in with one of the most bitter Enemies of Christian Religion, and make use of the same Arguments which he did; and therefore *Origen*'s reply to him, will reach them too. *For*, saith he, *our Savior in those words of his doth not bid Men beware in general of such as did Miracles*, ἀλλὰ δοκεῖ τῷ τοὺς ἀναγορεύουσιν ἑαυτοὺς εἶναι τὸ χρεῖττον τοῦ θεοῦ, καὶ πτοεμβόλοις τισὶ φαντασιῶν ὡσεὶ ἑαυτοὺς ἐπισείφειν τοὺς Ἰησοῦ μαθητάς· *but bids them beware of that when Men gave themselves out to be the true Christ the Son of God, and endeavor to draw Christ's Disciples from him, by some mere Appearances instead of Miracles.* Therefore Christ being evidently made appear to be the Son of God, by the powerful and uncontroul'd Miracles which he wrought, what pretence of Reason cou'd there be to hearken to any one who gave themselves out to be Christs, merely from some strange Wonders which they wrought? And from hence, as he further observes, may be justly inferr'd contrary to what *Celsus* imagin'd, that there was certainly an evidence of Divine Power in Miracles, when these false Christs gave themselves out to be Christs merely from the supposal that they had this power of doing Miracles. And so it is evident in all the false Christs which have appear'd, they have made this their great pretense that they did many Signs and Wonders; which God might justly permit them to do, to punish the great Infidelity of the *Jews*, who wou'd not believe in Christ notwithstanding those frequent and apparent Miracles which he did, which did infinitely transcend those of any such Pretenders. Such among the *Jews* were *Jonathas*, who after the destruction of *Jerusalem*, as *Josephus* tells us, drew many of the People into the Wilderness of *Cyrene*, σημεῖα καὶ φάσματα δείξειν ἐπαγγελλόμενος, *promising to shew them many Prodigies and strange Appearances.* Not long after in the times of *Adrian* appear'd that famous Blazing-star *Barchochebas*, who not only portended but brought so much mischief upon the *Jews*; his pretense was that he vomited Flames; and so he did, such as consum'd himself and his Followers: after him many other Impostors arose in *Ægypt*, *Cyprus* and *Crete*, who all went upon the same pretence of doing Miracles. In latter times the famous Impostor was *David el-David*, whose story is thus briefly reported by *David Ganz*. *David el-David pretended to be the true Messias and rebelled against the King of* Persia, *and did many Signs and Prodigies before the* Jews *and the* King *of* Persia: *at last his Head was cut off, and the* Jews *fined an hundred Talents of Gold*; in the Epistle of *Rambam* or *R. Moses Maimon.* It is said, *That*

Orig. lib. 2. c. Cels.

Tzemach David a. 895.

the King of Persia *desired of him a Sign, and he told him that he should cut off his Head and he would rise again;* (which he cunningly desir'd to avoid being tormented,) *which the King was resolv'd to try, and accordingly executed him;* but I suppose his Resurrection and *Mahomet's* will be both in one day, altho' *Maimonides* tells us, *some of the* Jews *are yet such Fools as to expect his Resurrection.* Several other Impostors *Maimonides* mentions in his Epistle *de Australi Regione.* One who pretended to be the *Messias* because he cur'd himself of the *Leprosy* in a night; several others he mentions in *Spain, France,* and other Parts, and the issue of them all was only a further aggravation of the Miseries and Captivities of the poor *Jews,* who were so credulous in following Impostors, and yet such strange Infidels where there were plain and undoubted Miracles to perswade them to believe in our blessed Savior as the true *Messias.* We freely grant then that many pretended Miracles may be done in the World, to deceive Men with; but doth it hence follow that either there are no true Miracles done in the World, or that there are no certain Rules to distinguish the one from the other? But as *Origen* yet further replies to *Celsus,* as a Wolf doth very much resemble a Dog, yet they are not of the same kind; nor a Turtle-Dove and a Pigeon; so that which is produced by a Divine Power is not of the same nature with that which is produced by *Magic;* but as he argues, *Is it possible that there should be only deceits in the World and Magical operations? and can there be no true Miracles at all wrought? Is Human nature only capable of Impostures, or can none work Miracles but Devils? Where there is a worse, there may be a better; and so from the Impostures and Counterfeits, we may infer that there are true Miracles, wrought by a Divine Power; otherwise it were all one as to say, there are Counterfeits, but no Jewels; or there are Sophisms and Paralogisms, but no legitimate Demonstrations: if then there be such deceits, there are true Miracles too; all the business is* βασανιστέον τοὺς ἐπαγγελλομένους τὰς δυνάμεις ἐξετάζειν, *strictly and severely to examine the pretenders to them and that from the Life and Manners of those that do them, and from the effects and consequents of them, whether they do good or hurt in the world, whether they correct Mens manners, or bring Men to goodness, holiness, and truth; and on this account we are neither to reject all Miracles, nor embrace all pretenses, but carefully and prudently examine the rational evidences whereby those which are true and Divine, may be known from such as are Counterfeit and Diabolical.*

V. ep. Maimon in not. Vorstii and Tzem. Dav.

IV. And this now leads us to the main subject of this Chapter, *viz. What Rules we have to proceed by, in judging Miracles to be true or false;* which may be these following.

1. *True Divine Miracles are wrought in confirmation of some Divine Testimony.* Because we have manifested by all the precedent discourse, that the intention of Miracles is to seal some Divine Revelation. Therefore if God shou'd work Miracles when no Divine Testimony is to be confirm'd, God would set the Broad-Seal of Heaven to a Blank. If it be said no, *because it will witness to us now the truth of that Testimony which was deliver'd so many Ages since;* I answer, 1. The truth of that Testimony was sufficiently seal'd at the time of the delivery of it, and is convey-

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ed down in a certain way to us. Is it not ſufficient that the Charter of a Corporation had the Prince's Broad-Seal in the time of the giving of it, but that every ſucceſſion of Men in that Corporation muſt have a new Broad-Seal, or elſe they ought to queſtion their Patent? What ground can there be for that, when the original Seal and Patent is preſerv'd, and is certainly convey'd down from Age to Age? So I ſay it is as to us, God's Grand Charter of Grace and Mercy to the World thro' Jesus Christ, was Seal'd by Divine Miracles, at the delivery of it to the World; the original Patent, *viz.* the Scriptures wherein the Charter is contain'd, is convey'd in a moſt certain manner to us; to this Patent the Seal is annex'd, and in it are contain'd thoſe undoubted Miracles which were wrought in confirmation of it; ſo that a new ſealing of this Patent is wholly needleſs, unleſs we have ſome cauſe of ſuſpicion, that the original Patent it ſelf were loſt, or the firſt ſealing was not true. If the latter, then Chriſtian Religion is not true, if the Miracles wrought for confirmation of it were falſe, becauſe the truth of it depends ſo much on the Verity and Divinity of the Miracles which were then wrought. If the firſt be ſuſpected, *viz.* the certain conveyance of the Patent, *viz.* the Scriptures, ſome certain grounds of ſuch a ſuſpicion muſt be diſcover'd in a matter of ſo great moment, eſpecially when the great and many Societies of the Chriſtian World do all conſent unanimouſly in the contrary. Nay it is impoſſible that any rational Man can conceive that the Patent which we now rely upon, is ſuppoſititious or corrupted in any of thoſe things which are of concernment to the Chriſtian World; and that on theſe accounts.

1. *From the watchfulneſs of Divine Providence for the good of Mankind.* Can we conceive that there is a God who rules and takes care of the World, and who to manifeſt his ſignal Love to Mankind, ſhould not only grant a Patent of Mercy to the World, by his Son Christ, and then ſeal'd it by Divine Miracles, and in order to the certain conveyance of it to the World, caus'd it by Perſons imploy'd by himſelf, to be recorded in a Language fitteſt for its diſperſing up and down the World, (all which I here ſuppoſe:) Can we I ſay conceive that this God ſhou'd ſo far have caſt off his care of the World and the good of Mankind, which was the original ground of the Grant it ſelf, as to ſuffer any wicked Men or malignant Spirits to corrupt or alter any of thoſe Terms in it, on which Mens eternal Salvation depends; much leſs wholly to ſuppreſs and deſtroy it, and to ſend forth one that is counterfeit and ſuppoſititious inſtead of it, and which ſhou'd not be diſcover'd by the Chriſtians of that Age wherein that corrupt Copy was ſet forth, nor by any of the moſt learned and inquiſitive Chriſtians ever ſince? They who can give any the leaſt entertainment to ſo wild, abſurd and irrational an Imagination, are ſo far from Reaſon, that they are in good diſpoſition to *Atheiſm*; and next to the ſuſpecting the Scriptures to be corrupted, they may rationally ſuſpect there is no ſuch thing as a God and Providence in the World; or that the World is govern'd by a Spirit moſt malignant and envious of the good of Mankind. Which is a ſuſpicion only becoming thoſe Heathens (among whom it was very frequent) who worſhipped the Devils inſtead of God.

2. *Becauſe*

2. *Because of the general dispersion of Copies in the World upon the first publishing of them.* We cannot otherwise conceive, but that Records containing so weighty and important things, wou'd be transcrib'd by all those Churches which believe the truth of the things contain'd in them. We see how far curiosity will carry Men as to the care of transcribing ancient *MSS.* of old Authors, which contain only some History of things past that are of no great concernment to us: Can we then imagine those who ventur'd Estates and Lives upon the truth of the things reveal'd in Scripture, wou'd not be very careful to preserve the authentic Instrument whereby they are reveal'd in a certain way to the whole World? And besides this, for a long time the Originals themselves of the Apostolical Writings were preserv'd in the Church; which makes *Tertullian* in his time appeal to them. *Age jam qui voles curiositatem melius exercere in negotio salutis tuæ; percurre Ecclesias Apostolicas, apud quas ipsæ adhuc cathedræ Apostolorum suis locis præsidentur, apud quas ipsæ authenticæ eorum literæ recitantur, sonantes vocem, & repræsentantes faciem uniuscujusque.* Now how was it possible that in that time the Scriptures could be corrupted, when in some of the Churches the original Writtings of the Apostles were preserv'd in a continual succession of Persons from the Apostles themselves, and from these Originals so many Copies were transcrib'd, as were convey'd almost all the World over, thro' the large spread of the Christian Churches at that time? And therefore it is impossible to conceive that a Copy should be corrupted in one Church, when it wou'd so speedily be discovered by another; especially considering these three circumstances. 1. The innumerable multitude of Copies which wou'd speedily be taken, both considering the moment of the thing, and the easiness of doing it; God, probably for that very end, not loading the World with *Pandects* and *Codes* of his Laws, but contriving the whole Instruments of Man's Salvation in so narrow a compass, that it might be easily preserv'd and transcrib'd by such who were passionate admirers of the Scriptures. 2. The great numbers of learned and inquisitive Men who soon sprung up in the Christian Church; whose great care was to explain and vindicate the sacred Scriptures; can we then think that all these Watchmen should be asleep together when the Evil one came to sow his Tares, which it is most unreasonable to imagine, when in the Writings of all these learned Men, which were very many and voluminous, so much of the Scripture was inserted, that had there been corruptions in the Copies themselves, yet comparing them with those Writings, the corruptions would be soon discover'd? 3. The great veneration which all Christians had of the Scripture, that they placed the hopes of their eternal Happiness, upon the truth of the things contain'd in the Scriptures: Can we then think these would suffer any material Alteration to creep into these Records without their observing and discovering it? Can we now think when all persons are so exceeding careful of their Deeds, and the Records whereon their Estates depend, that the Christians who valu'd not this World in comparison of that to come, should suffer the *Magna Charta* of that to be lost, corrupted, or imbezzelled away? Especially considering what care and industry was us'd by many

De præscript. adv. hæret. c. 36.

many Primitive Christians to compare Copies together, as is evident in *Pantænus*, who brought the *Hebrew* Copy of *Matthew* out of the *Indies* to *Alexandria*, as *Eusebius* tells us: in *Pamphilius* and the Library he erected at *Cæsarea*, but especially in *Origen*'s admirable *Hexapla*, which were mainly intended for this end.

3. It is impossible to conceive a corruption of the Copy of the Scriptures, because of the great differences which were all along the several ages of the Church, between those who acknowledg'd the Scriptures to be Divine. So that if one party of them had foisted in, or taken out any thing, another party was ready to take notice of it, and wou'd be sure to tell the World of it. And this might be one great reason, why God in his wise Providence might permit such an increase of *Heresies* in the Infancy of the Church, *viz.* that thereby Christians might be forced to stand upon their guard, and to have a special Eye to the Scriptures, which were always the great Eye-sores of *Heretics*. And from this great wariness of the Church it was that some of the Epistles were so long abroad before they found general entertainment in all the Churches of Christ, because in those Epistles which were doubted for some time, there were some passages which seemed to favor some of the Heresies then abroad; but when upon severe inquiry they are found to be what they pretended, they were receiv'd in all the Christian Churches.

4. Because of the agreement between the Old Testament and the New: the Prophecies of the Old Testament appear with their full accomplishment in the New which we have; so that it is impossible to think the New should be corrupted unless the Old were too, which is most unreasonable to imagin, when the *Jews*, who have been the great Conservators of the Old Testament, have been all along the most inveterate Enemies of the Christians: So that we cannot at all conceive it possible that any material Corruptions or Alterations shou'd creep into the Scriptures, much less that the true Copy shou'd be lost, and a new one forged.

Supposing then that we have the same Authentic Records preserv'd and handed down to us by the care of all Christian Churches, which were written in the first Ages of the Church of Christ: what necessity can we imagin that God should work new Miracles to confirm that Doctrine which is convey'd down in a certain uninterrupted way to us, as being seal'd by Miracles undoubtedly Divine in the first Promulgation and Penning of it? And this is the first Reason why the truth of the Scriptures need not now be seal'd by new Miracles. 2. Another may be, because God in the Scripture hath appointed other things to continue in his Church, to be as Seals to his People of the truth of the things contain'd in Scriptures. Such are outwardly, the Sacraments of the Gospel, Baptism, and the Lord's Supper, which are set apart as Seals to confirm the truth of the Covenant on God's part towards us in reference to the great Promises contain'd in it, in reference to pardon of Sin, and the ground of our Acceptance with God by Jesus Christ: and inwardly God hath promis'd his Spirit to be as a Witness within them, that by its working and strengthening Grace in the hearts of Believers, it may confirm to

them the truth of the Records of Scripture, when they find the Counter-part of them written in their Hearts by the finger of the Spirit of God. It cannot then be with any reaſon at all ſuppos'd, that when a Divine Teſtimony is already confirm'd by Miracles undoubtedly Divine, that new Miracles ſhou'd be wrought in the Church to aſſure us of the truth of it. So *Chryſoſtom* fully expreſſeth himſelf concerning Miracles, ſpeaking of the firſt Ages of the Chriſtian Church: καὶ γὰρ ἦν τότε χρήσιμα γινόμενα, καὶ τῶν χρησίμων ἐ γίνεται, τὸν λόγον ἅπ ἔργων καθῶν ἔ τῶν τότε σημείων τῷ πίστιν ἂν λάβωμεν παρεχόμενον. *Miracles were very uſeful then, and not at all now; for now we manifeſt the truth of what we ſpeak from the ſacred Scriptures, and the Miracles wrought in confirmation of them.* Which that excellent Author there fully manifeſts in a Diſcourſe on this ſubject, *Why Miracles were neceſſary in the beginning of the Chriſtian Church, and are not now.* To the ſame purpoſe St. *Auſtin* ſpeaks where he diſcourſeth of the truth of Religion: *Accepimus majores noſtros viſibilia miracula ſecutos eſſe; per quos id actum eſt ut neceſſaria non eſſent poſteris*; becauſe the World believed by the Miracles which were wrought at the firſt preaching of the Goſpel, therefore Miracles are no longer neceſſary. For we cannot conceive how the World ſhou'd be at firſt induced to believe without manifeſt and uncontrouled Miracles. For as *Chryſoſtom* ſpeaks, εἰ σημεῖον χρεὼς ἤκουσαν, πολλῷ μεῖζον τὸ θαῦμα φαίνεται. *It was the greateſt Miracles of all, if the World ſhou'd believe without Miracles.* Which the Poet *Dantes* hath well expreſs'd in the Twenty-fourth *Canto* of *Paradiſe*. For when the *Apoſtle* is there brought in, asking the Poet upon what account he took the Scriptures of the *Old and New Teſtament to be the Word of* God; his Anſwer is,

Chryſoſt. in 1 Cor. 2. Hom. 6. p. 266. To. 3. ed. Eton.

De ver. Relig. cap. 25.

Probatio quæ verum hoc mihi recludit,
Sunt opera, quæ ſecuta ſunt, ad quæ Natura
Non candefecit ferrum unquam aut percuſſit incudem.

i. e. *The evidence of that is the Divine Power of Miracles which was in thoſe who deliver'd thoſe things to the World.* And when the *Apoſtle* catechiſeth him further, *how he knew thoſe Miracles were ſuch as they pretended to be*, viz. *that they were true and Divine*; his Anſwer is,

Si orbis terræ ſeſe convertit ad Chriſtianiſmum,
Inquiebam ego, ſine miraculis: hoc unum
Eſt tale, ut reliqua non ſint ejus centeſima pars.

i. e. *If the World ſhou'd be converted to the* Chriſtian Faith *without Miracles, this wou'd be ſo great a Miracle, that others were not to be compar'd with it.* I conclude this then, with that known ſaying of St. *Auſtin*; *Quiſquis adhuc prodigia, ut credat, inquiret, magnum eſt ipſe prodigium qui mundo credente non credit: He that ſeeks for Miracles ſtill to induce him to Faith, when the World is converted to the* Chriſtian Faith, *he needs not ſeek for prodigies abroad; he wants only a looking-glaſs to diſcover one.* For as he goes on, *Unde temporibus eruditis, & omne quod fieri non poteſt reſpuentibus, ſine ullis miraculis nimium mirabiliter incredibilia credidit mundus?*

De Civit. Dei, l. 22. cap. 8.

Whence

Whence came it to paſs that in ſo learned and wary an Age as that was which the Apoſtles preach'd in, the World without Miracles ſhou'd be brought to believe things ſo ſtrangely incredible as thoſe were which CHRIST *and his Apoſtles preach'd?* So that by this it appears that the intention of Miracles was to confirm a Divine Teſtimony to the World, and to make that appear credible which otherwiſe wou'd have ſeemed incredible; but to what end now, when this Divine Teſtimony is believ'd in the World, ſhou'd Miracles be continu'd among thoſe who believe the Doctrine to be Divine, the Miracles wrought for the confirmation of it to have been true, and the Scriptures which contain both, to be the undoubted Word of GOD? To what purpoſe then the huge out-cry of Miracles in the *Roman* Church is, is hard to conceive, unleſs it be to make it appear how ambitious that Church is of being called by the name of him, *whoſe coming is after the working of Satan, with all power, and ſigns, and lying wonders, and with all deceivableneſs of unrighteouſneſs in them that periſh, becauſe they receiv'd not the love of the Truth that they might be ſav'd.* For had they receiv'd the Love of the Truth of the Goſpel, they wou'd have believ'd it on the account of thoſe Miracles, and Signs, and Wonders which were wrought for the confirmation of it, by CHRIST and his *Apoſtles*; and not have gone about by their Juglings and Impoſtures inſtead of bringing Men to believe the Goſpel, to make them queſtion the truth of the firſt Miracles when they ſee ſo many Counterfeits; had we not great aſſurance the *Apoſtles* were Men of other Deſigns and Intereſts than *Popiſh* Prieſts are, and that there is not now any ſuch neceſſity of Miracles, as there was then when a Divine Teſtimony revealing the truth of *Chriſtian Religion* was confirm'd by them.

2 Theſ. 2. 9, 10.

VI. 2. *Thoſe Miracles cannot be Divine, which are done now for the confirmation of any thing contrary to that Divine Teſtimony, which is confirm'd by uncontrouled Divine Miracles.* The caſe is not the ſame now, which was before the coming of CHRIST; for then tho' the Law of *Moſes* was confirm'd by Miracles; yet tho' the Doctrine of CHRIST did null the obligation of that Law, the Miracles of CHRIST were to be look'd on as Divine, becauſe GOD did not intend the Ceremonial Law to be perpetual; and there were many Prophecies which cou'd not have their accompliſhment but under a new State: But now under the Goſpel, GOD hath declar'd this to be the laſt Revelation of his Mind and Will to the World by his Son, that now the Prophecies of the Old Teſtament are accompliſh'd, and the Prophecies of the New reſpect only the various conditions of the *Chriſtian Church*, without any the leaſt intimation of any further Revelation of GOD's Mind and Will to the World: So that now the Scriptures are our adequate Rule of Faith, and that according to which we are to judg all pretenders to Inſpiration or Miracles. And according to this Rule we are to proceed in any thing which is propounded to us to believe by any Perſons, upon any pretenſes whatſoever. Under the Law after the eſtabliſhment of the Law its ſelf by the Miracles of *Moſes*, the Rule of judging all pretenders to Miracles, was by the worſhip of the true GOD. *If there ariſe among you a Prophet, or a dreamer of dreams, and giveth thee a ſign, or a wonder,*

Deut. 13. 1, 2, 3.

wonder, and the ſign or the wonder come to paſs, whereof he ſpake to thee, ſaying, Let us go after other Gods (which thou haſt not known) and let us ſerve them; thou ſhalt not hearken unto the words of that Prophet, or that dreamer of dreams: for the Lord your God proveth you to know whether you love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your ſoul. Whereby it is plain, that after the true Doctrine is confirm'd by Divine Miracles, God may give the Devil or falſe Prophets power to work, if not real Miracles, yet ſuch as Men cannot judg by the things themſelves whether they be real or no; and this God may do for the tryal of Mens Faith, whether they will forſake the true Doctrine confirm'd by greater Miracles for the ſake of ſuch Doctrines which are contrary thereto, and are confirm'd by falſe Prophets, by Signs and Wonders. Now in this caſe our Rule of tryal muſt not be ſo much the Wonders conſider'd in themſelves whether real or no, as the comparing them with the Miracles which were wrought in confirmation of that Doctrine, which is contrary to this, which theſe Wonders tend to the proving of. Therefore God's People under the Law were to examin the ſcope and drift of the Miracles; if they were intended to bring them to Idolatry, whatever they were, they were not to hearken to thoſe who did them. So now under the Goſpel, as the worſhip of the true God was then the Standard whereby to judg of Miracles by the Law of *Moſes*, ſo the worſhip of the true God thro' Jesus Christ, and by the Doctrine reveal'd by him, is the Standard whereby we ought to judg of all pretenders to work Miracles. So that let the Miracles be what they will, if they contradict that Doctrine which Christ reveal'd to the World, we are to look upon them as only tryals of our Faith in Christ, to ſee whether we *love him with our whole hearts* or no. And therefore I think it needleſs to examin all the particulars of *Lipſius* his Relations of Miracles wrought by his *Diva Virgo Hallenſis* and *Aſprecollis*; for if I ſee, that their intention and ſcope is to ſet up the worſhip of *Dæmons*, or a middle ſort of *Deities* between God and us, which the Scripture is ignorant of, on that very account I am bound to reject them all. Altho' I think it very poſſible to find out the difference between true Miracles, and them, in the manner and circumſtances of their operation; but this, as it is of more curioſity, ſo of leſs neceſſity; for if the Doctrine of the Scriptures was confirm'd by Miracles infinitely above theſe, I am bound to adhere to that, and not to believe any other Doctrine, *though an Angel from Heaven ſhould preach it*, much leſs, altho' ſome *Popiſh* Prieſts may boaſt much of Miracles to confirm a Doctrine oppoſite to the Goſpel: which I know not how far God may in judgment give thoſe Images Power to work, or others Faith to believe, becauſe they wou'd not receive the truth in the love of it: and theſe are now thoſe

2 Theſ. 2. 9. ψεύδει, *lying wonders*, which the Scripture forewarns us that we ſhou'd not believe, *viz.* ſuch as lead men to the belief of Lies, or of Doctrines, contrary to that of the Goſpel of Jesus Christ.

VII. 3. *Where Miracles are true and divine, there the effects which follow them upon the Minds of thoſe who believe them, are true and divine, i. e.* the effect of believing of them, is the drawing of men from ſin unto God. This the Primitive *Chriſtians* inſiſted much

much upon, as an undoubted Evidence that the Miracles of CHRIST were wrought by a Divine power, becauſe the effect which follow'd them, *was the work of converſion of Souls from ſin and Idols to God and Chriſt, and all true piety and virtue.* As the effect of the Miracles of *Moſes* was the drawing a People off from Superſtition and Idolatry to the worſhip of the true GOD; ſo the effect which follow'd the Belief of the Miracles of CHRIST in the World was the purging Mens Souls from all ſin and wickedneſs to make them New Creatures, and to live in all exactneſs and holineſs of converſation. And thereby *Origen* diſcovers the great difference between the Miracles of CHRIST and *Antichriſt*, that the intent of all *Antichriſt*'s Wonders was *to bring men* εἰς ἀπάτην τῆς ἀδικίας, *to the deceivableneſs of unrighteouſneſs, whereby to deſtroy them; but the intent of the Miracles of Chriſt was* οὐκ ἀπάτη ἀλλὰ σωτηρία ψυχῶν, *not the deceiving but the ſaving of Souls;* Ἵνα γὰρ τὰ κρείττονα βίον καὶ συνήθειαν τὴν τῆς κακίας ὑπομονῆς ἐπὶ τὸ ἄμεινον, εὐλόγως φησὶν ἀπὸ ἀπάτης γίνεσθαι; *who can with any probability ſay that reformation of life and daily progreſs from evil to good ſhould be the effect of mere deceit?* And therefore he ſaith, *Chriſt told his Diſciples, that they ſhou'd do greater works than he had done; becauſe by their Preaching and Miracles the eyes of blind Souls are opened, and the ears of ſuch as were deaf to all goodneſs are opened ſo far as to hearken to the Precepts and Promiſes of the Goſpel: and the feet of thoſe who were lame in their inward man, are ſo healed as to delight to run in the ways of God's Commandments.* Now is it poſſible that theſe ſhou'd be the effects of any evil Spirit? But on the contrary we ſee the effects of all Impoſtures, and pretended Miracles wrought by Diabolical power, was to bring men off from God to ſin, and to diſſolve that ſtrict obligation to duty which was laid upon Men by the Goſpel of *Chriſt*. Thus it was in that early Ape of the *Apoſtles*, *Simon Magus*, who far out-went *Apollonius Tyaneus* or any other Heathen in his pretended Miracles, according to the report which is given of him by the Primitive Chriſtians; but we ſee the intent of his Miracles was to raiſe an admiration of himſelf, and to bring men off from all holineſs of converſation, by aſſerting among other damnable Hereſies, that God did not at all regard *what Men did, but only what they believed:* wherein the *Gnoſtics* were his followers. Now when Miracles are wrought to be Patrons of ſin, we may eaſily know from whom they come.

Lib. 2. cont. Celſ.

V. Grot. in 2 Theſ. 2. 9. in opuſc.

4. *Thoſe Miracles are wrought by a Divine Power, which tend to the overthrow of the Kingdom of Satan in the World.* This is evident from hence, becauſe all ſuch things as are out of Man's power to effect, muſt either be done by a Power *Divine* or *Diabolical:* For as our Savior argues, *Every Kingdom divided againſt its ſelf is brought to deſolation, and every City or Houſe divided againſt its ſelf cannot ſtand; and if Satan caſt out Satan, he is divided againſt himſelf, how ſhall then his Kingdom ſtand?* Now *Chriſt* by his Miracles did not diſpoſſeſs Satan out of Mens Bodies, but out of his Temples too, as hath been ſhewn already. And beſides, the Doctrine of CHRIST which was confirm'd by thoſe Miracles, was in every thing directly contrary to the Devil's deſign in the World. For, 1. The Devil's deſign was to conceal himſelf among thoſe who worſhipp'd him; the deſign of the Go-

VIII.

Matth. 12. 25, 26.

ſpel was to diſcover him whom the *Gentiles* worſhipped, to be an evil and malignant Spirit, that deſign'd nothing but their ruin. Now it appears in the whole Hiſtory of *Gentiliſm*, the grand Myſtery of Satan which the Devil us'd among the *Heathens* was to make himſelf to be taken and worſhipp'd for God, and to make them believe that their *Dæmons* were very good and benign Spirits; which made the *Platoniſts* and other Philoſophers ſo much incenſed againſt the Primitive *Chriſtians*, when they declar'd their *Dæmons* to be nothing elſe but infernal and wicked Spirits which ſought the deſtruction of Souls.

2. *The Devil's great deſign was to draw men to the practice of the greateſt wickedneſs under a pretenſe of Religion*; as is very obſervable in all the *Heathen* Myſteries, which the more *recondite* and hidden they were, the greater wickedneſs lay at the bottom of them, and ſo were to purpoſe *Myſteries of Iniquity*: But now the deſign of the Goſpel was to promote the greateſt purity both of Heart and Life; there being in no other Religion in the World either ſuch incomparable Precepts of Holineſs, or ſuch incouraging Promiſes to the practice of it (from eternal Life hereafter as the Reward, and the aſſiſtance of God's Spirit to help Men here) or ſuch prevailing motives to perſuade men to it, from the *love of God in Chriſt to the World*, the *Undertakings of Chriſt for us* in his Death and Sufferings, the excellent Pattern we have to follow in our Savior's own example: now theſe things make it plain that the deſign of *Chriſt* and the *Devil* are diametrically oppoſite to each other. 3. The deſign of the *Devil* is to ſet God and Mankind at the greateſt diſtance from each other; the deſign of *Chriſt* in the Goſpel is to bring them nearer together. The *Devil* firſt tempts to ſin, and then for ſin; he makes Men preſume to ſin, and to deſpair becauſe they have ſinned. *Chriſt* firſt keeps Men from ſin, by his Precepts and Threatnings; and then ſuppoſing ſin, incourageth them to repent with hopes of pardon procur'd by himſelf for all truly penitent and believing Sinners. Thus in every things the deſign of *Chriſt* and the *Devil* are contrary, which makes it evident that the Miracles wrought in confirmation of the Doctrine of *Chriſt* cou'd be from no evil Spirit, and therefore muſt be from a truly Divine Power.

IX. 5. *True and Divine Miracles may be known and diſtinguiſhed from falſe and diabolical, from the circumſtances, or the manner of their operation.* There were ſome peculiar Signatures on the Miracles of *Chriſt* which are not to be found in any wrought by a power leſs than Divine. Which *Arnobius* well expreſſeth in theſe words to the *Heathens*. *Poteſtis aliquem nobis deſignare, monſtrare ex omnibus illis Magis qui unquam fuere per ſecula, conſimile aliquid Chriſto milleſima ex parte qui fecerit? qui ſine ulla vi carminum, ſine herbarum aut graminum ſuccis, ſine ulla aliqua obſervatione ſollicita ſacrorum, libaminum, temporum?——Atqui conſtitit Chriſtum ſine ullis adminiculis rerum, ſine ullius ritus obſervatione, vel lege, omnia illa quæ fecit, nominis ſui poſſibilitate feciſſe, & quod proprium, conſentaneum, Deo dignum fuerat vero, nihil nocens aut noxium, ſed opiferum, ſed ſalutare, ſed auxiliaribus plenum bonis poteſtatis munificæ liberalitate donaſſe?* He challengeth the *Heathens* to produce any one of all their *Magicians* who did the thou-

Arnob. c. gentes, l. 1. pag. 25, 26, &c.

thouſandth part of what our Savior did: who made uſe of none of their *Magical* Rites and Obſervations in whatever he did; and whatever he did was merely by his own power, and was withal moſt becoming GOD, and moſt beneficial to the Wold. And thence he proceeds to anſwer the *Heathens* about the Miracles wrought by their Gods, which fell ſhort of thoſe of CHRIST in three main particulars, the *Manner* of their working, and the *Number* of them, and the *Quality* of the things done.

1. *The manner of their working.* What they did was with a great deal of pomp and ceremony; what CHRIST did was with a word ſpeaking, and ſometimes without it by the touch of his Garment: *Non inquiro, non exigo,* ſaith he, *quis Deus, aut quo tempore, cui fuerit auxiliatus, aut quem fractum reſtituerit ſanitati; illud ſolum audire deſidero, an ſine ullius adjunctione materiæ,* i. e. *medicaminis alicujus ad tactum morbos juſſerit ab hominibus evolare, imperaverit, fecerit, & emori valetudinum cauſam, & debilium corpora ad ſuas remeare naturas. Omitting all other circumſtances, name me,* ſaith he, *but which of your Gods ever cured a Diſeaſe without any adjoyned matter, ſome preſcriptions or other; or which of them ever commanded Diſeaſes out of Bodies by their mere touch, and quite remov'd the cauſe of the Diſtempers.* *Æſculapius,* he ſays, cured Diſeaſes, but in the way that ordinary *Phyſicians* do, by preſcribing ſome thing or other, to be done by the Patients. *Nulla autem virtus eſt medicaminibus amovere quæ noceant; beneficia iſta rerum, non ſunt curantium poteſtates. To cure Diſeaſes by Preſcriptions argues no power at all in the preſcriber, but virtue in the Medicine.*

2. *In the number of the Perſons cured.* They were very few which were cured in the *Heathen* Temples; CHRIST cured whole multitudes, and that not in the Reveſtries of the Temples where fraud and impoſture might be eaſily ſuſpected, but in the preſence of the People who brought to him all manner of Perſons ſick of all ſorts of Diſeaſes, which were cured by him; and theſe ſo numerous, that the *Evangeliſt* who records many of CHRIST's Miracles which had been omitted by the other, yet tells us at laſt, the Miracles of CHRIST were ſo many, *that the whole World would not contain them.* Joh. 21. 25. But now *Arnobius* tells the *Heathens, Quid prodeſt oſtendere unum aut alterum fortaſſe curatos, cum tot millibus ſubvenerit nemo, & plena ſint omnia miſerorum infeliciumque delubra? What matter is it to ſhew one or two cured, when thouſands lie continually periſhing for want of cure?* yea ſuch as did *Æſculapium ipſum precibus fatigare, & invitare miſerrimis votis,* that cou'd not beg a cure of *Æſculapius* with all their earneſtneſs and importunity.

3. *In the quality of the Diſeaſes cured.* The Cures among the *Heathens* were ſome ſlight things in compariſon of thoſe performed by CHRIST; the moſt Acute, the moſt Chronical, the moſt Malignant of Diſeaſes, cur'd by a Touch, a Word, a Thought. A Learned *Phyſician* hath undertaken to make it evident from the circumſtances of the Hiſtory, and from the received Principles among the moſt Authentic *Phyſicians,* that the Diſeaſes cured by our Savior, were all incurable by the Rules of *Phyſic*; if ſo, the greater the power of our Savior, who cured them with ſo much facility *Gul. Ader. de morbis Evangel.*

facility as he did. And he not only cured all Diſeaſes himſelf, but gave a power to others, who were not at all verſed in matters of Art and Subtilty, that they ſhou'd do Miracles likewiſe *ſine fucis & adminiculis, without any fraud or aſſiſtance: quid dicitis O mentes incredulæ, difficiles, duræ! alicuine mortalium Jupiter ille Capitolinus hujuſmodi poteſtatem dedit?* When did ever the great *Jupiter Capitolinus give a power of working Miracles to any? I do not ſay*, ſaith he, *of raiſing the dead, or curing the blind, or healing the lame; ſed ut puſtulam, reduviam, populam, aut vocis imperio aut manus contrectatione comprimeret: but to cure a wart, a pimple, any the moſt trivial thing, with a word ſpeaking, or the touch of the hand.* Upon this *Arnobius* challengeth the moſt famous of all the *Heathen Magicians*, *Zoroaſtres*, *Armenius*, *Pamphilus*, *Apollonius*, *Damigero*, *Dardanus*, *Velus*, *Julianus*, and *Bæbulus*, or any other renowned *Magician* to give power to any one to make the dumb to ſpeak, the deaf to hear, the blind to ſee, or bring life into a dead Body. Or if this be too hard, with all their *Magic* Rites and *Incantations*, but to do that *quod a ruſticis Chriſtianis juſſionibus factitatum eſt nudis, which ordinary* Chriſtians *do by their mere words:* So great a difference was there between the higheſt that cou'd be done by *Magic*, and the leaſt that was done by the Name and Power of Christ.

X. 6. *Where Miracles are truly Divine, God makes it evident to all impartial judgments that the things done exceed all created power.* For which purpoſe we are to obſerve that tho' Impoſtures and Deluſions may go far, the power of *Magicians* further when God permits them; yet when God works Miracles to confirm a Divine Teſtimony, he makes it evident that His power doth infinitely exceed them all. This is moſt conſpicuous, in the caſe of *Moſes* and our Bleſſed Savior. Firſt *Moſes*, he began to do ſome Miracles in the preſence of *Pharaoh* and the *Ægyptians*, *turning his Rod into a Serpent*; but we do not find *Pharaoh* at all amaz'd at it, but ſends preſently for the *Magicians* to do the ſame, who did it (whether really or only in appearance, is not material to our purpoſe,) but Aaron's *Rod ſwallowed up theirs*. The next time *the waters are turned into blood* by *Moſes*. The *Magicians they do ſo too*. After this, *Moſes brings up Frogs upon the land, ſo do the Magicians*. So that here now is a plain and open conteſt in the preſence of *Pharaoh* and his People, between *Moſes* and the *Magicians*, and they try for Victory over each other; ſo that if *Moſes* do no more than they, they wou'd look upon him but as a *Magician*; but if *Moſes* do that which by the acknowledgment of theſe *Magicians* themſelves cou'd be only by Divine Power, then it is demonſtrably evident that his power was as far above the power of *Magic*, as God is above the *Devil*. Accordingly we find it in the very next Miracle in *turning the duſt into Ciniphes* (which we render) *lice*, the *Magicians* are *non-pluſt*, and give out, ſaying in plain terms, *This is the finger of God*. And what greater acknowledgment can there be of Divine Power than the confeſſion of thoſe who ſeem'd to conteſt with it, and to imitate it as much as poſſible? After this we find not the *Magicians* offering to conteſt with *Moſes*, and in the plague of *Boils*, we particularly read *that they could not ſtand* before *Moſes*. Thus we ſee in the caſe of *Moſes* how evident it was that there

8. 10, 12.

Exod. 7. 19, 22.

8. 6, 7.

8. 19.

9. 11.

there was a Power above all power of *Magic* which did appear in *Moſes*. And ſo likewiſe in the caſe of our Bleſſed Savior; for altho' *Simon Magus*, *Apollonius*, or others might do ſome ſmall things, or make ſome great ſhew and noiſe by what they did; yet none of them ever came near the doing things of the ſame kind which our Savior did, curing *the born-blind, reſtoring the dead to life after four days*, and ſo as to live a conſiderable time after; or in the manner he did them, with a Word, a Touch, with that frequency and openneſs before his greateſt Enemies as well as Followers, and in ſuch an uncontroul'd manner, that neither *Jews* or *Heathens* ever queſtion'd the truth of them. And after all theſe, when he was laid in the grave after his *Crucifixion*, exactly according to his own prediction, he roſe again the third day, appear'd frequently among his Diſciples for forty days together. After which in their preſence, he *aſcended up to Heaven*, and ſoon after, made good his promiſe to them, *by ſending his Holy Spirit upon them*, by which they ſpake with Tongues, wrought Miracles, went up and down preaching the Goſpel of CHRIST with great boldneſs, cheerfulneſs and conſtancy, and after undergoing a great deal of hardſhip in it, they ſeal'd the truth of all they ſpake with their Blood, laying down their Lives to give witneſs to it. Thus abundantly to the ſatisfaction of the minds of all good Men hath GOD given the higheſt Rational Evidence of the truth of the Doctrine which he hath reveal'd to the World. And thus I have finiſhed the Second Part of my Task, which concern'd the *Rational Evidence* of the truth of *Divine Revelation* from the Perſons who were imploy'd to deliver GOD's mind to the World: And therein have, I hope, made it evident that both *Moſes* and the *Prophets*, our *Savior* and his *Apoſtles*, did come with ſufficient *Rational Evidence* to convince the World that they were Perſons immediately ſent from GOD.

ORIGINES SACRAE.

BOOK III.

CHAP. I.

Of the Being of GOD.

I. The Principles of all Religion lie in the Being of God and Immortality of the Soul: from them the neceſſity of a particular Divine Revelation rationally deduced; the method laid down for proving the Divine Authority of the Scriptures. II. *Why* Moſes *doth not prove the Being of God, but ſuppoſe it.* III. *The notion of a Deity very conſonant to Reaſon. Of the nature of* Idea's, *and particularly of the* Idea *of God.* IV. *How we can form an* Idea *of an infinite Being.* V, VI. *How far ſuch an* Idea *argues exiſtence.* VII, VIII. *The great unreaſonableneſs of Atheiſm demonſtrated. Of the Hypotheſes of the* Ariſtotelian *and* Epicurean *Atheiſts.* IX. *The Atheiſts pretenſes examin'd and refuted.* X, XI, XII, XIII. *Of the nature of the Arguments whereby we prove there is a God. Of univerſal conſent and the Evidence of that to prove a Deity and Immortality of Souls.* XIV, XV. *Of neceſſity of Exiſtence imply'd in the notion of God, and how far that proves the Being of God.* XVI. *The order of the World and uſefulneſs of the parts of it, and eſpecially of Man's body an argument of a Deity.* XVII. *Some higher Principle prov'd to be in the World than Matter and Motion.* XVIII. *The nature of the Soul, and poſſibility of its ſubſiſting after Death.* XIX. *Strange appearances in Nature not ſolvable by the power of Imagination.*

I. HAving in the precedent Book largely given a rational account of the grounds of our Faith, as to the Perſons whom GOD imploys to reveal his Mind to the World; if we can now make it appear that thoſe ſacred Records which we embrace as Divinely inſpir'd, contain in them nothing unworthy of ſo great a name, or unbecoming Perſons ſent from GOD to deliver; there will be nothing wanting to juſtify our Religion in point of Reaſon to be True, and of Revelation to be Divine. For the Scriptures themſelves coming to us in the name of GOD, we are bound to believe them to be ſuch as they pretend to be, unleſs

unleſs we have ground to queſtion the general Foundations of all Religion as uncertain, or this particular way of Religion as not ſutable to thoſe general foundations. The foundations of all Religion lie in two things; *That there is a God* who rules the World, and that the *Souls of Men are capable of ſubſiſting after Death; for he that comes unto God, muſt believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of them that ſeek him;* ſo that if theſe things be not ſuppos'd as moſt agreeable to Human Reaſon, we cannot imagin upon what grounds Mankind ſhou'd embrace any way of Religion at all. For if there be not a God whom I am to ſerve and obey, and if I have not a Soul of an immortal nature, there can be no ſufficient obligation to Religion, nor motive inducing to it: For all obligation to Obedience muſt ſuppoſe the Exiſtence of ſuch a Being which hath power to command me; and by reaſon of the promiſcuous ſcatterings of good and evil in this Life, the Motives engaging Men to the practice of Religion, muſt ſuppoſe the certainty of a future State. If theſe things be ſure, and the foundations of Religion in general thereby firmly eſtabliſh'd, it will preſently follow as a matter moſt agreeable to reaſon, that the God whom we are to ſerve ſhou'd himſelf preſcribe the way of his own worſhip; and if the right of Donation of that happineſs which Mens Souls are capable of be alone in himſelf, that he alone ſhou'd declare the Terms on which it may be expected: For Man being a Creature endu'd with a free Principle of acting, which he is conſcious to himſelf of, and therefore not being carry'd to his end by neceſſity of Nature or external Violence, without the concurrence of his own Reaſon and Choice, we muſt ſuppoſe this Happineſs to depend upon the performance of ſome Conditions on Man's part, whereby he may demonſtrate that it is the matter of his free choice, and that he freely quits all other Intereſts that he might obtain the enjoyment of it. Which Conditions to be perform'd, being Expreſſions of Man's obedience towards God as his Creator and Governor, and of his gratitude for the Tenders of ſo great a Happineſs which is the free gift of his Maker, we cannot ſuppoſe any one to have power to preſcribe theſe Conditions, but he that hath power likewiſe to deprive the Soul of her Happineſs upon non-performance, and that muſt be God himſelf. But in order to Man's underſtanding his Duty, and his obligation to Obedience, it is neceſſary that theſe Conditions muſt not be lock'd up in the Cabinet Council of Heaven, but muſt be ſo far declar'd and reveal'd, that he may be fully acquainted with thoſe Terms which his Happineſs depends upon; elſe his neglect of them wou'd be excuſable, and his miſery unavoidable. Had Man indeed remain'd without offending his Maker, he might ſtill have ſtood in his favor upon the general terms of Obedience due from the Creature to his Creator, and to all ſuch particular Precepts which ſhou'd bear the impreſs of his Maker's will upon them; beſide which, the whole Volume of the Creation, without, and his own Reaſon within wou'd have been ſufficient Directors to him in the performance of his duty. But he abuſing his liberty, and being thereby guilty of *Apoſtaſy* from God (as is evident by a continu'd propenſity to Sin, and the ſtrangeneſs between God and the Souls of Men) a particular Revelation is now become neHeb. 11.6.

ceſſary, that Mankind may thereby underſtand on what terms God will be pleas'd again, and by what means they may be reſtored into his favor. And laſtly, it not agreeing with the free and communicative nature of Divine Goodneſs (which was the firſt Original of the World's creation) to ſuffer all Mankind to periſh in their own folly, we muſt ſuppoſe this way for Man's recovery to be ſomewhere preſcrib'd, and the Revelation of it to be ſomewhere extant in the World. So that from the general Principles of the exiſtence of God, and immortality of the Soul, we have deduced by clear and evident Reaſon the neceſſity of ſome particular Divine Revelation, as the Standard and Meaſure of Religion. And according to theſe Principles we muſt examin whatever pretends to be of Divine Revelation; for it muſt be ſutable to that Divine nature from whom it is ſuppos'd to come, and it muſt be agreeable to the conditions of the Souls of Men; and therefore that which carries with it the greateſt evidence of Divine Revelation, is, a faithful repreſentation of the ſtate of the caſe between God and the Souls of Men, and a Divine diſcovery of thoſe ways whereby Mens Souls may be fitted for eternal Happineſs. A Divine Revelation then muſt be faithful and true in all its Narrations; it muſt be excellent and becoming God in all its Diſcoveries. And therefore all that can with any reaſon be deſir'd for proof of the Divine Authority of the Scriptures, will lie in theſe three things. Firſt, *That the foundations of Religion are of undoubted certainty, or that there is a God, and that Mens Souls are Immortal.* Secondly, *That the Scriptures do moſt faithfully relate the matters of greateſt Antiquity therein contain'd* (which do moſt concern the Hiſtory of the Breach between God and Man.) Thirdly, *that the Scriptures are the only Authentic Records of thoſe terms on which happineſs may be expected in another World.*

II. I begin with the firſt of them, which concerns the Exiſtence of God, and Immortality of the Soul; both which ſeem to be ſuppos'd as general *Prolepſes* in the Writings of *Moſes*, and as things ſo conſonant to Human nature, that none to whom his Writings ſhou'd come cou'd be ſuppos'd to queſtion them. And therefore he ſpends no time in the operoſe proving of either of theſe, knowing to how little purpoſe his Writings wou'd be to ſuch who deny'd theſe firſt Principles of all Religion. But beſide this, there may be theſe accounts given, why theſe main foundations of all Religion are no more inſiſted on in the firſt Books of the Scripture, which contain the Originals of the World. Firſt, *Becauſe theſe were in the time of the writing of them, believed with an univerſal conſent of Mankind.* In thoſe more early days of the World, when the Tradition of the firſt Ages of it was more freſh and intire, it is ſcarce imaginable that Men ſhou'd queſtion the Being of a God, when the Hiſtory of the Flood, and the Propagation of the World after it by the Sons of *Noah*, and the burning of *Sodom* and *Gomorrah* were ſo freſh in their memories, as having been done ſo few Generations before them. And by what remains of any Hiſtory of other Nations in thoſe elder times Men were ſo far from *Atheiſm*, that *Polytheiſm* and *Idolatry* were the common practice of the World, as is moſt evident in all Relations of the ancient *Chaldeans*, *Ægyptians*, *Phœnicians*, and other Nations,

tions, who all ſuppos'd theſe two Principles, as well as thoſe who ſerv'd the true God. And in all probability, as Men are apt to run from one extreme to another, *Polytheiſm* was the firſt occaſion of *Atheiſm*, and *Idolatry* of *Irreligion*. And thence we find the firſt appearance of *Atheiſts* to be in the moſt blind and ſuperſtitious Age of *Greece*, when the obſcene Poets had ſo debauch'd the common underſtandings of the People, as to make them believe ſuch things concerning their Gods, which were ſo incongruous to Human Nature, that all who had any ſenſe of goodneſs left, cou'd not but loath and abhor ſuch Deities. And therefore we find all the flouts and jeers of the reputed *Atheiſts* among them, ſuch as *Dionyſius*, *Diagoras*, *Theodorus*, *Euhemerus*, *Meſſenius* and others, were caſt upon their venerable *Deities*, which they ſo ſolemnly worſhipped, who had been before, as *Euhemerus* plainly told them, poor mortal Men, and thoſe not of the beſt Reputation neither: and therefore as the *Epicurean* in *Tully* well ſays, *omnis eorum cultus eſſet in luctu*, the moſt ſutable Devotion for them had been lamenting their Death. Now when theſe common *Deities* were ſo much derided by intelligent Men, and yet the order of the World ſeem'd to tell them there was really a God, tho' thoſe were none; thoſe who had Philoſophical wits, ſuch as *Democritus* and *Epicurus*, ſet themſelves to work to ſee if they cou'd ſolve the *Phænomena* of Nature without a *Deity*; and therefore aſſerted the Origin of the Univerſe to be only by a fortuitous Concourſe of infinite little Particles: but herein they befool'd themſelves and their greedy Followers, who were glad to be rid of thoſe Anxieties of mind which the thoughts of a *Deity* and an immortal Soul did cauſe within them. And altho' *Lucretius* in a bravado tells us of his Maſter, *that when Mens minds were ſunk under the burden of Religion*,

Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. 1. c. 38.

Humana ante oculos fœde cum vita jaceret
In terris oppreſſa gravi ſub relligionè:
Primum Graius homo mortales tollere contra
Eſt oculos auſus, primuſque obſiſtere contra.

Lucret. l. 1.

That Epicurus *was the firſt true Gyant who durſt encounter the Gods*, and if we believe him, *overthrew them in open field*;

Quare relligio pedibus ſubjecta viciſſim
Obteritur, nos exæquat victoria cœlo.

Yet *Cotta* in *Tully* reports the iſſue of this Battle quite otherwiſe; for altho' the greateſt triumph in this Victory had been only to become like the Beaſts that periſh; yet if we believe *Cotta*, *Epicurus* was ſo far from gaining any of his belov'd Eaſe and Pleaſure by his Sentiments, that never was School-boy more afraid of a Rod, nor did any Enemy more dread a Conqueror, than *Epicurus* did the thoughts of a God and Death. *Nec quenquam vidi qui magis ea quæ timenda eſſe negaret, timeret; mortem dico & Deos.* So hard it is for an *Epicurean* even after he hath Proſtituted his Conſcience, to ſilence it; but (whatever there be in the Air) there is an Elaſtical power in Conſcience that will bear its ſelf

Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. 1. c. 86.

up notwithstanding the weight that is laid upon it. And yet after all the labors of *Epicurus*, he knew it was to no purpose to endeavor to root out wholly the belief of a Deity out of the World, because of the unanimous consent of the World in it; and therefore he admits of it as a necessary *Prolepsis* or Anticipation of Human Nature, *quod in omnium animis Deorum notionem impressisset ipsa natura, that nature its self had stamp'd an Idea of God upon the minds of Men; cum enim non instituto aliquo, aut more aut lege sit opinio constituta, maneatque ad unum omnium firma consensio, intelligi necesse est Deos esse, quoniam insitas eorum, vel potius innatas cognitiones habemus; de quo autem omnium natura consentit, id verum esse necesse est*, as *Velleius* the *Epicurean* argues. Since the belief of a Deity, neither rises from Custom nor was enacted by Law, yet is unanimously assented to by all Mankind; it necessarily follows that there must be a Deity, because the Idea of it is so natural to us. If it were thus acknowledg'd in the Philosophical Age of *Greece*, when Men bent their wits to unsettle the Belief of such things as tended to Religion; how much more might it be esteem'd a general Principle of Human Nature in those elder times, when not so much as one Dissenter appear'd that we read of among the more ancient Nations? But *Secondly*, it was less needful for *Moses* to insist much on the proof of a Deity in his Writings, when his very imployment, and the History he wrote, was the greatest Evidence that there was one. Cou'd any of them question, whether there were a God, or no, who had heard his voice at Mount *Sinai*, and had receiv'd a Law from him, who had been present at so many Miracles which were done by *Moses* in *Ægypt* and the Wilderness? What more evident demonstration of God cou'd be desir'd, than those many unparallell'd Miracles, which were wrought among them? And those who wou'd not be convinced by them that there was a God, wou'd certainly be convinced by nothing. *Thirdly*, It was unsutable to the purpose of *Moses* to go about to prove any thing he deliver'd by the mere force of Human Reason, because he writ as a Person imploy'd by God; and therefore by the Arguments on which they were to believe his Testimony in whatever he writ, they cou'd not but believe there was a God that imploy'd him. And from hence it is that *Moses* with so much Majesty and Authority begins the History of the Creation, with, *In the beginning God created the Heaven and the Earth.* There cou'd be no greater Evidence that there was an infinitely wise, good, and powerful God, than that the Universe was produced out of nothing by him; and what reason cou'd there be to distrust his Testimony who relates it, who manifested not only that there was a God, but that he was imploy'd by him, by the Miracles which he wrought? So that all our former discourse concerning the Evidences of Divine Revelation, are a most palpable demonstration of a Deity; for if there be such a power which can alter the course of Nature when he pleases, the Being wherein it is, must needs be infinite; which is the same which we mean by God.

Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. 1. c. 44.

III. But yet for those whose minds are so coy and squeamish as to any thing of Divine Revelation, we want not sufficient Evidence in

in point of Reaſon to prove to them the Exiſtence of a Deity. In order to which, I ſhall clear theſe following Propoſitions.

1. *That the true notion of a Deity is moſt agreeable to the faculties of Mens Souls, and moſt conſonant to Reaſon and the Light of Nature.*

2. *That thoſe who will not believe that there is a God, do believe other things on far leſs Reaſon, and muſt by their own Principles deny ſome things which are apparently true.*

3. *That we have a certain Evidence that there is a God, as it is poſſible for us to have, conſidering his nature.*

That the true notion of God is moſt agreeable to the faculties of Mens Souls, and moſt conſonant to Reaſon and the Light of Nature: i. e. that the Idea of God (or that which we conceive in our minds when we think of God) is ſo far from being any ways repugnant to any Principle of Reaſon within us, that it is hard to pitch on any other Notion which hath fewer entanglements in it, to a mind ſo far *Metaphyſical* as to abſtract from Sence and Prejudice. I grant it very difficult, nay impoſſible, for thoſe to have any true ſetl'd notion of a God, who ſearch for an Idea of him in their Fancies, and were never conſcious to themſelves of any higher faculty in their Souls than mere Imagination. Such may have *imaginem Jovis*, or *galeatæ Minervæ*, as he in *Tully* ſpeaks, ſome Idea of an Idol in their minds, but none of a true God. For we may as ſoon come by the ſight of colours to underſtand the nature of Sounds, as by any corporal Phantaſms come to have a true Idea of God. And altho' ſometimes an Idea be taken for that impreſſion of things which is lodg'd in the Phantaſy, yet here we take it in a more general ſence, as it contains the repreſentation of any thing in the Mind; as it is commonly ſaid in the Schools that the Divine Intellect doth underſtand things by their Ideas, which are nothing elſe but the things themſelves as they are objectively repreſented to the Underſtanding. So that an Idea in its general ſence in which we take it, is nothing elſe but the objective Being of a thing as it terminates the Underſtanding, and is the form of the act of Intellection: that which is then immediately repreſented to the mind in its perception of things, is the Idea or Notion of it. Now ſuch an Idea as this is, may be either true or falſe. For better underſtanding of which we muſt conſider that an Idea in the Soul may be conſider'd two ways. 1. As it is a mode of Cogitation, or the act of the Soul apprehending an Object; now this way no Idea can be falſe; for as it is an act of the Mind, every Idea hath its truth: for whether I imagine a Golden Mountain, or another, it matters not here; for the one Idea is as true as the other, conſidering it merely as an act of the Mind. For the Mind is as really imploy'd about the one as the other; as the Will is about an Object whether it be feaſible or no. 2. The Idea may be conſider'd in regard of its Objective Reality, or as it repreſents ſome outward object; now the truth or falſhood of the Idea lies in the Underſtanding paſſing judgment oncerning the outward Object, as exiſtent, which doth correſpond to the Idea which is in the Mind. And the proneneſs of the Underſtanding's error in this caſe ariſeth from the different nature of thoſe things which are repreſented to the Mind; for ſome of them are general and abſtracted things, and do not at all ſuppoſe exiſtence, as the nature of Truth, of a Being, of Cogitation; other Ideas depend upon

Prop. 1.

upon Exiſtence ſuppos'd, as the Idea of the Sun, which I apprehend in my Mind becauſe I have ſeen it; but beſides theſe, there are other Ideas in the Mind, which the Underſtanding forms within its ſelf by its own power, as it is a Principle of Cogitation; ſuch are thoſe which are called *entia rationis*, and have no other Exiſtence at all but only in the Underſtanding, as *Chimæra's*, *Centaures*, &c. Now as to theſe, we are to obſerve, that altho' the compoſition of theſe things together by the Underſtanding, be that which makes theſe Ideas to be only fictitious, yet the Underſtanding would not be able to compound ſuch things, were they not ſeverally repreſented to the Mind; as unleſs we had known what a Horſe and a Man had been, our minds cou'd not have conjoyn'd them together in its apprehenſion. So that in theſe which are the moſt fictitious Ideas, we ſee, that altho' the Idea its ſelf be a mere creature of the Underſtanding, yet the Mind cou'd not form ſuch an Idea but upon Pre-exiſtent matter, and ſome objective reality muſt be ſuppos'd in order to the intellectual Conception of theſe Anomalous Entities. By which we ſee that that ſtrange kind of Omnipotency which ſome have attributed to Underſtanding, lies not in a Power of conceiving things wholly impoſſible, or fanſying Ideas of abſolute Non-entities, but in a kind of *African* Copulation of ſuch Species of things together, which in Nature ſeem wholly incompoſſible, (as the Schools ſpeak) or have no congruity at all in the order of the Univerſe. So that had there never been any ſuch things in the World as *matter* and *motion*, it is very hard to conceive, how the Underſtanding cou'd have form'd within its ſelf the variety of the Species of ſuch things, which are the reſults of thoſe two grand Principles of the Univerſe. But becauſe it is ſo impoſſible for minds not very Contemplative and Metaphyſical to abſtract from matter, thence it is we are apt to imagin ſuch a Power in the Underſtanding, whereby it may form Ideas of ſuch things which have no objective reality at all. I grant thoſe we call *entia rationis* have no external reality as they are ſuch, but yet I ſay, the exiſtence of matter in the World, and the corporeal Phantaſms of outward Beings, are the foundation of the Soul's conception of thoſe Entities, which have no exiſtence beyond the Human Intellect.

IV. The great inquiry then is, how far this Plaſtic Power of the Underſtanding, may extend its ſelf in its forming an Idea of God. That there is ſuch a one in the minds of Men, is evident to every one that conſults his own Faculties, and inquires of them, whether they cannot apprehend a ſetl'd and conſiſtent Notion of a Being which is abſolutely Perfect. For that is all we underſtand by the Idea of God; not that there is any ſuch connate Idea in the Soul, in the ſenſe which connate Ideas are commonly underſtood; but that there is a Faculty in the Soul, whereby upon the free uſe of Reaſon, it can form within its ſelf a ſetl'd Notion of ſuch a Being, which is as perfect as it is poſſible for us to conceive a Being to be. If any difficulty be made concerning the forming ſuch a Notion in ones mind, let the Perſon who ſcruples it, only inquire of himſelf whether he judges all Beings in the World equal; whether a *Muſhroom* hath in it all the perfections which Man hath? which I ſuppoſe none, who have a Mind within them can queſtion. If then it be

be granted that Man hath ſome Perfections in him above inferior Creatures, it will be no matter of difficulty to ſhew wherein Man exceeds other inferior Beings. For is not Life a greater Perfection than the want of it? Is not Reaſon and Knowledge, a Perfection above Senſe? and ſo let us proceed to thoſe things, wherein one Man differs from another; for it is evident, that all Men are not of equal Accompliſhments; is not then Forecaſt and Prudence above Incogitancy and Folly? Is not the knowledge of Cauſes of things better than Stupidity and Ignorance? Is not Beneficence and Liberaility more noble than Parſimony and Narrowneſs of Spirit? Is not true Goodneſs far above Debauchery and Intemperance? And are not all theſe far better, when they are joyn'd with ſuch a power as hath no limits or bounds at all? Now then is it not poſſible for a Man's mind, proceeding in its ordinary way of Intellection, to form a notion of ſuch a Being, which hath Wiſdom, Goodneſs and Power in it, without any limits and bounds at all, or any of thoſe Abatements, which any of theſe Perfections are found with in Man? For it is unconceivable, that the mind of Man can attribute to its ſelf abſolute Perfection, when it cannot but ſee its own defects in thoſe things it excells other Creatures in; and ſuppoſing it had Power, Goodneſs and Knowledg far above what it hath; yet it cannot but ſay, that theſe Perfections wou'd be greater if it were always poſſeſs'd of them, and it were impoſſible that it ſhould ever ceaſe to be, or not have been. So that now joyning infinite Goodneſs, Wiſdom and Power, with Eternity and neceſſity of Exiſtence, the reſult is the notion of a Being abſolutely perfect. So that now whoever queſtions the ſutableneſs of ſuch a Notion or Idea to the faculties of Mens Souls, muſt queſtion the truth of his own Faculties, and the method they proceed in, in their cleareſt Conceptions and Ratiocinations. And the Mind of Man may as well queſtion the truth of any Idea it hath within its ſelf, as of this we now diſcourſe of. Nay, it may be far ſooner puzl'd in any of thoſe Ideas, which are tranſmitted into the Phantaſy by the impreſſions of Corporeal Beings upon the Organs of Senſe, than in this more intellectual and abſtracted Idea, which depends wholly upon the Mind.

IV.

V. All the difficulty now is, whether this Idea of ſuch an abſolutely perfect Being, be any thing elſe but the Underſtanding's Plaſtic power, whereby it can unite all theſe Perfections together in one Conception; or doth it neceſſarily imply, that there muſt be ſuch a Being really exiſtent, or elſe I cou'd never have form'd ſuch a ſetl'd Notion of him in my mind? To this I anſwer, 1. It is as much as I deſire at preſent, that the forming of ſuch an Idea in the Mind, is as ſutable and agreeable to our Faculties as the forming the Conception of any other Being in the World. For hereby it is moſt evident that the notion of a God imports nothing incongruous to Reaſon, or repugnant to the Faculties of our Souls; but that the Mind will form as ſetl'd and clear a notion of God, as of any thing which in the judgment of *Epicurus*, his infallible Senſes did the moſt aſſure him of. So that there can be no ſhadow of a pretenſe, why any ſhou'd reject the Being of a God becauſe of the impoſſibility to conceive any ſuch Being as God is. If to this it be objected, *that ſuch things are imply'd in this*

Idea, which make it unconceivable, in that all the Perfections in this Being are ſuppos'd to be infinite, and Infinity tranſcends our capacity of apprehenſion. To this I anſwer, 1. That thoſe who deny Infinity in God, muſt neceſſarily attribute it to ſomething elſe, as to infinite Space, infinity of ſucceſſion of Ages and Perſons, if the World were Eternal; and therefore it is moſt unreaſonable to reject any Notion for that, which it is impoſſible, but if I deny that, I muſt attribute it to ſomething elſe, to whoſe Idea it is far leſs proper than it is to God's. 2. Leſt I ſhou'd rather ſeek to avoid the Argument than to ſatisfy it, I ſay, that tho' infinite as infinite cannot be comprehended, yet we may clearly and diſtinctly apprehend a Being to be of that nature, that no limits can be aſſign'd to it, as to its Power or Preſence; which is as much as to underſtand it to be infinite. The *ratio formalis* of Infinity may not be underſtood clearly and diſtinctly, but yet the Being which is infinite may be. Infinity its ſelf cannot be on this account, becauſe however Poſitive we apprehend it, yet we always apprehend it in a Negative way, becauſe we conceive it by denying all limitations and bounds to it; but the Being which is infinite we apprehend in a Poſitive Manner, altho' not adequately, becauſe we cannot comprehend all which is in it. As we may clearly and diſtinctly ſee the Sea, tho' we cannot diſcover the bounds of it; ſo may we clearly and diſtinctly apprehend ſome Perfections of God when we fix our Minds on them, altho' we are not able to graſp them altogether in our narrow and confin'd Intellects, becauſe they are infinite. Thus we ſee that God's Infinity doth not at all abate the clearneſs and diſtinctneſs of the Notion which we have of God; ſo that tho' the Perfections of God are without bounds or limits, yet it bears no repugnancy at all to Mens natural Faculties, to have a ſetl'd Idea of a Being infinitely perfect in their Minds.

VI. To the Queſtion I anſwer, It ſeems highly probable and far more conſonant to Reaſon than the contrary, that this Idea of God upon the mind of Man, is no merely fictitious Idea, but that it is really imprinted there by that God whoſe Idea it is, and therefore doth ſuppoſe a reality in the Thing correſpondent to that objective reality which is in the Underſtanding. For altho' I am not ſo well ſatisfy'd that the mere objective reality of the Idea of God doth exceed the efficiency of the mind, as that Idea is nakedly conſider'd in its ſelf, becauſe of the unlimited power of the Underſtanding in conception: Yet I ſay, conſidering that Idea in all the circumſtances of it, it ſeems highly probable that it is no mere *ens rationis*, or figment of the underſtanding; and that will appear on theſe conſiderations. 1. This Idea is of ſuch a Nature as cou'd not be form'd from the Underſtanding's conſideration of any corporeal Phantaſms. Becauſe whatever hath any thing of Matter in it, involves of neceſſity many imperfections along with it; for every part of Matter is diviſible into more parts. Now it is a thing evident to Natural Light, that it is a greater Perfection not to be diviſible than to be ſo. Beſides, corporeal Phantaſms are ſo far from helping us in forming this Idea, that they alone hinder us from a diſtinct Conception of it, while we attend to them; becauſe theſe bear no proportion at all to ſuch a Being. So that this Idea however muſt be a pure act of Intellection, and therefore ſuppoſing

posing there were no other facultyin Man but Imagination, it would bear the greateſt repugnancy to our Conceptions, and it wou'd be according to the Principles of *Epicurus* and ſome modern Philoſophers, a thing wholly impoſſible to form an Idea of God, unleſs with *Epicurus* we imagin him to be Corporeal, which is to ſay, he is no God. Which was the reaſon that *Tully* ſaid, *Epicurus* did only, *nomine ponere, re tollere Deos*, becauſe ſuch a Notion of God is repugnant to Natural Light. So that if this Idea doth wholly abſtract from corporeal Phantaſms; it thereby appears that there is a higher faculty in Man's Soul than mere imagination, and it is hardly conceivable whence a faculty which thus extends it to an infinite object, ſhou'd come, but from an infinite Being: eſpecially if we conſider, Secondly, That the Underſtanding in forming this Idea of God, doth not by diſtinct acts, firſt collect one Perfection, and then another, and at laſt unite theſe together, but the ſimplicity and unity of all theſe Perfections is as neceſſarily conceiv'd as any of them. Granting then that the Underſtanding by the obſerving of ſeveral Perfections in the World, might be able to abſtract theſe ſeverally from each Being wherein they were, yet whence ſhou'd the Idea of the Unity and Inſeparability of all theſe Perfections come? The Mind may, it is true, knit ſome things together in fictitious Ideas, but then thoſe are ſo far from unity with each other, that in themſelves they ſpeak mutual Repugnancy to one another, which makes them proper *entia rationis*; but theſe ſeveral Perfections are ſo far from ſpeaking repugnancy to each other, that the Unity and Inſeparability of them is as neceſſary to the forming of this Idea, as any other Perfection whatſoever. So that from hence it appears that the conſideration of the Perfections which are in the Creatures, is only an occaſion given to the Mind to help it in its Idea of God, and not that the Idea itſelf depends upon thoſe Perfections as the cauſes of it: as in the cleareſt *Mathematical* truths the Manner of demonſtration may be neceſſary to help the Underſtanding to its clearer aſſent, tho' the things in themſelves be undoubtedly true. For all minds are not equally capable of the ſame truths; ſome are of quicker apprehenſion than others are; now altho' to ſlower apprehenſions a more particular way of demonſtrating things be neceſſary, yet the truths in themſelves are equal, tho' they have not equal Evidence to ſeveral Perſons.

3. It appears that this is no mere fictitious Idea from the uniformity of it in all perſons who have freed themſelves from the Entanglements of corporeal phantaſms. Thoſe we call *entia rationis*, we find by experience in our Minds, that they are form'd *ad placitum*; we may imagin them as many ways as we pleaſe; but we ſee it is quite otherwiſe in this Idea of God; for in thoſe Attributes or perfections which by the light of Nature we attribute to God, there is an uniform conſent in all thoſe who have diveſted their Minds of corporeal phantaſms in their conceptions of God. For while men have agreed that the object of their Idea is a Being abſolutely perfect, there hath been no diſſent in the Perfections which have been attributed to it; none have queſtion'd but infinite Wiſdom, Goodneſs, and Power, joyn'd with neceſſity of Exiſtence, have been all imply'd in this Idea. So that it is ſcarce poſſible to in-

ſtance in any one Idea, no not of thoſe which are moſt obvious to our Senſes, wherein there hath been ſo great an uniformity of Mens conceptions as in this Idea of God. And the moſt groſs corporeal Idea of the moſt ſenſible matter hath been more liable to heats and diſputes among *Philoſophers*, than this Idea of a Being infinite and purely ſpiritual. Which ſtrongly proves my preſent Propoſition, That this Idea of God is very conſonant to Natural light; for it is hardly conceivable that there ſhou'd be ſo univerſal a Conſent of minds in this Idea, were it not a Natural reſult from the free uſe of our Reaſon and Faculties. And that which adds further weight to this Argument is, that altho' Infinity be ſo neceſſarily imply'd in this Idea of God, yet Men do not attribute all kind of infinite Things to God; for there being conceivable infinite Number, infinite Longitude, as well as infinite power and knowledg, our minds readily attribute the latter to God, and as readily abſtract the other from his Nature, which is an Argument this Idea is not fictitious, but argues Reality in the thing correſpondent to our conception of it. So much may ſuffice to clear the firſt Propoſition, *viz. That the notion of a God is very ſutable to the Faculties of Mens Souls, and to that light of Nature which they proceed by in forming the conceptions of things.*

VII. Prop. 2. *Thoſe who deny that there is a God, do aſſert other things on far leſs evidence of Reaſon, and muſt by their own principles deny ſome things which are apparently true.* One wou'd expect that ſuch Perſons who are apt to condemn the whole World of folly in believing the truth of Religion, and wou'd fain be admir'd as Men of a deeper reach, and greater wit and ſagacity than others, wou'd, when they have exploded a *Deity*, at leaſt give us ſome more rational and conſiſtent account of things, than we can give that there is a God. But on the contrary we find the reaſons on which they reject a *Deity* ſo lamentably weak, and ſo eaſily retorted upon themſelves, and the *Hypotheſes* they ſubſtitute inſtead of a *Deity* ſo precarious, obſcure and uncertain, that we need no other Argument to evince the reaſonableneſs of Religion, than from the manifeſt folly as well as impiety of thoſe who oppoſe it. Which we ſhall make evident by theſe two things: 1. *That while they deny a Deity, they aſſert other things on far leſs reaſon.* 2. *That by thoſe principles on which they deny a Deity, they muſt deny ſome things which are apparently true.*

1. 1. *That they aſſert ſome things on far leſs reaſon than we do that there is a God.* For if there be not an infinitely powerful God who produced the World out of nothing, it muſt neceſſarily follow according to the different Principles of the *Ariſtotelian* and *Epicurean Atheiſts*, that either the World was as it is from all eternity, or elſe that it was at firſt made by the fortuitous concourſe of Atoms. Now I appeal to the Reaſon of any Perſon, who hath the free uſe of it, Whether either of theſe two *Hypotheſes* urged with the ſame or greater difficulties, *&c.* be not far more weakly prov'd than the exiſtence of a *Deity* is, or the production of the World by Him.

1. *They run themſelves into the ſame difficulties which they wou'd avoid in the belief of a* Deity; and nothing can be a greater evidence of an entangled Mind than this is: To deny a thing becauſe of ſome difficulty in it, and inſtead of it to aſſert another thing which

which is chargeable with the very ſame difficulty in a higher degree. Thus when they reject a *Deity*, becauſe they cannot underſtand what Infinity means; both theſe *Hypotheſes* are liable to the ſame intricacy in apprehending the nature of ſomething infinite. For according to the *Epicureans*, there muſt be an infinite Space, and what greater eaſe to the Mind is there in conceiving an Idea of that than of an infinite Being? And if the World be eternal, there muſt have been paſt an infinite ſucceſſion of Ages, and is not the Underſtanding as eaſily loſt in this, as in an eternal Being which created the World? For if the courſe of Generations in the World had no beginning at all, (which neceſſarily follows upon the eternity of the World) then an infinite number of ſucceſſions are already paſt, and if paſt, then at an end, and ſo we find an infinite which hath had an end, which is a conſequence becoming one who avoids the belief of a *Deity*, becauſe Infinity is an unconceivable thing. Beſides, if the number of Generations hath been infinite; theſe two Conſequences will unavoidably follow, which the reaſon of any one but an *Atheiſt* wou'd ſtartle at, that one infinite may be greater than another, and that the part is equal to the whole. For let him fix where he pleaſe, in the courſe of Generations, I demand whether in the Great-grand-father's time the ſucceſſion of Generations was finite or infinite; if finite, then it had a beginning; and ſo the World not eternal; if infinite, then I ask, whether there were not a longer ſucceſſion of Generations in the time of his Great-grand-children, and ſo there muſt be a number greater than that which was infinite; for the former ſucceſſion was infinite, and this hath more Generations in it than that had: but if it be ſaid that they were equal, becauſe both infinite, then the ſucceſſions of Generations to the Grand-father, being but a part of that which extends to his Grand-children and poſterity, the part is equal to the whole. And is not now the notion of an infinite Being enough to ſtumble an *Atheiſt*'s Reaſon, when he can ſo nimbly leap over ſo apparent contradictions? I inſiſt not on this as an evident Demonſtration to prove a *Deity*, which poſſibly it may not amount to, becauſe it may only demonſtrate the impoſſibility of our Underſtandings comprehending the nature of Infinity. But however it doth moſt evidently demonſtrate the folly and unreaſonableneſs of the *Atheiſt*, who rejects the Being of God on the account of his infinity, when his Underſtanding is more loſt in apprehending an infinite ſucceſſion of Generations which follows from his ſuppoſition of the eternity of the World. If then it be impoſſible, as it is, upon any Principles whatſoever, to avoid the conception of ſomewhat infinite and eternal, either Matter or Space, or ſome Being, let any one appeal to his own Reaſon, whether it be not more agreeable to that, to attribute theſe Perfections to ſuch a Being, to whoſe Idea they neceſſarily belong, than to attribute them to this World, in whoſe conception they are not at all imply'd; but on the contrary they do far more puzzle our Underſtandings than when we conceive them to be in God. If ſomewhat muſt have a continued duration and be of an unbounded nature, how much more rational is it to conceive Wiſdom, Power, and Goodneſs to be conjoyn'd with Eternity and Infinity, than to beſtow theſe Attributes upon an

empty Space, or upon dull and unactive Matter? It cannot be Reaſon then, but ſome more baſe and unworthy Principle which makes the *Atheiſt* queſtion the Being of God, becauſe his Perfections are unconceivable, when according to his own Principles the moſt puzzling Attributes of God return upon him with more force and violence, and that in a more inexplicable manner.

VIII. 2. As the *Atheiſt* muſt admit thoſe things himſelf which he rejects the Being of God for; ſo he admits them upon far weaker grounds than we do attribute them to God. If any thing may be made evident to Man's natural Reaſon concerning the exiſtence of a Being ſo infinite as God is, we doubt not but to make it appear that we have great aſſurance of the Being of God; but how far muſt the *Atheiſt* go, how heartily muſt he beg before his *Hypotheſis* either of the fortuitous Concourſe of *Atoms*, or Eternity of the World will be granted to him? For if we ſtay till he proves either of theſe by evident and demonſtrative Reaſons, the World may have an end before he proves his *Atoms* cou'd give it a beginning, and we may find it Eternal, *a parte poſt*, before he can prove it was ſo *a parte ante*. For the proof of a Deity we appeal to his own Faculties, Reaſon and Conſcience; we make uſe of Arguments before his Eyes; we bring the univerſal Senſe of Mankind along with us: But for his Principles, we muſt wholly alter the preſent Stage of the World, and crumble the whole Univerſe into little Particles; we muſt grind the Sun to Powder, and by a new way of Interment turn the Earth into Duſt and Aſhes, before we can ſo much as imagin how the World cou'd be fram'd. And when we have thus far begg'd leave to imagin things to be what they never were, we muſt then ſtand by in ſome infinite Space to behold the friskings and Dancings about of theſe little Particles of Matter, till by their frequent Rencounters and Juſtlings one upon another, they at laſt link themſelves together, and run ſo long in a round till they make Whirl-pools enough for Sun, Moon and Stars, and all the Bodies of the Univerſe to emerge out of. But what was it which at firſt ſet theſe little Particles of Matter in motion? Whence came ſo great variety in them to produce ſuch wonderful diverſities in Bodies as there are in the World? How came theſe caſual Motions to hit ſo luckily into ſuch admirable Contrivances as are in the Univerſe? When I once ſee a thouſand blind Men run the point of a Sword in at a Key-hole without one miſſing; when I find them all frisking together in a ſpacious Field, and exactly meeting all at laſt in the very middle of it; when I once find, as *Tully* ſpeaks, the *Annals* of *Ennius* fairly written in a heap of Sand, and as *Kepler*'s Wife told him, a Room full of Herbs moving up and down fall down into the exact order of Sallets, I may then think the *Atomical Hypotheſis* probable, and not before. But what Evidence of Reaſon or Demonſtration have we, that the great Bodies of the World did reſult from ſuch a Motion of theſe ſmall Particles? *It is poſſible to be ſo*, ſaith *Epicurus*; What if we grant it poſſible? Can no things in the World be, which it is poſſible might have been otherwiſe? What elſe thinks *Epicurus* of the Generations of things now? They are ſuch certainly as the World now is, and yet he believes it was once otherwiſe: Muſt therefore a bare poſſibility of the contrary make us

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deny our Reaſon, ſilence Conſcience, contradict the univerſal Senſe of Mankind by excluding a Deity out of the World? But whence doth it appear poſſible? Did we ever find any thing of the ſame nature with the World produced in ſuch a manner by ſuch a concourſe of *Atoms?* Or is it becauſe we find in natural Beings, how much theſe Particles of Matter ſerve to ſolve the *Phænomena* of Nature? But doth it at all follow, becauſe now under Divine Providence which wiſely orders the World, and things in it, that theſe Particles, with their ſeveral Affections and Motion, may give us a tolerable account of many Appearances as to Bodies, that therefore the Univerſe had its Original merely by a Concretion of theſe, without any Divine Hand to order and direct their Motion? But of this more when we come to the Creation of the World; our deſign now is only to compare the Notion of a Deity, and of the *Atheiſt's Hypotheſis* in point of Perſpicuity and Evidence of Reaſon: of which let any one who hath Reaſon judg. Thus we ſee how the *Atheiſt* in denying a Deity, muſt aſſert ſomething elſe inſtead of it, which is preſs'd with the ſame, if not greater difficulties, and prov'd by far leſs Reaſon.

IX. 2. *The Atheiſt by the ſame principles on which he denies a God, muſt deny ſome things which are apparently true.* Which will be evident by our running over the moſt plauſible pretenſes which he inſiſts upon.

1. Becauſe the Being of God cannot be demonſtrated. But how doth the *Atheiſt* mean it? Is it becauſe God cannot be demonſtrated to Senſe, that we cannot [*digito monſtrari & dicier hic eſt*] point at him with our Fingers? It is a ſign there is little of Reaſon left, where Senſe is made the only Umpire of all kinds of Beings. Muſt all intellectual Beings be proſcrib'd out of the order of Nature, becauſe they cannot paſs the ſcrutiny of Senſe? And by the ſame reaſon all Colours ſhall be daſh'd out becauſe they cannot be heard; all Noiſes ſilenced, becauſe they cannot be ſeen; for why may not one Senſe be ſet to judge of all objects of Senſe with far more Reaſon, than Senſe it ſelf be ſet as Judge over Intellectual Beings? But yet it is wiſely done of the *Atheiſt* to make Senſe his Judge; for if we once appeal to this, he knows our Cauſe is loſt; for as he ſaid of a Phyſician, when one ask'd him, whether he had any experience of him: No, ſaid he, *Si periculum feciſſem, non viverem; If I had try'd him, I had been dead e'er now*; ſo here, If God were to be try'd by the judgment of Senſe, he muſt ceaſe to be God; for how can an infinite and ſpiritual Being be diſcern'd by the judgment of Senſe? and if he be not an infinite and ſpiritual Being, he is not God. But it may be the *Atheiſt's* meaning is not ſo groſs, but he intends ſuch a *demonſtration to reaſon as That two and two make four, or That the whole is greater than the parts*; with ſuch a demonſtration he wou'd ſit down contented. But will no leſs than this ſerve him? What becomes then of the World's being made by a fortuitous concourſe of Atoms? Is this as evident as that two and two make four? And will the Philoſophical *Atheiſt* really believe nothing in Nature, but what is as evident to him in material Beings, as *that the whole is greater than the parts?* By any means let *Atheiſts* then write Philoſophy, that at the laſt the Clocks in *London* may ſtrike together,

gether, and the Philoſophers agree; for I ſuppoſe none of them queſtion that. But yet it is poſſible the *Atheiſt* may in a good humor abate ſomething of this, and mean by demonſtration ſuch a proof as takes away all difficulties. If he means as to the Ground of Aſſent, we undertake it; if as to the Object apprehended, we reject it as unreaſonable, becauſe it is impoſſible a Being Infinite ſhou'd be comprehended by us; for if it cou'd, it were no longer Infinite. But let us try this Principle by other things, and how evident is it, that on this account ſome things muſt be deny'd which himſelf will confeſs to be true? For inſtance, that *opprobrium Philoſophorum*, the diviſibility of Quantity, or extended matter into finite or infinite parts; let him take which ſide he pleaſe, and ſee whether by the force of theſe Arguments on either ſide, if he hold to this principle, he muſt not be forced to deny that there is any ſuch thing as matter in the World: and then we may well have an infinite empty ſpace, when by force of this one Principle, both God and Matter are baniſh'd quite out of the World. But if the *Atheiſt* will but come one ſtep lower, and by his demonſtration intend nothing elſe but ſuch a ſufficient proof of it as the nature of the thing is capable of, he will not only ſpeak moſt conſonant to Reaſon, but may be in ſome hopes of gaining ſatisfaction. For it is moſt evident, that all things are not capable of the like way of proof; and that in ſome caſes the poſſibility of the contrary muſt be no hindrance to an undoubted aſſent. What theſe proofs are, will appear afterwards. I come to the next ground of the *Atheiſt*'s opinion, which is,

2. *The weakneſs of ſome Arguments brought to prove a Deity.* But let us grant that ſome Arguments will not do it, doth it therefore follow that none can do it? What if ſome have prov'd the Sun to be the Center of the World; and the motion of the Earth, by very weak Arguments, will the Atheiſt therefore queſtion it? What if *Epicurus* hath prov'd his *Atomical Hypotheſis* by ſome ſilly *Sophiſms*, will the *Atheiſt* therefore rather believe the Creation of the World than it? What if the *Atheiſt* may make himſef ſport at ſome Stories of Apparitions inſiſted on to prove a Deity, doth it therefore follow there is no God, becauſe ſome Perſons have been over-credulous? What if ſome having more Zeal than Knowledg, may attribute ſuch things to God's immediate hand, which may be produced by natural Cauſes, doth it thence follow that God hath no hand in governing the World at all? What if Fears, and Hopes and Perſuaſions, may depend much on Principles of Education, muſt Conſcience then be reſolv'd wholly into theſe? What if ſome devout *Melancholiſt* may embrace the iſſues of his own Imagination for the impreſſions of the Divine Spirit, doth it therefore follow, that Religion is nothing but ſtrength of Fancy improv'd by principles of Education? What if ſome of the numerous proofs of a Deity were cut off, and only thoſe made uſe of, which are of the greateſt force, wou'd the Truth ſuffer at all by that? I grant, advantage is often taken againſt a thing more by one weak Argument brought for it, than for it by the ſtrongeſt Proofs: but I ſay, it is unreaſonable it ſhou'd be ſo; and were Men Rational and Ingenuous it wou'd not be ſo. Many times Arguments may be good in their order, but they are miſ-placed;

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ſome may prove the thing rational, which may not prove it true; ſome may ſhew the Abſurdities of the Adverſaries, rejecting the thing, which may not be ſufficient to prove it; now when Men number and not weigh their Arguments, but give them in the lump to the main queſtion, without fitting them to their ſeveral places, they do more diſſervice to the main of the Battle by the diſorder of their Forces, than they can advantage it by the number of them.

3. Another great pretenſe the *Atheiſt* hath, is, that Religion is only an invention of Politicians, which they awe People with as they pleaſe, and therefore tell them of a God, and another World, as Mothers ſend young Children to School to keep them in better order, that they may govern them with the greater eaſe. To this I anſwer, 1. Religion I grant, hath a great influence upon the well-governing the World, nay ſo great, that were the *Atheiſts* opinion true, and the World perſuaded of it, it were impoſſible the World cou'd be well govern'd. For the Government of the World in civil Societies, depends not ſo much on Force, as the ſacred Bonds of Duty and Allegiance, which hold a Nation that owns Religion as true, in far ſurer Obligations to endeavor the peace and welfare of a Nation than ever Violence can do. For in this caſe only an opportunity is watch'd for to ſhake off that which they account a Yoke upon their Necks; whereas when Mens minds are poſſeſs'd with a ſenſe of duty and obligation to Obedience out of Conſcience, the Reins may be held with greater eaſe; and yet the People be better manag'd by them, than by ſuch as only gall and inrage them. So that I grant true Religion to be the moſt ſerviceable Principle for the governing of civil Societies; but withal, I ſay, 2. It were impoſſible Religion ſhou'd be ſo much made uſe of for the governing of People, were there not a real propenſity and inclination to Religion imprinted on the Minds of Men. For as, did not Men love themſelves, and their Children, their Eſtates and Intereſts, it were impoſſible to keep them in Obedience to Laws; but doth it follow, becauſe Magiſtrates perſuade People to Obedience by ſuting Laws to the general intereſt of Men, that therefore the Magiſtrates firſt made them love themſelves and their own concerns? So it is in Religion, the Magiſtrate may make uſe of this propenſity to Religion in Men for civil ends, but his making uſe of it doth ſuppoſe it and not inſtill it. For were Religion nothing elſe in the World but a deſign only of Politicians, it wou'd be impoſſible to keep that deſign from being diſcover'd at one time or other; and when once it came to be known, it wou'd hurry the whole World into confuſion; and the People wou'd make no ſcruple of all Oaths and Obligations, but every one wou'd ſeek to do others what miſchief he cou'd if he had opportunity, and obey no further than Fear and Force conſtrain'd him. Therefore no Principle can be ſo dangerous to a State as *Atheiſm*, nor any thing more promote its Peace than true Religion; and the more Men are perſuaded of the truth of Religion, they will be the better Subjects, and the more uſeful in civil Societies. As well then may an *Atheiſt* ſay there is no ſuch thing as Good Nature in the World, becauſe that is apt to be abus'd, nor any ſuch thing as Love, becauſe that may be cheated, as that Re-

ligion is nothing but a deſign, becauſe Men may make it ſtalk to their private ends. Thus we ſee how the *Atheiſt* by the force of thoſe Principles on which he denies a God, muſt be forced to deny other things, which yet by his own confeſſion are apparently true.

X. Prop. 3. So I come to the third *Propoſition*, which is, *That we have as certain Evidence that there is a God, as we can have, conſidering his Nature.* When we demand the proof of a thing, our firſt eye muſt be to the nature of the thing which we deſire may be prov'd; for things equally true, are not capable of equal evidence, nor have like manners of probation. There is no demonſtration in *Euclide* will ſerve to prove that there are ſuch places as the *Indies*: we cannot prove the Earth is round by the judgment of ſenſe; nor that the Soul is immortal by corporeal Phantaſms. Every diſtinct kind of Being hath its peculiar way of probation; and therefore it ought not to be at all wondred at, if the ſupreme and infinite Being have his peculiar way of demonſtrating himſelf to the minds of Men. If then we have as evident proofs of the Exiſtence of God, as we can have, conſidering the infinity of his Nature, it is all which in reaſon we can deſire; and of that kind of proofs we have theſe following. For, 1. *If God hath ſtamped an univerſal Character of himſelf upon the minds of Men.* 2. *If the things in the World are the manifeſt effects of infinite Wiſdom, Goodneſs and Power.* 3. *If there be ſuch things in the World which are unaccountable without a Deity*, then we may with ſafety and aſſurance conclude *that there is a God.*

1. *That God hath imprinted an univerſal Character of himſelf on the minds of Men*; and that may be known by two things, 1. *If it be ſuch as bears the ſame importance among all Perſons.* 2. *If it be ſuch as cannot be miſtaken for the Character of any thing elſe.*

1. I begin with the firſt, whereby I ſhall prove this Character to be univerſal, becauſe the whole World hath conſented in it. This Argument we may rely on with the greater ſecurity, becauſe it was the only Argument which retain'd the Deity in the ancient School of *Epicurus*; which cou'd he have thought of as eaſy a way of evading, as he thought he had found out as to the Origin of the Univerſe, he was no ſuch great Friend to the very name of a God, as to have retain'd it as an Anticipation or Prolepſis of Human Nature. And this Argument from the univerſal conſent of the World, was that which bore the greateſt ſway among the Philoſophers, who went by nothing but Dictates of natural Light, which they cou'd not ſo clearly diſcover in any things, as in thoſe which all Mankind did unanimouſly conſent in. Two things I ſhall make out this by. 1. *That no ſufficient account can be given of ſo univerſal a conſent, unleſs it be ſuppoſ'd to be the voice of Nature.* 2. *That the diſſent of any particular Perſons is not ſufficient to controul ſo univerſal an Agreement.*

1. *That no ſufficient account of it can be given, but only by aſſerting it to be a Dictate of Nature.* In ſo ſtrange a diſſent as there hath been in the World concerning moſt of thoſe things which relate to Mankind in common, as the Models of Government, the Laws they are rul'd by, the particular Rites and Cuſtoms

ſtoms of Worſhip; we have the greateſt reaſon to judge that thoſe common Principles which were the Foundations on which all theſe ſeveral different Cuſtoms were built, were not the effect of any poſitive Laws, nor the mere force of principles of Education, but ſomething which had a deeper root and foundation in the Principles of Nature it ſelf. A common and univerſal Effect muſt flow from ſome common and univerſal Cauſe. So the *Stoic* argues in *Tully*, If there were no God, *non tam ſtabilis opinio permaneret, nec confirmaretur diuturnitate temporis, nec una cum ſeculis ætatibuſque hominum inveterare potuiſſet.* It is ſtrange to think that Mankind in ſo many Ages of the World ſhou'd not grow wiſe enough to rid it ſelf of ſo troubleſome an Opinion as that was, of the Being of God, had it not been true. *Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. 2.*

We ſee in all the alterations of the World, other vain Opinions have been detected, refuted and ſhaken off; if this had been ſuch, how comes it to remain the ſame in all Ages, and Nations of the World? *Opinionum commenta delet dies, naturæ judicia confirmat.* It is a great diſcredit to Time to make it like a River in that ſence, that it bears up only lighter things, when matters of greateſt weight are ſunk to the bottom and paſt recovery. This may paſs for a handſom Alluſion, as to the Opinions and Writings of particular Perſons, but cannot be underſtood of ſuch things which are founded on the univerſal conſent of the World; for theſe common Notions of Human Nature are ſo ſuted to the temper of the World, that they paſs down the ſtrong current of Time with the ſame facility that a well built Ship, tho' of good burden, doth furrow the Ocean. So that if we muſt adhere to the Allegory, it is eaſily reply'd, that it is not the weight of things which makes them ſink, but the unſutableneſs of their Superficies to that of the water; ſo we ſee a ſmall piece of Wood will ſink, when a ſtately Ship is born up; ſo ſuch things which have not that agreeableneſs in them to the Dictates of Nature may ſoon be loſt, but ſuch as lie ſo even upon the ſuperficies of the Soul, will ſtill float above the Water, and never be loſt in the ſwifteſt current of Time. Thus we aſſert this univerſal conſent of Mankind, as to the exiſtence of a Deity, to be a thing ſo conſonant to our Natural reaſon, that as long as there are Men in the World it will continue.

XI. But now it is hardly conceivable, according to the Principles of *Epicurus*, how Mankind ſhou'd univerſally agree in ſome common Sentiments; much leſs how it ſhou'd have ſuch an Anticipation as himſelf grants of the Being of God. For if the Soul be nothing elſe but ſome more active and vigorous Particles of Matter (as *Diogenes Laertius* tells us, that his Opinion was, that the Soul was nothing elſe but a *Syſtem* ἐξ ἀτόμων λειοτάτων ϛ στρογγυλωτάτων, *of the moſt ſmooth and round Atoms*) if ſo, it is very hard apprehending how any ſuch things as Anticipations or common Notions can be lodg'd in the Soul; for if our Souls be nothing elſe but ſome ſmall Sphærical Corpuſcles which move up and down the Body, as the *Epicurean* Philoſophy ſuppoſeth, then all our Knowledg and Perception muſt depend on Motion, which Motion muſt be by the impreſſion of external Objects: which *Lucretius* acknowledgeth and contends for. *Laertius l. 10. in v. Epic. v. Gaſſend. To. 2d. l. 3. ſect. 3.*

Lucret. l. 4. *Invenies primis a ſenſibus eſſe creatam*
Notitiam veri.

If then our knowledg of Truth comes in by our Senſes, and Senſation doth wholly depend upon the impreſſion of outward Objects, what becomes of all common Notions and of the *Prolepſis* of a Deity? unleſs we ſuppoſe the knowledg of a Deity came in by Senſe, which *Epicurus* himſelf denies when he attributes to the Deity not *corpus*, but *quaſi corpus*, as *Tully* tells us, and therefore he is not a proper object of Senſe. So that it is impoſſible there ſhou'd be any ſuch thing as a natural Notion which may be the ground of univerſal conſent among Men, according to the Doctrine of *Epicurus*. And therefore it ſtands to all reaſon in the World, that if our Senſes be the only competent Judges of Truth, Men ſhou'd differ about nothing more than ſuch things which cannot be try'd by the judgment of Senſe; ſuch as the notion of a God is; (for where ſhou'd Men be more uncertain in their judgments, than in ſuch things which they have no rule at all to go by in the judging of?) but we are ſo far from finding it ſo, that Men are nothing ſo much agreed about the objects of Senſe, as they are about the exiſtence of a Deity; and therefore we ſee this univerſal conſent of Mankind concerning a God, cannot be ſalv'd by the Principles of thoſe who deny it; according to which no account at all can be given of any ſuch things as univerſal or common Notions.

Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. 1.

XII. Neither can this univerſal conſent of Mankind be enervated with any greater probability by thoſe *Atheiſts* who aſſert the Eternity of the World, and reſolve this conſent wholly into mere Tradition, ſuch as the Fables of Poets were convey'd in from one to another. For I demand concerning this Tradition, Whether ever it had any beginning or no? If it had no beginning, it cou'd be no Tradition; for that muſt run up to ſome Perſons from whom it firſt came; again, if it had no beginning, it was neceſſary that it ſhou'd always be, on the ſame accounts on which they make the World eternal. And if it be neceſſary, it muſt be antecedent to any free Act of Man's Will which Tradition ſuppoſeth; and ſo ſome falſe Opinion wou'd be found to be as neceſſary as the World's being eternal, (and by conſequence the World's being eternal may be a neceſſary falſe Opinion) but if any falſe Opinion be once granted neceſſary, it then follows that our Faculties are not true, and that Nature is a neceſſary cauſe of ſome notorious Falſity, which is the higheſt Impeachment the *Atheiſt* cou'd have laid upon his only ador'd Nature; which muſt then have done that, (which *Ariſtotle* was aſham'd to think ever Nature ſhou'd be guilty of) which is, ſomething in vain; for to what purpoſe ſhou'd Man have rational Faculties, if he be under an unavoidable neceſſity of being deceiv'd? If then it be granted that this Tradition had once a beginning, either it began with Human Nature, or Human Nature did exiſt long before it: if it began with Mankind, then Mankind had a beginning, and ſo the World was not eternal; if Mankind did exiſt before this Tradition, I then inquire in what time, and by what means, came this Tradition firſt to be embraced, if it doth not ſuppoſe the exiſtence of a Deity? Can any Age be

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mention'd in Hiſtory, wherein this Tradition was not univerſally receiv'd? and which is moſt to our purpoſe, the further we go back in Hiſtory, the fuller the World was of Deities, if we believe the Heathen Hiſtories; but however no Age can be inſtanc'd in, wherein this Tradition began firſt to be believ'd in the World; we can trace the Poetic Fables to their true Original, by the Teſtimonies of thoſe who believ'd them; we know the particular Authors of them, and what courſe they took in divulging of them; we find great diverſities among themſelves in the meaning of them, and many Nations that never heard of them. But all things are quite otherwiſe in this Tradition; we have none to fix on as the firſt Authors of it; if the World were eternal, and the belief of a Deity fabulous, we cannot underſtand by what Artifice a fabulous Tradition cou'd come to be ſo univerſally receiv'd in the World, that no Nation of old cou'd be inſtanced in by the inquiſitive Philoſophers, but however rude and barbarous it was, yet it own'd a Deity. How cou'd ſuch a Tradition be ſpread ſo far, but either by Force or Fraud? It cou'd not be by force, becauſe embraced by an unanimous conſent where no force at all hath been us'd, and hath been ſo rooted in the very Natures of thoſe People who have been moſt tender of their Liberties, that they have reſented no Indignity ſo highly, as any Affronts they conceiv'd to be offer'd to their Gods. Nay, and where any Perſons ſeem to quit the belief of a Deity, we find what Force and Violence they have us'd to their own Reaſon and Conſcience to bring themſelves to *Atheiſm*, which they cou'd not ſubdue their Minds to any longer than the Will cou'd command the Underſtanding; which when it gain'd but a little liberty to examin it ſelf, or view the World, or was alarm'd with Thunder, Earth-quakes or violent Sickneſs, did bring back again the ſenſe of a Deity with greater force and power than they had endeavor'd to ſhake it off with. Now had this Tradition come by force into the World, there wou'd have been a ſecret exultation of Mind to be freed from it, as we ſee Nature rejoyceth to ſhake off every thing which is violent, and to ſettle every thing according to its due order. It is only Fraud then which can be with any Reaſon imagin'd in this caſe; and how unreaſonable it is to imagin it here, will appear to any one who doth conſider how extremely jealous the World is of being impoſed upon by the Subtilty of ſuch who are thought to be the greateſt Politicians. For the very Opinion of their Subtilty makes them apt to ſuſpect a Deſign in every thing they ſpeak or do, ſo that nothing doth more generally hinder the entertaining of any motion ſo much among vulgar People, as that it comes from a Perſon reputed very Politic. So that the moſt politic way of gaining upon the Apprehenſions of the Vulgar, is by taking upon one the greateſt appearance of Simplicity and Integrity; and this now cou'd not be done by ſuch Politicians which we now ſpeak of, but by accommodating themſelves to ſuch things in the People which were ſo conſonant to their Natures, that they cou'd ſuſpect no deſign at all in the matters propounded to them. And thus I aſſert it to have been in the preſent caſe, in all thoſe Politic Governors who at firſt brought the World into both Civil and Religious Societies, after they were grown Rude and Barbarous; for as it had

been impoſſible to have brought them into Civil Societies, unleſs there had been ſuppos'd an inclination to Society in them, ſo it had been equally impoſſible to have brought them to embrace any particular way of Religion, unleſs there had been a natural propenſity to Religion implanted in them, and founded in the general belief of the exiſtence of a Deity. And therefore we never find any of the ancient Founders of Common-wealths go about to perſuade the People that there was a God, but this they ſuppos'd and made their advantage of it, the better to draw the People on to embrace that way of Worſhip, which they deliver'd to them, as moſt ſutable to their own deſign. And this is plainly evident in the vaſt difference of Deſigns and Intereſts which were carry'd on in the Heathen World upon this general apprehenſion of a Deity. How came the World to be ſo eaſily abus'd into Religions of all ſhapes and faſhions, had not there been a natural inclination in Mens Souls to Religion, and an indelible Idea of a Deity on the Minds of Men? Were then this propenſity groundleſs, and this Idea fictitious, it were the greateſt ſlur imaginable, which cou'd be caſt upon Nature, that when the Inſtincts of irrational Agents argue ſomething real in them; only Man the moſt noble Being of the viſible World, muſt be fatally carry'd to the belief of that which never was. Which yet hath ſo great a force and awe upon Man, that nothing creates ſo great Anxieties in his life as this doth; nothing lays him more open to the deſigns of any who have an intent to abuſe him. But yet further, theſe Politicians who firſt abus'd the world, in telling them there was a God, did they themſelves believe there was a God or no? If they did, then they had no ſuch end as abuſing the world into ſuch a belief. If they did not, upon what accounts did they believe there was none, when the People were ſo ready to believe there was one? Was that as certain a Tradition before that there was no God, as afterwards they made it to be that there was? If ſo, then all thoſe People whom they perſuaded to believe there was a God, did before, all believe there was none; and how can it poſſibly enter into the Reaſon of any Man to think, that People who had been brought up in the belief that there was no God at all, nor any State after this Life, ſhou'd all unanimouſly quit the Principles of Education which tended ſo much to their Eaſe and Pleaſure here, to believe there was a God and another Life, and thereby to fill themſelves full of Fears and Diſquietments, merely becauſe their Rulers told them ſo? Again, if theſe Rulers themſelves were ſo wiſe as not to believe a Deity, can we imagin there ever was ſuch an Age of the World wherein it fell out ſo happily, that only the Rulers were Wiſe, and all the Subjects Fools? But it may be, it will be ſaid, *That all who were wiſe themſelves did not believe a Deity, but yet conſented to the practice of Religion, becauſe it was ſo uſeful for the Government of Mankind;* but can it be thought that all theſe wiſe Men, which we muſt ſuppoſe of ſeveral Ranks and Degrees, (for Philoſophers are not always States-men, nor States-men Philoſophers) ſhou'd ſo readily concur in ſuch a thing which tended moſt to the intereſt of the Prince, and to the abuſe of the World? Wou'd none of them be ready to aſſert the Truth, tho' it were but to make a Party of their own, and diſcover to the People,

People, that it was only the Ambition and Deſign of their Governors which ſought to bring the People to Slavery by the belief of ſuch things, which were contrary to the Tradition of their Fore-fathers, and wou'd make their Lives, if they believ'd them, continually troubleſome and unquiet? Or if we cou'd ſuppoſe things ſhou'd hit thus in one Nation, what is this to the whole World which the *Atheiſt* here ſuppoſeth eternal? What, did all the Rulers of the World exactly agree in one moment of time; or at leaſt in one Age thus to abuſe the World? Did the deſigns of Governors and the credulity of all People fall out to be ſo ſutable together? But on the contrary, we do not find that Governors can have the Judgments of People ſo at their command, that they can make them to believe what they pleaſe; if it were ſo, we may well ſay with that *Atheiſtical* Pope, *Heu quam minimo regitur Mundus; What a twine thread will Rule the World!* But granting theſe things, (which any but an *Atheiſt* will ſay are impoſſible) yet whence ſhou'd it come to paſs that the World, which is generally led more by the Opinions of their Fore-fathers, than by Reaſon, ſhou'd ſo cancel that former Tradition that there was no God, that no remaining foot-ſteps of it can be traced in any Hiſtory of thoſe times? Or did the Governors all conſent to aboliſh all Records of it? Public and Written I grant they might, but not thoſe out of Mens Minds and Memories; which wou'd have been for the eaſe of the Minds of their Poſterity convey'd in ſome ſecret *Cabala* from Fathers to their Children. It may be it will be ſaid, *ſo it was, but Men durſt not profeſs it for fear of the Laws:* but, it is not evident that the Laws of all the ancient Common-wealths were ſo ſevere againſt *Atheiſm*; and withal how came ſome of the wiſeſt and moſt philoſophical Men of *Greece* and *Rome* to embrace the exiſtence of a Deity, as a thing far more conſonant to Reaſon than the contrary Opinion, and eſtabliſh'd their belief on ſuch Evidences from Nature it ſelf, that none of their *Antagoniſts* were able to anſwer them? It was not certainly the fear of Laws which made Men rational and inquiſitive into the Natures and Cauſes of things; and yet thoſe who were ſuch amidſt the great Idolatries of the Heathen, and being deſtitute of Divine Revelation, yet freely and firmly aſſented to the exiſtence of a Deity. Had it been only Fraud and Impoſture which brought Men to believe a God, whence came it to paſs that this Fraud was not diſcover'd by theſe Philoſophers, who were far better able by their nearneſs to thoſe eldeſt times, and much converſe abroad in other Nations (for ſome Travell'd into *Ægypt*, *Chaldea*, *Perſia*, *India*, merely to gain Knowledg) to have found out ſuch an Impoſture, had it been ſuch, than any of our modern *Atheiſts?* Whence come theſe now in this almoſt decrepit Age of the World to be the firſt Smellers out of ſo great a Deſign? By what Means, what Tokens and Evidence came ſuch an Impoſture to their knowledg? Becauſe, forſooth, the World is ſtill apt to be abus'd by a pretenſe of Religion; but he that doth not ſee how ſilly and ridiculous a Sophiſm that is, either by his own Reaſon, or by what hath gone before; hath Wit and Reaſon little enough to be an *Atheiſt*. Some therefore who wou'd ſeem a little wiſer than the vulgar ſort of *Atheiſts* (for it ſeems there is a *Vulgus* among them too, I wiſh it be more for their

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Meanneſs than Multitude) are ſo far convinced of the unreaſonableneſs of judging that the belief of a Deity came in by Fraud, that finding it ſo general and univerſal, they attribute it to as general and univerſal a Cauſe, which is the influence of the Stars. So true ſtill is that of the Poet, *Cælum ipſum petimus ſtultitia*; for by what imaginable influence come the Stars to plant Opinions in Mens Minds ſo deeply and univerſally? But yet further, is this Opinion which is thus caus'd by the Stars, true or falſe? If the Opinion be true, we have what we deſire; if falſe, what malignant Influence is this of the Stars, ſo powerfully to ſway Men to the belief of a Falſity? How far are the Stars then from doing good to Mankind, when they are ſo influential to deceive the World; but then, by what peculiar Influence come ſome Men to be freed from this general Impoſture? If the Cauſe be ſo univerſal, the Effect muſt be univerſal too. But if only the nativity and continuance of ſome particular Religions may be calculated by the Stars, (as *Cardan* and *Vaninus*, Atheiſtically ſuppoſe) whence then comes the general propenſity and inclination to Religion in all Ages and Nations of the World? If it be then caus'd by the Heavens in general, it muſt be produced neceſſarily and univerſally, and ſo to be an *Atheiſt*, were impoſſible; if it be caus'd by the influence of ſome particular Stars, then when that influence ceaſeth, the World wou'd univerſally relapſe into *Atheiſm*. So that there is no poſſible way of avoiding this univerſal conſent of Mankind, as an Argument that there is a God, when all the Pretenſes of the *Atheiſt* againſt it are ſo weak, ridiculous and impertinent.

XIII. The only thing then left for him, is, to deny the truth of the thing, *viz.* that there is ſuch an univerſal conſent; becauſe ſome Perſons have been found in the World who have not agreed with the reſt of Mankind in this Opinion. To this I anſwer, (which was the ſecond Particular for clearing this Argument) that the diſſent of theſe Perſons is not ſufficient to manifeſt the conſent not to be univerſal, and to ariſe from a Dictate of Nature: For I demand of the greateſt *Atheiſt*, whether it be ſufficient to ſay, that it is not natural for Men to have two Legs, becauſe ſome have been born with one, or that it is not natural for Men to deſire Life (which the *Atheiſt* loves ſo dearly) becauſe there have been ſo many who have taken away their own Lives? If it be ſaid that theſe are Monſters and *Anomalies* in Nature, and therefore not to be reckon'd in the regular Account of things, the ſame I may with as great reaſon ſay of *Atheiſts*, that they are to be diſpung'd out of the *Cenſus* of ſuch who act upon free Principles of Reaſon; becauſe there may be ſome peculiar Reaſons given of their Diſſent from the reſt of Mankind in the denial of a Deity. We ſee by the old Philoſophers how far the Affectation of Novelty, and Ambition of being cry'd up for no vulgar Wits, may carry Men to deny ſuch things, which are moſt common and obvious in the World. Is there any thing more plain and evident to Reaſon, than that it implies a contradiction for the ſame thing to be and not to be at the ſame time? and yet if we believe *Ariſtotle*, who largely diſputes againſt them, εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἱ αὐτό τι ἐνδέχεσθαι φασι τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι. *There were ſome who affirm'd that a thing might be and not be at the ſame time.* What ſo evident in Nature as Motion?

Ariſt. Metaphyſ. l. 4. c. 4.

yet

yet the Philoſopher is well known who diſputed againſt it, and thought himſelf ſubtile in doing ſo too. What are Men more aſſur'd of, than that they live, and yet (if it be not too Dogmatical, even in that to believe the *Sceptics*) it was a thing none cou'd be aſſur'd of? What are our Senſes more aſſur'd of than that the Snow is white, yet all the Philoſophers were not of that Opinion? Is this then ſufficient Reaſon on which to deny an univerſal conſent, becauſe ſome Philoſophers oppos'd it, when it is moſt undoubtedly true, which *Tully* ſharply ſpeaks of the ancient Philoſophers, *Nihil tam abſurdum quod non dixerit aliquis Philoſophorum; There was no abſurdity ſo great, but it found a Philoſopher to vouch it?* But in this caſe thoſe Philoſophers who queſtion'd the exiſtence of a Deity, tho' they were not for number to be compar'd with thoſe who aſſerted it, yet were not ſo inexcuſable therein as our modern *Atheiſts*; becauſe they then knew no other way of Religion, but that which was joyn'd with horrible Superſtition, and ridiculous Rites of Worſhip; they were Strangers to any thing of Divine Revelation, or to any real Miracles wrought to confirm it, and to ſuch a way of ſerving God which is moſt agreeable to the Divine Nature, moſt ſutable to our Reaſon, moſt effectual for advancing true Godlineſs in the World. And altho' this moſt excellent Religion, *viz.* the Chriſtian, be ſubject to many Scandals by reaſon of the Corruptions which have been mix'd with it by thoſe who have profeſs'd it, yet the Religion its ſelf is clear and untainted, being with great Integrity preſerved in the ſacred Records of it. So that now *Atheiſm* hath far leſs to plead for its ſelf than it had in the midſt of the Ignorance and Superſtition of the Heathen Idolatries. But if we ſhou'd grant the *Atheiſt* more than he can prove, that the number of ſuch who deny'd a Deity hath been great in all Ages of the World; is it probable they ſhou'd ſpeak the Sence of Nature, whoſe Opinion, if it were embraced, wou'd diſſolve all Ties and Obligations whatſoever; wou'd let the World looſe to the higheſt Licentiouſneſs, without check or controul, and wou'd in time overturn all Civil Societies? For as *Tully* hath largely ſhewn, *Take away the Being and Providence of God out of the World, and there follows nothing but Perturbation and Confuſion in it, not only all Sanctity, Piety and Devotion is deſtroy'd, but all Faith, Virtue and Human Societies too*; which are impoſſible to be upheld without Religion, as not only he, but *Plato*, *Ariſtotle* and *Plutarch*, have fully demonſtrated. Shall ſuch Perſons then who hold an Opinion ſo contrary to all other Dictates of Nature, rather ſpeak the Sence of Nature, than they who have aſſerted the belief of a Deity, which tends ſo much to advance Nature, to regulate the World, and to reform the Lives of Men? Certainly if it were not a dictate of Nature that there was a God, it is impoſſible to conceive the World ſhou'd be ſo conſtant in the belief of him, when the thoughts of him breed ſo many Anxieties in Mens Minds, and withal, ſince God is neither obvious to Senſe, nor his Nature comprehenſible by Human Reaſon. Which is a ſtronger Evidence it is a Character of himſelf which God hath imprinted on the Minds of Men, which makes them ſo unanimouſly agree that he is, when they can neither ſee him, nor yet fully comprehend him.

Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. 3.

Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. 1. & de Legib. l. 2

For any whole Nation, which have consented in the denial of a *Deity*, we have no evidence at all; some suspicions it is true there were at first concerning some very barbarous People in *America*, but it is since evident, tho' they are grosly mistaken as to the Nature of God, yet they worship something instead of him, such as the *Toupinamboults*, *Caribes*, *Patagons*, *Tapuiæ*, and others; of the last of which *Vossius* from one *Christophorus Arcissewski*, a *Polonian* Gentleman, who was among them, hath given a large account of their Religion, and the manner of their Worshipping of their Gods, both good and bad. And that which among these *Indians* much confirms our present Argument, is, That only those who have been the most barbarous and savage Nations, have been suspected of Irreligion, but the more civiliz'd they have been, the more evident their sense of Religion. The *Peruvians* worship one chief God, whom they call *Virachocha*, and *Pachacamak*, which is as much as *The Creator of Heaven and Earth*. And of the Religion of the *Mexicans*, *Lipsius* and others speak. So that the nearer any have approach'd to Civility and Knowledg, the more ready they have been to own a Deity, and none have had so little sense of it, as they who are almost degenerated to Brutes; and whether of these two now comes nearer to Reason, let any one who hath it judg.

Vossius Addend. ad l. 1. de Idol. p. 2.

Vid. Acostam, l. 5. c. 3.

Lips. Mon. & Exempl. Politic.

XIV. 2. Another great Evidence, that God hath imprinted a Character or Idea of himself on the Minds of Men, is, *because such things are contain'd in this Idea of God, which do necessarily imply his existence.* The main force of this Argument lies in this, *That which we do clearly and distinctly perceive to belong to the nature and essence of a thing, may be with truth affirm'd of the thing*; not that it may be affirm'd with truth to belong to the nature of the thing, for that were an empty *Tautology*, but it may be affirm'd with truth of the thing its self; as if I clearly perceive upon exact enquiry, that to be an Animal doth belong to the nature of Man, I may with truth affirm that Man is a living Creature; if I find it demonstrably true that a Triangle hath three Angles equal to two Right ones, then I may truly affirm it of any Triangle: But now we assume, That upon the most exact search and inquiry, I clearly perceive that necessary existence doth immutably belong to the nature of God; therefore, I may with as much truth affirm, that God exists, as that Man is a living Creature; or, a Triangle hath three Angles equal to two Right ones. But because many are so apt to suspect some kind of *Sophism* in this Argument, when it is managed from the Idea in Mens Minds, because that seems to imply only an objective reality in the Mind, and that nothing can be thence inferr'd as to the existence of the thing whose Idea it is, I therefore shall endeavor to manifest more clearly the force of this Argument, by proving severally the suppositions which it stands upon, which are these three: 1. *That clear and distinct perception of the Mind is the greatest Evidence we can have of the truth of any thing.* 2. *That we have this clear perception that necessary existence doth belong to the nature of God.* 3. *That if necessary existence doth belong to God's nature, it unavoidably follows, that he doth exist.* Nothing can be desir'd more plain or full, to demonstrate the force of this Argument, than by proving every one of these.

1. *That*

1. *That the greateſt Evidence we can have of the truth of a thing, is a clear and diſtinct perception of it in our Minds.* For otherwiſe the rational Faculties of Man's Soul wou'd be wholly uſeleſs, as being not fitted for any end at all, if upon a right uſe of them, Men were ſtill liable to be deceiv'd. I grant the imperfection of our Minds in this preſent ſtate is very great, which makes us ſo obnoxious to error and miſtake; but then that imperfection lies in the proneneſs in Man's Mind to be led by intereſt and prejudice in the judgment of things; but in ſuch things as are purely ſpeculative and rational, if the Mind cannot be certain it is not deceiv'd in them, it can have no certainty at all of any *Mathematical* Demonſtrations. Now we find in our own Minds a clear and convincing Evidence in ſome things, as ſoon as they are propounded to our Underſtandings, as that a *thing cannot be and not be at the ſame time*; that *a non-entity can have no proper Attributes*; that *while I reaſon and diſcourſe, I am*; theſe are ſo clear, that no Man doth ſuſpect himſelf deceiv'd at all in them. Beſides, if we had no ground of certainty at all in our judging things, to what purpoſe is there an Idea of true and falſe in our Minds, if it be impoſſible to know the one from the other? But I ſay not, that in all Perceptions of the Mind we have certain Evidence of truth, but only in ſuch as are clear and diſtinct; that is, when upon the greateſt conſideration of the nature of a thing, there appears no ground or reaſon at all to doubt concerning it; and this muſt ſuppoſe the Mind's abſtraction wholly from the Senſes; for we plainly find that while we attend to them, we may judg our ſelves very certain and yet be deceiv'd, as thoſe who have an *Icteriſm* in their Eyes, may judg with much confidence that they ſee things as clearly and diſtinctly as any other doth. Beſides, there are many things taken for granted by Men, which have no Evidence of Reaſon at all in them: Now if Men will judge of the truth of things by ſuch Principles, no wonder if they be deceiv'd. But when we ſpeak of clear and diſtinct Perception, we ſuppoſe the Mind to proceed upon evident Principles of Reaſon, or to have ſuch Notions of things, which as far we can perceive by the light of Reaſon, do agree with the natures of the things we apprehend; if in ſuch things then there be no ground of certainty, it is as much as to ſay, our Faculties are to no purpoſe; which highly reflects either upon God or Nature. It is a noble Queſtion as any is in *Philoſophy*, What is the certain κριτήριον of the truth of things, or what ground of certainty the Mind hath to proceed upon in its judgment of the truth of ſuch objects as are repreſented to it? Nothing can render the *Philoſophy* of *Epicurus* more juſtly ſuſpected to any rational and inquiſitive Mind, than his making the Senſes the only conveyers of the truth of things to the Mind. The Senſes I grant do not in themſelves deceive any; but if I make the impreſſions of Senſe to be the only rule for the Mind to judg by of the truth of things, I make way for the greateſt impoſtures, and the moſt erring judgments. For if my Mind affirms every thing to be in its proper nature according to that Idea which the Imagination hath receiv'd from the impreſſions upon the organs of Senſe, it will be impoſſible for me ever to underſtand the right natures of things. Becauſe the natures of things may remain the ſame, when all thoſe things in them which affect

the organs of Senſe may be alter'd, and becauſe the various Motion and Configuration of the Particles of Matter may make ſuch an impreſſion upon the Senſes, which may cauſe an Idea in us of that in the things themſelves, which yet may be only in the manner of Senſation; as ſome Philoſophers ſuppoſe it to be in Heat and Cold. Now if the Mind judgeth of the nature of things according to thoſe Ideas which come from the impreſſions made upon the organs of Senſe; how is it poſſible it ſhou'd ever come to a right judgment of the natures of things? So that in reference even to the groſſeſt material Beings, it muſt be the Perception only of the Mind, which can truly inform us of their proper Nature and Eſſence. Beſides, there are many Ideas of things in the Mind of Man which are capable to have Properties demonſtrated of them, which never ow'd their original to our Senſes; and were never imported to the Mind at the Keys of the Senſes. Such are moſt *Mathematical* Figures, which have their peculiar Properties and Demonſtrations; ſuch are all the mutual reſpects of things to each other, which may be as certain and evident to the Mind as its ſelf is: now it is plain by this, that all certainty of Knowledg is not convey'd by the Senſes; but our trueſt way of certain underſtanding the Nature of any thing, is by the clear and diſtinct Perception of the Mind, which is founded on the truth of our Faculties; and that however we may be deceiv'd when we do not make a right uſe of our Reaſon, becauſe of the imperfection of our preſent ſtate; yet if we ſay our Minds may be deceiv'd when things are evident and clear to them upon plain Principles of Reaſon, it is highly to reflect upon that God who gave Men rational Faculties, and made them capable of diſcerning Truth from Falſhood.

2. *That we have clear and diſtinct Perception that neceſſity of Exiſtence doth belong to the Nature of God.* For which we are to conſider the vaſt difference which there is in our Notion of the Nature of God, and of the Nature of any other Being. In all other Beings, I grant we may abſtract Eſſence and Exiſtence from each other; now if I can make it appear, that there is evident Reaſon, *ex parte rei*, why I cannot do it in the Notion of God, then it will be more plain that neceſſity of Exiſtence doth immutably belong to his Nature. It is manifeſt to our Reaſon, that in all other Beings, which we apprehend the Natures of, nothing elſe can be imply'd in the Natures of them beyond bare poſſibility of Exiſtence; no, altho' the things which we do apprehend, do really exiſt; becauſe in forming an Idea of a thing, we abſtract from every thing which is not imply'd in the very Nature of the thing: now Exiſtence being contingent and poſſible, as to any other Being, it cannot be any ingredient of its Idea, becauſe it doth not belong to its Eſſence; for we may fully apprehend the Nature of the thing, without attributing Exiſtence to it. But now in our Conception of a Being, abſolutely perfect, bare poſſibility or contingency of Exiſtence ſpeaks a direct repugnancy to the Idea of him; for how can we conceive that Being abſolutely perfect, which may want that which gives life to all other Perfections, which is *Exiſtence?* The only ſcruple which Mens Minds are ſubject to in apprehending the force of this Argument lies in this,

this, *Whether this neceſſary Exiſtence doth really belong to the Nature of that Being whoſe Idea it is, or elſe it be only a Mode of our Conception in apprehending God?* For clearing of this, we muſt conſider by what certain Rules we can know when the compoſition of things together in the Underſtanding doth depend upon the mere Operation of the Mind, and when they do belong to the things themſelves and their immutable Nature. For which we have no Rule ſo certain and evident as this is, that in thoſe things which depend merely on the Act of the Mind joyning together, the Underſtanding cannot only abſtract one thing from another, but may really divide them in its Conceptions from each other: but in ſuch things which cannot be divided from each other, but the Eſſence of the thing is quite alter'd, it is a certain evidence that thoſe things were not conjoyn'd by the mere Act of the Mind, but do immutably belong to the Natures of the things themſelves. As for inſtance, when I conceive a Triangle inſcrib'd in a Square, a Man walking, a Horſe with wings, it is evident I may underſtand the Natures of all theſe things without theſe Affections of them, becauſe I can fully apprehend the Nature of a Triangle, without imagining a Square, a Man without walking, a Horſe without wings; thence it neceſſarily follows, that the joyning of theſe things together, was merely an Act of the Mind: But now I cannot conceive a Triangle not to have three Angles equal to two right ones, nor a Man that hath not Rationality belonging to him; for if I divide theſe Attributes from them, I deſtroy their Natures; and therefore the joyning of theſe together is not any mere Act of the Mind; but theſe are ſuch things as are imply'd in the very notion of them, and therefore immutably belongs to them. So now, when I conceive the notion of a Body, I can imagine all Perfections belonging to it, without conceiving it neceſſarily to exiſt; for it may be a Body ſtill, tho' it hath not its Being from it ſelf; but when I conceive a Being abſolutely perfect, it is impoſſible to imagin it ſhou'd have its Being from any other; and if it be from it ſelf, it muſt of neceſſity exiſt. For tho' the Mind ſtill be apt to doubt, whether Exiſtence in this Idea be only a Mode of Cogitation; yet that doubt may be eaſily remov'd, if the Mind doth but attend to this, that at leaſt Poſſibility of Exiſtence doth belong to all thoſe Beings which we have a clear Idea of in our Minds; and the reaſon why we attribute bare poſſibility to them, is becauſe we apprehend ſome Reaſon in our Minds which keeps us from attributing neceſſity of Exiſtence to them, as that it is not imply'd in its Nature, or that it doth depend on ſome other Being, or that it wants infinite Power, &c. Now all theſe Reaſons which make us attribute bare poſſibility of Exiſtence to any Being, are taken away when we conceive a Being abſolutely perfect; for then Exiſtence is imply'd among the number of Perfections; and this Being is independent upon all others, and infinitely powerful; ſo that nothing can hinder its Exiſtence; and therefore we muſt conclude that neceſſity of Exiſtence doth immutably belong to the Nature and Nature of God, and is not any Mode only of our Conception; becauſe if we take away neceſſity of Exiſtence from God, we loſe the notion of a Being abſolutely perfect.

The third thing, *That if neceſſary Exiſtence belongs to the Nature of God, he doth exiſt*, not only follows as a neceſſary Concluſion from the other two, as the Premiſſes, but is in it ſelf evident to any one's Reaſon; for it implies no leſs than a Contradiction for a Being to exiſt neceſſarily, and yet it be queſtionable, Whether it doth exiſt or no? Thus much I ſuppoſe may ſuffice here to explain and inforce this Argument; if any are yet unſatisfy'd, I refer them to thoſe judicious Authors, who have made it their peculiar buſineſs to manage it, and vindicate it from all objections: which falls in only here as an Evidence that God hath imprinted a Character of himſelf on the Minds of Men, ſeeing we have ſo clear and diſtinct an Idea of ſuch a Being, from whom, if we take away neceſſity of Exiſtence, we deſtroy that Notion which our Minds have of an abſolutely perfect Being. This is the firſt way whereby we can conceive an infinite Being may make himſelf known to Mankind, by imprinting an indelible Character of himſelf upon the Soul, which can be attributed to none beſides himſelf without doing manifeſt violence to our own Faculties, and ſuſpecting our ſelves deceiv'd in things which are moſt clear and evident to us.

Vid. Des Cartes Metaphyſ. Medit. & Reſp. ad Object. D. H. *More* Antidote againſt Atheiſm, *l.* 1. *ch.* 8. *Append. ch.* 5, 6, 7.

XV. I come to the ſecond Evidence which God hath given us of his own Exiſtence, which is the mark, and *impreſſion which he hath left of an infinite Wiſdom and Counſel, in the appearances which are in Nature.* There needs no great Criticiſm to find out the true Author of all the Works of Nature; the Works themſelves ſhew the Author as plainly, as if his effigies were drawn upon them. If the great curioſity and contrivance of any artificial Engine ſpeak the excellency of the Mechanical Wit of the Framer of it; what ridiculous folly will it be to impute that rare Mechaniſm of the Works of Nature to the blind and fortuitous motion of ſome Particles of Matter? Suppoſe a multitude of Letters caſually thrown together, ſhou'd fall ſo handſomly in order, that we might read in them the Names of *Troja*, *Juno*, *Æneas*, *Dido*, *Turnus*, *Aſcanius* or the like; is it poſſible for any to imagin that ever they ſhou'd reach the Grandeur, Stile, Matter and Accuracy of the whole Books of the *Æneids?* So granting, that now Matter being ſet in motion by a Divine Power, may by its continual agitation, at laſt produce ſome of the appearances of Nature; yet what is this to the whole Univerſe, or the admirable Contrivance of any one part in it? If theſe things had been the reſult of mere Matter and Motion, when once the Particles of Matter had been ſo united and ſetled together, as to produce any one ſpecies of Animals in the World (which it is almoſt unconceivable they ſhou'd) yet we cannot think that if there had been but Symmetry of Parts enough for it merely to ſubſiſt it ſelf, and propagate more, there cou'd have been any further Attempt made by thoſe *Atoms*, which had been once ſetl'd in a determinate figure. How came it then to paſs that there is not any one ſpecies of Animals in the World, but what hath ſuch an Order, Symmetry and Contrivance of parts, which ſpeaks more than mere neceſſity of Subſiſtence, and therefore ſpeaks them to be the Effect of a Supreme Governor of the World, and not the Products of mere Matter? Is it poſſible, that any who is not before-hand reſolv'd to exclude a *Deity*, ſhou'd imagin that

that any Particles of Matter ſhou'd fall into the exact Form, Order, Motion, and ſerviceableneſs to the World which the Heavenly Bodies are in, without Divine Counſel and Wiſdom diſpoſing of them? *Tully* tells us of a Speech of *Ariſtotle* to this purpoſe; *If we cou'd ſuppoſe Perſons to have liv'd in ſome caverns of the earth, and to have enjoy'd every thing there of pleaſure, and riches, or whatever it is which we think makes Mens Lives happy, and had never been abroad upon the ſurface of the earth, but had only had ſome obſcure report of an infinite Power and Being; and that afterwards theſe Perſons ſhou'd by an opening of the caverns wherein they were, come abroad into theſe parts of the World, and ſhou'd ſuddenly behold the Earth, Sea, and the Heavens, and obſerve the vaſtneſs of the Clouds, and violence of Winds, and behold the bigneſs, beauty and influence of the Sun, and how the Day depended upon his preſence, and upon his withdrawing ſhou'd view the face of the Heavens again* (as it were the *ſecond courſe* of Nature) *the order and ornament of the Stars, the varieties of the light of the Moon, their riſing and ſetting, and their fixed and immoveable courſes; they cou'd not hold from believing there was a* DEITY, *and that theſe were the effects of his Power.* So vaſtly different are the free and natural emanations of our Souls, from that which we force and ſtrain out of our ſelves by diſtorting and wringing thoſe free Principles of Reaſon which GOD hath given us. When a few ſorry Experiments and ſome arbitrary *Hypotheſes*, muſt make us form other Conceptions of things, than the Majeſty, Order and Beauty of them do naturally ſuggeſt to us: We ſee, when once we can but abſtract our Minds from thoſe prejudices which continual converſation with the World brings upon us, by that Speech of *Ariſtotle*, how readily our Minds will frame an excellent Commentary upon thoſe words of the Royal *Pſalmiſt*, *The Heavens declare the glory of God, and the Firmament ſhews his handy-work.* To which purpoſe likewiſe thoſe words of the excellent *Orator* himſelf in another place, are very obſervable; *Quid eſt enim verius quam neminem eſſe oportere tam ſtulte arrogantem, ut in ſe mentem & rationem putet ineſſe, in cælo mundoque non putet? aut ea quæ vix ſumma ingenii ratione comprehendat, nulla ratione moveri putat? Quem vero aſtrorum ordines, quem dierum noctiumque viciſſitudines, quem menſium temperatio, quemque ea quæ gignuntur nobis ad fruendum, non gratum eſſe cogant, hunc hominem omnino numerare qui dicet? What monſtrous arrogancy wou'd it be in any Man to think there is a Mind and Reaſon in himſelf, and that there is none in the World? Or to think thoſe things are mov'd without Reaſon and Underſtanding, which all that he hath is ſcarce able to comprehend? Neither can he deſerve the name of a Man, from whom the obſervation of the courſes of the Stars, the ſucceſſion and order of Seaſons, and the innumerable benefits which he enjoys in the World, doth not extort gratitude towards that Being which order'd all theſe things.* What a low opinion then had thoſe more refin'd and generous Spirits, who went only upon Principles of pure and undiſtorted Reaſon, of thoſe mean and ignoble Souls, which were inclin'd to *Atheiſm*; eſpecially then, when Religion was ſo abus'd, that it was true of the wiſeſt of them, what one ſaid of *Eraſmus*, *Magis habuit quid fugeret quam quid ſequeretur*,

Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. 2. c. 95.

Ciceero de Legibus, l. 2.

tur, they knew what to avoid, but not what they ſhou'd embrace: And yet when they ſaw ſo much into the Folly and Superſtition of Heathen Worſhip, they ſaw the greateſt reaſon ſtill to adhere to the belief of a Deity, as may be clearly ſeen, eſpecially in the ſecond of thoſe excellent Dialogues of *Tully*, *De Natura Deorum:* Where this particular Argument to prove a Deity from the admirable contrivance of the Works of Nature, is manag'd with a great deal of Eloquence and Reaſon, and by particular enumeration of moſt conſiderable parts of the Univerſe. So unbecoming a late Philoſopher was that Reaſon of his, why he wav'd the Argument from the conſideration of the World, to infer a Deity, becauſe the ends of God are unſearchable, as flowing from his Infinite Wiſdom. For, what tho' God may conceal ſome things from Men, which he intends, and are of no concernment for Men to know, muſt therefore of neceſſity thoſe ends of his be unſearchable in his works of Creation, which refer ſo immediately to the advantage of Life, and tend ſo much to the veneration of the Deity?

XVI. Nay, the peculiar uſe and ſerviceableneſs of many parts of the Univerſe, eſpecially of Animals, and chiefly of Man, is ſo evident, that this hath been the main Argument which hath induced ſome, otherwiſe *Atheiſtical* enough, to acknowledg and adore a Deity. And altho' the *Epicureans* be lamentably puzled to give any tolerable account of many other appearances in Nature, yet they no where diſcover ſo much Weakneſs and Ignorance, as when they come to diſcourſe *De uſu partium*, about the contrivance of the parts of Man's Body. Whoſe Opinion is thus briefly delivered by *Lucretius*;

Lucret. l. 4. *Nil ideo quoniam natum'ſt in corpore ut uti*
Poſſemus; ſed quod natum'ſt id procreat uſum.

i. e. *that no parts of Man's body were deſign'd for that uſe which they are imploy'd for, but the parts by chance fell into that form they are in, and Men by degrees brought them to their preſent uſe and ſerviceableneſs.* An Opinion at firſt view ſo ſtrangely unreaſonable, that we cannot think *Epicurus* ſhou'd have ever embraced it, had it not unavoidably follow'd upon his *Hypotheſis* of all things in the Univerſe reſulting only from a fortuitous Concourſe of Atoms: According to which he ſuppos'd in Man a different configuration of Parts wou'd happen from the various Agitation and Concretion of thoſe little Particles which at firſt run together in the faſhion of a Man; and becauſe that Man had in him a more florid and vivacious Spirit, made up of the moſt ſubtle and movable Atoms, thence Motion came into the ſeveral parts ſutable to the different Conformation of them. And becauſe thoſe Atoms of which the Soul is compos'd, are capable of Senſation, thence it comes to paſs, that it ſees in the Eye, hears in the Ear, and ſmells in the Noſtrils. This is the moſt which is made of the Opinion of *Epicurus* by the late ſedulous Vindicator of him, which yet himſelf calls *intoleranda opinio*; and it will appear to be ſo, not only as contradicting, what God himſelf hath deliver'd concerning Man, but what Reaſon it ſelf will eaſily ſug-

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geſt from the conſideration of the ſeveral parts of Man's Body. It muſt be confeſs'd there were ſome Philoſophers elder than *Epicurus*, who were much inclin'd to this Opinion, as *Democritus*, *Empedocles*, *Anaxagoras*, and others; yet we find thoſe who more narrowly ſearch'd into the Natures of living Creatures, were thereby brought to acknowledg a Divine Providence, which with a great deal of Wiſdom did order the ſeveral parts of Animals, and adapted them to their peculiar uſes. And altho' *Ariſtotle* in his Book *de partibus Animalium*, hath ſaid enough to refute the fond Opinion of thoſe Philoſophers; yet none hath handled this Argument with more exactneſs and accuracy, and with a more peculiar reflection on *Epicurus*, than *Galen* hath done in his excellent piece *De uſu partium*. Which *Gaſſendus* thinks *Galen* writ with a kind of *Enthuſiaſm* upon him (*adeo totum opus videre conſcriptum* ἐνθουσιαστικῶς) and ſo all thoſe ſeventeen Books of his on that ſubject, are a kind of 119th *Pſalm* in Philoſophy, or a perpetual *Hymn* upon the praiſe of the great Creator, a juſt Commentary on thoſe words of the *Pſalmiſt*, Pſal. 139. 14. *I am fearfully and wonderfully made; marvellous are thy works, and that my Soul knoweth right well.* In the entrance of thoſe Books, *Galen* firſt ſhews the great variety of parts which is in ſeveral Animals ſutable to their ſeveral Natures; the Horſe becauſe of his Swiftneſs and Pride, hath the ſtrongeſt Hoofs and moſt curl'd Main; the Lion becauſe of his Fierceneſs and Courage hath his Strength lying in his Teeth and Paws; the Bull in his Horns; the Boar in his Tuſks; the Hart and Hare being timorous Creatures, their parts are made fitteſt for flight: but Man becauſe he hath a principle of Reaſon in him, hath no defenſive or offenſive Weapons in his Body, but he hath Hands to make uſe of both; which being joyn'd with, and imploy'd by his Reaſon, far exceed all thoſe advantages which any other Creatures have, being imploy'd not only to defend himſelf, but to build Houſes, make Cloaths, Arms and Nets, whatever is uſeful for himſelf, or hurtful to thoſe Creatures which he hath command over; but becauſe Man was made for Society and civil Converſe, therefore his Hands were not only imploy'd to defend himſelf or hurt other Creatures, but for the mutual benefit and advantage of Mankind; for by theſe were Laws written, Temples built, all Inſtruments of Arts fram'd; by them we enjoy the benefit of others Wits, we can diſcouſe with *Plato*, *Ariſtotle*, *Hippocrates*, and other Ancients, tho' at ſuch a diſtance from us. Now that the Configuration of Parts is not the cauſe of the uſe of them afterwards; as the Lion's paw of his Courage, the Bull's horns of his Fierceneſs, or the ſlenderneſs of the Hart of its Fearfulneſs; appears by this, becauſe the young Ones of the ſeveral kinds of Animals, before their parts are grown up, ſtrive to make the ſame uſe of them which the others do. As *Galen* ſaith, he had often ſeen a Bull-calf puſhing with his Head before any Horns were grown out, and a Colt kicking when his Hoofs were yet tender, and a young Boar defending himſelf with his Jaws before he had any Tuſks, which is an evident Argument that the parts were deſigned for the uſe, and not the uſe to follow the parts. *So*, ſaith he, *take three Eggs, one of an Eagle, another of a Duck, and a third of a Serpent, and after they are hatch'd thro' a moderate*

Gaſſend. Tom. 2. l. 2. §. 3.

heat, we ſhall find when they are but newly hatch'd, the two firſt will be ſtriving to fly before they have Wings, and the third endeavoring to creep away on its Belly; and if you breed them up to greater Perfection, and bring them into the open Air, you will preſently ſee the young Eagle mounting into the Air, the Duck quoddling in a Pool, and the Serpent creep under Ground. Afterwards he comes particularly to handle the ſeveral parts of Man's Body, and firſt begins with the Hand, and ſhews in each part that it were impoſſible to have fram'd them with greater conveniency for their ſeveral uſes than they have. The uſe of the Hand is to take hold of any thing which Man can uſe; now there being things of ſuch different ſizes which Men may uſe, it had been impoſſible for the Hand, if it had been one intire thing, and undivided, that it cou'd have held things greater or leſſer than its ſelf, but it muſt have been equal to it. But now as the Fingers are placed and divided, they are equally fit for laying hold of Objects of any ſize or quantity; for the leaſt things as a Barley Corn, are taken up with the Fore-finger and the Thumb, things ſomewhat bigger are taken up by the ſame, but not by the extremities of them as before; things ſomewhat bigger than theſe, with the Thumb, Fore-finger and Middle-finger, and ſo on by degrees, till at laſt the whole Hand is us'd: ſo that the diviſion of the Hand into Fingers is neceſſary. Neither were this enough, but the very poſition of the Fingers as they are, is neceſſary too; for they had been uſeleſs if they had been all divided in a right line; for the firmeſt hold is either circular, or at leaſt in two oppoſite points; but now this is provided for, by the poſition of the Thumb, which may equally joyn with any of the Fingers in taking hold of any thing. After this, he largely ſhews the particular neceſſity of the ſoftneſs, roundneſs of the Fleſh, and Nails on the tops of the Fingers; and the ſpecial uſefulneſs of theſe; and then comes to the Bones of the Fingers, how neceſſary they are for firm-hold, and if there had been but one Bone in each Finger, they wou'd have ſerv'd only for thoſe things which we take up when they are extended; but now ſeeing they have three ſeveral joynts, they are fitted for all kinds of things; for when we bow our Fingers, we uſe them as tho' they had no Bones at all, and when we ſtretch them out, as tho' they were all but one intire Bone; and the ſeveral inflections of the Joynts ſerve for all kind of Figures: and then he ſhews the neceſſity of the Fleſh within the Fingers, and on either ſide of them, and upon them; and ſo with wonderful accuracy handles the magnitude, number, figure of the Bones, and nature of the Joynts of the Fingers, and then the Tendons and Muſcles belonging to the ſeveral Fingers, which after he hath diſcours'd on thro' his firſt Book, he concludes it with the manifeſt inconveniency which wou'd follow in the hand, were not every thing in it in that exact magnitude, poſition, and figure in which it is. With the ſame exactneſs he goes thro' all the parts of the Body, handling in the ſecond Book all that belongs to the Arm, in the third the Legs, in the fourth and fifth the Organs of Nutrition, in the ſixth and ſeventh the Lungs, in the eighth and ninth the Head, in the tenth the peculiar and admirable Fabric of the Eyes, in the eleventh the other parts of the Face, in the twelfth the parts of

of the Back, and ſo in the thirteenth, in the fourteenth and fifteenth the Genitals, in the ſixteenth the Arteries, Veins, and Nerves, and in the laſt the peculiar Diſpoſition and Figure of all theſe Parts, and the uſefulneſs of the whole Deſign: Which is as great as can be in any Work whatſoever, which is for us to take notice of the admirable Wiſdom of God in contriving the ſeveral parts of the Body of Man: So that, that whole Book contains in it a moſt full and pregnant demonſtration of a Deity, which every Man carries about with him in the Structure of his Body, on which account Men need not go out of themſelves to find proof of a Deity, whether they conſider their Minds or their Bodies, of which it may be more truly ſaid than *Heraclitus* of old did of his Stove, *Etiam hic Dii ſunt*. So that of all Perſons, I ſhou'd moſt wonder at thoſe whoſe Imployment particularly leads them to the Underſtanding the parts and nature of Man's Body, if the Proverb be not a great injury to them, ſince they have fuller inſight into this demonſtration of a Deity in the Fabric of Man's Body, than many others who converſe only with ſome jejune and ſapleſs Writings. And certainly, whatever is imagin'd to the contrary by Men of weak Underſtandings, the beſt way to cure the World of *Atheiſm*, is true Philoſophy, or a ſearch into the Natures of things; which the more deep and profound it is, the more impoſſible will it be found to explicate all the *Phænomena* of Nature by mere Matter and Motion. It was wiſely obſerv'd of a great Perſon and Philoſopher, that a narrow and ſlight Inſpection into Nature, inclin'd Men of weak Heads to *Atheiſm*; but a more thorow-inſight into the cauſes of things, made them more evidently ſee the neceſſary dependance of things on the great and wiſe Creator of them. A little knowledg of Philoſophy is apt to make Mens heads dizzy, and then in danger of falling into the Gulf of *Atheiſm*; but a more careful and diligent view of it, brings them into Sobriety and their right Wits again. Such a ſlight Inſpection had the Followers of *Epicurus* into the Nature of things; for when they found how in the preſent State of the World the various Motion and Configuration of the Particles of Matter wou'd handſomely ſalve many appearances of Nature, they, drunk with the ſucceſs, reel preſently into an Infinite Space, and there imagin they behold Infinite Worlds made of the concretion of Atoms, and ever ſince their Eyes have been ſo duſted with theſe little Atoms, that they cou'd ſee nothing elſe in the World but them. Which how groſs and unreaſonable it is, will appear from our preſent ſubject; for who but *Lucretius* or *Epicurus* cou'd ever think that our Noſtrils were at firſt faſhion'd as they are merely by the violent impulſe of the Air within, which wou'd force it ſelf a paſſage out? But how came the Air into the Body before it was forced out? Did it break open the Lips, make all that round cavity in the Mouth, for a paſſage thro' the *aſpera Arteria?* But if when it was in, it wou'd come out again, was not the Mouth wide enough to let it go? Or did the firſt Man ſhut his Mouth on purpoſe to find another vent for the Air? If ſo, how chance the force of the Air did not carry away the *Epiglottis?* Or if it got ſafely up to the Noſe, how came it not to force a paſſage out about the Eyes rather than to go down ſo low firſt? But if we believe theſe rare Contrivers of Man's

Ariſtot. de part. Anim. l. 1.

Body, all the inward Veſſels of the Body were made by the courſe of Water, as Channels are; but how is it poſſible, to imagin, that the *Oeſophagus* and the Stomach ſhou'd be ſo curiouſly contriv'd by the mere force of Water? and that all the *Inteſtines* ſhou'd be made only as Channels, to let it out again when it was once in? but how comes then ſuch a kind of Reciprocation and *Periſtaltic* Motion in thoſe Veſſels? how comes the ſeveral Coats of them to be ſo firm? if it had been only a forced paſſage, it wou'd have been direct and thro' the ſubſtance of the parts, as we find it to be in all forced paſſages in the Body of the Earth. Beſides, if the Water receiv'd into the Stomach forced the paſſage thro' the Guts, how comes it not to run in the channel it had made for it ſelf? or did it not like that paſſage when other things came into it, and therefore found out a more ſecret one into the Bladder? but if that were made by the Water, how came it to be ſo full of Membranes, and ſo ſubject to dilatation? Thus ridiculous will Men make themſelves, rather than **ſhew themſelves** Men in owning and adoring that infinitely wiſe and powerful God, who *orders all things in the World, according to the counſel of his Will.* What can be more plain and evident than the peculiar uſefulneſs of the ſeveral parts of Man's Body is? What other intent can be imagin'd that Man is form'd with a Mouth, but only for taking in of Nouriſhment, and for receiving and letting forth of Air? or that an Infant is ſo ready to open his Mouth, but that there are Breaſts and Milk for him to ſuck in order to his Nouriſhment? Why ſhou'd the *Oeſophagus* be ſo hollow and the Stomach ſo wide, but that one was provided for the better conveyance of the Meat down, and the other for the Fermentation of it? Whence come all the other Veſſels to be ſo conveniently plac'd, were it not for the diſtribution of Nouriſhment into the ſeveral parts, or for conveying away the Excrements of it? Can any one think that the ſeveral Muſcles and Tendons ſhou'd be plac'd in the more ſolid parts for any other end than for the better Motion of them? or that the Nerves ſhou'd be deriv'd from the Brain into the ſeveral parts of the Body for any other deſign than to be the inſtruments of Senſe and Motion? or that the continual motion of the Heart ſhou'd be for any other purpoſe, than for receiving and diſtributing of the Blood thro' the Arteries into the parts of the Body? or that the Eye with all its curious Fabric ſhou'd be only accidentally imploy'd in ſeeing? Theſe things are ſo plain, that however the *Epicureans* may more eaſily loſe themſelves, and deceive others in explaining the appearances of Nature in ſome inanimate Beings, yet when they come with their blind concourſe of *Atoms* to give an account of the parts of Animals, they miſerably befool themſelves, and expoſe themſelves only to contempt and pity. It were eaſy to multiply examples in this kind, but I ſhall only mention one thing more, which is, if all the parts of Man's Body have no higher original than the concourſe of *Atoms* in the firſt Man and Woman, by what were the Umbilical Veſſels form'd whereby the Child in the Womb receives its Nouriſhment? by what *Atoms* was the paſſage of the *Succus nutritius* fram'd from the Mother to the Child? how come thoſe Veſſels to cloſe up ſo naturally upon the birth of the Child, and it to ſeek its Nouriſhment in quite another way?

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Will the Particles of Matter which by their concretion form'd the first pair, salve this too? Thus still we see how impossible it is (to go no further than our selves) to give any tolerable account of things without an infinite Power and Being which produc'd all these things, and hath left so plain an inscription of Himself upon the works of Nature, that none but those who shut their Eyes can abstain from seeing it.

I come now to the third Evidence of a *Deity*, which is, *That there are some Beings in the World, which cannot depend upon Matter or Motion*, *i e.* that there are some Spiritual and Immaterial Substances or Beings, (for if the thing be acknowledg'd, it is unbecoming a Man to contend about words) the consequence of this for the proving a *Deity*, neither hath been nor I suppose will be deny'd, by such who question an infinite Being; the same Principles leading to the denying and the Proof of both, and immaterial Beings being the strongest proof that there is something above Matter in the World. If there be then such things in the World, which Matter and Motion cannot be the causes of, then there are certainly spiritual and immaterial Beings, and that I shall make appear both as to the Minds of Men, and some extraordinary effects which are produc'd in the World. XVII. 3.

1. I begin with the nature of the Soul of Man. And herein I must confine my self to those Arguments which directly prove my present purpose, and on that account must quit all those common Arguments to prove the Soul's immortality from the Attributes of God; for all these do suppose the existence of a *Deity* as already evident; neither can I rely with safety on the way which some have taken to prove the immortality of the Soul merely from the *Phænomena* of Sensation, which they endeavor to prove, cannot be perform'd by mere Matter and Motion; for granting all this, yet the utmost that can be prov'd by it is no greater immortality in our Souls than in the Souls of Brutes; and in the sence in which that is admitted, I suppose an *Epicurean* will not deny the Soul of Man to be immortal, as *Demonax* in *Lucian* said, when he was ask'd whether the Soul were immortal or no, *It is* (said he) *but as all things else are*; for those who make the Soul to be nothing but some more subtile and active Particles of matter, do not think that upon death they are annihilated, but that only they are dispers'd and dissipated, or in the *Platonists* Phrase, may *return to the Soul of the World*. These ways I cannot think to be sufficient probations of such a spiritual and immaterial Being in Man, which we now inquire for, much less can I make use of so precarious and infirm an *Hypothesis* as *Præ-existence*, which makes Men apt to suspect the cogency of such Reasons which tend to prove the immortality of the Soul, which are link'd with a supposition, not only inevident either to Sense or Reason, but likewise needless and impertinent. For I know no one Argument which doth directly prove the immateriality of the Soul, that doth in the least infer any necessity of *Præ-existence*, but on the same accounts it will prove the Soul's eternity. Being therefore thus at liberty to inquire into the Nature of the Soul consider'd in her self, our only way must be to find out such peculiar properties in the Soul of Man, which cannot be salv'd on supposition, there were nothing else but Mat-

ter and Motion in the World. Supposing then that all Sensation in Man doth arise from corporeal Motion, which is so strongly asserted by the modern Philosophers, and that the highest Conceptions which depend on Sense, can amount no higher than Imagination, which is evident; if it can then be prov'd that there is a Principle of Action in Man, which proceeds in a different way of operation than Sensation doth, and that there are such operations of the Soul which are not Imaginations, it will be then clear that there is a Principle in Man higher than Matter and Motion. Now altho' it be a task sufficiently difficult to explain the manner of Sensation it self in a mere mechanical way, supposing no higher Principle than mere Matter, yet it will appear far more difficult, nay impossible without a spiritual or immaterial Being to salve such appearances in Man which transcend the power of Imagination; which will appear by these following Operations of the Mind, which every one who hath it, may find within himself.

1. *Correcting the errors of Imagination.* For if all our Perceptions were nothing else but the Images of corporeal things left in the Brain, the judgment of the Mind must of necessity be according to the impressions, which are made upon the Organs of Sense. But now if our Minds can and do form apprehensions of things quite different from those which are convey'd by Sense, there must be a higher Principle of knowledg in Man than Imagination is. For which the common instance of the just magnitude of the Sun is very plain; If we judg according to the image which is convey'd to the Brain by our Eyes, we can never imagin the Sun to be bigger than he seems to us to be; nay tho' the Sight be advantaged by the help of *Telescopes*, it cannot receive such an Image or Idea of the Sun which answers to its just magnitude, *viz.* that it is 160 times bigger than the Earth. From whence now comes this apprehension of the bigness of the Sun above that proportion which can possibly come in at our Senses? If it be said, *That by the observation of the lessening of objects according to the proportion of distance, the Mind may come to understand how much bigger the Sun may be than he seems*; I grant it, but withal inquire how the Imagination comes to have Proportions and Distances which are mere respects, and can have no corporeal phantasms whereby to be represented to it; so that by this very way of ratiocination it is evident, that there is some principle in Man beyond Imagination. Again, when the Mind by ratiocination hath proceeded thus far, and finds the Sun to be so great, what Idea is there of this magnitude in the Mind? the Mind cannot fix it self on any thing but it must have an Idea of it; from whence comes this Idea? not from corporeal phantasms; for none of them cou'd ever convey the due magnitude of the Sun to the Mind, and therefore the forming of this Idea must be a pure act of Intellection which corrects the errors of Imagination, and is a Principle above it. So in the sight of a stick, when under water, the representation of it by the Sense to Imagination is as crooked; for corporeal Motion carries things to the Eye, without any judgment upon them; the Eye conveys the Imagination to the Brain; and according to the rules of corporeal Perception must presently take every thing for true which is convey'd thither; now from what Principle is it

that

that this error of our Senſes is corrected? So in many other things wherein our Imaginations are quite puzl'd, and when we go according to them, it is impoſſible to apprehend things as our Reaſon tells us they are; thus as to the *Antipodes* our Imaginations are wholly of the Mind of the Ancients, that the *Antipodes* to us muſt needs be in danger of knocking their heads againſt the Stars, and if they go upon any thing, it muſt be their Heads, and that that part of the Heavens which is in the other *Hemiſphere* is below us; theſe are pertinacious errors of Imagination while we adhere to that, and are only corrigible by our Reaſon, which makes it evident to be otherwiſe. Beſides, there are many things our Reaſon and Underſtanding inform us that they may be, and yet our Imaginations can form no Idea of them; let an *Epicurean* Philoſopher try the power of his Imagination in his *Inane* or *Infinite empty Space*, and he will ſoon find, that as ſtrong as his Phancy is, it will ſoon tire and retreat, as not being able to courſe thro' ſo unimaginable a Space. So for Eternal Duration our Reaſon tells us the thing is poſſible, but when our Imaginations begin to fardle up ſome Conceptions of it, they are preſently tying both ends together; which will make a ſtrange Idea of Eternity; the caſe is the ſame in the infinite Diviſibility of Quantity, which *Epicurus* was ſomewhat aware of when he deny'd the thing. But how many *Mathematical Problems* are there which will jade our Imaginations preſently, and yet our Reaſon ſtands ſtill and aſſures us of the poſſibility of the things, as in *two lines coming nearer ſtill to each other, and yet never meeting*, and in many other things, which moſt clearly evince that there is a higher Faculty in Man which exceeds Matter and Motion, when it is able thus to correct the faults and to ſupply the defects of Imagination.

XVIII. 2. *Reflex acts of the Mind upon it ſelf, argue a higher Principle than Imagination.* That there are ſuch things is evident to any one who hath any uſe of Cogitation; and if any one doubt of it, his very doubting argues he hath reflex Acts; for he cou'd not doubt whether he had or no, but by Reflection upon himſelf. Now that reflex Acts ſhou'd be caus'd thro' Matter and Motion, or thro' mere Imagination is unconceivable. For we ſee no Matter can act upon it ſelf: indeed one part of extended Matter may act upon another, but not purely upon it ſelf; the extremities of the Fingers can never feel themſelves, tho' they can touch each other; neither can Imagination reflect on it ſelf; for that proceeding upon Corporeal Images, muſt have ſuch a repreſentation from the Senſes of what it acts upon; now what image of it ſelf can be convey'd to the Imagination thro' the external Organs of Senſe? The Eye may ſee thro' the motion of the objects of Sight preſſing upon it; but how can it ſee that it ſees? ſo the Imagination receives the images convey'd to the Brain; but what ſhop hath it to make new ones in of it ſelf, and ſo be guilty of the greateſt Idolatry or worſhipping its own Image? But tho' the Imagination cannot thus reflect, yet we find ſuch a Principle within us that is very apt to retire into it ſelf, and recollect things which cou'd never have been conſerv'd ſo long in that ſhop of ſhadows, the Imagination. For if Imagination be nothing elſe but, as a modern * Philoſopher defines it, *Conception remaining, and a little*

* Hobbes's *Humane Nature, ch. 3. ſect. 1.*

tle and little decaying from and after the act of Senſe, like the Motion of Water after a ſtone is thrown into it; how is it poſſible that at ſo great a diſtance of Years, as we commonly find, the image of a thing may be retriev'd with as much facility and freſhneſs as to circumſtances, as if it were but new done? And that account which he gives of Remembrance is very weak and inſufficient, when he tells us, that *Remembrance is nothing elſe but the miſſing of parts, which every Man expecteth ſhould ſucceed after they have a conception of the whole.* For according to this, it is impoſſible for the Men to retrieve any object without mutilation of it; and ſo there cannot poſſibly be a recollecting of all circumſtances, when an object is once paſs'd, and the Motion begins to decay. But all this while, we underſtand nothing by what means this decaying Motion ſhou'd continue ſo long as our Memory can fetch things back, or by what means an object when once paſs'd, can be recover'd again, if Memory be nothing elſe but decaying Motion. Such perplexities muſt needs ariſe, when Men will undertake to ſalve the inward operations of the Soul by mere Motion; but is it not evident that many times when the Mind is imploy'd about other things, ſome Phantaſms of things long ago paſt will come and preſent themſelves to the Mind with as much clearneſs as if new done? whereas if Memory were decaying Motion, the longer paſt, the more impoſſible wou'd it be to recover any thing; but, do we not find that many old Men will better remember the circumſtances of many things they did in their Childhood, than a year or two before? Beſides, we ſee what quickneſs and vivacity there is in our Intellectual Faculties above Corporeal Motion, with what facility the Mind turns it ſelf from one object to another, how ſuddenly it rangeth the whole World, how it trips over Mountains, croſſeth the Ocean, mounts to the Skies, and at laſt quarries upon it ſelf, and all in the twinkling of an intellectual Eye. As quick as the Eye of the Body is, the Mind far exceeds it, and can withdraw the Imagination from attending the Organs of Senſe, thus do Men who have their Minds much fix'd, fix their Eyes too; and yet afterwards can ſcarce tell themſelves what they have look'd on all that while. Sometimes the Mind fits and compares Phantaſms together, and ſports it ſelf in ſorting them into ſeveral ranks and orders, and making matches between ſuch things which are ſure to have no affinity with each other, which are thence called *entia rationis*, or the Creatures of the Mind. And can all theſe and many other ſuch operations which Men are conſcious to themſelves of, be nothing elſe but the Motion of ſome flegmatic Matter, the Reaction of the Brain, and the mere effects of Imagination?

3. *The profound ſpeculations of the Mind argue a power far above Imagination and Corporeal Motion.* I wonder how *Epicurus* his Soul, when, if we believe him, it was made up of *Atoms*, cou'd ever imagin an *Infinite Vacuity?* Cou'd mere *Atoms* ever diſpute whether they were *Atoms* or no? For I doubt not but *Epicurus* was fain to argue much againſt himſelf, before he cou'd perſuade himſelf to ſo ſtupendious a piece of folly. Were there nothing in Man but mere Corporeal Motion, whence came the diſpute, whether the Soul were Corporeal or no? Can *Atoms* frame *Syllogiſms* in *Mood* and *Figure?* and mere Matter argue *pro* and *con*, whether it

it be Matter or ſomething elſe? What kind of Aereal Particles were their Souls compounded of, who firſt fanſy'd themſelves to be immaterial? What ſtrange agitations of Matter were thoſe which firſt made Men think of an Eternal ſtate? which thoughts have ever ſince ſo ſtuck upon theſe little Spherical Bodies, that they cou'd never yet disburthen themſelves of them? Whence come ſuch amazing fears, ſuch dreadful apprehenſions, ſuch ſinking thoughts of their future condition in Minds that wou'd fain eaſe themſelves by believing, that death wou'd put a period both to Soul and Body? Whence on the other ſide come ſuch incouraging hopes, ſuch confident expectations, ſuch comfortable prepoſſeſſions of their future ſtate, in the Souls of good Men, when their Bodies are neareſt to the grave? *Seneca*, who was ſomewhat dubious ſometimes as to the future condition of the Soul, yet cou'd tell his dear *Lucilius* with what pleaſure he cou'd think of it; and cou'd elſewhere ſay of the Soul, *Et hoc habet argumentum divinitatis ſuæ quod illum divina delectant, nec ut alienis intereſt ſed ut ſuis: The Soul had that mark of Divinity in it, that it was moſt pleas'd with Divine Speculations, and convers'd with them as with matters which nearly concern'd it.* And when it hath once view'd the dimenſions of the Heavens, *contemnit domicilii prioris anguſtias*, it was aſham'd of the Cottage it dwelt in; nay, were it not for theſe Speculations, *non fuerat operæ pretium naſci*, it had not been worth while for the Soul to have been in the Body; and as he goes on, *detrahe hoc ineſtimabile bonum, non eſt vita tanti ut ſudem, ut æſtuem.* Cou'd there be now ſo great an *Epicuriſm* in Contemplation, were the Soul of Man of *Epicurus* his mould, a mere complexion of *Atoms?* wou'd dull and heavy Matter ever have delighted to have ſearch'd ſo much into the cauſes of things, to have gone over the World in its Speculations, and found more ſweetneſs in Knowledg, than the little *Epicure*, the Bee, taſts in his choiceſt Flowers? *Epicurus* his own Philoſophy is a demonſtration againſt himſelf; if his Soul had not been of a purer Nature than he fanſy'd, when his Brain had been well heated at his Study, thoſe more vivid and ſpirituous Particles, like the ſpirits of Wine, had been in danger of evaporation, and leaving the more lumpiſh matter to complete his work. Of all Perſons, I moſt admire that Philoſophers, who make ſo much uſe of their Underſtandings, ſhou'd ſo ungratefully requite them, and ſerve them like old Horſes, when they have made them do all the ſervice they cou'd, turn them into the high-ways, and let them die in a ditch. But yet all Philoſophers have not been ſo unthankful, ſome have underſtood the worth of their Souls, and aſſerted it, if they have not us'd too high, i. e. *Platonical* expreſſions of it, making it a Particle, not of Matter, but of the Divine Nature it ſelf, a little Deity in a Cottage, that ſtays here a-while, and returns to that upper Region from whence it came. As *Manilius* ſpeaks,

Senec. præf. ad Quæſt. Natur.

An dubium eſt habitare Deum ſub pectore noſtro,
In cœlumque redire animas, cœloque venire?

Manil. l. 4.

And while the Soul is here in its Cage, it is continually fluttering up and down, and delighteth to look out now at this part, and

then at another, to take a view by degrees of the whole Universe, as the ſame Poet goes on,

Quid mirum noſcere mundum
Si poſſunt homines, quibus eſt & mundus in ipſis:
Exemplumque Dei quiſque eſt in imagine parva?

The Soul hath nothing more delightful to it than Knowledg, and no Knowledg ſo pleaſing and ſatisfactory as of him whoſe Image and Superſcription it bears, who makes Himſelf moſt known to ſuch as enquire after him;

Seque ipſum inculcat & offert
Ut bene cognoſci poſſit.

I conclude this with that of *Seneca*, in that excellent Preface to his *Natural Queſtions*, *O quam contempta res eſt homo niſi ſupra humana ſe erexerit! What a pitiful thing is Man, were it not that his Soul was apt to ſoar above theſe earthly things?* And by this Aptneſs to ſoar ſo high above theſe Terrene Objects, and to converſe with ſo much freedom with ſpiritual Beings, as well as abſtracted Notions, we may certainly infer that our Rational Souls are of a far more noble and refin'd Nature, than that more feculent Principle of Imagination, which always converſes in *fæce Romuli*, and can go no further than our Senſes carry it. And thus I have made good the firſt proof, that there is ſomething above Matter and Motion in the World, which is from that immaterial Being which is in Man.

XIX. 2. The next Evidence which we have of a Being above Matter and Motion, is, from *the extraordinary effects which have been in Nature*. I ſpeak not now merely of ſuch things which by their Natures and Effects are manifeſted to proceed from ſome Beings which bear ill-will to Mankind, multitudes of which are related by Men philoſophical and inquiſitive, with ſuch enumerations of circumſtances, and particular Evidences, that they are not mere impoſtures, that one may on the ſame grounds queſtion any Matter of fact which himſelf did not ſee, as ſuch relations which are deliver'd by Perſons without intereſt or deſign, and ſuch as were able to judge of the truth of circumſtances; ſuch are both ancient and modern Philoſophers, Phyſicians, States-men, and others. Neither ſhall I inſiſt on ſuch Prodigies, which oft-times preſage revolutions in States, if we believe *Machiavel* himſelf, who in a whole Chapter deſignedly proves it; and profeſſeth himſelf utterly to ſeek for the cauſes of them, unleſs they may be attributed to ſome Spirits and Intelligences in the Air, which give the World notice of ſuch things to come. But thoſe things which I ſuppoſe have the moſt clear and undoubted Evidence of true and undoubted Miracles (the Matters of fact being affirm'd by Eye-witneſſes, who ſeal'd the truth of them with their Lives) are thoſe recorded in the Holy Scriptures; which there are only two ways to evade, either by queſtioning the truth of the things, which I ſuppoſe in the precedent Book we have prov'd with as much rational Evidence as any thing of that nature is capable of, or elſe that the things therein recorded

Machiav. diſput. l. 1. c. 56.

recorded might be salv'd without a *Deity*. For which only two ways have been excogitated by *Atheistical* Spirits, either attributing them to the power and influence of the Stars, the foundations of which fond and absurd Opinion have been taken away by those many Writers, who have rationally confuted the whole Art of *Judicial Astrology*, or else that they are done by mere power of Imagination, which is the way of *Avicenna* and some other *Arabic* Writers, which is so wild an effect of the power of Imagination, that nothing doth so much demonstrate the irregular Motions of it, as such an Opinion doth; and is sufficiently derided and refuted by *Pomponatius* himself. Now then, it being an acknowledg'd Principle in Nature, *That every thing continues in the course it is in, till something more powerful put it out*, if then such things have been in the World, which have been real alterations of the course of Nature, as the *Sun's standing still in the time of* Joshua, then there must be something above Matter and Motion, and consequently that there is a God.

Vid. D. H. *More's* Mystery of Godliness, *l.* 7. *c.* 14, 15, 16, 17.

CHAP. II.

Of the Origin of the Universe.

I. *The necessity of the belief of the Creation of the World in order to the truth of Religion. Of the several Hypotheses of the Philosophers who contradict* Moses: *with a particular examination of them.* II. *The ancient Tradition of the World consonant to* Moses; *prov'd from the Ionic Philosophy of* Thales, *and the Italic of* Pythagoras. III. *The Pythagoric Cabala rather Ægyptian than Mosaic. Of the fluid Matter, which was the material Principle of the Universe.* IV. *Of the Hypothesis of the Eternity of the World asserted by* Ocellus Lucanus *and* Aristotle. V. *The weakness of the Foundations on which that Opinion is built. Of the manner of forming principles of Philosophy.* VI. *The possibility of Creation prov'd.* [*No arguing from the present state of the World against its beginning, shew'd from* Maimonides.] VII. *The Platonists arguments from the goodness of God for the Eternity of the World, answer'd.* VIII. *Of the Stoical Hypothesis of the Eternity of Matter; whether reconcilable with the Text of* Moses. IX. *Of the Opinions of* Plato *and* Pythagoras *concerning the præ-existence of Matter to the formation of the World.* X. *The contradiction of the Eternity of Matter to the Nature and Attributes of God.* XI, XII, XIII. *Of the Atomical Hypothesis of the Origin of the Universe.* XIV, XV, XVI, XVII. *The World cou'd not be produced by a casual*

concourſe of Atoms prov'd from the nature and motion of Epicurus's *Atoms, and the Phænomena of the Univerſe, eſpecially the production and nature of Animals.* XVIII. *Of the* Carteſian *Hypotheſis, that it cannot ſalve the Origin of the Univerſe without a Deity giving motion to Matter.*

1. THE Foundations of Religion being thus eſtabliſh'd in the Being of God, and the Immortality of the Soul, we now come to erect our Superſtructure upon them, by aſſerting the undoubted truth and certainty of that account of the World which is given us in the Writings of *Moſes*. Which beginning with the World it ſelf, leads us to a particular conſideration of the Origin of the Univerſe, the right underſtanding of which hath great influence upon our belief of all that follows in the word of God. For altho' we ſhou'd aſſert with *Epicurus* the Being of a Deity, if yet with him we add that the World was made by a caſual concourſe of Atoms, all that part of Religion which lies in obedience to the Will of God is unavoidably deſtroy'd. All that is left, is only a kind of Veneration of a Being more excellent than our own, which reacheth not to the government of Mens Lives, and ſo will have no force at all upon the generality of the World, who are only allur'd by Hopes or aw'd by Fears, to that which of their choice they would be glad to be freed from. Beſides, What expreſſions of Gratitude can be left to God for his Goodneſs, if he interpoſe not in the Affairs of the World? What dependance can there be on Divine Goodneſs, if it be not at all manifeſted in the World? What apprehenſions can we have of God's Infinite Wiſdom and Power, if neither of them are diſcernable in the Being of the World? And as the Opinion of *Epicurus* deſtroys Religion, ſo doth that of *Ariſtotle* which attributes Eternity to the Univerſe, and a neceſſary Emanation of it from the firſt cauſe, as Light comes from the Sun; for if ſo, as *Maimonides* well obſerves, *the whole Religion of* Moſes *is overthrown, all his Miracles are but Impoſtures, all the Hopes which are grounded on the Promiſes of God, are vain and fruitleſs.* For if the World did of neceſſity exiſt, then God is no free Agent; and if ſo, then all Inſtituted Religion is to no purpoſe; nor can there be any expectation of Reward, or fear of Puniſhment from him who hath nothing elſe to do in the World; but to ſet the great Wheel of the Heavens going. So much is it our concernment to inquire into the true Original of the World; and on what Evidence of Reaſon thoſe Opinions are built, which are ſo contrary to that account given of it in the very entrance of the Books of *Moſes*. Wherein we read the true Origin of the World to have been by a Production of it by the Omnipotent Will and Word of God. This being then the plain Aſſertion of *Moſes*, we come to compare it, in point of Reaſon, with all thoſe ſeveral *Hypotheſes* which are repugnant to it, which have been embrac'd in ſeveral Ages by the Philoſophers of greateſt eſteem in the World. Which may be reduc'd to theſe four: 1. *Such as ſuppoſe the World to have exiſted as it is from all Eternity.* 2. *Such as attribute the Formation of the World as it is to God: but withal aſſert the præ-exiſtence and eterni-*

Maimon. more Nevoch. p. 2. c. 25.

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ty of Matter. 3. *Such as deny any eternity to the World, but assert the Origin of it to have been by a casual concourse of Atoms.* 4. *Such as endeavor to explain the Origin of the Universe and all appearances of Nature, merely by the Mechanical Laws of the motions of Matter.*

II. I begin with those who assert the eternity of the World as it is, among whom *Aristotle* hath born the greatest name; who seems to have arrogated this Opinion to himself; for when he inquires into the judgment of Philosophers, who had writ before him, he says of them, ἁπάντες εἶναι φασιν, *all the Philosophers asserted that the World was made*, tho' some one way, some another. And were this true which *Aristotle* saith, it wou'd be the strongest Prejudice against his Opinion; for if the World had been eternal, how shou'd it come to pass, that the eldest Philosophers shou'd so readily and unanimously embrace that Opinion which asserted the Production of the World? Was it not a strong presumption of the novity of the Universe, that all Nations to whom the Philosophers resorted had Memorials left among them of the first Origin of things? And from hence it is observable, that when the humor of philosophizing began to take the *Greeks* (about the XL *Olympiad*, when we may suppose *Thales* to flourish) the beginning of the World was no matter of dispute, but, taking that for granted, the inquiry was, out of what material Principle the Universe was form'd; of which *Thales* thus delivers his Opinion in *Tully*; *aquam dixit esse initium rerum, Deum autem eam mentem quæ ex aqua cuncta fingeret*; wherein he plainly distinguisheth the efficient from the material Cause of the World. The prime efficient was God, the material principle, Water. It is a matter of some inquiry, whether the first principles of Philosophy among the *Greeks* were not rather some Traditional things conveyed to them from others, than any certain Theories which they had form'd from their own Experiments and Observations. The former is to me far the more probable on many accounts, but chiefly on this, that the first principles of the two Founders of the chief Sects of Philosophers, *viz.* the *Ionic* and *Italic* (for all the other were but the various issues of these two) did come so near to that which we have the greatest Reason to believe to have been the most certain account of the Origin of the World. For this Opinion of *Thales* seems to have been part of that Universal Tradition which was continu'd in the World concerning the first principles of things: for I do not see any reason to aver with so much confidence, as some do, that those Philosophers who spake any thing consonantly to *Moses*, must presently converse with the *Jews*, transcribe their Opinions out of the Scriptures, or have them convey'd to them in some secret Cabala of the Creation, as it is affirm'd of *Pythagoras* and *Plato*, and may with no less reason of *Thales*. But this I suppose may be made evident to any considerative Person, that those Philosophers of *Greece*, who convers'd most abroad in the World, did speak far more agreeably to the true account of things, than such who only endeavor'd by their own wits to improve or correct those Principles which were deliver'd by the other Philosophers. Which I impute not so much to their converse with the *Mosaic* Writings, as to that Universal Tradition

Aristot. de cœlo, l. 1. c. 10.

Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. 1. c. 25.

dition of the first Ages of the World, which was preserv'd far better among the *Phœnicians*, *Ægyptians*, *Chaldeans*, and others, than among the *Greeks*. For which we have this evident Reason, that *Greece* was far more barbarous and rude in its elder times, than those other Nations were, which had means of preserving some Monuments and general Reports of the first Ages of the World, when the *Græcians* wanted them. And therefore we find that *Greece* from its beginning shin'd with a borrow'd Light; and saw not by an extramission of Rays of Knowledg from its self, but by an intromission of those representations of things which were receiv'd from other Nations. Those who form'd *Greece* first into civil Societies, and lick'd it into the shape of well order-ed Common-wealths, were such who had been Traders for knowledg into foreign Parts. To which purpose *Diodorus Siculus* informs us *that* Lycurgus *and* Solon, *as well as the Poets*, Orpheus, Musæus, Melampus *and* Homer, *and the Philosophers, afterwards* Pythagoras, Plato, *and others, had gain'd most of their Knowledg and Wisdom out of* Ægypt; nay, he saith in general, ὅσοι τῶν παρ' Ἕλλησι διοξασθέντων ἐπὶ συνέσει τῇ παιδείᾳ, παρέβαλον εἰς Αἴγυπτον τὸ τοῖς ἀρχαίοις χρόνοις, ἵνα τὰ σύμπαντα τῶν νομίμων τῆς παιδείας μεθέλωσιν. *All those who were renown'd among the* Greeks *for Wisdom and Learning, did in ancient time resort to* Ægypt, *to be acquainted with their Laws and Knowledg.* On this account therefore we are not to seek for the ancient and genuine Tradition of the World from the native and home-bred *Greeks*, such as *Aristotle* and *Epicurus*, but from those who took the pains themselves to search into those Records which were preserv'd among the elder and more knowing Nations: And altho' the Nations they resorted to, sought to advance their own Reputation in the Histories of their Ancient Times, of which we have already given a large account, yet they were more faithful in the account they gave of the Origin of the whole Universe. For it appears from *Diogenes Laertius*, that the *Ægyptians* did constantly believe, *That the World had a beginning, and was corruptible; that it was a Sphærical, and the Stars were of the nature of Fire; that the Soul was of an Immortal nature, and did pass up and down the World.* Which *Laertius* cites from *Hecatæus* and *Aristagoras*. So that we need not make *Pythagoras* acquainted with such a *Cabala* of the Creation, which in all probability neither the *Jews* nor he ever dreamt of; we find a fair account may be given of most of the Opinions of *Pythagoras*, and whence he deriv'd them, without forcing the words of *Moses* into such a sense, which the plainness and perspicuity of the Writings of *Moses*, argue them not capable to admit of. But I will not deny from those concurrent Testimonies of *Hermippus* and *Aristobulus*, besides *Origen*, *Porphyry*, *Clemens Alexandrinus*, and others, that *Pythagoras* might have had an opportunity of conversing with the *Jews*, (which it is most probable was in *Chaldæa*, after the Captivity, at which time *Pythagoras* was there among them) but that *Pythagoras* shou'd converse with the Successors of *Elisha* on Mount *Carmel*, as *Vossius* thinks; or that *Moschus* the *Sidonian* Philosopher, in *Iamblichus*, shou'd be *Moses*, as others fansie; or that præ-existence of Souls shou'd be part of the *Mosaic Cabala*; or that the *Pythagoric* numbers, as they are explain'd by *Nichomachus* Gera-

Diodorus, l. 1. V. Euseb. Præp. Evangel. l. 10.

Diog. Laert. proœm. p. 7.

V. Selden. de jure Nat. & Gen. apud Ebræos, l. 1. c. 2.

Voss. de Sectis Philosoph. c. 6. sect. 5.

Geraſenus in *Photius*, ſhould be adequate to the Creation Cabaliſtically underſtood, are Fanſies too extravagant and *Pythagorean*, to be eaſily embraced. If *Pythagoras* was Circumcis'd, it was more for love of the *Ægyptians* than the *Jews*, among whom he ſpent twenty two years; if præ-exiſtence of Souls be a rational *Hypotheſis*, we may thank the *Ægyptians* for it, and not *Moſes*; if numbers be ſo expreſſive of the work of Creation, we are beholding to the Arithmetical Hieroglyphics of *Ægypt* for them. But altho' *Pythagoras* might not be acquainted with ſuch a philoſophic *Cabala* of the Creation, which none of the *Jews*, as far as we can find, underſtood, till one more vers'd in *Plato* and *Pythagoras* than in the Learning of his own Nation, *viz. Philo* of *Alexandria*, began firſt to exerciſe his wit on the Text of *Moſes*, with *Platonic* Notions; yet I ſhall eaſily grant that *Pythagoras*, by means of his great Induſtry and Converſe with the learned Nations, might attain to far greater knowledg of many myſterious things in Natural Philoſophy, and as to the Origin of the Univerſe, than any of the home-bred Philoſophers of *Greece*, or it may be, than any one of the Nations he reſorted to, becauſe he had the advantage of comparing the ſeveral accounts of them together, and extracting out that which he judg'd the beſt of them. And hence *Plutarch* tells us, that the firſt Principles of the World, according to *Pythagoras*, were theſe two, the one was τὸ ποιητικὸν αἴτιον ἢ εἰδικὸν (ὅπερ ἐστὶ νοῦς ὁ θεὸς) *an active and forming Principle*, and that was God, whom he call'd Mind, (as *Anaxagoras* likewiſe did) the other τὸ παθητικόν τε καὶ ὑλικὸν (ὅπερ ἐστὶν ὁ ὁρατὸς κόσμος) *paſſive and material*, which is, *the viſible World*.

V. Mathem Hierogl. Kircheri. Tom. 3. Oedip. Ægypt.

Plutarch. de Plat. philoſ. l. 1. cap. 3.

III. And thus we ſee theſe two renowned Founders of the *Ionic* and *Italic* Societies of Philoſophers, both giving their concurrent Teſtimony with *Moſes* as to the true Origin of the World, and not at all differing from each other; for thus *Thales* ſpeaks in *Diogenes Laertius*, πρεσβύτατον τῶν ὄντων θεός· ἀγέννητον γάρ· κάλλιστον κόσμος· ποίημα γὰρ θεοῦ, *God is the eldeſt Being, becauſe unbegotten; the World the moſt beautiful, becauſe it is God's workmanſhip.* To which thoſe expreſſions of *Plato*, in his *Timæus*, come very near (whoſe Philoſophy was for ſubſtance the ſame with the *Pythagorean*) when he had before aſcrib'd the Production of the World to the goodneſs of God, which goodneſs of his did incline him to make all other things like himſelf. Θεμις ἦν τὸ ἄριστον τοιοῦτον ὂν τοιοῦτον ἔργον ἐργάζεσθαι. *For the moſt excellent Being cannot but produce the moſt excellent Effects.* And as to the material Principle out of which the World was made, there appears no great difference between the ὕδωρ of *Thales*, and the ὕλη of *Plato* and *Pythagoras*; for *Plato*, when he tells us what a kind of thing the material Principle was, he deſcribes it thus, οὐκ ἀσυντάκτως φερόμενα ἀλλὰ κινούμενον πλημμελῶς καὶ ἀτάκτως, which as *Chalcidius* renders it, is *motu importuno fluctuans neque unquam quieſcens*, it was a *viſible corporeal thing* (πᾶν ὅσον ἦν ὁρατόν) *which was never at reſt, but in continual diſorderly Motion and Agitation*: which is a full Explication, I ſuppoſe, of what *Thales* meant by his Water, which is the ſame with that πηλὸς or mixture of Mud and Water together which others ſpeak of as the Principle of the Univerſe; as *Orpheus*, in *Athenagoras*, and the Scholiaſt on *Apollonius* cited by *Grotius* and others. Which we have the more reaſon to believe, becauſe the Suc-

Diog. Laert. V. Thalet.

Plato in Tim. p. 1047. ed. Ficini.

Chalcid. Tim. p. 25. ed. Meurſ.

Grot. Annot. in l. 1. de Ver. Chriſt. Rel.

Succeſſors of *Thales*, *Anaximander* and *Anaxagoras*, expreſs themſelves to that purpoſe. *Anaximander* call'd the Sea, ἡ πρώτης ὑγρασίας λείψανον, *the remainder of the primitive moiſture:* and *Anaxagoras* ſays, before the Νοῦς, or God, ſet things in their order, πάντα χρήματα ἦν ὁμοῦ πρωτόμορφα, *all things were at firſt confus'd together:* which muſt needs make that which *Chalcidius* tells us *Numenius* attributes to *Pythagoras*, which his Tranſlator calls *Sylvam fluidam*, or *fluid Matter*. Which is the ſame likewiſe with the *Phœnicians* Μώτ, which as appears by *Euſebius*, ſome call ὑλαῖον, others ὑλαπώδους μίξεως ὑγρᾶς, ſome, *Mud* or *Slime*, others, the *putrefaction of watery Mixtures*, which they ſay was, ἀρχὴ κτίσεως καὶ γένεσις ὅλων, *the Seed-plot of the Creation and the Generation of things*. Thus we ſee how *Thales* with the *Phœnicians* from whom he was deriv'd, as *Laertius* tells us and *Pythagoras*, with the *Ægyptians* and others, concur with *Moſes*, not only in the production of the World, but in the manner of it, wherein is expreſs'd a fluid Matter which was the material Principle out of which the World was form'd, when we are told that *The Earth was without form and void, and the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the Waters, i. e.* that all at firſt was but fluid Matter; for *P. Fagius*, from *R. Kimchi*, renders תהו by ὑλη, which fluid Matter was agitated and mov'd by the Divine Spirit, or the *vis plaſtica mundi*, ſo *Chryſoſtom* calls it σύστασιν ζωικήν, and ſo *Druſius* and *P. Fagius* explain רוח by Motion or Agitation. And herein we have likewiſe the conſent of thoſe forenamed excellent Philoſophers, who attribute the Origin of particular things in the World to this Agitation or Motion of the fluid Matter. For *Chalcidius* ſpeaking not only of *Thales*, *Pythagoras*, *Plato*, but of *Anaximenes*, *Heraclitus*, and others, ſays thus of them, *omnes igitur hi---in motu poſitam rerum originem cenſuerunt: they all agreed in this, that the Origin of things was to be aſcrib'd to the motion of the parts of Matter.* So the *Phœnicians* call'd this Motion of the Particles of Matter ἀέρα ζοφώδη καὶ πνευματώδη, *a dark and bluſtering Wind*. And how ſutable this Explication of the Origin of things from the motion of fluid Matter is to the Hiſtory of Nature, appears by thoſe many Experiments by which mixt Bodies are ſhew'd to ſpring from no other material Principle than the Particles of fluid Matter. Of which you may read a Diſcourſe of that ingenious and learned Gentleman Mr. *Boyle* in his *Sceptical Chymiſt*. Only thus much may here ſuffice to have made it appear, that all thoſe Philoſophers, who were moſt inquiſitive after the ancient and genuine Tradition of the World concerning the firſt beginning of things, did not only concur with *Moſes* in the main thing, that its beginning was from God, but in the particular Circumſtances of it, as to the fluid Matter and motion thereof. Concerning which I may yet add, if it be material, the Teſtimony of *Homer* in *Plutarch*.

Chalcid. in Tim. p. 394

Euſeb. Præp. Evang. l. 1. c. 10.

Gen. 1. 2.

Chalcid. in Tim. p. 378

Boyle's Sceptical Chymiſt, p. 115. &c.

Homer. Iliad. ξ.

Ὠκεανὸς, ὅσπερ γένεσις πάντεσσι τέτυκται.

Odyſſ. ί. Chalcid. p. 178. V. Meurſ. in Chal. p. 37.

And in *Chalcidius*: *Inque eadem ſententia Homerus eſſe invenitur, cum Oceanum & Thetin dicat parentes eſſe genituræ; cumque juſjurandum Deorum conſtituat aquam, quam quidem ipſe appellat Stygem, antiquitati tribuens reverentiam, & jurejurando nihil conſtituens*

ens reverentius. To which purpoſe likewiſe *Ariſtotle* ſpeaks in his Metaphyſics, that the reaſon why *Styx* was made the Oath of the Gods, was becauſe Water was ſuppos'd to be the material Principle of things, which he ſaith was ἀρχαία τις αὕτη γ' παλαιὰ περὶ τ φύσεως δόξα, *a moſt ancient Tradition concerning the Origin of the Univerſe.* And tells us before, that ſome were of opinion, τὰς παμπαλαίας, καὶ πολὺ πρὸ τ νῦν ἡλίσεως καὶ πρώτας θεολογήσαντας, *that the moſt ancient and remote Perſons and firſt Writers of Theology held this Opinion of Water being the firſt material Principle of things.* *Ariſtot. Metaphyſ. l. 1. c. 3.*

Having thus made it appear what a conſent there was between the ancient Tradition of the World, and the Writings of *Moſes* concerning the Origin of the World; I now come to conſider upon what pretenſe of Reaſon this Tradition came to be contradicted, and the Eternity of the World aſſerted. For which we are to conſider, that the difference of the former Philoſophers of the *Ionic* Sect, after the time of *Thales*, as to the material Principle of the World, one ſubſtituting Air, another Fire inſtead of Water, rendred the Tradition it ſelf ſuſpected among other Philoſophers, eſpecially when the humor of innovating in Philoſophy was got among them, and they thought they did nothing unleſs they contradicted their Maſters; thence came that multiplicity of Sects preſently among them, and that Philoſophy which at firſt went much on the original Tradition of the World, was turn'd into Diſputes and Altercations, which help'd as much to the finding out of Truth, as the fighting of two Cocks on a Dung-hill doth to the finding out the Jewel that lies there. For which, ſcraping and ſearching into the Natures of things had been far more proper, than contentions and wranglings with each other; but by means of this litigious humor, Philoſophy from being a Deſign, grew to be a mere Art, and he was accounted the beſt Philoſopher, not that ſearch'd further into the Bowels of Nature, but that dreſs'd and trick'd up the Notions he had in the beſt poſture of defence againſt all who came to oppoſe him. From hence thoſe Opinions were moſt plauſible, not which were moſt true, but which were moſt defenſible, and which like *Des-Cartes* his ſecond Element, had all the Angles cut off, on which their Adverſaries might have an advantage of juſtling upon them, and then their Opinions were accounted moſt pure when they were ſo Sphærical, as to paſs up and down without interruption. From ſuch a degeneracy of Philoſophy as this we have now mention'd, aroſe the Opinion of the Eternity of the World; for the certain Tradition of the World being now loſt in a crowd of Philoſophers, whoſe main aim was to ſet up for themſelves, and not to Trade with the Common-bank, ſo that there cou'd be no certain and convictive Evidence given to a ſhuffling Philoſopher that things were ever otherwiſe than they are; they found it moſt defenſible to aſſert that the World never had a beginning, nor wou'd have an end, but always did, and wou'd continue in the ſtate they were in. This Opinion, tho' *Ariſtotle* ſeems to make all before him to be of another mind, yet was hatched, as far as we can find, at firſt, under *Pythagoras* his Succeſſors by *Ocellus Lucanus*, as appears by his Book ſtill exſtant, περὶ τ τ παντὸς φύσεως, *of the nature of the Univerſe*; to whom *Ariſtotle* hath not been a little beholding, as *Ludov. Nogarola* hath in part manifeſt-

ed in his Notes on *Ocellus*, altho' *Ariſtotle* had not the Ingenuity of *Pliny*, *agnoſcere per quos profecerit*. From *Ariſtotle* this Opinion together with his Name, ſpread it ſelf much farther, and became the Opinion moſt in vogue among the Heathen Philoſophers, eſpecially after the riſe of Chriſtianity; for then not only the *Peripatetics*, but the modern *Platoniſts*, *Plotinus*, *Apuleius*, *Taurus*, *Iamblichus*, *Alcinous*, *Proclus*, and others, were all engaged in the defence of the Eternity of the World, thinking thereby the better to overthrow Chriſtianity. Hence came the hot and eager Conteſts between *Proclus*, *Simplicius*, and *Philoponus*, who undertook to anſwer *Proclus* his eighteen Arguments for the Eternity of the World, and to charge *Ariſtotle* with ſelf-contradiction in reference to it. But nothing were they more troubl'd about, than to reconcile the *Timæus* of *Plato* with the Eternity of the World, which they made to be a mere *Hypotheſis*, and a kind of *Diagramme* to ſalve Providence withal; altho' the plain words of *Plato* not only there, but elſewhere do expreſs, as far as we can judg by his way of writing, his real Judgment to have been for the production of the World by God. For which purpoſe we have this obſervable Teſtimony in his *Sophiſta*, where he divides all manner of Productions of things into *Divine* and *Human*, and oppoſes the Opinion that conceiv'd all things to be produc'd by an Eternal Power, to the Opinion of the vulgar, which ſaith he, was τὴν φύσιν αὐτῶν γενέσεως ἀπὸ τύχης αὐτομάτης καὶ ἄνευ ἀγαθοῦ φύσεως, *that all things were produc'd by a blind force of Nature, without any Reaſon or Counſel*, to which he oppoſeth the other Opinion, that they are made μετὰ λόγου τινὸς καὶ ἐπιστήμης θείας ἀπὸ θεοῦ γιγνομένης, *by a Divine Power with Infinite Reaſon and Wiſdom*; and when *Theætetus* expreſſeth himſelf in an Academical way as to either of theſe Opinions, the *Hoſpes Eleatenſis*, who there acts the part of the Philoſopher, tells him, if he thought he were inclinable to the other Opinion, νῦν ἂν τῷ λόγῳ μετὰ πιθοῦς ἀναγκαίας ἐπιχειρήσειν ὁμολογεῖν. *He wou'd undertake to make him confeſs the contrary by the Evidence of Reaſon which he wou'd bring.* And we ſhall ſee what great reaſon there is for this Opinion, when we conſider what weak and infirm foundations the contrary is built upon. For all the Arguments which either *Ocellus*, or *Ariſtotle*, or the modern *Platoniſts* make uſe of, are built on theſe following Suppoſitions which are all falſe. 1. *That it is unconceivable that things ſhou'd ever have been in any other ſtate than they are.* 2. *That there is no other way of Production but by Generation.* 3. *That* God *is no free Agent, but produced the World by neceſſity of Nature.*

Plato. Sophiſt. p. 185. Ed. Fic.

V. 1. *That it is unconceivable that things ſhou'd ever have been any otherwiſe than they are.* The reaſon of which ſuppoſition was this, That the general Concluſions of Reaſon, which they proceed upon in *Philoſophy*, were taken up from the Obſervation of things as they are at preſent in the World. Which is evident from the ground of *Ariſtotle*'s condemning the Opinion of *Empedocles*, who aſſerted the Production of the World, and yet the Incorruptibility of it. τὸ μὲν ὂν γενέσθαι μὲν ἀΐδιον δ' ὅμως εἶναι φάναι τὸ ἀδυνάτων, which he accounts impoſſible, and gives this as his Reaſon, μόνα γὰρ ζητεῖται θεῖον εὐλόγως, ὅσα ἐπὶ πόλλων ἢ πλείων ὑπάρχοντα. *For*, ſaith he, *nothing elſe can be rationally aſſerted, but what we find to be in all things or at leaſt in moſt*; now

Ariſt. de cœlo, l. 1. cap. 10.

becauſe

becauſe there cou'd nothing be found in the World which was produc'd (*i.e.* by Generation) and yet was incorruptible, therefore he concludes it impoſſible it ſhou'd be ſo with the Univerſe. By which we evidently ſee what the grand Principles of Reaſon among the Philoſophers were: *viz.* ſuch Obſervations as they had made from the preſent courſe of Nature in the order of the Univerſe. From hence aroſe that ſtrong preſumption among them, which hath been ſo taken for granted, that it hath been look'd on as common Notion of Human Nature, *viz. Ex nihilo nihil fit*, which was the main Argument us'd by them to prove the Eternity of the World: and by others to prove the *Præ-exiſtence of Matter*. So *Ocellus* argues againſt both the Diſſolution and Production of the World from this Principle; *If the World be diſſolv'd*, ſaith he, *it muſt either be* ἤτοι εἰς τὸ ὄν, ἢ εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν, *either into that which is, or into that which is not*: It cannot *be diſſolv'd into that which is, becauſe then the Univerſe cannot be deſtroy'd; for that which is, is either the Univerſe, or a part of it: neither can it be diſſolv'd into that which it is not*, ἀμήχανον γὰρ τὸ ὂν διαπίλεσθαι εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄντως, ἢ εἰς τὸ μὴ ὂν ἀναλυθῆναι. *For it is impoſſible that a thing ſhou'd be made out of that is not, or be diſſolv'd into nothing*. And *Ariſtotle* ſomewhere tells us, that it is a Principle which all the Writers of *Natural Philoſophy* are agreed in, (περὶ γὰρ ταύτης ὁμογνωμονοῦσι τῆς δόξης ἅπαντες οἱ περὶ τῆς φύσεως) which is ἐκ μὴ ὄντων γίνεσθαι ἀδύνατον, *that is impoſſible for any thing to come out of nothing*. But now when we obſerve upon what grounds this Principle was took up by theſe Philoſophers, we have no reaſon to admit of it as an univerſal ſtandard of Nature. For we find theſe Naturaliſts, who thus aſſerted this Principle, that when they go about to prove it, it is only from the courſe of Generations in the World, or from the works of *Art*, both which ſuppoſe *Matter Præ-exiſtent*, and from theſe ſhort collections they form this univerſal Maxim. And from hence when they diſcours'd of the manner whereby God did produce the World, their Imaginations ran preſently upon that which the *Epicurean* in *Tully* inquires after, *Quæ molitio? quæ ferramenta? qui vectes? quæ machinæ? qui miniſtri tanti operis fuerunt?* they apprehend God only as an Artificer that contrives the World firſt into a Platform, and then uſeth inſtruments to erect it, and conſequently ſtill ſuppoſe the Matter ready for him to work upon. So true is that of *Balbus* in *Tully*, when he comes to diſcourſe of the Nature of God; *In quo nihil eſt difficilius quam a conſuetudine oculorum aciem mentis abducere; nothing is more difficult than to abſtract our Minds from the obſervations of this viſible World when we ſeek to apprehend the Nature of the Deity*. Thus we ſee upon what general grounds the Philoſophers proceeded, and from what they took them, and how inſufficient any collections from the preſent order of the Univerſe are to determine any thing concerning its Production by. For ſuppoſing a Production of the World, ſeveral things muſt of neceſſity be ſuppos'd in it, different from what the preſent order of the World is; and it is an unreaſonable thing to argue from a thing when it is in its greateſt prefection, to what muſt always have been in the ſame thing; for by this means we muſt condemn many things for falſities which are apparently true, and believe many others to be true which are apparently falſe. For which *Maimonides* uſeth an excellent

Vid. Laert. in vit. Democriti.

Ocellus Lucanus p. 16. ed. Comm.

Ariſtot. Phyſic. l. 4.

Cicero de Nat. l. 1.

Ibid. l. 2.

Maimon. More Nev. l. 2. c. 17.

cellent ſimilitude. *Suppoſe*, ſaith he, *one of exquiſite Natural parts, whoſe Mother dies aſſoon he is born, and his Father brings him up in an Iſland, where he may have no ſociety with Mankind till he be grown up to years of underſtanding, and that he never ſaw any female of either Man or Beaſt: Suppoſe now this Perſon to inquire of the firſt Man he ſpeaks with, how Men are born, and how they come into the World. The other tells him, that every Man is bred in the Womb of one of the ſame kind with our ſelves, thus and thus form'd; and that while we are in the Womb we have a very little Body, and there move and are nouriſhed, and we grow up by little and little till we come to ſuch a bigneſs, and then we come forth into the World, and yet grow ſtill till we come to ſuch a proportion as we are of. Here preſently this young Man ſtops him and inquires, when we were thus little in the Womb and did live, move and grow, did we not eat and drink, and breath at our Mouth and Noſtrils as we do now? did we not eaſe Nature as we do now? If it be anſwer'd him, No; then he preſently is ready to deny it, and offers to bring demonſtrations that it was utterly impoſſible that it ſhou'd ſo be: For, ſaith he, if either of us ceaſe breathing, but for an hour, our Motion and Life is gone; how is it then poſſible for one of us tho' never ſo little, to live and move in the Womb for ſo many Months, when it is ſo cloſe, and ſhut up, and in the middle of the Body? If one of us,* ſaith he, *ſhou'd ſwallow a little Bird, it wou'd preſently die as ſoon as it came into the Stomach, how much more if it were in the Belly? If we ſhou'd be but for few days without eating and drinking, we cou'd not live; how can a Child then continue ſo many Months without it? Again, if one doth eat and not void the excrement of what he eats, he will be kill'd with it in few days; how can it poſſibly be otherwiſe with a Child? If it be reply'd that there is a paſſage open in the Belly at which the Child receives his nouriſhment, he will preſently ſay that it is as impoſſible as the other; for if our Bellies were ſo open, we ſhou'd be quickly deſtroy'd. And again, if the Child hath all its Limbs perfect and ſound, how comes it not to open its Eyes, uſe the Feet, Mouth and hands, as we do? And ſo concludes it impoſſible that Man ſhou'd ever be born after after this manner.* Much after this way, ſaith that excellent Author, do *Ariſtotle* and others argue againſt the Production of the World; for if the World were produc'd, ſay they, it muſt have been thus, and thus; and it is impoſſible that it ſhou'd have been ſo: Why? Becauſe we ſee things are otherwiſe now in the World. Which how infirm a way of arguing, it appears from the conſideration of the former ſimilitude, in which the Arguments are as ſtrong to prove the impoſſibility of that which we know to be true, as in the caſe about which we diſpute.

VI. 2. And this now leads us to the ſecond falſe *Hypotheſis* which the opinion of the World's Eternity was founded on, which is, *That there is no other way of Production but by Generation.* Moſt of the Arguments which are us'd by *Ocellus* and *Ariſtotle* againſt the Production of the World, run upon this Suppoſition, that it muſt be generated as we ſee things are in the World. So *Ocellus* argues,

Ocell. Luc. p. 8. πᾶν τι τὸ γεγόνος ἄρχεται τελευτῆς, καὶ ἀγένητον ἄφθαρτον κοινωνῆσαι, δύο ἐπιδέχεται μεταβολάς· μίαν μὲν τὴν ἀπὸ μείονος ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον, καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ χείρονος ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον· καλεῖται δὲ τὸ μὲν ἀφ' ἑαυτῆς ἂν ἄρξηται μεταβάλλειν γένεσις· τὸ δὲ εἰς ὃ ἀφικνεῖται ἀκμή. δευτέραν δὲ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ μείζονος

ἐπὶ

ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖον, καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ θοῦ βελτίονος ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον· τὸ δὲ συμπέρασμα τ᾽ μεταβολῆς ταύτης ὀνομάζεται φθορὰ καὶ ἀφάνισις. *Every thing that comes into Being, and is ſubject to diſſolution, hath two obſervable mutations in it; the one is, whereby it grows from leſs to greater, and from worſe to better, and this is called Generation, and the height of this Mutation, Perfection; the other begins from better to worſe, and from bigger to leſs; and the concluſion of this is Corruption, and Diſſolution. But now,* ſaith he, *if the World had a beginning, there wou'd be ſuch a mutation in it, and it wou'd have grown by degrees greater, till it had come to its perfection, and from thence it wou'd ſenſibly decay till it came to diſſolution; but no body hath ever obſerv'd ſuch a mutation in the World, neither is there any appearance of it;* ἀλλ᾽ ἀεὶ καθ᾽ αὐτὸ καὶ ὡσαυτῶς ἀφαπλεῖ καὶ ἴσον ὅμοιον αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ· *but the World is ſemper idem, it varies not nor alters any thing from it ſelf.* For which he particularly inſtanceth in the Courſes, Symmetries, Figures, Poſitions, Intervals, Proportions of Motion which are in the World, which things all are capable of ſuch a Mutation, yet we ſee no ſuch thing in the Univerſe, from whence he infers that the Univerſe was always and will be as it is. Upon the ſame Principle doth *Ariſtotle* diſpute for the Eternity of the World from the Nature of his *materia prima*; becauſe if the Firſt Matter were generated, it muſt be generated of other Matter, and ſo *in infinitum*; and ſo argues from the Nature of the Heavens, that they are not capable of Generation and Corruption as other Bodies are. All which Arguments ſignify no more than this, that the World was not generated as Plants or Animals are; and whoever right in his Wits aſſerted that it was? But do any of theſe Arguments prove it impoſſible that God having infinite Power, ſhou'd produce the Univerſe after another way, than any of thoſe things are produc'd in, which we obſerve in the World? For we aſſert an Infinite and Eternal Being, which was the Efficient Cauſe of the World, who by his Omnipotent Power produc'd it out of nothing, and continues it in its Being; which is well expreſs'd by the Author of the Refutation of *Ariſtotle* in *Juſtin Martyr*'s Works. *We aſſert,* ſaith he, *one* God *who is eternal himſelf, that hath nothing elſe co-equal with himſelf, neither by way of ſubjection or oppoſition, whoſe power is ſo great that nothing can hinder it, by which power he produc'd the World,* ἀρχὴν ἔχοντες τοῦ εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ἀεὶ εἶναι, καὶ θοῦ πῶς ἀφαιρεῖν, τὴν ἐκείνου θέλησιν; *which hath no other cauſe, either of its beginning, or of its being, or continuance, but only his Will.* Who fully anſwers in a Philoſophical manner, the particular Allegations out of *Ariſtotle*, concerning the *Eternity of the World:* his deſign being, as he ſaith, to ſhew μὴ καθ᾽ τὴν ἀποδεικτικὴν ἐπιστήμην, καθ᾽ ἣν ἐπαγγέλονται Ἕλληνες περὶ θεοῦ τε καὶ κτίσεων τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖν, τοῦτο πεποιηκότας, ἀλλ᾽ εἰκασμῷ τὸ δοκοῦν διεξιόντας. *That the Greek Philoſophers in their diſcourſes concerning* God *and the Creation, were very far from being as good as their word to obſerve the laws of Demonſtration, but inſtead of them proceeded only upon Opinions and Conjectures.* And to this particular of the Poſſibility of another way of Production, beſides that of Generation, he proves it from *Ariſtotle*'s own Opinion, from the equal neceſſity of the exiſtence of Matter, as of God. *For,* ſaith he, *if* God *can produce any thing out of Matter, which is as neceſſarily exiſtent as himſelf, he may produce ſomething out of nothing. For the ſame repug-*

Ariſtot. dogmat. overſ. p. 111.

Juſt. Mar. ep. p. 113.

nancy that there is in that which is abſolutely nothing to be produc'd, the ſame muſt there be in that which is neceſſarily exiſtent. How then can God produce ſomething out of Matter which neceſſarily exiſts, and not be able to produce ſomething out of nothing? For if Matter have its original from it ſelf, how can it be ſubject to the power of another? And beſides, if we acknowledg God to have his Being from himſelf, and on that account attribute infinite Power to him, by the ſame reaſon we muſt attribute it to Matter. But whatever hath infinite Power in it ſelf, hath a Power upon ſomething beyond it ſelf; but if God and Matter have it both, they can never have Power upon each other, or without themſelves. Which is a far greater Abſurdity than the mere aſſerting a Power to produce ſomething out of nothing, which is imply'd in the very Notion of infinite Power; for if it be confin'd to any Matter, the Power is not infinite, becauſe we cannot but conceive the bounds of it; for it extends no farther than Matter doth. So that a Power of Creation is imply'd in the very Notion of a *Deity*; and therefore it is a mere *Sophiſm* to argue becauſe the World cou'd not be generated, therefore it cou'd not be produc'd, unleſs any other way of Production but by Generation, be prov'd impoſſible.

VII. 3. A third falſe *Hypotheſis* they proceeded on was this, *That the Being of the World was no effect of* God's *Will, but of the neceſſity of Nature.* For altho' the Philoſophers we now ſpeak of, did aſſert a *Deity*, which in ſome ſenſe might be call'd the cauſe of the World, yet they withal aſſerted that the World was co-equal with God himſelf, and ſo tho' there might be ſome priority in order of Cauſes between them, yet there was none in order of time, or duration, as we ſee the Light, tho' it flows from the Sun, yet the Sun is never without Light. This *Ariſtotle* proves from the neceſſity of Motion and Time: For, ſaith he, *whatever is mov'd, muſt be mov'd by ſomething elſe, and conſequently there muſt be a running in infinitum*; but this runs on a falſe Suppoſition of the neceſſity of a continual *Phyſical* Motion in things, which we deny, ſince God by his infinite Power may give Motion to that which had it not before; and ſo all that can be prov'd, is the neceſſity of ſome firſt Cauſe, which we aſſert, but no neceſſity at all of his continual Acting, ſince he may cauſe Motion when he pleaſe. And for time continually exiſting, it denotes nothing real in it ſelf exiſting, but only our manner of Conception, of the Duration of things, as it is conceiv'd to belong to Motion; and ſo can argue nothing as to the real exiſtence of things from all eternity. But the latter *Platoniſts* look upon theſe as inſufficient ways of Probation, and therefore argue from thoſe Attributes of God, which they conceive moſt neceſſary and agreeable to God's Nature; and by which the World was produc'd if at all: ſo that by the ſame Arguments whereby we prove that the World was made by God, they prove it to have been from all eternity. It was well and truly ſaid in *Plato*, in his *Timæus*, *That the goodneſs of* God *was the cauſe of the production of the World*; from which Speech the more modern *Platoniſts* gather a neceſſity of the World's eternity, for from hence they infer, that ſince God was always good, he muſt always have an object to exerciſe his Goodneſs upon; as the *Sun diſperſeth his light as ſoon as he is himſelf.* True, were God of the

the Nature of the Sun, it wou'd be ſo with him; or were the Sun of the Nature of God, it wou'd not be ſo with it. But there is this vaſt difference between them, that tho' God be eſſentially and neceſſarily good, yet the communications of his Goodneſs are the effects of his Will, and not merely of his Nature; For, were not the acts of Beneficence and Goodneſs in God the free acts of his Will, Man muſt be made as happy as he was capable of being, not only upon his firſt exiſtence in the World, but as long as it ſhou'd continue, by mere neceſſity of Nature, without any intervention of the will or actions of Men. And ſo there cou'd be no ſuch difference as that of good and bad Men in the World; For, if the lettings forth of God's Goodneſs to the World be ſo neceſſary, all Men muſt become neceſſarily good, if God's Goodneſs be ſo great as to be able to make Men ſo; which I ſuppoſe will not be queſtion'd. By this then when we ſee that the communications of God's Goodneſs to the World are free, and depend upon the eternal Counſels of his Will, which is a depth too great for us to approach, or look into; by what neceſſity then, if God be a free Agent, and of infinite Wiſdom, as well as Goodneſs, muſt we either aſſert the Eternity of the World, or fear to deprive God of his eſſential Goodneſs? Whereas to make the communications of God's Goodneſs *ad extra* neceſſary, and therefore to make the World from Eternity, that he might have an object to exerciſe his Goodneſs on, is, to take as much off from the infinite Perfection and Self-ſufficiency of the Divine Nature, as it wou'd ſeem to flatter his Goodneſs. For God cannot be himſelf without his Goodneſs; and if his Goodneſs cannot be without ſome Creature to ſhew or diſplay it upon, God cannot be perfect nor happy, without his Creatures, becauſe theſe are neceſſary iſſues of his Goodneſs; and conſequently we make the Being of the Creatures neceſſary to his being God. Which is the higheſt derogation from the abſolute Perfection of the Divine Nature. We aſſert then ſo much Goodneſs in God, as none can be imagin'd greater; we aſſert, that it was from the communication of this Divine Goodneſs which gave Being to the World; but withal we acknowledg God to be an Agent infinitely wiſe and free, who diſpenſeth this Goodneſs of his in ſuch a way and manner as is beſt pleaſing to himſelf, tho' ever agreeable to his Nature. As God is infinitely good in himſelf, ſo whatever he doth is ſutable to this Nature of his; but the particular determinations of the Acts of God's Beneficence belong to the Will of God, as he is a moſt free and independent Agent; ſo that Goodneſs as it imports the neceſſary rectitude of the Divine Nature, implies a Perfection inſeparable from the true Idea of God; but as it is taken for the expreſſions of Divine Bounty to ſomewhat without, as the object of it, it is not imply'd in our conception of God, as to his Nature, but belongs to the free determinations of his Will. We cannot then, neither ought we to determine any thing concerning the particular ways of God's Bounty towards the whole Univerſe, or any part of it, any farther than God himſelf hath declar'd it to us. Now we ſee the World exiſts, we have cauſe to adore that Goodneſs of God, which not only gave a Being to the Univerſe, but continually upholds it, and plentifully provides for the Creatures

tures which he hath made in it. Which the *Heathen* was ſo ſenſible of, that the *Stoic* in *Tully* taking notice of the abundant proviſion which is made in the World, not only for Man's neceſſity, but for delight and ornament, cries out, *Ut interdum Pronœa noſtra Epicurea eſſe videatur: God's Providence doth abundantly exceed Man's neceſſity.* We ſee then from this Diſcourſe, how unſafe and unſatisfactory (that I may not ſay bold and preſumptuous) thoſe Arguments are, which are drawn from a general Conſideration of the Divine Nature and Goodneſs, without regard had to the determinations of his Will, as to the exiſtence of things in the World. It cannot certainly then be an Argument of any great force with any candid Inquirers after Truth and Reaſon, which hath been lately pleaded in the behalf that *Pythagorean Hypotheſis* of the *Præ-exiſtence* of Souls, *viz. That if it be good for Men's Souls to be at all, the ſooner they are, the better; but we are moſt certain that the Wiſdom and Goodneſs of God will do that which is beſt; and therefore if they can enjoy themſelves before they come into theſe terreſtrial Bodies (it being better for them to enjoy themſelves than not) they muſt be before they come into theſe Bodies. Wherefore the Præ-exiſtence of Souls is a neceſſary reſult of the Wiſdom and Goodneſs of God, who can no more fail to do that which is beſt, than he can to underſtand it.* I now ſeriouſly inquire of ſuch who love Reaſon above *Plato* and *Pythagoras*, whether if the Eternity of the World were put into the Argument inſtead of the *Præ-exiſtence* of Souls, this Argument wou'd not hold as ſtrongly for that, as it doth for *Præ-exiſtence*; and if I am bound to believe *Præ-exiſtence* on this ground, I be not likewiſe bound to believe at leaſt the Souls of Men eternal, if not the Univerſe. But how reconcilable the Eternity of the World is to the *Pythagoric Cabala* of the Creation, I am yet to underſtand. But if this Argument doth not at all infer the Eternity of the World, as we have ſhew'd it doth not, much leſs doth it *Præ-exiſtence* of Souls.

Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. 2.

VIII. We have thus far conſider'd the firſt *Hypotheſis*, which is repugnant to *Moſes*, concerning the origin of the Univerſe, which is that which aſſerts the *Eternity of the World as it is*; we come now to the ſecond, which attributes the Formation of the World as it is, to God, as the efficient Cauſe; but attributes Eternity to the Matter out of which the World was fram'd. I am not ignorant that ſome who wou'd be taken for the Maſters of Reaſon, are ſo far from conceiving this *Hypotheſis* to be repugnant to the Text of *Moſes*, that they conceive it to be the genuine ſenſe of it, *viz.* That there was a *præ-exiſtent Matter*, out of which God form'd the World. But I wou'd willingly underſtand how *Moſes* wou'd have expreſs'd that Matter it ſelf was created, ſuppoſing it had been his intention to have ſpoken it; for altho' the word ברא may not of it ſelf imply neceſſarily the Production of things out of nothing, *i. e.* out of no *præ-exiſtent Matter*; yet it is acknowledg'd by all, that no word us'd by the *Jews* is more proper to that than ברא is; and *P. Fagius* cites it from *R. Nachmani*, *That the Hebrew Language hath no other word to ſignify ſuch a Production out of nothing but* ברא. It is therefore a very weak manner of arguing, That becauſe ברא is ſometimes us'd for

Volkelius de vera rel. l. 2. c. 4.

no

no more than עשה, therefore the World was created out of *Præexiſtent* Matter; all that can rationally be inferr'd, is, that from the mere force and importance of that word the contrary cannot be collected: but if other places of Scripture compar'd, and the evidence of Reaſon, do make it clear that there could be no *Præexiſtent* Matter which was uncreated, then it will neceſſarily follow that Creation muſt be taken in its proper Senſe. And in this Senſe it is evident, that not only *Jews* and *Chriſtians*, but even the *Heathens* themſelves underſtood *Moſes*, as is plain by *Galen*, where he compares the Opinion of *Moſes*, with that of *Epicurus*, and ingenuouſly confeſſeth that of *Moſes*, which attributed the Production of things to God, to be far more rational and probable than that of *Epicurus*, which aſſign'd the origin of Things to a mere caſual concourſe of *Atoms:* but withal adds, that he muſt diſſent from both; and ſides with *Moſes* as to the origin of ſuch things as depend on Generation, but aſſerts the *Præexiſtence* of Matter, and withal, that *God's power could not extend it ſelf beyond the capacity of the Matter which it wrought upon. Atque id eſt*, ſaith he, *in quo ratio noſtra ac* Platonis, *tum aliorum qui apud Græcos de rerum natura recte conſcripſerunt, a* Moſe *diſſidet.* How true theſe words are, will appear afterwards. *Chalcidius* in his Commentaries on *Plato*'s *Timæus*, where he ſpeaks of the Origin of ὕλη, which in him is ſtill tranſlated *Sylva*, and inquires into the different Opinions of all Philoſophers about it, takes it for granted, that according to *Moſes*, this ὕλη had its Production from God. *Hebræi Sylvam generatam eſſe conſitentur; quorum ſapientiſſimus* Moyſes *non humana facundia, ſed Divina, ut ferunt, inſpiratione vegetatus, in eo libro, qui de genitura mundi cenſetur, ab exordio ſic eſt profatus, juxta interpretationem LXX. prudentium; Initio Deus fecit cœlum & terram. Terra autem erat inviſibilis & incompta. Ut vero ait Aquila; Caput rerum condidit Deus cœlum & terram; terra porro inanis erat & nihil; velut Symmachus; Ab exordio condidit Deus cœlum & terram. Terra porro fuit otioſum quid, confuſumque & inordinatum. Sed* Origenes *aſſeverat ita ſibi ab Hebræis eſſe perſuaſum, quod in aliquantum ſit a vera proprietate derivata interpretatio. Fuiſſe enim in exemplari, Terra autem ſtupida quadam erat admiratione. Omnia tamen hæc in unum aiunt concurrere, ut & generata, ſic ea quæ ſubjecta eſt univerſo corpori, ſylva, ſermoneſque ipſos ſic interpretantur.* Where we find by the teſtimony of *Chalcidius* an univerſal conſent as to the Production of the Univerſal Corporeal Matter by God; for that is all which is underſtood by his term of *Generata eſt*. But this ſame Author afterwards tells us, that by *Heavens* and *Earth* in the firſt verſe of *Geneſis*, we are not to underſtand the viſible Heavens and Earth: *For*, ſaith he, *the Heavens, which are called the Firmament, were created after, and on the third day, when the Waters were ſeparated, the dry Land appeared, which was called Earth. Qui tumultuario contenti ſunt intellectu, cœlum hoc quod videmus, & terram qua ſubvehimur, dici putant; porro qui altius indagant, negant hoc cœlum ab initio factum, ſed ſecundo die.* And therefore by the *Heavens* he underſtands *Incorpoream Naturam*, and by *Earth*, ὕλην, or the *Primogenial Matter*.

Galen. de uſu part. l. 11.

Chalcid. in Tim. p. 372.

And this, saith he, *appears by the following words, The Earth was inviſible and without form*; i. e. this Corporeal Matter, before it was brought into order by the Power and Wiſdom of God, remain'd a rude and indigeſted Lump; and that which is ſo, might well be call'd inviſible and without form. And therefore it is called *inanis* and *nihil*, becauſe of its capacity of receiving all forms, and having none of its own. *Symmachus* calls it *otioſa & indigeſta*; the former, becauſe of its inability to produce any thing of its ſelf: the latter, becauſe it wanted a Divine Power to bring it into due order. The ſtupidity and admiration which *Origen* attributes to it, he conceives to relate to the Majeſty of God, who was the Orderer and Contriver of it, *ſiquidem Opificis & Auctoris ſui Majeſtate capta ſtupuerit*. Thus we ſee that according to *Moſes*, the firſt Matter of the World was produced by God, which is largely manifeſted by *Origen* againſt the *Marcioniſts*, a fragment of which is extant in his *Philocalia*; and by *Tertullian* againſt *Hermogenes*, and others, who from the Opinion of the præ-exiſtence of Matter, are call'd *Materiarii*.

Origen. Philoc. c. 24. Tertull. ad Hermog. per tot.

IX. Having thus clear'd the Senſe of *Moſes*, it is far more difficult to find out the true Opinions of the ancient Philoſophers concern the production or eternity of Corporeal Matter, there having been ſo great Diſſentions, not only about the thing it ſelf, but about the Opinions of ſome about it. For it is plain by *Plutarch* his ὑποθέσεις, as well as the Diſcourſes of the later *Platoniſts*, how eager ſome have been to interpret *Plato*'s *Timæus* in favor of the Eternity, at leaſt of Matter, if not of the World. But altho' *Plato* doth aſſert therein a præ-exiſtence of rude Matter, before the formation of the World, yet I ſee no reaſon why he ſhould be otherwiſe underſtood than in the ſame ſenſe that we believe a *Chaos*, to have gone before the bringing the World into the order it is now in. And in that ſence may thoſe places in *Plutarch* be interpreted, ὁ μὲν οὖν Θεὸς ἀγένητος, ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ μὴ καλῶς καὶ ἀτάκτως ἔχοντος· and ſo likewiſe thoſe following words, ὁ δὲ θεὸς ἔτι σώματος τοῦ ἀοράτου, ἔτι ψυχὴν τὴν ἄψυχον ἐποίησεν· for the meaning may be no more than that *Plato* conceiv'd that all the productions of the kinds of things, which are in the World, was out of a præ-exiſtent Hyle, the one Spiritual and Intelligible, out of which he ſuppos'd Souls to be form'd, the other Senſible and Corporeal, out of which other Beings which were more groſs and material, were produced. So *Chalcidius* tells us that both *Pythagoras* and *Plato* look'd upon *conſtitutionem Sylvæ* to be *opus providentiæ*: which I ſuppoſe relates not only to the bringing of Matter into form, but to the production of Matter it ſelf. But after this he takes a great deal of pains to ſearch out the true meaning of *Plato* concerning the Origin of Hyle, and mentions the great Diſſentions among the *Platoniſts* about it, and the obſcurity of the *Timæus* in it. To him therefore I refer the Reader: Who likewiſe brings in *Numenius* largely diſcourſing concerning the Opinion of *Pythagoras* about it, who condemns all thoſe, as not underſtanding *Pythagoras*, who attribute to him the production of the indeterminate Hyle: Theſe are his words, *Numenius ex Pythagoræ Magiſterio Stoicorum hoc de initiis dogma refellens, Pythagoræ dogmate, cui concinere dicit dogma Platonicum, ait Pythagoram, Deum quidem ſingularitatis nominaſſe (nomine*

Plutarch. de Anima procreat. e Tim.

Chalcid. in Tim. p. 377.

Pag. 401.

Pag. 393.

mine appellaſſe) *ſylvam vero duitatis. Quam duitatem indeterminatam quidem, minime genitam, limitatam vero, generatam eſſe dicere. Hoc eſt, antequam exornaretur quidem, formamque & ordinem nanciſceretur, ſine ortu & generatione; exornatam vero atque illuſtratam, a Digeſtore Deo eſſe generatam. Atque ita quia generationis ſit fortuna poſterior, inornatum illud minime generatum, æquævum Deo, a quo eſt ordinatum, intelligi debeat. Sed nonnullos Pythagoreos, vim ſententiæ non recte aſſecutos, putaſſe, dici etiam illam indeterminatam & immenſam duitatem, ab una ſingularitate inſtitutam, recedente a natura ſua ſingularitate, & in duitatis habitum migrante.* But however theſe *Pythagoreans* might be deceiv'd, who thought the Unity it ſelf became the Deity; yet it is evident by *Numenius*, that he look'd on the undetermin'd and confus'd matter to have been *co-æval* with God himſelf, and not produced by him. And if *Numenius* be as much to be credited in this as when he calls *Plato*, *Moſes Atticus*, then the Creation of Univerſal Matter can be no part of *Pythagoras* his philoſophic *Cabala*. But whatever were the Opinions of *Plato* and *Pythagoras*, concerning the firſt Origin of Matter, we are certain that the *Stoics* generally aſſerted the improduction of Matter, and make that to be as neceſſary a paſſive Principle for the Being of the World, as God is the active and efficient Cauſe. So *Diogenes Laertius* reports of the *Stoical* Principles concerning the Origin of the Univerſe: Δοκεῖ δὲ αὐτοῖς ἀρχὰς εἶναι τῶν ὅλων δύο· τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον· τὸ μὲν οὖν πάσχον εἶναι τὴν ἄποιον οὐσίαν τὴν ὕλην· τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν, τὸν ἐν αὐτῇ λόγον τὸν θεόν. *They make two principles of the Univerſe, one active, and the other paſſive; the paſſive, an Eſſence without quality, called Hyle or confuſed Matter; the active, the Reaſon which acts on the other, which is God.* Theſe two Principles *Seneca* calls *Cauſa & materia; eſſe vero debet*, ſaith he, *aliquid unde fiat; deinde, a quo fiat; hoc cauſa eſt, illud materia.* Altho' *Seneca* ſeems to make a Query of it elſewhere; *quantum Deus poſſit? materiam ipſe ſibi formet, an data utatur?* But *Zeno* is expreſs in *Stobæus*, Οὐσίαν εἶναι τὴν τῶν ὄντων πάντων πρώτην ὕλην, πάντῃ δὲ πᾶσιν ἀΐδιον, ὅτι πλείω γίνεσθαι οὐκ ἐπιδέχεται. *The firſt Eſſence of all is Matter, which is eternal, and not capable of acceſſion or diminution.* To the ſame purpoſe *Chalcidius* ſpeaks, *Stoici ortum ſylvæ rejiciunt, quin potius ipſam & Deum, duo totius rei ſumunt initia; Deum, ut opificem; Sylvam, ut quæ operationi ſubjiciatur. Una quidem eſſentia præditos facientem, & quod fit ac patitur, id corpus eſſe; diverſa vero virtute; quia faciat, Deum; quia fiat, Sylvam eſſe.*

Laert. V. Zenon.

V. Lipſium in Phyſiol. Sto. l. 1. c. 4.

Senec. Epiſt. 65.

Idem Præfat. ad Nat. Quæſt.

Stob. Eclog. Phyſic.

Chalcid. in Tim. p. 388.

X. Having now found out the certain Aſſertors among the Heathen Philoſophers of the eternity and improduction of Matter as the paſſive Principle of things, we come to examin the reaſon of this *Hypotheſis*, and whether there were foundation enough for this matter to ſubſiſt upon to all Eternity? It might be ſufficient prejudice againſt this Opinion, that it was built on the ſame infirm Concluſions which that of the Eternity of the whole World was, *viz.* that Maxim which *Lipſius* attributes to *Democritus*, but was embraced by all thoſe Philoſophers who deny'd production of Matter, μηδὲν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος γίνεσθαι, μηδὲ εἰς τὸ μὴ ὂν φθείρεσθαι, *that nothing cou'd be produced out of nothing, nor cou'd return into nothing*; which as we have already ſaid, was only taken up from the eſtabliſhed order of the Univerſe, and the manner of production of material

Beings. But this is not all we have to charge this *Hypothesis* with; for,

1. It is repugnant to the natural Notion of a Deity, which must imply in it an Omnipotent Power; For otherwise we degrade him to the imbecillity of finite Creatures, if he cannot produce any thing which doth not imply a contradiction: but what contradiction is there in this, that God shou'd give a Being to that which had none before? For that is all we understand by Creation, *viz.* the producing of something out of nothing, or which had nothing out of which it was produc'd. Now what repugnancy is there to any free Principle of Reason, that a Power infinite shou'd raise an Insect into Being without any passive Principle out of which it was caus'd; and if an Infinite Power can do that, it may as well produce the World out of nothing, else the Power wou'd not be Infinite; for it wou'd have its bounds set, that thus far it cou'd go and no further. Now if such a Power in God implies no contradiction in it self, I say, the asserting the necessary existence of Matter implies a contradiction to this Power. For 1. a Power to produce something out of nothing wou'd be to no purpose, if a passive Principle or præ-existent Matter be necessary to the production of any thing; and so that Being which hath a power to produce something out of nothing, hath only a power to produce something out of something, which is a plain contradiction. 2. If God hath a power to produce something out of nothing, either this power doth extend to the production of this Matter, or not; if it doth, then it depends on him; if not, his power is not Infinite, and so the same power is Infinite and not Infinite; which is another contradiction. So that it is plainly repugnant to the Notion of a God, to assert the necessary and eternal existence of Matter.

2. If Matter be unproduced, then necessary Existence must belong to it as well as to God; and if necessary Existence belongs to Matter, Infinite Power must belong to it too; for whatever necessarily exists is Self-originated; whatever is Self-originated, cou'd not by any Cause whatsoever be hinder'd from Being; what cannot by any Cause be hinder'd from Being, hath Infinite Power; what hath Infinite Power, may produce any thing, and is God, and so Matter cannot be a mere passive Principle, but must be an active, and must be God himself, or else there must be more Gods than one. To an Argument something of this nature *Hermogenes* in *Tertullian* replies, that Matter wou'd not lose the Name or Nature of Matter, because of its Co-eternity with God, neither cou'd it be God merely on that account, unless it had other things that were agreeable to the Nature of God as well as that. But I have already shew'd that necessary Existence implies other Perfections going along with it: which is likewise thus prov'd by *Tertullian* in answer to *Hermogenes*; The reason of the Imperfections which are to be seen in any Creatures, is from hence, that they derive their Beings from a higher Cause, who creates them in what order he pleases; but that which hath its original from it self, must on that account want those Imperfections which other Creatures in the World have; and therefore if necessary Existence be of the Nature of Matter, all other Perfections must belong to it too: and so

Tertull. adverſ. Hermog. c. 4.

there

there can be no ſuperiority and inferiority between God and Matter, becauſe on both ſides there will be neceſſary Exiſtence. *Divinitas gradum non habet, utpote unica:* and ſo the eternal exiſtence of Matter, is repugnant to the Unity of God. *Tertul. c. 7.*

3. It is repugnant to the Independency of God: for it makes God ſubject to Matter, and not Matter to God. For if God cannot produce any thing without præ-exiſtent Matter, the Matter is neceſſary to his Action, and ſo God muſt depend on that which he can do nothing without; and ſo God's uſing Matter, is as *Tertullian* ſpeaks, *ex neceſſitate mediocritatis ſuæ*, to help him in the production of things. *Nemo non ſubjicitur ei cujus eget ut poſſit uti*, as he goes on. Thus Matter at laſt is crept above the Deity, that God can do nothing without its aid and concurrence; and ſo as *Tertullian* ſharply ſays, *God is beholding to Matter for every Being known to the World; grande beneficium Deo contulit ut haberet hodie per quam Deus cognoſceretur, & omnipotens vocaretur, niſi quod jam non omnipotens, ſi non & hoc potens ex nihilo omnia proferre.* Thus we ſee how irreconconcilable this *Hypotheſis* is with theſe Attributes of God. *Ibid. c. 8.*

4. It is repugnant to the Immenſity of God. For either God did exiſt ſeparate from this Eternal Matter, or was conjoyn'd with it: if conjoyn'd with it, then both made but one Being, as *Maximus*, or *Origen* argues; if ſeparate from it, then there muſt be ſomething between them, and ſo there will be three real improduced things. If it be anſwer'd that they are neither conjoyn'd nor ſeparate, but God is in Matter as in his proper place, as the *Stoics* aſſerted, it is eaſily reply'd, that either then he is in a part of Matter, or the whole Matter; if in a part only, he cannot be immenſe; if in the whole as his adequate place, how cou'd he then ever frame the World? For either he muſt then recede from that part in which he was, and contract himſelf into a narrower compaſs, that he might faſhion that part of the World which he was about, or elſe he might likewiſe frame part of himſelf with that part of the World which he was then framing of, which conſequence is unavoidable on the *Stoical Hypotheſis* of God's being Corporeal and confin'd to the World as his proper place. And ſo much for this ſecond *Hypotheſis* concerning the Origin of the Univerſe, which ſuppoſeth the eternity of Matter as co-exiſting with God. *Orig. Philoc. c. 24.*

XI. I come now to that which makes moſt noiſe in the World, which is the *Atomical* or *Epicurean Hypotheſis*; but will appear to be as irrational as either of the foregoing, as far as it concerns the giving an account of the Origin of the Univerſe. For otherwiſe ſuppoſing a Deity which produc'd the World and put it into the order it is now in, and ſupremely governs all things in the World, that many of the *Phænomena* of the Univerſe, are far more intelligibly explain'd by Matter and Motion than by ſubſtantial Forms, and real Qualities, few free and unprejudic'd Minds do now ſcruple. But becauſe theſe little Particles of Matter may give a tolerable account of many appearances of Nature, that therefore there ſhou'd be nothing elſe but Matter and Motion in the World, and that the Origin of the Univerſe ſhou'd be from no wiſer Principle than the caſual concourſe of theſe *Atoms*, is one of the Evi-

dences of the proneneſs of Mens minds to be intoxicated with thoſe Opinions they are once in love with. When they are not content to allow an *Hypotheſis* its due place and ſubſerviency to God, and Providence, but think theſe *Atoms* have no force at all in them unleſs they can extrude a Deity quite out of the World. For it is moſt evident that it was not ſo much the truth as the ſerviceableneſs of this *Hypotheſis*, which hath given it entertainment among Men of *Atheiſtical* Spirits. *Epicurus* himſelf in his Epiſtle to *Pythocles* urgeth that as a conſiderable circumſtance in his Opinion that he brought no God down upon the Stage to put things in order, καὶ ἡ ἡμῖν φύσις οὐδὲν πρὸς ταῦτα μηδαμῶς ἀποσκιάζει, which his Paraphraſt *Lucretius* hath thus rendred.

Diog. Laert. l. 10.

Lucret. de Nat. l. 5.

Nequaquam nobis divinitus eſſe paratam
Naturam rerum.

If this Opinion then be true, the Hiſtory of the Creation quite falls to the ground; on which account we are oblig'd more particularly to conſider the reaſon of it. The *Hypotheſis* then of *Epicurus* is, *that before the World was brought into that Form and Order it is now in, there was an infinite empty Space, in which were an innumerable company of ſolid Particles or Atoms of different ſizes and ſhapes, which by their weight were in continual motion, and that by the various occurſions of theſe, all the Bodies of the Univerſe were fram'd into that order they now are in.* Which is fully expreſs'd by *Dionyſius* in *Euſebius*, and very agreeably to the Sence of *Epicurus* in his Epiſtles to *Herodotus* and *Pythocles*, and to what *Plutarch* reports of the Sence of *Epicurus*, tho' he names him not (if at leaſt that Book be his, which *Muretus* denies) the words of *Dionyſius* are theſe concerning the *Epicureans*, οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀτόμους ἀποφαίνοντες ἄφυκτόν τινα καὶ σμικρὸν εἶναι σῶμα, πλῆθος ἀναρίθμου, καί τι χωρίον κενὸν, μέγιθος ἀπεριλήπτου ὑποτιθέμενοι, τούτους δή φασι τοὺς ἀτόμους ὡς ἔτυχεν ἐν τῷ κενῷ φερομένους, αὐτομάτως τι συμπεσούσας ἀλλήλαις ἀφ' ῥύμης ἄτακτον καὶ συμπλεκομένους ἀφ' τὸ πολύχημον ἀλλήλων ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι, καὶ ὕτω τόνδε κόσμον, καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ, μᾶλλον δὲ κόσμους ἀπείρους ἀποτελεῖν. So that according to this Opinion, all the account we have of the Origin of the World, is from this general Rendezvouz of Atoms in this infinite Space, in which after many encounters and facings about, they fell into their ſeveral Troops, and made up that order'd Battalia which now the World is the Scheme of. It was not imprudently done of *Epicurus* to make the Worlds infinite, as well as his Space and Atoms; for by the ſame reaſon that his Atoms wou'd make one World, they might make a thouſand; and who wou'd ſpare for Worlds, when he might make them ſo eaſily? *Lucretius* gives us in ſo exact an account of the ſeveral courſes the Atoms took up in diſpoſing themſelves into Bodies, as tho' he had been Muſter-Maſter General at the Rendezvouz; for thus he ſpeaks of his Atoms.

Euſeb. Præp. Evang. l. 14. c. 22. p. 421. R. St.

Plutarch. de Placitis Phil. l. 1. c. 4.

Muret. Annot. in Senec. de provid.

Lucret. l. 1.

Quæ quia multa modis multis mutata per omne
Ex Infinito vexantur percita plagis,
Omne genus motus & cœtus experiundo,
Tandem deveniunt in taleis diſpoſituras,
Qualibus hæc rerum conſiſtit ſumma creata.

And

And more particularly afterwards;

Sed quia multa modis multis primordia rerum *Lucret. l. 5.*
Ex Infinito jam tempore percita plagis,
Ponderibuſque ſuis conſuerunt concita ferri,
Omnimodiſque coire, atque omnia pertentare,
Quæcunque inter ſe poſſunt congreſſa creare;
Ut non ſit mirum, ſi in taleis diſpoſituras
Deciderunt quoque, & in taleis venere meatus,
Qualibus hæc rerum genitur nunc ſumma novando.

Thus we ſee the ſubſtance of the *Epicurean Hypotheſis*, that there was an infinite number of Atoms, which by their frequent occurſions did at laſt meet with thoſe of the ſame nature with them, and theſe being conjoyn'd together made up thoſe Bodies which we ſee; ſo that all the account we are able to give according to this *Hypotheſis* of all the *Phænomena* of the Univerſe, is from the fortuitous concourſe of the Atoms in the firſt forming of the World, and the different contexture of them in Bodies. And this was deliver'd by the ancient *Epicureans* not with any Doubt or Heſitation, but with the greateſt Confidence imaginable. So *Tully* obſerves of *Velleius* the *Epicurean*, beginning his Diſcourſe, *fidenter ſane ut ſolent iſti, nihil tam verens quam ne dubitare de aliqua re videretur; tanquam modo ex Deorum concilio, & ex Epicuri intermundiis deſcendiſſet:* Confidence was the peculiar Genius of that Sect, which we ſhall ſee in them to be accompany'd with very little reaſon.

XII. For thoſe two things which make any principles in Philoſophy to be rejected, this Atomical *Hypotheſis* is unavoidably charg'd with; and thoſe are, *If the principles be taken up without ſufficient ground in reaſon for them; and if they cannot give any ſufficient account of the* Phænomena *of the World.* I ſhall therefore make it appear, *That this Hypotheſis*, as to the Origin of the Univerſe, is *firſt, merely precarious, and built on no ſufficient grounds of Reaſon. Secondly, That it cannot give any ſatisfactory account of the Origin of things.*

1. That it is a precarious *Hypotheſis*, and hath no evidence of Reaſon on which it ſhou'd be taken up; and that will be prov'd by two things. 1. *It is ſuch an Hypotheſis as the* Epicureans *themſelves cou'd have no certainty of according to their own principles.* 2. *That the main principles of the Hypotheſis its ſelf are repugnant to thoſe Catholic Laws of Nature which are obſerv'd in the Univerſe.*

1. *The* Epicureans *according to their own principles cou'd have no certainty of the truth of this Hypotheſis.* And that, 1. *Becauſe they cou'd have no certain Evidence of its Truth.* 2. *Becauſe their way of proving it was inſufficient.*

1. *That they cou'd have no certain evidence of the truth of it,* I prove from thoſe *Criteria*, which *Epicurus* lays down as the only certain Rules of judging the truth of things by; and thoſe were *Senſe*, *Anticipation* and *Paſſion*. Let Senſe be never ſo infallible a Rule of Judgment, yet it is impoſſible there ſhou'd be any Evidence

dence to Senſe of the truth of this *Hypotheſis*; and let him extend his τὸ ἀσυμφόρητον as long as he pleaſe, which was his great help for correcting the Errors of Senſe, *viz.* as it was in the *Roman* Court when the Caſe was not clear, *ampliandum eſt*; So *Epicurus* wou'd have the Object repreſented every way it cou'd be before he paſt his Judgment; yet this prudent Caution wou'd do him no good for this *Hypotheſis*, unleſs he were ſo wiſe as to ſtay till this World were crumbl'd into Atoms again, that by that he might judg of the Origin of it. There is but one way left to find out the truth of things inevident to Senſe, (as by *Epicurus*'s own confeſſion all theſe Atoms are, which are now the component Particles of Bodies; much more thoſe which by their fortuitous concourſe gave Being to the World) and that is, if ſomething evident to Senſe doth apparently prove it, which is his way of proving a Vacuity in Nature and Motion; but tho' that be eaſily anſwer'd by Principles different from thoſe of *Epicurus*, and more rational; yet that very way of probation fails him in this preſent *Hypotheſis*. For what is there evident to Senſe which proves a fortuitous concourſe of Atoms for the production of things? nay if we grant him that the compoſition of Bodies is nothing elſe but the Contexture of theſe inſenſible Particles, yet this is far from being an evidence to Senſe, that theſe Particles without any wiſe and directing Providence ſhou'd make up ſuch Bodies as we ſee in the world. And here when we ſpeak of the evidence of Senſe, we may well ask, as the *Stoic* in *Tully* doth, whether ever *Epicurus* found a Poem made by the caſual throwing of Letters together; and if a concourſe of Atoms did produce the world, *cur porticum, cur templum, cur domum, cur urbem non poteſt? Why did it never produce a cloyſter, a temple, a houſe, a city*, which are far eaſier things than the world? I know *Epicurus* will ſoon reply, *That things are otherwiſe in the World now than when it was produc'd*; I grant it, and from thence prove, that becauſe no ſuch thing ever happens in the world now, as a merely caſual concourſe of Atoms to produce any things, *Epicurus* could have no Evidence from Senſe at all to find out the truth of his *Hypotheſis* by. And as little relief can he find from his ſecond *Criterium*, viz. *Anticipation*; for by his own acknowledgment, all Anticipation depends on the Senſes, and Men have it only one of theſe four ways, 1. By Incurſion, as the Species of a Man is preſerv'd by the ſight of him. 2. By Proportion, as we can enlarge or contract that Species of a Man either into a Gyant or Pigmy. 3. By Similitude, as we may fanſie the image of a City by reſemblance to one which we have ſeen. 4. By Compoſition, whereby we may joyn different Images together, as of a Horſe and a Man to make a Centaur. Now tho' it be very queſtionable how ſome of theſe ways belong to a *Criterium* of Truth, yet none of them reach our caſe; for there can be no Incurſion of inſenſible Particles as ſuch upon our Senſes; we may indeed by proportion imagin the parvitude of them: but what is this to the proving the truth of the *Hypotheſis?* Similitude can do no good, unleſs *Epicurus* had ever ſeen a world made ſo; the only relief muſt be from compoſition, and that will prove the Origin of the world by Atoms to be as true as that there are Centaurs in the world, which we verily believe. Theſe are the only *Criteria* which *Epicurus*

Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. 2.

V. Gaſſend. de Logica Epicuri. Op. To. 1. c. 7. Can. 7.

curus wou'd judg of the truth of natural things by (for the third, Paſſion relates wholly to things Moral and not Phyſical) and now let any one judg, whether the *Hypotheſis* of the Origin of the Uverſe by Atoms can ever be prov'd true, either by the judgment of Senſe, or by Anticipation.

The way they had to prove this *Hypotheſis* was inſufficient; and that was by proving that the Bodies of the World are compounded of ſuch inſenſible Particles; now, granting the thing, I deny the conſequence; for what tho' the compoſitiou of Bodies be from the contexture of Atoms, doth it therefore follow, that theſe Particles did caſually produce theſe Bodies? Nay doth it at all follow, that becauſe Bodies upon their reſolution do fall into inſenſible Particles of different ſize, figure and motion, therefore theſe Particles muſt be præ-exiſtent to all Bodies in the world? For it is plain, that there is now an Univerſal lump of Matter out of which theſe inſenſible Particles ariſe, and whither they return on the diſſolution of Bodies; and all theſe various Corpuſcles may be of the ſame uniform ſubſtance only with the alteration of ſize, ſhape and motion; but what then? Doth this prove, that becauſe particular Bodies do now emerge out of the various configuration and motion of inſenſible Particles of that Matter which exiſts in the world, that therefore this whole Matter was produc'd by the caſual occurſions of theſe Atoms? It will ask more time and pains than is uſually taken by the Philoſophers either ancient or modern, to prove that thoſe things whatſoever they are, whether Elements or Particles out of which Bodies are ſuppos'd to be compounded, do exiſt ſeparately from ſuch compounded Bodies, and antecedently to them. We find no *Ariſtotelian* Elements pure in the world, nor any Particles of Matter deſtitute of ſuch a ſize, figure and motion as doth make ſome Body or other. From whence then can we infer either the exiſtence of *Ariſtotle*'s *materia prima*, without quiddity, quantity, or quality, or the *Epicurean* Atoms without ſuch a contexture as makes up ſome Bodies in the world? Our profound Naturaliſt Dr. *Harvey*, after his moſt accurate ſearch into the Natures and Generation of things, delivers this as his Experience and Judgment concerning the commonly reputed Elements or Principles of Bodies. For ſpeaking of the different Opinions of *Empedocles*, and *Hippocrates*, and *Democritus*, and *Epicurus*, concerning the compoſition of Bodies, he adds, *Ego vero neque in animalium productione, nec omnino in ulla corporum ſimilarium generatione, (ſive ea partium animalium, ſive plantarum, lapidum, mineralium,* &c. *fuerit) vel congregationem ejuſmodi, vel miſcibilia diverſa in generationis opere unienda præ-exiſtere, obſervare unquam potui.* And after explaining the way which he conceiv'd moſt rational and conſonant to Experience in the Generation of things, he concludes his diſcourſe with theſe words; *Idemque in omni generatione fieri crediderim; adeo ut corpora ſimilaria miſta, elementa ſua tempore priora non habeant, ſed illa potius elementis ſuis prius exiſtant (nempe Empedoclis atque Ariſtotelis igne, aqua, aere, terra, vel Chymicorum ſale, ſulphure, & Mercurio, aut Democriti atomis) utpote natura quoque ipſis perfectiora. Sunt, inquam, miſta, & compoſita, etiam tempore priora elementis quibuſlibet ſic dictis, in quæ illa corrumpuntur & deſinunt; diſſolvuntur ſcilicet,*

XIII. 2.

Harvey, de Generat. Anim.

ſcilicet, in iſta ratione potius quam re ipſa & actu. Elementa itaque quæ dicuntur, non ſunt priora iſtis rebus quæ generantur aut oriuntur; ſed poſteriora potius, & reliquiæ magis quam principia. Neque Ariſtoteles ipſemet aut alius quiſpiam unquam demonſtravit, elementa in rerum natura ſeparatim exiſtere, aut principia eſſe corporum ſimilarium. If then none of theſe things which Bodies are reſolv'd into, and are ſuppos'd to be compounded of, either have been or can be prov'd to exiſt ſeparate from and antecedent to thoſe Bodies which they compound, what then becomes of all our company of Atoms which are ſuppos'd by their concourſe in an infinite Space to be the Origin of the world? I know not where to find them, unleſs dancing with the School-men's *Chimera's* in a *vacuum*, or in a Space as empty as the infinite one, *viz.* ſome *Epicurean*'s Brains. Neither therein will they be much unlike their great Maſter *Epicurus*, if we believe the character which the *Stoic* in *Tully* gives of him, who ſaith he was *homo ſine arte, ſine literis, inſultans in omnes, ſine acumine ullo, ſine auctoritate, ſine lepore.* But allowing the *Stoic* ſome of that Paſſion, (which he diſclaim'd ſo much) in theſe words; yet we may rather believe what *Tully* himſelf elſewhere ſpeaks of *Epicurus*'s Sentiments, that they were none of them handſom or becoming a Man. *At ille quid ſentit?* ſaith he of *Epicurus*; and ſoon replies, *ſentit autem nihil unquam elegans, nihil decorum*; and in another place ſpeaking of his Morals, he ſaith, *nihil generoſum ſapit atque magnificum, there was nothing Noble and Generous in him.* Which Cenſure of *Epicurus*, all the pains that *P. Gaſſendus* hath taken in the Vindication of the Life and Opinions of *Epicurus*, hath not been able to wipe off. For altho' we ſhou'd yield what that learned Man ſo much contends for, that all the Calumnies which were caſt on *Epicurus* ariſe from the antipathy between *Zeno* and the following *Stoics*, and the School of *Epicurus*; yet all this will not make *Epicurus* to have been comparable with ſome other Philoſophers for parts and judgment, whoſe Principles have ſomewhat more generous and venerable in them, than the Morals of *Epicurus* had, taking them in their more refin'd ſenſe.

Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. 2.

Idem de Divinat. l. 1.

Idem de Finibus, l. 1.

XIV. But it is not the Morality of *Epicurus* which we now inquire after; our buſineſs is to ſee how well he acquits himſelf in rendring an account of the Origin of the Univerſe without a Deity. And ſo we come to conſider the *Hypotheſis* it ſelf, whether it be rational or no, or conſiſtent with the Catholic Laws of Nature which appear in the world. Two things I ſhall here inquire into, which are the main Principles of *Epicurus*, viz. the motion of theſe Atoms in the infinite Space, and the manner of the concretion of Bodies by the concourſe of theſe Atoms.

1. I begin with their motion; which *Epicurus* attributes to his Atoms without any heſitation, and yet never undertakes to give an account of the Origin of that Motion; which argues his whole *Hypotheſis* to be extremely precarious. The thing then, (which he muſt aſſume as his main Principle, without which all his other do nothing) is, That Motion doth inſeparably belong to the leaſt Atom or inſenſible Particle; for without this there cannot be imagin'd any concourſe of Atoms at all, much leſs any ſuch contexture of Bodies out of them. But for one to ſay that Atoms move, becauſe

becauſe it is their nature to move, and give no other account of it, is ſo precarious, that it will never give the leaſt ſatisfaction to an inquiſitive Mind. And it will be the leaſt of all pardonable in the exploders of ſubſtantial Forms and occult Qualities, when the Origin of the whole World is reſolv'd into an occult Quality which gives motion to Atoms. And herein the *Atomiſts* out-do themoſt credulous *Peripatetics*, ſeeing they lay the prime Foundation of the World and of their own Philoſophy together in a thing they can give no rational account of at all, which is, the motion of Atoms in an infinite Vacuity. If it be reply'd, which is all *Epicurus* hath to ſay, *That the motion of Atoms depends upon their gravity*; the queſtion returns upon him with the ſame violence, how comes this gravity to belong to theſe Atoms in ſuch an empty Space, where there can be no impulſion from other Bodies, no attraction from any magnetic Particles which are ſuppos'd to be the cauſes of the deſcent of heavy Bodies? Nay, *Epicurus* himſelf takes away any center of that motion of Atoms; and yet attributes a neceſſary deſcent to his Atoms by virtue of their gravity; and if a Philoſopher may beg ſuch things as theſe are, ſo repugnant to the *Phænomena* of Nature, without aſſigning any other Reaſon for them, but that it is their Nature, let us never venture Philoſophizing more, but ſit down in that contented piece of Ignorance which attributes the Cauſes of every thing unto ſpecific Forms and occult Qualities. For this is ſo ſhameful a piece of Beggery, that *P. Gaſſendus* doth more than once diſclaim it, and in his diſcourſe of Motion doth prove an impoſſibility of motion in an infinite empty Space. Might not *Epicurus* then have ſav'd his Credit better by ſitting down with the Opinions of his Fore-fathers, than thus to go a begging for ſuch *Hypotheſes*, which none, who are not reſolv'd to be ignorant, will be ready to grant him?

Gaſſendus Phyſ. ſ. 1. l. 3. c. 7. De apparent. magnitud. Solis humilis & ſublimis, ep. 4. ſ. 3. De motu Phyſ. ſ. 1. l. 5. c. 2. V. ep. de motu impreſſo a motore tranſlato. To. 3. op.

But yet this is not all, but according to this fundamental Principle of *Epicurus*, viz. That there is a principle of motion in every inſenſible particle of Matter, he plainly overthrows another Principle of his, which is, the ſolidity and different magnitude of theſe Atoms. Theſe Particles are ſuppos'd ſo ſolid, that *Dionyſius* in *Euſebius* tells us the account given why they are call'd ἄτομοι was, διὰ τὸ ἄλυτον στερρότητα, becauſe of their indiſſoluble firmneſs; and the different ſizes of theſe Atoms is ſo neceſſary a Principle, that from thence they undertake to reſolve many *Phænomena* of the Univerſe: let us now ſee how conſiſtent theſe things are with the inſeparable property of Motion belonging to Atoms: For if there be Particles of ſuch different ſizes, then it is plain that there are ſome Particles which may not only be conceiv'd to be bigger than others, but are really ſo; and ſo there muſt be more parts of Matter imagin'd in this bigger Particle than in another leſs; and if there be more parts, theſe parts may be conceiv'd ſeparate from each other, that this Particle may be equal to the other; now then, I demand, if Motion doth inſeparably belong to the leaſt Particle of Matter, how comes one to be bigger than the other? For herein we ſee that every Particle is not in diſtinct motion; for there cannot but be more imaginable Particles in an Atom of a bigger ſize than in a leſs; and if ſo, there muſt be ſome union of thoſe imaginable Particles in that bigger Atom; and how cou'd ſuch an

Euſeb. prap Evang. l. 14. c. 22.

XV.

union be without reſt, and what reſt cou'd there be if motion doth inſeparably belong to every particle of Matter? And ſo it muſt be in all thoſe Atoms which are ſuppos'd to have Angles and Hooks, in order to their better catching hold of each other, for the compoſition of Bodies; how come theſe Hooks and Angles to be annex'd to this Atom? For an Atom may be without them; whence comes this union, if ſuch a principle of motion be in each Particle? If it be anſwer'd, *That Motion did belong to all theſe Particles, but by degrees the leſſer Particles hitting together made up theſe angled and hooked Particles*; I ſoon reply, that the difficulty returns more ſtrongly; for if theſe angled and hooked Particles be ſuppos'd neceſſary to the contexture and union of Bodies; how came thoſe leaſt imaginable Particles ever to unite without ſuch Hooks and Angles? And ſo the Queſtion will return *in infinitum*. If then the ſolidity and indiviſibility of theſe angled Atoms, doth depend on the union and reſt of thoſe leſſer imaginable particles joyn'd together, then it is evident that Motion is no inſeparable property of all theſe Particles, but ſome are capable of union, in order to the making of ſuch Hooks and Angles, which are neceſſary for the contexture of Bodies; and where there is union and ſolidity, there is reſt, which is at leaſt accompany'd with it, if it be not one of the great Cauſes of it. And without which the *Atomiſts*, of all other Philoſophers, will be leaſt able to give an account of firmneſs in Bodies, when they make Bodies to conſiſt of an aggregation of Particles, by which it will be very hard finding a ſufficient account of the difference between fluid and firm Bodies, unleſs it be from the quicker motion and agitation of the particles of fluid Bodies, and the reſt of the ſmall and contiguous parts that make up the firm Body, according to that Catholic Law of Nature, whereby things continue in the ſtate they are in till ſome ſtronger force puts them out of it. The only thing which the *Epicurean Atomiſts* have left to give any account of the ſolidity of Particles of ſuch different ſizes, is, the want of Vacuity; for ſay they, *The ground of diviſibility of Bodies is the interſperſion of a diſſeminated Vacuum; now where there is no Vacuity, tho' the particles be of different ſize, yet they may be ſolid and indiviſible.* But this is taken off by the inſtance produced againſt other perſons by that Ingenious and Honorable Perſon Mr. *Boyle* in his *Phyſiological Eſſays*, which is to this purpoſe, *Suppoſe two of theſe preſum'd indiviſible particles, both ſmooth and of a cubical figure, ſhould happen to lie upon one another, and a third ſhould chance to be fitly placed upon the upper of the two; what ſhould hinder but that this Aggregate may by the violent knock of ſome other Corpuſcles be broken in the midſt of the whole Concretion, and conſequently in the middlemoſt Body?* For ſuppoſe them as ſolid as may be, yet ſince Corpuſcles as hard as they, can be made very violently to knock againſt them, why may not thoſe grate or break the middlemoſt Corpuſcle, or any of the others? And if there be a poſſibility of breaking off theſe cubical particles in the middle, then mere want of Vacuity is no ſufficient account of their being indiviſible. By this we ſee how far the *Atomiſts* are from giving any rational account of the Origin of the motion of the Atoms themſelves without a Deity.

V. Deſcartes, princip. p. 2. art. 54, 55, 56.

Hiſtory of Fluid. and Firm. p. 202.

2. Sup-

2. Supposing this Motion to be granted them, yet they *cannot give any satisfactory account of the manner of concretion of Bodies by the casual occursions of these Atoms moving in an infinite empty space.* Which appears from those gross and extravagant suppositions of *Epicurus*, in order to the making these *Atoms* of his so hit together that they make up any Bodies by their Contexture. XVI.

1. He supposeth as it were two Regions, a Superior and Inferior in an infinite empty Space, which hath no center at all in it, nor any Body, from which to measure those respects of above and below, as appears by his Epistle to *Herodotus*, wherein he saith, *These terms of* ἄνω *and* κάτω, *or upwards and downwards, must be conceiv'd without any bounds or limits at all. So that tho' we conceive something superior, we must imagin nothing supreme, and so on the contrary.* Whereby it is evident, as *Gassendus* confesseth, that *Epicurus* thought the surface of the Earth to be a plain, and this plain to be continued up in a level superficies to the Heavens, and so to all that immense space of the Universe. So that all those heavy Bodies which should fall downwards in any parts of the widest distance on the Earth, as in *Europe*, *Asia*, and *Africa*, would never meet (if they continued their Motion) in the center of the Earth, but would continue their Motion still in a parallel line; and so he imagin'd that which is said to be above as to us, was really the upper part of the World, and so the descent of his *Atoms*, must necessarily be downwards towards the Earth, according to the weight of them. And was not this a worthy *Mathematical* Supposition, for one who would undertake to give an Account of the Origin of the Universe without a *Deity?* *Gassend. Physic. s.* 1. *l.* 3. *c.* 7.

This Motion of descent by reason of the gravity of *Atoms* would not serve his turn; for if the *Atoms* mov'd downwards thus in a parallel line, how was it possible for them ever to meet for the contextures of Bodies? Now for this purpose he invented a *Motion of declination*; for finding the Motion *ad lineam*, or *ad perpendiculum* as some call it, could not possibly produce those varieties of Bodies which are in the Universe, he suppos'd therefore the Descent not to be in a perpendicular right line, but to decline a little, that so several Particles in their descent might make some occursions one upon another. And this *Epicurus* added to *Democritus*; but therein, as *Tully* observes, was very unhappy, that where he adds to *Democritus*, *ea quæ corrigere vult, mihi quidem depravare videatur*; that he marr'd what *Democritus* had said, by mending of it. The reason of which Motion of Declination is thus given by *Lucretius*; *Cicero de Fin. l.* 1.

Quod nisi declinare solerent, omnia deorsum
Imbris uti guttæ caderent per Inane profundum;
Nec foret offensus natus, neque plaga creata
Principiis, ita nil unquam natura creasset. *Lucret. l.* 2.

It was obvious to object, That, according to the Principles of *Epicurus*, there could have been no concourse at all of *Atoms* in an infinite space, on the two grounds he went on, which were the Natural Descent of *Atoms*, and the *æqui-velocity* of the Motion of all *Atoms* of what size soever, which he likewise asserted (altho' one

would think, if Gravity were the cauſe of Motion, then the more Gravity, the ſwifter the Motion would be) from hence, I ſay, it were not eaſy to conceive how the *Atoms* ſhould embrace each other in a parallel line, if they fell down, as *Lucretius* expreſſeth it, *like drops of rain*; and therefore they ſaw a neceſſity to make their Motion decline a little, that ſo they might juſtle and hit one upon another. But this oblique Motion of the *Atoms*, tho' it be the only refuge left to ſalve the origin of things by a concourſe of *Atoms*, is yet as precarious and without reaſon as any other Suppoſition of theirs whatſoever. *Tully* chargeth this Motion of Declination with two great faults, *Futility*, and *Inefficacy*, *quæ cum res tota ficta ſit pueriliter, tum ne efficit quidem quod vult.* It is a childiſh Fancy, and to no purpoſe: For, *firſt*, It is aſſerted without any reaſon at all given for it, which is unworthy a *Philoſopher*; neither is to any purpoſe; for if all *Atoms*, ſaith he, decline in their Motion, then none of them will ſtick together; if ſome decline, and others do not, this is as precarious as any thing can be imagin'd, to aſſign a diverſity of Motion in indiviſible Particles, which yet have all the ſame velocity of Motion; and, as *Tully* ſaith, *Hoc erit quaſi provincias Atomis dare, quæ recte, quæ oblique ferantur*; as tho' *Epicurus* were the General at this *Rendezvous* of *Atoms*, who ſtands ready to appoint every one his Task and Motion. This *Plutarch* tells us was the great charge againſt *Epicurus*, ὡς ἀναίτιον εἰσαγαγὼν κίνησιν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, *becauſe he introduced ſuch a Motion of Declination out of nothing, upon no pretenſe of reaſon.* And *Turnebus* tells us that the ground why they deſir'd ſo ſmall a Declination, was, becauſe they were conſcious to themſelves, that it was founded upon no ground of Reaſon; *Et Epicurei ſibi conſcii culpæ, timide eam ponebant, & minimam ſibi poſtulabant.* To which purpoſe *Turnebus* cites thoſe Verſes of *Lucretius*,

Ciccero de Fin. bon. & mal. lib. 1.

Plutarch. de Anim. procreat. è Timæo.

Turnebus in Ciceron. de Fato.

Lucret. l. 2.

Quare etiam atque etiam paulum inclinare neceſſe eſt
Corpora, nec pluſquam minimum, ne fingere motus
Obliquos videamur, & id res vera refutet.
Nam hoc in promptu manifeſtumque eſſe videmus,
Pondera quantum in ſe eſt, non poſſe obliqua meare
E ſupero cum præcipitant, quod cernere poſſis.
Sed nihil omnino recta regione viai
Declinare quis eſt qui poſſit cernere ſeſe?

But this Argument of *Lucretius* will hold, if at all, further than this little Declination (for it is no more they deſire than as little as may be imagin'd, *quo nihil poſſit fieri minus*, as *Tully* expreſſeth it) but if they may decline a little, why not a great deal more? nay, it is impoſſible to conceive, but a little oblique Motion at firſt will in an infinite Space grow to be very oblique; for there is nothing to hinder the Motion which way it bends: now if there be never ſo little Motion of Declination, the *Atom* will be inclin'd that way; and what then ſhould hinder, but that the obliquity in a Motion thro' a great Space ſhould at laſt come to be very great; there being no center at all to guide the Motion towards, and the gravity not hindring this little Declination? Therefore *Tully* asks that Queſtion, *Cur declinet uno minimo, non declinet duobus aut tribus? Why only it declines one minim, and not two or three?* For, ſaith

Cicero de Fato.

ſaith he, *it is no impulſion from any other Atom which makes it decline that one minim; neither is there any impediment in the Space to hinder it from declining more; ſo that*, as he well ſaith, *optare hoc quidem eſt, non diſputare*, this is to beg *Hypotheſes*, and not to prove them, which is the thing we have prov'd *Epicurus* to do. Which was the firſt thing premis'd, *viz.* that this *Hypotheſis* of *Epicurus* was very precarious, and is built on no foundation of Reaſon.

2. *It is unſatisfactory and inſufficient, as well as precarious*; for ſhould we grant his two main Principles, *Atoms*, and his *Infinite empty Space*; yet we deny that ever his *Atoms* with all their occurſions would ever produce thoſe things which are in the Univerſe. To run thro' the noted *Phænomena* of the Univerſe, and to ſhew how inſufficient an account the *Epicureans* are able to give of them, from a fortuitous concourſe of *Atoms*, is a task too large to be here undertaken. There are only three things which I ſhall rather ſuggeſt than inſiſt upon, to ſee what miſerable ſhifts the *Epicureans* are driven to for the ſalving of them, and ſhall then leave it with the *Reader* to judg, what unmeaſurable confidence it is in any to reject the Creation of the World for the ſake of the *Epicurean Hypotheſis*; and whether it be not the height of credulity, as well as infidelity, to believe the World ever to have been made by a fortuitous concourſe of *Atoms*. XVII.

1. *The great variety of appearances in Nature*, which are attributed to Particles of the ſame Nature, only with the alteration of Size, Shape and Motion. That ſome things in the world, ſhould have no other reaſon given of them, may not only be tolerable, but rational, as in the objects and operations on the organs of Senſe, thoſe affections which are miſtaken for real qualities, &c. But that all thoſe effects which are ſeen in Nature, ſhould have no other cauſe but the different Configuration and Motion of *Atoms*, is the height of Folly as well as impiety. To imagin that the Particles of Matter, as they are in Men, ſhould be capable of Senſation, Memory, Intellection, Volition, &c. merely becauſe of a different Shape, Size and Motion from what they have in a piece of wood, is a riddle that requires a new Configuration of *Atoms* in us to make us underſtand. May it not be hoped, that at leaſt one time or other by this caſual concourſe of *Atoms*, the Particles may light to be of ſuch a Nature in Stones, as to make them fly; in Plants, to make them all ſenſitive; and in Beaſts, to make them reaſon and diſcourſe? What may hinder ſuch a Configuration or Motion of Particles, if all theſe effects are to be imputed to no higher Principles? We ſee in other Bodies what different appearances are caus'd by a ſudden alteration of the Particles of the Matter of which they are compounded; why may it not fall out ſo in the things mentioned? Neither can this be unreaſonable to demand. 1. Becauſe the Motion of theſe Particles of Matter is caſual ſtill according to them, and who knows what chance may do? for the Seminal Principles themſelves are, I ſuppoſe, according to them of the ſame uniform Matter with the reſt of the world, and ſo are liable to different Motion and Configution. 2. Becauſe all Particles of Matter are ſuppos'd to be in continual Motion, becauſe of that diſſeminated Vacuity which is preſum'd

ſum'd to be in the world, and becauſe a *Coacervate Vacuity* is not only aſſerted as poſſible, but as probably exiſtent: I aſſume only then (that which is inſiſted on as probable) *viz.* that that Space which lies between our *Atmoſphere* and the *Stars*, is empty of any other thing, but only the rays of the *Stars* which paſs thro' it; I then ſuppoſing it a Vacuity, whether would not the Particles of thoſe Bodies which lie contiguous to that Space preſently diſlodg from the Bodies wherein they are, and begin a new *Rendezvous* of *Atoms* there? for all *Atoms* are ſuppos'd to be in perpetual Motion; and the cauſe aſſign'd, why in ſolid Bodies they do not fly away, is becauſe of the repercuſſion of other *Atoms*, that when they once begin to ſtir, they receive ſuch knocks as make them quiet in their places. Now this cannot hold in the Bodies contiguous to this Space; for both thoſe Bodies are more fluid, and ſo there is no ſuch knocking of Particles to keep them at reſt; but which is more, thoſe which are contiguous have nothing at all to hinder them from Motion, and ſo thoſe Particles will neceſſarily remove into that empty Space where there is no impediment of their Motion, and ſo the next *Atoms* to thoſe muſt remove, becauſe that Space wherein the other were is made empty by their removal; and ſo the next, and ſo on, till not only the Air, but the whole maſs of the Earth will on ſuppoſition of ſuch a Vacuity be diſſolv'd into its firſt Particles, which will all mutiny in the ſeveral Bodies wherein they are, and never reſt till they come to that empty Space, where they may again *Rendezvous* together. So dangerous is the news of Liberty, or of an empty Space to theſe *Democratical* Particles of the Univerſe. Neither can I ſee how a diſſeminated Vacuity can ſalve the difficulty; for thoſe Particles of the moſt ſolid Bodies, being in continual Motion, and the ground of their union being repercuſſion, it thence follows that towards that part where the diſſeminated *vacuum* is, the Particles meeting with no ſuch ſtrokes may fairly take their leaves of the Bodies they are in, and ſo one ſucceed in the place of another, till the Configuration of the whole be alter'd, and conſequently different appearances and effects may be caus'd in the ſame Bodies, tho' it reſults from ſeminal Principles. So that according to the *Atomical* Principles, no Rational account can be given of thoſe Effects which are ſeen in Nature. This *Dionyſius* in *Euſebius* urgeth againſt the *Atomiſts*, that from the ſame Principles without evident reaſon given for it, they make of the ſame uniform Matter ſome things conſpicuous to Senſe, others not, ſome ſhort-liv'd, others extremely long-liv'd. Τίνα δὲ τρόπον μιᾶς ἔστι καὶ τ̃ αὐτ̃ης ἀπείρων ὑσίας, καὶ τ̃ αὐτ̃ης ἀφθάρτε φύσεως, πολὺ τ̃ μεγεθῶν, ὡς φασι, καὶ τ̃ σχημάτων, ἓ μὲν ἐπ μῆκος καὶ ὀκτάεδρα καὶ αἰώνια, ὡς αὐτὸι φάσκειν ἂν, πύραμιδα, ἡ κυβικώτερά γε καὶ τὸν ἥλιον ὀνομάσαντα, φαινόμενά π καὶ ἀφανῆ; *What ground can there be aſſign'd of ſo vaſt a difference between things if they all be of the ſame nature, and differ only in ſize and ſhape?* ſaith that excellent Perſon, who there with a great deal of Eloquence lays open the folly of the *Atomical* Philoſophy, Θαυμαστὸν γὰ τ̃ ἀτίμων, ἡ δημοκρατία δεδογμένον π ἀλλήλοις τῶν φίλων καὶ συναπτομένων εἰς μίαν π κατοικίαν συνοικίαν ἐπεσπευσμένων. *It is a rare Democracy of Atoms*, ſaith he, *where the friendly Atoms meet and embrace each other, and from thence forward live in the cloſeſt ſociety together.*

Euſeb. Prep. Ev. l. 15. c. 24.

2. Not

2. Not only the variety, but the *exact order and beauty of the World*, is a thing unaccountable by the *Atomical Hypotheſis*. Were the whole World ſtill a *Heſiod*'s *Chaos* (from the conſideration of which *Diogenes Laertius* tells us *Epicurus* began to philoſophize) we might probably believe an Agitation of Particles (ſuppoſing matter created) might ſettle it in ſuch a confus'd manner; but that there ſhould be nothing elſe but a blind *impetus* of *Atoms* to produce thoſe vaſt and moſt regular Motions of the heavenly Bodies, to order the paſſage of the *Sun* for ſo great conveniency of Nature, and for the alternate ſucceſſion of the Seaſons of the Year, which ſhould cut ſuch Channels for the *Ocean*, and keep that vaſt Body of the Water (whoſe ſurface is higher than the Earth) from overflowing it, which ſhould furniſh the Earth with ſuch ſeminal and prolific Principles, as to provide food and nouriſhment for thoſe Animals which live upon it, and furniſh out every thing neceſſary for the comfort and delight of Man's Life; to believe, I ſay, that all theſe things came only from a blind and fortuitous concourſe of *Atoms*, is the moſt prodigious piece of credulity and folly, that Human Nature is ſubject to. But this part which concerns the order and beauty of the parts of the Univerſe, and the Argument thence, that it could be no blind fortuitous Principle, but an infinitely wiſe God, hath been ſo fully and judiciouſly handled by a Learned Perſon already, that I ſhall rather chooſe to refer the Reader to his Diſcourſe, than inſiſt any more upon it.

Laert. l. 10.

D.H. *More* Antidote againſt Atheiſm, *part* 2.

3. *The Production of Mankind* is a thing which the *Atomiſts* are moſt ſhamefully puzzl'd with, as well as the Formation of the internal parts of Man's Body, of which I have already ſpoken in the precedent Chapter. It would pity one to ſee what lamentable ſhifts the *Atomiſts* are put to, to find out a way for the Production of Mankind, *viz. That our teeming mother the Earth, at laſt caſt forth ſome kind of bags like wombs upon the ſurface of the Earth, and theſe by degrees breaking, at laſt came out Children, which were nouriſh'd by a kind of juice of the Earth like Milk, by which they were brought up till they came to be Men.* Oh what will not *Atheiſts* believe rather than a Deity and *Providence!* But leſt we ſhould ſeem to wrong the *Atomiſts*, hear what *Cenſorinus* ſaith of *Epicurus*; *Is enim credidit limo calefactos uteros neſcio quos radicibus terræ cohærentes, primum increviſſe, & infantibus, ex ſe editis ingenitum lactis humorem, natura miniſtrante præbuiſſe; quos ita educatos & adultos, genus humanum propagaſſe.* But becauſe *Lucretius* may be thought to ſpeak more impartially in the caſe, how rarely doth he deſcribe it?

Cenſor. de die Nat. c. 2.

Creſcebant uteri terræ radicibus apti,
Quos ubi tempore maturo patefecerit ætas
Infantum, fugiens humorem, auraſque petiſſens,
Convertebat ibi natura foramina terræ,
Et ſuccum venis cogebat fundere apertis
Conſimilem lactis; ſicut nunc fœmina quæque
Quum peperit dulci repletur lacte, quod omnis
Impetus in mammas convertitur ille alimenti:
Terra cibum pueris, veſtem vapor, herba cubile
Præbebat, multa & molli lanugine abundans.

Had *Lucretius* been only a Poet, this might have paſs'd for a handſomely deſcrib'd Fable: but to deliver it for a piece of Philoſophy, makes it the greater Mythology: that Man's Body was form'd out of the Earth we believe, becauſe we have reaſon ſo to do; but that the Earth ſhould caſt forth ſuch *folliculi*, as he expreſſeth it, and then Men ſhould be brought up in ſuch a way as he deſcribes, deſerves a place among the moſt incredible and Poetic Fables. But if Poets muſt be credited, how much more like a Man did he ſpeak, who told us,

Natus homo eſt; ſive hunc divino ſemine fecit
Ille opifex rerum, Mundi melioris origo;
Sive recens tellus, ſeductaque nuper ab alto
Æthere, cognati retinebat ſemina cœli;
Quam ſatus Iapeto miſtam fluvialibus undis,
Finxit in effigiem moderantum cuncta Deorum.

Thus have we conſider'd the *Epicurean Hypotheſis*, both as to the Principles on which it ſtands, and the ſutableneſs of it to the *Phænomena* of the Univerſe; and I ſuppoſe now there cannot be the the leaſt ſhadow of Reaſon found from the *Atomical Philoſophy* to make us at all queſtion that Account of the Origin of the Univerſe, which aſcribes it not to the fortuitous concourſe of *Atoms*, but to the infinite wiſdom of a Deity. I conclude then this Diſcourſe of the *Epicurean Hypotheſis* with the words of *Automedon* in the *Greek Epigram*.

Anthолog. l. 1. c. 15.

Ταῦτ' εἰδὼς ϭοφὸς ἴϖι, μάτην δ' Ἐπίκυϱον ἔαϭον
Πᾶ τὸ κενὸν ζητεῖν, κ̀ τίνες αἱ μονάδες.

Learn to be wiſe; let Epicurus *chaſe*
To find his Atoms, *and his empty Space.*

XVIII. I come now to the laſt *Hypotheſis* mention'd, which undertakes to give an account of the Origin of the Univerſe, *from the mere Mechanical Laws of Motion and Matter*. Which is the *Hypotheſis* of the late Famous *French* Philoſopher Mr. *Des-Cartes*. For altho' there be as much Reaſon as Charity to believe that he never intended his *Hypotheſis* as a foundation of *Atheiſm*, having made it ſo much his buſineſs to aſſert the Exiſtence of a Deity, and Immateriality of the Soul: yet becauſe it is apt to be abus'd to that end by Perſons *Atheiſtically* diſpos'd, becauſe of his aſcribing ſo much to the power of Matter; we ſhall therefore ſo far conſider it, as it undertakes to give an Account of the Origin of the Univerſe without a Deity. His *Hypotheſis* therefore is briefly this. He takes it for granted, that all the Matter of the World was at firſt of one Uniform Nature, diviſible into innumerable parts, and divided into many, which were all in Motion: from hence he ſuppoſeth, 1. *That all the Matter of which the Univerſe is compoſed, was at firſt divided into equal particles of an indifferent ſize, and that they had all ſuch a Motion as is now found in the*

Carteſii Princip. P. 3. Art. 46, &c.

the World. 2. *That all thoſe particles were not at firſt Sphærical, becauſe many ſuch little Globes joyn'd together will not fill up a continued Space, but that of whatever figure they were at firſt, they would by continual Motion become Sphærical, becauſe they would have various circular Motions; for ſeeing that at firſt they were mov'd with ſo great force that one particle would be disjoyn'd from the other, the ſame force continuing would ſerve to cut off all angles which are ſuppos'd in them, by their frequent occurſions againſt each other; and ſo when the angles were cut off, they would become Sphærical.* 3. *He ſuppoſeth that no Space is left empty, but when thoſe round particles being joyn'd, leave ſome intervals between them, there are ſome more ſubtile particles of Matter, which are ready to fill up thoſe void Spaces, which ariſe from thoſe angles which were cut off from the other particles to make them Sphærical; which fragments of particles are ſo little, and acquire thereby ſuch a celerity of Motion, that by the force of that, they will be divided into innumerable little fragments, and ſo will fill up all thoſe Spaces which other particles could not enter in at.* 4. *That thoſe particles which fill up the intervals between the Sphærical ones, have not all of them the ſame celerity of Motion, becauſe ſome of them are more undivided than others are, which fill'd up the ſpace between three globular particles when their angles were cut off, and therefore thoſe particles muſt neceſſarily have very angular figures, which are unfit for Motion, and thence it comes to paſs that ſuch particles eaſily ſtick together, and transfer the greateſt part of their Motion upon thoſe other particles which are leſs, and therefore have a ſwifter motion; and becauſe theſe particles are to paſs thro' ſuch triangular ſpaces which lie in the midſt of three globular particles touching each other, therefore he ſuppoſeth them as to their breadth and depth to be of a triangular figure; but becauſe theſe particles are ſomewhat long, and the globular particles thro' which they paſs with ſo ſwift motion have their rotation about the poles of the Heavens, thence he ſuppoſes that thoſe triangular particles come to be wreathed.* Now from theſe things being thus ſuppos'd, *Des-Cartes* hath ingenuouſly and conſonantly to his Principles undertaken to give an Account of the moſt noted *Phænomena* of the World, and thoſe three ſorts of particles mention'd, he makes to be his three Elements. The *firſt* is that ſubtile Matter which was ſuppos'd to ariſe from the cutting off the angles of the greater particles; and of this he tells us the *Sun* and Fix'd *Stars* conſiſt, as thoſe particles of that ſubtile Matter being in continual motion have made thoſe ſeveral *vortices* or *Æthereal Whirpools*. The *ſecond* Element conſiſts of the *Sphærical* particles themſelves, which make up the *Heavens*; out of the *third* Element, which are thoſe *Wreathed particles*, he gives an Account of the Formation of the *Earth*, and *Planets*, and *Comets*; and from all of them, by the help of thoſe common Affections of Matter, Size, Figure, Motion, &c. he undertakes to give an Account of the *Phænomena* of the World. How far his Principles do conduce to the giving Mens Minds ſatisfaction, as to the particular *Phænomena* of *Nature*, is not here our buſineſs to inquire, but only how far theſe Principles can give an Account of the Origin of the Univerſe without a DEITY? And that it

cannot give a ſatisfactory account how the World was fram'd without a *Deity*, appears by the two grand Suppoſitions on which all his Elements depend, both which cannot be from any other Principle but God. Thoſe are, 1. *The Exiſtence of Matter in the World*, which we have already prov'd cannot be independent on God, and neceſſarily exiſtent; and therefore ſuppoſing that Matter exiſtent and put into Motion, would grind it ſelf into thoſe ſeveral particles by him ſuppos'd, yet this cannot give an Account of the Origin of the Univerſe without a *Deity*. 2. *The motion of the particles of Matter ſuppoſeth a* Deity; for Matter is no ſelf-moving Principle, as hath been fully demonſtrated in ſeveral places by that judicious Philoſopher Dr. *H. More*, who plainly manifeſts that if Motion did neceſſarily belong to Matter, it were impoſſible there ſhould be *Sun*, or *Stars*, or *Earth*, or *Man* in the World; for the Matter being uniform, it muſt have equal Motion in all its particles, if Motion doth belong to it. For Motion being ſuppos'd to be natural and eſſential to Matter, muſt be alike every where in it, and therefore every particle muſt be ſuppos'd in motion to its utmoſt capacity, and ſo every particle is alike and mov'd alike: and therefore there being no prevalency at all in any one particle above another in Bigneſs or Motion, it is manifeſt that this *Univerſal Matter*, to whom Motion is ſo eſſential and natural, will be ineffectual for the producing of any variety of appearances in Nature; for nothing could be caus'd by this thin and ſubtile Matter, but what would be wholly imperceptible to any of our Senſes: and what a ſtrange kind of viſible World would this be? From hence then it appears that there muſt be an infinitely powerful and wiſe God, who muſt both put Matter into Motion, and regulate the Motion of it, in order to the producing all thoſe varieties which appear in the World. And this neceſſity of the Motion of Matter by a power given it from God is freely acknowledg'd by Mr. *Des-Cartes* himſelf in theſe words; *Conſidero materiam ſibi libere permiſſam, & nullum aliunde impulſum ſuſcipientem, ut plane quieſcentem; illa autem impellitur a Deo, tantundem motus ſive tranſlationis in ea conſervante quantum ab initio poſuit*. So that this great improver and diſcoverer of the Mechanical power of Matter, doth freely confeſs the neceſſity not only of God's giving Motion in order to the Origin of the Univerſe, but of his conſerving Motion in it for the upholding it: So that we need not fear from this *Hypotheſis* the excluding of a *Deity* from being the prime efficient cauſe of the World. All the Queſtion then is concerning the particular manner, which was us'd by God as the efficient cauſe in giving Being to the World. As to which I ſhall only in general ſuggeſt what *Maimonides* ſays of it. *Omnia ſimul creata erant, & poſtea ſucceſſive ab invicem ſeparata*; altho' I am ſomewhat inclinable to that of *Gaſſendus*, *Majus eſt mundus opus, quam ut aſſequi mens humana illius molitionem poſſit*: To which I think may be well apply'd that Speech of *Solomon*; *Then I beheld all the work of* God, *that a man cannot find out the work that is done under the Sun: becauſe tho' a man labor to ſeek it out, yea further, tho' a wiſe man think to know it, yet ſhall he not be able to find it*.

Dr. *More Antidote b. 2. ch. 1.* Immortality of the Soul, *b. 1. c. 11. ſ. 3.* &c. *Ep. 3. ad Carteſ. p. 88.*

Carteſ. reſp. ad ep. 3. H. Mori, p. 104.

Maimon. More Nev. l. 2. c. 30. Gaſſendi Phyſic. ſ. 1. l. 7. c. 6. Eccl. 8. 17.

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

Of the Origin of Evil.

I. *Of the Being of Providence.* II. Epicurus *his Arguments againſt it refuted. The neceſſity of the belief of Providence in order to Religion.* III. *Providence prov'd from a conſideration of the nature of* God, *and the things of the World. Of the Spirit of Nature.* IV. *The great objections againſt Providence propounded. The firſt concerns the Origin of Evil.* V. God *cannot be the Author of Sin, if the Scriptures be true. The account which the Scriptures give of the fall of Man, doth not charge* God *with Man's fault.* God's *power to govern Man by Laws, tho' he gives no particular reaſon of every poſitive Precept.* VI. *The reaſon of* God's *creating Man with freedom of Will, largely ſhew'd from* Simplicius; *and the true account of the Origin of Evil.* VII. God's *permitting the Fall, makes him not the Author of it.* VIII. *The account which the Scriptures give of the Origin of Evil compar'd with that of Heathen Philoſophers.* IX. *The antiquity of the opinion of aſcribing the Origin of Evil to an evil Principle. Of the judgment of the* Perſians, Ægyptians, *and others about it.* X. *Of Manichæiſm.* XI, XII, XIII, XIV. *The opinion of the ancient Greek Philoſophers; of* Pythagoras, Plato, *the* Stoics; *the Origin of Evil not from the neceſſity of Matter.* XV, XVI. *The remainders of the Hiſtory of the Fall among the Heathens.* XVII, XVIII, XIX. *Of the malignity of* Dæmons. XX, XXI, XXII. *Providence vindicated as to the ſufferings of the good, and impunity of bad Men. An account of both from Natural Light, manifeſted by* Seneca, Plutarch, *and others.*

IT being now manifeſted not only that there is a God, but that the World had its Being from Him; it thence follows by an eaſy and rational Deduction, that there is a particular Hand of Divine Providence, which upholds the World in its Being, and wiſely diſpoſeth all Events in it. For it is a moſt irrational and abſurd Opinion to aſſert a *Deity*, and deny *Providence:* and in nothing did *Epicurus* more diſcover the weakneſs and puerility of his judgment than in this. Indeed, if *Epicurus* had no other deſign in aſſerting a *Deity*, than (as many ancient Philoſophers imagin'd) to avoid the imputation of direct *Atheiſm*, and yet to take away all foundations of Religion; he muſt needs be ſaid to ſerve his *Hypotheſis* well, tho' he did aſſert the Being of an *Excellent Nature*, which he call'd God; while yet he made Him ſit as it were with his Elbows folded up in the Heavens, and taking no cognizance of Human actions. For he well knew, that if the belief of Di- I.

vine Providence were once rooted out of Mens Minds, the thoughts of an *Excellent Being* above the Heavens, would have no more awe or power upon the Hearts and Lives of Men, than the telling Men that there are Jewels of ineſtimable value in the *Indies*, makes them more ready to pay Taxes to their Princes. For that Philoſopher could not be ignorant, that it is not Worth but Power, nor Speculation but Intereſt that rules the World. The poor Tenant more regards his petty Landlord, than the greateſt Prince in the World that hath nothing to do with him: and he thinks he hath great reaſon for it; for he neither fears puniſhment, nor hopes for reward from him; whereas his Landlord may diſpoſſeſs him of all he hath upon diſpleaſure, and may advantage him the moſt if he gains his favor: Suppoſing then that there were ſuch an *Excellent Being* in the World which was compleatly happy in Himſelf, and thought it an impairing of his happineſs to trouble Himſelf with an inſpection of the World; Religion might then be indeed deriv'd *à relegendo*, but not *à religando*; there might be ſome pleaſure in contemplating his Nature, but there could be no obligation to Obedience. So that *Epicurus* was the firſt founder of a kind of *Philoſophical Antinomianiſm*, placing all Religion in a Veneration of *the Deity*, purely for its own Excellency, without any ſuch mercenary Eye (as thoſe who ſerve God for their own ends, as they ſay, are apt to have) to reward and puniſhment. And I much doubt that Good-woman whom the Story goes of, who in an *Enthuſiaſtic* poſture ran up and down the Streets with Emblems in her Hands, *Fire* in the one, as ſhe ſaid, to burn up *Heaven*, and *Water* in the other, to quench *Hell*, that Men might ſerve God purely for Himſelf, would, if ſhe had compaſs'd her deſign, ſoon have brought *Proſelytes* enough to *Epicurus*, and by burning *Heaven* would have burnt up the Cords of *Religion*, and in quenching *Hell* would have extinguiſh'd the Awe and Fear of a *Deity* in the World. Inded the incomparable Excellency and Perfection which is in the *Divine Nature*, to Spirits advanc'd to a Noble and Generous height in Religion, makes them exceedingly value their Choice; while they diſregard whatever rivals with God for it; but were it not for thoſe Magnetical hooks of Obedience and Eternal Intereſt, there are few would be drawn to a due Conſideration of, much leſs a Delight in ſo Amiable and Excellent a Nature. And it is impoſſible to conceive, why God in the Revelation of his Will ſhould ever ſo much as mention a future puniſhment, or promiſe an eternal Reward, were not the Conſideration of theſe things the Sinews of *Religion*.

II. Which they whoſe deſign was to undermine the very Foundations on which all Religion was built, underſtood far better, than thoſe weak pretended Advancers of Religion, who while in ſuch a way they pretend to advance it, do only blow it up. For if Men ought not to have an Eye and reſpect to their own future condition, nor ſerve God on the account of his power to make our Souls miſerable or happy, much leſs ought Men to ſerve God with any regard to his Providence, ſince the matters which Providence is employ'd about in this World, are of infinitely leſs moment, than thoſe which concern our future State. And if we have no Eye on Divine Providence in the exerciſe of Religion, we ſhall ſcarce be

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able to understand for what end God should take so much care of Mankind, and manifest so much of his goodness to them, were it not to quicken them in their search after him, and excite them to the more cheerful Obedience to him. And when once we question to what end God troubles himself with the World, we are come next door to *Epicurus*, and may in few steps more delight in the Flowers of his Garden. For this was his strongest plea against Providence, that it was beneath the Majesty and Excellency of the Divine Nature to stoop so low, and trouble himself so far, as to regard what was done on Earth. This being one of his *Ratæ Sententiæ*, or undoubted Maxims, Τὸ μακάριον καὶ ἄφθαρτον οὔτε αὐτὸ πράγματα ἔχει, οὔτε ἄλλῳ παρέχει. *The blessed and immortal Being, neither hath any imployment himself, nor troubles himself with others.* Which as *Maximus Tyrius* well observes, is rather a description of a *Sardanapalus*, than a Deity; nay, of a worse than a *Sardanapalus*; for he in the midst of all his softness and effeminacy wou'd yet entertain some Counsels for the safety and good of his Empire; but *Epicurus* his Deity is of so tender a nature, that the least thought of Business wou'd quite spoil his Happiness. This Opinion of *Epicurus* made the more raised-spirited Moralists so far contemn the unworthy Apprehensions which he entertain'd of the Divine Nature, that they degraded him from the very title of a Philosopher in it, and rank'd him beneath the most fabulous *Poets*, who had writ such unworthy things of their Gods, as is evident by the Censures which *Tully*, *Plutarch*, and others, pass upon him for this very Opinion. And they tell him that some of their own Men were of a more noble and excellent Spirit than *Epicurus* his Deity, who abhorr'd Softness and Idleness, and made it their greatest delight to do good to their Countries. But *Epicurus* must needs make his God of his own humor (the usual flattery which Men bear to themselves, to think that most excellent which they delight in most) as *Xenophanes* was wont to say, that if his Horse, were to describe a God, it would be with a curl'd Main, a broad Chest, *&c.* and in every thing like himself. Had *Epicurus* himself so little of an *Athenian* in him, as not to make it some part of his delight to understand the Affairs of the World? Or at least, did he take no pleasure in the walks of his famous Garden, nor to order his Trees, and set his Flowers, and contrive every thing for his own delight? Wou'd *Epicurus* then count this a part of his Happiness? And is it inconsistent with the Happiness of the Deity to take notice of the World and order all things in it for his own Glory? Must so excellent a Nature as God's was, by his own acknowledgment, be presently tired with Business, when the more excellent any Nature is, the more active and vigorous it is, the more able to comprehend and dispatch matters of moment with the least disturbance to it self? Is it a pleasure to a Nurse to fill the Child with her Milk? Doth the Sun rejoice to help the World with his constant Light? And doth a Fountain murmur till it be deliver'd of its Streams which may refresh the Ground? And is it no delight to the Divine Nature to behold the effects of his Goodness upon the World? We see here then the foundation on which *Epicurus* went, *viz.* that his God must be like himself, or there must be none; and truly he might more sutably to his Principles

Diog. Laert. l. 10.

Max. Tyr. Dissert. 29.

Cicero de Finib. l. 1. *De Nat. Deor. l.* 2. *Plutarch. adverſ. Colot.*

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queſtion his Exiſtence, than ſuppoſing his Exiſtence deny his Providence on ſuch miſerable accounts as theſe are, which yet are the chief which either *Epicurus* or *Lucretius* cou'd bring againſt it, from the conſideration of the Divine Nature.

III. The which to any one who conſiders it, doth neceſſarily infer a peculiar Eye and Hand of Providence in the World. For can we imagin that a Being of Infinite Knowledg ſhou'd be ignorant of what is done in the World? And of Infinite Power, ſhou'd ſtand by and leave things to Chance and Fortune? Which were at firſt contriv'd and brought into Being by the contrivance of his Wiſdom, and exerciſe of his Power. And where the foundation of Exiſtence lies wholly and ſolely in the power of an Infinite Being producing, the ground of continuance of that Exiſtence muſt lie in the ſame power conſerving. When Men indeed effect any thing, the work may continue, whatever become of him that did it; but the reaſon of that is, becauſe what Man doth, is out of Matter already exiſtent, and his work is only ſetting Materials together; but now what God effects, he abſolutely gives a Being to, and therefore its duration depends on his conſervation. What is once in its Being, I grant, will continue till ſome greater force than it ſelf put it out of Being; but withal I add, that God's withdrawing his Conſervation is ſo great a force, as muſt needs put that Being which had its Exiſtence from his Power, out of the condition it was in by it. The light of the Sun continues in the Air, and as long as the Sun communicates it, nothing can extinguiſh the Light, but what will put out the Sun: but cou'd we ſuppoſe the Sun to withdraw his Beams, what becomes of the Light then? This is the caſe of all Beings, which come from an Infinite Power; their ſubſiſtence depends on a continual Emanation of the ſame Power which gave them Being: and when once this is withdrawn, all thoſe Beings which were produced by this power muſt needs relapſe into nothing. Beſides, what dependence is there upon each other in the moments of duration of any created Being? The mode of Exiſtence in a Creature is but contingent and poſſible, and nothing is imply'd in the notion of an exiſtent Creature, beyond mere poſſibility of Exiſtence: what is it then which gives actual Exiſtence to it? That cannot be it ſelf, for it wou'd be neceſſarily exiſtent: if another then gives Exiſtence, this Exiſtence muſt wholly depend upon him who gave it: for nothing can continue Exiſtence to it ſelf, but what may give it to it ſelf, (for it gives it for the moment it continues it) and what gives Exiſtence to it ſelf, muſt neceſſarily exiſt, which is repugnant to the very notion of a created Being: So that either we muſt deny a poſſibility of Non-exiſtence, or Annihilation in a Creature, which follows upon neceſſity of Exiſtence; or elſe we muſt aſſert that the duration or continuance of a Creature in its Being doth immediately depend on Divine Providence and Conſervation, which is with as much reaſon as frequency ſaid to be a continu'd Creation. But yet further: was an Infinite Wiſdom and Power neceſſary to put things into that order they are in? And is not the ſame neceſſary for the governing of them? I cannot ſee any reaſon to think that the Power of Matter when ſet in motion, ſhou'd either bring things into that exquiſite order and dependance which the parts of

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the World have upon each other: much leſs that by the mere force of that firſt motion all things ſhou'd continue in the ſtate they are in. Perpetual Motion is yet one of the *deſiderata* of the World: the moſt exquiſite *Mechaniſm* cannot put an Engine beyond the neceſſity of being look'd after: can we then think this dull, unactive Matter, merely by the force of its firſt motion ſhou'd be able ſtill to produce the effects which are ſeen in the World, and to keep it from tumbling, at leaſt by degrees, into its priſtine *Chaos?* It was an Infinite Power, I grant, which gave that firſt motion; but that it gave power to continue that motion till the Conflagration of the World, remains yet to be prov'd. Some therefore finding that in the preſent ſtate of the World, Matter will not ſerve for all the noted and common *Phænomena* of the World, have call'd in the help of a Spirit of Nature, which may ſerve inſtead of a Man-midwife to Matter, to help her in her production of things. Or, as tho' God had a plurality of Worlds to look after, they have taken care to ſubſtitute him a Vicar in this, which is the Spirit of Nature. But we had rather believe God himſelf to be perpetually reſident in the World, and that the power which gives Life, and Being, and Motion to every thing in the World, is nothing elſe but his own Providence; eſpecially ſince we have learnt from himſelf, that it is *in him we live and move and have our being.* Acts 17. 28.

Thus then we ſee a neceſſity of aſſerting Divine Providence whether we conſider the Divine Nature, or the *Phænomena* of the World; but yet the caſe is not ſo clear but there are two grand Objections behind, which have been the continual exerciſe of the Wits of inquiſitive Men almoſt in all Ages of the World. The one concerns the firſt origin of Evil; the other concerns the diſpenſations of Providence, whence it comes to paſs that good Men fare ſo hard in the World, when the bad triumph and flouriſh: if theſe two can be clear'd with any ſatisfaction to Reaſon, it will be the higheſt Vindication of Divine Providence, and a great evidence of the Divinity of the Scriptures, which give us ſuch clear light and direction in theſe profound Speculations, which the dim Reaſon of Man was ſo much to ſeek in. IV.

I begin with the origin of Evil; for, if there be a hand of Providence which orders all things in the World, how comes Evil then into it, without God's being the Author of it? Which is a ſpeculation of as great depth as neceſſity, it highly concerning us to entertain the higheſt apprehenſions of God's Holineſs, and how far he is from being the Author of Sin; and it is likewiſe a matter of ſome difficulty ſo to explain the origin of Evil, as to make it appear that God is not the Author of it. I eaſily then aſſent to what *Origen* ſaith on this ſubject, when *Celſus* upon ſome miſtaken places of Scripture, had charg'd the Scripture with laying the origin of Evil upon God; εἰκὸς ἴν ἄλλῳ τις τόπῳ τῶ σὺ αἰσχρόπους ἐξεπίστευς διόμφῳ, δυσθήρατός ἐστι τῇ φύσει ἡμῶν, σὺ τύδις ἐ ἡ τῶ κακῶν πηχθεία ἂν γένοις. *If any thing which calls for our inquiry be of difficult inveſtigation, that which concerns the origin of Evils is ſuch a thing;* and as *Simplicius* well begins his diſcourſe on this ſubject; περὶ τ ὑποστάσεως τῶ κακῶν ὁ λόγῳ μὴ καλῶς διορθωθεὶς ἐ τ περὶ τὸ θεῖον ἀσεβείας αἴτιῳ γέγονε, καὶ τ τῶν ἡμῶν συναγωγίας τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀνέῳξε, καὶ πολλοῖς καὶ ἀλύσεις ἀπορίας ἐνέβαλε τοὺς μὴ καλῶς αἰτιολογοῦντας αὐτῶ. *The diſ-* Orig. c. Celſ. l. 4. p. 207. Simplic. in Epictet. c. 34.

pute concerning the nature and origin of Evil, not being well ſtated, is the cauſe of great Impiety towards God, and perverts the principles of good Life, and involves them in innumerable perplexities who are not able to give a rational account of it. So much then is it our great concernment to fix on ſure grounds in the reſolution of this important queſtion; in which I intend not to lanch out into the depth and intricacies of it, as it relates to any internal purpoſes of God's Will, (which is beyond our preſent ſcope) but I ſhall only take that account of it which the Scripture plainly gives in relating the fall of the firſt Man. For the clearing of which I ſhall proceed in this method:

1. *That if the Scriptures be true, God cannot be the Author of Sin.*

2. *That the account which the Scripture gives of the origin of Evil, doth not charge it upon God.*

3. *That no account given by Philoſophers of the origin of Evil, is ſo clear and rational as this is.*

4. *That the moſt material circumſtances of this account are atteſted by the Heathens themſelves.*

1. *That if the Scriptures be true, God cannot be the Author of Sin.* For if the Scriptures be true, we are bound without Heſitation to yield our aſſent to them in their plain and direct affirmations; and there can be no ground of ſuſpending aſſent, as to any thing which pretends to be a Divine Truth, but the want of certain Evidence, whether it be of Divine Revelation or no. No doubt it would be one of the moſt effectual ways to put an end to the numerous controverſies of the Chriſtian World (eſpecially to thoſe bold diſputes concerning the method and order of God's Decrees) if the plain and undoubted aſſertions of Scripture were made the Rule and Standard, whereby we ought to judg of ſuch things as are more obſcure and ambiguous. And cou'd Men but reſt contented with thoſe things which concern their eternal Happineſs, and the means in order to it (which on that account are written with all imaginable perſpicuity in Scripture) and the moment of all other Controverſies be judg'd by their reference to theſe, there wou'd be fewer Controverſies and more Chriſtians in the World. Now there are two grand Principles which concern Mens eternal Condition, of which we have the greateſt certainty from Scripture, and on which we may with ſafety rely, without perplexing our Minds about thoſe more nice and ſubtile Speculations (which it may be are uncapable of all full and particular reſolution) and thoſe are, *That the ruin and deſtruction of Man is wholly from himſelf*; and, *That his ſalvation is from God alone.* If then Man's ruin and miſery be from himſelf; which the Scripture doth ſo much inculcate on all occaſions; then without controverſy that which is the cauſe of all the miſery of Human Nature, is wholly from himſelf too, which is, Sin. So that if the main ſcope and deſign of the Scripture be true, God cannot be the Author of that, by which (without the intervention of the Mercy of God) Man's miſery unavoidably falls upon him. For with what Authority and Majeſty doth God in the Scripture forbid all manner of Sin? with what earneſtneſs and importunity doth he wooe the Sinner to forſake his ſin? With what loathing and deteſtation

teſtation doth he mention Sin? With what juſtice and ſeverity doth he puniſh Sin? With what wrath and indignation doth he threaten Contumacious Sinners? And is it poſſible, (after all this and much more, recorded in the Scriptures, to expreſs the Holineſs of God's Nature, his hatred of Sin, and his appointing a day of Judgment for the ſolemn puniſhment of Sinners) to imagin that the Scriptures do in the leaſt aſcribe the Origin of Evil to God, or make him the Author of Sin? *Shall not the Judg of all the world do right?* will a God of infinite Juſtice, Purity, and Holineſs, puniſh the Sinner for that which himſelf was the cauſe of? Far be ſuch unworthy thoughts from our Apprehenſions of a *Deity*, much more of that God whom we believe to have declar'd his Mind ſo much to the contrary, that we cannot believe that and the Scriptures to be true together.

Taking it then for granted in the general, that God cannot be the Author of Sin, we come to inquire, *Whether the account which the Scripture gives of the Origin of Evil, doth any way charge it upon God?* There are only two ways, according to the Hiſtory of the fall of Man recorded in Scripture, whereby Men may have any ground to queſtion whether God were the cauſe of Man's fall; either *firſt*, by the giving him that poſitive Law, which was the occaſion of his fall; or *ſecondly*, by leaving him to the liberty of his own Will. *Firſt*, The giving of that poſitive Law cannot be the leaſt ground of laying Man's fault on God; becauſe, 1. It was moſt ſutable to the nature of a rational Creature to be govern'd by Laws, or declarations of the Will of his Maker: for conſidering Man as a free Agent, there can be no way imagin'd ſo conſonant to the nature of Man as this was, becauſe thereby he might declare his obedience to God to be the matter of his free choice. For where there is a capacity of Reward and Puniſhment, and acting in the conſideration of them, there muſt be a declaration of the Will of the Law-giver, according to which Man may expect either his Reward or Puniſhment. If it were ſutable to God's nature to promiſe Life to Man upon Obedience, it was not unſutable to it to expect Obedience to every declaration of his Will; conſidering the abſolute Sovereignty and Dominion which God had over Man as being his Creature, and the indiſpenſable Obligation which was in the nature of Man to obey whatever his Maker did command him. So that God had full and abſolute Right to require from Man, what he did as to the Law which he gave him to obey; and in the general we cannot conceive, how there ſhou'd be a Teſtimony of Man's Obedience towards his Creator, without ſome declaration of his Creator's Will. *Secondly*, God had full Power and Authority, not only to govern Man by Laws, but to determin Man's general obligation to Obedience to that particular poſitive Precept by the breach of which Man fell. If God's power over Man was univerſal and unlimited, what reaſon can there be to imagin it ſhou'd not extend to ſuch a poſitive Law? Was it, becauſe the matter of this Law ſeem'd too low for God to command his Creature? But whatever the matter of the Law was, Obedience to God was the great end of it, which Man had teſtify'd as much in that Inſtance of it as in any other whatſoever; and in the violation of it were imply'd the higheſt aggravations of

Disobedience; for God's Power and Authority were as much contemned, his Goodness slighted, his Truth and Faithfulness question'd, his Name dishonor'd, his Majesty affronted in the breach of that, as of any other Law whatsoever it had been. If the Law were easie to be observ'd, the greater was the Sin of Disobedience; if the weight of the matter was not so great in it self, yet God's Authority added the greatest weight to it; and the ground of Obedience is not to be fetch'd from the nature of the thing required, but from the Authority of the Legislator. Or was it then because God conceal'd from Man his Counsel in giving of that positive Precept? Hath not then a Legislator power to require any thing, but what he satisfies every one of his reason in commanding it? If so, what becomes of Obedience and Subjection? It will be impossible to make any probative Precepts on this account; and the Legislator must be charg'd with the Disobedience of his Subjects, where he doth not give a particular account of every thing which he requires: which as it concerns Human Legislators (who have not that absolute Power and Authority which God hath) is contrary to all Laws of Policy and the general Sense of the World. This *Plutarch* gives a good account of, when he discourseth so rationally of the Sobriety which Men ought to use in their inquiries into the grounds and reasons of God's Actions; *For*, saith he, *Physicians will give prescriptions without giving the Patient a particular reason of every circumstance in them:* οὐδὲ γὰρ οἱ ἀνθρωπινοι νόμοις πᾶσιν, τὸ εὔλογον ἀεὶ παλῶς ἔχουσι καὶ πάντῃ φαινόμενον, ἀλλ' εἶναι καὶ ἀνεῖ κρυπδῆ γελοῖα τῶν προσταγμάτων. *Neither have Human Laws always apparent reason for them, nay some of them, are to appearance ridiculous*; for which he instanceth in that Law of the *Lacedæmonian Ephori*, μὴ πείφειν μύστακα, to which no other reason was annex'd but this, καὶ πιθανὸν τοῖς νόμοις ὡς μὴ χαλεποὶ ὦσιν αὐτοῖς: *They commanded every Magistrate at the entrance of his Office to shave himself, and gave this reason for it, that they might learn to obey Laws themselves.* He further instanceth, in the *Roman* Custom of *Manumission*, their Laws about Testaments, *Solon*'s Law against Neutrality in Seditions, and concludes thence, καὶ ὅλως πολλὰς ἂν τις εὕροι νόμων ἀλογίας, μήτε τὸν λόγον ἔχων τοῦ νομοθέτου, μήτε τὴν αἰτίαν συνιεὶς ἑκάστου τῶν γραφομένων. *Any one would easily find many Absurdities in Laws, who doth not consider the intention of the Legislator, or the ground of what he requires.* Τί δὲ θαυμαστὸν, saith he, εἰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἔστιν ἡμῖν ὄντων δυσεξιχνεύτων, οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπ τὰ περὶ τῶν θεῶν εἰπεῖν, ᾧ τινι λόγῳ τὰς μὲν ὑστέρας, τὰς δὲ πρώτερον τῶν ἀμφιβαλλόντων κολάζεσιν· *What wonder is it, if we are so puzzled to give an account of the Actions of Men, that we shou'd be to seek as to those of the Deity?* This cannot be then any ground on the account of mere reason, to lay the charge of Man's Disobedience upon God, because he requir'd from him the observance of that positive command of not eating of the *forbidden Fruit.*

Plutarch. de his qui sero puniuntur a numine.

VI. The only thing then left, is, *whether God be not liable to this charge as he left Man to the liberty of his Will:* And that may be grounded on two things; *either that God did not create Man in such a condition, in which it had been impossible for him to have sinned; or that knowing his temptation he did not give him power to resist it.* If neither of these will lay any imputation of the Origin of Evil upon God, then God will appear to be wholly free from it. *First, concerning Man's being created a free Agent;* if

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the determination of the Schools be good, that poſſibility of Sinning is imply'd in the very notion of a Creature; and conſequently that impeccability is repugnant to the nature of a created Being; then we ſee a neceſſary reaſon, why Man was created in a ſtate of Liberty: but endeavoring to ſhew that the grounds of our Religion are not repugnant to natural Reaſon, I ſhall rather make uſe of the Teſtimony of ſuch who profeſs'd to be Followers of nothing elſe but Reaſon and Philoſophy. Among whom I ſhall make choice of *Simplicius* both for the Reaſon he produceth, and becauſe he is fartheſt from any ſuſpicion of partiality, by reaſon of his known oppoſition to the *Moſaic* Hiſtory of the Creation. He then in his *Commentaries* on *Epictetus* profeſſedly diſputes this very ſubject of the Origin of Evil, and after having rejected that fond Opinion of two Principles, one of Good, and the other of Evil, undertakes to give an account whence Evil came into the World; which becauſe it tends ſo much to the illuſtrating our preſent ſubject, I ſhall give an account of. *God*, ſaith he, *who is the fountain and principle of all Good, not only produced things which were in themſelves good, nor only thoſe things which were of a middle nature, but the extremes too, which were ſuch things which were apt to be perverted from that which is according to nature, to that which we call Evil. And that after thoſe Bodies which were* (as he ſuppoſeth) *incorruptible, others were produced which are ſubject to Mutation and Corruption; and ſo after thoſe Souls which were immutably fixed in Good, others were produced which were liable to be perverted from it; that ſo the riches of God's goodneſs might be diſplay'd in making to exiſt all Beings which are capable of it; and that the Univerſe might be perfect in having all ſorts of Beings in it. Now*, he ſuppoſeth *that all thoſe Beings which are above this ſublunary World are ſuch as are immutably good, and that the loweſt ſort of Beings which are liable to be perverted to Evil, are ſuch which are here below. Therefore*, ſaith he, *the Soul being of a more noble and immutable Nature, while it is by it ſelf, doth not partake of Evil; but it being of a nature apt to be joyned with theſe Terreſtrial Bodies (by the Providence of the Author of the Univerſe, who produced ſuch ſouls, that ſo both extremes might be joyned by the Bonds of vital Union) thereby it becomes ſenſible of thoſe Evils and Pains which the Body is ſubject to; but theſe things are not properly Evils but rather Good, conſidering our Terreſtrial Bodies as parts of the Univerſe which is upheld by the changes and viciſſitudes which are in this lower World:* Which he largely diſcourſes on to ſhew that thoſe particular alterations which are in Bodies, do conduce rather to the perfection and beauty of the Univerſe, than are any real Evils in it. *But now*, ſaith he, *for the Origin of thoſe things which are properly Evils*, viz. *Moral Evils, which are* τὰ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ψυχῆς πλημμελήματα, *the lapſes and errors of the Human ſoul, we are to conſider, that there are ſouls of a more excellent nature than ours are, which are immutably good; and the ſouls of Brutes are of a lower kind than ours are, and yet are middle between the rational and vegetative, having ſomething in them parallel both to the Appetites and Evils which are in Men, which will therefore be underſtood by an account of the other.* Ἡ δὲ ἀνθρωπίνη ψυχὴ, μέση οὖσα πως καὶ ἔχουσά τι καὶ ἀεὶ ἄνω ῥεπόντων ψυχῶν, καὶ τι τὸν ἐν τῇ ψυχικῇ οὐσίᾳ ἀκόρεστον, καὶ ἀφ' ὧν μέθεξιν, καὶ τὰ ἀεὶ κάτω ἀφ' ὧν πάθος

Vid. Thom. 1 p. q. 63. art. 1. Eſtium in ſentent. l. 2. diſt. 7. ſect. 9.

Simplic. Com. in Epict. c. 34. p. 175.

Ibid. p. 180. ed. Salmaſ.

τὸ σῶμα συνήνεικαν τῇ ἀλόγῳ ζωῇ, τῷ σύνδεσμῳ ζωϊκὸς γινομένη τῇ τι ἄνω ἐ τῇ κάτω, ἀμφὶ τὸ αὐτεξούσιόν χέσεως, ποτὲ μὲν ὡς ἐκείνα, ποτὲ δὲ ὡς ταῦτα ὁμοιοῦται. *The Soul of Man is nexus utriusque mundi, in the middle between those more excellent Beings which perpetually remain above, with which it partakes in the sublimity of its Nature and Understanding, and those inferior Terrestrial Beings with which it communicates thro' the vital Union which it hath with the Body, and by reason of that freedom and indifferency which it hath, it sometimes is assimilated to the one, sometimes to the other of these extremes. So that while it approacheth to the nature of the superior Beings, it keeps it self free from Evil, but because of its freedom it may sometimes sink down into these lower things,* and so he calls *the cause of all evil in the Soul* τὴν αὐθαιρέτῳ καθοδον εἰς τόνδε θνητὸν τόπον, *its voluntary descent into this lower World,* and immersing it self in the *feculency of Terrestrial Matter.* καὶ φύσιν δὲ ἀμφίβολον ἔλαχεν, ἐκ ἀναγκαζομένη κάπισιν ἢ ἄνεσιν, ἀλλ' ὅπως ἐπίσῃ, ὡς ὅλως αὐτῇ ἕξις καλήναι τι ἐ ἀνήναι. *For tho' the Soul be of a kind of Amphibious Nature, yet it is not forced either upwards or downwards, but acts either way according to its internal liberty. But* saith he, *while the rational soul keeps that power which it hath in its hands over the Body, and makes use of it only as an instrument for its own good, so long it keeps pure and free from any stain of evil; but when it once forgets the similitude it hath with the more excellent Being, and throws away the Scepter of its power, and drowns it self in the Body and Brutish Affections (preferring the pleasure of Sense above that of Reason) when it so far degenerates below the principles of Reason, that instead of commanding the Brutish Faculties it becomes a slave to them, then it conceives and brings forth evil; but this it doth not thro' any coaction or necessity, but thro' the abuse of that power and liberty which it hath: For the choice is a proper action of the Soul it self: which he proves from hence, because God, and the Laws, and all good Men, do not measure the good and evil of Actions so much by the event, as by the will and intention of the Person; and that Punishment and Reward have chiefly a respect to those. And therefore Men are pardoned for what they do out of constraint and force, and the fault is ascribed,* οὐ τῷ πραξαντι ἀλλὰ βιαζομένῳ, *not to him that did it, but to him that forced him to the doing of it.* And so from hence he concludes, *that because of the freedom of the will of Man, nothing else can be said to be the Author of Evil properly, but the Soul of Man;* and concludes that discourse with this excellent Speech, Ἔχοντες ἂν τὴν αἰτίαν τοῦ κακοῦ, λαμπρᾷ τῇ φωνῇ βοῶμεν, ὅτι ὁ Θεὸς κακίας ἀναίτιος, διότι τὸ κακὸν ἡ ψυχὴ ἐνεργεῖ αὐτεξουσίως, ἐ θεὸς· εἰ μὲν γὰρ βίᾳ τὸ κακὸν ἐπράττετο ἡ ψυχὴ, πέφυκε ἂν ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ χαλάσαι τὴν ἀναστίαν αὐτὴν συγχωρήσαντος βιασθῆναι, καί τοι οὐδὲ κακὸν ἦν τὸ βίᾳ πραττόμενον· κατὰ δὲ περαίρεσιν αὐτὸ αἱρεμένη αὐτὴ ἂν αἰτία λέγοιτο δικαίως. *Having thus found out the true origin of Evil, let us cry out with a loud voice, that God is not the Author of Sin, because the Soul freely doth that which is evil, and not God; for if the Soul were forced to do what it doth, one might justly lay the blame on God, who permits such a force to be offered it, neither could it be properly evil which the Soul was constrained to; but since it acted freely, out of choice, the Soul must alone be accounted the Author and Cause of Evil.* Thus we see that God cannot with any shadow of Reason be accounted the Author of Evil, because he gave the Soul of Man a principle of internal freedom, when the very freedom of acting which the Soul had, put it into a capacity of standing as well as falling.

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And certainly, he can never be ſaid to be the cauſe of the breaking of a Perſon, who gave him a ſtock to ſet up with, and ſuppos'd him able to manage it when he gave it him. Indeed had not Man had this freedom of Will, he could not have fallen; but then neither had he been a rational Agent, which ſuppoſing no corruption, doth ſpeak freedom of Action. So that while we inquire after the origin of Evil we have no other cauſe to aſſign it to, but Man's abuſe of that free power of acting which he had: but if we will be ſo curious as to inquire further, why God did create Man with a freedom of Will, and not rather fix his Soul immutably on Good; if the order of Beings be no ſatisfactory Reaſon for it, we can give no other than that why he made Man, or the World at all, which was the good pleaſure of his Will.

VII. But ſecondly, *ſuppoſing God's giving Man this freedom of Will, doth not entitle him to be the Author of Evil*; doth not his leaving Man to this liberty of his in the Temptation, make him the cauſe of Sin? I anſwer no, and that on theſe accounts.

1. *Becauſe Man ſtood then upon ſuch terms, that he could not fall but by his own free and voluntary act*; he had a power to ſtand, in that there was no principle of corruption at all in his Faculties, but he had a pure and undefil'd Soul which could not be polluted without its own conſent: Now it had been repugnant to the terms on which Man ſtood (which were the tryal of his Obedience to his Creator) had he been irreſiſtibly determin'd any way. *Simplicius* puts this queſtion after the former diſcourſe, *Whether God may be called the Author of ſin, becauſe he permits the ſoul to uſe her liberty?* *Simplic. in Epictet. p. 186, 187.*

But, ſaith he, *he that ſays God ſhould not have permitted this uſe of its freedom to the ſoul, muſt ſay one of theſe two things, either that the ſoul being of ſuch a nature as is indifferent to Good or Evil, it ſhould have been wholly kept from the chooſing Evil, or elſe that it ſhould have been made of ſuch a nature that it ſhould not have had a power of chooſing Evil. The firſt is irrational and abſurd; for what freedom and liberty had that been, where there was no choice? And what choice could there have been where the Mind was neceſſitated only to one part? For the ſecond we are to conſider*, ſaith he, *that no Evil is in it ſelf deſirable, or to be choſen; but withal, if this power of determining it ſelf either way muſt be taken away, it muſt be either as ſomething not good, or as ſome great evil; and whoever ſaith ſo, doth not conſider, how many things in the World there are, which are accounted good and deſirable things, yet are no ways comparable with this freedom of Will. For it excells all ſublunary Beings; and there is none would rather deſire to be a Brute or Plant than Man; if God then ſhew'd his goodneſs in giving to inferior Beings ſuch Perfections which are far below this, is it any ways incongruous to God's Nature and Goodneſs to give Man the freedom of his Actions, and a ſelf-determining power, tho he permitted him the free uſe of it? Beſides*, as that Author reaſons, *had God to prevent Man's ſin taken away the liberty of his Will, he had likewiſe deſtroyed the foundation of all Virtue, and the very nature of Man; for Virtue would not have been ſuch, had there been no poſſibility of acting contrary; and Man's Nature would have been Divine, becauſe impeccable. Therefore*, ſaith he, *tho' we attribute this ſelf-determining Power to God as the Author of it, which was ſo neceſſary in the order of the Univerſe, we have no reaſon to attribute the*

Origin

Origin of that Evil to God, which comes by the abuſe of that Liberty. For, as he further adds, *God doth not at all cauſe that Averſion from Good, which is in the Soul when it ſins, but only gave ſuch a power to the Soul, whereby it might turn it ſelf to Evil, out of which God might afterwards produce ſo much Good, which could not otherwiſe have been without it.* So conſonantly to the Scripture doth that Philoſopher ſpeak on this ſubject.

2. *God cannot be ſaid to be the Author of Sin, tho' he did not prevent the fall of Man, becauſe he did not withdraw before his fall any Grace or Aſſiſtance, which was neceſſary for his ſtanding.* Had there been indeed a neceſſity of ſupernatural Grace to be communicated to Man for every moment, to continue him in his Innocency, and had God before Man's fall withdrawn ſuch Aſſiſtance from him, without which it were impoſſible for him to have ſtood, it would be very difficult freeing God from being the cauſe of the fall of Man. But we are not put to ſuch difficulties for acquitting God from being the Author of Sin; for there appears no neceſſity at all for aſſerting any Diſtinction of ſufficient and efficacious Grace in Man before his fall; that the one ſhould belong only to a Radical power of ſtanding, the other to every Act of good which *Adam* did: For if *God made Man upright*, he certainly gave him ſuch a power as might be brought into act without the neceſſity of any ſupervenient Act of Grace, to elicite that Habitual power into particular Actions. If the other were ſufficient, it was ſufficient for its end; and how could it be ſufficient for its end, if notwithſtanding that, there were no poſſibility of ſtanding, unleſs efficacious help were ſuperadded to it? God would not certainly require any thing from the Creature in his Integrity, but what he had a power to obey; and if there were neceſſary further Grace to bring the Power into Act, the ſubtracting of this Grace, muſt be by way of puniſhment to Man, which it is hard to conceive for what it ſhould be, before Man had ſinned, or elſe God muſt ſubtract this Grace on purpoſe that Man might fall, which would neceſſarily follow on this Suppoſition, in which caſe Man would be neceſſitated to fall, *Veluti cum ſubductis columnis domus neceſſario corruit*, as one expreſſeth it, *As a houſe muſt needs fall, when the pillars on which it ſtood are taken away from it.* But now if God withdrew not any effectual Grace from Man, whereby he muſt neceſſarily fall, then tho' God permit Man to uſe his Liberty, yet he cannot be ſaid to be any ways the Author of Evil, becauſe Man had ſtill a *poſſe ſi vellet*, a power of ſtanding, if he had made right uſe of his Liberty, and God never took from Man his *Adjutorium quo potuit ſtare, & ſine quo non potuit*, as *Divines* call it, Man enjoying ſtill his Power, tho' by the abuſe of his Liberty he fell into ſin; ſo that granting God to leave Man to the uſe of his Liberty, yet we ſee God cannot in the leaſt be charg'd with being the Author of Sin, or the Origin of Evil, by the Hiſtory of the Fall of Man in Scripture: which was the thing to be clear'd.

VIII. We come now in the third place to compare that account given of the Origin of Evil in Scripture, with that which was embrac'd by Heathen Philoſophers, in point of Reaſon ad Evidence. There was no one inquiry whatſoever in which thoſe who had nothing but Natural Light to guide them, were more to ſeek for Satisfaction

ction in, than this concerning the Origin of Evil. They ſaw by continual Experience how great a torrent of both ſorts of Evils, of Sin and Puniſhment, did overflow the World; but they were like the *Ægyptians*, who had ſufficient evidence of the overflowing their Banks by the River *Nile*, but could not find out the Spring or the Head of it. The reaſon was, as Corruption increas'd in the World, ſo the means of Inſtruction and Knowledg decay'd; and ſo as the *Phænomena* grew greater, the reaſon of them was leſs underſtood; the knowledg of the Hiſtory of the firſt Ages of the World, thro' which they could alone come to the full underſtanding of the true cauſe of Evil, inſenſibly decaying in the ſeveral Nations: Inſomuch that thoſe who are not at all acquainted with that Hiſtory of the World which was preſerv'd in Sacred Records among the *Jews*, had nothing but their own uncertain conjectures to go by, and ſome kind of obſcure Traditions which were preſerv'd among them, which while they ſought to rectify by their Interpretations, they made them more obſcure and falſe than they found them. They were certain of nothing, but that Mankind was in a low and degenerate condition, and ſubject to continual Miſeries and Calamities; they who cry'd up the moſt the αὐτεξούσιον, or the Self-determining power of the Soul, could not certainly but ſtrangely wonder, that a Principle indifferent to be carry'd either way, ſhould be ſo almoſt fatally inclin'd to the worſt of them. It was very ſtrange that ſince Reaſon ought to have the command of Paſſions by their own acknowledgment, the Brutiſh part of the Soul ſhould ſo maſter and enſlave the Rational, and the Beaſt ſhould ſtill caſt the Rider in Man, the ſenſitive Appetite ſhould throw off the power of the τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν, of that Faculty of the Soul which was deſign'd for the Government of all the reſt. The Philoſophers could not be ignorant what ſlaves they were themſelves to this *Terreſtrial Hyle*, how eaſily their moſt mettleſome Souls were mir'd in the dirt, how deep they were ſunk into corporeal Pleaſures, that it was paſt the power of their Reaſon to help them out. Nay, when the Soul begins to be fledg'd again, after her πτεροῤῥύησις, or moulting, at her entrance into the Body, which *Plato* ſpeaks of, and ſtrives to raiſe her ſelf above this lower World, ſhe then feels the weight of ſuch plummets hanging at her feet, that they bring her down again to her former fluttering up and down in her Cage of Earth. So *Hierocles* complains, that when Reaſon begins to carry the Soul to the perception of the moſt noble objects, the Soul with a generous flight would ſoar above this World, ὅταν μὴ ταῖς παθητικαῖς ὁλκαῖς ὥσπερ τισι μολύβδοισιν, ὑποφιέντων κάτω κυκλίων, *Were it not born down to that which is evil by the force of Paſſions, which hang like leads upon the Soul's feet.* What a ſtrange unaccountable thing muſt this needs be to thoſe who beheld the conſtancy of the effect, but were to ſeek for the cauſe of it? It could not but be clear to them that the αὐτεξούσιον they were wont to extoll ſo high, was (in the ſtate Man was now in) but a more noble Name for ſlavery; when themſelves could not but confeſs the ῥοπὴ, or inclination in the Soul, was ſo ſtrong to the evil; and could that be an even ballance, where there was ſo much down-weight in one of the ſcales? unleſs they made, as ſome of them did, the voluntary Inclinations of the Soul to evil, an evidence of her Li-

Hieroc. in aurea carmina, p. 17.

berty in this moſt degenerate condition, as tho' it were any Argument that the Priſoner was the freer, becauſe he delighted himſelf in the noiſe of his ſhackles. Neither was this Diſorder alone at home in the Soul, where there was ſtill a *Xantippe* ſcolding with *Socrates*, *Paſſion* ſtriving with *Reaſon*; but when they look'd abroad in the World, they could not but obſerve ſome ſtrange Irregularities in the converſe among Men. What debaucheries, contentions, rapines, fightings and deſtroying each other, and that with the greateſt cruelty, and that frequently among Country-men, Friends, nay Relations and Kindred! and could this Hoſtility between thoſe of the ſame Nature, and under the moſt ſacred bonds of Union, be the reſult of Nature, when even Beaſts of prey are not ſuch to thoſe of their own kind? Beſides all this, when they ſummed up the Life of Man together, and took an account of the weakneſſes and follies of Childhood, the heats and extravagancies of Youth, the paſſions, diſquietments and diſappointments of Men in their ſtrength and height of buſineſs, the inquietude, aches and infirmities of old Age, beſides the miſeries which thro' every one of theſe all Men are ſubject to, and few eſcape, into how ſmall a ſum will the ſolid Pleaſure and Contentment of the Life of Man be reduc'd? Nay, if we take thoſe things in the World which Men pleaſe themſelves the moſt in enjoyment of, and conſider but with what care they are got, with what fear they are kept, and with what certainty they muſt be loſt; and how much the poſſeſſion of any thing fails of the expectation of it, and how near Men are upon the top of *Tenariff* to fall into the depth of the Sea, how often they are precipitated from the height of Proſperity, into the depth of Adverſity; we ſhall find yet much leſs that by the greateſt *Chymiſtry* can be extracted of real ſatisfaction out of theſe things. Whence then ſhould it come that Mens Souls ſhould ſo delight to feed on theſe Husks, and to embrace theſe Clouds and Shadows, inſtead of that real Good which is the true object of the Soul's deſire? They could eaſily ſee there was no pure, unmix'd Good in the World, but there was a Contemperation of both together, according to that of *Euripides*:

Οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο χωρὶς ἐσθλὰ ϛ κακά,
Ἀλλ' ἔστι τις σύγκρασις.

There is a kind of continual mixture of good and evil in the World; which *Socrates* obſerv'd upon the rubbing of his thigh where the fetters made it itch, ὡς ἄτοπον, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἔοικέ γε εἶναι τοῦτο ὃ καλοῦσιν ἄνθρωποι ἡδύ; ὡς θαυμασίως πέφυκε πρὸς τὸ δοκοῦν ἐναντίον εἶναι, τὸ λυπηρόν; *What a ſtrange thing is that which Men are wont to call Pleaſure? how near a kin is it to that which ſeems ſo contrary to it, Pain?* *Plat. in Phæd.*

Now the obſerving the ſtrange and ſudden viciſſitudes of theſe things, and what near neighbours Pain and Pleaſure were to each other, (ſo that there is frequently a paſſage out of one into the other) did yet more entangle them to give a clear account of the Origin of both theſe. Thoſe who believe there was a God, who produc'd the World and order'd all things in it, did eaſily attribute whatever was good in the World to the Fountain of all Goodneſs;

neſs; but that any Evil ſhould come from him they thought it repugnant to the very Notion of a Deity; which they were ſo far right in, as it concern'd the evil of Sin; which we have already ſhew'd God could not be the Author of; but therein they ſhew'd their Ignorance of the true cauſe of *Evil*, that they did not look upon the miſeries of Life as the effects of God's Juſtice upon the World for the evil of Sin. And therefore that they might ſet the Origin of Evil far enough off from God, they made two different Principles of things, the one of good, and the other of evil; this *Plutarch* tells us was the moſt ancient and univerſal account which he could meet with of the Origin of *Good* and *Evil*. To which purpoſe we have this ample Teſtimony of his in his learned Diſcourſe, *De Iſide & Oſiride*, Διὸ καὶ παμπάλαιος αὕτη κάπτισιν ὑπ᾽ ἀνθρώπων καὶ νομοθετῶν, εἴς τε ποιητὰς καὶ φιλοσόφους δόξα, τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀδιάπτωτον ἔχουσα, τὴν δὲ πίστιν ἰσχυρὰν καὶ ἀνυπεξάλειπτον, οὐκ ἐν λόγοις μόνον, οὐδ᾽ ἐν φήμαις, καὶ ἀκοαῖς ἔν τε τελεταῖς ἔν τε θυσίαις, καὶ βαρβάροις καὶ Ἕλλησι πολλαχοῦ διεφθαρμένη, ὡς ὅτ᾽ ἄνευ καὶ ἄλογον καὶ ἀκυβέρνητον αἰωρεῖσθαι τὸ πᾶν, ὅτι εἷς ἐστιν ὁ κρατῶν καὶ κατευθύνων, ὥσπερ οἰακίζειν ἥλιοι πτηνοῖς χαλινοῖς λόγος· ἀλλὰ πολλαὶ καὶ μιμιγμέναι κακοῖς καὶ ἀγαθοῖς, μᾶλλον δὲ μηδὲν ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν, ἄκρατον ἐνδιδοῦσα τὴ φύσεως φερούσης· ὑὸ δυοῖν πηγῶν εἰς ἅπαντας, ὥσπερ κάμακας τὰ πρόγραμμα καπηλικῶς ἀφαιρεῖσθαι ἀναπεφήνασιν ἡμῖν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀπὸ δυοῖν ἐναντίων ἀρχῶν, καὶ δυοῖν ἀναλιπαλῶν δυνάμεων, τὴ μὲν ἐπὶ τὰ δεξιὰ καὶ καθ᾽ ἡσυχίαν ἐφηγουμένης, τὴ δὲ ἴμπαλιν ἀναστρεφούσης καὶ ἀνακλώσης, ὁ τε βίος μικτὸς, ὁ τε κόσμος εἰ καὶ μὴ πᾶς, ἀλλ᾽ ὁ περίγειος ὅτος καὶ μὴ σελήνιος, ἀνώμαλος ἂν ποικίλος γίγνοιτο, καὶ μιξοπονηρίας πίσσας ἀχράντου. εἰ γὰρ οὐδὲν ἀναιτίως πέφυκε γίνεσθαι, αἰτίαν δὴ κακοῦ πάντων οὐκ ἂν ὀφείλοι, δεῖ γίνεσθαι ἰδίαν καὶ ἀρχὴν, ὥσπερ ἀγαθοῦ, ἧς κακοῦ τὴν φύσιν ἔχειν. Which words I have the more largely cited, becauſe they give us the moſt full account of the Antiquity, Univerſality and Reaſon of that Opinion, which aſſerts two different Principles of Good and Evil. *It is a Tradition* (ſaith he) *of great antiquity deriv'd down from the ancient Maſters of Divine Knowledg, and Formers of Commonwealths, to the Poets and Philoſophers, whoſe firſt Author cannot be found, and yet hath met with firm and unſhaken Belief, not only in ordinary Diſcourſes and Reports, but was ſpread into the Myſteries and Sacrifices both of* Greeks *and others, that the Univerſe did not depend on chance, and was deſtitute of Mind and Reaſon to govern it; neither was there one only Reaſon which ſate at the Stern, or held the Reins, whereby he did order and govern the World; but ſince there is ſo much confuſion and mixture of Good and Evil in the World, that Nature doth not produce any pure untainted Good; there is not any one who like a Drawer takes the Liquor our of two ſeveral veſſels, and mixeth them together, and after diſtributes them; but there are two Principles and Powers contrary to each other, whereof one draws us to the right hand, and direct us ſtraight forward, the other pulls us back, and turns us the other way; ſince we ſee the Life of Man ſo mixed as it is; and not only that, but the World too, at leaſt ſo much as is ſublunry and terreſtrial, which is ſubject to many varieties, irregularities and changes. For if nothing be without a cauſe, and Good cannot be the cauſe of Evil, it neceſſarily follows, that as there is a peculiar Nature and Principle which is the cauſe of Good, ſo there muſt be another, which is the cauſe of Evil.*

Plutarch. de Iſide & Oſir. p. 369. ed. Fr.

But leſt we ſhould think it was only a Sect of a kind of Heathen *Manichees* which held this Opinion; he tells us, to prevent that, καὶ δοκεῖ τοῦτο τοῖς πλείστοις καὶ Σοφωτάτοις, *It was the Opinion of the moſt,*

and wiſeſt of the Heathen. Now theſe two Principles ſome (ſaith he) call *Two oppoſite Gods*, whereof the one is the cauſe of *Good*, and the other of *Evil*; him they call Θεὸς, this Δαίμων. By this one would imagin that this very ancient Tradition was nothing elſe but the true account of the Origin of Evil a little diſguis'd. For the Scripture making the *Devil* the firſt Author of *Evil* himſelf, and the firſt ſollicitor and tempter of Man to it; who when God directed him ſtraight forward, pull'd Man back, and put him quite out of his way, by which means all the Miſeries of the World came into it: For while Man kept cloſe to his Maker, his Integrity and Obedience were to him what the *vaſa umbilicalia* are to the child in the Womb; by them he receiv'd whatever tended to his ſubſiſtence and comfort: but Sin cut thoſe Veſſels aſunder, and prov'd the *Midwife* of Miſery, bringing Man forth into a World of ſorrow and ſufferings: Now, I ſay, the Scripture taking ſuch eſpecial notice of one, as the chief of *Devils*, thro' whoſe means Evil came into the World, this gave occaſion to the Heathens, when length of time had made the Original Tradition more obſcure, to make theſe two, *God* and the *Dæmon*, as two *Anti-gods*, and ſo to be the cauſes, the one of all *Good*, and the other of all *Evil*. Which at laſt came to that (which was the *Devil*'s great deſign in thus corrupting the Tradition) that both theſe *Anti-gods* ſhould have ſolemn worſhip by Sacrifices; the one by way of Impetration, for beſtowing of Good; the other by way of Deprecation, for averting of Evil. Such *Plutarch* there tells us were the *Oromaſdes* and *Arimanius* of *Zoroaſtres* which were worſhipped by the *Perſians*, the one for doing good, and the other for avoiding evil; the one they reſembled to Light (or Fire) the other to Darkneſs and Ignorance; what Animals were good and uſeful they aſcribed to *Oromaſdes*, and all venomous and noxious ones to *Arimanius*, whom *Plutarch* elſewhere calls Τὸν πονηρὸν Δαίμονα Περσῶν, *The evil Dæmon of the Perſians*. The ſame *Diogenes Laertius* relates of the *Magi*, the Philoſophers of *Perſia*, that they made two diſtinct Principles, Ἀγαθὸν Δαίμονα καὶ κακὸν, *a good and bad Dæmon*; for which he quotes *Dinon*, *Ariſtotle*, *Hermippus*, *Eudoxus*, and others. The ſame *Plutarch* makes to be the Opinion of the ancient *Greeks*, who attribute the good to *Jupiter Olympius*, the bad to *Hades*; the *Chaldeans*, ſaith he, *make the Planets their Gods*, of which two they ſuppoſe the cauſe of Good; two more of only a malignant Influence; and other three to be indifferent to either. The ſame he affirms of the *Ægyptians*, that whatever was evil and irregular, they aſcrib'd to *Typho*; what was good, comely and uſeful, they attributed to *Iſis* and *Oſiris*; to *Iſis* as the paſſive, *Oſiris* as the active Principle.

Plut. in Alex.

Diog. Laertius in Proœm.

X. Thus we ſee how large a ſpread this Opinion of the Origin of Evil had in the *Gentile* World; neither did it expire with *Heathenism*; But *Manes* retain'd ſo much of the Religion of his Countrey, being a *Perſian*, that he made a ſtrange medley of the *Perſian* and *Chriſtian* Doctrine together. For that was his famous Opinion, of which St. *Auſtin* tells us; *Iſte duo principia inter ſe diverſa atque adverſa, eademque æterna, & co-æterna, hoc eſt, ſemper fuiſſe, compoſuit; duaſque naturas atque ſubſtantias, boni, ſcilicet, & mali, ſequens alios antiquos hæreticos, opinatus eſt.* St. *Auſtin*

Auguſt. de Hæreſ. c. 46.

Auſtin thinks that *Manes* had his Opinion concerning two Principles from the ancient Heretics, by whom I ſuppoſe he means the *Marcioniſts* and *Valentinians*; but it ſeems more probable that *Manes* had his Doctrine immediately from his Countreymen, tho' it be generally thought that *Scythianus* and *Buddas* were his Maſters in it. But from whomſoever it came, the Opinion was merely *Heathen*, and not more contrary to Scripture than it is to Reaſon; the former I meddle not with, that Opinion being now extinct in the *Chriſtian* World; I only briefly conſider the Unreaſonableneſs of it; to ſhew what a far better account of the *Origin of Evil* the Scriptures give us, than was diſcover'd by the *Heathen* Philoſophers. For on both ſides that Opinion is repugnant to the Notion of a *Deity*, ſo that while they would make two ſuch *Gods*, they make none at all. For how can the Principle of Good be God, if he hath not Infinite Power, as well as Goodneſs? and how can he have Infinite Power, if he hath not the management of things in the World? and how can he have the management of things, if they be liable to Evil, which the other *God*, which is the Principle of Evil, may lay upon it; from which, according to this ſuppoſition, the Principle of Good cannot reſcue it? So that they who hold this Opinion cannot, as *Simplicius* tells us, Give God τὸ ἥμισυ τῆ ὅλης δυνάμεως, *the half of that Infinite Power* which belongs to him; for neither can he keep the good Creatures which he makes from the power of the evil *Dæmon*, and therefore if he loves them, muſt be in continual fears of the Power of the contrary Principle; neither can he free them from the evil which the other lays upon them; for then God's Power would be far greater than the evil *Dæmon*, and ſo he could be no *Anti-god*. And on the other ſide the Notion or Idea of an *Infinite evil Being*, is in it ſelf an inconſiſtent Idea; for it is an *Infinite Non-entity*, if we ſuppoſe his very Being to lie in *being evil*, which is only a privation of Goodneſs; and beſides if he be infinitely evil, he muſt be infinitely contrary to the good Principle; and how can he be infinitely contrary which injoys ſeveral of the ſame Perfections, which the other hath, which are *Infinity of Eſſence*, and *Neceſſity of Exiſtence?* Now if this Principle of *Evil* be abſolutely contrary to the other, it muſt be contrary in all his Perfections; for whatever is a Perfection, belongs to that which is good; and now if it be contrary in every Perfection, *Infinity of Eſſence*, and *Neceſſity of Exiſtence*, being two, it muſt be as contrary as is imaginable to them, by which this evil Principle muſt be infinitely defective in Being and Exiſtence, and ſo it will be an *Infinite Non-entity* which yet exiſts, which is the height of contradiction. Again, if there be ſuch a contrary Principle, which is the cauſe of all Evil, then all Evil falls out unavoidably, and by the power of this *Infinitely evil Principle*, by which means not only all *Religion*, but all *Virtue* and *Goodneſs* will be taken out of the World, if this evil Principle be infinite; and if not infinite, no *Anti-god*: and not only ſo, but all difference of *Good* and *Evil* will be taken away (and then what need making two ſuch contrary Principles to give an account of the Origin of Evil?) for when once Evil becomes thus neceſſary, it loſeth its Nature as a Moral Evil; for a Moral Evil implies in it a voluntary breach of ſome known Law; but how can that breach be voluntary, which

was caus'd by an Infinite Power in the moſt proper way of Efficiency? And thus if all freedom of Will be deſtroy'd (as it is neceſſarily by this Suppoſition) then no Government of the World by Laws can be ſuppos'd, and conſequently no Reward or Puniſhment, which ſuppoſe liberty of Action, and by this means all Religion, Law, and Providence are baniſh'd out of the World, and ſo this evil *Dæmon* will get all into his own hands, and inſtead of two contrary Principles, there will be but one *Infinitely evil Dæmon*. Which that there is not, appears by this, that notwithſtanding all the Evil in the World, there is ſo much Good left in it, of which there would be none, if this evil *Dæmon* had Infinite Power. By this we ſee there cannot be a Principle infinitely evil; for while they go about to make two ſuch contrary Principles infinite, they make neither of them ſo, and ſo while they make two *Gods*, they take away any at all. So that this Opinion of the *Origin of Evil*, is manifeſtly abſurd, irrational, and contradictious.

XI. But all the *Heathen* Philoſophers were not ſo groſs as to imagin two ſuch *Anti-gods* with infinitely active Power; but yet thoſe who would not in terms aſſert it, might be driven to it by the conſequence of their Opinion concerning the *Origin of Evil*, which did ſuppoſe a neceſſity of it in Nature, as flowing from that paſſive Principle out of which the World was produc'd. Hence it was that *Heraclitus*, as *Plutarch* tells us, attributed the Origin of all things to *Diſcord* and *Antipathy*, and was wont to ſay, that when *Homer* wiſh'd

Plutarch. de Iſid. & Oſiride.

Ἔκ τε θεῶν ἔρις ἔκτ' ἀνθρώπων ὀλέσθαι.

That all contention were baniſh'd out of the World, that he did ſecretly curſe the Origin of things, and wiſh'd the ruin of the World. So *Empedocles* call'd the active Principle which did good, Harmony and Friendſhip, but the other

Νεῖκος ὐλόμενον τ' ἀπὸ αἱματόεσσαν.

by which he makes it to be a quarrelſom, pernicious, and bloody Principle. The ſame *Plutarch* tells us of theſe two renowned Philoſophers, *Pythagoras* and *Plato*. Thence he tells us the *Pythagoreans* call'd the Principle of Good, τὸ ἓν, πεπερασμένον, τὸ μόνον, τὸ ἰσῆ, τὸ τετράγωνον, τὸ τελεόγωνον, τὸ δεξιὸν, τὸ λαμπρόν. *Unity, finite, quieſcent, ſtraight, uneven number, ſquare, right and ſplendid*; the Principle of Evil, they call'd τὴν δυάδα, τὸ ἄπειρον, τὸ φερόμενον, τὸ καμπύλον, τὸ ἄρτιον, τὸ ἑτερόμηκες, τὸ ἄνισον, τὸ ἀφανὲς, τὸ σκοτεινόν. *The Binary, Infinite, moving, crooked, even, long of one ſide, unequal, left, obſcure.* The Opinion of *Plato*, he tells us, is very obſcure, it being his purpoſe to conceal it; but he ſaith in his old Age in his Book *de Legibus*, ἁπλῶς δὲ καὶ ἀναμφιλόγως, καὶ οὐ συμβολικῶς, *without any ifs or ands*, he aſſerts the World to be mov'd by more than one Principle, by two at the leaſt, τὸν μὲν ἀγαθουργὸν εἶναι, τὸν δὲ ἐναντίαν ταύτῃ, καὶ τὰ ἐναντία δημιουργόν. *The one of a good and benign Nature, the other contrary to it both in its Nature and Operations.*

* *Chalcid. in Tim. p.* 394. *Numenius* in **Chalcidius* thus delivers the Opinions of *Pythagoras* and

and *Plato de originibus*, as he ſpeaks; *Igitur Pythagoras quoque, inquit Numenius, fluidam & ſine qualitate ſylvam eſſe cenſet; nec tamen ut Stoici naturæ mediæ, interque malorum, bonorumque viciniam, ſed plane noxiam; Deum quippe eſſe (ut etiam Platoni videtur) initium & cauſam bonorum, ſylvam malorum:* So that according to *Numenius*, both *Plato* and *Pythagoras* attributed the Origin of Evil to the Malignity of Matter, and ſo they make Evils to be neceſſarily conſequent upon the Being of Things. For thus he delivers expreſly the Opinion of *Pythagoras*; *qui ait, Exiſtente providentia, mala quoque neceſſaria ſubſtitiſſe, propterea quod ſylva ſit, & eadem ſit malitia prædita: Platonemque idem Numenius laudat, quod duas mundi animas autumet; Unam beneficentiſſimam; malignam alteram*, ſc. *Sylvam. Igitur juxta Platonem mundo bona ſua Dei, tanquam patris liberalitate collata ſunt; mala vero, matris ſylvæ vitio cohæſerunt.* But *Plutarch* will by no means admit, that *Plato* attributes the Origin of Evil merely to Matter, but he makes the Principle of Evil to be ſomething diſtinct from Matter, which he calls τὴν ἄπειρον, καὶ ἀόριστον, αὐτοκίνητόν τε καὶ κινητικὴν ἀρχήν, *A confuſed infinite, ſelf-moving, ſtirring Principle*; which (ſaith he) he elſewhere calls *Neceſſity*, and in his *de Legibus*, plainly, ψυχὴν ἄτακτον καὶ κακοπαθῆ, *a diſorderly and malignant Soul*, which cannot be underſtood of mere Matter, when he makes his *Hyle* ἄμορφον καὶ ἀχημάτιστον ἕξιν πάσης ποιότητος καὶ δυνάμεως οἰκείας ἔρημον, *Without form or figure, and deſtitute of all qualities and power of operation: and it is impoſſible* (ſaith he) *that that which is of it ſelf ſuch an inert principle as Matter is, ſhould by* Plato *be ſuppos'd to be the cauſe and principle of Evil*, which he elſewhere calls ἀνάγκην παλαὶ τῷ Θεῷ δυσμαχοῦσαν καὶ ἀφηνιάζουσαν, *Neceſſity which often reſiſted God, and caſt off his reins.* So that according to *Plutarch*, *Plato* acquits both *God* and *Hyle* from being the Origin of Evil, τὴν γε ὕλην ἀμοίρου ἀπειλοῦς ἀπαλλάττων, καὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ τὴν τῶν κακῶν αἰτίαν ἀποτίτου πρόμβρου, and therefore attributes it to that malignant Spirit which moves the Matter, and is the cauſe of all the diſorderly Motions in the World. But what this Spirit ſhould be, neither he or any one elſe could ever underſtand: what darkneſs and ignorance then was there among the wiſeſt of Philoſophers concerning the Origin of Evil, when they were ſo confus'd and obſcure in the account which they gave of it, that their greateſt admirers could not underſtand them!

Plutarch. de Anima procreat. & Tim.

XII.

But tho' *Plato* ſeem'd ſo ambiguous in his judgment of the Origin of Evil, whether he ſhould attribute it to the *Hyle*, or ſome malignant Spirit in it, the *Stoics* were dogmatical, and plainly imputed the cauſe of Evil to the perverſity of Matter. So *Chalcidius* tells us, that the *Stoics* made Matter not to be evil in it ſelf as *Pythagoras*, but that it was indifferent to either; *perrogati igitur unde mala? perverſitatem ſeminarium malorum cauſati ſunt:* they made the perverſity of Matter the Origin of Evil; but as he well obſerves, *nec expediunt adhuc unde ipſa perverſitas, cum juxta ipſos duo ſint initia rerum, Deus & ſylva. Deus ſummum & præcellens bonum; ſylva, ut cenſent, nec bonum nec malum.* They give no rational account whence this perverſity of Matter ſhould ariſe, when according to the *Stoics*, there are but two Principles of Things, *God* and *Matter*, whereof the one is perfectly good, the other neither good nor evil. But this perverſity they tell us is ſomething neceſſarily conſe-

Chalcid. in Tim. p. 395.

consequent upon the Generation of Things. Ταῦτα γάρ ἐστι παθη τῆ γενέσει ἀκολουθήματα, ὥσπερ ἰὸς τῷ χαλκῷ, καὶ ὁ ῥυπὸς τῷ σώματι, *these are affections*, (*viz.* the Disorders in the World) which *follow the Generation of things, as rust comes upon brass, and filth upon the body*, as the counterfeit *Trismegistus* speaks; so *Maximus Tyrius* saith that Evils in the World are οὐ τέχνης ἔργα, ἀλλ' ὕλης παθη, *not any works of art, but the affections of Matter*. *Non potest artifex mutare materiam*, saith *Seneca*, when he is giving an account *Why God suffers Evils in the World:* and elsewhere gives this account why Evils came into the World, *non quia cessat ars, sed quia id in quo exercetur inobsequens arti est*. So that the Origin of Evil by this account of it lies wholly upon the perversity of Matter, which it seems was uncapable of being put into better order by that God who produc'd the World out of that Matter which the *Stoics* suppos'd to be eternal. And the truth is, the avoiding the attributing the cause of Evil to God, seems to have been the great Reason, why they rather chose to make it matter necessary and co-existent with God, and this was the only plausible pretence which *Hermogenes* had for following the *Platonists* and *Stoics* in this Opinion, that he might set God far enough off from being the Author of Sin; but I cannot see what advantage comes at all by this *Hypothesis*, but it is chargeable with as many difficulties as any other. For,

Maxim. Tyr. Serm. 25.

Seneca de Provid. c. 5.

Idem præf. ad natur. quæst.

1. 1. *It either destroys God's Omnipotency, or else makes him the approver of Evil*; so that if he be not *Auctor*, he must be *Assentator mali*, as *Tertullian* speaks against *Hermogenes*, because he suffer'd Evil to be in Matter; for, as he argues, *Aut enim potuit emendere sed noluit; aut voluit quidem, verum non potuit infirmus Deus: si potuit & noluit, malus & ipse, quia malo favit; & sic jam habetur ejus licet non instituerit: quia tamen si noluisset illud esse, non esset; ipse jam fecit esse, quod noluit non esse: quo quid est turpius? si voluit esse quod ipse noluit fecisse, adversum semetipsum egit, cum & voluit esse quod noluit fecisse, & noluit fecisse quod voluit esse.* So that little advantage is gain'd for the clearing the true Origin of Evil by this Opinion; for either God could have taken away Evil out of Matter but would not, or else would but could not; this last destroys God's Omnipotency, the former his Goodness; for by that means Evil is in the World by his consent and approbation; for if God would not remove it when he might, the Being of it will come from him; when if he would have hindred it, it would not have been, and so God by not rooting out of Evil, will be found an Assertor of it; *Male si per voluntatem: turpiter si per necessitatem, aut famulus erit mali Deus, aut amicus:* if God's Will were the cause why Sin was, it reflects on his Goodness, if God's Power could not hinder it, it destroys his Omnipotency. So that by this Opinion God must either be a slave or a friend to Evil.

Tertull. adverſ. Hermogen. c. 10.

2. 2. *This Principle overturns the foundations of Religion, and all transactions between God and Mens Souls in order to their welfare*, because it makes Evil to be necessarily existent in the World; which appears from hence, in that Evil doth result from the Being of Matter, and so it must necessarily be as Matter is suppos'd to be; for whatever results from the Being of a thing, must be co-existent with it; and so what flows from what doth necessarily exist, must have the same Mode of Existence which the Being it self

ſelf hath; as is evident in all the Attributes of God, which have the ſame immutability with his Nature: now then, if Evil did exiſt from Eternity together with Matter, it muſt neceſſarily exiſt as Matter doth, and ſo evil will be invincible and unavoidable in the World; which if once granted, renders Religion uſeleſs, makes God's Commands unrighteous, and deſtroys the foundation of God's Proceedings in the day of Judgment. 3. *This Opinion makes God not to be the Author of Good,* while it denies him to be the Author of Evil. For either there was nothing elſe but Evil in this eternal Matter, or there was a mixture of Good and Evil; if nothing elſe but Evil which did neceſſarily exiſt, it were as impoſſible for God to produce Good out of it, as to annihilate the neceſſarily exiſtent Matter. If there were a mixture of Good and Evil, they were both there either neceſſarily or contingently; how could either of them be contingently in that which is ſuppos'd to be neceſſarily exiſtent, and no free Agent? If they be both there neceſſarily, 1. It is hard conceiving how two ſuch contrary things as Good and Evil, ſhould neceſſarily be in the ſame uniform Matter. 2. Then God is no more the Author of Good than of Evil in the World; for he is ſaid not to be Author of Evil becauſe it comes from Matter; and ſo it appears Good doth too, and ſo God according to this Opinion, is no more the Author of Good, than he is of Evil. But if it be ſaid *that Good is not in Matter, but God produc'd that out of nothing:* Then I reply, 1. If God did produce Good out of nothing, why did he not produce Matter out of nothing too? If he were ſo powerful as to do the one, there could be no defect of power as to the other. What inſufficiency is there in God's Nature for producing all things out of nothing, if he can produce any thing out of nothing? 2. If God did produce Good out of Evil, why could he not have remov'd all Evil out of Matter? For Good could not but be produc'd by the removing of ſome Evil which was before that Good, and ſo God might have remov'd all Evil out of Matter. And ſo by not doing it when he might, this opinion gives not the leaſt Satisfaction in point of Reaſon for acquitting God from being the Author of Sin, nor for clearing the true origin of Evil. 3.

XIII. Thus we have now compar'd the account given of it in Scripture, with that given by the Heathen Philoſophers, and find it in every thing more clear, rational and ſatisfactory than theirs is. Which doubtleſs is the reaſon, why the more modern Philoſophers, ſuch as *Hierocles*, *Porphyry*, *Simplicius* and others, tho' otherwiſe great oppoſers of Chriſtianity, did yet in this ſide with the Scriptures and attribute the original of Evil not to Matter but to the Will of Man. And whoever is ſeriouſly converſant with the writings of thoſe Philoſophers, who were ἐκ τῆς ἱερᾶς ῥοιᾶς of the ſacred ſucceſſion out of the School of *Ammonius* at *Alexandria*, ſuch as *Plotinus*, *Porphyrius*, *Iamblichus* and *Hierocles*, will find them write in a higher ſtrain concerning many weighty and important Truths, as of the degeneracy of Mens Souls from God, and the way of the Souls returning to Him, than the moſt ſublime of the ancient Philoſophers had done. Which Speculations of theirs no doubt aroſe not ſo much from the School of *Plato*, and *Pythagoras*, as of that great reſtorer of Philoſophy *Ammonius* of *Alexandria*; whoſe Scholars *Herennius*, *Origen* and *Plotinus* were. Who living

Euſeb. Eccleſ. hiſt. l. 6. c. 19. Hierom. de Script. Eccl.

ing and dying a Christian, as *Eusebius* and *Hierom* assure us, whatever *Porphyrius* suggests to the contrary, did communicate to his Scholars the sublimer Mysteries of Divine Revelation, together with the Speculations of the ancient Philosophers: which *Holstenius* conceives he did with an adjuration of secrecy, which he tells us *Porphyrius* himself acknowledgeth, that those three Scholars of *Ammonius*, *Herennius*, *Origen* and *Plotinus*, were under an obligation to each other not to reveal and discover, tho' it were after violated by them. It is an easie matter to conceive what an excellent improvement might be made of the ancient *Platonic* Philosophy by the advantage of the Scriptures, by one who was so well vers'd in both of them as *Ammonius* is suppos'd to have been; and how agreeable and becoming would that Philosophy seem which had only its rise from *Plato*, but its height and improvement from those rich and truly Divine Truths which were inlaid with them? The want of observing this, *viz.* whence it was that those excellent discourses in the latter *Platonists* had their true Original, hath given occasion to several mistakes among learned Men: as first the over-valuing of the *Platonic* Philosophy, as tho' in many of the discourses and notions of it, it seem'd to some (who were more in love with Philosophy than the Scriptures) to out-go what is discover'd therein concerning the same things. A most groundless and unworthy Censure! when it is more than probable (and might be largely manifested, were it here a fit opportunity) that whatever is truly generous and noble in the sublimest discourses of the *Platonists*, had not only its primitive rise, but its accession and improvement from the Scriptures wherein it is still contain'd in its native lustre and beauty, without those paintings and impure mixtures which the sublimest Truths are corrupted with in the *Platonic* Writings. The reason of which is, tho' these Philosophers grew suddenly rich thro' the spoils they had taken out of the Scriptures, yet they were loth to be known, from whence they had them, and would seem to have had that out of their own Gardens which was only transplanted from the Sacred Writings. Therefore we find them not mentioning the Scriptures and the Christian Doctrine without some contempt of its meanness and simplicity; and whatever improvement they had gain'd by them, they would have it less taken notice of by professing their opposition to the Christians, as is notorious in those great Philosophers, *Porphyrius*, *Iamblichus*, *Hierocles*, *Simplicius* and others. It being their design to take so much and no more out of the Christian Doctrine as they could well suit with their *Platonic* Notions, by which means they so disguis'd the Faces of the Truths they stole, that it were hard for the right owners of them to know them again. Which was the grand Artifice of their great Master *Plato*, who doubtless by means of his abode and acquaintance in *Ægypt* about the time when the *Jews* began to flock thither, had more certain knowledge of many Truths of grand importance, concerning the Deity, the nature of the Soul, the origin of the World, than many other *Greek* Philosophers had; but yet therein lay his great fault, that he wrapt up and disguis'd his Notions in such a fabulous and ambiguous manner, that partly he might be less known from whence he had them, and that they might find better entertainment among the *Greeks*,

Holsten. de vit. & Script. Porphyr. c. 6.

Greeks, than they were ever like to do in their plain and native dreſs. Which *Plato* himſelf ſeems ſomewhere to intimate, when he ſaith, that what the *Greeks* receiv'd from the *Barbarians*, κάλλιον τῦβ εἰς τὰλ@. ἀσφαλίζονται, *they put it in a better faſhion*, *i. e.* they diſguiſe it, alter and change it as they pleaſe, and put it into a *Greek* habit, that it might never be ſuſpected to have been a Foreigner. Thence *Tertullian* ſpeaks with a great deal of truth and freedom of ſuch Philoſophers who did *ingenii ſitim de prophetarum fonte irrigare* (as he expreſſeth it) that quench'd their thirſt after Knowledg with the Waters of *Jordan* (tho' they did not, like *Naaman*, cure the Leproſie of the Head by waſhing in them) for as *Tertullian* ſaith, they came only *ex negotio curioſitatis*, more to pleaſe the itch of their curioſity than to cure it.

Plato in Epinom.

Tertul. Apol. c. 47.

And wherein they ſeem'd moſt to agree with the Scriptures, their difference was beyond their agreement. *Siquidem vera quæque & conſonantia Prophetis aut aliunde commendant aut aliorſum ſubornant, cum maxima injuria veritatis, quam efficiunt aut adjuvari falſis aut patrocinari. Whatever the Philoſophers ſpeak agreeable to the Scriptures, either they do not own whence they had it, or turn it quite another way, whereby they have done the truth a great deal of injury, by mixing it with their corruptions of it, and making that little Truth a plea for the reſt of their Errors.* Neither was this only among the ancient Philoſophers, but the primitive Chriſtians began to diſcern the underhand workings of ſuch, who ſought to blend Philoſophy and Chriſtianity together; for *Tertullian* himſelf takes great notice of ſuch, who did *Veritatis dogmata ad Philoſophicas ſententias adulterare*, ſuborn Chriſtianity to maintain Philoſophy; which makes him cry out, *Viderint qui Stoicum, & Platonicum, & Dialecticum Chriſtianiſmum protulerunt*; by which we ſee what tampering there was betimes rather to bring Chriſtianity down to Philoſophy, than to make Philoſophy truckle under the truth and ſimplicity of the Scriptures. Whether *Ammonius* himſelf, and ſome others of the School of *Alexandria*, might be guilty in this kind, is not here a place to inquire, tho' it be too evident in the Writings of ſome, that they rather ſeek to accommodate the Scriptures to the Sentiments of the School of *Plato*, than to reform that by the Scriptures; but I ſay, however it were with thoſe who were Chriſtians, yet thoſe who were not, but only Philoſophers, made their great advantage by it. For when they found what was reconcilable with the Doctrine of *Plato* in the Scriptures, done already to their hands, by the endeavors chiefly of *Ammonius* and *Origen*, they greedily embrace thoſe improvements of their Philoſophy, which would tend ſo much to the credit of it, and as contemptuouſly reject what they found irreconcilable with the Dictates of their Philoſophy. Now what an unreaſonable thing is it, when whatever was noble and excellent in the Heathen Philoſophy was derivative from the Scriptures, as the ſacred Fountain of it, that the meeting with ſuch things ſhould in the leaſt redound to the prejudice of the Scriptures, from whence it was originally deriv'd? When on the other ſide it ſhould be a great confirmation to our Faith, as to the Scriptures, that they who were profeſs'd Philoſophers and Admirers only of Reaſon, did ſo readily embrace ſome of thoſe grand Truths which are contain'd in the Word of God.

Tertul. de Anima, c. 2.

Tertul. de Proſcrip. adverſ. hæret. c. 7.

XIV. For which we need no other inſtance, than that before us, concerning the origin of Evil, the making out of which will tend to the clearing the laſt thing mention'd concerning it, which was, That *the moſt material things in it are atteſted by the Heathens themſelves*. And this Honey which is gain'd out of the Lion's mouth, muſt needs taſte ſweeter than any other doth. For it is a weak and groundleſs miſtake on the other ſide, which is the ſecond (which ariſeth from meeting things conſonant to the Scriptures in the Writings of Philoſophers) preſently to conclude from ſuch things, that they were Chriſtians (as it is ſaid ſome have lately done in the behalf of *Hierocles*.) For their being ſuch clear accounts given in Scripture of the grand difficulties and perplexities which the minds of Men were troubl'd with, when theſe came to the knowledg of ſuch who were of Philoſophic and inquiſitive Heads, we cannot but think they would meet with acceptation among them, eſpecially if they might be made conſiſtent with their former Speculations: thus it was in our preſent caſe concerning the origin of Evil, we have already beheld the lamentable perplexities the ancient Philoſophers were in about it, what *Meanders* they were loſt in for want of a Clue to guide them thro' them; now it pleas'd God, after the coming of Christ in the fleſh, to declare to the World the only way for the recovery of Souls and their eternal Salvation, the news of which being ſpread ſo far that it ſoon got among the Philoſophers, could not but make them more inquiſitive concerning the ſtate and condition of their Souls; and when they had ſearch'd what the Philoſophers had formerly diſcover'd of it, their curioſity would preſently prompt them to ſee what account of things concerning the Souls of Men was deliver'd by the Preachers of this new Doctrine. By this they could not but preſently underſtand that they declar'd all Mens Souls to be in a moſt degenerate and low condition, by being ſo continually under the power of the moſt unreaſonable and unruly paſſions, that they were eſtranged from God, and prone to fix on things very unſutable to their nature, as to all which, their own inward ſenſe and experience could not but tell them that theſe things were notoriouſly true; and therefore they inquire further how theſe things came to be ſo; which they receive a full account of in Scripture, that Man's Soul was at firſt created pure and holy, and in perfect friendſhip with God, that God dealt bountifully and favorably with Man; only expected Obedience to his Laws; that Man being a free Agent, did abuſe his Liberty, and diſobey'd his Maker; and thence came the true πτερόρρυσις, the feathers of the Soul, whereby it ſoared up to Heaven, moulted away, and the Soul ſunk below it ſelf, into a degenerate and apoſtate Condition, out of which it is impoſſible to be recover'd without ſome extraordinary expreſſion of Divine Favor. Now what is there in all this account, but what is hugely ſutable to principles of Reaſon, and to the general experience of the World, as to thoſe things which were capable of being try'd by it? And thoſe Philoſophers who were any thing ingenuous, and Lovers of Truth, could not but confeſs the truth of thoſe things which we are now ſpeaking of, *viz. That Mens Souls are in a very degenerate condition; That the moſt rational account of it is, that Man by the act of his own will brought himſelf into*

into it; and that in order to the happineſs of Mens Souls, there was a neceſſity of recovery out of this condition.

As to the degeneracy of the Souls of Men; this was the common complaint of thoſe Philoſophers, who minded the government of themſelves, and the practice of Virtue, eſpecially of the *Platoniſts* and *Stoics*. *Seneca* in all his Moral Diſcourſes, eſpecially in his Epiſtles, may ſpeak ſufficiently in behalf of the *Stoics*, how much they lamented the degeneracy of the World. And the *Platoniſts* all complain of the ſlavery of the Soul in the Body, and that it is here by way of puniſhment, for ſomething which was done before; and which makes me ſomewhat inclinable to think, that *Plato* knew more of the lapſe of Mankind, than he would openly diſcover, and for that end diſguis'd it after his uſual manner in that *Hypotheſis* of præ-exiſtence, which taking it Cabaliſtically (for I rather think the Opinion of præ-exiſtence is ſo to be taken, than the hiſtory of the Fall of Man) may import only this, *That Mens ſouls might be juſtly ſuppos'd to be created happy, but by reaſon of the Apoſtaſy of Man's ſoul from God, all Souls come now into their Bodies as into a kind of Priſon, they being enſlav'd to the brutiſh part within them, there having been ſuch a true* παλιγγενεσία, *the ſoul being now depriv'd of her chiefeſt perfections in this her low and degenerate condition.* And it ſeems far more rational to me to interpret thoſe Perſons Opinions to a Cabaliſtical, or an Allegorical Senſe, who are known to have writ deſignedly in a way obſcure and ambiguous, than to force thoſe Mens expreſſions to *Cabala's*, who profeſs to write a plain Hiſtory, and that with the greateſt ſimplicity and perſpicuity. But it cannot but ſeem very ſtrange that an *Hypotheſis* capable of being reconcil'd to the plain literal ſenſe of the Scriptures (deliver'd by a perſon who uſeth great artifice and cunning to diſguiſe his Opinions, and ſuch a perſon withal, who (by ſuch perſons themſelves who make uſe of this Opinion to that end) is ſuppos'd to have been very converſant with the Writings of *Moſes*) ſhould be taken in its literal ſenſe, as it really imports præ-exiſtence of each particular Soul in the groſſeſt manner; and this ſhould be made to be a part of the Philoſophic Cabala of the Writings of ſuch a Perſon, who uſeth not the leaſt Artifice to diſguiſe his Senſe, nor gives us any where the leaſt intimation that he left behind him ſuch plaited Pictures in his Hiſtory of the beginning of the World, that if you look ſtraight forward, you may ſee a literal Cabala, on the one ſide a Philoſophical, and on the other a Moral. But now if we remove the Cabala from *Moſes* to *Plato*, we may find no incongruity or repugnancy at all either as to *Plato*'s way of writing, or the conſonancy of the Opinion ſo interpreted to the plain genuine ſenſe of *Moſes*, if by *Plato*'s opinion of the præ-exiſtence and deſcent of Souls, be underſtood by the former, the happy ſtate of the Soul of Man in conjunction with God; and by the latter, the low and degenerate condition which the Soul is in, after Apoſtaſy from him. Which the latter *Platoniſts* are ſo large and eloquent in expreſſing. *Porphyry*, where he ſpeaks of ſome things he counſels Men to do, hath theſe words, *But if we cannot do them, let us at leaſt do that which was ſo much lamented of old*, Τὸ ἡλωσύμφορον ὡς ἐκ τῶν παλαιῶν, which is, ὡς τῶν ἴσῃ ἐλέσθαι, ἴκτι τειχέων ἡρώμεθα,

XV. 1.

Porphyr. de Abſtinent. l. 3. ſ. 2.

ἐπ τὸ ϑεῖον καὶ ἀκήρατον, καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν ἀβλαβὲς σώζειν οὐ δυνάμεθα. *Let us at the leaſt join with our Fore-fathers in lamenting this, that we are compounded of ſuch diſagreeing and contrary principles, that we are not able to preſerve divine, pure and unſpotted Innocency.* And *Hierocles* fully expreſſeth his ſenſe of the Degeneracy of Mankind in theſe words; οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ κακοὶ καὶ τῆς αὐτοπαθείας ἥττους καὶ φρενοβλαβεῖς ὑπὸ τῆς εἰς γῆν νεύσεως βλάπτονται, ὡς καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτοὺς τὸ κακὸν ἔχειν, ἀφ' τὸ βουληθῆναι φυγεῖν ἀπὸ Θεοῦ, καὶ ἀπομερίσαι αὐτοὺς τῆς τοῦ ὁμιλίας, ἧς εὐτύχουν ἐν αὐγῇ καθαρᾷ ἀφέρητος· ἡ μὲν ἀπὸ Θεοῦ χωρισμὸς βλάπτουσα τὰς φρένας ἡ πρὸς γῆν νῦσις δηλοῖ. *The moſt of Men in the World are bad, and under the command of their paſſions, and grown impotent thro' their propenſity to Earth; which great evil they have brought upon themſelves, by their wilful Apoſtaſy from God, and withdrawing themſelves from that Society with him which they once enjoy'd in pure light: which departure of of Mens Souls from God, which is ſo hurtful to the minds of Men, is evident by their ſtrong inclination to the things of this World.* The ſame Author mentions, with much approbation, that Speech of *Heraclitus*, ſpeaking of thoſe Souls which are ἀπταῖσι εἰς κακίαν, which I cannot better render than *undeclinably good*, he ſaith, ὃν ζῶμεν τὸν ἐκείνων θάνατον, τεθνήκαμεν δὲ τὸν ἐκείνων βίον· *We live their death, and die their life:* κάπτωσι γὰρ καὶ ἀπαπίπτει τὸν εὐδαίμονα χῶρον ὁ ἄνθρωπος. *For Man is now fallen down from that bleſſed Region*, and as *Empedocles* the *Pythagorean* ſpeaks,

Hieroc. in Pythag. Carm. p. 261.

Φυγὰς ϑεόϑεν κἀλήτης
Νείκεϊ μαινομένῳ πίσυνος.

Which words cannot be better rendred, than in the words the Scripture uſeth concerning *Cain, and he went from the preſence of the Lord, and was a fugitive in the earth*, and under continual perplexities. For the Soul of Man having left τὰ λειμῶνα τὰ ἀληθείας (it is *Hierocles*'s own expreſſion) *the pleaſant meadow of truth* (a fit deſcription of Paradiſe) τῇ ὁρμῇ τῆς πτεροῤῥύησεως εἰς γένεσιν ἔρχεται σώματος ὀλοΐου αἰῶνος ἀμοιρήσας, *thro' the violence of her moulting, or deplumation, ſhe comes into this earthly Body, deprived of that bleſſed Life, which ſhe before enjoy'd.* Which he tells us is very conſonant to *Plato*'s ſenſe of the καθόδους, or deſcent of Souls, that when by reaſon of their impotency of fixing wholly on God they ſuffer συντυχίαν καὶ πτεροῤῥύσιν, *ſome great loſs, and a depravation of former perfections*, (which I ſuppoſe is meant by the πτεροῤῥύσις, the Souls impotency of flying up above this earthly World) then they lapſe into theſe Terreſtrial and Mortal Bodies. So *Hierocles* concludes with this excellent and divine Speech, ὥσπερ οὖν ἡ ἀπὸ Θεοῦ φυγὴ, καὶ ἡ πτεροῤῥύησις τῶν κουφιζόντων ἡμᾶς πρὸς τὰ ἄνω εἰς τὸ τῆς ϑνητῆς ἤνεγκε τόπου, οἷς τὰ κακὰ συνέρχεται· οὕτως οὖν ἡ τῆς ϑνητῆς πρὸς ἀπαθείας ἀπόδρασις, καὶ ἡ τῶν ἀρετῶν, οἷον πτερῶν τινῶν ἔκφυσις πρὸς τὸ τῶν καλῶν καθαρὸν τόπον, εἰς τὴν ϑείαν εὐζωίαν ἡμᾶς ἀνάξει. *As therefore by apoſtaſy from God, and the moulting of thoſe feathers of our Souls, whereby we may be rais'd up above this World, we have fallen into this place of Mortals which is compaſſed about with Evils: ſo by caſting off carnal affections, and by the growth of Virtues like new feathers to the ſoul, we ſhall aſcend to the place of pure and perfect good, and to the enjoyment of a Divine Life.* So much more becoming Chriſtians do theſe excellent Philoſophers ſpeak of the degeneracy of Mens Souls, and

Hieroc. in Pythag. p. 254.

the

the conſequents of it, than ſome who would be accounted the followers of Reaſon, as well as of CHRIST, who make it ſo much of their buſineſs to extenuate the fall of Man. Which we find thoſe who were mere Philoſophers, far more rational and ingenuous in, than thoſe who pretend ſo highly to Reaſon; but I think with as little of it as any, ſuppoſing the Scriptures to be of Divine Authority. But it is not here our buſineſs to conſider the Opinions of thoſe who pretend to Chriſtianity, but only of ſuch who pretending only to Reaſon, have yet conſented with the Doctrine of the Scriptures as to the Degeneracy of the Souls of Men, that it lies in an Apoſtaſie from GOD, and having loſt thoſe Perfections which they had before.

XVI. 2.

That Man's Fall is the cauſe of his Apoſtaſie; this we have already manifeſted at large from the Teſtimony and Reaſon of *Simplicius*, and *Hierocles* is as large and clear in it as the other, with Expreſſions much of the ſame nature. Μέση ἡ ὑσία τῆ ἀνθρώπῳ ὑσία τ τι ἀεὶ ῥεύσῃ τ θεὸν, καὶ τ μηδέποτε νοεῖν πεφυκότων, ἄνεισι ποτὲ ὀυσίνα, καὶ καίτοι ποτὲ πάλιν, νοῦ κλίσις καὶ ἀποδολῆ, ποτὲ τὴν θείαν ὁμοίωσιν καὶ τὴν θηρειον, ἀφ' τὸ τ φύσεως ἀμφίδολον ἀναμένῃ. *Man's Nature lying between thoſe Beings which perpetually contemplate God, and thoſe which are uncapable of it, it ſometimes aſcends to thoſe, and ſometimes deſcends to theſe, according as it obſerves or rejects the Dictates of Reaſon, and ſo by reaſon of the indifferency of the Will is liable to take upon it the ſimilitude of God or a Beaſt.* Ταῦτ' ὢν ὁ περὶ τ ἀνθρωπίνης ἐγνωκὼς ὐσίας, οἶδε πῶς αὐθαιρέτῳ πήμασ' ἔχουσι οἱ ἄνθρωποι, καὶ πῶς τλήμονες καὶ πάλαιοι πρὸς ἑαυτ αἱρέσεσι γίνονται. *And whoever throughly conſiders this will eaſily underſtand, how Men are the cauſes of their own Evils, and become unhappy and miſerable thro' their own choice and ſelf-wills.* Which he brings in by way of explication of that truly golden *Pythagorean* Verſe, *Hieroc. in aur. Carm. p. 258.*

Γνώσῃ δ' ἀνθρώπους αὐθαιρέτα πήματ' ἔχοντας
Τλήμονας.

Men are grown miſerable thro' their own fault. And afterwards *Hierocles* excellently deſcribes the nature of Evil in theſe words, Ἓν δὲ συμφυὲς ἅμα καὶ ἐπίκτητον ἡμῖν κακὸν, ἡ τ αὐπροαιρέτου πρὸς φύσιν κίνησις. *Both our natural and contracted pravity, is nothing elſe but the unnatural motion of our free Wills:* according to which, ſaith he, εἰκαιοπραγ τοῖς θείοις νόμοις πειρώμεθα, ὐδὲν ἐπαισθανόμενοι ὅσον ἑαυτοῖς βλάπτομεν, μόνον δ' δοκεῖν ἀνεπίφθ θεῖ ἀφέντες τοὺς τυφλῶς ὁρῶντες, ὅτι ἐδυνήθημεν ἀφηνιάσαι τ ἐκείνε ζυγῶν. *We dare to contradict the Laws of God, not being ſenſible how much we injure our ſelves when we do it; and only look at this, that we are able to caſt off the reins of God's Laws from our necks.* And he truly ſaith, *That it is the greateſt abuſe of liberty to offend God, when we either do what he forbids, or neglect what he requires.* Ἵνα ἑκατέρωθεν τ ἀθλιότητι ἑαυτοὺς πληρώσωσιν οἱ τ θεῖον νόμον ἐκβαίνοντες, τῷ τε μὴ ποιεῖν τὰ προστεταγμένα καὶ τῷ ποιεῖν τὰ ἀπηγορευμένα. *So that on both ſides Men bring miſery upon themſelves, by tranſgreſſing the Divine Law, both by not doing what they are commanded, and by doing what they are forbidden.* So that he fully aſcribes the origin of Evil to the τὸ αὐπροαίρετον κίνημα πρὸς φύσιν ἁμαρτεῖν, as he calls it, *the irregular motion of*

of the Will of Man, which we have already ſhew'd to be the Doctrine of the Scriptures.

3. As to the neceſſity of the Soul's recovery from this condition, in order to her felicity, we have theſe Philoſophers expreſſing their conſent with the Scriptures; *Porphyrius*, as St. *Auguſtine* tells us in the end of his firſt Book, *De regreſſu animæ*, doth acknowledg the neceſſity of a way of recovering Souls, which ſhould be univerſal. *Cum autem dicit Porphyrius, Nondum receptam unam quandam ſectam, quæ univerſalem viam animæ contineat liberandæ, ——nondumque in ſuam notitiam eandem viam hiſtoriali cognitione perlatam, proculdubio confitetur eſſe aliquam, ſed nondum in ſuam veniſſe notitiam.* But the neceſſity of the purgation of the Soul in order for the Felicity, is ſo largely and fully diſcours'd of by all the *Platoniſts* and *Pythagoreans*, that it will be needleſs to inſiſt upon it. Thus far then we find the account given of the origin of Evil in Scripture to be embrac'd by the ſublimeſt of the Heathen Philoſophers, as moſt rational and ſatisfactory; which was the thing to be prov'd.

Auguſt. de Civit. Dei, l. 10. c. 32.

XVII. Neither do we find only the main of this account acknowledged as rational, but we may trace ſome not obſcure foot-ſteps of the truth of particular Circumſtances which concern the fall of Man, among the Heathens: ſuch as the *Devil's envying of Man's happineſs, his diſguiſing himſelf under the form of a Serpent, and Man's being thrown out of Paradiſe upon his fall.*

D. *Caſaub.* Original of temporal Evils.

1. *The Devil's envying the happineſs of Man.* It hath been truly obſerv'd by a learned Man, that the original of that very ancient Opinion among the Heathen, *de invidia Dæmonis*, had its riſe from the Hiſtory of the fall of Man, which he hath made out ſo fully, that I ſhall the leſs need to prove it. And that there was an undoubted Tradition of ſome malignant Spirits, which envy'd the welfare of Mankind, appears by that ample Teſtimony of *Plutarch*, in his *Dio*, mention'd by the ſame Author; Οὐκ οἶδα, μὴ τῷ πάνυ παλαιῶν τὸ ἀποπίπτειν ἀναγκαδῶμεν ὡς σεσοβημένας λόγον, ὡς τὰ φαῦλα δαιμόνια καὶ βάσκανα, ὡς σφονοῦντα τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἐνδιδόντα καὶ παῖς πρᾶξεσιν ἐνιστάμενα, παρηχὰς δὲ φόβους ἐπάγοντα, σείοντα καὶ σφάλλοντα τὴν ὁρμὴν ὡς μὴ ἀμφιβόλοντες ἀπτῶτες ἐν τῷ καλῷ καὶ ἀκίνητοι, βελτίονος ἐκείνων μοίρας μεταλάβωσιν τὴν πλουτὴν τύχωσιν. *Plutarch* was much troubl'd to give an account of the Apparitions which *Brutus* and *Dio*, who were learned and philoſophical Men, were haunted withal; and doubts he can give no juſt account of it, unleſs he embrac'd that very ancient Tradition (which yet ſeem'd abſurd and incredible,) viz. *That there are certain wicked and malignant Dæmons, which envy good Men, and withſtand their Enterprizes, by raiſing Fears and Troubles to them, that ſo they might hinder them in their purſuit of Virtue; leſt, if they continue ſtedfaſt and unmoveable in Good, they ſhould be at laſt partakers of greater Felicity than they enjoy.* There being ſo ancient a Tradition of ſuch ὑβριστὰι δαίμονες, (as the learned Man mention'd hath more fully ſhew'd in his Notes on this place of *Plutarch*,) gives a great confirmation to the truth of what the Scripture reports concerning the Devil's being ſo great an Inſtrument in procuring the fall of Man. To him therefore I refer the inquiſitive Reader, and ſhall not add to the Teſtimonies of him cited, that of *Xenocrates* in *Plutarch*, *de Iſide & Oſiride*, where he ſaith that the calamities of Life and Misfortunes Men meet with, do not agree with

Plutarch. de Iſid. & Oſir. p. 361.

with, do not agree with that veneration which we have for the Deity and good Spirits, Ἀλλ' εἶναι φύσεις ἐν τῷ ἀερίῳ μεγάλας μὲν καὶ ἰσχυρὰς, δυσκόλους δὲ καὶ σκυθρωπὰς, αἳ χαίρουσι τοῖς πονηροῖς. *But that there are in the Air ſome great and potent Beings; which are of a ſurly and malignant nature, and rejoyce to do Men all the miſchief they can.* Iamblichus, in his anſwer to *Porphyrius* concerning the *Ægyptian* Myſteries, undertakes to give an account of theſe evil Spirits or Dæmons, and that from them the origin of Evil in the World is; for thus he ſpeaks (as he is tranſlated by *Ficinus*) *Si verum eſt quod de Idolis dicebamus, improbiſque Dæmonibus, hinc ſane exoritur multiplex origo malorum. Simulant enim Deorum præſentiam, Dæmonumque bonorum, ideoque cultorem ſuum jubent eſſe juſtum, ut ipſi videantur boni, ſicut & Dii; quoniam vero natura ſunt mali, rogati mala inferre, libenter inferunt, atque nobis ad injuſta conducunt. Hi ſunt omnino qui & in oraculis mentiuntur & fallunt, & turpia conſulunt atque peragunt.* By which we ſee he acknowledgeth ſome Spirits whoſe natures are wicked, and help Men to do evil; and that theſe very Spirits may ſometimes command that which is good, leſt they ſhould be ſuſpected to be what they are, of a wicked and malignant Nature, which only deſign the ruin of Men. By which we have a good account of whatever was commendable deliver'd by the Heathen Oracles, which yet might come from the Devil ſtill, by this confeſſion of *Iamblichus* himſelf.

Iamblich. de myſter. p. 105.

For the Devil's appearing under the form of a Serpent, It is very probably conjectur'd, that from hence it was that the Prince of thoſe who contended with *Saturn*, was by that Ænigmatical writer *Pherecydes Gyrius* call'd Ὀφιονεύς. *Celſus* who had ſo little skill in Antiquity as to think that the Hiſtory of *Moſes* was as to many paſſages of it taken out of Heathen Fables, inſiſts on this very ſtory of *Ophioneus* as the ground-work of that relation in *Geneſis* concerning the Fall. But *Origen* well anſwers him, ὅρα οὖν, εἰ ἐγκαλῶν ἡμῖν ὡς σφαλλομένοις ἀστοχάζεται, καὶ λοιπὸν παλαιομέτρων γνώμονα αἰνιγμάτων, αὐτὸς σαφῶς σφάλλεται; μὴ καταγνόντες ὅτι τὰ πολλῷ ὑμῶν μόνον Ἡρακλείτου καὶ Φερεκύδου ἀρχαιότερα, ἀλλὰ καὶ Ὁμήρου, Μωϋσέως γεγραμμένα εἰσήγαγε τὸν περὶ πονηροῦ τούτου καὶ ἐκπεσόντος τοῦ οὐρανίου λόγον. *See therefore if this rare Antiquary who chargeth us with Impiety in corrupting and altering the Heathen Fables, be not himſelf more juſtly chargeable with the ſame fault, not underſtanding the far greater Antiquity of the Writings of* Moſes, *than either of* Heraclitus, *or* Pherecydes, *or* Homer *himſelf, which reports the ſtory of that evil one which fell from Heaven.* ὁ γὰρ ὄφις (παρ' ὃν τῷ Φερεκύδῃ γίγνεται Ὀφιονεὺς) αἰτίως ὑπόμνημα τοῦ ἐκβληθῆναι τοῦ θείου παράδεισον τὸν ἄνθρωπον τοιαῦτά πως αἰνίσσεται, ὑπαγωγῇ θειότητος καὶ μείζονων ἀπατήσας τὸ γηλύτερον γένος· ὡς συναπολουθηκέναι λέγεται καὶ ὁ ἀνήρ· *For the Serpent (from which* Ophioneus *in* Pherecydes *deriv'd his name) which was the cauſe why Man was caſt forth of Paradiſe, doth intimate ſome ſuch thing, while under a pretence of Divinity, and of a better condition, he firſt deceiv'd the Woman, and by her means the Man.* Cælius Rodiginus calls this *Ophioneus Dæmonicum Serpentem, qui anteſignanus fuerit agminis a Divinæ mentis placito deficientis.* This *Pherecydes*, as appears by *Euſebius*, had much converſe with the *Phœnicians*; where he purpoſely ſpeaks concerning this *Ophioneus*. Now the *Phœnicians*, as *Euſebius* likewiſe tells us, worſhipped their God under the form of a Serpent; which probably might be occaſion'd by the Devil's ambition and

XVIII. 2.

Orig. c. Celſum, l. 6.

Cal. Rhodig. Antiq. lect. l. 2. c. 7. Euſeb. de Prap. Evang. l. 1. c. 10.

tyranny over Men, that would be worſhipped among them in that very Form wherein he had done ſo much miſchief to the World. It was very early in the World, when the *Phœnicians* and *Ægyptians* did begin to adore their Gods under the form of Serpents, for the beginning of it is attributed to *Taautus* by *Euſebius*, τῶν μ ἐν τῇ Δρόμῳ φύσιν καὶ τ ὄφεων αὐτὸς ἐξεθείασεν ὁ Ταάυτ, καὶ μετ' αὐτὸν αὖθις Φοινικές π καὶ Αἰγύπτιοι. Neither was this only among the *Phœnicians* and *Ægyptians*, but where-ever the Devil reign'd, the Serpent was had in ſome peculiar veneration: thence *Juſtin Martyr* ſaith, ὃν καὶ παρὰ νομιζομένων παρ' ὑμῖν θεῶν ὄφις σύμβολον μέγα καὶ μυστήριον ἀναγράφεται. *The Serpent was the Symbol of Adoration among them*; and was the proper *Indicium*, or note of a Conſecrated Place, as is evident by that of *Perſius*.

Juſt. Mart. Apolog. 2.

Perſ. Satyr. 1.

Pinge duos angues: pueri, ſacer eſt locus.

Thence the Scholiaſt on *Ariſtophanes* on that place in *Plutus*, ἐχθὲς ἐν δύο δράκοντ' ἐπὶ Ξ γεά, obſerves κοινὸν πᾶσι τοῖς ἥρωσι δράκοντες περιτίθεσι, ſo that where-ever any God or Hero was to be worſhipped, there were Serpents painted to denote ſo much. So *Orus Appollo* ſaith of the *Ægytians*, οὐδαῖον ὁ ἐστὶν ἰδίωσι βασίλισκον χρυσοῦν ἀφιδρύσαι τοῖς θεοῖς, *they were wont to put the form of a golden Baſilisk to their Gods*. *Heinſius* conceives that the firſt worſhip of *Appollo* at *Delphi* was under the form of a Serpent, whither *Nonnus* tells us that *Cadmus* the *Phœnician* went upon his firſt coming into *Boætia*, and from hence he derives the name *Pytho* from the Hebrew פתן which ſignifies a Serpent. *Ut non dubitandum ſit*, ſaith he, *quin Pythius Apollo, hoc eſt, Spurcus ille ſpiritus, quem Hebræi Ob & Abaddon, Helleniſtæ ad verbum* Ἀπολλύωνα, *cæteri* Ἀπόλλωνα *ſub hac forma qua miſeriam humano generi invexit, primo cultus ſit in Græcia.* And which is further obſervable, the Devil was always ambitious to have the World think that the knowledg of Good and Evil was to come by the Serpent ſtill; thence the famous Oracle of *Apollo* here at *Delphi*; thence came the uſe of Serpents ſo much in Divination, thence נחש ſignifies to divine, from נחש a Serpent; and ſo among the *Greeks* οἰωνίζομαι, is taken in the ſame ſenſe, from οἰωνὸς a Serpent. So that excellent Gloſſographer *Heſychius*; οἰωνὸς, ὄφις· ἐπειτεχῶς λέγεται εἰς τὰς μαντείας τοὺς ὄφεις ἔχει· ἃς καὶ οἰωνοὺς ἔλεγον. The Serpent was reckoned among the *pedeſtria auſpicia* by the *Romans*; and *Homer* tells in that ſolemn Divination concerning the *Greeks* ſucceſs at *Troy* there appears,

Heinſ. Ariſtarch. p. 18. ed. 1627.

Iliad. β'.

δρακων ἐπὶ νῶτα δάφοινος.

Which, ſaith *Heinſius*, is an exact deſcription of the *Nachas*; whom they would have ſo call'd from the marks on his back, which they accurately obſerv'd in Divination. Thus we ſee how careful the Devil was to advance his honor in the World under that form, wherein he had deceiv'd Mankind into ſo much folly and miſery.

3. We meet with ſome remainders of Man's being caſt out of Paradiſe, upon his Fall among the *Heathens*. *Origen* thinks that *Plato* by

Orig. c. Cel. l. 4. p. 189.

by his converſe with the *Jews* in *Ægypt*, did underſtand the Hiſtory of the Fall of Man, which he after his way enigmatically deſcribes in his *Sympoſiacs*. Where he brings in Porus *the God of plenty feaſting with the reſt of the Gods; after ſupper* Penia *comes a begging to the door*; Porus *being drunk with Nectar, goes into* Jupiter's *garden, and there falls aſleep*; Penia *obſerving it, ſteals to him, and by this deceit conceiv'd by him.* In this Fable of *Plato*, *Origen* takes notice what a near reſemblance the garden of *Jupiter* hath to *Paradiſe*, *Penia* to the *Serpent* which circumvented *Adam*, and *Porus* to *Man*, who was deceiv'd by the *Serpent*. Which he conceives more probable becauſe of *Plato*'s cuſtom, Τὰ μεγάλα ἑαυτῷ φαινόμενα δόγματα κρύψαι μὲν διὰ τὰς πολλὰς ἐν τῷ θεῖ μύθῳ χήμασι, *to wrap up thoſe excellent things he knew under ſome Fables, becauſe of the vulgar*; for which he after ſpeaks of his cuſtom in altering and diſguiſing what he had from the *Jews*, leſt he ſhould too much diſpleaſe the Fabulous *Greeks*, if he ſhould adhere too cloſe to the *Jews*, who were ſo infamous among them. Some have thought the ſtory of Paradiſe was preſerv'd among the *Heathens* in the Fable of the Gardens of *Adonis* which comes near that of *Eden*; but what footſteps may be gather'd of the truth of Scripture-hiſtory in the *Heathen* Mythology, will appear afterwards. Thus much here then may ſerve to have manifeſted the account which the Scripture gives of the Origin of Evil by the Fall of Man to be in it ſelf rational, and atteſted by the conſent of ſuch Perſons who cannot be ſuſpected of any partiality to the Scriptures.

XX. We come now to conſider the other grand Difficulty which concerns the Origin of Evil, and the truth of Divine Providence together. Which is, that if Sin be the cauſe of Miſery, and there be a God which Governs the World; *Whence comes it to paſs, that the worſt of Men do ſo frequently eſcape ſufferings, and the beſt do commonly undergo them?* This hath been in all Ages of the World where Men have been philoſophical and inquiſitive, one of the great Inquiries which the Minds of Men have been perplex'd about. The true and full Reſolution of which Queſtion, depends much upon thoſe Grounds and Principles which are diſcover'd to us by Divine Revelation in the Scriptures, concerning the grounds of God's patience towards wicked Men, the nature and end of ſufferings which good Men are exercis'd with. And certainly this ſhould very much commend the Scriptures to all ſober and inquiſitive Perſons, that they contain in them the moſt clear and certain grounds of ſatisfaction to the Minds of Men, in ſuch things wherein they are otherwiſe ſo irreſolv'd. But of that afterwards: Our preſent buſineſs is to give an account of this difficulty from Natural Reaſon, which will be moſt ſatisfactorily done by the producing thoſe grounds from which they have reſolv'd this Queſtion, *Cur malis bene, & bonis male*, who either have not had, or at leaſt own'd any thing of Divine Revelation. I begin with that which doth concern the proſperity and impunity of wicked Men, which Men have with more confidence inſiſted on on this account, becauſe all Men could not but underſtand a general reaſon of ſufferings, by reaſon there were none whoſe conſciences could wholly acquit them of evil actions; but why Perſons notoriouſly wicked ſhould live in impunity, when others

ſuffer, that they were unable to give an account of. And this was the common pretenſe of *Atheiſm*, and *Simplicius* tells us, συμβαίνῃ δέ ἵνας ἐξ ἀφ' τὸ ἀναπόδικτον πιστεύειν, καὶ ἀφ' τὸ ὁρᾶν ποτὲ μὲν ἀγαθοὺς δυσχεροῦντας, ποτὲ δὲ κακοὺς εὐ ἰσωθῆς τυγχάνοντας, ἀλογεῖν ἂν ἔχουσι συλλήψεων, καὶ χρέων διδόναι τῇ τραγῳδίᾳ λέγειν,

Simplic. Comment. in Epictet. c. 38. p. 223.

Τολμῶ κατειπεῖν μήποτ' ὤν εἰσὶν Θεοὶ,
Κακοὶ γὰ εὐτυχοῦντες ἐπιπλήττουσί με.

It comes to paſs, that ſuch who have no grounded belief of a Deity, when they obſerve the miſeries of good Men, and the tranquillity and felicity of bad Men, they regard not the common notions they have of a Deity, and are ready to cry out with the Tragœdian,

Shall I not dare to ſay there are no Gods,
When thoſe do proſper who have injur'd me?

And it is obſervable, that the moſt of thoſe who have taken occaſion amongſt the *Heathens* to queſtion Providence, have done it upon ſome remarkable injury which they have conceiv'd to be done to themſelves, and ſo we have ground to think that it was more Paſſion and Intereſt, than any clear Reaſon which was the inducement to it. So *Diagoras* reſolves to ſet up for an *Atheiſt*, becauſe the perjur'd Perſon was not ſtruck down in the place.

And *Jaſon* in *Seneca*, when he ſees *Medea* fly away after killing his Children, cries out,

Teſtare nullos eſſe qua veheris Deos.

Thou tell'ſt the World there are no Gods that way
Where thou doſt fly.

And ſo *Claudian*, who largely reaſons the caſe on both ſides, for Providence and againſt it, at laſt tells us what it was which was the main cauſe of his doubts, *viz.* the long impunity of *Rufinus*.

Abſtulit hunc tandem Rufini pœna tumultum
Abſolvitque Deos.

Rufinus's *death doth clear the Gods, and ſet*
My Mind at eaſe.

Cicero l. 3. de Nat. Deor.

But becauſe ſome carry it higher, as *Cotta* in *Tully*, who reaſons the moſt (as became a Stateſ-man) in reference to ſuch Perſons who had been uſeful or hurtful to the Common-wealths, we may ſuppoſe there might be ſomewhat more of Reaſon than Intereſt in ſuch Argumentations; and yet even in thoſe Diſcourſes we may ſtill find that the main original of this quarrel againſt Providence, was an over-high eſteem of themſelves, that they thought they deſerv'd better from the Gods, than to receive ſuch injuries, or undergo ſuch calamities. Therefore *Cotta* cries out on Providence, becauſe ſuch Perſons who were uſeful to the *Roman* Commonwealth, were deſtroy'd, when the enemies to it eſcap'd, as tho' Providence had been only a *Tutelar Deity* of *Rome*, and had nothing to do elſe-

where.

where. Thence he cries out, If there be Providence, why were the two *Scipio*'s deſtroy'd in *Spain* by the *Carthaginians?* Why was *Maximus* killed by *Hannibal?* Why were the *Romans* with *Paulus* ruined at *Cannæ?* Why did *Regulus* undergo ſo much cruelty by the *Carthaginians?* Why did not *Africanus* die in his own bed? Nay, ſaith he, to come nearer home, why is my Uncle *Rutilius* in baniſhment? Why was my friend *Druſus* killed in his own houſe? On the other ſide, why did *Marius* die in peace, and the moſt cruel *Cinna* enjoy ſo long tranquillity? with many other inſtances of both ſorts. But this is it which I take notice of theſe for, becauſe we hereby ſee how common it is for Men to queſtion Providence, more out of paſſion and Intereſt, than out of any ſolid grounds of Reaſon.

XXI. Let us therefore appeal from perſons who were particularly engaged by ſome private intereſt in thoſe paſſages, from whence they would infer that there was no Providence, to ſuch who ſtood by unconcern'd, and made uſe of the free dictates of their Reaſon in theſe caſes. And ſuch perſons when they come to reaſon the caſe like Philoſophers, and Men out of paſſion, have given ſatisfactory and rational accounts why God in his wiſe Providence may ſometimes ſuffer the worſt of Men to go on in impunity, when good Men may go thro' the troubles of this World. As,

1. *God forbears wicked Men, to propound the example of his goodneſs to their imitation, to teach them not to revenge their injuries too greedily on each other.* This *Plutarch*, in that admirable Diſcourſe of his on this ſubject, inſiſts on as his firſt reaſon, why God doth not preſently puniſh wicked Men. For, ſaith he out of *Plato*, *God hath ſet forth himſelf in the midſt of the World for our imitation; and true Virtue is nothing elſe but an imitation of the Divine Nature. And therefore God*, ſaith Plato, *gave Man the uſe of ſight, that by the ſight of the heavenly Bodies, and the exact motions which are in them, Men ſhould learn* τὸ εὔχημον καὶ πεφυγμένον, *that which was comely and orderly, and hate all diſorderly and irregular motions;* For as he excellently ſpeaks, Οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ὅ, τι μεῖζον ἄνθρωπος ἀπολαύει θεοῦ πέφυκεν ἢ τὸ μιμήσει, καὶ διώξει τῶν οἰκείων καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν εἰς ἀρετὴν καθίστασθαι. *There is no greater benefit Man can receive from God, than to attain true Virtue by the imitation and purſuit of thoſe perfections which are in him.* And thence, ſaith *Plutarch*, God forbears to puniſh wicked Men preſently, not leſt if he ſhould puniſh them he might do that he would repent of afterwards, ἀλλ' ἵνα τὸ περὶ τὰς τιμωρίας θηριῶδες καὶ λάβρον ἀφέλῃ, *but that he might take away the fury and violence of Men in revenging their injuries on each other*, that they ſhould not do it in wrath and anger, with as much eagerneſs as they ſatisfy their hunger and thirſt, whereby they do, ἐπιπηδῶσι τοῖς ἠλυκηκόσιν, *leap upon them who have injur'd them*, with as much fury as a wild beaſt upon his prey; but Men ſhould learn to imitate τὴν ἐκείνου πραότητα καὶ μῆκος, *God's gentleneſs and patience*, whereby he gives the offender time to conſider with himſelf what he hath done, before he doth ſeverely puniſh him. As *Plato* when his Boy had angred him, ſtood ſtill a while without ſtriking him, τὸν θυμὸν κολάζων, as he ſaid, *puniſhing himſelf firſt for his anger*, before he would chaſtiſe the Boy for his fault; and *Archytas* when he ſaw how negligent his workmen had been, and began to be very angry with them, told them, εὐτυχεῖν ὅτι

Plutarch. de his qui ſero puniuntur à numine, p. 550. ed. Fr.

ὅτι ὀργίζομαι ὑμῖν, *It is well for you that I am angry with you.* Now ſaith *Plutarch*, if the conſideration of this forbearance in Men ſhould tend to moderate Mens heat and violence, how much more ſhould the conſideration of the lenity and patience of God, do it! καὶ θεῶν ἡγεῖσθαι μέγιστον ἀρετὴν τὴν πραότητα καὶ τὴν μακροθυμίαν, *and to account gentleneſs and forbearance to be an imitation of Divine perfections.* Now what can be more rational and agreeable to our Apprehenſions of a Divine Nature than this is, that he ſhould ſhew his Goodneſs to all, and by his forbearance of ſo many, teach the World more meekneſs and gentleneſs towards each other? For if offences riſe by the quality of the perſon againſt whom they are committed, no injuries can be ſo great in one Man to another, as thoſe affronts are which Men put upon God by their continual provocations of Him: and if God then be of ſo infinite patience to forbear ſuch who have offended him, what juſtice and reaſon is there, but that Men ſhould expreſs more lenity and patience towards each other? So *Hierocles* excellently ſpeaks, μιμεῖται καὶ ἐν ταῖς φιλίας μίξεσι τὸν θεὸν, ὃς μισεῖ μὲν οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων, τὸ δὲ φιλανθρωπίας ἀγαθὸν κοινὸν πᾶσι γίνεσθαι νομίζει. *A good Man imitates God in the meaſures of friendſhip, who hates no Man, and extends his loving kindneſs to all Mankind.* Of which *Seneca* likewiſe ſomewhere ſpeaks: *Ne Deos quidem immortales ab hac tam effuſa benignitate ſacrilegi negligenteſque eorum deterrent; utuntur natura ſua, & cuncta, interque illa ipſos munerum ſuorum malos interpretes, juvant. The Divine Benignity extends it ſelf to all, even to ſuch as affront and diſhonor them, and abuſe the gifts they beſtow upon them.* And ſince there is ſo much truth and reaſon in that of *Plato*, πλέον τι ἀγαθὸν τὸ ὁμοιωθῆναι θεῷ. *It is the height of goodneſs to be like to God*; we ſee what excellent reaſon there is for that Command of our Savior, *Love your enemies, and do good, and lend, hoping for nothing again; and your reward ſhall be great, and ye ſhall be the children of the Higheſt; for he is kind unto the unthankful, and to the evil. Be ye therefore merciful, as your Father is merciful.*

Luk. 6. 35, 36.

2. *God forbears preſently to puniſh wicked Men, to give them time to become better.* This the ſame excellent Moraliſt gives as another account of God's patience, that thereby he gives them χρόνον σφίσιν ἐπανορθώσεως, *a ſpace to repent in*, as the Scripture call it. *For Men*, ſaith *Plutarch*, *in their puniſhments look at nothing further than mere ſatisfying their revenge and malice, and that makes them purſue thoſe that have offended them with ſo much rage and eagerneſs; but God*, ſaith he, *aims at the cure of thoſe who are not utterly incurable*, to ſuch he gives, μεταβολῆς χρόνον, *a time to reform in.* Here he brings in the examples of ſuch who were bad at firſt, and came afterwards to be chang'd from what they were; for which he inſtances in *Cecrops*, who was thence call'd Διφυὴς, becauſe from a cruel ſevere Prince, he became gentle and mild; and ſo *Gelon* and *Hieron* of *Sicily*, and *Piſiſtratus* the Son of *Hippocrates*, who, from being Uſurpers, became excellent Princes. If *Miltiades*, ſaith he, had been cut off while he acted the part of a Tyrant, and *Cimon* in his Inceſt, or *Themiſtocles* in his Debaucheries, what had become of *Marathon*, *Eurymedon*, *Dianium*, by which the *Athenians* got ſo great Glory and Liberty? and as he well obſerves, οὐδὲν γὰρ αἱ μεγάλαι φύσεις μικρὸν ἀποφέρουσιν, *Great Spirits do nothing mean*; οὐδὲ ἀρχῆς δεῖ ὀξύτητος τὸ σφοδρὸν ἐν αὐλαῖς καὶ θρασύτητος, ἀλλ' ἐν σκλήρῳ ἀμφίεσται πρὸς τὸ μόνιμον καὶ καθεκτικὸς ἦθος ἀληθῶς.

Plutarch. p. 551.

Rev. 2. 21.

That

That ſharp and active Spirit that is in them can never lie at reſt by reaſon of its vigor, but they are toſs'd up and down, as it were in a tempeſt, till they come to a ſettled compos'd life. But as the multitude of weeds argues the richneſs and ſoftneſs of the ground, tho' for the ſake of thoſe weeds one not skill'd in Husbandry would not account ſuch ground worth looking after; ſo, ſaith he, ἅπτα πολλὰ καὶ φαῦλα πεφύκασι τῶν μεγάλων φύσεις *Great Spirits uſually bring forth no commendable fruits at firſt; which we conſidering the danger and hurtfulneſs of, are preſently for cutting them down: but one that more wiſely conſiders the generous nature which may lie under this ill fruit, waits time and leiſure, till Reaſon and Age begin to maſter theſe head-ſtrong paſſions.* And therefore according to the prudent Law of the *Ægyptians*, *The Woman with Child muſt be repriev'd till the time of her delivery.*

3. *God ſpares ſome wicked Men from puniſhment to make them inſtruments of his juſtice in puniſhing others.* Ἐνίοις γὰρ ἀμείλιξ καὶ κολαστὴς ἐτέρων πονηρῶν, ἅτε δημιουργοῖς, ἀπεχρήσατο τὸ δαιμόνιον, as *Plutarch* goes on, *God ſpares ſome from puniſhment, that by them he might puniſh others.* Which he ſuppoſeth to be the caſe of all Tyrants; and thereby *Cotta*'s difficulty concerning *Marius*, *Cinna*, *Sylla*, and thoſe other cruel and tyrannical perſons, who uſurp'd Authority among them, is clearly taken off: For Divine Providence might let thoſe Trees grow from whence he intended to take his Rods to ſcourge others withal. God makes the ſame uſe of Tyrants (ſaith *Plutarch*) to Common-wealths, that Phyſicians do of the Gall of a *Hyæna* and other hurtful Creatures; which may be good for curing ſome dangerous Diſeaſes; ſo may the tyrannical ſeverity and ſharpneſs of ſuch perſons be continued ἢ τὸ νοσοῦν ἀπαιδαξῃ καὶ καθάρῃ, *till the diſeaſes of the political Body be cur'd by theſe ſharp Medicines.* Such a one was *Phalaris* to the *Agrigentines*, and *Marius* to the *Romans:* and the Oracle told the *Sicyonians* in expreſs terms, μαστιγόομεν δεῖας τὴν πόλιν. *The City wanted ſome ſevere diſcipline.* Thence *Totilas*, when he found what ſtrange ſucceſs he had in his enterprizes, call'd himſelf *Flagellum Dei*, and thought God rais'd him up on purpoſe to be a Scourge for the ſins of the World. And no doubt thoſe ſtrange paſſages of the *Roman* Common-wealth (which made *Cato* at leaſt diſpute Providence, and ſay, *Res divinas multum habere caliginis*, when he ſaw *Pompey* ſucceſsful as long as he ſerv'd his Ambition, but preſently overthrown when he ſtood for the Common-wealth) theſe things, I ſay, had a higher end than they look'd at, which was to make both *Pompey* and *Cæſar* the Inſtruments of Divine Juſtice to puniſh the *Romans* for their Luſts, Ambition and Cruelty, which were never greater than in that Age. Now then, if God muſt juſtly puniſh Offenders, why may he not ſpare ſome to make them his Inſtruments in the puniſhing of others, eſpecially ſince after he hath us'd his Rods, he may caſt them into the fire too? as was evident in the inſtance of *Cæſar*, who, after all his ſlaughters and triumphs, was murthered in the *Senate*, and that by ſome who had been as active as any for him. And herein Divine Juſtice, both as to the puniſhment of the perſons, and the means of it, hath been very remarkable in multitude of Inſtances, which every one's reading may afford him.

4. There-

4. Therefore, another account why God may ſpare wicked Men a while, is, *That Divine Providence might more remarkably be obſerv'd in the manner of their puniſhment afterwards.* *Plutarch* tells us of *Callippus*, who was ſtabb'd by his Enemies with the ſame Dagger with which he had kill'd *Dion* under a pretence of friendſhip. And when *Mitius* the *Argive* was kill'd in a tumult, afterwards, upon the day of a ſolemn Shew, a braſs Statue in the Market place fell upon his Murtherer, and kill'd him there. But moſt remarkable is the Story of *Belſus* recorded by the ſame Author, who having kill'd his Father, and a long time conceal'd it, goes one night to Supper to ſome Friends, and while he was there, thruſts up his Spear into a Swallow's Neſt, and pulls it down, and kills the young ones; his Friends asking him the reaſon of ſo ſtrange an action: οὐ γὰρ (ἔφη) μοῦ πάλαι καλαμαρτυρῆσιν αὗται ψευδῆς ἐ καλιεῦσιν, ὡς ἀπεκτόνοιμι τὸν πατέρα; *Do not your hear*, ſaith he, *how they falſly accuſe me, and cry out, that I have killed my Father?* Which being by the perſons preſent carry'd to the King, and the truth of it found out, he was executed for it. Such ſtrange ways doth Providence ſometimes uſe to ſhew how vigilant it is, even when we think it ſleeps the moſt.

5. *Tho' God ſpares the perſons of wicked Men, he doth not defer their puniſhment*, when the thoughts of their evil actions is the greateſt torment to them; *Maxima peccati pœna eſt, peccaſſe*, as *Seneca* ſpeaks. Sin bears its own puniſhment along with it. Wickedneſs is δεινὴ τις βίᾳ δημιουργὸς αἰκίας, *the moſt exquiſite contriver of miſery*, which fills the Minds of thoſe who commit it whith continual conſternations, anxieties and perplexities of Mind. But as that often and deſervedly cited Author on this ſubject, *Plutarch* tell us, moſt Men are in this like Children, who when they behold Malefactors in the Theatres in their Cloth of Gold, and Purple Robes, with their Crowns on their Heads dancing about, they admire them, and imagin them to be moſt happy Men, till they ſee them laſh'd and beaten, and fire come out from their brave Apparel; ſo ſaith he, as long as Men ſee others in their Pomp and Grandeur, they think them very far from puniſhment, till they behold their execution; which ſaith he, is not ſo much the entrance of their puniſhment, as the perfection of it. So that the longer the time of their Lives is, the longer is the time of their puniſhment here; οὐδὲ μεθύουσι, ἐκολάσθησαν, ἀλλ' ἐγήρασαν κολαζόμενοι· *They are not puniſhed when they grow old, but are grown old in puniſhments.* Cannot we ſay a perſon is puniſhed while he is in Priſon and hath his fetters upon him, till his execution comes? nor that one that hath drunk Poiſon, is a dying while he walks about till the cold comes to his Heart, and kills him? *If we deny*, ſaith he, *that all the inquietudes, horrors and anxieties of Mind which wicked Men have, are no part of their puniſhment, we may as well ſay that a Fiſh which hath ſwallow'd the hook is not taken, becauſe he is not fry'd, or cut in pieces.* So it is with every wicked Man, he hath ſwallow'd the hook when he hath committed an evil action (τὸ γλυκὺ τῆς ἀδικίας ὥσπερ δέλεαρ εὐθὺς ἐξεδήδεκε) and this Conſcience within him, as he expreſſeth it,

Θύννος βολαῖσι πέλαγος ὡς διασφραγεῖ.

Which

Which in the Prophet's expreſſion is, *The wicked are like a troubled ſea, which caſts forth nothing but mire and dirt.* As *Apollodorus* dreamt, that he was flea'd and boyl'd by the *Scythians*, and that his Heart ſpake to him out of the Cauldron, Ἐγώ σοι τούτων αἰτία, *I am the cauſe of all this.* God deals by wicked Men, as *Caligula* was wont to ſay of thoſe he commanded to be executed, *Ferit ut ſentiant ſe mori*, he ſo puniſhes them, as to make them ſenſible of their puniſhments. And as *Tacitus* ſpeaks of cruel and wicked perſons, *quorum mentes ſi recludantur, poſſint aſpici laniatus & ictus; quando ut corpora verberibus, ita ſævitia, libidine, malis conſultis animus dilaceretur.* Wickedneſs is the only Fury which continually haunts and laſhes thoſe who delight in it, and leaves ſtill behind it αἰσχεὰ καὶ φοβερὰ πάθη, *loathſome and terrible perturbations*, ſecret gripings of Conſcience and ſelf-condemning thoughts for their folly and wickedneſs; like *Lyſimachus*, who for extreme thirſt offer'd his Kingdom to the *Getæ* to quench it, which when he had done, φεῦ τῆς ἐμῆς κακίας, ὃς δι' ἡδονὴν ὕπτιον βραχίαν ἐξέμην βασιλείας τηλικαύτης. *What a wretch was I* (ſaith he) *to loſe ſuch a Kingdom for ſo ſhort a pleaſure!* And tho' wicked Men be not ſenſible of the loſs of a far more glorious Kingdom than this of *Lyſimachus*, viz. *that of Heaven*, yet they cannot but be ſenſible how much they have loſt that Kingdom which every good Man hath in the tranquillity of his Spirit, and the command of his paſſions. Iſa. 57. 21.

6. *The time that God ſpares wicked Men, is not ſo long as we think for.* It is all one, as *Plutarch* ſaith, as if we ſhould complain, that the Malefactor was puniſhed in the evening, and not in the morning; God's forbearance is but for a very little time, compar'd with his own duration. We meaſure God by the ſhort hour-glaſs of our time, when we are ſo ready to confine him to our meaſures. The time ſeems long to us, but it is as nothing in it ſelf: ἐπὶ τῶν θείων πᾶν ἀνθρωπίνου βίου μέρος, τὸ μηδὲν ἐστι. *The whole life of Man compared with eternity is nothing.* Beſides, all this time God ſuffers wicked Men to live here, he hath them under ſafe cuſtody; he doth but let them take the air within the Priſon-wall, or it may be they may play and ſport themſelves there, but there is no poſſibility of eſcaping out of the hands of Divine Juſtice.

7. *God forbears wicked Men here, becauſe the time is to come wherein God intends to puniſh them.* This is the higheſt vindication of Divine Providence, as to the preſent impunity of wicked Men in the world, becauſe this is not the proper ſeaſon for the open Execution of Juſtice. There are but few in compariſon whom Juſtice cauſeth to be executed in the Priſon, of what are reſerv'd for the General Aſſizes; God reſerves them for a fair and open Trial, for the greater vindication of his honor, and manifeſtation of his Juſtice to the World. And altho' God's Judgments even in this World be ſometimes ſo remarkable, that we cannot but ſee a hand of Providence in them, yet they are but few whom God doth ſo remarkably puniſh here, to make us more firmly believe a day of Judgment to come. Which tho' it be moſt clearly and fully reveal'd in Scripture, yet the *Heathens* themſelves from mere Reaſon have had ſuch a perſuaſion of it, that they have given this as another great reaſon, why God did forbear to puniſh wicked Men here, becauſe he did reſerve them for future puniſhment.

For, as the ſame Moraliſt ſpeaks in the ſame Diſcourſe concerning the Soul, Ἀγωνίζεται γὰρ ὥσπερ ἀθλητὴς καὶ ὁ βίος, ὅταν δὲ ἀγωνίζεται τότε τυγχάνῃ τῶν στεφανιτῶν, *This preſent life is the place of the Soul's combat, which when it hath finiſh'd, it then receives according to its performance of it.* And as he before ſpeaks, Εἷς ἐστι λόγος ὁ τὸν Θεὸν τὸν σπέρματον ἅμα καὶ ἀφαιρούμενος τὴν ἀνθρωπίνης ψυχῆς βεβαιῶν, καὶ ἡπερεῖ τὸν ἐστι ἀπολιπεῖν, ἀναιρεῖται ἡπερεῖ. *The ſame reaſon which confirms Providence, doth likewiſe confirm the Immortality of the Soul; and if one be taken away, the other follows.* Οὗτος δὲ τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ τὸν πλοῦτον, μᾶλλον εἰκὸς ἐστι ἐ ἡμᾶς λανθάνειν καὶ ἡμαρτίας· *And if the Soul doth ſubſiſt after death, it ſtands to the greateſt reaſon, that it ſhould there retieve either reward or puniſhment.* Thus we ſee how far Natural Light, and Moral Reaſon will carry Men in the vindicating of Divine Providence, as to the preſent impunity of wicked Men.

Plutarch. p. 561.

XXII. The other part which concerns the *ſufferings of good Men*, is not of ſo great difficulty, becauſe there are none ſo good as not to have a mixture of evil in them, and as they have a mixture of evil, ſo they have but a mixture of puniſhment; none lying under ſo great miſeries here, but withal they have ſome ſhare in the comforts of this Life. And therefore it is leſs wonder, that this part of Divine Providence which concerns the ſufferings of Men, hath not wanted ſome among the Heathen Moraliſts, who have made it their deſign to vindicate it; which ſetting aſide what *Simplicius* on *Epictetus*, and many others have done, is fully performed by *Seneca* in his Tract on this ſubject, *Cur bonis male ſit, cum ſit Providentia* (as *Muretus* reſtores the title of that Book) wherein theſe following accounts are given of it.

1. *God brings them up as his Children under ſharp diſcipline for their future benefit.* A good Man in *Seneca*'s language is, *Diſcipulus Dei, æmulatorque, & vera progenies:* which in the language of the Scripture is, *one taught of God, and a follower of God, and one born of him.* Now, ſaith he, *Parens ille magnificus, virtutum non lenis exactor, ſicut ſeveri patres, durius educat. God, who is the great Father of good Men, keeps them under diſcipline while under age, and by hardſhip fits them for the practice of Virtue.* Thence he bids us take notice of the different indulgence of Fathers and Mothers to their Children; the Father he haſtens them to School, ſuffers them not to be idle on their play-days, makes them toil, and ſometimes cry; the Mother ſhe is all for holding them in her lap, keeping them out of the Sun, and from catching cold, would not willingly have them either cry or take pains. *Patrium habet Deus adverſus bonos animum, & illos fortius amat. God bears the indulgence of a Father towards his Children, and loves them with greater ſeverity.*

Senec. de Provid. c. 1.

2. *Good Men receive benefit by their ſufferings; Quicquid evenit in ſuum colorem trahit*, ſaith *Seneca* of a good Man, which in the language of the Apoſtle is, *Every thing works together for his good. The ſea loſeth nothing*, ſaith he, *of its ſaltneſs by the rivers running into it, neither doth a good Man by the current of his ſufferings.* And of all benefits which he receives, that of the exerciſe and trial of his Virtue and Patience is moſt diſcernible. *Marcet ſine adverſario virtus*; as ſoon as *Carthage* was deſtroy'd, *Rome* fell to Luxury: *True Wreſtlers deſire to have ſome to try their ſtrength upon them;*

Cui

Cui non induſtrio otium pœna eſt? An active ſpirit hates idleneſs and cowardiſe; For, *etiamſi ceciderit, de genu pugnat, tho' his legs be cut off, he will fight on his knees.*

3. *It redounds to God's honor, when good Men bear up under ſufferings. Ecce par Deo dignum, virtus fortis cum mala fortuna compoſitus.* It is a ſpectacle God delights to ſee, a good Man combat with calamities. God doth in *Seneca*'s phraſe *quoſdam faſtidio tranſire*, paſſeth them by in a flight; *An old wreſtler ſcorns to contend with a Coward*, one who is *vinci paratus*, ready to yield up preſently. *Calamitates ſub jugum mittere proprium magni viri eſt*, It argues a noble ſpirit to be able to ſubdue miſeries.

4. *It tends to the trial and increaſe of their ſtrength. Seneca* highly extols that ſpeech of the Philoſopher *Demetrius, Nihil infelicius eo cui nihil unquam evenit adverſi; non licuit enim illi ſe experiri.* He is the moſt unhappy Man who never knew what miſery meant; for he could never know what he was able to bear. And, as he ſaith, to paſs one's Life away *ſine morſu animi*, without any trouble, it is *ignorare rerum naturæ alteram partem*, not to know what is upon the reverſe of Nature. *Idem licet fecerint qui integri revertuntur ex acie, magis ſpectatur qui ſaucius redit.* Tho' he that comes home ſound, might fight as well as he that is wounded; yet the wounded perſon hath the more pity, and is moſt cry'd up for his valor. The Pilot is ſeen in a Tempeſt, a Souldier in the Battel, and a good Man in Sufferings. God doth by ſuch as Maſters do by Scholars, *qui plus laboris ab his exigunt, quibus certior ſpes eſt*; who ſet the beſt Wits the hardeſt tasks.

5. *God exerciſeth good Men with ſufferings, to diſcover the indifferency of thoſe things which Men value ſo much in the World, when he denies them to good Men.* Blindneſs would be hateful, if none were blind but ſuch whoſe Eyes were put out; and therefore *Appius* and *Metellus* were blind. Riches are no good things, therefore the worſt as well as the beſt have them. *Nullo modo magis poteſt Deus concupita traducere, quam ſi illa ad turpiſſimos defert, ab optimis abigit.* God could not traduce or defame thoſe things more which Men deſire ſo much, than by taking them away from the beſt of Men, and giving them to the worſt.

6. *That they might be examples to others of patience and conſtancy:* For, as *Seneca* concludes, *Nati ſunt in exemplar*, they are born to be patterns to others. If to theſe things we add what the Word of God diſcovers concerning the nature, grounds, and ends of afflictions, and that Glory which ſhall be reveal'd, in compariſon with *which exceeding weight of Glory, theſe light and momentany afflictions are not at all to be valu'd*; then we have a clear and full vindication of Divine Providence, as to the ſufferings of good Men, as well as to the impunity of ſuch as are wicked. But however, from hence we ſee how far the mere light of Reaſon hath carried Men in reſolving theſe difficulties concerning God's Providence in the World, and what a rational account may be given of them, ſuppoſing evil of puniſhment to ariſe from ſin, and that there is a God in the World, who is ready to puniſh the wicked, and to reward the good: Which was the thing to be ſhew'd.

CHAP. IV.

Of the Origin of Nations.

I. *All Mankind deriv'd from* Adam, *if the Scriptures be true.* II. *The contrary ſuppoſition an introduction to Atheiſm.* III. *The truth of the Hiſtory of the Flood. The poſſibility of an univerſal Deluge prov'd.* IV. *The Flood univerſal as to Mankind, whether univerſal as to the Earth and Animals; no neceſſity of aſſerting either.* V. *Yet ſuppoſing the poſſibility of it demonſtrated without creation of new Waters.* VI. *Of the Fountains of the Deep. The proportion which the height of Mountains bears to the Diameter of the Earth. No Mountains much above three Mile perpendicular. Of the origin of Fountains. The opinion of* Ariſtotle *and others concerning it diſcuſs'd. The true account of them from the vapors ariſing from the maſs of ſubterraneous Waters.* VII. *Of the capacity of the Ark for receiving the Animals, from* Buteo *and others.* VIII. *The truth of the Deluge from the Teſtimony of Heathen Nations. Of the propagation of Nations from* Noah's *Poſterity.* IX. *Of the beginning of the* Aſſyrian *Empire. The multiplication of Mankind after the Flood. Of the Chronology of the* LXX. *Of the time between the Flood and* Abraham, *and the advantages of it.* X. *Of the pretenſe of ſuch Nations, who call'd themſelves* Aborigines. XI. *A diſcourſe concerning the firſt Planters of* Greece: *the common opinion propounded and rejected. The* Hellens *were not the firſt Inhabitants of* Greece, *but the* Pelaſgi. *The large ſpread of them over the parts of* Greece. XII. *Of their language different from the* Greeks. XIII. *Whence theſe* Pelaſgi *came; that* Phaleg *was the* Pelaſgus *of* Greece, *and the Leader of that Colony, prov'd from* Epiphanius. XIV. *The language of the* Pelaſgi *in* Greece *Oriental: thence an account given of the many Hebrew words in the Greek language, and the remainders of the Eaſtern languages in the Iſlands of* Greece, *both which not from the* Phœnicians, *as* Bochartus *thinks, but from the old* Pelaſgi. XV. *Of the ground of the affinity between the* Jews *and* Lacedæmonians. *Of the Peopling of* America.

THE

THE next thing we proceed to give a rational account of, in the Hiſtory of the firſt Ages of the World contain'd in Scripture, is the peopling the World from *Adam*. Which is of great conſequence for us to underſtand, not only for the ſatisfaction of our curioſity as to the true Origin of Nations, but alſo in order to our believing the truth of the Scriptures, and the univerſal effects of the fall of Man. Neither of which can be ſufficiently clear'd without this. For as it is hard to conceive how the effects of Man's fall ſhould extend to all Mankind, unleſs all Mankind were propagated from *Adam*; ſo it is unconceivable how the account of things given in Scripture ſhould be true, if there were perſons exiſtent in the World long before *Adam* was. Since the Scripture doth ſo plainly affirm, *That God hath made of one blood all Nations of Men, for to dwell on the face of the Earth*; ſome Greek Copies read it ἑξ ἑνὸς leaving out αἵματος which the vulgar Latin follows: the *Arabic* Verſion to explain both, reads it *ex homine*, or as *de Dieu* renders it *ex Adamo uno*, there being but the difference of one letter in the Eaſtern languages between דם and אדם, the one denoting Blood, and the other Man. But if we take it as our more ordinary Copies read it ἑξ ἑνὸς αἵματος, yet thereby it is plain, that the meaning is not, that all Mankind was made of the ſame uniform Matter, as the Author of the *Præ-Adamites* weakly imagin'd (for by that reaſon, not only Mankind, but the whole World might be ſaid to be ἑξ ἑνὸς αἵματος, of the ſame blood, ſince all things in the World were at firſt form'd out of the ſame Matter) but αἷμα is taken there in the ſenſe in which it occurs in the beſt *Greek* Authors for the ſtock out of which Men come: So *Homer*, Act. 17. 26.

Εἰ ἐτεόν γ' ἐμὸς ἐσσὶ καὶ αἵματος ἡμετέροιο. *Hom. Odyſſ. ω.*

Thence thoſe who are near Relations, are call'd in *Sophocles*, οἱ κατ' αἷμα, thence the name of Conſanguinity for nearneſs of Relation; and *Virgil* uſeth *ſanguis* in the ſame ſenſe,

Trojano a ſanguine duci.

So that the Apoſtle's meaning is, that however Men now are ſo diſpers'd in their habitations, and differ ſo much in Language and Cuſtoms from each other, yet they were all originally of the ſame ſtock, and did derive their ſucceſſion from that firſt Man whom God created. Neither can it be conceiv'd on what account *Adam* in the Scripture is call'd the firſt Man, and that *he was made a living ſoul, and of the earth, earthy*; unleſs it were to denote that he was abſolutely the firſt of his kind, and ſo was to be the ſtandard and meaſure of all that follows. And when our Savior would reduce all things to the beginning, he inſtanceth in thoſe words which were pronounc'd after *Eve* was form'd. *But from the beginning of the creation God made them Male and Female; for this cauſe ſhall a Man leave Father and Mother, and cleave unto his Wife.* Now nothing can be more plain and eaſie than from hence to argue thus; thoſe of whom theſe words were ſpoken, 1 Cor. 15. 45, 47. Mark 10. 6, 7.

were the first Male and Female which were made in the beginning of the Creation; but it is evident these words were spoken of *Adam* and *Eve*: *And* Adam *said, this is now bone of my bone, and flesh of my flesh: therefore shall a Man leave his Father and his Mother, and shall cleave unto his Wife.* If the Scriptures then of the *New Testament* be true, it is most plain and evident that all Mankind is descended from *Adam*; and no less conspicuous is it from the History of the Creation as deliver'd by *Moses*.

Gen. 2. 23, 24.

II. For how necessary had it been for *Moses*, when he was giving an account of the origin of things, to have discover'd by whom the World was first planted, if there had been any such Plantation before *Adam*; but to say that all the design of *Moses* was only to give an account of the Origin and History of the *Jewish* Nation, and that *Adam* was only the first of that stock, is manifestly ridiculous, it being so clear, that not only from *Adam* and *Noah*, but from *Sem*, *Abraham*, and *Isaac* came other Nations besides that of *Jews*. And by the same reason that it is said, that *Moses* only speaks of the origin of the *Jewish* Nation in the History of *Adam*, it may as well be said that *Moses* speaks only of the making of *Canaan*, and that part of the Heavens which are over it, when he describes the Creation of the World in the six days work. For why may not the Earth in the second verse of *Genesis* be as well understood of the Land of *Judea*, and the Light and production of Animals and Vegetables refer only to that, as to understand it so in reference to the Flood, and in many other passages relating to those eldest times? But the Author of that *Hypothesis* answers, *That the first Chapter of* Genesis *may relate to the true origin of the World and the first Peopling of it, but in the second* Moses *begins to give an account of the first Man and Woman of the Jewish Nation.* Very probable! but if this be not a putting asunder those which God hath joyn'd together, nothing is. For doth not *Moses* plainly at first give an account of the Formation of things in the first six days, and of his Rest on the seventh? But how could he be said to have rested then from the works of Creation, if after this follow'd the Formation of *Adam* and *Eve* in the second Chapter? Besides if the forming of Man mention'd, *Gen.* 2. 7. be distinct from that mention'd, *Gen.* 1. 27. then by all parity of Reason, חולדות השמים והארץ the *Generations* of *Heaven and Earth* mention'd, *Gen.* 2. 4. must be distinct from the *Creation of the Heaven and Earth* mention'd, *Gen.* 1. 1. And so if there were another Creation of Heaven and Earth belonging to the *Jews* in *Gen.* 2. we may likewise believe that there was a new Creation of Man and Woman in that Chapter distinct from that mention'd in the former. Again further, if there had been any such Persons in the World before *Adam*, no doubt *Adam* himself was ignorant of them; or else it had been a false and ridiculous account which he gives of the name of his Wife חוה *because she was* אמכלחי *the Mother of all living.* Not of all living things, for that had been a more proper description of a *Ceres*, or *Magna Mater*, or *Diana multimammia*, of our Grand-mother the Earth, but certainly it extends to all of the kind, that all living Creatures that are of Human Nature came from her. So the *Chaldee* Paraphrast understands it, she was call'd *Hava*, because she was אמא רכל בני אנשא *the*

Gen. 3. 20.

the Mother of all the ſons of Men. And ſo the *Arabic* Verſion, *quia ipſa fuit mater omnis viventis rationalis.* To which purpoſe our Learned *Selden* cites the verſion of the *Mauritanian Jews*, and the *Perſic* of *Tawaſius*. *Selden. de jure natur. & gent. l. 1. c. 5. p. 65.*

But whatever the Credit or Authority of theſe Verſions be, this is moſt certain, that *Adam* had no reaſon at all to have given this name to his Wife, as being *the Mother of all living*, if there had been any of Mankind exiſting in the World from other Mothers, which had been long before *Eve* was form'd. So that we find it plain and clear, that if the report given of things in Scripture be true, the *Hypotheſis* of *Præ-Adamites* is undoubtedly falſe. And certainly who ever ſeriouſly conſiders the frequent Reflections on the Authority of the Scriptures which were caſt by the Author of that Fiction, and his endeavoring on all occaſions to derogate from the Miracles recorded in it, may eaſily ſuſpect the deſign of that Author was not to gain any credit to his Opinion from thoſe Arguments from Scripture, which he makes ſhew of (which are pitifully weak and ridiculous) but having by the help of ſuch Arguments made his Opinion more plauſible, his hope was that his Opinion would in time undermine the Scriptures themſelves; when he had made it appear that the account given in the Scriptures of the plantation of the World was unſatisfactory, ſince there were Men before *Adam*, which the Scriptures to pleaſe the *Jewiſh* Nation take no notice of. So that after he had attempted to proſtitute the Scriptures to his Opinion, his next work had been to have turn'd them out of doors, as not of credit to be rely'd on by any, when they were ſo common to every Opinion. But how impious, abſurd and rude that attempt was upon the ſacred and inviolable Authority of the Scriptures, hath been ſo fully diſcover'd by his very many not unlearned Adverſaries, that it might ſeem needleſs ſo much as to have taken notice of ſo weakly grounded, and infirmly prov'd an Opinion, had it not thus far lain in my way in order to the clearing the true origin of Nations according to the Scriptures. The main foundations of which fabulous Opinion lying chiefly in the pretended Antiquities of the *Chaldæans*, *Ægyptians*, and others, have been fully taken away in our firſt Book, where our whole deſign was to manifeſt the want of credibility in thoſe accounts of ancient times, which are deliver'd by Heathen Nations in oppoſition to the Scriptures. There is nothing at all in Scripture from the Creation of *Adam* to the Flood which ſeems to give any countenance to that Figment, but only what may be eaſily reſolv'd from the conſideration of the great conciſeneſs of the *Moſaic* Hiſtory, in reporting that long interval of time which was between the fall of *Adam*, and the Flood; by means of which conciſeneſs ſuch things are reported as ſpeedily done, becauſe immediately ſucceeding in the ſtory, which asked a very conſiderable time before they could be effected; and beſides all things which were done before the Flood, being all quite obliterated by it, and all the numerous Poſterity of *Adam* being then deſtroy'd (only *Noah* and his Family excepted) to what purpoſe had it been any further to have reported the paſſages before the Flood, otherwiſe than thereby to let us underſtand the certainty of the ſucceſſion of Perſons from *Adam*, and ſuch Actions in

thoſe times which might be remarkable diſcoveries of God's Providence and Man's Wickedneſs in it; which being moſt apparent at firſt in *Cain* and his Poſterity, did by degrees ſo ſpread it ſelf over the face of the then inhabited World, that the juſt God was thereby provok'd to ſend a Deluge among them to ſweep away the preſent Inhabitans, to make room for another Generation to ſucceed them.

III. This therefore we now come to conſider, *viz. The Hiſtory of the Flood*, and the certainty of the propagation of the World from the Poſterity of *Noah* after the Flood. I begin with the Hiſtory of the Flood it ſelf, as to which two things will be ſufficient to demonſtrate the truth of it. 1. *If there be nothing in it repugnant to Reaſon.* 2. *If we have ſufficient evidence of the truth of it, from ſuch who yet have not believ'd the Scriptures.* There are only two things which ſeem queſtionable to Reaſon concerning the Flood; the *firſt*, is, *concerning the poſſibility of the Flood it ſelf*; the other is, *concerning the capacity of the Ark for preſerving all kinds of Animals.* The only ground of queſtioning the poſſibility of ſuch a Flood, as that is related in Scripture, hath been from hence, that ſome have ſuppos'd it impoſſible, that all the Water which is contain'd in the Air, ſuppoſing it to fall down, ſhould raiſe the ſurface of Water upon the Earth a foot and a half in height; ſo that either new Waters muſt be created to overflow the Eath, or elſe there muſt be ſuppos'd a Rarefaction of the Water contain'd in the Sea and all Rivers, ſo that it muſt take up at leaſt fifteen times the ſpace that now it doth; but then, they ſay, if the Water had been thus rarefy'd, could neither have deſtroy'd Man nor Beaſt, neither could *Noah*'s Ark have been born up by it any more than by liquid Air. To this therefore I anſwer.

Firſt, I cannot ſee any urgent neceſſity from the Scripture to aſſert, that the Flood did ſpread it ſelf over all the ſurface of the Earth. That all Mankind (thoſe in the Ark excepted) were deſtroy'd by it, is moſt certain according to the Scriptures. When the occaſion of the Flood is thus expreſs'd, *And God ſaw that the wickedneſs of Man was great upon Earth, and that every imagination of the thoughts of his Heart was only evil continually. And the Lord ſaid, I will deſtroy Man whom I have created from the face of the Earth.* It could not be then any particular Deluge of ſo ſmall a Country as *Paleſtine*, which is here expreſs'd, as ſome have ridiculouſly imagin'd; for we find an univerſal corruption in the Earth mention'd as the cauſe; an univerſal threatning upon all Men for this cauſe; and afterwards an univerſal deſtruction expreſſed, as the effect of this Flood. *And all fleſh died that moved upon the Earth, and every Man. And every living ſubſtance was deſtroyed which was upon the face of the ground, both Man and Cattle, and the creeping things, and the Fowl of the Heaven, and they were deſtroyed from the Earth, and* Noah *only remained alive, and they that were with him in the Ark.* So then it is evident that the Flood was univerſal as to Mankind; but from thence follows no neceſſity at all of aſſerting the univerſality of it as to the Globe of the Earth, unleſs it be ſufficiently prov'd that the whole Earth was Peopled before the Flood: which I deſpair of ever ſeeing prov'd. And what Reaſon can there be to extend the Flood beyond the occaſion

Gen. 6. 5, 7.

Gen. 7. 21.

v. 23.

caſion of it, which was the corruption of Mankind? And it ſeems very ſtrange that in ſo ſhort an interval in compariſon, as that was from *Adam* to the Flood according to the ordinary computation, *viz.* 1656 years, and not much above two thouſand, according to the largeſt, the World ſhould then be fully Peopled, when in ſo much longer a ſpace of time ſince the Flood to this day, the Earth is capable of receiving far more Inhabitants, than now it hath. The only probability then left for aſſerting the univerſality of the Flood, as to the Globe of the Earth, is from the Deſtruction of all living Creatures together with Man; now tho' Men might not have ſpread themſelves over the whole ſurface of the Earth, yet Beaſts and creeping Things might which were all deſtroy'd with the Flood: For it is ſaid, *That all fleſh died that moved upon the Earth, both of fowl and of cattle, and of beaſt, and of every creeping thing, that creepeth upon the Earth, and every Man.* To what end ſhould there be not only a note of univerſality added, but ſuch a particular enumeration of the ſeveral kinds of Beaſts, creeping Things, and Fowls, if they were not all deſtroy'd? To this I anſwer. I grant as far as the Flood extended all theſe were deſtroy'd; but I ſee no reaſon to extend the deſtruction of theſe beyond that compaſs and ſpace of Earth where Men inhabited: Becauſe the puniſhment upon the Beaſts was occaſion'd by, and could not but be concomitant with the deſtruction of Mankind, but (the occaſion of the Deluge being the Sin of Man, who was puniſh'd in the Beaſts, that were deſtroy'd for his ſake, as well as in himſelf) where the occaſion was not, as where there were Animals, and no Men, there ſeems no neceſſity of extending the Flood thither. But to what end then, it will be replyed, *Did God command* Noah *with ſo much care to take of all kind of Beaſts, and Birds, and creeping Things into the Ark with him, if all theſe living Creatures were not deſtroyed by the Flood?* I anſwer, becauſe all thoſe things were deſtroy'd where ever the Flood was; ſuppoſe then the whole Continent of *Aſia* was Peopled before the Flood, which is as much as we may in reaſon ſuppoſe, I ſay, all the living Creatures in that Continent were all deſtroy'd; or if we may ſuppoſe it to have extended over our whole Continent of the anciently known World; what reaſon would there be that in the oppoſite part of the Globe, *viz. America*, which we ſuppoſe to be unpeopled then, all the living Creatures ſhould there be deſtroy'd, becauſe Men had ſinned in this? And would there not on this ſuppoſition have been a ſufficient reaſon to preſerve living Creatures in the Ark for future propagation, when all other living Creatures extant had been in ſuch remote places as would not have been acceſſible by them in many Generations, and thoſe Beaſts growing wild for want of Inhabitants, would not have prov'd preſently ſerviceable for the uſe of Men after the Flood? Which was certainly the main thing look'd at in the preſervation of them in the Ark, that Men might have all of them ready for their uſe after the Flood, which could not have been, had not the ſeveral kinds been preſerv'd in the Ark, altho' we ſuppoſe them not deſtroy'd in all parts of the World.

IV. All this proceeds on ſuppoſition that Animals were propagated much further in the World than Men were, before the Flood.

Which I confeſs ſeems very probable to me on this account, becauſe the production of Animals is parallel in *Geneſis* with that of
Gen. 1. 20, 21. Fiſhes, and both of them different from Man; *For God ſaith, Let the waters bring forth every moving Creature that hath life*; viz. *Fiſh, and Fowl*; and accordingly it is ſaid, *that the waters brought forth abundantly every living Creature after their kind, and every Fowl after his kind.* Accordingly in the production of Beaſts, we read, *Let the Earth bring forth the living Creature*
Ver. 24. *after his kind, Cattle, and creeping thing, and Beaſt of the Earth after his kind, and it was ſo:* But in the production of Man, it
Ver. 26. is ſaid, *Let us make Man in our own likeneſs.* From hence I obſerve this difference between the production of Animals, and of Man, that in the one God gave a prolific Power to the Earth and Waters for production of the ſeveral living Creatures which came from them; ſo that the ſeminal principles of them were contain'd in the Matter out of which they were produc'd; which was otherwiſe in Man, who was made by a peculiar Hand of the great
Gen. 2. 6. Creator himſelf, who thence is ſaid to have *formed Man of the duſt of the ground.* Now therefore altho' there were but one Male and Female of Mankind at firſt, which had a ſpecial formation by God himſelf; yet there is no reaſon we ſhould conceive it to be ſo as to the Production of other living Creatures, whether Fiſh, or Fowl, or Beaſts; but the prolific Virtue being by God's power given to that material principle out of which they were form'd, it may very well be ſuppos'd that many of the ſame kind were at firſt produc'd. For it ſeems very ſtrange to imagin that in the whole Ocean there ſhould be only two of a kind produc'd; but Fiſh and Fowl both ariſing from the Water, we may have juſt reaſon to think, that the Waters being ſeparated before this prolific Virtue was communicated to the whole maſs of Waters, might in the ſeveral parts of the Globe of the Earth, bring forth both Fiſh and Fowl after their kinds. The ſame I ſay of the production of Animals in the ſixth days work, which are rank'd into three ſorts, Cattle, creeping Things, and Beaſts of the Earth after their kinds; now God ſaying, *Let the Earth bring forth her living Creatures*, (and that after the Waters had divided ſome parts of the Earth from other, ſo that there could be no paſſage for the Cattle, creeping Things, and Beaſts out of one part into another, without the help of Man,) it ſeems very probable that at leaſt thoſe parts of the Earth which were thus divided from each other, did bring forth theſe ſeveral living Creatures after their kinds, which did after propagate in thoſe parts without being brought thither by the help of Man. If now this ſuppoſition be embrac'd, by it we preſently clear our ſelves of many difficulties concerning the propagation of Animals in the World, and their converſation in the Ark, which many have been ſo much to ſeek for ſatisfaction in. As how the unknown kind of Serpents in *Braſil*, the ſlow-belly'd Creature of the *Indies*, and all thoſe ſtrange ſpecies of Animals ſeen in the *Weſt-Indies* ſhould either come into the Ark of *Noah*, or be convey'd out of it into thoſe Countries which are divided from that Continent where the Flood was by ſo vaſt an Ocean on the one ſide, and at leaſt ſo large a tract of Land on the other (ſuppoſing any paſſage out of one Continent into another, which yet hath not been diſcover'd.) Beſides, ſome kind of Animals cannot live

live out of that particular Clime wherein they are; and there are many ſorts of Animals diſcover'd in *America*, and the adjoyning Iſland, which have left no remainders of themſelves in theſe parts of the World. And it ſeems very ſtrange that theſe ſhould propagate into thoſe remote parts of the World from the place of the Flood, and leave none at all of their number behind them in thoſe parts from whence they were propagated. Theſe things at leaſt make that Opinion very probable which extends the production of Animals beyond that of Mankind in the old World, and that the Flood tho' it deſtroy'd all Mankind, and every living Creature within that compaſs wherein Mankind inhabited, yet might not extend it ſelf to thoſe parts, and the Animals therein, in which Men had never inhabited. And by this means we need not make ſo many Miracles as ſome are fain to do about the Flood; and all thoſe difficulties concerning the propagation of Animals do of themſelves vaniſh and fall to the ground. This is the firſt way of reſolving the difficulty concerning the poſſibility of the Flood, by aſſerting it not to have been over the whole Globe of the Earth, but only over thoſe parts where Mankind Inhabited.

V. *Secondly*, Suppoſe the Flood to have been over the whole Globe of the Earth, yet there might have been Water enough to have over-whelm'd it to the height mention'd in Scripture. For which we are to conſider that many cauſes concurr'd to the making of this Deluge; *firſt*, the Air was condens'd into Clouds, and thoſe fell down with continu'd force and violence, not breaking into drops, but all in a body (which Sir *Walter Rawleigh* parallels with the ſpouts of the *Weſt-Indies*) which are thence call'd the Cataracts or Flood-gates of Heaven, God looſening (as he expreſſeth it) the power retentive which was in the Clouds, and ſo the Waters muſt needs fall in abundance, according to the expreſſion of *Job*, *Behold he with-holdeth the waters, and they dry up, alſo he ſendeth them out, and they overturn the Earth.* Now I ſay, altho' theſe Waters falling down with ſo much fury and violence, as well as in ſo great abundance might quickly deſtroy all living Creatures; yet this was not all; for God who held in the Ocean within its bounds, whereby he ſaith to it, *Thus far it ſhall go, and no further*, might then give it commiſſion to execute his Juſtice upon the ſinful World: and to all this, we have another cauſe of the Deluge, which was, *That the Fountains of the great Deep were broken up.* By which *Vatablus*, moſt probably underſtands, *Immenſam illam & profundam aquarum copiam quæ eſt ſubter terram*, that vaſt body of Water which lies in the bowels of the Earth; now when all theſe Fountains were broken up, and the Waters within the Earth ruſh out with violence and impetuoſity upon it, it muſt needs cauſe an Inundation ſo great as that is mention'd in the Scripture. For as that judicious Hiſtorian Sir *W. Rawleigh* obſerves, Let us conſider that the Earth had above 21000 Miles compaſs, the Diameter of the Earth according to that Circle 7000 Miles, and then from the Superficies to the Center 3500 Miles; take then the higheſt Mountain of the World, *Caucaſus*, *Taurus*, *Teneriff*, or any other, and I do not find, ſaith he, that the higheſt exceeds thirty Miles in height: It is not then impoſſible, anſwering Reaſon with Reaſon, that all thoſe Waters mixed within the Earth,

Sir Walter Rawleigh's *Hiſtory.*

Job. 12. 15.

Gen. 7. 11.

Sir Walter Rawleigh *Ibid.*

3500 Miles deep, ſhould be able to cover the ſpace of 30 Miles in height, which 30 Miles upright being found in the depths of the Earth 116 times; for the Fountains of the great Deep were broken, and the Waters drawn out of the bowels of the Earth. But then withal, ſaith he, if we conſider the proportion which the Earth bears to the Air about it, we may eaſily underſtand the poſſibility of the Flood, without any new creation of Waters; for ſuppoſing ſo much Air to be condens'd, and ſo turn'd into Water which doth encompaſs the Earth, it will not ſeem ſtrange to Men of Judgment, yea but of ordinary Underſtanding, that the Earth (God ſo pleaſing) was cover'd over with Waters, without any new Creation. But this will yet appear more probable; if the height of the higheſt Mountains doth bear no greater proportion to the Diameter of the Earth, than of the 1670 part to the whole, ſuppoſing the Diameter of the Earth to be 8355 Miles, as *P. Gaſſendus* computes both. And it is more than probable, that Men have exceedingly miſtaken, as to the height of Mountains, which comes ſo ſhort of what Sir *Walter Rawleigh* allows to them, that the higheſt Mountain in the World will not be found to be five direct Miles in height, taking the altitude of them from the Plain they ſtand upon. *Olympus* whoſe heigth is ſo extoll'd by the Poets and ancient *Greeks*, that it is ſaid to exceed the Clouds; yet *Plutarch* tells us that *Xenagoras* meaſur'd it, and found it not to exceed a Mile and half perpendicular and about 70 Paces. Much about the ſame height *Pliny* ſaith that *Dicæarchus* found the Mountain *Pelion* to be. The Mount *Athos* is ſuppos'd of extraordinary height, becauſe it caſts its ſhadow into the Iſle of *Lemnos*, which according to *Pliny* was 87 Miles, yet *Gaſſendeus* allows it but two Miles in height; but *Iſaac Voſſius* in a learned diſcourſe concerning the height of Mountains in his Notes on *Pomponius Mela*, doth not allow above 10 or 11 Furlongs at moſt to the height of Mount *Athos*. *Caucaſus* by *Ricciolus* is ſaid to be 51 Miles in height: *Gaſſendus* allowing it to be higher than *Athos* or *Olympus*, yet conceives it not above three or four Miles at moſt; but yet *Voſſius* will not yield it above two Miles perpendicular, for which he gives this very good reaſon; *Polybius* affirms, there is no Mountain in *Greece* which may not be aſcended in a days time, and makes the higheſt Mountain there not to exceed 10 Furlongs; which, ſaith *Voſſius*, it is ſcarce poſſible for any one to reach unleſs he be a Mountainer born; any other will ſcarce be able to aſcend above ſix Furlongs perpendicular; for in the aſcent of a Mountain every Pace doth reach but to an hand breadth perpendicular; but if we do allow eight Furlongs to a days aſcent, yet thereby it will appear that the higheſt Mountains in the World are not above twenty four Furlongs in height, ſince they may be aſcended in three days time: and it is affirm'd of the top of Mount *Caucaſus*, that it may be aſcended in leſs than the compaſs of three days, and therefore cannot be much above two Miles in height. Which may be the eaſier believ'd of any other Mountain, when that which is reputed the higeſt of the World, *viz* the *Pike* of *Teneriff*, which the Inhabitants call *Pica de Terraria*, may be aſcended in that compaſs of time, *viz.* three days: for in the Months of *July* and *Auguſt* (which are the only Months in which Men can aſcend it, be-

Gaſſend. Tom. 2. op. Phyſ. ſ. 3. l. 1.

Plut. in Æmilian. Plin. l. 2. c. 65.

Voſſ. in Pomp. Melam, l. 5. c. 2. p. 115, &c.

cauſe

cauſe all other times of the year Snow lies upon it, altho' neither in the Iſle of *Teneriff* nor any other of the *Canary-Iſlands* there be Snow ever ſeen) the Inhabitants then aſcend to the top of it in three days time, which top of it is not Pyramidal but plain, from whence they gather ſome Sulphurous Stones, which are carry'd in great Quantities into *Spain*. So that according to the proportion of eight Furlongs to a days journey, this *Pike* of *Teneriff* will not exceed the height of a *German* Mile perpendicular, as *Varenius* confeſſeth, than which he thinks likewiſe, that no Mountain in the World is higher. For what *Pliny* ſpeaks of the *Alps* being fifty Miles in height, muſt be underſtood not perpendicular, but in regard of the obliquity of the aſcent of it; ſo that he might account ſo much from the foot of the *Alps* to the top of them, and yet the *Alps* in a perpendicular line not come near the height of a *German* Mile. If then the higheſt Mountains do not exceed much above three Miles in height, (for the *Spaniards* themſelves affirm, that thoſe lofty Mountians of *Peru*, in compariſon of which, they ſay, the *Alps* are but like Cottages, may be aſcended in four days compaſs,) we ſee from hence then far greater probability, how the waters in the time of the general Flood might overtop the higheſt Mountains.

V. Varenium Geogr. General. l. 1. c. 10. prop. 3.

VI. Eſpecially if it be made evident that there is ſo great an Abyſs of ſubterraneous Waters, that the breaking open of the Fountains of it may ſo much increaſe the Inundation ariſing from the Clouds, and from the breaking in of the Ocean upon the main Land. And that there is ſuch a maſs of Waters in the body of the Earth, is evident from the origin of Fountains; for the opinion of *Ariſtotle* imputing them to the condenſation of Air in the Caverns of the Earth, and that of other Philoſophers aſcribing them to the fall of Rain-water receiv'd into ſuch Ciſterns in the Earth which are capable of receiving it, are both equally unſatisfactory, unleſs we ſuppoſe a maſs of Waters in the Bowels of the Earth, which may be as the common ſtock to ſuply thoſe Fountains with. For it is very hard conceiving, how mere Air ſhould be ſo far condens'd, as to cauſe not only ſuch a number of Fountains, but ſo great a quantity of Water as runs into the Sea by thoſe Rivers which come from them, (as the River *Volga* is ſuppos'd to empty ſo much Water in a years time into the *Caſpian* Sea, as might ſuffice to cover the whole Earth,) by which likewiſe it is moſt evident that there muſt be ſome ſubterranean paſſages into the Sea, or elſe of neceſſity, by that abundance of Water which continually runs into it from the Rivers, it would overflow and drown the World. And from this multitude of Waters which comes from Fountains, it is likewiſe evident, that the origin of Fountains cannot be merely from ſuch Water which falls from the Clouds, which would never ſuffice to maintain ſo full and uninterrupted a ſtream as many Fountains have: Eſpecially if that be true which ſome aſſert, that Rain-water doth never moiſten the Earth above ten foot deep, for of far greater profundity many Fountains are. And beſides, the Rain-water runs moſt upon the ſurface of the Earth, and ſo doth rather ſwell the Rivers, which thereby run with greater force in their paſſage to the Ocean, and doth not lodg it ſelf preſently in the Earth, eſpecially if it deſcends in a greater quantity, which alone is able to fill ſuch Ciſterns ſuppos'd to be in the Earth, eſpecially in Mountains,

tains, which may keep a ſtream continually running. Altho' therefore we may acknowledg that the fall of Rain may much conduce to the over-flowing and continuance of Fountains, as is evident by the greater force of Springs after continu'd Rains, and by the decay of many of them in hot and dry weather, (which yet I had rather impute to the Sun's exhaling by his continu'd heat thoſe moiſt Vapors in the Earth, which ſhould continually ſupply the Springs, than merely to the want of Rain,) and by the riſe of moſt great Rivers from ſuch Fountains which came from the foot of Mountains; where the ground is ſuppos'd to be of ſo hard and conſiſtent a ſubſtance, as Stone or Chalk, or ſomething of like nature, which might help to the conſervation of water there, from whence it after ran in ſtreams to the Ocean, (which was the great argument of the famous *Peireskius* for his Opinion,) altho' I ſay, theſe things may argue thus far, that Rain-water doth much conduce to the preſervation of Springs, yet it cannot give a ſufficient account of the origin of them: Which with the greateſt reaſon and probability is imputed to thoſe ſubterraneous Waters which paſs up and down thro' the Bowels of the Earth. Some have fanſy'd the Earth to be as one great Animal, whoſe ſubterraneous paſſages were like Veins in the Body, which receiv'd Water out of the Sea, as the Veins do Blood out of the Liver; and that there are ſome kind of Vapors in the Earth which ſupply the place of vital Spirits, which are diffus'd up and down the Body thro' the Arteries. And that as in an Animal, there are ſome parts which upon the leaſt prick do ſend forth Blood, and others are more callous where the inciſion muſt be deeper before any Blood appears; ſo it is in the Earth: when it is open'd in a right Vein we find preſently a Spring of Water; but if we chance to hit on a wrong place, we go deep and may find none; not that Water is wanting, but we have not hit on the Veins thro' which it runs. And thence the Blood with equal freedom and velocity aſcends into the Head as it runs into the Legs, becauſe it is equally diſpers'd into all the parts from the Center of it; ſo in the body of the Earth it is as natural for the Water to aſcend into the tops of Mountains, as it is to fall down into the Center of the Earth. And that it is no more wonder to ſee Springs iſſue out of Mountains, than it is to ſee a Man bleed in the Veins of his Fore-head when he is let Blood there. So in all places of the Earth the parts of it are not diſpoſed for apertion; for ſome of them are ſo hard and compact, that there ſeems to be no paſſage thro' them, (which is the moſt probable reaſon, why there is no Rain neither in thoſe places, becauſe there is no ſuch exſudation of thoſe moiſt vapors thro' the ſurface of the Earth, which may yield Matter for Rain, as it is in many of the ſandy places of *Africa*;) but uſually Mountainous Countries have more large, and as it were Temple-veins thro' which the moiſt vapors have a free and open paſſage, and thence there are not only more frequent Springs there, but Clouds and Rains too. Now if this account of the origin of Springs in the Earth be as rational as it is ingenious and handſome, (and there is not much can be ſaid againſt it, but only that then all Fountains ſhould be ſalt as the Water is from whence they come,) then we eaſily underſtand how the Earth might be overflow'd in the univerſal Deluge;

V. Gaſſend. vit. Peireſkii. l. 3. p. 292.

luge; for then the Fountains of the Deep were broken up, or there was an universal opening of the Veins of the Earth, whereby all the Water contain'd in them would presently run upon the surface of the Earth, and must needs according to its proportion advance it self to a considerable height. But because the salving the difference of the Water in Springs from what it is in the Sea is so considerable a *Phænomenon* in our present case, I therefore rather take this following as the most rational account of the origin of Fountains, *viz.* That there are great Cavities in the Earth, which are capable of receiving a considerable quantity of Water, which continually runs into them from the Sea, (which as it continually receives fresh supplies from the Rivers which empty themselves into it, so it dispatcheth away a like quantity thro' those spungy parts of the Earth under the Ocean, which are most apt to suck in and convey away the surplusage of Water,) so that by this means the Sea never swells by the Water convey'd into it by the Rivers, there being as continual a circulation in the body of the Earth of the Water which passeth out of the Ocean into the subterraneous Caverns, and from thence to the Mountains, and thence into the Sea again; as there is a circulation of Blood in Man's Body from the Heart by the Arteries into the exterior parts, and returning back again by the Veins into the Heart. According to which we may imagin such a place in the Heart of the Earth like *Plato*'s *Baratrum*,

Τῆλε μάλ' ἦχι βάθιστον ὑπὸ χθονός ἐστι βέρεθρον.

As *Plato* in his *Phædrus* describes it out of *Homer*, *a long and deep subterraneous Cavity*. εἰς ᾧ τοῦτο τὸ χάσμα συρρέυσί τε πάντες οἱ ποταμοὶ, καὶ ἐκ τούτου πάλιν πάντες ἐκρέουσι. *Into which Cavity all the Rivers at last flow, and from which they again disperse themselves abroad.* Now this Cavity of the Earth thus fill'd with Water, supplies the place of the Heart in the body of the Earth, from which all those several *Aqueducts* which are in the Earth have their continual supply; but that which makes those passages of Water which we call Springs and Fountains properly, I suppose, is thus generated; from those Cavities fill'd with Water in the Earth by reason of the hot steams which are in the body of the Earth, there are continually rising some Vapors or little Particles of Water, which are disjoyn'd from each other by the heat, by reason of which they attain a greater celerity of motion, and so pass thro' the inner pores of the Earth till they come near the superficies of it. Which when they have approach'd to, they are beat back again by the cold, which environs the surface of the Earth, or at least are so arrested by the cold and condens'd by it, that they lose the form of Vapors, and become perfect Water again. Which Water being now more gross, than while it was a mere Vapor, cannot descend again thro' the same pores thro' which it ascended before, because these are not now capable of receiving it: And therefore it seeks out some wider passages near the surface of the Earth, by which means it moves in an oblique manner, and is ready to embrace any other Vapors which are arrested in the same manner; now when these are grown to a considerable body in the surface of a Mountain, or a Plain,

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and find a vent fit for them, there appears a proper Fountain, whoſe ſtreams are ſtill maintain'd by the ſame condenſation of Vapors, which when they are once come abroad, are in continual motion, whereby Rivers are made, which are ſtill finding a paſſage thro' the declivity of the ſurface of the Earth, whereby they may return to the Ocean again. Now according to this account, that grand *Phænomenon* of the freſhneſs of Fountain-water, when the Water of the Sea is ſalt, whence it originally comes, is ſufficiently reſolv'd. For mere tranſcolation may by degrees take away that which the *Chymiſts* call the fixed Salt; and for the Volatile Salt of it (which being a more ſpiritous thing, is not removable by Diſtillation, and ſo neither can it be by tranſcolation,) yet ſuch an evaporation as that mention'd, may ſerve to do it, becauſe it is evident that freſh Water will fall from the Clouds which hath riſen from thoſe Vapors which have come out of the Sea; and beſides theſe Vapors or ſmall Particles of Water in their paſſage thro' the Earth (eſpecially when they come near the ſurface of it) do incorporate with other ſweet Vapors, as thoſe which come from Rain and others, by which means they inſenſibly loſe their former acidity and ſharpneſs. But thoſe Fountains which do retain their former ſaltneſs, as there are many ſuch in the World, may very probably be ſuppos'd not to have come from thoſe Vapors condens'd, but to be a kind of breaking of a Vein in which the Salt Water was convey'd up and down the body of the Earth. Now then, conſidering that maſs of Waters and multitude of Vapors ariſing thence which are in the Earth, how eaſie is it for us to underſtand what the breaking open the Fountains of the Deep means in Scripture, and how by that means together with the falling down of the Cataracts of the Clouds, and the letting looſe of the Ocean, the whole Earth might be overſpread with an univerſal Deluge? The poſſibility of which was the thing to be ſhew'd.

VII. The next thing we come to concerning the Flood, is, the capacity of the Ark for receiving the ſeveral Animals which were to propagate the Word afterwards. Concerning which, two things are neceſſary to be underſtood, what the meaſure of the Ark was, and what the number of Animals contain'd in it. The meaſure of the Ark muſt be determin'd by the proportion of the cubit, which there is no reaſon at all to ſuppoſe either with *Origen* and others to have been the Geometrical cubit, which contains ſix ordinary cubits or nine feet, both becauſe we find no mention at all of any ſuch cubit in Scripture, and becauſe the Fabric of the Ark would have been of too vaſt a proportion. Neither yet is it probable, what Sir *W. Rawleigh* ſuppoſeth, that this cubit muſt be of a proportion as much exceeding ours, as the ſtature of a Giant doth ours, both becauſe there is no certain evidence, either from Scripture or Reaſon, that the proportion of Men then did generally exceed what is now; and beſides, this tends not in the leaſt to make the thing more plain. For according to that proportion, we muſt then have imagin'd Beaſts to have been as well as Men; for the Horſe muſt have been proportionably as great to have been ſerviceable to Men of that ſtature, and ſo the Animals would have taken up as much more room in the Ark as the cubit is ſuppos'd to be bigger. I ſuppoſe then that *Moſes* ſpeaks of the cubit moſt

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in use in his own time (for he writ so that they for whose use he writ, might be easily able to understand him,) now this cubit by the consent of Writers contain'd a foot and a half in length; according to which proportion, supposing the Ark by *Moses*'s description to have 300 cubits in length, 50 in breadth, and 30 in height, the whole capacity of the Ark, according to the computation of *Joh. Buteo* comes to 450000 solid cubits. For the length of 300 cubits being multiply'd into the breadth of 50 cubits, and the product by the height of 30 cubits, makes the whole Concavity 450000. Which *Matheus Hostus* reducing to the *German* measure, makes the longitude of the Ark to be 31 perches, 4 cubits, 5 fingers; the latitude 5 perches, 2 cubits and 11 fingers; the altitude 3 perches 1 cubit, 9 fingers; allowing to every perch 15 *Roman* feet. So that if we take a perch to contain 10 *Hebrew* cubits, which exceeds the former 11 fingers, the whole capacity of the Ark will be 450 cubical perches. And as he saith, *Hujusmodi sane ædificii amplitudo capacissima est, & quamlibet magno animantium numero haud dubie sufficere potuit*, the Ark of so large a capacity might easily contain the several kinds of Animals in it. Which will be easily understood, if according to our former supposition, only the Animals of the inhabited part of the World were preserv'd in the Ark; but admitting that all kinds of Animals were there, there would be room enough for them, and for Provision for them. For which Sir *W. Rawleigh* gives a prudent caution, that Men ought not to take Animals of a mixt Nature, as *Mules* and *Hyæna*'s, nor such as differ in size and shape from each other, as the *Cat* of *Europe*, and *Ownce* of *India*, into the several species of Animals. Sir *W. Rawleigh* following *Buteo* reckons 89, or lest any be omitted, a 100 several kinds of Beasts, and undertakes to demonstrate from a triple proportion of all Beasts to the Ox, Wolf, and Sheep, that there was sufficient capacity for them in the Ark. *Hostus* allows a 150 several kinds of Animals, yet questions not the capacity of the Ark. But these things are so particularly made out by those learned Authors, especially by *Buteo*, that I shall rather refer the Reader for further satisfaction to the Authors themselves, than take the pains to transcribe them.

Gen. 6. 15.

Buteo de arca Noe. p. 93.

Hostius de fabrica Arca Noah. th. 66.

VIII. I come now therefore to the evidence of the truth and certainty of this universal Deluge, of which we have most clear and concurring Testimonies of most ancient Nations of the World. For which purpose *Grotius* and others have at large produc'd the Testimony of *Berosus* the *Chaldean* out of *Josephus*, concerning the Flood and the Ark in which *Noah* was preserv'd, of *Abidenus* out of *Cyril* and *Eusebius* concerning *Xisuthrus*, or *Noah*'s sending out of the Birds to see if the Flood were asswag'd, and of *Alexander Polyhistor* concerning the preservation of Animals in the Ark, of *Plutarch* concerning the sending out of the Dove, of *Lucian de Dea Syria* concerning the whole story, and so of *Molon* and *Nicolaus Damascenus*. Besides it is manifested by others, how among the *Chaldeans* the memory of *Noah* was preserv'd under the Fable of *Oannes*, which had part of a Fish, and part of a Man, as is evident from the fragments of *Apollodorus*, *Abydenus*, and *Alexander Polyhistor*, preserv'd in *Eusebius*'s Greek Chronica; among the *Chineses* under the name of *Puoncuus*, who by them is said

V. Grot. Annot. in l. 1. de Verit. relig. Christ. Voss. Isagog Chron. dissert. 4. c. 2. & 3. Bochar. Geogr. sacr. l. 1. c. 4. August. de Civit. Dei, l. 18. c. 12. & ibid. Lud. Viv.

Euseb. Chr. p. 5. ed. 2. Scaliger.

said to have escap'd alone with his Family out of the universal Deluge, saith *Isaac Vossius*, who supposeth *Pu* or *Pi* to be only a prefix to the name, and so that *Puoncuus*, is the same with ὁ Νῶε. *Martinius* tells us, *de diluvio multa est apud Sinicos Scriptores mentio*, that the ancient Writers of the *Sinic* History speak much of the Flood. *Johannes de Laet* tells out of *Lescharbotus* how constant the Tradition of the Flood is among the *Indians*, both in *New-France*, *Peru*, and other parts. This being therefore so fully attested by the evident and apparent consent of so many Writers and Historians, which did not own the Authority of the Scriptures, I shall suppose this sufficiently prov'd, and proceed to the main thing which concerns the Origin of Nations, which is, *the certainty of the propagation of Mankind from the posterity of* Noah. Of which there this is strong and convincing evidence, that in all that account which the Scripture gives of the propagation of Nations from the Sons of *Noah*, there is some remainder in the History of that Nation to justify the reason of the imposition of the name from the names of the Nations themselves, which have preserv'd the original name of their Founder in their own, as the *Medes* from *Madai*; the *Thracians* from *Thiras*; the *Ionians* from *Javan*; the *Sidonians* from *Sidon*; the *Philistins* from *Polesthim*; the *Arcæans*, *Aradians*, *Elymæans*, *Assyrians*, *Lydians*, fron *Arki*, *Arad*, *Elam*, *Assur* and *Lud*, and many others produc'd by *Grotius*, *Montanus*, *Junius*, and especially *Bochartus*, who with admirable Industry and Learning hath clear'd all this part of sacred History, which concerns the reason of the imposition of the names of the People which were propagated from the posterity of *Noah*, and given a full and satisfactory account of the several places where the posterity of *Noah* seated themselves after the Deluge. Instead of that therefore, I shall consider the pretenses which can be brought against it, which are chiefly these three. 1. That the *Chaldean* Empire seems to have greater Antiquity than can be attributed to it by the History of *Moses*. 2. That the most learned Heathen Nations pretend to be self-originated, and that they came not from any other Country. 3. That no certain account is given from whence *America* should be Peopled.

Is. Voss. epist. ad Colvium, p. 409.
Martin. hist. Sinic. l. 1. p. 12.
Joh. de Laet. de orig. gent. American. l. 1. p. 115.

Gro. Annot ad l. 1. de Verit.
Ari. Montan. Phaleg.
Junius in Gen. 10.
Bochart. Geogr. sacr. p. 1.

IX. 1. The History of the *Assyrian* Empire seems inconsistent with the propagation of the World from the Sons of *Noah*; for the Reign of *Ninus* and *Semiramis* is plac'd by many *Chronologers* within the first Century after the Flood, which seems a manifest inconsistency with the propagation of Mankind from the Sons of *Noah*; for it seems utterly impossible that the foundations of so great an Empire should be laid in so small a compass of time by the Posterity of three Persons; and besides, *Ninus* and *Semiramis* were not the first who began the *Assyrian* Empire; for *Belus* not only reign'd fifty five years before *Ninus*, but according to the *Chaldean* Antiquities from *Evechous*, who they say first reign'd among them, are reckon'd 495 years. But admit that the Beginning of the *Assyrian* Empire be plac'd so low as *Petavius* and other Chronologers would have it, *viz.* in the year after the Flood, 153, yet the difficulty is only somewhat abated, but not remov'd; for it seems yet unconceivable that from three Persons in 150 years, such multitudes should spring, as to make so large and Empire as that of

Petav. de doct. temp. l. 9. c. 14. Tom. 2.

of *Ninus*, and that within an hundred years after the Flood there ſhould be ſuch vaſt multitudes for the building the Tower of *Babel* and diſperſion up and down the World, ſo that according to the *Hebrew* computation in the compaſs of 300 years, *viz.* about *Abraham*'s time, the World was ſo fully peopl'd, that we read of ſeveral Kings encountring one another, by which it is evident the World had been peopl'd ſome time before, or elſe there could not have been ſuch potent Kings as ſome of them were at that time. This being the grand Difficulty, to it I anſwer theſe things.

1. There is no ſuch certainty of the beginning of the *Aſſyrian* Empire, as for the ſake of that, to queſtion the truth of the Propagation of the World by the Sons of *Noah*. I have already largely manifeſted the want of credibility in the Chronology of the ancient *Chaldeans*, and that we have no certain grounds to rely upon in reference to it. Eſpecially as to theſe ſeven firſt *Babylonian* Kings, which are cited out of *Africanus*, by *Euſebius*, and *Georgius Syncellus*, viz. *Evechous*, *Chomasbolus*, *Porus*, *Nechubes*, *Abius*, *Oniballus*, *Chinzirus*, who are ſaid to reign 225 years two months; and alike fabulous, I ſuppoſe, is the other *Dynaſty* of ſix *Arabian* Kings, whoſe Empire is ſaid to have ſtood 215 years to the time of *Belus*, who expell'd the *Arabians*, and took the power to himſelf: And it is much more agreeable to Reaſon to reject theſe two *Dynaſties*, which had no record of them left in any Hiſtory of the *Aſſyrian* Empire, but only in *Beroſus*, whoſe authority in this caſe hath been diſcuſs'd already; than to follow our late Excellent Primate of *Armach*, who punctually ſets down the Reign of the Kings of theſe two *Dynaſties*, but cuts off at leaſt eight Ages in the time of the *Aſſyrian* Empire from *Ninus* to *Sardanapalus*, which times he confines to 496 years, and placeth *Ninus* in the 2737 year of the World, according to the *Hebrew* Computation, and ſo to live in the time of the *Judges*, and be contemporary with *Deborah*: Which he buidls only on a place in *Herodotus*, which relates not to the time between *Ninias* and *Sardanapalus*, but to the time of the defection of the *Medes* from the *Aſſyrian* Empire, as *Iſaac Voſſius* hath already ſhew'd. We cannot then find any certainty in the beginning of the *Aſſyrian* Empire, which may give us cauſe to queſtion the Propagation of the World from the Poſterity of *Noah*.

Uſſer. Ann. vet. Teſt. A. M. 2737.

Caſtigat. adv. Horn. c. 10.

Gen. 9. 1.

2. We have reaſon to think that there was a more than ordinary multiplication of the World from the Sons of *Noah* after the Flood. For as God had before puniſh'd the World by deſtroying Mankind in it by an extraordinary manner; ſo after the Flood, he doth in a particular manner bleſs *Noah* and his Sons; and ſaid unto them, *Be fruitful and multiply, and repleniſh the earth*, which may well be thought to have then had an extraordinary effect. Several ways have been attempted by Learned Men to make appear, to what a vaſt number the Poſterity of *Noah* would increaſe in the ſpace of two or three hundred years after the Flood. *Petavius* ſuppoſeth that the Poſterity of *Noah* might beget Children at ſeventeen, and that each of *Noah*'s Sons might have eight Children in the eighth year after the Flood, and that every one of theſe eight might beget eight more; by this means in only one Family, as of *Japhet* in the year after the Flood 238, he makes a *Dia-*

Petav. de doct. temp. l. 9. *c.* 14.

gram consisting of almost an innumerable company of Men. *Johannes Temporarius*, as our most Learned *Primate* tells us, takes this way, that all of the Posterity of *Noah*, when they attain'd twenty years of Age, had every year twins, on which supposition by *Arithmetical* progression he undertakes to make it appear, that in the 102 year after the Flood, there would be of Males and Females 1554420; but taking away the one half, because of the groundless supposition of twins, yet then in that time there would be 388605 Males desides Females. Others suppose that each of the Sons of *Noah* had ten Sons, and by that proportion, in few Generations it would amount to many thousands within a Century. Others insist on the parallel between the multiplication of the Children of *Israel* in *Ægypt*; that if from 72 Men in the space of 215 years there are procreated 600000, how many will be born of three Men in the space of an hundred years? some have said above 23000, but with what success in their *Arithmetic*, I shall not determin. But whether all or any of these ways be sufficient, and satisfactory, we have yet cause to believe that there was a more than ordinary multiplication in the Posterity of *Noah* after the Flood.

Uss. Chron. sacr. c. 5.

Horn. def. dissert. de atat. mundi, c. 26.

3. If we embrace the account of those Copies, which the *Septuagint* follow'd in their Version, all this difficulty is then ceas'd. For that account doth very much enlarge the times, and makes almost a thousand years between the Flood and *Abraham*, by which means there will be sufficient space given for the propagation of Mankind, the building the Tower of *Babel*, the dispersion of Nations, the founding the *Assyrian* Empire, the plantation of *Ægypt*, *China*, and other places, all which seem to have been in that time, and to concur with that computation, as well as *Josephus* doth, and the whole Primitive Church before *Hierom*, which certainly ought in no case to be disregarded.

The whole controversy concerning this part of the Chronology of the World comes at last to this; Whether it be more probable that the *Jews* who lived under the second Temple (who then were the Trustees to whom were committed *the Oracles of God*) whom the LXX. follow'd in their Version, had the true reading, or the *Talmudic Jews* after their dispersion and banishment from their Countrey, when they were discarded by God himself from being his People, when he broke up house among them at the destruction of *Jerusalem* and the Temple. But if the Reader desire further satisfaction concerning this difference of this Chronology of the LXX. from that of the present *Hebrew* Copies, he may consult the learned dissertation of the late learned Bishop of *Chester* upon the LXX. and the later Discourses of *Isaac Vossius* on this subject. Setting aside then the controversy between the present *Hebrew* Copies and the LXX. in point of integrity and incorruption, which I meddle not with, I cannot but subscribe to the judgment of our judicious Historian, * Sir *W. Rawleigh*: *That if we look over all, and do not hastily satisfy our Understanding with the first things offer'd, and thereby being satiated do slothfully and drowsily sit down, we shall find it more agreeable rather to follow the reckoning of the LXX. who according to some Editions make it above 1072 years between the Flood and* Abraham's *Birth, than to take away any part of those 352 years given. For if we advisedly*

Walton Proleg. ad Bibl. Polyg. c. 9. ss. 58, 63, &c. Isaac Vossius de LXX. Interpr. & atat. Mundi.

* Sir *Walt. Rawleigh Hist. p. 1. b. 2. c. 1. sect. 7.*

viſedly conſider the ſtate and countenance of the World, ſuch as it was in Abraham's *time, yea before* Abraham *was born, we ſhall find that it were very ill done of us by following opinion without the guide of Reaſon, to pare the time over deeply between* Abraham *and the Flood; becauſe in cutting them too near the quick, the reputation of the whole ſtory might perchance bleed thereby, were not the teſtimony of the Scriptures ſupream, ſo as no objection can approach it; And that we did not follow withal this precept of St.* Auſtin, *that whereſoever any one place in the Scriptures may be conceiv'd diſagreeing to the whole, the ſame is by ignorance of miſ-interpretation underſtood. For in* Abraham's *time all the then known parts of the World were peopled: all Regions and Countries had their Kings.* Ægypt *had many magnificent Cities, and ſo had* Palæſtine *and all bordering Countries; yea all that part of the World beſides as far as* India: *and thoſe not built with ſticks, but of hewn ſtones, and defended with Walls and Rampiers, which magnificence needed a Parent of more antiquity than thoſe other Men have ſuppos'd. And therefore where the Scriptures are plaineſt and beſt agreeing with Reaſon and Nature, to what end ſhould we labor to beget doubts and ſcruples, or draw all things into wonders and marvels? giving alſo ſtrength thereby to common cavillers, and to thoſe Mens apiſh brains, who only bend their Wits to find impoſſibilities and monſters in the Story of the World and Mankind.* Thus far that excellent Hiſtorian, whoſe words deſerve conſideration. Thus much for the firſt Objection.

The ſecond is, *From the great pretenſe of ſeveral Nations that they were ſelf-originated,* or came not from any other place. This was the pretenſe of the *Ægyptians*, *Græcians*, ancient Inhabitants of *Italy*, and others. But how little reaſon we have to give credit to theſe pretenſes, will appear on theſe accounts. 1. The Impoſſibility in Nature that Mankind ſhould be produc'd in ſuch a way as they imagin'd, which we have manifeſted already in our Diſcourſe of the Origin of the Univerſe. 2. That the Nations which pretended this, were never able to give ſufficient Evidence of it to any other Nation which demanded it; which is manifeſt by their want of any certain Records of their ancient times, which is fully prov'd in our Diſcourſe in the firſt Book of the want of credibility in the *Heathen* Hiſtory. 3. The only probable Reaſon which induc'd theſe Nations to make themſelves *Aborigines*, was, becauſe they ſuppos'd themſelves to be the firſt Inhabitants of the Countries they liv'd in: which altho' I may allow to the *Ægyptians*, and ſome other ancient Nations, yet I cannot do it to the *Hellens* or *Greeks*, who moſt vainly and arrogantly pretend to it. Which becauſe it may give more light into the greateſt Antiquities of *Greece*, and ſome other Nations than hath been yet diſcover'd or taken notice of, and becauſe it may further tend to clear the truth of the Scriptures, as to the Origin of Nations, I ſhall more particularly inquire into the firſt Plantation of *Greece*. That it was firſt inhabited by ſome of *Noah*'s Poſterity, is out of queſtion with all thoſe who prefer the moſt ancient and undoubted Records of Scripture before the fabulous Impoſtures of Mens Brains. But by whoſe immediate Poſterity the Country of *Greece* was firſt inhabited, is not yet ſo clear as it hath been generally

x. 2.

preſum'd to be, by moſt who had rather follow the dictates of others, than ſpend time in ſuch inquiries themſelves: Which yet certainly are ſo far from being unworthy Mens labor and induſtry, that nothing tends more clearly to advance the truth of Scripture-hiſtory, than the reconciling the Antiquities of the elder Nations to what we find deliver'd of the Plantation of the World from the Poſterity of *Noah*. As to this particular therefore of the firſt Plantation of *Greece*, I ſhall firſt propound the opinion generally embraced among Learned Men, and then ſhew how far it is defective, and what other more true account may be given of it. It is evident from *Moſes*, Gen. 10. 5. that the Poſterity of *Japhet* took poſſeſſion of the Iſles of the *Gentiles*, i. e. according to the *Hebrew* Idiom, not only ſuch as are properly ſo call'd, but all thoſe Countries which lay much upon the Sea, being at any diſtance from *Palæſtine*, eſpecially ſuch as lay between the *Ocean* and *Mediterranean* Sea; and ſo both *Greece* and *Italy* come under the name of the *Iſles of the Gentiles*. Among the Sons of *Japhet* none is conceiv'd ſo probable to have firſt peopled *Greece*, as he whoſe name was preſerv'd among the Inhabitants of *Greece* with very little alteration. And ſo as the *Medes* from *Madai*, the *Aſſyrians* from *Aſſur*, the *Thracians* from *Thiras*, by the like Analogy the *Ionians* *Javan*. From which it is obſervable, that altho' among the *Greeks* themſelves, the *Ionians* were but as one diviſion of that People which inhabited *Greece*, yet other Nations comprehended all under the name of *Ionians*. For which we have ſufficient evidence from *Heſychius*, and the Scholiaſt on *Ariſtophanes*. Οἱ βάρβαροι τοὺς Ἕλληνας Ἴωνας λέγουσιν, ſaith *Heſychius*; and more to this purpoſe the Scholiaſt ſpeaks. Πάντες τοὺς Ἕλληνας Ἰάονας οἱ βάρβαροι ὀνομάζουσιν. For Ἰάονες with the Inſertion of the *Æolic Digamma* (which is always done when two Vowels meet) is Ἰϝάονες i. e. *Javones*; and *Stephanus Byzantius* tells us, that from Ἰάων comes Ἰών, and ſo *Homer*,

Heſych. v. Ἴωνι. *Acharnen. Shol. in Ariſtoph.* *Stephanus de Urb. v.* Ἰών.

Hom. Il v.

Ἔνθα δὲ Βοιωτοὶ καὶ Ἰάονες ἑλκεχιτῶνες.

And *Dionyſius Periegetes* reckons up Ἰάων as one of the Rivers of *Arcadia*,

Dionyſ. v. 416.

Ἔνθα μέλας ὄδι Κεφῖς ἵνα ῥέῃ ὕργῳ Ἰάων.

And which much confirms this opinion, the *Hebrew* word for *Javan* before the points added by the *Maſorites*, *viz.* יון bears a perfect Analogy with the *Greek* Ἰών; and ארץ יון in Scripture is taken for *Greece*; and ſo *Dan.* 8. 21. *Alexander* is call'd מלך יון, which the LXX render Βασιλεὺς ἑλλάνων; and *Joel* 3. 6. *You have ſold my Sons*, לבני היונים *the Sons of Javan*, i. e. to the *Greeks*, as it is generally underſtood. But as *Javan* cannot be ſuppos'd to have come into theſe parts without his Family, ſo it is generally preſum'd that there are no obſcure foot-ſteps left of *Javan*'s eldeſt Son, *Eliſha*'s ſeating himſelf in *Greece*. For from him *Joſephus* derives the name Αἰολεῖς, with whom the *Jeruſalem* Paraphraſt concurs. *Montanus* from thence derives the name *Elis*, from whence he ſuppoſeth the *Greeks* are call'd Ἕλληνες. *Bochartus* finds the cleareſt remainders

Ar. Mont. Phaleg. p. 24.

mainders of *Eliſha* in *Elis*, the ſame with *Peloponneſus*, one part of which by *Homer* is call'd *Aliſium*; thence *Ezek.* 27. 7. we read of the *purple and ſcarlet from the Iſles of* Eliſha, which makes it moſt probable to be that part of *Greece* which lay upon the *Ionian* Sea, where the beſt Purple next to the *Tyrian* was found, as the Learned *Bochartus* hath demonſtrated from ſeveral Authors. This is now the ſubſtance of the generally-receiv'd account concerning the plantation of *Greece* from the Poſterity of *Noah*. Which if it be taken as to that People which did at length poſſeſs *Greece*, I ſee no reaſon to diſapprove it; but if it be extended to the firſt plantation of *Greece*, I ſee as little to embrace it. That we may therefore judg more freely of the firſt Inhabitants of *Greece*, it is requiſite we take an account of it from thoſe who profeſs themſelves moſt vers'd in their own Antiquities, who may in a matter of this nature, which is atteſted by the common conſent of the moſt learned Antiquaries of *Greece*, be the more credited, in that what they thus deliver, may be ſuppos'd to come from an ancient and undoubted Tradition.

Bochart. Phaleg. l. 3. cap. 10.

XI. It is evident therefore, from the judgment of the moſt learned and judicious, even of the *Greeks* themſelves, that *Greece* was firſt inhabited by a People by them call'd *Barbarous*, i. e. a People different from them in Language and Manners. So *Ephorus*, whom *Polybius* commends as the beſt Writer of the *Greek Antiquities*, ſaith that *Greece* was inhabited by a barbarous People before the *Hellens* came into it. And *Hecatæus Mileſius* cited by *Strabo* concerning *Peloponneſus*, ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι φησὶν οἰκῆσαι βαρβάρους, which *Strabo* himſelf not only believes of *Peloponneſus*, but of all *Greece*, that it was τὸ παλαιὸν βαρβάρων τὴν πᾶσαν, *anciently a Plantation of Barbarians*; the ſame is affirm'd by *Ariſtotle* writing of the Common-wealth of the *Tegeates* concerning *Arcadia*, that before its being poſſeſs'd by the *Arcadians*, it was inhabited by a barbarous People, who becauſe they were expulſed their Country before Moon-riſing, the *Arcadians* call'd themſelves προσέληνοι. Whether that be the ground of that vain-glorious boaſt (of which many reaſons are given by learned Men) I here diſpute not; it is ſufficient that we find the *Grecians* were not the firſt who peopled any of theſe ſeveral places; which is likewiſe atteſted by *Herodotus*, *Thucydides*, and others, whoſe teſtimonies we ſhall afterwards produce. It being then evident that the *Grecians* were not the firſt who inhabited that Country after from them called *Greece*, it follows to be inquir'd what this barbarous People was, and from whence they came. *Strabo* hath given us in a large Catalogue of the names of many of them, as the *Dryopes*, *Caucones*, *Leleges*, beſides the *Aones*, *Tembices*, *Hyantes*, and many others; but theſe ſeem not to have been that ancient People, but rather ſome latter Caſtlings of the *Carians*, who, as *Thucydides* tells us, did very often make inroads upon the quarters of *Greece*. That People which had the largeſt ſpread, and greateſt Antiquity, was the *Pelaſgi*: thence *Peloponneſus* was anciently called Πελασγία. *Stephanus Byzantius* Πελοποννήσου πρὸς ἰσθμῷ, Ἀπία, Πελασγία and Ἄργος: and *Apollodorus* ſaith, that the *Peloponneſians* were anciently called *Pelaſgi*; and *Euripides*,

Strabo l. 7. V. Scholiaſt. in Apollon. l. 4. v. 262.

Πελα-

Πελασγιώτας ὠνομασμένους τὸ πεὶν
Δαναούς.

And elsewhere,

Πρῶτον Πελασγοὶ, Δαναίδαι τὸ δεύτερον.

Strabo l. 9. These *Pelasgi* were not only in *Peloponnesus*, but in *Attica* too, as appears by *Strabo*, where he saith the Nation of the *Pelasgi* did inhabit, and by the *Athenians* (that is after their mixture) they were called πλαργοὶ *Storks*, ἀπὸ τὴν πλάνην, for their frequent removals from place to place: And *Pausanias* mentions their being under the *Acronoli* at *Athens*: that they were in *Thessaly*, is evident from *Hesychius*. Πελασγοὶ οἱ ἀγριανες ἔθνος Θρᾳκῶν, ἢ χῶρος ἀπὸ Πελασγοῦ τοῦ Ἀρκάδος ἢ ὄρος Θετταλίας; *Arcadia* seems to have the first or chief place of their residence, for the *Arcadians* who were accounted πελασγότατον ἔθνος ἁπάντων, do vindicate the Founder of this Nation, whom they call *Pelasgus*, to themselves, and say he was an αὐτόχθων among them, that is, the first who came into that Country; for all those, whose Original they knew not, they called *Terræ filios*, and *Genuinos terræ*. *Pausanias* rightly conjectures that he was the first Man among them, not as tho' he was alone, but because the Chief Ruler and Commander among them, and that brought them into the Country; but tho' they might fix themselves about *Arcadia*, it is evident they spread further; for *Menecrates Eleates* in his Book of the Founders of Cities, affirms that all the Sea-coasts of *Greece* called *Ionica*, beginning from *Mycale*, were first inhabited by the *Pelasgi*; nay we find them yet much higher in *Epirus*, who were, as *Strabo* tells us, the first Founders of that famous Oracle of *Dodona*; for so *Ephorus* in him saith it was Πελασγῶν ἵδρυμα, and that these were τῶν περὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα δυναστευόντων ἀρχαιοτάτων: thence the Poet,

Pausan. in Arcad.

Idem l. 7.

Ζεῦ ἄνα Δωδωναῖε Πελασγικέ.

And *Hesiod*,

Δωδώνηι φυγόντε Πελασγῶν ἕδρανον ἦεν.

Strabo further makes it evident, that they were a barbarous People which liv'd about *Dodona*, from the description *Homer* gives of them,

ἀμφὶ δ' Σελλοὶ
Σοὶ ναίουσ' ὑποφῆται, ἀνιπτόποδες χαμαιεύναι.

Philostr. in Imag. Which *Philostratus* best interprets, when he saith they were αὐτοχθόνες τινες ἐκ ἔτι καλοκαγαθίᾳ ἐπιμένοντες τῷ βίῳ, *such that thought the Gods were best pleased with their simplicity and severity of life*, and therein far different from the *Grecian* humor. *Suidas* in *Thessalicis* (cited likewise by *Strabo*) saith that the Temple of *Dodona* was remov'd from

from *Scotusa* in *Pelasgia* to *Thessala*, which is confirm'd by *Herodotus* in *Euterpe*, where he largely speaks of the *Temple* and *Oracle* at *Dodona*. These *Pelasgi* confin'd not themselves to *Greece* neither, but were dispers'd into the neighbor Islands, as *Chios*, *Crete*, *Lesbos*, *Lemnos*, *Imbro*, *Samos*, as will appear afterwards; and at last came into *Italy*, as is well known, and are thought to be the same with the *Tyrrhenians*, and by some conceiv'd to be the first Founders of *Rome*. We see what a large spread the *Pelasgi* had over *Greece*, which was divided after the *Hellens* began to appear, into τὸ πελασγικὸν and τὸ ἑλληνικὸν, as *Herodotus* witnesseth; and so these two appear to be a very different People from one another, and not the same under different names, as is commonly thought.

XII. Which sufficiently appears from their Language, which was quite different from one another. So *Herodotus* Ἦσαν οἱ Πελασγοὶ βάρβαρον γλῶσσαν ἱέντες, *they us'd a barbarous Language: i.e.* a Language not understood by the *Hellens*; who at first had their chief residence in *Thessaly*, from whence by degrees they came forwards into *Greece*, as *Thucydides* shews. For altho' the name of *Hellens* at last spread it self over all the People of *Greece*, yet it was at first peculiar to that part of *Thessaly* called *Pthiotis*, and thence *Homer* calls them properly *Hellens* which followed *Achilles* from thence; and it appears by *Homer* that there was a City there called Ἑλλάς, which as *Stephanus de Urbibus* tells us was there built by Ἕλλην, altho' he will not have him to be *Hellen* the Son of *Deucalion*, but the Son *Pthius*, wherein he is mistaken; For *Thucydides* plainly shews, that it was from *Hellen* the Son of *Deucalion*, that the name Ἕλλην came, and this *Hellen* liv'd in *Pthiotis*. But altho' they were first in *Pthiotis*, yet they daily increasing in numbers and power, by degrees they got all *Thessaly* into their hands, of which one part was called Πελασγιώτης; afterwards under *Dorus* the Son of *Hellen* they conquer'd *Hestiæotis*, that part of *Thessaly* which lies under the Mountains *Ossa* and *Olympus*; from thence they were beaten back by the *Cadmeans* into *Pindus*, where the *Greeks* were first called Μακεδνοὶ, as *Herodotus* tells us; from hence they went into *Dryopis*, and thence into *Peloponnesus*, and there had the name *Dorians*; but before their coming hither, they had first secured themselves of the *Hellens* lying between *Thessaly* and *Peloponnesus*, and there they dispossest the *Pelasgi* in all the *Attic* Region; who were now forc'd to submit or to fly; they who submitted, as most of them did, were incorporated into the *Greeks*, and became one People with them, and so by degrees lost that former Language which was peculiar to themselves and wholly distinct from the *Greek* Tongue. That the *Hellens* did thus gradually come into *Peloponnesus*, is evident from the names of People and Places common to *Thessaly* and *Peloponnesus*; which came from hence, that tho' the *Greeks* left the Cities behind them, yet they carried most of the names along with them. Thus the *Achæi*, *Ionians*, and *Æolians*, and *Dorians* in *Peloponnesus* came from those of the same names in *Thessaly*; and so likewise the names of these following Regions and Cities were common to both, as *Ellopia*, *Estiæa*, *Eretria*, and *Oropos*, *Graia*, *Lariſſa*, *Psophis*, *Iton*, *Oechalia*, and very many others. *Salmasius* seems to be of opinion, that the *Pelasgi* never us'd any Language distinct from the *Hellens*; but besides that it is directly *Salmas. de Hellen.* p. 315.

contrary to the teſtimony of *Herodotus*, the Arguments he produceth for it are very weak. The firſt is becauſe the *Pelaſgi* that went into *Italy*, did uſe the *Greek* Tongue, from their calling *Agylla Cære*, from χαῖρε, a word pronounc'd from one on the Walls; and becauſe the *Arcades* us'd only the *Greek* Language in the *Æolian* Dialect, which *Evander* carried with him into *Italy*, and from which moſt of the old *Roman* Language was deriv'd. But doth not *Herodotus* expreſly ſay, that after the mixture between the *Greeks* and *Pelaſgi* theſe by degrees loſt their own proper Language and made uſe of the common *Greek* Tongue? Yet afterwards too it is evident from *Herodotus* in ſome places, as at *Crotona*, they did
XII. uſe a Language different from the *Greek*. His other Argument is, *That the names of the eldeſt perſons mention'd were originally* Greek; but this is expreſly deny'd by *Strabo*, who makes the contrary one of his ſtrongeſt Arguments, that the *Barbarians* did anciently inhabit *Greece*; and inſtanceth in *Cecrops*, *Codrus*, *Æolus*, *Cothus*, *Drymas*, *Crimanus*. Thus we have abundantly prov'd againſt the common opinion, that *Greece* was not firſt peopl'd by the *Hellens*, or the Poſterity of *Eliſa*, altho' theſe did afterwards come to the full poſſeſſion of *Greece*.

XIII. It remains that we ſhew whence theſe *Pelaſgi* came, and of whoſe Poſterity they were, and what the Language was which was us'd by them. He that gave the name to this People according to the *Grecian* Fables, was one *Pelaſgus*, which none will wonder at among them, whoſe conſtant cuſtom it was, (partly by reaſon of their Ignorance of the true account of their Names, and partly by their Pride that they might not ſeem ignorant of any thing) when they meet with any Names of People, to find out ſome Perſon near it who was the Founder of them. Thus *Attica* from *Actæus*, it being anciently called Ἀκτικὴ, and *Cranae* from *Cranaus*, *Ægialea* from *Ægialeus*, *Mauritania* from *Maurus*, *Scythia* from one *Scythes*, *Galatæa* from *Galates*, and thus in multitudes of other Names. But from the Name *Pelaſgi* we may probably find out the true Founder of the People, allowing that variation which is uſually caus'd thro' the *Greeks* melting the harſher words of the *Eaſtern* Languages into a ſound fit for their more delicate palates, as is evident in the comparing the Names of the Prophets in *Hebrew*, with what they are in the *Greek* Verſion. Thus the *Pelaſgi* may with great probability be deriv'd from פלג, *Phaleg*; for which we have the concurrent teſtimony of two Learned Perſons, *Grotius* and *Salmaſius*, who are contented to mention it, without bringing much evidence of Reaſon for it. What they only touch at, we ſhall endeavour to make out more at large; which we ſhall do by removing the great preſumptions againſt it, and laying down the probabilities for it. The great preſumptions lying againſt it are; for that the Iſles of the Nations fell to the Poſterity of *Jepheth*, and that *Phaleg* liv'd with *Eber* in *Chaldæa*. For the firſt, it muſt be acknowledg'd that the greateſt part of the Countries lying upon the *Ocean* and *Mediterranean*, were in the time when *Moſes* wrote ſo inhabited; not that the Habitations of the Sons of *Noah* had their bounds and limits ſet them either by God or *Noah*, but that the poſterity of *Japhet* did chiefly addreſs themſelves to thoſe parts which lay towards *Europe*; but yet not ſo, as to exclude any

Grot. not. in lib. 1. de jure bel. &c. c. 3. Sal. de Hellen.

of

of the Posterity of *Sem*, if their necessities for further room made it necessary for them to seek for Habitations further abroad. For we can have no reason to think, that because the chief of *Sem*'s Posterity did live together, therefore none of them went further off, which necessity would put them upon because of their great increase; for we read of *Phaleg* and others, that besides those in direct Line to *Abraham*, (whose Genealogy it was *Moses* his great design to recount) they begat many other Sons and Daughters, which would make it necessary for them, to seek their Habitations further abroad. And that *Phaleg* and *Ragau* did so, we have the express testimony of *Epiphanius*, Φαλὲγ ἡ Ῥαγαὺ οἵτινες ἐπὶ τὸ τῆ Εὐρώπης κλίμα προδιέβησαν τῆ τῆ Σκυθίας μέρει ἡ τοῖς αὐτῶν ἔθνεσι συμπεκλήκασιν, ἀπὸ τῆ τοῦ Θήρα ἡλικίας καὶ ἐπέκεινα, ἐξ ὧν καὶ οἱ Θρᾷκες γεγόνασι. *That from the age of* Therah *and thence forward* Phaleg *and* Ragau *diverted towards the clime of Europe, to part of* Scythia, *and were joyn'd with those Nations from which the* Thracians *arose*. Several things make this not so improbable as some have imagin'd it to be; for first, it is the constant acknowledgment of all sober Inquirers into the Original of the *Greeks*, that *Greece* was first peopled from *Scythia*; and indeed almost all the Nations in *Europe* have come out of that Country: besides there is evidence of it, even in the Grecian Fables; for *Prometheus* (from whom the *Greeks* deriv'd themselves) is fancy'd by them to lie bound in Mount *Caucasus*, which must be suppos'd to be the Country from whence he came. Again, it is evident already that the *Hellens* came not into *Greece* before it was peopled by the *Pelasgi*, and that these had different Language and Customs from one another; now then in all probability, altho' the Posterity of *Elisa* might come first down from *Scythia* into those parts, and seat themselves in *Macedonia* and *Thessaly*, where they had in probability more than room enough at first, and a Country to their desire: they might be willing to permit the Posterity of *Phaleg* to pass on further; for in those first Plantations we cannot otherwise conceive, but that the last comers must be the furthest goers; unless they had strength enough to drive the former Inhabitants out of their Seats whereof they were already possess'd, as the *Scythians* did afterwards, and so the *Hellens*; So then the Posterity of *Phaleg* being forced to quit their own Country because of the multitude of Inhabitants, must be supposed to take that course, where in probability they might find an empty Seat fit for them to dwell in; thence they come towards *Europe*; for they saw how the Posterity of *Sem* did spread it self Eastwards already, and *Cham* Southwards, and coming to part of that vast Country of *Scythia*, which was both already taken up, and not so convenient an Habitation for them, they draw downwards towards *Thracia*, and there the Posterity of *Thiras*, from whom the *Thracians* came, had already possessed themselves; passing further into *Thessaly*, they find that already planted by some of the Posterity of *Elisa*, but as yet but scant and thin of Inhabitants; therefore they disperse themselves up and down through some part of *Epirus*, most part of *Ellas*, and some pass into *Peloponnesus*, where they fix themselves chiefly upon *Arcadia*, and thence spread up and down by degrees towards the Sea-side; for we cannot but think that the Maritime parts were the last peopled, partly for fear of another Deluge, partly for want

Gen. 11. 19. 21.

Epiph. de Scythis l. ep. ad Acu. & Paulum.

of conveniency of Navigation, moſt of their travels being by Land; and partly when Navigation grew more in uſe for fear of Pirates, who drove a great Trade upon the Coaſts of *Greece* in elder times, as is moſt evident from *Thuycidides* in the beginning of his Hiſtory. Thus we have a reaſonable account given of the *Pelaſgi* their firſt coming into *Greece*, and how by degrees the *Hellens* came to poſſeſs their Country, and what a fair pretence the *Arcadians* had to boaſt of the greateſt Antiquity, their Country being probably firſt peopled by the *Pelaſgi* of any part of the whole *Cherſoneſe*, and the Seat of the Leader of the whole Company whom they call *Pelaſgus*, and the Scriptures *Phaleg*.

XIV. Having thus far clear'd the Antiquities of *Greece* as to the firſt Planters of it, whom we have evidenc'd to have been the *Pelaſgi*, and theſe deriv'd from *Peleg*, it will be no great difficulty to reſolve what Language they brought along with them, which muſt be ſuppos'd to be the ſame with that us'd in the Family from whence *Peleg* or *Phaleg* came, as to the ſubſtance of it, altho' it might admit as great variation of Dialect from it as the *Chaldee* or *Syriac* doth. But this I will not only ſuppoſe, but offer theſe probabilities for the proof of it; the firſt is, the agreement of the ancient *Greek* Language with the *Hebrew* in many of its primitive words; and here we have a moſt rational and probable account given of it; which is, the *Greeks* mixing with the *Pelaſgi*, and both coming to be one People, they muſt needs retain many of the old words us'd by the *Pelaſgi* in their *Greek* Language; which are evidently of an Eaſtern extraction, the ground of which cannot with ſuch probability be fetch'd from *Cadmus* and the *Phœnicians*, becauſe it is not ſo eaſy admiſſion of a foreign Language after the perfection of their own, unleſs by long tract of time, or great numbers over-running the former People, neither of which can be ſo truly affirm'd of *Cadmus* and his company; for they were ſoon driven out of *Greece*, he himſelf ending his days in *Illyricum*, neither was their ſpread ſo large as that of the *Pelaſgi*, who were before poſſeſſors of the Country; and it is continually ſeen how impoſſible it is for any Conquerors, as the *Greeks* were, to bring their own Language ſo into a place, where ſome of the former People are ſuffered to live, and not to retain many of their old words among them, and ſo make the Language mixt of both, as it is in all Nations conquer'd by the *Romans*; the *Roman* not being purely ſpoken by any, but corrupted with a mixture of the former Language in uſe among them. The ſecond Argument is from the different Pronunciation and Dialects in uſe in the *Greek* Language; of which no account ſo likely can be given, as the mixture with different Languages. This is moſt evident in the *Doric* Dialect; for the *Dorians* inhabiting probably where moſt of the *Pelaſgi* had been, their Pronunciation and Dialect comes the neareſt to the Eaſtern of any of the *Greeks*: For in the *Doric* Dialect the πλατυασμὸς, or *broad pronunciation*, is moſt taken notice of: So he in *Theocritus* upbraids the *Dorians*, ὅτι παλαιὰ σόδωσι, ἄπαντα, they ſpeak every thing *very broad*; which anſwers to the pronunciation of the Eaſtern Languages; beſides, the *Doric* Dialect delights much in adding *a* to the end of words, which beſides that it is the cuſtom of Eaſtern Tongues, eſpecially the *Syriac*, it doth much

much widen the Pronunciation. The third Argument is from the remainders of the Eastern Tongues in those places, especially where the *Pelasgi* had been. The *Pelasgi* are much taken notice of for their frequent removes and travelling from one place to another; which I suppose was chiefly after the *Hellens* had conquer'd the Country where they dwelt, then they were forc'd to go seek better Habitations abroad; thence *Strabo* calls the Nations of the *Pelasgi* πολύπλανον & ζαχὺ τὸ ἔθνος· ἀεὶς ἱπανασταίοις: and elsewhere that they were πολλαχοῦ τῆ Εὐρώπης τὸ παλαιὸν πλανώμενοι, they went up and down to a great part of *Europe*; but we may suppose them to have made their first and chief resort to the neighbor Islands to *Greece*; where we shall see what evidence they left of their Language there. The first Island we meet with them in, is *Crete*; so *Strabo* speaking of them, Καὶ ἡ δὲ Κρήτη ἔπουκοι μιγάδαιν, ὡς φησὶν Ὅμηρος; that a Colony of them liv'd in *Crete*, for which he voucheth *Homer*'s Authority:

Strabo l. 5.
Id. lib. 12.
Id. lib. 5.

Ἄλλη δ' ἄλλων γλῶσσα μεμιγμένη, ἐν μὲν Ἀχαιοὶ,
Ἐν δ' Ἐτεόκρητες μεγαλήτορες, ἐν δὲ Κυδῶνες,
Δωριέες τε τριχάϊκες, δῖοί τε Πελασγοί.

Hom. Odyss. τ. 175.

It is evident then that the *Pelasgi* were in *Crete*. Now most of the *Cretan* words are of an Eastern extraction, if we believe the Learned *Bochartus*, who hath promis'd a Discourse on that subject; besides *Crete* we find the *Pelasgi* in *Chios*, τὴν Χίον δὲ οἰκισταὶ ἑαυτῶν Πελασγοὶ φασι τοὺς ἐκ Θετταλίας, saith *Strabo*, the Inhabitants of *Chios* say that the *Pelasgi* of *Thessaly* were their first Inhabitants; and here the forenamed Learned Person hath deriv'd the Name *Chios*, the Mountain *Pelinæus*, and the Wine *Arvisium*, all from the Eastern Languages. The next we find them in, is *Lesbos*, καὶ ἡ τὴν Λέσβον Πελασγῶν οἰκήσασι, which from them was called *Pelasgia*, saith *Strabo*, whose Name is likewise fetched out of the East. By *Bochartus* further we find them in *Lemnos* and *Imbros*: so *Anticlides* in *Strabo*, αὐτοὺς φησὶ Πελασγοὺς τὰ περὶ Λῆμνον & Ἴμβρον κτίσαι; concerning whose Names, see *Bochartus* 82. I know that Learned Author makes the *Phœnicians* the Authors of all these Names, from no other ground generally, but because they are of an Eastern derivation; but according to what we have laid down, we may yield to the thing it self, and upon clearer grounds; for of some of these Islands he ingenuously confesseth he can find no evidence of the *Phœnicians* being in them. *Phœnices in his Insulis habitasse nusquam legimus:* but we find it very plain, that in those very Islands the *Pelasgi* inhabited; and whether account then be more probable, let the Reader judge. One thing more I shall insist on, which is the Original of the *Samothracian Mysteries:* That these were as to their Names from the Eastern Languages, is now ackowledg'd by all Learned Men, the *Cabiri* being so evidently deriv'd from כביר, which signifies *strength* and *power*, i. e. the *Dii potes*, so *Cabiri* is explain'd by *Varro* and *Tertullian*, and the particular Names of the several *Cabiri* mention'd by the Scholiast on *Apollonius*, Ἀξιερός, Ἀξιόκερσα, Ἀξιόκερσος and Κάδμιλος are very handsomly explain'd by that Learned and Excellent *Bochartus* from the Eastern Languages; only he will needs have them deriv'd from the *Phœnicians*, whereas *Herodotus* expresly tells us that they

Bochart. de Phœn. Col. l. 1. c. 15.
Strabo l. 1. c. 9.
Bochart. Geogr. p. 2. l. 1. c. 12.
Id. lib. 1. c. 9.
Tertull. de spect. c. 8.
Bochart. ibid. l. 1. c. 12.

Herod. l. 2. were from the *Pelasgi*, whose words are these; ὅσοι δὲ τὰ Καβείρων ὄργια μεμύηνται τὰ Σαμοθρήικες ἐπιτελέουσι λαβόντες παρὰ Πελασγῶν. And again, τὸν γὰρ Σαμοθρήικα εἶχον αὐτόχθονα Πελασγοὶ μοῖρά τις πρὸς Ἀθηναίοισι σύνοικοι ἐγένοντο, ἀφ' οὗ ὦν Σαμοθρήικες τὰ ὄργια παραλαμβάνουσι. We see evidently by this, that the *Samothracians* deriv'd their Mysteries from the *Pelasgi*; and without all question they had their names from thence, whence they deriv'd their Mysteries: And to this purpose it is further observable, that as the old *Hetrurians* were certainly a Colony of the *Pelasgi*, upon their removal out of *Greece*; so *Vossius* observes that the old *Hetruscan* language (*fere a Syris habet cuncta sacrorum nomina*) hath almost all the sacred Appellations from the Eastern tongues. For which purpose it is further observable, which *Grotius* takes notice of, that the *jus pontificum Romanorum* was taken a great part from the *Hetrusci*, and the *Hetrurians* had it *ab Hebræis* out of the Eastern parts.

Vossius de Idol. l. 2. c. 57.

Grot. Annot. in Mat. 12. 1.

XV. By all which I cannot conceive but this opinion, notwithstanding its novelty, is advanc'd to as high a degree of probability, as any that stands on the like foundations; and not only so, but it is an excellent clue to direct us to the Labyrinth of Antiquities, and gives us a fair account whence the *Eastern* Tongues came to be so much us'd among both the ancient *Greeks* and *Hetrurians*. One thing more this will help us to understand far better than any *salvo* hath been yet us'd for it; which is the affinity spoken of by *Arius* King of *Lacedæmon* in his Letters to *Onias*, between the *Jews* and *Lacedæmonians*: εὑρέθη ἐν γραφῇ περί τινων τῶν Σπαρτιατῶν καὶ Ἰουδαίων ὅτι εἰσὶν ἀδελφοὶ, καὶ ὅτι εἰσὶν ἐκ γένους Ἀβραάμ· which is explain'd by *Josephus* thus: ἐντυχόντες γραφῇ τινι, εὑρομεν ὡς ἐξ ἑνὸς εἰσι γένους Ἰουδαῖοι καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ Ἀβραάμ εἰσιν. *They had found in a boook that the* Jews *and* Lacedæmonians *were of the same stock, from their mutual relation to* Abraham. *Vossius* thinks the original of this was from those of the posterity of *Anak*, who came into *Greece*, and Peopled *Sparta*, and would seem to have been of the posterity of *Abraham*; or that they were partly of the Posterity of *Abraham* by *Agar* or *Ceturah*, and partly of the *Canaanites*, driven out by *Joshua*: But how unlikely a thing is it (supposing *Sparta* Peopled by the *Canaanites*, which yet is not evident) that they should give out themselves to be of that stock which they had been expell'd their Country by? And for the true posterity of *Abraham* coming thither, as we have no ground for it but the bare assertion, so we have this strong evidence against it, that all that came from *Abraham* were Circumcis'd, as the *Ishmaelites*, *Hagarens*, &c. which we never read of among the *Lacedæmonians*. *H. Grotius* differs not much from the opinion of *Vossius* concerning the ground of this kindred between the *Jews* and *Spartans*: For in his Notes on that place in the *Maccabees*, where it is spoken of, he gives this account of it. The *Dorians*, of whom the *Spartans* were a part, came from the *Pelasgi*; the language of the *Pelasgi* was different from that of the *Greeks*, as appears by *Herodotus* in his *Clio*: ἦσαν οἱ Πελασγοὶ βαρβαρόφωνοι γλῶσσαν ἱέντες. Now the *Pelasgi* (saith he) are פלגי *dispersi*, a *scatter'd Nation*; thence he supposeth these *Pelasgi* or banish'd People, to have come from the Confines of *Arabia* and *Syria*, in which the posterity of *Abraham* and *Ceturah* had plac'd themselves. But 1. it is uncertain whether the posterity of *Abraham* by *Ceturah* were plac'd so near *Canaan* or no. I know

1 Maccab. 12. 21.

Josep. Antiq. l. 13. c. 9.

Voss. de Idol. l. 1. c. 13.

know *Junius* endeavors to find the ſeat of all the Sons of *Keturah* in *Arabia*; but *Mercer* gives ſeveral not improbable reaſons why he conceives them plac'd not in the Eaſt of *Canaan*, but in the Eaſtern parts of the World. 2. We have no evidence at all of any remove of theſe Sons of *Abraham* by *Keturah* out of the parts of *Arabia*, ſuppoſing them plac'd there; nor any reaſon why they ſhould be baniſh'd thence. 3. That which was the badg of *Abraham*'s poſterity, was never that we read of in uſe among the *Spartans*, which was Circumciſion. Indeed in much later Ages than this we ſpeak of, we read of a People among the *Thracians* who were circumcis'd, whom the *Greeks* themſelves judg'd to be *Jews*. So *Ariſtophanes* brings the *Odomantes* in. Τὶς ἡ Ὀδομάντιν τὸ πρωκτὸν ἀπτίθεγκεν ἀν· ἀπτίθεγκεν (ſaith the Scholiaſt) i. e. αἰσχρὸν, ἰλαπίνοις δὲ καὶ ἀπτήνοις οἱ Θρᾷκες τὸ αἰδεῖν καὶ ἀποτετυμμένα εἶχον αὐτά. Whereby it is plain that Circumciſion was in uſe among the *Thracians*; for theſe *Odomantes* were (ſaith the Scholiaſt) a People of *Thrace*. φασὶ δὲ αὐτὺς Ἰουδαίους εἶναι. It ſeems it was a Tradition among them that they were *Jews*. If ſo, it ſeems moſt probable that they were ſome of the ten Tribes, who were plac'd about *Colchis*, and the adjacent places: For *Herodotus* in *Euterpe* ſaith, that the *Syrians* that liv'd about the Rivers *Thermodoon* and *Parthenius*, learn'd Circumciſion from the *Colchi*, of whom he ſaith, Μοῦνοι πάντων Κόλχοι καὶ Αἰγύπτιοι καὶ Αἰθίοπες ἀπημοτοντμημένα ἀπ' ἀρχῆς τὸ αἰδοῖα. *Only the* Colchi, *and* Ægyptians, *and* Ethiopians *had originally the cuſtom of Circumciſion.* Or elſe the *Odomantes* might be ſome of the diſpers'd *Jews* in *Armenia*, where *Strabo* mentions a Region call'd *Odomantis*, and ſo they retain'd the name of the place from whence they came, after their removal into *Thrace*. But whatever theſe *Odomantes* were, they were far enough from the *Spartans*, who never were thus ſuſpected of *Judaiſm*, nor laught at for Circumciſion. So that this opinion of *Grotius* on that account ſeems not very probable. *Bochartus*, who hath been ſo happy in many other Conjectures, yet here gives out, unleſs it may depend upon the Teſtimony of *Claudius Iolaus* in *Stephanus Bizantius*, who fabulouſly derives the *Jews* from one *Judæus Sparton*, who went from *Thebes* along with *Bacchus* into the Wars; which *Sparton* they might confound with another *Sparton*, the Son of *Phonoreus*, the Founder of *Sparta*; which yet is rejected as a Fable by *Pauſanias* in *Laconicis*. Surely the *Lacedæmonians* were very ambitious of Kindred with the *Jews*, that would claim it upon ſuch grounds as theſe, eſpecially at ſuch a time when the People of the *Jews* were under diſtreſs, and their Kindred might be like to coſt them ſo dear; and if they had never ſuch a mind to have claim'd Kindred with the *Jews*, they would certainly have done it upon a more plauſible Teſtimony than the Fable of one *Claudius Iolaus*, that had neither Senſe nor Reaſon in it; and yet ſuppoſing his Fable true, it had been nothing to the purpoſe, without the linking another Fable to it, which was ſo groſs, that even the *Greeks* themſelves were aſham'd of it, who were always the moſt daring Forgers of Fables in the World. But let us ſee further what the Divine (as ſome have lov'd to call him) *Joſ. Scaliger* ſaith to it: All that he ſaith, is only a wonder or two at it: *Quid magis mirum quam Lacedæmonios ab Abraham prognatos eſſe*, &c. and a refutation of an abſurd opinion, that *Oebalus* the

Ariſtoph. Acharnen. Act. 1. ſc. 4.

Strabo l. 11.

Bochart. de Phœn. Col. l. 1. c. 22.

Scalig. Canon. Iſag. p. 332.

the Father of *Tyndareus*, and Grandfather of *Caſtor*, *Pollux*, and *Helena*, was the ſame with *Ebal*, mention'd *Gen.* 10. 28. which there can be no reaſon for, ſince *Ebal* was the Son of *Joktan*, and ſo of another Race from *Abraham*; and *Joktan*'s Sons were plac'd Eaſtward, but chiefly *Oebalus* was within an hundred years before the deſtruction of *Troy*; but *Phaleg* Unkle to *Ebal*, died 664 years before *Oebalus* in *A. M.* 1993. Thus far then we cannot find any plauſible account of this claim of Kindred: but tho' it be an endleſs task to make good all the claims of Kindred in the World, eſpecially to Perſons of Power and Authority, yet there being no viſible intereſt or deſign which the *Spartans* could have in ſuch a claim, eſpecially at that time with a Nation generally hated and maligned by Heathen Idolaters, we cannot ſuppoſe but there muſt be ſome at leaſt plauſible ground for ſuch a perſuaſion among them. What if we ſhould conjecture that the *Spartans* might find in the *Greek* Verſion of the *Pentateuch*, which was much ſpread abroad at that time among the Sons of *Iſhmael*, one whoſe name makes the neareſt approach to their *Cadmus*, from whom they ſuppoſe themſelves deriv'd; for the youngeſt of *Iſhmael*'s Sons was call'd *Kedemah*, Gen. 25. 15. which the *Syriac* renders *Kedem*, the very name of *Cadmus* in the Eaſtern Tongues. But this being a light conjecture, I paſs it by, and return to the ſubject of our diſcourſe, which gives a plauſible account of the ground of this Kindred. We have already ſhew'd that the *Pelaſgi* were the firſt who Peopled *Greece*, (κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα πᾶσαν ἐπιπόλασεν, is *Strabo*'s expreſſion of that Nation, that it ſpread over all *Greece*,) and withal it appears that the chief Seat of the *Pelaſgi* was in *Arcadia*, to which next adjoyns *Laconia*; and therefore in all probability was Peopled by them; and beſides, the *Dorians* ſprang from the *Pelaſgi*, and the *Spartans* were a part of the *Dorians*, as appears already out of *Grotius*; ſo that what Kindred the *Pelaſgi* had, was deriv'd down to the *Spartans*; and we have manifeſted that theſe *Pelaſgi* were from *Phaleg*, and the Scripture tells us that *Phaleg* was the Son of *Eber*, from whom *Abraham* came in a direct and lineal ſucceſſion. And thus the *Jews* coming from *Abraham* and the *Spartans* by the *Pelaſgi* from *Phaleg*, they both came out of the ſame ſtock: For ſo *Joſephus* expreſſeth it, not that the *Lacedæmonians* came from *Abraham*, but that the *Jews* and they were both ἐκ ἑνὸς γένους, *out of the ſame ſtock, and both had relation to* Abraham; the *Jews* as coming in a direct line, the *Spartans* as deriving from *Phaleg*, from whom *Abraham* came. And thus much may now ſuffice to clear the firſt Plantation of *Greece*, and to ſhew how conſonant it is to ſacred Scripture; which I have taken the more pains in, becauſe of the ſerviceableneſs of this diſcourſe to that end, and to ſhew what uſe may be made of this kind of Learning, for vindicating the honor of the Sacred Scriptures.

Gen. 11. 17, 28.

The only thing remaining as to the origin of Nations, is the Peopling of that vaſt Continent of *America*, which I cannot think we have yet ſufficient information, either concerning the paſſages thither, eſpecially Eaſt and North, or concerning any Records the *Indians* have among themſelves abſolutely to determin any thing in it. It ſeems moſt probable that the ſeveral parts of it were Peopled at ſeveral times, and from ſeveral parts, eſpecially North and Eaſt; but to go about abſolutely to determin from what Nation, in what

Age,

Age, by what means they were firſt Peopled, were a piece of as great confidence as ignorance, till we have more certain diſcoveries of it. I chuſe therefore rather to refer the Reader to the bandyings of this Controverſy in the many Writers about it, than to undertake any thing as to the deciſion of it. Only in the general it appears from the remaining Tradition of the Flood, and many Rites and Cuſtoms us'd among them, that they had the ſame original with us, and that there can be no Argument brought againſt it from themſelves, ſince ſome Authors tell us, that the eldeſt Accounts and Memoirs they have, do not exceed 800 years backward; and therefore their Teſtimony can be of no validity in a matter of ſo great Antiquity, as the origin of Nations is.

V. Grot. Joh. de Laet. Horn. de Orig. Gent. American. V. Maneſſe Ben. Iſrael. Spes Iſrael. Et Spizzel. de Iſrael. American.

CHAP. V.

Of the Origin of the Heathen Mythology.

I. *That there were ſome remainders of the ancient Hiſtory of the World preſerv'd in the ſeveral Nations after the diſperſion.* II. *How it came to be corrupted: by decay of Knowledg, increaſe of Idolatry, confuſion of Languages.* III. *An inquiry into the cauſe of that. Difficulties againſt the common opinion that languages were confounded at* Babel. IV. *Thoſe difficulties clear'd.* V. *Of the fabulouſneſs of Poets. The particular ways whereby the Heathen Mythology aroſe. Attributing the general Hiſtory of the World to their own Nation. The corruption of* Hebraiſms. *Alteration of names. Ambiguity of ſenſe in the Oriental languages.* VI. *Attributing the actions of many to one perſon, as in* Jupiter, Bacchus, *&c.* VII. *The remainders of Scripture-hiſtory among the Heathens. The names of God,* Chaos, *formation of Man among the* Phœnicians. *Of* Adam *among the* Germans, Ægyptians, Cilicians. Adam *under* Saturn. Cain *among the* Phœnicians. Tubal-Cain *and* Jubal *under* Vulcan *and* Apollo. Naamah *under* Minerva. VIII. Noah *under* Saturn, Janus, Prometheus *and* Bacchus. IX. Noah's *three Sons under* Jupiter, Neptune *and* Pluto. Canaan *under* Mercury, Nimrod *under* Bacchus, Magog *under* Prometheus. *Of* Abraham *and* Iſaac *among the* Phœnicians. X. Jacob's *ſervice under* Apollo's. *The* βαιτύλια *from* Bethel. Joſeph *under* Apis. Moſes *under* Bacchus. Joſhua *under* Hercules. Balaam *under the old* Silenus.

I. THE main particulars contain'd in the Scriptures concerning the Hiſtory of ancient Times being thus far clear'd, there remains only that Evidence which there is of the truth of the Hiſtorical part of thoſe eldeſt times, in thoſe foot-ſteeps of it which are contain'd in the Heathen Mythology. For we cannot conceive, that ſince we have manifeſted that all Mankind did come from the Poſterity of *Noah*, that all thoſe paſſages which concern'd the Hiſtory of the World, ſhould be preſently obliterated and extinguiſhed among them, but ſome kind of Tradition would be preſerv'd, altho' by degrees it would be ſo much alter'd for want of certain Records to preſerve it in, that it would be a hard matter to diſcover its original, without an exact comparing it with the true Hiſtory it ſelf from whence it was firſt taken. For it far'd with this Tradition of the firſt Ages of the World, as with a Perſon who hath a long time travell'd in Foreign Parts, who by the variety of Climes and Countries may be ſo far alter'd from what he was, that his own Relations may not know him upon his return, but only by ſome certain marks which he hath in his Body, by which they are aſſur'd, that however his Complexion and Viſage may be alter'd, yet the Perſon is the ſame ſtill. Thus it was in this original Tradition of the World; thro' its continual paſſing from one Age to another, and the various humors, tempers, and deſigns of Men, it receiv'd ſtrange diſguiſes and alterations as to its outward favor and complexion; but yet there are ſome ſuch certain marks remaining on it, by which we find out its true original. Two things then will be the main ſubject of our inquiry here. 1. *By what means the original Tradition came to be alter'd and corrupted.* 2. *By what marks we may diſcern its true original*, or what Evidences we have of the remainders of Scripture-hiſtory in the Heathen Mythology.

II. 1. Concerning the means whereby the Tradition by degrees came to be corrupted. There may be ſome more general, and others more particular. The general cauſes of it were;

1. The gradual decay of Knowledg and increaſe of Barbariſm in the World; occaſion'd by the want of certain Records to preſerve the ancient Hiſtory of the World in: Which we at large diſcours'd of in our entrance on this ſubject. Now in the decay of Knowledg, there muſt needs follow a ſudden and ſtrange alteration of the memory of former times, which hath then nothing to preſerve it, but the moſt uncertain report of Fame, which alters and diſguiſeth things according to the humors, and inclinations, and judgments of thoſe whoſe hands it paſſeth thro'.

Book 1. c. 1. ſect. 16.

2. The gradual increaſe of Idolatry in the World: which began ſoon after the diſperſion of Nations, and in whoſe Age, we cannot at ſo great a diſtance and in ſo great obſcurity preciſely determin; but as ſoon as Idolatry came in, all the ancient Tradition was made ſubſervient in order to that end; and thoſe Perſons whoſe memories were preſerv'd in ſeveral Nations, by degrees came to be worſhipped under diverſities of names; and ſuch things were annexed to the former Traditions as would tend moſt to advance the greateſt Superſtition in the World.

3. The Confuſion of Languages at *Babel*, was one great reaſon of corrupting the ancient Tradition of the World. For in ſo great variety (as ſuddenly happen'd) of Languages in the World, it cannot be conceiv'd but ſuch things which might be preſerv'd in ſome uniform manner, had all Nations us'd the ſame language, would thro' the diverſity of Idioms and Properties of ſeveral Tongues be ſtrangely alter'd and diſguis'd, as will appear afterwards. This alteration of Languages in the World upon the confuſion of Tongues at *Babel*, brought as great a confuſion into the original Tradition, as it did among thoſe who were the Deſigners of that work.

III. And becauſe this ſubject of the original and cauſe of this diverſity of Languages among Men, doth both tend to explain the preſent ſubject, and to clear the truth of Scripture-hiſtory, I ſhall a little further inquire into it. Chiefly on this account, becauſe it is pretended that ſuch a confuſion is needleſs which is deliver'd in Scripture, for the producing ſuch diverſities of Languages, which would ariſe thro' mere length of time, and the varieties of Climes and Cuſtoms in the World. But if we only ſpeak concerning the ſenſe of *Moſes* about it, the inquiry is of greater difficulty than at firſt view it ſeems to be. For it is pretended that *Moſes* no where ſpeaks of a diverſity of Languages, as we underſtand it, but only of a confuſion of their Speech who were at *Babel*, which might well be, altho' they all us'd the ſame Language; that is, there might be a confuſion rais'd in their Minds, that they could not underſtand one another; their notions of things being diſturb'd, ſo that tho' they heard one word, they had different apprehenſions of it: ſome thinking it ſignify'd one thing, and ſome another: as *Julius Scaliger* tells us that the *Jews* he had convers'd with, did not underſtand by it a multiplication of Tongues; but only by that confuſion their former notions of things by the ſame words were alter'd. As if one call'd for אבו a Stone, one by that word underſtands Lime, another Water, another Sand, *&c.* this muſt needs produce a ſtrange confuſion among them, and enough to make them deſiſt from their work. But ſuppoſing no ſuch diviſion of Languages there, yet after their diſperſion, which might be caus'd by the former confuſion, by the different Laws, Rites, and Cuſtoms, Commerce, and Trading, and tract of Time, there would have riſen a diviſion of their ſeveral Tongues. But if there were ſuch a diviſion of Tongues miraculouſly caus'd there (that as it is commonly ſaid, all thoſe who were of the ſame language, went together in their ſeveral companies) whence comes it to paſs, that in their diſperſion we read of ſeveral Families diſperſed, which uſed the ſame language after their diſperſion; as all the Sons of *Canaan* mentioned, *Gen.* 10. 15, 16, 17, 18. uſed the *Canaanitiſh* Tongue: in *Greece*, *Javan* and *Eliſa* had the ſame language. In *Ægypt*, *Miſraim* and *Pathruſim*; in *Arabia* the Sons of *Joktan* and *Chus*; in *Chaldæa Aram* and *Uz* the Inhabitants of *Syria*, *Maſh* of *Meſopotamia*, *Nimrod* of *Babylon*, *Aſſur* of *Aſſyria*: whence comes it to paſs if their ſeveral Tongues were the cauſe of their diſperſion, that theſe ſeveral Heads of Families ſhould uſe the ſame Tongue? Another reaſon againſt the common opinion, is this, which ſeems to have a great deal of force in it. If Tongues were divided at

V. Mer. Caſaub. de 4 linguis p. 3. &c.

Scal. Exercit. in Cordan. 259. ſect. 1.

Babel as it is imagin'd; whence was it, that the nearer any Nation lay to thoſe who had the primitive language the *Hebrew*, they did participate more of that Tongue than thoſe who were more remote, as is plain in the *Chaldeans*, *Canaanites*, *Greeks*, and others? Whereas if their language were divided at *Babel*, they would have retain'd their own languages as well as others. This very argument prevail'd ſo far with the learned *Iſ. Caſaubon*, as appears by his *Adverſaria* on this ſubject (publiſh'd by the learned Doctor's Son) as to make him leave the common opinion, and to conclude the ſeveral Tongues to be only ſome variations from the *Hebrew*, but yet ſo as many new words were invented too. Hence he obſerves that the *Aſiatic Greeks* came nearer to the *Hebrew* than the *European*. And if this opinion hold true, it is the beſt foundation for deriving other languages from the *Hebrew*: a thing attempted by the ſame learned Perſon, as you may ſee in the Book fore-cited, and endeavor'd by *Guichardus*, *Avenarius* and others. Thus we ſee there is no agreement in Mens minds concerning the diviſion of Tongues at *Babel*.

Caſaub. Diatrib. de L. Heb. p. 17, 18.

P. 47.

IV. But having ſet down this Opinion with its Reaſons, I ſhall not ſo leave the receiv'd Opinion, but ſhall firſt ſee what may be ſaid for that, and leave the judgment concerning the probability of either to the underſtanding Reader. And it ſeems to be grounded on theſe Reaſons. 1. That had it been left to Mens own choice, there cannot be a ſufficient reaſon aſſign'd of languages in the World. For there being one language originally in the World, whereby Men did repreſent their conceptions to one another; we cannot imagin that Men ſhould of themſelves introduce ſo great an alteration, as whereby to take off that neceſſary ſociety and converſe with each other, which even Nature it ſelf did put Men upon. Hence *Calvin* and others conclude that *prodigii loco habenda eſt linguarum diverſitas*; becauſe there having been that freedom of converſe among Men, it is not to be ſuppoſed they ſhould of themſelves cut it off to their mutual diſadvantage. But to this it is ſaid, *That the long tract of time and diverſity of Cuſtoms might alter the language.* I grant it much, but not wholly; and they would only therein differ in their languages, wherein their Cuſtoms differ'd: ſo that there would remain ſtill ſuch an agreement as whereby they might underſtand each other; which it will be hard to find in many of the eldeſt languages. As for the length of time, tho' that doth alter much in reference to Words and Phraſes, in which that of *Horace* holds true, *Multa renaſcentur quæ jam cecidere, &c.* yet it will be more difficult to find where mere length of time hath brought a whole language out of uſe, and another in the room of it. But that which I think deſerves well to be conſider'd, is this, that the greateſt alteration of languages in the World hath riſen from Colonies of Nations that us'd another language; and ſo by the mixture of both together the language might be much alter'd: as the *Hebrew* by the *Chaldees* in *Babylon*: the *Spaniſh*, *Italian* and others by the *Latin*, as *Breerwood* ſhews, our own by the *Normans* and others. So that were there not a diverſity of languages ſuppos'd, this interfering of People would bring no conſiderable alteration along with it, no more than a Colony from *New-England* would alter our language

Calvin. Annot. in Gen. 11. 1, 2.

Breerwood Inquiries *c.* 5, 6.

language here. And as for another cauſe aſſign'd of the change of languages, the difference of Climates, which *Bodin* gives as the reaſon why the *Northern* People uſe Conſonants and Aſpirates ſo much, eſpecially the *Saxons*, and thoſe that live by the *Baltic* Sea who pronounce thus, *Per theum ferum pibimus penum finum.* And ſo *R. D. Kimchi* obſerves of the *Ephraimites*, Judg. 12. 6. that it was the Air that was the cauſe of their liſping, and calling it *Sibboleth*, as he there obſerves the Men of *Sarphath*, that is, the *French*, that they could not pronounce *Schin*, but pronounc'd it like *Thau Raphe*. But by theſe examples we ſee that this would cauſe only an alteration as to ſome Letters and Syllables, and rather as to the pronunciation, than any variety of the language. So that we ſee that, ſetting aſide the confuſion of languages at *Babel*, there can be no reaſon ſufficient aſſign'd for the variety of languages in the World. 2. Tho' it be granted, that a confuſion in their Minds without diſtinct languages were enough to make them deſiſt from their work, yet the Context in that place, *Gen.* 11. doth infer a diverſity of tongues, as will appear from the antecedents and conſequents; as from the firſt verſe, where it is not conceivable why it ſhould be there taken notice of as ſuch a remarkable circumſtance, that then they had but one language before they ſet upon this work, if there was not a diverſity of tongues cauſed by the work they went about; but eſpecially *ver.* 6. where God takes ſuch notice of this very thing, that they had but one language, wherein they were ſo confident to carry on their work; therefore, *ver.* 7. when he would deſtroy their work by confounding their language, it muſt be by multiplying that language into many more; for it muſt be taken in oppoſition to what is ſaid in the other verſe. And what is there added, *their not underſtanding one anothers ſpeech*, ſeems to refer not to their inward conceptions, as tho' they did not underſtand one anothers Minds, but to the outward expreſſions, as שבח doth apparently relate to them: further in *ver.* 8. this is ſet down as the cauſe of their diſperſion, which had the tongue been the ſame afterwards as it was before, could have been no reaſon for it. Again ſome argue from the name *Babel* given to the place, from בלל, which ſignifies to *confound* and mingle things of ſeveral kinds together. So us'd *Judg.* 19. 21. *Eſay* 30. 24. *Job* 6. 5. *&c.* thence the name בבל for בלבל the middle ל left out, as in *Golgotha* for *Golgoltha*, *Kigaltha* for *Kilkaltha*, and others of a like nature. Beſides, there ſeems to be ſomewhat in what is ſaid, *that the families were divided according to their tongues*, Gen. 10. 5, 20, 31. which doth at leaſt imply a diverſity of tongues among them, the cauſe of which muſt be aſſigned by them who will not allow of the confuſion and diviſion of languages at *Babel*. Further, this ſeems moſt agreeable to God's end in making of them thus leave off their work, that there might be not only a preſent judgment upon them, but that which might remain to Poſterity as a note of the folly of their Anceſtors. Thoſe who recede from the common opinion leſt they ſhould give advantage to Infidels by attributing that to a Miracle, which might be done without, ſeem to be more wary than wiſe in it. For beſides that it is certain that Miracles may be in thoſe things which might be effected otherwiſe by natural cauſes, when they are produced

Bodin Method. Hiſt. c. 9.

Mayer. Prodr. Chaldaiſm c. 1.

without the help of thoſe Cauſes, and in a ſpace of time impoſſible to nature; and that it hath not been as yet prov'd how ſuch diverſity of tongues as is in the World would have been effected without ſuch a Miracle; it muſt be granted by them that there was a Miracle in it; and what greater difficulty there ſhould be in the variety of languages, than in the ſignification of the ſame words, I underſtand not. But I ſee no neceſſity of aſſerting that every one of the Families had a diſtinct language; and the common opinion of 70 or 72. as the Gr. Families and as many languages, is now taken for a groundleſs fancy by learned Men: as is eaſily prov'd from the dividing Father and Children, whoſe Families could not certainly be without them: and ſome ſuppos'd to be unborn then, as *Joktan*'s 13 Children; eſpecially if we ſay, as many do, that the confuſion was at the birth of *Phaleg*, and *Joktan* was his younger Brother, as the *Jews* generally do. To the laſt objection it may be reply'd, that the agreement of languages in ſome radical words doth not infer the derivation of the one from the other, as is plain in the *Perſian* and *German*, in which learned Men have obſerv'd ſo many words alike. And ſo by *Buſbequius* of the Inhabitants about *Tauric Cherſoneſe*; and ſo in moſt of our modern tongues there may be ſome words alike without any ſuch dependence or derivation. Again, tho' it be granted that the languages of them who were at *Babel* were confounded, yet it is not neceſſary we ſhould ſay that all *Noah*'s poſterity were there. It is thought by ſome that they were chiefly *Cham* and his company; if ſo, then *Sem* and his Poſterity might retain the language they had before, only with ſome variations. But this is very uncertain, unleſs we take it for *Heber* and *Phaleg*, from whoſe vicinity other bordering Nations might make uſe of many of their primitive words: and for the *Greeks*, it will be granted that many of their words, eſpecially the old *Bœotic*, had affinity with the *Hebrew*; but it was from the *Pelaſgi* at firſt, and *Cadmus* the *Phœnician* afterwards: the old *Canaanitiſh* language, being if not the pure *Hebrew*, yet a dialect of that tongue, as is prov'd by many learned Men. But however theſe things be, it is not neceſſary to ſay that all Mother tongues ſo call'd, were then exiſtent at that confuſion: but the preſent curſe did divide their languages who were there, and that all diviſion of languages ſince, is to be look'd upon as the effect of that curſe.

Bochart. Geog. l. 1. c. 15. *Buxt. diatr. ſect. 54.* *Ibid. ſect. 68.* *Lipſ. cent. 3. ep. 44.* *Busbeq. ep. 24.* *Mayer. Philol. ſacr. p. 2. c. 6.*

It being thus manifeſted what a ſtrange confuſion of languages was caus'd in the World, we may thereby eaſily underſtand how the ancient Tradition came to be corrupted and alter'd in the World.

v. 4. Another reaſon of the alteration of the ancient Traditions, was the fabulouſneſs of the Poets: for theſe made it their deſign to diſguiſe all their ancient Stories under Fables, in which they were ſo loſt, that they could never recover them afterwards. For the elder Poets of *Greece* being Men of greater learning than generally the People were of, and being converſant in *Ægypt* and other parts, did bring in new reports of the ancient times which they receiv'd from the Nations they went to; and by mixing their own Traditions and others together, and by ſuting what was remaining of the ancient Tradition to theſe, they muſt needs make a ſtrange confuſion of things together, and leave them much more obſcure

and

and fabulous than they found them. And herein all their cunning and ſubtilty lay in putting a new face on whatever they borrow'd from other Nations, and making them appear among themſelves in a *Greek* Habit, that the former owners of thoſe Traditions could ſcarce challenge them as theirs under ſo ſtrange a *Metamorphoſis*. For thoſe things which were moſt plain and hiſtorical in the Fountains whence they deriv'd them, they did ſo πεπλάνηκε, as *Clemens Alexandrinus* ſpeaks, (or as *Origen*, ὑφαιρέσεως ἀνάπλασιν) wrapt them up under ſo great *Mythology*, that the original Truths can hardly be diſcerned, becauſe of that multitude of prodigious Fables, with which they have inlaid them. But as great as their Artifice was in the doing this, we may yet diſcern apparently many of thoſe particular courſes which were taken by them to diſguiſe and alter the primitive Tradition.

Clemens Strom. 6. c. Orig. contr. Celſ. l. 4.

1. Attributing what was done by the great Anceſtors of Mankind to ſome Perſons of their own Nations. Thus the *Theſſalians* make *Deucalion* to be the Perſon who eſcap'd the Flood, and from whom the World was peopled after it. And whoever compares the Relation of the Flood of *Deucalion* in *Apollodorus* with that in the Scripture, might eaſily render *Apollodorus* his *Greek* in the Language of the Scriptures, only changing *Greece* into the whole Earth, and *Deucalion* into *Noah*, *Parnaſſus* into *Ararat*, and *Jupiter* into *Jehovah*. On the ſame account the *Athenians* attribute the Flood to *Ogyges*, not that the Flood of *Ogyges* and *Deucalion* were particular and diſtinct Deluges, which many have taken a great deal of needleſs pains to place in their ſeveral Ages: But as *Deucalion* was of the eldeſt memory in *Theſſaly*, ſo was *Ogyges* at *Athens*, and ſo the Flood as being a matter of remoteſt Antiquity, was on the ſame account in both places attributed to both theſe. Becauſe as Mankind was ſuppos'd to begin again after the Flood, ſo they had among them no memory extant of any elder than theſe two, from whom on that account they ſuppos'd Mankind deriv'd. And on the ſame reaſon it may be ſuppos'd that the *Aſſyrians* attribute the Flood to *Xiſuthrus*, whom they ſuppos'd to be a King of *Aſſyria*; but the circumſtances of the Story as deliver'd by *Alexander Polyhiſtor*, and *Abydenus*, are ſuch as make it clear to be only a remainder of the univerſal Flood which happened in the time of *Noah*. So the *Theſſalians* make *Prometheus* to be the *Protoplaſt*; the *Peloponneſians* *Phoroneus*, as *Clemens Alexandrinus* tells us, whom *Phoronides* the Poet calls πατέρα τῶν ἀνθρώπων, *The Father of Mankind*. This may be now the firſt way of corrupting the ancient Tradition, by ſuppoſing all that was convey'd by it to have been acted among themſelves; which may be imputed partly to their Ignorance of the ſtate of their ancient times, and partly to their Pride, leſt they ſhould ſeem to be behind others in matters of Antiquity.

Apollod. biblioth. l. 1. p. 19.

Apud Cyr. c. Julian. lib. 2 1.

Clemens Strom. l. 1.

2. Another fountain of *Heathen Mythology*, was the taking the *Idiom* of the Oriental Languages in a proper Senſe. For whether we ſuppoſe the ancient Traditions were convey'd to them in the ancient *Hebrew* by the *Pelaſgi*, or were deliver'd to them by the *Phœnicians*, or were fetch'd out of the Scriptures themſelves (as ſome ſuppoſe, tho' improbably, of *Homer* and ſome ancient Poets) yet all theſe ſeveral ways agreeing in this, That the Traditions were Oriental,

Oriental, we thereby understand how much of their *Mythology* came by taking the *Hebrew* in a proper and literal sense without attending to the *Idiom* of the Tongue. From hence *Bochartus* hath ingeniously fetch'd many Heathen Fables. Thus when *Noah* is said to be איש האדמה *Gen.* 9. 20. which in the *Idiom* of the *Hebrew* only signifies a *husbandman*, they took it in a proper sense for ὁ ἀνὴρ τῆς γῆς, and thence *Saturn* who was the same with *Noah* (as will appear afterwards) is made by *Mythologists* the husband of *Rhea*, which was the same with the *Earth*. So the Gyants making war against Heaven, was only a Poetical adumbration of the design at the building of *Babel*, whose top in the Scripture is said to
Gen. 11.4. reach בשמים, which in the *Hebrew* signifies only a *great height*; but to aggrandize the Story, was taken in the literal Interpretation, that they attempted *Heaven*. So when they are said to fight against the Gods, *Bochartus* thinks it might be taken from that phrase of *Nimrod*, that he was a *mighty hunter*, לפני יהוה *before the Lord* we render it, but it sometimes signifies *against the Lord*. So what
Ap. Euseb. Præp. Ev. l. 9. *Abydenus* saith the Gyants, that they were ἐκ τῆς γῆς ἀναχυντες, *those that came out of the earth*, is suppos'd to be taken from that phrase, *Gen.* 10. 11. מן הארץ יצא, *è terra ipsa exiit*. But far more likely and probable is that which Learned Men are generally agreed in concerning *Bacchus* his being born of *Jupiter*'s *Thigh*, which
Gen. 46. 26. is only an Expression of that *Hebraism* יצאי ירכו, wherein *coming out of the thigh* is a phrase for ordinary Procreation.

3. 3. A third way observable, is, the alteration of the Names in the ancient Tradition, and putting Names of like importance to them in their own Language. Thus *Jupiter* who was the same with *Cham*, was called Ζεὺς παρὰ τὸ ζέσαι, as חם, from חמם *fervere, incalescere*. Ἄμμωνα γὰρ Αἰγύπτιοι καλέουσι τὸν Δία, saith *Herodotus*; him whom the *Greeks* call Ζεὺς the *Ægyptians* call *Cham*. So *Japheth*, whose memory was preserv'd under *Neptune*, to whose portion the Islands in the Sea fell, was called by the *Greeks* Ποσειδῶν, which comes (saith *Bo-*
Bochart. Phaleg. l. 1. c. 1. *chartus*) from the *Punic* פשׁישׁן, which signifies *large* and *broad*, which is the very importance of the *Hebrew* יפת; thence in allusion to to the Name, it is said, *Gen.* 9. 27. אלהים ליפת יפת *God shall enlarge Japhet*. Thence the *Epithets* of *Neptune* are Εὐρύστερνος, Εὐρύπλευρος, Εὐρυκρείων, all equally alluding to the Name *Japhet*. So Ἀπόλλων, in the *Greek* is of the same importance with the *Heb.* שׁר, *Dæmon*, from שׁרר *to destroy*. Thence we read, *Deut.* 32. 17. *they sacrificed* לשׁדים, *to Devils*. *Canaan* in the *Hebrew* signifies a Merchant; thence *Mercury*, under whom the memory of *Canaan* the Son of *Cham* was preserv'd is deriv'd, by many from מכר, *to sell*. *Ceres* which was the Inventress of *Agriculture*, from גרשׁ which imports *Bread-corn*. These and many others are produc'd by *Vossius*, *Heinsius*, *Bochartus* and other Learned Men, which I insist not on, because my design is only *digitos ad fontes intendere*, and to make these handsom and probable conjectures, argumentative to our purpose, and to bind up those loose and scattering observations into some order and method, in which they have not yet appear'd, nor been improv'd to that end which I make use of them for.

4. When the Oriental phrases were ambiguous and equivocal, they omitted that sense which was plain and obvious, and took that which was more strange and fabulous. From hence the Learned

Bochartus

Bochartus hath fetch'd the Fable of the *Golden Fleece*, which was nothing elſe but robbing the Treaſury of the King of *Colchis*; but it was diſguis'd under the name of the *Golden Fleece*, becauſe the *Syriac* word גוא, ſignifies both a *Fleece* and a *Treaſury*. So the *Bulls* and *Dragons* that kept it, were nothing but the *Walls* and *Brazen-gates*; for שור, ſignifies both a *Bull* and a *Wall*, and נשח *Braſs*, and a *Dragon*. And ſo the Fable of the *Braſs-Bull* in the Mountain of *Tabyrus* which foretold Calamities, aroſe from the Equivocation of the *Phœnician* or *Hebrew* words אדוף מנחש, which ſignify either *Doctor*, *Augur*, or *bos ex ære*, a *foreteller* of *events* or a *Brazen-Bull*. From the like Ambiguity of the word אלפ׳א aroſe the Fable of *Jupiter* ſtealing *Europa* in the form of a *Bull*, becauſe the word either ſignifies a *Ship* in which he convey'd her away, or a *Bull*; or it may be the Ship had ישמחו בשלם *bovis*, as the Ship St. *Paul* ſailed in had *Caſtor* and *Pollux*, it being uſual to call their Ships by the names of the Signs they carry'd. From the like Equivocation in the *Phœnician* Language doth *Bochartus* fetch many other Heathen Fables, in his Excellent Piece *De Phœnicum Coloniis*, as particularly that of *Arethuſa* coming from *Alpheus*, which was from אלפי a *Ship*, becauſe it was not far from an *Excellent Haven*. And ſo he makes the *Chimæra* to be no more than a mere *ens rationis*; for he takes the *Chimæra* which *Bellerophon* conquered, to be only the People of *Solymi* under the three Generals, *Aryus*, *Troſibis*, and *Arſalus*; ארי that ſignifies a *Lion*; *Troſibis* was ראש הויא *the head of a Serpent*: *Arſalus* was אור ויל a *young Kid*, and ſo the *Chimæra* conſiſted of *the form of a Lion*, *a Goat*, *and a Serpent*. Thus we ſee how eaſy a matter it was to advance the *Heathen Mythology* from the Equivocation of the Oriental Languages, in which their Traditions were convey'd to them.

Bochart. Canaan. l. 1. cap. 28.

Ibid. l. 1. c. 6.

VI. 5. But yet a more prolific Principle of *Mythology* was by attributing the Actions of ſeveral Perſons to one who was the firſt or the chief of them. Thus it was in the Stories of *Jupiter*, *Neptune*, *Mars*, *Mercury*, *Minerva*, *Juno*, *Bacchus* and *Hercules*, which were a collection of the Actions done by a multitude of Perſons, which were all attributed to one Perſon. So *Voſſius* tells us before the time of the *Trojan* Wars, moſt of their Kings, who were renowned and powerful, were called *Joves*. Now when the Actions of all theſe were attributed to one *Jupiter* of *Creet*, they muſt needs ſwell his Story up with abundance of Fables. *Voſſius* hath taken a great deal of pains to digeſt in an Hiſtorical manner the Stories of the ſeveral *Jupiters*, whereof he reckons two *Argives*, a third the Father of *Hercules*, a fourth a King of *Phrygia*, and two more of *Creet*; to one of which, without any Diſtinction, the Actions of all the reſt were aſcribed, and who was worſhipped under the name of *Jupiter*. And ſo beſides the ancient *Neptune*, who was the ſame with *Japhet*, they ſometimes underſtood any Inſular Prince, or one that had great power at Sea; but beſides theſe, there were two Famous *Neptunes* among the *Greeks*, the one of *Athens*, the other the Builder of the Walls of *Troy*: Now the Stories of all theſe being mixed together, muſt needs make a ſtrange confuſion. So for *Mars*, beſides that ancient one they had by the Oriental Tradition, they had a *Spartan*, *Thracian*, and *Arcadian Mars*. What abundance of *Mercuries* are we told of by **Tully?* and of

Voſſ. de Idol. l. 1.

* *Cicero l. 3. de Nat. Deor.*

no leſs than five *Minervas?* Every angry, ſcornful, jealous Queen would fill up the Fables of *Juno*, who was equally claim'd by the *Argives* and *Samians*. What conteſts were there between the *Greeks* and *Ægyptians*, concerning the Country of *Bacchus*, or *Liber Pater*, whoſe Story was made up of many patches of the Oriental Story, as will appear afterwards. The ſame may be ſaid of *Hercules*. Now what a ſtrange way was this to increaſe the number of Fables? when they had one whoſe memory was anciently preſerved among them, they attributed the Actions of all ſuch to him, who came near him in that which his Memory was moſt remarkable for: And in thoſe things which they did retain of the Eaſtern Tradition, it was an uſual thing to confound Perſons, Places and Actions together. So the Story of *Enoch* and *Methuſelah* is joyned together by *Stephanus de Urbibus*, under the Name of Ἀνανγος. who is there ſaid to live above 300 years (which agrees with *Enoch* as the Name doth) and that at his death the World ſhould be deſtroy'd by a Flood; which agrees with *Methuſelah*. So *Abraham* by *Orpheus* is called Μονοθεον. which belongs to *Iſaac* his Son; ſo the Actions of *Nimrod*, *Ninus* and *Cham*, are confounded together in their *Mythology*. By theſe ſeveral ways now we underſtand how the Original Tradition was by degrees corrupted and altered in the Heathen *Mythology*.

Steph. V. Ἀνανγος.

I come now to the footſteps of Scripture-hiſtory, which notwithſtanding theſe corruptions, may be diſcern'd in the Heathen *Mythology*, which I ſhall methodically inquire after according to the ſeries of Scripture-hiſtory. That the Names given to God in Scripture were preſerv'd among the *Phœnicians*, appears ſufficiently by the remainders of the *Phœnician Theology*, tranſlated by *Philo Byblius* out of *Sanchoniathon*; wherein we read of the God Ἰαὼ, which hath the ſame Letters with יהוה, beſides which there we meet with Ἑλιοῦν, the ſame with עליון, *The moſt High*, and Ἰαὼ, which is אל *The ſtrong God*; *Beelſaman*, which is, בעל שמין *The God of Heaven:* and Ἐλωαῖος, the very Name of God us'd in the beginning of *Geneſis* ſo often. Beſides in thoſe Fragments we have expreſs mention of the *Chaos*, and the *Evening* following it, or *the Darkneſs on the face of the Deep*; the *Creation of Angels* under the Ζοφασημίν, צופה שמים thoſe *Beings* which contemplate the *Heavens:* and the *Creation* of *Mankind*, Ἐκ θ πόλπε ἀνέμε, i. e. קול יה׳, ſaith *Bochartus*, *The voice of the mouth of God*, which is by God's Word and Inſpiration, when it is expreſs'd that God ſaid, *Let us make Man*, and that he *breathed into him the breath of life*. After we read of Ἰαὼ and αὐτόχθον, which properly agree to *Adam*, who was made out of the *Earth*. *Voſſius* conceives that the memory of *Adam* was preſerv'd among the old *Germans*, of whom *Tacitus* ſpeaks, *Celebrant antiquis carminibus Tuiſtonem Deum terra editum, & filium Mannum, originem gentis, conditoreſque*. Either by *Tuiſto Adam* is underſtood, who was form'd of the Earth, and by *Mannus*, *Noah:* or by *Tuiſto* God may be underſtood, and by *Mannus*, *Adam*; to which conjecture may be added further that the ſame Author reports that ſome of the *Germans* ſacrificed to *Iſis*, which *Voſſius* likewiſe conceives to be a remainder of the *Hebrew Iſcha*. And ſo among the *Ægyptians* it is with like probability conceiv'd that *Adam* and *Iſcha* were preſerv'd

V. Scaliger. Not. in Frag. Grac. Selden. de Diis Syr. Bochart. Cana. l. 2. c. 2.

Voſſ. de Idololat. l. 1. cap. 38. Tacit. de moribus German.

ſerv'd under *Oſiris* and *Iſis*, as they were hiſtorically taken. In *Cilicia*, the City *Adana* is thought to have ſome remainder of the Name of *Adam*; for the *Greeks* had no termination in *M*, therefore for *Adam* they pronounced it *Adan*, and that from Ἀδαν, and ſo the City *Adana*: Now that Ἀδανὸς, by *Stephanus de Urbibus*, is ſaid to be the *Son of Heaven and Earth*. Ἔστι δὲ ὁ Ἀδανὸς γῆς καὶ οὐρανοῦ παῖς. This *Adanus*, he tells us, was otherwiſe called Κρόνος, or *Saturn*, under whom the *Greeks* preſerv'd the memory of *Adam*; for *Diodorus*, *Thallus*, *Caſſius*, *Severus*, and *Cornelius Nepos*, do all (as *Tertullian* ſaith) confeſs *Saturn* to have been a Man; and according to their Fables, he muſt have been the firſt of Men. *Saturn* was the Son of *Heaven and Earth*, and ſo was *Adam*: he taught Men Husbandry; and was not *Adam* the firſt that tilled the ground? Beſides, that power which *Saturn* had, and was depos'd from, doth fitly ſet out the Dominion Man had in the *Golden Age* of Innocency which he loſt by his own folly. And *Adam*'s hiding himſelf from the preſence of the LORD, gave occaſion to the Name of *Saturn*, from *Satar* to hide. We find ſomething of *Cain* preſerv'd in the *Phœnician* Antiquities, under the Name of Ἀγρέως, or Ἀγρεύς, the firſt Countryman or Husbandman, who with his Brother Ἀγρεύς, built Houſes, and the firſt foundation of a City is attributed to *Cain*: And on that account *Voſſius* conjectures that the memory of *Cain*'s Wife was preſerv'd under *Veſta*, both becauſe ſhe was the Daughter of *Saturn*, i. e. of *Adam*, and that ſhe is ſaid τὴν οἰκῶν καθεσιὰν εὑρεῖν, *to find find out firſt the way of building Houſes*. That *Tubal-Cain* gave firſt occaſion to the Name and Worſhip of *Vulcan*, hath been very probably conceiv'd, both from the very great affinity of the Names, and that *Tubal-Cain* is expreſly mention'd *to be an Inſtructer of every Artificer in braſs and iron*; and as near relation as *Apollo* had to *Vulcan*, *Jubal* had to *Tubal-Cain*, who was the *Inventer of Muſic, or the Father of all ſuch as handle the Harp and Organ*; which the *Greeks* attribute to *Apollo*. And if that be true which *Genebrard* and others aſcribe to *Naamah*, the Siſter of *Jubal* and *Tubal-Cain*, *viz.* that ſhe was the Inventer of Spinning and Weaving, then may ſhe come in for *Minerva*. Thus we ſee there were ſome, tho' but obſcure footſteps preſerved, even of that part of Scripture-hiſtory which preceeded the Flood.

Stephan. V. Ἀδανα.

Tertull. Apolog. c. 10.

Voſſius de Idol. l. 1. c. 17.

Gen. 4. 22.

4. 21.

VIII. The memory of the Deluge it ſelf we have already found to be preſerved in the Heathen *Mythology*; we come therefore to *Noah* and his Poſterity. Nany parcels of *Noah*'s memory was preſerved in the ſcattered fragments of many Fables, under *Saturn*, *Janus*, *Prometheus*, and *Bacchus*. *Bochartus* inſiſts on no fewer than 14 Parallels between *Noah* and the Heathen *Saturn*, which he ſaith are ſo plain, that there is no doubt but under *Saturn*, *Noah* was underſtood in the Heathen *Mythology*. *Saturn* was ſaid to be the common Parent of Mankind, ſo was *Noah*; *Saturn* was a juſt King, *Noah* not only righteous himſelf, but a preacher of Righteouſneſs; The Golden Age of *Saturn* was between *Noah* and the diſperſion of Nations. In *Noah*'s time all Mankind had but one Language, which the Heathens extend under *Saturn*, both to Men and Beaſts: The Plantation of Vines attributed to *Saturn* by the Heathens, as to *Noah* by the Scriptures: The Law of *Saturn* men-

Bochart. Phal. l. c. 1.

tioned by the Poets, that none ſhould ſee the nakedneſs of the Gods without puniſhment, ſeems to reſpect the Fact and Curſe of *Cham*, in reference to *Noah*. *Saturn* and *Rhea*, and thoſe with them are ſaid to be born of *Thetis*, or the *Ocean*, which plainly alludes to *Noah* and his companies eſcaping the Flood; thence a Ship was the ſymbol of *Saturn*; and that *Saturn* devoured all his Children, ſeems to be nothing elſe but the Deſtruction of the old World by *Noah's* Flood. And not only under *Saturn*, but under *Prometheus* too, was *Noah*'s memory preſerved. *Diodorus* ſpeaks of the great Flood under *Prometheus*; and *Prometheus* implies one that hath Forecaſt and Wiſdom, ſuch as *Noah* had, whereby he foretold the Flood, and was ſaved in it, when others were *Epimetheus's*, that had not Wit to prevent their own deſtruction.

Diod. l. 1.

And no wonder if *Prometheus* were *Noah*, that the forming Mankind was attributed to him, when the World was peopled from him. *Herodotus* his ſaying that *Aſia* was *Prometheus* his Wife, might relate to the Country *Noah* lived in, and our propagation from thence. Another part of *Noah*'s memory was preſerved under *Janus*; the Name of *Janus* is moſt probably derived from יין, becauſe of *Noah*'s planting a Vine, and *Janus* was called *Conſivius*, ſaith *Macrobius*, *à conſerendo, hoc eſt, à propagine generis humani, quæ Jano autore conſeritur*; now to whom can this be ſo properly apply'd as to *Noah*, from whom Mankind was propagated? and *Janus* his being *bifrons* or looking πρόσω καὶ ὀπίσω, *forward and backward*, is not ſo fit an Emblem of any thing as of *Noah*'s ſeeing thoſe two Ages before and after the Flood. And it is further obſervable which *Plutarch* ſpeaks of in his *Roman Queſtions*, that the ancient Coins had on one ſide the Image of *Janus* with his two Faces, on the other πλοίου πρύμναν ἢ πρῷραν ἐγκεχαραγμένην, *the fore or hinder part of the ſhip*, by which the memory of the *Ark* of *Noah* ſeems to have been preſerv'd. Thus we ſee what *Analogy* there is in the Story of *Janus* to that of *Noah*: not that I give credit to thoſe fooleries which tell us of *Noah*'s coming from *Palæſtine* with his Son *Japhet* into *Italy*, and planting Colonies there, for which we are beholding to the ſpurious *Ethruſcan* Antiquities; but all that I aſſert is, that the Story of *Noah* might be preſerv'd in the eldeſt Colonies, tho' diſguiſed under other Names, as here in the caſe of *Janus*. And on the ſame account that the Name of *Janus* is attributed to *Noah*, ſome likewiſe believe him to have been the moſt ancient *Bacchus*, who was according to *Diodorus* Εὑρετὴς ἀμπέλου, *the firſt planter of Vines and inſtructer of Men in making Wines:* and beſides *Bacchus* his being twice born, ſeems only an adumbration of *Noah*'s preſervation after the Flood, which might be accounted a ſecond Nativity, when the reſt of the World was deſtroy'd; and withal *Philoſtratus* in the Life of *Apollonius*, relates that the ancient *Indian Bacchus* came thither out of *Aſſyria*, which yet more fully agrees with *Noah*. So that from theſe ſcattered Members of *Hippolytus*, theſe broken Fragments of Traditions, we may gather almoſt an intire Hiſtory of all the paſſages concerning *Noah*.

V. Mayer. Philol. ſacr. p. 2. c. 5.

Philoſtr. vit. Apoll. c. 4.

IX. As the Story of *Saturn* and *Noah* do much agree, ſo the three Sons of *Noah* and thoſe of *Saturn*, *Jupiter*, *Neptune*, and *Pluto*, have their peculiar reſemblances to each other. Of which *Voſſius* and

and *Bochartus* have largely ſpoken, and we have touched on already. Beſides which this latter Author hath carry'd the Parallel lower, and finds *Canaan* the Son of *Cham*, the ſame with *Mercury* the Son of *Jupiter*; as it was the curſe of *Canaan* to be a ſervant of ſervants, ſo *Mercury* is always deſcribed under ſervile employments; his Wings ſeem to be the Ships of the *Phœnicians* who were derived from *Canaan*, and his being the God of Trade, noting the great Merchandize of the *Phœnicians*, and *Mercury*'s Thievery noting the Pyracies, or at leaſt the ſubtilty and craft of the *Phœnicians*; he was the Father of *Eloquence* and *Aſtronomy*, as *Letters* and *Aſtronomy* came from the *Phœnicians* into *Greece*. The ſame Author parallels *Nimrod* and *Bacchus*, and *Magog* and *Prometheus* together. The Name of *Bacchus* is but a light variation of בר כוש, *Bar-chus*, as *Nimrod* was the Son of *Chus*, and *Bacchus* is called *Nebrodes* by the *Greeks*, which is the very Name of *Nimrod* among them, and *Bacchus* is called Ζωγεὺς, which excellently interprets *Nimrod*'s being a *mighty hunter*. *Bacchus* his Expeditions into *India* were the attempts of *Nimrod* and the *Aſſyrian* Emperors. On which account *Voſſius* makes *Nimrod* or *Belus* the moſt ancient *Mars*; for *Heſtiæus Mileſius* ſpeaks of *Enyalius* which is *Mars*, his being in *Sennaar* of *Babylonia*. That the memory of *Magog* was preſerved under *Prometheus*, theſe things make it probable, that *Magog* was the Son of *Japhet*, as *Prometheus* of *Iapetus*, and that the Poſterity of *Magog* was placed about *Caucaſus*, where *Prometheus* is feigned to lie: and the eating of *Prometheus* his Heart, is only an Interpretation of מגג, which apply'd to the Heart ſignifies to *waſte away*, and *be conſum'd*. Thus far *Bochartus*.

Voſſius de Idol. l. 1. c. 18. Bochart. Phaleg. l. 1. c. 1. cap. 2.

Voſſius de Idol. l. 1. c. 16.

The *Phœnician* Antiquities ſeem to have preſerved the memory of *Abraham*'s ſacrificing his Son *Iſaac*, by that place which *Euſebius* produceth out of *Porphyry*'s Book concerning the *Jews*; where he relates, *How* Saturn *whom the* Phœnicians *call* Iſrael, *when he reigned in thoſe parts and had an only ſon called* Jeoud, *of a Nymph called* Anobret, *being under ſome great calamity, did ſacrifice that ſon of his, being clothed with a royal habit.* Here we have a Royal Perſon called *Iſrael*; and that *Abraham* ſhould be accounted a King in thoſe elder times, is nothing ſtrange, conſidering his wealth, and what petty Royalties there were in thoſe times. But *Grotius*, and from him *Voſſius*, do not think that *Abraham* was here called *Iſrael*, but that the Tranſcriber of *Euſebius* meeting with Ἰὰ, ſuppoſed it to be a contraction of Ἰσραὴλ, and ſo writ at length: it muſt be acknowledg'd that Ἰὰ is uſed in the *Phœnician Theology* for *Saturn*, but yet the circumſtances of the Story make the ordinary reading not improbable; neither is it ſtrange, that *Abraham* ſhould be called by the name of the People which he was the Progenitor of. That *Iſaac* ſhould be meant by his only Son called *Jeoud* is moſt likely; for when God bids *Abraham* go ſacrifice him, he ſaith, *Take thy ſon*, יחיד, *thy only ſon*; *Jehid* is the ſame with the *Phœnician Jeoud*. That *Sara* is meant by *Anobret*, the original of the Name implies, which is as *Bochartus* derives it חן עוברת, *Annoberet*, that is, *ex gratia concipiens*, which the Apoſtle explains, *Through faith* Sara *her ſelf receiv'd ſtrength to conceive ſeed.* Now all the difference is, that which was only deſigned and intended by *Abraham*,

V. Scaliger. ad Frag. Grac.

Grot. in Deut. c. 18. v. 10. Voſſius de Idol. l. 1. c. 18.

Gen. 22. 1.

Bochart. de Phœnic. col. l. 2. c. 2. Heb. 11. 11.

ham, was believ'd by the *Phœnicians* as really done, that it might be as a precedent to them for their Ἀνθρωποθυσία, *ſacrificing* of Men, a thing ſo much in uſe among the *Phœnicians*, and all the Colonies derived from them, as many Learned Men have at large ſhew'd. But beſides this, there are particular teſtimonies concerning *Abraham*, his age, wiſdom and knowledg, his coming out of *Chaldæa*, and the Propagation of Knowledg from him among the *Chaldæans*, *Phœnicians*, and *Ægyptians*, are extant out of *Beroſus*, *Eupolemus*, and others in * *Joſephus* and *Euſebius*, and from thence tranſcribed by many Learned Men, which on that account I forbear tranſcribing, as being common and obvious.

* *Joſeph. Antiq. l. 1. c. 7. Euſ. Præp. Evang. l. 9. c. 16.*

X. Some have not improbably conjectured, that the memory of *Jacob*'s long peregrination and ſervice with his Uncle *Laban*, was preſerved under the Story of *Apollo* his baniſhment and being a Shepherd under *Admetus*. For *Callimachus* reports that *Love* was the cauſe of *Apollo*'s travails, as it was of *Jacob*'s, and withal mentions a ſtrange increaſe of Cattel under *Apollo*'s care, anſwerable to what the Scripture reports concerning *Jacob*. But it is more certain, that the memory of *Jacob*'s ſetting up the *Stone* he had reſted on for a Pillar, and pouring *Oyl* upon it, and calling the place *Bethel*, was preſerved under the Anointed Stones, which the *Phœnicians* from *Bethel* called Βαιτύλια, as hath been frequently obſerv'd by Learned Men, from whence came the cuſtom of *Anointing ſtones* among the Heathens, of which ſo very many have largely diſcourſed. Thence the Proverb of a ſuperſtitious Man, πέτρα λίθον λιπαίνει, which *Arnobius* calls *lubricatum lapidem, & ex olivi unguine ſordidatum*. It ſeems the anointing the ſtones with oyl, was then the ſymbol of the conſecration of them. The Name Βαιτύλου for ſuch a ſtone occurs in *Heſychius*, the *Greek Etymologiſts*, *Damaſcius* in *Phocius*, and others. That the memory of *Joſeph* in *Ægypt* was preſerved under the *Ægyptian Apis*, hath been ſhew'd with a great deal of probability by the Learned *Voſſius*, in his often-cited piece of *Idolatry*, from the teſtimonies of *Julius Maternus*, *Ruſinus*, and *Suidas*; and from theſe three Arguments. 1, The greatneſs of the Benefit which the *Ægyptians* received by *Joſeph*; which was of that nature that it could not eaſily be forgot, and that no ſymbol was ſo proper to ſet it out as the *Ægyptian Apis*; becauſe the famine was portended by lean Kine, and the plenty by fat; and *Minucius* at *Rome*, for relieving the People in a time of famine, had a Statue of a golden Bull erected to his memory. 2. The *Ægyptians* were not backward to teſtify their reſpect to *Joſeph*, as appears by *Pharaoh*'s rewarding him; now it was the cuſtom of the *Ægyptians* to preſerve the memories of their great Benefactors by ſome ſymbols to poſterity; which were at firſt intended only for a Civil uſe, altho' they were after abus'd to Superſtition and *Idolatry*. 3. From the Names of *Apis* and *Serapis*. *Apis* he conceives to be the ſacred Name of *Joſeph* among the *Ægyptians*, and is as much as אב, *Father*; ſo *Joſeph* himſelf ſaith, he was a *Father* to *Pharaoh*. And *Serapis*, as *Ruſinus* and *Suidas* both tell us, had a *Buſhel* upon his *Head*, and *Serapis* is probably derived from שור, *Sor*, which ſignifies a *Bull*, and *Apis*. So that by this means the Story of *Joſeph* is atteſted by the *Ægyptians* ſuperſtitions, of which they can give no account ſo likely as this is.

Callimach. Hymn. in Apoll.

Gen. 28. 18.

Scalig. not. in Frag. Gr. Bochart. Can. l. 2. c. 2. Seld. de Diis Syris. V. Heinſ. in Clem. Al. Strom. 7. Caſaubon. ad Theoph. p. 295. Herald. ad Arnob. l. 1. Colvium ad Apul. Florid. Ouzel. & Elmenhorſt. ad Minuc. de Idolol. l. 1. c. 29.

Gen. 45. 8.

Many

XI. Many things concerning *Moſes* are preſerv'd in the Story of *Bacchus*; not that from thence we are to conclude that *Moſes* was the *Bacchus* of the *Greeks*, as *Voſſius* thinks, but they took ſeveral parts of the Eaſtern Traditions concerning him, which they might have from the *Phœnicians* who came with *Cadmus* into *Greece*, while the memory of *Moſes* was yet freſh among the *Canaanites*. In the Story of *Bacchus*, as *Voſſius* obſerves, it is expreſly ſaid, that he was born in *Ægypt*, and that ſoon after his birth he was put in an Ark, and expos'd to the River, which Tradition was preſerv'd among the *Braſiatæ* of *Laconica*: and *Bacchus* in *Orpheus* is called Μίσης, and by *Plutarch de Iſide & Oſiride*, *Palæſtinus*: and he is called Βιμάτωρ, which agrees to *Moſes*, who, beſides his own Mother, was adopted by *Pharaoh*'s Daughter: *Bacchus* was likewiſe commended for his Beauty as *Moſes* was, and was ſaid to be educated in a Mount of *Arabia* called *Nyſa*, which agrees with *Moſes* his reſidence in *Arabia* forty years; ſo *Plutarch* mentions Φυγὰς Διονύσου, the *baniſhments* of *Bacchus*; and *Nonnus* mentions *Bacchus* his flight into the Red-ſea: who likewiſe mentions his Battles in *Arabia*, and with the neighboring Princes there. *Diodorus* ſaith, that *Bacchus* his Army had not only Men but Women in it; which is moſt true of the company which *Moſes* led. *Orpheus* calls *Bacchus* Θεσμοφόρον, and attributes to him Δίπλακα Θεσμοὺς, whereby we underſtand *Moſes* his being a *Legiſlator*, and that he deliver'd the *Laws* in two Tables. *Moſes* his fetching Water out of a Rock with his Rod, is preſerv'd in the *Orgia* of *Bacchus*, in which *Euripides* relates that *Agave* and the reſt of the *Bacchæ* celebrating the *Orgia*, one of them touched a Rock, and the Water came out: and in the ſame *Orgia Euripides* reports how they were wont to crown their Heads with Serpents, probably in memory of the cure of the fiery Serpents in the Wilderneſs. A Dog is made the companion of *Bacchus*; which is the ſignification of *Caleb*, who ſo faithful adhered to *Moſes*. To theſe and ſome other circumſtances inſiſted on by *Voſſius*, *Bochartus* adds two more very conſiderable ones; which are, that *Nonnus* reports of *Bacchus* that he touched the two Rivers *Orontes* and *Hydaſpes* with his *Thyrſus*, or *Rod*, and that the Rivers dried, and he paſs'd thro' them: and that his *Ivy-ſtaff* being thrown upon the ground, crept up and down like a *Serpent*, and that the *Indians* were in darkneſs while the *Bacchæ* enjoy'd light; which circumſtances conſider'd will make every one that hath judgment ſay as *Bochartus* doth; *Ex mirabili illo conſenſu vel cœcis apparebit priſcos fabularum architectos a ſcriptoribus ſacris multa eſſe mutuatos*. From this wonderful agreement of *Heathen Mythology* with the Scriptures, it cannot but appear that one is a corruption of the other. That the memory of *Joſhua* and *Sampſon* was preſerved under *Hercules Tyrius*, is made likewiſe very probable from ſeveral circumſtances of the Stories. Others have deduced the many Rites of *Heathen Worſhip* from thoſe us'd in the *Tabernacle* among the *Jews*. Several other might be inſiſted on, as the Parallel between *Og* and *Typho*, and between the old *Silenus* and *Balaam*, both noted for their skill in *Divination*, both taken by *Water*, Num. 22. 5. both noted for *riding* on an *Aſs*: ἐπὶ ὄνου δὲ πολλὰ ἐκάθιζεν, ſaith * *Lucian* of the old *Silenus*; and that which

Voſſius de Idol. l. 1. c. 30.

Nonn.

Dion. l. 20.

Diod. l. 4.

Bochart. Canaan. l. 1. c. 18.

Voſſius de Idol. l. 1. c. 26. p. 118. p. 169.

* *Lucian. de Deor. Con.*

Pauſan. Eliacōn. 2. p. 203.

which makes it more probable, is that of *Pausanias*, Ἐν δὲ τῇ Ἐλευσῖνι, χάλκη Σιλλινοῦ μνῆμα. which some Learned Men have been much puzled to find out the truth of; and this conjecture which I here propound, may pass at least for a probable account of it. But I shall no longer insist on these things, having, I suppose, done what is sufficient to our purpose, which is, to make it appear what footsteps there are of the truth of Scripture-history amidst all the corruptions of *Heathen Mythology*.

CHAP. VI.

Of the Excellency of the Scriptures.

I. *Concerning matters of pure Divine Revelation in Scripture: the terms of Salvation only contain'd therein. The ground of the disesteem of the Scripture is tacite Unbelief.* II. *The Excellency of the Scriptures manifested as to the matters which* God *hath reveal'd therein.* IV. *The Excellency of the discoveries of* God's *Nature which are in Scripture.* V. *Of the Goodness and Love of* God *in* Christ. *The suitableness of those discoveries of* God *to our Natural Notions of a* Deity. *The necessity of* God's *making known Himself to us in order to the regulating our Conceptions of Him.* VI. *The Scriptures give the fullest account of the state of Mens Souls, and the corruptions which are in them. The only way of pleasing* God *discover'd in Scriptures.* VII. *The Scriptures contain matters of greatest Mysteriousness, and most universal satisfaction to Men's Minds.* VIII. *The Excellency of the manner wherein things are reveal'd in Scriptures, in regard of Clearness, Authority, Purity,* IX. *Uniformity, and Persuasiveness.* X. *the Excellency of the Scriptures as a Rule of life. The Nature of the Duties of Religion and the Reasonableness of them. The Greatness of the Encouragements to Religion contained in the Scriptures.* XI. *The great Excellency of the Scriptures, as containing in them the Covenant of Grace in order to Man's Salvation.*

I. HAving thus largely prov'd the truth of all those passages of sacred Scripture which concern the History of the first Ages of the World, by all those Arguments which a subject of that nature is capable of, the only thing left in order to our full proving the Divinity of the Scriptures, is, the consideration of those matters contain'd in it, which are in an especial manner said to be of Divine Revelation. For those historical passages, tho' we believe them as contain'd in the Scripture, to have been divinely inspir'd

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as well as others: yet they are ſuch things as ſuppoſing no Divine Revelation, might have been known ſufficiently to the World, had not Men been wanting to themſelves as to the care and means of preſerving them; but thoſe matters which I now come to diſcourſe of, are of a more ſublime and tranſcendent nature, ſuch as it had been impoſſible for the Minds of Men to reach, had they not been immediately diſcover'd by God himſelf. And thoſe are the Terms and Conditions on which the Soul of Man may upon good grounds expect an eternal Happineſs, which we aſſert the Book of Scriptures to be the only authentic and infallible records of. Men might by the improvements of Reaſon and the ſagacity of their Minds diſcover much, not only of the lapſed condition of their Souls, and the neceſſity of a purgation of them, in order to their Felicity; but might in the general know what things are pleaſing and acceptable to the Divine Nature, from thoſe differences of Good and Evil which are unalterably fix'd in the things themſelves: but which way to obtain any certainty of the Remiſſion of Sins, to recover the Grace and Favor of God, to enjoy perfect Tranquillity and Peace of Conſcience, to be able to pleaſe God in things agreeable to his Will, and by theſe to be aſſur'd of eternal Bliſs, had been impoſſible for Men to have ever found, had not God himſelf been graciouſly pleas'd to reveal them to us. Men might ſtill have bewildred themſelves in following the *Ignes fatui* of their own imaginations, and hunting up and down the World for a path which leads to Heaven, but could have found none, unleſs God himſelf taking pity of the wandrings of Men had been pleas'd to hang out a Light from Heaven to direct them in their way thither, and by this *Pharos* of Divine Revelation to direct them ſo to ſteer their courſe, as to eſcape ſplitting themſelves on the Rocks of open Impieties, or being ſwallow'd up in the Quick-ſands of terrene delights. Neither doth he ſhew them only what Shelves and Rocks they muſt eſcape, but what particular courſe they muſt ſteer, what Star they muſt have in their Eye, what Compaſs they muſt obſerve, what Winds and Gales they muſt expect and pray for, if they would arrive at laſt at eternal Bliſs. Eternal Bliſs! What more could a God of infinite Goodneſs promiſe, or the Soul of Man wiſh for? A Reward to ſuch who are ſo far from deſerving, that they are ſtill provoking; Glory to ſuch who are more apt to be aſham'd of their Duties, than of their Offences; but that it ſhould not only be a Glorious Reward, but Eternal too, is that which tho' it infinitely tranſcend the Deſerts of the Receivers, yet it highly diſcovers the infinite Goodneſs of the Giver. But when we not only know that there is ſo rich a Mine of ineſtimable Treaſures, but if the Owner of it undertakes to ſhew us the way to it, and gives us certain and infallible directions how to come to the full poſſeſſion of it; how much are we in love with Miſery, and do we court our own ruin, if we neglect to hearken to his Directions, and obſerve his Commands!

II. This is that we are now undertaking to make good concerning the *Scriptures*, that theſe alone contain thoſe ſacred diſcoveries, by which the Souls of Men may come at laſt to enjoy a compleat and eternal Happineſs. One would think there could be nothing more

needleſs in the World than to bid Men regard their own welfare, and to ſeek to be happy; yet whoever caſts his Eye into the World, will find no counſel ſo little hearkened to as this, nor any thing which is more generally look'd on as a matter trivial and impertinent. Which cannot ariſe but from one of theſe two grounds, that either they think it no great wiſdom to let go their preſent hold as to the good things of this World, for that which they ſecretly queſtion whether they ſhall ever live to ſee or no; or elſe that their Minds are in ſuſpenſe, whether they be not ſent on a *Guiana Voyage* to *Heaven*, whether the certainty of it be yet fully diſcover'd, or the inſtructions which are given be ſuch as may infallibly conduct them thither. The firſt, tho' it hath the advantage of ſenſe, fruition, delight, and further expectation; yet to a rational Perſon who ſeriouſly reflects on himſelf, and ſums up what (after all his troubles and diſquietments in the procuring, his cares in keeping, his diſappointments in his expectations, his fears of loſing what he doth enjoy, and that vexation of Spirit which attends all theſe) he hath gain'd of true contentment to his Mind, can never certainly believe that ever theſe things were intended for his Happineſs. For is it poſſible that the Soul of Man ſhould ever enjoy its full and compleat Happineſs in this World, when nothing is able to make it happy, but what is moſt ſutable to its Nature, able to fill up its large Capacity, and commenſurate with its Duration? but in this Life the matter of Mens greateſt delight is ſtrangely unſutable to the Nature of our rational Beings, the meaſure of them too ſhort for our vaſt Deſires to ſtretch themſelves upon, the Proportion too ſcant and narrow to run parallel with Immortality. It muſt be then only a Supreme, Infinite and Eternal Being, which by the free communications of his Bounty and Goodneſs can fix and ſatiate the Soul's Deſires, and by the conſtant flowings forth of his own uninterrupted ſtreams of Favor will always keep up Deſire, and yet always ſatisfy it: One whoſe Goodneſs can only be felt by ſome tranſient touches here, whoſe Love can be ſeen but as thro' a lattice, whoſe conſtant preſence may be rather wiſh'd for than enjoy'd, who hath reſerv'd the full ſight and fruition of himſelf to that future ſtate, when all theſe dark veils ſhall be done away, and the Soul ſhall be continually ſunning her ſelf under immediate beams of Light and Love. But how or in what way the Soul of Man in this degenerate condition ſhould come to be partaker of ſo great a Happineſs, by the enjoyment of that God our Natures are now at ſuch a diſtance from, is the greateſt and moſt important inquiry of Human Nature; and we continually ſee how ſucceſleſs and unſatisfactory the endeavors of thoſe have been to themſelves at laſt, who have ſought for this Happineſs in a way of their own finding out: The large volume of the Creation, wherein God hath deſcrib'd ſo much of his Wiſdom and Power, is yet too dark and obſcure, too ſhort and imperfect to ſet forth to us the way which leads to eternal Happineſs. Unleſs then the ſame God who made Mens Souls at firſt, do ſhew them the way for their recovery; as they are in a degenerate, ſo they will be in a deſperate condition: but the ſame Bounty and Goodneſs of God, which did at firſt diſplay it ſelf in giving

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Being to Mens Souls, hath in a higher manner enlarged the Diſcovery of it ſelf, by making known the way whereby we may be taken into his Grace and Favor again.

III. Which it now concerns us particularly to diſcover, thereby to make it appear that this way is of that peculiar excellency, that we may have from thence the greateſt evidence, it could come from no other Author but God himſelf, and doth tend to no other end but our eternal Happineſs. Now that incomparable excellency which is in the ſacred Scriptures, will fully appear, if we conſider the Matters contain'd in them under this threefold capacity. 1. As *Matters of Divine Revelation.* 2. As *a Rule of Life.* 3. As containing *that Covenant of Grace which relates to Man's eternal Happineſs.*

1. Conſider the Scripture generally, as containing in it Matters of Divine Revelation, and therein the excellency of the Scriptures appears in two things. 1. *The Matters which are revealed.* 2. *The Manner wherein they are revealed.*

1. *The matters which are revealed* in Scripture, may be conſider'd theſe three ways. 1. *As they are matters of the greateſt weight and moment.* 2. *As matters of the greateſt depth and myſteriouſneſs.* 3. *As matters of the moſt univerſal ſatisfaction to the Minds of Men.*

1. *They are matters of the greateſt moment and importance for Men to know.* The Wiſdom of Men is moſt known by the weight of the things they ſpeak; and therefore that wherein the Wiſdom of God is diſcover'd, cannot contain any thing that is mean and trivial; they muſt be matters of the higheſt importance, which the ſupreme Ruler of the World vouchſafes to ſpeak to Men concerning: And ſuch we ſhall find the matters which God hath revealed in his Word to be, which either concern the rectifying our apprehenſions of his Nature, or making known to Men their ſtate and condition, or diſcovering the way whereby to avoid eternal Miſery. Now which is there of theſe three, which ſuppoſing God to diſcover his Mind to the World, it doth not highly become him to ſpeak to Men of?

IV. 1. What is there which doth more highly concern Men to know than God himſelf? or what more glorious and excellent object could he diſcover than himſelf to the World? There is nothing certainly which ſhould more commend the Scriptures to us, than that thereby we may grow more acquainted with God; that we may know more of his Nature, and all his Perfections, and many of the great Reaſons of his actings in the World. We may by them underſtand with ſafety what the eternal purpoſes of God were as to the way of Man's Recovery by the death of his Son; we may there ſee and underſtand the great Wiſdom of God; not only in the contrivance of the World, and ordering of it, but in the gradual Revelations of himſelf to his People, by what ſteps he train'd up his Church till the *fulneſs of time was come*; what his Aim was in laying ſuch a load of Ceremonies on his People of the *Jews*; by what ſteps and degrees he made way for the full revelation of his Will to the World by ſpeaking in theſe laſt days by his Son, after he had ſpoke *at ſundry times and in divers manners by the Prophets*, &c. *unto the Fathers.* In the Scriptures we read

the moſt rich and admirable diſcoveries of Divine Goodneſs, and all the ways and methods he uſeth in alluring Sinners to himſelf; with what Majeſty he commands, with what Condeſcention he intreats, with what importunity he wooes Mens Souls to be reconciled to him, with what Favor he embraceth, with what Tenderneſs he chaſtiſeth, with what Bowels he pitieth thoſe who have choſen him to be their God! With what Power he ſupporteth, with what Wiſdom he directeth, with what Cordials he refreſheth the Souls of ſuch who are dejected under the ſenſe of his diſpleaſure, and yet their love is ſincere towards him! With what profound humility, what holy boldneſs, what becoming diſtance, and yet what reſtleſs importunity do we therein find the Souls of God's People addreſſing themſelves to him in Prayer! With what cheerfulneſs do they ſerve him, with what confidence do they truſt him, with what reſolution do they adhere to him in all ſtreights and difficulties, with what patience do they ſubmit to his Will in their greateſt extremities! How fearful are they of ſinning againſt God, how careful to pleaſe him, how regardleſs of ſuffering, when they muſt chooſe either that or ſinning, how little apprehenſive of Mens diſpleaſure, while they enjoy the favor of God! Now all theſe things which are ſo fully and pathetically expreſs'd in Scripture, do abundantly ſet forth to us the exuberancy and *Pleonaſm* of God's Grace and Goodneſs towards his People, which makes them delight ſo much in him, and be ſo ſenſible of his diſpleaſure. But above all other diſcoveries of God's Goodneſs, his ſending his Son into the World to die for Sinners, is that which the Scripture ſets forth with the greateſt Life and Eloquence. By Eloquence, I mean not an artificial compoſure of Words, but the gravity, weight, and perſuaſiveneſs of the matter contain'd in them. And what can tend more to melt our frozen Hearts into a current of thankful obedience to God, than the vigorous reflection of the beams of God's love thro' *Jeſus Chriſt* upon us! Was there ever ſo great an expreſſion of love heard of! nay, was it poſſible to be imagin'd, that that God who perfectly hates ſin, ſhould himſelf offer the pardon of it, and ſend his Son into the World to ſecure it to the Sinner, who doth ſo heartily repent of his ſins, as to deny himſelf, and take up his Croſs and follow *Chriſt!* Well might the Apoſtle ſay, *This is a faithful ſaying, and worthy of all acceptation, that Jeſus Chriſt came into the world to ſave ſinners.* How dry and ſapleſs are all the voluminous diſcourſes of Philoſophers, compar'd with this Sentence! How jejune and unſatisfactory are all the Diſcoveries they had of God and his Goodneſs, in compariſon of what we have by the Goſpel of *Chriſt!* Well might *Paul* then ſay, *That he determined to know nothing but Chriſt, and him crucified. Chriſt crucified* is the Library which triumphant Souls will be ſtudying in to all eternity. This is the only Library which is the true Ἰατρεῖον ψυχῆς, that which cures the Soul of all its Maladies and Diſtempers: other Knowledg makes Mens Minds giddy and flatulent; this ſettles and compoſes them: other Knowledg is apt to ſwell Men into high Conceits and Opinions of themſelves; this brings them to the trueſt view of themſelves, and thereby to humility and ſobriety: other Knowledg leaves Mens Hearts as it found them; this alters them and makes them

1 Tim. 1. 15.

1 Cor. 2. 2.

them better. So tranſcendent an excellency is there in the knowledg of *Chriſt crucified* above the ſublimeſt ſpeculations in the World.

And is not this an ineſtimable benefit we enjoy by the Scripture, that therein we can read and converſe with all theſe expreſſions of GOD's Love and Goodneſs, and that in his own Language? Shall we admire and praiſe what we meet with in *Heathen Philoſophers*, which is generous and handſom; and ſhall we not adore the infinite fulneſs of the Scriptures, which run over with continued expreſſions of that and a higher nature? What folly is it to magnify thoſe *Lean Kine*, the Notions of Philoſophers, and contemn the Fat, the Plenty and Fulneſs of the Scriptures? If there be not far more valuable and excellent diſcoveries of the Divine Nature and Perfections; if there be not far more excellent Directions and Rules of Practice in the ſacred Scriptures, than in the ſublimeſt of all the Philoſophers: then let us leave our *full ears*, and feed upon the *thin*. But certainly no ſober and rational Spirit that puts any value upon the Knowledg of GOD, but on the ſame account that he doth praiſe the Diſcourſes of any Philoſophers concerning GOD, he cannot but ſet a value of a far higher nature on the Word of GOD. And as the goodneſs of GOD is thus diſcover'd in Scripture, ſo is his Juſtice and Holineſs: we have therein recorded the moſt remarkable judgments of GOD upon contumacious Sinners, the ſevereſt denunciations of a judgment to come againſt all that live in ſin, the exacteſt Precepts of Holineſs in the World; and what can be deſir'd more to diſcover the Holineſs of GOD, than we find in Scripture concerning Him? If therefore acquaintance with the Nature, Perfections, Deſigns of ſo excellent a Being as GOD is, be a thing deſirable to Human Nature; we have the greateſt cauſe to admire the excellency, and adore the fulneſs of the Scriptures, which give us ſo large, rational, and compleat account of the Being and Attributes of GOD. And which tends yet more to commend the Scriptures to us, thoſe things which the Scripture doth moſt fully diſcover concerning GOD, do not at all contradict thoſe prime and common Notions which are in our Natures concerning him, but do exceedingly advance and improve them, and tend the moſt to regulate our Conceptions and Apprehenſions of GOD, that we may not miſcarry therein, as otherwiſe Men are apt to do. For it being natural to Men ſo far to love themſelves, as to ſet the greateſt value upon thoſe excellencies which they think themſelves moſt maſters of: thence Men came to be exceedingly miſtaken in their Apprehenſions of a *Deity*, ſome attributing one thing as a Perfection, another a different thing, according to their humors and inclinations. Thus imperious ſelf-willed Men are apt to cry up GOD's abſolute Power and Dominion as his greateſt Perfection; eaſy and ſoft-ſpirited Men his Patience and Goodneſs; ſevere and rigid Men his Juſtice and Severity: every one according to his humor and temper, making his GOD of his own complexion: and not only ſo, but in things remote enough from being Perfections at all; yet becauſe they are ſuch things as they prize and value, they ſuppoſe of neceſſity they muſt be in GOD, as is evident in the *Epicureans* Ἀοργησία, by which they excluded *Providence*, as hath been already obſerv'd. And withal

withal conſidering how very difficult it is for one who really believes that God is of a pure, juſt, and holy Nature, and that he hath grievouſly offended him by his ſins, to believe that this God will pardon him upon true repentance: It is thence neceſſary that God ſhould make known himſelf to the World, to prevent our miſ-conceptions of his Nature, and to aſſure a ſuſpicious, becauſe guilty Creature, how ready he is to pardon iniquity, tranſgreſſion, and ſin, to ſuch as unfeignedly repent of their follies, and return unto himſelf. Tho' the light of Nature may dictate much to us of the Benignity and Goodneſs of the Divine Nature, yet it is hard to conceive that that ſhould diſcover further than God's general Goodneſs to ſuch as pleaſe him: but no foundation can be gathered thence of his readineſs to pardon offenders, which being an act of Grace, muſt alone be diſcovered by his Will. I cannot think the *Sun*, *Moon*, and *Stars*, are ſuch itinerant Preachers, as to unfold unto us the whole Counſel and Will of God in reference to Man's acceptance with God upon repentance. It is not every *Star* in the Firmament can do that which the *Star* once did to the *Wiſe-men*, lead them unto *Chriſt*. The *Sun* in the *Heavens* is no *Parelius* to the *Sun of Righteouſneſs*. The beſt *Aſtronomer* will never find the *Day-ſtar from on high* in the reſt of his number. What St. *Auſtin* ſaid of *Tully*'s Works, is true of the whole Volume of the Creation, There are admirable things to be found in them: but the Name of *Chriſt* is not legible there. The work of *Redemption* is not engraven on the works of *Providence*; if it had, a particular Divine Revelation had been unneceſſary, and the *Apoſtles* were ſent on a needleſs errand, which the World had underſtood without their Preaching, *viz. That God was in Chriſt reconciling the World unto himſelf, not imputing to Men their treſpaſſes, and hath committed to them the Miniſtry of Reconciliation.* How was the word of *Reconciliation* committed to them, if it were common to them with the whole frame of the World? and the *Apoſtle*'s *Quære* elſewhere might have been eaſily anſwer'd, *How can Men hear without a Preacher?* For then they might have known the way of *Salvation*, without any ſpecial Meſſengers ſent to deliver it unto them. I grant that *God's long-ſuffering* and *patience* is intended to lead Men to Repentance, and that ſome general collections might be made from *Providence* of the placability of God's Nature, and that *God never left himſelf without a witneſs of his Goodneſs* in the World, being *kind to the unthankful, and doing good, in giving rain and fruitful ſeaſons.* But tho' theſe things might ſufficiently diſcover to ſuch who were apprehenſive of the guilt of ſin, that God did not act according to his greateſt ſeverity, and thereby did give Men encouragement to hearken out and inquire after the true way of being reconcil'd to God; yet all this amounts not to a firm Foundation for Faith, as to the remiſſion of ſin, which doth ſuppoſe God himſelf publiſhing an Act of Grace and Indemnity to the World, wherein he aſſures the Pardon of ſin to ſuch as truly repent and unfeignedly believe his holy Goſpel. Now is not this an ineſtimable advantage we enjoy by the Scriptures, that therein we underſtand what God himſelf hath diſcover'd of his own Nature and Perfections, and of his readineſs to pardon ſin upon thoſe gracious terms of *Faith* and *Repentance*, and

2 Cor. 5. 18, 19.

Rom. 10. 14.

Act. 14. 14. Luk. 6. 35, 36.

and that which neceſſarily follows from theſe two, hearty and ſincere Obedience?

VI. 2. *The Scripture gives the moſt faithful repreſentation of the ſtate and condition of the Soul of Man.* The World was almoſt loſt in Diſputes concerning the Nature, Condition, and Immortality of the Soul, before *Divine Revelation* was made known to Mankind by the *Goſpel* of *Chriſt*; but *Life and Immortality* was *brought to light by the Goſpel*, and the future ſtate of the Soul of Man, not diſcover'd in an uncertain *Platonical* way, but with the greateſt light and evidence from that God who hath the ſupreme diſpoſal of Souls, and therefore beſt knows and underſtands them. The Scriptures plainly and fully reveal a Judgment to come, in which *God will judg the ſecrets of all Hearts*, when *every one muſt give an account of himſelf unto God*, and God will call Men to give *an account of their ſtewardſhip* here, of all the Receipts they have had from him, and the Expences they have been at, and the Improvements they have made of the Talents he put into their hands. So that the *Goſpel* of *Chriſt* is the fulleſt Inſtrument of diſcovery of the certainty of the future ſtate of the Soul, and the conditions which abide it, upon its being diſlodg'd from the Body. But this is not all which the Scripture diſcovers as to the ſtate of the Soul; for it is not only a Proſpective-glaſs, reaching to its future ſtate, but it is the moſt faithful Looking-glaſs, to diſcover all the ſpots and deformities of the Soul: And not only ſhews where they are, but whence they came, what their nature is, and whither they tend. The true Original of all that diſorder and diſcompoſure which is in the Soul of Man, is only fully and ſatisfactorily given us in the Word of God, as hath been already prov'd. The nature and working of this corruption in Man, had never been ſo clearly manifeſted, had not the Law and Will of God been diſcover'd to the World: that is the Glaſs whereby we ſee the ſecret workings of thoſe Bees in our Hearts, the corruptions of our Natures; that ſets forth the folly of our Imaginations, the unrulineſs of our Paſſions, the diſtempers of our Wills, and the abundant deceitfulneſs of our Hearts. And it is hard for the Elephantin ſinner (one of the greateſt magnitude) ſo to trouble theſe Waters, as not therein to diſcover the greatneſs of his own deformities. But that which tends moſt to awaken the drowſy, ſenſleſs Spirits of Men, the Scripture doth moſt fully deſcribe the tendency of Corruption; that the wages of *ſin* is *death*, and the iſſue of continuance in ſin will be the everlaſting miſery of the Soul, in a perpetual ſeparation from the preſence of God, and undergoing the laſhes and ſeverities of Conſcience to all eternity. What a great diſcovery is this of the faithfulneſs of God to the World, that he ſuffers not Men to undo themſelves without letting them know of it before-hand, that they might avoid it! God ſeeks not to entrap Mens Souls, nor doth he rejoyce in the miſery and ruin of his Creatures; but fully declares to them what the conſequence and iſſue of their practices will be, aſſures them of a Judgment to come, declares his own future ſeverity againſt contumacious Sinners, that they might not think themſelves ſurpriz'd, and that if they had known there had been ſo great danger in ſin, they would never have been ſuch fools, as for the ſake of it to run into eternal miſery.

fery. Now God, to prevent this, with the greateſt plainneſs and faithfulneſs hath ſhew'd Men the nature and danger of all their ſins, and asks them before-hand what they will do in the end thereof; whether they are able to bear his Wrath, and wreſtle with everlaſting burnings? if not, he bids them bethink themſelves of what they have done already, and repent, and amend their Lives, leſt *iniquity prove their ruin*, and *deſtruction overtake them, and that without remedy*. Now if Men have cauſe to prize and value a faithful Monitor, one that tenders their good, and would prevent their ruin; we have cauſe exceedingly to prize and value the Scriptures, which give us the trueſt repreſentation of the ſtate and condition of our Souls.

3. *The Scripture diſcovers to us the only way of pleaſing God, and enjoying his favor.* That clearly reveals the way (which Man might have ſought for to all eternity without particular Revelation) whereby ſins may be pardoned, and whatever we do may be acceptable unto God. It ſhews us that the ground of our acceptance with God, is thro' *Chriſt*, whom he hath made a *propitiation for the ſins of the World*, and who alone is the *true and living way*, whereby we may *draw near to God with a true heart, in full aſſurance of Faith, having our hearts ſprinkled from an evil conſcience*. Thro' *Chriſt* we underſtand the terms on which God will ſhew Favor and Grace to the World, and by him we have ground of a παῤῥησία, *acceſs with freedom and boldneſs unto God*. On his account we may hope not only for Grace to ſubdue our ſins, reſiſt temptations, conquer the Devil and the World; but having *fought this good fight and finiſhed our courſe, by patient continuance in well-doing*, we may juſtly *look for glory, honor, and immortality*, and that *crown of righteouſneſs which is laid up for thoſe who wait* in faith, holineſs, and humility, *for the appearance of Chriſt from Heaven*. Now what things can there be of greater moment and importance for Men to know, or God to reveal, than the Nature of God, and our ſelves, the ſtate and condition of our Souls, the only way to avoid eternal miſery, and enjoy everlaſting Bliſs?

VII. 2. The Scriptures diſcover not only matters of importance, but of the greateſt depth and myſteriouſneſs. There are many *wonderful things in the Law of God*, things we may admire, but are never able to comprehend. Such are the eternal Purpoſes and Decrees of God, the Doctrin of the *Trinity*, the Incarnation of the Son of God, and the manner of the Operation of the Spirit of God on the Souls of Men, which are all things of great weight and moment for us to underſtand and believe that they are; and yet may be unſearchable to our Reaſon, as to the particular manner of them. What certain ground our Faith ſtands on as to theſe things hath been already ſhew'd, and therefore I forbear inſiſting on them.

Book II. Ch. 8. Sect. 5, 6, 7.

3. The Scripture comprehends matters of the moſt univerſal ſatisfaction to the Minds of Men; tho' many things do much exceed our Apprehenſions, yet others are moſt ſutable to the Dictates of our Nature. As *Origen* bid *Celſus* ſee, Εἰ μὴ ἄρα τὸ πίστεως ἡμῶν ἕξις τοῖς κοιναῖς ἐννοίαις ἀρέσκειν σπουδάζουσα, μᾶλλον ἤνεγκε τὰς συγγενομένους ἀκόντως τῶν λεγομένων, *Whether it was not the agreeableneſs of the Principles of Faith with the common Notions of Human Nature, which prevail'd moſt upon all candid*

Orig. contr. Celſ. l. 3. p. 135.

candid and ingenuous auditors of them. And therefore as *Socrates* ſaid of *Heraclitus* his Books, What he underſtood was excellent, and therefore he ſuppos'd that which he did not underſtand was ſo too: ſo ought we to ſay of the Scriptures; If thoſe things which are within our capacity be ſo ſutable to our Natures and Reaſons, thoſe cannot contradict our Reaſon which yet are above them. There are many things which the Minds of Men were ſufficiently aſſur'd that they were, yet were to ſeek for ſatisfaction concerning them, which they could never have had without Divine Revelation. As the Nature of true Happineſs, wherein it lay, and how to be obtain'd, which the Philoſophers were ſo puzl'd with, the Scripture gives us full ſatisfaction concerning it. True contentment under the troubles of Life, which the Scripture only acquaints us with the true grounds of; and all the preſcriptions of Heathen *Moraliſts* fall as much ſhort of, as the directions of an *Empyric* do of a wiſe and skilful *Phyſician*. *Avoiding the fears of Death*, which can alone be thro' a grounded Expectation of a ſtate of Happineſs which Death leads Men to, which cannot be had but thro' the right underſtanding of the Word of God. Thus we ſee the excellency of the matters themſelves contain'd in this Revelation of the Mind of God to the World.

As the Matters themſelves are of an excellent Nature, ſo is the manner wherein they are reveal'd in the Scriptures, and that, VIII.

1. *In a clear and perſpicuous manner*; not but there may be ſtill ſome paſſages which are hard to be underſtood, as being either prophetical, or conſiſting of ambiguous Phraſes, or containing matters above our comprehenſion; but all thoſe things which concern the terms of Man's Salvation are deliver'd with the greateſt evidence and perſpicuity. Who cannot underſtand what theſe things mean, *What doth the Lord require of thee, but to do juſtly, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God?* that *without Faith it is impoſſible to pleaſe God*; that *without Holineſs none ſhall ſee the Lord*; that *unleſs we be born again, we can never enter into the Kingdom of Heaven?* Theſe and ſuch like things are ſo plain and clear, that it is nothing but Mens ſhutting their Eyes againſt the Light can keep them from underſtanding them: God intended theſe things as Directions to Men; and is not he able to ſpeak intelligibly when he pleaſe? He that made the Tongue, ſhall he not ſpeak ſo as to be underſtood without an infallible Interpreter? eſpecially when it is his deſign to make known to Men the terms of their eternal Happineſs. Will God judg Men at the great day for not believing thoſe things which they could not underſtand? Strange! that ever Men ſhould judg the Scriptures obſcure in matters neceſſary, when the Scripture accounts it ſo great a judgment for Men not to underſtand them. *If our Goſpel be hid, it is hid to them that are loſt*; *In whom the god of this world hath blinded the minds of them which believe not, leſt the light of the glorious Goſpel of Chriſt ſhould ſhine unto them.* Sure *Lot*'s door was viſible enough, if it were a judgment for the Men of *Sodom* not to ſee it; and the Scriptures then are plain and intelligible enough, if it be ſo great a judgment not to underſtand them. 2. 2 Cor. 4. 3, 4.

2. *In a powerful and authoritative manner*; as the things contain'd in Scripture do not so much beg acceptance as command it; in that the expressions wherein our duty is concern'd are such as awe Mens Consciences, and pierce to their Hearts and to their secret thoughts; *All things are open and naked before this Word of God; every secret of the Mind and thought of the heart lies open to its stroke and force; it is quick and powerful, sharper than a two-edged sword, piercing to the dividing asunder of soul and spirit, and of the joynts and marrow, and is a discerner of the thoughts and intents of the heart.* The *Word* is a *Telescope* to discover the great Luminaries of the World, the Truths of highest concernment to the Souls of Men; and it is such a *Microscope* as discovers to us the smallest *Atom* of our Thoughts, and discerns the most secret intent of the Heart. And, as far as this Light reacheth, it comes with Power and Authority, as it comes arm'd with the Majesty of that God who reveals it, whose Authority extends over the Soul and Conscience of Man in its most secret and hidden recesses.

Heb. 4. 12, 13.

3. *In a pure and unmix'd manner*; in all other Writings how good soever, we see a great mixture of dross and gold together; here is nothing but pure gold, Diamonds without flaws, Suns without spots. The most current Coins of the World have their Alloys of baser Metals, there is no such mixture in Divine Truths; as they all come from the same Author, so they all have the same purity. There is a *Urim* and *Thummim* upon the whole Scripture, Light and Perfection in every part of it. In the Philosophers we may meet, it may be, with some scattered fragments of purer Metal, amidst abundance of dross and impure Oar; here we have whole wedges of Gold, the same vein of purity and holiness running thro' the whole Book of Scriptures. Hence it is call'd the *form of sound words*; here have been no hucksters to corrupt and mix their own Inventions with Divine Truths.

2 Tim. 1. 13.

IX. 4. *In an uniform and agreeable manner.* This I grant is not sufficient of it self to prove the Scriptures to be Divine, because all Men do not contradict themselves in their Writings; but yet there are some peculiar circumstances to be consider'd in the agreeableness of the parts of Scripture to each other, which are not to be found in mere human Writings. 1. That this *Doctrine was delivered by persons who lived in different Ages and Times from each other.* Usually one Age corrects another's faults, and we are apt to pity the Ignorance of our Predecessors, when it may be our Posterity may think us as ignorant as we do them. But in the sacred Scripture we read not one Age condemning another; we find Light still increasing in the series of times in Scripture, but no reflexions in any time upon the Ignorance, or Weakness of the precedent; the dimmest Light was sufficient for its Age, and was a step to further discovery. *Quintilian* gives it as the reason of the great uncertainty of *Grammar* Rules, *Quia non analogia dimissa cœlo formam loquendi dedit*; that which he wanted as to *Grammar*, we have as to Divine Truths; they are deliver'd from Heaven, and therefore are always uniform and agreeable to each other.

Quint. l. 1. *cap.* 6.

2. *By persons of different interests in the World.* God made choice of Men of all ranks to be Inditers of his *Oracles*, to make it

it appear it was no matter of State-policy or particular intereſt which was contain'd in his Word, which Perſons of ſuch different intereſts, could not have agreed in as they do. We have *Moſes*, *David*, *Solomon*, Perſons of Royal Rank and Quality; and can it be any mean thing, which theſe think it their glory to be Penners of? We have *Iſaiah*, *Daniel*, and other Perſons of the higheſt Education and Accompliſhments; and can it be any trivial thing which theſe imploy themſelves in? We have *Amos*, and other Prophets in the Old Teſtament, and the Apoſtles in the New, of the meaner ſort of Men in the World, yet all theſe joyn in conſort together; when God tunes the Spirits, all agree in the ſame ſtrain of Divine Truths, and give light and Harmony to each other.

3. *By perſons in different places and conditions*; ſome in proſperity in their own Country, ſome under baniſhment and adverſity, yet all agreeing in the ſame ſubſtance of Doctrine; of which no alteration we ſee was made either for the flattery of thoſe in power, or for avoiding miſeries and calamities. And under all the different diſpenſations before, under and after the Law, tho' the management of things was different, yet the Doctrine and Deſign was for Subſtance the ſame in all. All the different diſpenſations agree in the ſame common Principles of Religion; the ſame ground of acceptance with God, and obligation to duty was common to all, tho' the peculiar inſtances wherein God was ſerv'd might be different, according to the Ages of growth in the Church of God. So that this great uniformity conſider'd in theſe circumſtances, is an Argument that theſe things came originally from the ſame Spirit, tho' convey'd thro' different Inſtruments to the knowledg of the World.

5. *In a perſuaſive and convincing manner:* and that theſe ways. 1. *Bringing Divine Truths down to our capacity*, clothing Spiritual matter in familiar expreſſions and ſimilitudes, that ſo they might have the eaſier admiſſion into our Minds. 2. *Propounding things as our intereſt which are our duty:* thence God ſo frequently in Scripture, recommends our duties to us under all thoſe motives which are wont to have the greateſt force on the Minds of Men; and annexeth gracious Promiſes to our Performance of them; and thoſe of the moſt weighty and concerning things. *Of Grace, Favor, Protection, Deliverance, Audience of Prayers*, and *Eternal Happineſs:* and if theſe will not prevail with Men, what Motives will? 3. *Courting us to Obedience, when he might not only command us to obey, but puniſh preſently for diſobedience.* Hence are all thoſe moſt pathetical and affectionate ſtrains we read in Scripture. *O that there was ſuch a heart within them, that they would fear me and keep all my commandments always, that it might go well with them, and with their children after them.* Deut. 5. 29. *Wo unto thee, O Jeruſalem, wilt thou not be made clean? when ſhall it once be? Turn ye, turn ye from your evil ways, for why will ye die, O houſe of Iſrael?* Jer. 13. 27. Ezek. 33. 11. *How ſhall I give thee up, Ephraim? how ſhall I deliver thee, Iſrael? how ſhall I make thee as Admah? how ſhall I ſet thee as Zeboim? mine heart is turned within me, my repentings are kindled together. O Jeruſalem, Jeruſalem, how often would I have gathered* Hoſ. 11. 8. Matth. 23. 37.

thy children together, as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, and ye would not. What Majeſty, and yet what ſweetneſs and condeſcenſion is there in theſe expreſſions? What obſtinacy and rebellion is it in Men for them to ſtand out againſt God, when he thus comes down from his Throne of Majeſty, and wooes rebellious Sinners to return unto him that they may be pardoned? Such a matchleſs and unparallell'd ſtrain of *Rhetoric* is there in the Scripture, far above the Art and Inſinuations of the moſt admired *Orators*. Thus we ſee the peculiar excellency of the manner wherein the matters contain'd in Scripture are reveal'd to us: Thus we have conſider'd the Excellency of the Scripture, as it is a Diſcovery of God's Mind to the World.

X. 2. The Scriptures may be conſidered as a *Rule of Life*, or as a *Law of God*, which is given for the Government of the Lives of Men, and therein the Excellency of it lies in the Nature of the Duties, and the Encouragements to the Practice of them.

1. In the Nature of the Duties requir'd, which are *moſt becoming God to require*, moſt reaſonable for us to perform.

1. *Moſt becoming God to require*, as they are moſt ſutable and agreeable to the Divine Nature, the imitation of which in our Actions, is the ſubſtance of our Religion. Imitation of him in his Goodneſs and Holineſs, by our conſtant Endeavors of mortifying Sin, and growing in Grace and Piety. In his Grace and Mercy, by our kindneſs to all Men, forgiving the injuries Men do unto us, *doing good to our greateſt enemies*. In his Juſtice and Equity, by *doing as we would be done by, and keeping a conſcience void of offence towards God and towards Men*. The firſt takes in the Duties of the firſt, the other the Duties of the ſecond Table. *All acts of piety towards God*, are a part of Juſtice; for, as *Tully* ſaith, *Quid aliud eſt pietas, niſi juſtitia adverſus Deos?* and ſo *our loving God with our whole hearts, our intire and ſincere obedience to his Will*, is a part of Natural Juſtice; for thereby we do but render unto God that which is his due from us as we are his Creatures. We ſee then the whole Duty of Man, *the fearing God and keeping his Commaudments*, is as neceſſary a part of Juſtice, as the rendring to every Man his own is.

2. They are moſt reaſonable for us to perform, in that, 1. *Religion* is not only a ſervice of the Reaſonable Faculties which are imploy'd the moſt in it, the commands of the Scripture reaching the heart moſt in it, and the ſervice requir'd being a ſpiritual ſervice, not lying in Meats and Drinks, or any outward Obſervations, but in a ſanctify'd temper of Heart and Mind, which diſcovers it ſelf in the courſe of a *Chriſtian*'s Life: but, 2. The Service it ſelf of Religion is reaſonable; the Commands of the *Goſpel* are ſuch as no Man's Reaſon which conſiders them can doubt of the excellency of them. All Natural Worſhip is founded on the Dictates of Nature, all inſtituted Worſhip on God's revealed Will; and it is one of the prime Dictates of Nature, that God muſt be univerſally obey'd. Beſides, God requires nothing but what is apparently Man's intereſt to do; God prohibits nothing but what will deſtroy him if he doth it; ſo that the Commands of the Scriptures are very juſt and reaſonable.

2. The

2. The Encouragements are more than proportionable to the difficulty of Obedience. God's Commands are in themſelves eaſy, and moſt ſutable to our Natures. What more rational for a Creature than to obey his Maker? all the difficulty of Religion ariſeth from the corruption of Nature. Now God to encourage Men to conquer the difficulties ariſing thence, hath propounded the ſtrongeſt Motives and moſt prevailing Arguments to Obedience. Such are the conſiderations of God's Love and Goodneſs manifeſted to the World, by ſending his Son into it, to die for Sinners, and to give them an example which they are to follow, and by his readineſs thro' him to pardon the ſins, and accept the Perſons of ſuch who *ſo receive him as to walk in him*; and by his Promiſes of Grace to aſſiſt them in the wreſtling with the enemies of their Salvation. And to all theſe add that glorious and unconceivable reward which God hath promis'd to all thoſe who ſincerely obey him; and by theſe things we ſee how much the encouragements over-weigh the difficulties, and that none can make the leaſt pretence that there is not motive ſufficient to down-weigh the troubles which attend the exerciſe of Obedience to the will of God. Thus we ſee what a peculiar excellency there is in the Scriptures as a Rule of Life, above all the Precepts of mere *Moraliſts*; the foundation of Obedience being laid deeper in Man's Obligation to ſerve his Maker, the practice of Obedience being carry'd higher in thoſe moſt holy Precepts which are in Scripture, the reward of Obedience being incomparably greater than what Men are able to conceive, much leſs to promiſe or beſtow.

3. The Excellency of the Scriptures appears, as they contain in them a Covenant of Grace, or the Tranſactions between God and Man, in order to his eternal Happineſs. The more memorable any Tranſactions are, the more valuable are any authentic Records of them. The Scriptures contain in them the *Magna Charta* of Heaven, an Act of Pardon with the Royal Aſſent of Heaven, a Proclamation of Good-will from God towards Men; and can we then ſet too great a value on that which contains all the remarkable paſſages between God and the Souls of Men, in order to their Felicity, from the beginning of the World? Can we think, ſince there is a God in the World of infinite Goodneſs, that he ſhould ſuffer all Mankind to periſh inevitably, without his propounding any means for eſcaping of eternal Miſery? Is God ſo good to Men as to this preſent Life; and can we think if Man's Soul be immortal, as we have prov'd it is, that he ſhould wholly neglect any offer of good to Men as to their eternal welfare? Or is it poſſible to imagine that Man ſhould be happy in another World without God's promiſing it, and preſcribing conditions in order to it? If ſo, then this Happineſs is no free gift of God, unleſs he hath the beſtowing and promiſing of it; and Man is no rational Agent, unleſs a reward ſuppoſe conditions to be perform'd in order to the obtaining it; or Man may be bound to conditions which were never requir'd him; or if they muſt be requir'd, then there muſt be a Revelation of God's Will, whereby he doth require them: And if ſo, then there are ſome Records extant of the Tranſactions between God and Man, in order to his eternal Happineſs: For what reaſon can we have to imagine that ſuch Re-

cords, if once extant, ſhould not continue ſtill, eſpecially ſince the ſame Goodneſs of God is engag'd to preſerve ſuch Records, which at firſt did cauſe them to be indited? Suppoſing then ſuch Records, extant ſomewhere in the World of theſe grand Tranſactions between God and Mens Souls, our buſineſs is brought to a Period; for what other Records are there in the World that can in the leaſt vye with the Scriptures, as to the giving ſo juſt an account of all the Tranſactions between God and Men from the foundation of the World? Which gives us all the ſteps, methods and ways whereby God hath made known his Mind and Will to the World, in order to Man's eternal Salvation. It remains only then that we adore and magnify the Goodneſs of God in making known his Will to us, and that we ſet a value and eſteem on the Scriptures, as on the only authentic Inſtruments of that *Grand Charter of Peace*, which God hath reveal'd in order to Man's Eternal Happineſs.

FINIS.

BRITISH MUSEUM 8 DE 74

ORIGINES SACRAE:

OR A

RATIONAL ACCOUNT

Of the Grounds of NATURAL and REVEAL'D

RELIGION:

WHEREIN

The Foundations of Religion, and the Authority of the SCRIPTURES are asserted and clear'd;

WITH

An Answer to the Modern Objections

OF

ATHEISTS and DEISTS.

In Five BOOKS.

By the Right Reverend Father in GOD *EDWARD,*
late Lord Bishop of WORCESTER.

CAMBRIDGE,

Printed at the University-Press, for HENRY MORTLOCK,
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THE

ORIGINES SACRAE.

BOOK I.

DISCOURSE I.

CHAP. I.

The General Prejudices againſt Religion in our Age examin'd; and the old Atheiſtical Hypotheſes *conſider'd.*

BEFORE I come to the particular Vindication of the *Truth* and *Authority* of the *Holy Scriptures*, which is my chief Deſign, it will be neceſſary to remove, if poſſible, the common and general Prejudices againſt Religion in this Age, as if it were only a cunning Artifice of ſome crafty Perſons to ſupport their own intereſt by deceiving the reſt of Mankind. If this were the truth of the caſe, none ought to be blam'd for their Contempt of Religion; nor for their endeavors to ſet the Minds of Men free from the uneaſineſs and ſlavery of a ſuperſtitious and groundleſs Fear: For this muſt be all that is imply'd in Religion, if it were at firſt begun, and is ſtill carry'd on by the Craft of ſome men, and the Folly of the reſt. But ſuch an imputation as this ought to be very well grounded, becauſe it reflects on all Mankind (a very few excepted) and ought in common juſtice to be prov'd by the moſt clear and convincing Evidence; becauſe no men have any reaſon to preſume ſo far upon their own Wit and Capacity above all others, as to take it for granted, that the reſt of Mankind are either *Fools* or *Knaves*. For this is the meaning of thoſe who go about to perſuade others, that Religion is nothing but *an Impoſture*, that hath appear'd under ſeveral ſhapes and diſguiſes; but ſtill the *Machine* is the ſame, and the ſame Deſign carry'd on by the different Actors, according to the Humor and Inclination of ſeveral Ages.

I could be glad, that all this might juſtly be look'd on as a feign'd caſe, only for a better Introduction to the following Diſcourſes; but none that live in our Age, and underſtand the too great prevalency of Scepticiſm and Infidelity in it, can apprehend it to be ſo. And therefore I ſhall lay down the true ſtate of the preſent Caſe, with reſpect to Religion in general. It cannot be deny'd by the greateſt Enemies to it, that there is ſtill a general Belief of the truth of it among Mankind, however they differ in their particular Notions about it. For this cannot be look'd on as a new Thing, or an Invention of the preſent Age, ſince it is manifeſt by the undoubted Hiſtory of former Times, that the ſame foundations of Religion have been generally receiv'd by Mankind; by

which I underſtand the Being of God and Providence, and the Rewards and Puniſhments of a future State; but yet not ſo, but that there have been in ſeveral Ages ſuch as have gone about to unſettle Mens Minds about them, and to repreſent them as an invention of *Politicians* to keep the World in greater Awe. But they have not met with ſuch ſucceſs as they expected in their Diſcoveries; for they have been oppos'd by the wiſeſt and moſt thoughtful Men in the ſeveral Ages they appear'd in; and the generality of Mankind continu'd in the ſame Belief which they had before. And yet they had then the ſame inclinations to Eaſe and Pleaſure, as they now have, and would have been as willing to be rid of the terrible apprehenſions of God and another World; they had the ſame value and eſteem for themſelves and their own intereſts, and hated all ſuch as deſign'd to cheat them; they fell into warm Diſputes and violent Heats about ſome particular Parts and Modes of Religion, which are apt to make them call all the reſt into queſtion: Yet under all theſe diſadvantages, the Foundations of Religion have been preſerv'd among them; and Mankind cannot be brought to look on them as *an Impoſture*. But thoſe who think ſo, are forc'd in great meaſure to conceal their thoughts, and to put on diſguiſes to the World, that they may appear to be of another Mind than really they are.

Whence then comes it to paſs, that thoſe who are averſe to the Practice of Religion, yet cannot be brought to ſhake off the Principles of it? That thoſe who are otherwiſe ſo fond of their own eaſe and intereſt, ſhould abhor thoſe Atheiſtical Principles, which are ſaid to be very much for the advantage of both? That thoſe Nations which have had no communication with each other, and differ ſo much from one another in Languages, cuſtoms and modes of Religion, yet agree in the ſame common ſenſe of God, and a future ſtate?

It is a ridiculous thing for any to pretend to make our Religion to be *an Impoſture*, unleſs they can firſt give a juſt and ſatisfactory account of theſe things.

All that I can meet with to that purpoſe, may be reduc'd to theſe three Heads; which contain the great *Atheiſtical* Pretenſes of this Age.

I. That the Notions of Religion were firſt ſtarted among rude and barbarous People by *Politicians*, to keep the People in better Awe; and that the *Prieſts* found it their intereſt to ſupport them, becauſe they were ſupported by them.

II. That there are ſome *Peculiar Qualities in Mankind*, which joyn'd with their *Ignorance* and *Fear*, tend to preſerve *that ſeed of Religion which is in Man, and no other living Creature*.

III. That the conſent of Mankind is not ſo great, as is pretended, there being ſeveral Nations now known by the late diſcoveries, which have no ſenſe or notion of God, or a future ſtate.

Theſe are the things, which I ſhall now make it my buſineſs to inquire into; and thereby ſhew the vanity and folly of theſe general Prejudices againſt Religion.

I begin with the firſt, That Religion was firſt invented and carry'd on by *Politicians* and *Prieſts*, who aim'd only at keeping the World in better awe, and Themſelves in a better condition. This

hath

hath been ſuggeſted by Atheiſtical Perſons in all Ages, where they have dar'd to appear; and was thought the moſt plauſible Artifice to draw in the People to their party; for no Men love to be impos'd upon, eſpecially in what concerns their eaſe and intereſt; but they were not able to make out the Perſons, Times, or Places, when the Notions of Religion were firſt ſpread among Mankind. For they could never produce any inſtances of Perſons who deſign'd to impoſe upon Mankind in matters of Religion, but they found the general Principles of Religion were entertain'd among them before; as will appear by the following Examples of the *Egyptians* and *Greeks*, which are moſt inſiſted upon.

The *Egyptians* are ſaid by *Lucian* to have been the firſt who ſet up *Religious Worſhip*: and *Herodotus* ſeems to be of the ſame opinion; *Plutarch* ſaith it was done by *Oſiris*, and *Diodorus Siculus* ſaith *it was directed by Hermes, who was a great Politician*, and *Chief Counſellor to Oſiris*. But all that *Diodorus* ſaith is, *that he brought the Honors and Services of the Gods into Order*; which ſuppoſes, that there was Religion among them before, but he methodiz'd it. And if we believe *Sanchoniathon*, who makes him firſt Counſellor to *Cronus* Father to *Miſor* or *Oſiris*, he began *the Symbolical Images of the Gods*, which caus'd ſuch confuſion in their Worſhip afterwards. *Diodorus* ſaith *that Oſiris built Thebes or Dioſpolis*; where there was a Temple to *the Immortal God that made the World*, as appears by the Teſtimonies both of *Plutarch* and *Porphyry*. And the former obſerves, *That the moſt ancient, and univerſal and moſt credible Tradition, both of Law-givers and others, Philoſophers, as well as Poets and Divines, was, that the World was not made by chance, without a Mind and Reaſon to order and govern it*. From whence it follows, That before ſuch *Politicians* took upon them to order matters of Religion, there was a generally receiv'd Tradition of a Divine Being, which made and govern'd the World, and was the true foundation on which religious Worſhip was built. And the ſame *Plutarch* in that Diſcourſe affirms it to be *an Impious and Atheiſtical opinion to attribute the Name of* God *to inſenſible matter*; and adds, *that there is One univerſal Reaſon which governs the World*. *Ammianus Marcellinus* ſaith, *that the firſt beginnings of Religion were in Egypt long before they were in other parts*. Here therefore we muſt ſearch out for the firſt laying this deſign by *Politicians*; and here we find it fix'd upon *Hermes Triſmegiſtus*, who by the accounts given of him, was a very great Man, and that in the beginning of the *Egyptian Monarchy*. *Philo Byblius* ſaith, he was call'd by the *Egyptians Thoth*, by the *Phœnicians Taautus*, by the *Greeks Hermes*; he flouriſh'd, he ſaith, *with great reputation for wiſdom among the Phœnicians*; who it ſeems at that time, were under the government of *Cronus* Father to *Oſiris* (or *Miſor* as they call'd him from *Miſraim*, the Son of *Ham*, who firſt peopled thoſe Countries.) And ſo far there is nothing improbable in the Story. For the ſame Perſon being of an extraordinary Capacity, might be in favor both with *Cronus* in *Phœnicia*, and with *Oſiris* afterwards in *Egypt*; but he goeth on, and ſaith, That *Taautus* was * *the firſt who took the matters of religious Worſhip, out of the hands of unskilful Men, and brought them into due method and order*. So that we find plainly there was

Lucian. de Deâ Syriâ. Herodot. 2. 4. Plutarch. de Iſid. & Oſiride. Diod. Sicul. l. 1.

Euſeb. Præp. Ev. l. 1. c. 10. Plutarch. de Iſid. & Oſirid. Euſeb. Præp. Ev. l. 3. c. 11. Plutarch. ib. p. 369.

Ammian. Marc. l. 22.

Euſeb. Pr. Ev. l. 1. c. 10. p. 40.

* Πρῶτος δὲ καὶ τὴν θεοσεβείαν ἐκ τῶν χυδαίων ἀπειρίας, εἰς ἐπιστημονικὴν εὐπειθείαν διέταξεν.

Religion among the People before, but this wiſe Politician thought he could manage it better, if he appointed the Rites of public worſhip, ſo as to be moſt ſerviceable to Government. And for that end he ſet up the worſhip of Princes after their Death (eſpecially of *Oſiris*, after his being cut in pieces by his Brother) and joyn'd their Names with thoſe of the Stars, as viſible Deities; and of ſome Animals, as ſo many living Images of their Gods. And herein, as far as we can find, lay the politic invention of *Hermes Triſmegiſtus*; not in the firſt planting the principles of Religion, but in turning them that way, as he thought would ſerve beſt to the ends of Government; by raiſing a high veneration for deceas'd Monarchs; and deifying ſuch things as they thought moſt uſeful to Mankind. This was indeed playing the *Politician* with Religion. But that there was a ſenſe of Religion before among the People, not only appears by the former ſaying of *Philo Byblius*, but by another in his *Proëm to Sanchoniathon*: where he ſaith, *That the* Phœnicians *and* Egyptians *agreed* (*from whom other Nations took it up*) *to worſhip thoſe as their chief Gods, which were moſt uſeful to Mankind; and to this purpoſe they turn'd the Temples already ſtanding and erected Pillars & Statues to their Memories, and made Feſtivals to them.* From whence it appears that there were Rites of public worſhip among them before, but that *Hermes* caus'd them to be imploy'd this way; joyning the worſhip of the Stars and their Kings together.

Καὶ εἰς τὸ θεῖον καθεστάναι νεὼς μετὰ σκιαποδημίας.

But there are two very different accounts concerning that Religion which was firſt ſetled by *Hermes* in *Egypt*. The one is of thoſe who believe there are ſome remainders of the old *Egyptian* Doctrine in the *Triſmegiſtic Books*, tho' with many additions and interpolations. And their opinion is, that under all the popular diſguiſes and ſuperſtitious Ceremonies for amuſing the common People, he did cover the true principles of Natural Religion, aſſerting the Being and Providence of God, and the Immortality of Souls. And for this, they produce not only diverſe paſſages in thoſe Books of *Hermes*, which were known in the Egyptian times, while their Prieſts were yet in being to have contradicted them if they had publiſh'd falſhoods under ſo great a Name; but from the teſtimonies of *Plutarch* and *Iamblichus*, which cannot be ſuſpected: To which the opinions of *Pythagoras* and *Plato*, who ſojourn'd ſo long among the *Egyptian* Prieſts to learn their Doctrine, may be added. But it is not pretended, that in thoſe times, this was the common and profeſs'd Religion among the People; but that it was kept up *as a Secret*, not to be communicated, but only to ſuch who were prepar'd for it. According to this opinion, the deſign of *Hermes* was not to eſtabliſh any true Religion among the People, but to entertain them with Pomp and Sacrifices, and Ceremonies; and (as ſome in *Plutarch* and *Diodorus* think) to keep up a difference among them about the ſacred Animals to ſecure them from an univerſal Conſpiracy againſt the Monarchy. But if the true notions of God and Providence, and another World, were preſerv'd among the Prieſts, eſpecially at *Dioſpolis*, or the famous *Thebes*, where the chief of their reſidence was; then it appears, that theſe were not ſcatter'd among the common People, by *Prieſts* and *Politicians*; but were kept ſecret, as not

Plutarch. de Iſid. & Oſir. p. 380. *Diod. Sic. l.* 1.

ſo

ſo fit for their capacities, which would go no further than viſible Deities, and a pompous worſhip. So that the True principles of Religion were not ſow'd by them to ſerve their ends, but the Corruptions of it in order to the pleaſing and entertaining the ſenſes and devotions of the common People, who they knew were moſt affected with what was moſt agreeable to their ſuperſtitious fancies. And there was much more of *Policy* than *Religion*, in keeping the Beſt parts of it from the knowledg of the People: but the *Politicians* knew very well, thoſe would not ſerve their turn ſo well as the fopperies of their Superſtition.

But there is another opinion which depends moſt upon the credit of *Philo Byblius*, who liv'd about *Hadrian*'s time. This Man being learned, had a Mind to make ſome noiſe in the World with the *Antiquities* of his own Country (for *Byblus* was a *Phœnician* Town.) He found the Jewiſh Antiquities aſſerted by *Joſephus* and others, and the Egyptian by *Apion*; and now he thought was a fit time to vye with them both. To that end, he produces Nine Books of the *Phœnician Antiquities*, written, as he pretended, long ſince by *Sanchoniathon*, and tranſlated by him into *Greek*; which he pretends *to have found after a moſt diligent ſearch into the* Phœnician *Monuments*. And to make it appear how credible this account of *Sanchoniathon* was, he ſaith, *He took it out of the Records of Cities, and the Monuments of Temples; which were kept up in the ſacred Ammonian Letters.* And this Man is very much commended by *Porphyry* writing againſt the *Chriſtians* for his *Antiquity* and *Veracity*. What ground there is for theſe pretenſes may be examin'd afterwards; I am now only to conſider the ſcheme of Religion, which is produc'd with ſo much pomp; and yet the Author of it, whoever he was, was neither Divine, Philoſopher, nor Politician, for it is one of the rankeſt and moſt inſipid pieces of Atheiſm that is to be found in Antiquity. And *Porphyry* could not but deteſt it, unleſs he had produc'd it in ſpite to the *Chriſtians*. For he doth on all occaſions declare not only his belief of God and Providence, but that he was the Maker of the World; as *Holſtenius* hath made it appear in his Life, cap. 9. and it is well known that he was a profeſs'd *Platoniſt*. But let us now ſee what an account we have from this *Phœnician Scheme*, about the making of the World. "At firſt there was a dark, confus'd, reſtleſs Chaos, "which was agitated for a long time, and nothing came of it. At "length, a mixture happened, and this was the firſt principle of "making the Univerſe: but it was ignorant of its own making. "From this Mixture came *Môt*, or a ſlimy kind of ſubſtance, out "of which iſſued the Generation of all things. There were ſome "Animals which had no Senſe; out of which came thoſe which had "Underſtanding, and were called *Zophaſemin*, i. e. Beholders of "the Heavens, and were made in the figure of an Egg: and the "*Môt* ſhined forth, and the Sun and Moon and great Stars ap-"pear'd. But it ſeems thoſe living Creatures were faſt aſleep, till "they were awaked by dreadful Thunders, and then they began to "beſtir themſelves. This is the ſhort account of this matter, which depends not, we are told, on *Sanchoniathon*'s Authority; *but he took it out of the Records of* Taautus *himſelf*. And ſo we have the Original of the World according to this ancient *Hermes*. And if

Euſeb. Prep. Ev. l. 1. c. 9.

Euſeb. l. 10. c. 9.

this were his true Doctrine, it is one of the moſt abſurd and ſenſleſs pieces of Atheiſm, and tends directly to overthrow all Religion in the World. For can any thing do it more effectually, than to ſuppoſe, that there was nothing originally in the World but ſtupid Matter; which by its own motion, without a God to give and direct it, ſhould produce the Heavens and Earth, and all living Creatures; and that Senſleſs creatures ſhould beget thoſe that had Underſtanding; and theſe not capable of acting, till they were throughly awaked by cracks of Thunder? Can we imagin this *Taautus* to have been any deep Philoſopher or Politician, by ſetting down ſuch extravagant and unreaſonable ſuppoſitions as theſe? But let us ſee how it was poſſible for him to advance any thing like Religion upon theſe grounds: He muſt be a Politician indeed that could do it. The firſt Men, he ſaith, conſecrated the fruits of the Earth, by which they liv'd, and worſhip'd them, and made oblations to them. This was a very notable beginning of Religion, according to this admirable Politician; for Mankind to worſhip what they devour'd. But *Cotta* in *Cicero* thought *No Man could be ſo mad to worſhip what he did eat*. But he ſaith, *That theſe notions of worſhip were ſutable to their weakneſs and puſillanimity*. This doth not give any account how they came to have any notions of Divine worſhip at all. What was there in the Plants, which made them give ſuch Reverence and Devotion to them? They ſaw how they grew out of the Earth, and had no power to help themſelves, when they made uſe of them for food. And how was it poſſible then to give Divine worſhip to them? which muſt ſuppoſe Power at leaſt in what is worſhip'd, or elſe it is a moſt ridiculous folly in Mankind to ſtoop to things ſo much below them. Now this original inclination to give Divine worſhip to ſomething or other, is that which argues that there is that which ſome call a Natural Seed of Religion in Human Nature; and muſt come from ſome antecedent Cauſe, ſince there could be nothing in theſe objects of worſhip, which ſhould move them to it; if it had been ſo, as *Sanchoniathon* repreſents it from the ancient Records of *Taautus*.

Ecquem tam amentem eſſe putas, ut illud quo veſcatur credat Deum eſſe? Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. 3, c. 16.

The two firſt Mortals, he ſaith, *were Æon* and *Protogonus*; and *their Children were Genus* and *Genea, who inhabited Phœnicia; and when they were ſcorched with the heat, they lift up their hands to the Sun, whom they believ'd to be the Lord of Heaven, and called him Beel-ſamen, the ſame*, ſaith he, *whom the Greeks call Ζεύς*. But how came they to imagin any Lord of Heaven, if they knew that the Sun was made out of ſenſleſs Matter, as well as themſelves? It may be ſaid, *That they being weak and ignorant, did not know it*. But how then came their poſterity to know it, if the very firſt Race of Mankind were ignorant of it? By what means came *Taautus* to be ſo well inform'd? Revelation cannot be pretended, for that ſuppoſes what they deny; *viz.* a Supreme Being, above Matter, which hath Underſtanding, and gives it to Mankind. But here Mankind come to be underſtanding Creatures, by being born of Animals that had no Senſe: which is a moſt unreaſonable Suppoſition. They could not have it by original Tradition, for that fails in the Fountain-head, if the firſt pair of Mortals knew nothing of it. Then they muſt find it out by Reaſon:

and

and how was that poſſible, if there was no Maker of the World, that there ſhould be *a Lord of Heaven?* It is a remarkable ſaying of *Ariſtotle* obſerv'd by *Cicero*, (who ſaw ſeveral of his pieces which we have not, after they were brought to *Rome* by *Sylla*, and put into order by *Andronicus Rhodius*) That if there were Men bred under ground, and had there all conveniencies of Life, without coming upon the ſurface of the Earth; but ſhould only hear that there was a God and a Divine Power; and afterwards theſe Perſons ſhould come out of their Caves, and behold the Earth, Sea, and the Heavens; the greatneſs of the Clouds, the force of the Wind, the bulk, and beauty, and influence of the Sun, with the orderly motions and courſes of the heavenly Bodies: they could not but think, not only that there was a Divine Power, but that theſe things were the effects of it. And why ſhould there not have been the ſame thoughts in this firſt Race of Mankind, unleſs we can ſuppoſe that they had never heard of any ſuch thing as God, or a Divine Power in the World? But then I ask, How they ſhould come to think of worſhiping this *Beelſamen* or Lord of the Heavens? for ſo he confeſſes they did, and *lift up their hands to the Sun.* What could the lifting up their hands ſignify to a ſenſleſs maſs of Fire; which lately happened to be united together by chance in one body? If he had made Mankind wholly devoid of Religion, till they had been inſtructed in it by ſome crafty Politician, it had been much more agreeable to this *Hypotheſis*; but to ſuppoſe them to pray to the Heavenly Bodies ſo early, and without any Inſtructor, muſt imply ſome natural apprehenſion of a Deity, altho' they were ſo much miſtaken in the Object of Divine worſhip. But it is not reaſonable to believe this ſhould have been ſo early and ſo univerſal, but that they preſum'd the Sun, Moon, and Stars to have been the viſible Deities appointed to govern the viſible World; and that the Supreme Mind was to be worſhip'd in a way ſutable to his own Excellency, by acts of the Mind; which was the opinion of many Nations, and ſome of the greateſt Philoſophers.

De Nat. Deor. l. 2. 37.

Then he proceeds to relate, how after ſome of their poſterity had found out ſome uſeful Inventions, as to the conveniences of Life; after their death their Children erected Statues and Pillars to their Memories, and worſhip'd and kept Annual Feſtivals at them: and that after the death of *Uranus*, and *Cronus*, and *Dagon* and the reſt, *Taautus* made Symbolical Images of them, being made King of *Egypt* by *Cronus*; and theſe things he ſaith, the *Cabiri*, by *Taautus* his own command, enter'd into Records; from whence we are to believe that *Sanchoniathon* took them, and *Philo Byblius* tranſlated them out of the *Phœnician* Language. And *Euſebius* ſeems not to queſtion the antiquity of them, but prefers this plain and ſimple Story far before the Inventions of Poets, or the Allegories of the Philoſophers. If theſe things were recorded by the *Cabiri*, the ſons of *Sydyc*, Brother to *Miſor*, the Father of *Taautus*, they do not ſeem to have conſulted the honor of *Taautus*; for they make him not barely to be chief Counſellor to *Cronus*, in the deſign againſt his father *Uranus*, but that he made uſe of Magical Arts againſt him, (but they do not tell us who invented them; nor upon what principles they could be founded, if there were nothing but Matter in the World) and beſides this, he adviſ'd

Cronus,

Cronus, having a ſuſpicion of his brother, to bury him alive in the Earth. And one would think ſo great a Politician as *Hermes*, would never have commanded the *Cabiri* to have preſerv'd theſe Stories of himſelf and his Anceſtors.

However, this is the account given by *Philo Byblius*, out of *Sanchoniathon*, about the firſt planting Religion by *Hermes*, who was after, worſhiped himſelf as a God by the *Egyptians*. And now let any one conſider, whether this be a reaſonable or tolerable account of the firſt *ſowing the ſeeds of Religion among Mankind*. And yet this was the foundation of that ſort of Religion which came out of *Phœnicia* and *Egypt* into *Greece*: For they pretend to give an account of *Uranus* and *Cronus*, or *Saturn*, and his Sons, and of *Minerva* at *Athens*, to whom *Sanchoniathon* ſaith, *Saturn gave the dominion of it*; but the *Greeks*, as *Philo Byblius* complains, *confounded all with their Fables and Allegories*: but this, he ſaith, is the true foundation which they rais'd their *Mythology* upon.

It is evident by what is ſaid by *Herodotus*, *Diodorus Siculus* and others, that there were ſeveral Colonies that went out of *Egypt* into *Greece*, in the times of *Cecrops*, *Cadmus*, *Danaus*, and *Erectheus*; and it is very probable that they carry'd the *Egyptian* Superſtitions along with them: but the Perſon who is pretended to have ſetled Religion among the *Greeks*, was *Orpheus*, who is ſaid to have reduc'd them firſt from Barbariſm, and then to have model'd Religion among them, and to have brought out of *Egypt* the Doctrine of the Immortality of the Soul, and the Rewards and Puniſhments of a future ſtate.

This muſt therefore be more particularly inquired into. *Orpheus* is reported to have been a Man of Quality in his own Country of *Thrace*, his Father having a Command over a ſmall Territory there, called *Sithonia*, ſaith *Pliny*, near *the Mountain Rhodope*, whence he had his Title *Rhodopeïus Orpheus*. But *Diodorus Siculus* ſaith, *That when he had accompliſhed himſelf at home, he went into* Egypt; *and from thence brought the greateſt part of the Egyptian Myſteries into* Greece, *only changing the Names from* Oſiris *and* Iſis, *to* Bacchus *and* Ceres; and ſo he did, *as to the ſtate of the good and bad after death*. For, ſaith he, *The* Elyſian *fields for the good, and the torments of* Hades *for the bad, were both of Egyptian original*. I do not queſtion but the Egyptian ſuperſtition was in great meaſure the foundation of the *Greek*; but it is hard to determin any thing concerning *Orpheus*; ſince *Ariſtotle*, who was born in *Macedonia*, *knew nothing of him*, as *Cicero* informs us, and *That the Verſes under his Name were written by a Pythagorean*. Which is not at all improbable. But not only *Diodorus* ſpeaks poſitively about him, but *Strabo* and *Pauſanias* ſeem not at all to queſtion him; and *Diogenes Laertius* mentions an Epitaph upon him at *Dios* in *Macedonia*: But I lay no weight on the Verſes under his Name; for *Suidas* mentions ſeveral ancient Poets of that Name; and it is allow'd on all hands, that there have been at leaſt great Additions and Interpolations in the Verſes that bear the Name of *Orpheus*. The *Argonautics*, *Suidas* ſaith, were written by one *Orpheus* of *Crotone*, one well acquainted with *Piſiſtratus*; others ſay, the true Author of the *Orphic Poems*, was *Onomacritus*, who liv'd about

Plin. l. 4. c. 11. *Diod. Sic. l. 1. & 4.* *Euſeb. Pr. Evang. l. 2. c. 1.* *L. 10. c. 8.* *De Nat. Deor. l. 1.*

about that time; and the *Deſcent into Hades* was written by one *Orpheus* of *Camarine*, ſaith *Suidas*. The moſt probable opinion is that of *Ariſtotle*, that his Sacred Poems were written by a *Pythagorean*; and therefore the *Platoniſts Syrianus* and *Proclus* might well boaſt of the agreement of the *Orphic* and *Pythagorean Doctrines*. It is no objection, that there is no ſuch thing now to be found in *Ariſtotle*; for I think *Cicero* may be truſted, who ſaw more of *Ariſtotle* than we now have. But I confeſs if *Diodorus* were not deceiv'd by the Egyptian Prieſts, their mentioning him with *Pythagoras*, *Plato*, *Eudoxus*, and *Democritus*, who were certainly in *Egypt*, makes it very credible, that *Orpheus* had been there too, and carry'd many of the *Egyptian* ſuperſtitions with him: and he might the eaſier ſettle them in *Greece*, becauſe as *Diodorus Siculus* obſerves, he had a particular intereſt in the Colony which *Cadmus* brought, and was much eſteem'd by them; and *Cadmus* himſelf was originally of *Thebes* or *Dioſpolis*; altho' *Cadmus* himſelf might call it after his own Name; or at leaſt the Caſtle, which long continued it, when the City was called *Thebes*.

But that *Orpheus* did not find thoſe parts ſo barbarous, as to be deſtitute of all Religion before, will appear from the account *Diodorus Siculus* himſelf gives of him, *viz. That he was very well inſtructed in the Theology of his Country before he went into Egypt*. How could this be, if they were a wild and barbarous People, without any ſenſe of God and Religion, till he return'd and planted it among them? It's true, he calls it a *Mythology*; and what elſe were the Egyptian Doctrines about *Oſiris* and *Iſis*, or about *Bacchus* and *Ceres*, as *Orpheus* chang'd them? But whether it were a *Mythology* or not, he calls it a *Theology*; ſuch as was then known and thought to be true Doctrine, and I am apt to think, more decent and agreeable to their natural notions of Religion, than the Myſteries which *Orpheus* brought among them from the *Egyptians*. Some have obſerv'd, that the very Name of Religion among the *Greeks* was deriv'd from the *Thracians* (Θρησκεία) and ſuch religion they had among them, before *Orpheus* was born, as *Diodorus* himſelf confeſſes. Whether *Zamolxis* had inſtructed them in Religion before the time of *Orpheus*, we cannot determin, unleſs his time had been better fix'd: The *Greeks*, who write *Pythagoras* his Life in favor to themſelves, make *Zamolxis* his Servant; and that he went from them to inſtruct the *Getæ*, among whom he was honor'd as a God. But *Herodotus*, who extols them *as the moſt valiant and juſt of the Thracians*, after he hath told the *Greek* Story about *Zamolxis* being *Servant to Pythagoras*, he concludes, *That he thought him long before Pythagoras*. And he ſaith, *that the Thracians had that opinion of his Doctrine, that they deſpis'd death; ſaying, they only went to Zamolxis*. From whence it is plain, that the *Thracians* then believed the Immortality of the Soul: and *Pomponius Mela* ſaith, *That Belief continu'd among them to his time*. But whereas *Diodorus Siculus* affirms, that *Orpheus brought all the Mythology about Hades and the ſtate of the dead out of Egypt, and the cuſtoms of Burial there; For the Body was to be convey'd over the Lake Acheron by Charon, where on one ſide were pleaſant fields; and not far off the Temple of Hecate, and Cocytus, and Lethe:* I do not deny that *Orpheus* might add particular circumſtances from what

Καὶ ὁ περὶ τῆς Θεολογίας μυθολογούμενα μαθὼν, ἀπεδήμησε πρὸς τοὺς Αἰγυπτίους. l. 4. p. 232.

Herodot. l. 9. c. 95.

Mela l. 2. c. 2.

Diod. Sic. l. 1. p. 58, 61.

he had obſerv'd in *Egypt*; but that the whole Tradition concerning a future ſtate came from thence, is ſo far from being true, that the *Thracians*, the *Getæ* and *Hyperborei* had the like Tradition among them; as appears by the Gothic *Edda's*, where we read *of the Judgment* of another World, and that the Good ſhall dwell with *Odin* in a happy ſtate, and the Bad go to *Hellen* and *Thiſſulheim*; and a large account is given of the manner of Judicature in the other World, from the Braſs Tables of the *Hyperborei* in the Iſland of *Delos*, which are mention'd in the Dialogue *Axiochus* in *Plato*'s Works. And however it be not genuine, it is ſufficient to our purpoſe, that all this Tradition came not out of *Egypt*. One would think by the Account given by *Diodorus*, that neither *Orpheus*, nor the *Egyptians*, believ'd any thing at all concerning a future ſtate: but that only ſome Ceremonies were us'd about Burials, wherein the Lives of Men were inquir'd into, and Judgment paſs'd upon them; which the Hiſtorian thinks more effectual for reforming Mankind, than the Greek or Poetical Fables. But that the *Egyptians* had a real Belief of another ſtate, appears from *Diodorus* himſelf. For, if any Perſon were accus'd before the ſolemn Judicature, which ſat upon him; if the matter were not prov'd, the Accuſer was ſeverely puniſh'd; if it were, the Body was depriv'd of Burial; if there were no Accuſation, then the Perſon's virtues were remembred, his piety, juſtice, chaſtity, &c. and they concluded with a Prayer, that he might be admitted to the bleſſed Society of the Good; and the People applauded his Happineſs in that reſpect. But *Porphyry*, who cannot be ſuſpected of Forgery in this matter, gives a more particular Account of this Prayer; which he ſaith *Euphantus* tranſlated out of the Egyptian Language; and the ſubſtance of it is this: They firſt take out the Bowels, and put them into a cheſt on purpoſe, and then lift it up towards Heaven; and the Perſon to whom it belongs, makes a Prayer in the name of the Deceaſed, to the Sun and all the Gods, which give life to Men, that they would receive him into the Society of the immortal Gods. For he had piouſly worſhip'd the Gods his Parents had taught him, as long as he liv'd; he had honor'd thoſe from whom he came into the World; he had not kill'd, nor injur'd or defrauded any one, nor had committed any horrible wickedneſs; but if he had offended in eating and drinking, it was for the ſake of that which was in that Cheſt; and ſo they took that, and threw it into the River, and intombed the reſt of the Body. By this we ſee a diſtinction is to be made between the general ſenſe of another Life, and ſome particular ſuperſtitions, ſuch as thoſe *Orpheus* carry'd into *Greece*; where they had a notion of another World before, as well as in *Egypt*. For it is not reaſonable to preſume that the *Greeks* ſhould be worſe in this reſpect, than the moſt barbarous Northern People. For, beſides thoſe already mention'd, †*Cæſar*, and *Strabo*, and *Ammianus Marcellinus* ſay, *that the Druids aſſerted the Immortality of Souls*; and neither *Orpheus*, nor any out of *Egypt* ever convers'd among them.

But ſome in our Age are ſo fond of the *Egyptians*, that they will by all means make the Immortality of Souls to be * *a Noble Invention of theirs*. What is the meaning of this *Noble Invention?*

Edda Mythol. c. 3.

Porphyr. De Abſtin. l. 1. c. 10.

† *Cæſ. l. 6. Strabo l. 4. Ammian. Marcellin. l. 15.*

* *Nobiliſſimum autem eorum inventum fuit Immortalitas Animæ.* Canon. Chron. p. 217.

tion? Is it that none ever thought of it before them; and all others deriv'd it from them? That appears already to be otherwiſe; and that very diſtant and remote Nations, who had no communication with theſe Noble Inventors held the ſame opinions; as might, if it were needful, be prov'd by undoubted Teſtimonies, both of the *Eaſt* and *Weſt Indies*; where neither *Orpheus* nor the Egyptian Prieſts were ever heard of. And *Pauſanias* long ſince obſerv'd, *That the Chaldeans and Indians held the ſame*; and before the *Egyptians*; for he *makes them the firſt*. But *Herodotus* ſaith, *That the Egyptians were the firſt who aſſerted the Immortality of Souls*. Not abſolutely; *but ſo as to paſs from one Body to another, till at laſt it came into a human Body*. And of this *Noble Invention* let the *Egyptians* have the due honor; and not thoſe *Greeks*, who, as he ſaith, *would deprive them of it*. It is great pity they ſhould loſe it; ſince *Diodorus Siculus* ſaith, *The Soul of Oſiris paſt into a Bull, and that is the reaſon why they give ſo much honor to it*. It cannot be deny'd, that ſome *Greek Philoſophers* of great Reputation did aſſert the *Tranſmigration of Souls*; if their Doctrine be not miſrepreſented: but neither *Pythagoreans* nor *Platoniſts* did hold it univerſally; nor in ſuch a manner as is commonly underſtood. For, they held no Tranſmigration of the Souls of Good Men, which were fit for happineſs; but aſſerted that they went immediately to Heaven, or a ſtate of Bliſs; as may be prov'd by the teſtimonies of *Epicharmus*, *Empedocles*, *Plato*, and many others: but the difficulty lay about Impure Souls; the *Pythagoreans* utterly rejected the poetical Fables about the ſtate of the dead; and therefore they were forc'd to think of ſome way of purifying them after death. They had no light to direct them, but their own Imagination; and they thought it beſt for the ſame Soul to come into another human Body, to try if it would behave it ſelf better, that it might be happy: But for profligate and very wicked Perſons, they told them of going into ſuch Beaſts, as were moſt remarkable for thoſe vices they were moſt addicted to; as the cruel into Tigers and beaſts of Prey; the voluptuous into Swine; the proud and vain into Birds; the idle and ſoft into Fiſhes. This is the Account given, ſaith *Beſſarion*, by *Timæus* in his Book *de Mundo & Animâ*. And when *Trapezuntius* charged *Plato* with aſſerting that *Brutes were informed by human Souls*; Cardinal *Beſſarion*, a very learned *Greek*, utterly denies it; and ſaith, *That* Plato *doth not make the Soul of a Man to become the Soul of a Brute; but only that it is confined to it as a priſon for a certain time, but it is not capable of acting there for want of proper Organs*. So that theſe Philoſophers opinion was very different from the *Egyptians*. But whence came the moſt ancient Philoſophers to hold the Immortality of Souls? Had they it from the *Egyptians? Plutarch* ſaith, That *Thales was the firſt*; not that held the Soul to be immortal; for ſo many did before him; but that maintained it as a Philoſopher by Reaſon; that is, becauſe it had the principle of Motion within it ſelf, and ſo could not be ſuppoſed to forſake it ſelf, or to ceaſe moving by the death of the Body. * For, as *Cicero* obſerves, a Body is moved by impulſe from another Body; but the Soul finds it hath this power wholly within and from it ſelf; and therefore is immortal.

Pauſan. in Meſſ.

Herodot. l. 2. c. 123.

Diod. Sic. l. p. 54.

Epicharm. apud Grot. Excerpt. p. 481. Clement. Alex. Str. 5. Poëſis Philoſ. p. 28.

Beſſar. cont. Calumn. l. 2. c. 7.

* Θαλῆς ἀπεφήνατο πρῶτος τὴν ψυχὴν φύσιν ἀεικίνητον καὶ αὐτοκίνητον, *Plut. de Plac. Phil. l. 4. c. 2. Cicero Tuſc. 1. 23.*

But *Pythagoras* is said *to have learnt this Doctrine in Egypt*: He called the Soul *a ſelf-moving Number*, ſaith *Plutarch* in the ſame place; i. e. as he well explains it, he puts *Number* after his myſtical way for *a Mind*: and it ſeems very ſtrange to me, that ſo great a Man as *Ariſtotle*, ſhould think *Pythagoras* ſpake literally of *Numbers*; as tho' any Number could move it ſelf. But *Plutarch* rightly interpreted him; and the latter Pythagoreans from *Moderatus Gaditanus* made no ſcruple of ſaying that *Pythagoras expreſſed his ſenſe about immaterial Beings by Numbers and Figures, as having nothing of Matter in them.* And it is very probable, he learnt this way from the *Symbols* and *Hieroglyphics* of the *Egyptians*. But *Cicero* ſaith, *That he had learnt the Immortality of the Soul from his Maſter* Pherecydes; *which he confirmed very much.* And it is obſervable, that he firſt ſuppoſes *a general conſent of Mankind as to the Immortality of Souls, from a very ancient Tradition*; and then proceeds to the *Philoſophers*, who offered to give Reaſons for aſſerting it, of which he gives an account. And if there were ſuch a general conſent *from all Antiquity* as he affirms, then this Doctrine could not originally come out of *Egypt* by *Orpheus* into *Greece*.

Porphyr. in vit. Pytha.

Plutarch. de Iſid. & Oſir. p. 354.

Cicero Tuſc. 1. 16.

Cap. 13.

Cap. 12.

Let us now conſider the ſenſe of Religion or Divine worſhip among the *Greeks* before *Orpheus* his time; whether they were ſuch ſtrangers to it, as they muſt be ſuppoſed, if he brought it firſt among them. *Plato* was a very competent witneſs as to the *Old Greeks*; and he affirms *that the firſt Inhabitants of* Greece *ſeemed to him to have worſhip'd no other Gods, but the Sun, Moon, and Earth, and Stars, and the Heavens; as moſt barbarous Nations ſtill do.* So that here we have the ſame *Religion* in *Greece*, that was then common to the reſt of the World; i. e. the worſhip of *Viſible Deities*, and ſuch as they apprehended to have the greateſt influence upon their affairs. The heavenly Bodies did ſtrike them with aſtoniſhment at their vaſtneſs, and beauty, and orderly motion, and the benefits they continually receiv'd from them; and theſe they were moſt ready to pay their Devotions to, as to thoſe which appear'd moſt to them; but that which did not appear, was to them that were ſo much govern'd by Senſe, as if it were not. As if we ſuppoſe a Prince travelling with his chariot in the Country, with the curtains drawn up on all ſides, and a great Retinue about him; the People are much ſurpriſed with ſo great an Appearance, and flock about them to ſee to whom they muſt pay their Reſpects; and ſeeing no body in the Chariot, they turn their eyes to the Attendants, and eſpecially to him that ſits ſo high in the Coach-box and manages the Horſes; and immediately give him that profound Reverence which was only due to the Prince himſelf, if he had appear'd. Much after this manner it was with the Barbarous People, both in *Greece* and other parts of the World: There was ſomething ſo great, as to require Devotion from them; and they looked about them, and could ſee nothing which they thought could deſerve it better than the Sun, Moon and Stars, which were placed very high, and were the great Movers which kept all things in their order, and made them ſo ſerviceable to them. But this is far from being an argument that they had no Religion; it being rather a ſign they had too much, but knew not how to govern it. But this was a far more rea-

Plato in Cratyl. p. 397.

ſonable

ſonable worſhip, than that which *Orpheus* or the *Old Poets* brought in among the *Greeks*; whoſe Stories and Ceremonies were ſo filthy and indecent, as were enough to have turned the ſtomachs of modeſt and virtuous Men from any kind of worſhip, which had the tincture of ſo much obſcenity going along with it. And it is really to be wonder'd at, that the *Orphic Myſteries* and *poetical Fables* receiv'd among the *Greeks*, did not quite overthrow all Religion among them. For, as *Plutarch* well ſaith, *Abſurd Notions of* God *have very bad conſequences both ways; for ſome are plung'd into the depth of Superſtition, and others to avoid that, run themſelves into Atheiſm.* And if there had not been ſome very great reaſon in Nature, to have kept the notion of a Deity in Mens minds; it is hardly conceivable, that under all the horrible ſuperſtitions of *Greece*, there ſhould be any ſuch thing as a ſenſe of Religion left among them. But the evidence of that was ſo great, as made all Men of Underſtanding to put any tolerable ſenſe upon thoſe *vile ſuperſtitions*, which were ſo prevailing in *Greece*, after the *Egyptian fopperies* were brought in among them. The Rule they went by was this, That Religion muſt be preſerv'd in the World, not to ſerve Politic Ends, but to ſatisfy the Reaſon and common Senſe of Mankind; and that ſince ſuch a way of Worſhip was ſo generally receiv'd, they were willing to put the beſt conſtructions upon it, and to make it ſome way or other ſerve to keep up the ſenſe of a Divine Power in the management of the World. And of this we have a remarkable inſtance in *Plutarch*, with reſpect to the *Egyptian Myſteries*, in his Treatiſe of *Iſis* and *Oſiris*. He profeſſes at firſt *a great deſire to find out the truth of theſe things that concern the knowledg of* God, *it being the greateſt Bleſſing* God *can give, and Mankind can receive; and that without it Immortality is not Life, but Duration. And the end of all*, he ſaith, *is the knowledg of the firſt and principal and intellectual Being.* But he can make nothing at all of the *Matters of fact* with relation to *Oſiris* and *Iſis*, which he looks on as very abſurd; and ſo overthrows all *the Phœnician Scheme of Philo Byblius*, who lived much about the ſame time, under *Trajan:* but *Plutarch* ſaith, *To underſtand thoſe things of a Divine Being literally, is ſo abſurd and impious, that they deſerve to be ſpit at who offer them.* And for thoſe, *who interpret theſe things of great Princes in former times, who had Divine Honor given them, this*, he ſaith, *is the way to overthrow the natural ſenſe of a Divine Being, and ſo open the way to Atheiſm, by confounding Gods and Men together*; as he ſaith, *Euhemerus Meſſenius had done.* And therefore he was fain to turn all into *Allegory*, to avoid the miſchief of abſurd and impious opinions concerning that Divine Power, which he owned to be in the World; and not only ſo, but he adds (as is already obſerved) that *there was a very ancient Tradition in the World, among all ſorts of Men; and which had obtained a firm and unſhaken Belief in the World, not only in common talk, but in their greateſt Myſteries, and that both among Greeks and Barbarians, that the Univerſe was not made by chance, or without reaſon, but that it was made and governed by it.* From whence it follows, that there was ſuch a

Plutarch. de Iſid. & Oſir.

Ὧν πλάσμα ἐστὶν ἡ περὶ τῶν πρώτων καὶ κυρίων ἐννοητῶν γνῶσις. P. 352.

P. 358.

Διὸ καὶ πάμπαλαιος αὕτη μὲν Θεολόγων καὶ νομοθετῶν εἰς ποιητὰς, καὶ φιλοσόφους δόξα τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀδίαιτον ἔχουσα, καὶ βαρβάροις καὶ Ἕλλησι πολλαχοῦ διεφθαρμένη, ὡς οὔτ' ἄνευ λόγου καὶ μάτην τὸ Πᾶν. P. 369.

Tradition among the *old Greeks*, which did not loſe its Authority, when thoſe Myſteries were brought in; and that made the moſt intelligent Perſons to apply them that way. For it ſeems, by the account he gives of *Euhemerus Meſſenius*, that Atheiſtical Perſons took great advantages from theſe Stories of their Gods, to prove that there were none at all; but only that Great Men in former ages, that had found out ſome uſeful Inventions, were deify'd after their deaths. *Plutarch* makes that a fabulous ſtory, which he tells of his *Golden Inſcriptions* in *Panchæa*, to prove the truth of his aſſertion, *which none ever ſaw beſides himſelf*; and he affirms, That there were no ſuch Perſons as the *Panchæi*: but others have ſhew'd that there was ſuch a place as *Panchæa* about *Arabia Felix*. And *Diodorus Siculus* mentions it as a conſiderable Iſland in the *Arabian* Sea, and that the Inhabitants are called *Panchæi*; and that near the City *Panara*, there is a Temple to *Jupiter Triphyllius* which was in great veneration for its Antiquity and Magnificence, which he deſcribes at large; and upon the Mountain there, it is ſaid that *Uranus* of old inhabited; and the People were called *Triphyllii*, from three different Tribes which joyn'd there, and were afterwards driven out by *Ammon*. And to make the Story of *Euhemerus* more probable, he ſaith, The Inhabitants came firſt out of *Crete* in *Jupiter*'s time. So that *Plutarch* was very much to ſeek, when he deny'd that there was any ſuch place as *Panchæa*, or ſuch a Perſon as *Jupiter Triphyllius*. And *Diodorus* further ſaith, There was in it a golden Pillar in the old Egyptian Letters, wherein there were Inſcriptions containing the Acts of *Uranus* and *Jupiter*, and of *Diana* and *Apollo* written by *Hermes*. Which is a very different account of this matter, from what *Plutarch* gives. Some are willing to excuſe *Euhemerus*, as tho' he intended nothing more, but to let the *Greeks* know, that they worſhip'd ſuch for Gods which had been Men; which was true enough. But this did not reach his deſign, according to *Plutarch*; which was to prove, *that there were no other Gods but theſe*: ſo *Plutarch* ranks him with *Diagoras Melius* and *Theodorus*, who ſaid *there were no Gods*. And the *Epicurean* in *Tully* ſaid, *that Euhemerus deſtroy'd all Religion*; which could not be true, if he had left any Divinity to be worſhip'd. *Sextus Empiricus* reckons him among the *Atheiſts*; and ſaith, he was *a conceited Man*; but he charges him only with ſaying, *That ſome Great Men in former Ages had been made Gods*. Which was ſo evident a thing, that one would think none could have been called an *Atheiſt* merely upon that account. But *Jupiter* of *Crete* had been advanc'd a long time to the higheſt Divine Honor; and conſequently thoſe who went about to diſprove his worſhip, were thought to deſtroy the worſhip which belongs to the Supreme God. But *Diodorus Siculus* in a Fragment of his ſixth Book preſerv'd by *Euſebius*, gives a very different account of him; and that from *Euhemerus* his own words, *viz.* That the Ancients had deliver'd to their poſterity two different Notions of Gods; one of thoſe that were Eternal and Immortal, as the Sun, Moon and Stars, and other parts of the Univerſe; but others were Terreſtrial Gods, that were ſo made, becauſe they were Benefactors to Mankind, as *Hercules*, *Bacchus*, and others. And as to *Euhemerus*, he ſaith *that he was a Favorite*

Diod. Sicul. l. 5. p. 220.

Plutarch. de Placitis Philoſ. l. 7. Cicer. de N. D. l. 1. Sext. Emp. ad Mathe. p. 317.

Euſeb. Pr. Evang. l. 2. c. 2.

of

of Caſſander *King of* Macedonia, *by whoſe command he made a voyage into thoſe parts*; where he found the things before mention'd. But ſome learned Men are ſtill of *Plutarch*'s opinion, that *Euhemerus* his *Panchæa* is a mere figment of his; for which I do not ſee any reaſon ſufficient; eſpecially when the ſame Perſons do allow *Sanchioniathon*'s Phœnician Antiquities; and methinks *Euhemerus* his Account of the Inſcriptions on Pillars of the Acts of *Uranus* and *Cronus*, and *Jupiter* and *Ammon*; and *the Sacred Letters* by *Hermes*, comes ſo near to *Philo Byblius*, that one would think he had compar'd Notes with *Euhemerus* and *Diodorus Siculus*. But their deſign was different in this reſpect, that *Sanchoniathon* juſtify'd the making Men to be Gods; but *Euhemerus* went about to prove they were *not Gods*, becauſe they had *been Men*. It is poſſible, that the common People might account him an Atheiſt for denying *Jupiter* of *Crete* to be God, or for ſaying, that his Sepulchre was to be found. But why ſhould *Plutarch* charge him on this account, when he himſelf ſo much finds fault with thoſe who made Men to be Gods? He endeavor'd, he ſaith, to avoid the extremes both of *Superſtition* and *Atheiſm*; but he could but *endeavor* it, when he allow'd the practices of the *Greeks* and *Egyptians*, and only offer'd at ſome forced Interpretations of them; againſt the general ſenſe of the Egyptian Myſteries. *Bochart. Phaleg. l. 2. c. 8.*

But however it appears from him, that the *old Greeks* did preſerve the ancient Tradition of *the World not being made by chance*, which is the foundation of all Religion. And *Plato*, when he enters upon the Diſcourſe againſt *Atheiſm*, begins with two things, *viz. That the Sun, and Moon, and Stars, and the order of Seaſons ſhew'd there was a* God *and Providence; and the conſent of all Mankind, Greeks and Barbarians.* Now, how could *Plato* have ſaid this of the *old Greeks*, if they had been without any Religion till *Orpheus* came out of *Egypt?* And we have an evident proof of the practice of Divine Worſhip among them, from the *Parian Chronicle*; where it is ſaid, *That* Deucalion *after he had eſcaped the Flood went to* Athens, *and there offer'd a ſolemn ſacrifice for his deliverance*; and *Pauſanias* ſaith, *he there built a magnificent Temple.* Which are ſufficient Evidences of the Religion of the *old Greeks*, even before they had the Name of *Hellens* from the Son of *Deucalion*. But I have not yet done with *Diodorus Siculus*, who lets fall ſeveral inſinuations, as tho' he were of the Mind of *Euhemerus Meſſenius*; and that the old Religion, both in *Egypt* and elſewhere, was nothing but a *Politic Contrivance.* For in the beginning of his Hiſtory, he pretends to give an Account of the beginning of all things. But it is ſuch a one as plainly ſhews he was no friend to Religion; for he takes away the very foundation of it, by ſuppoſing the World to be produc'd without any Intellectual Cauſe. He ſaith at firſt there were two Opinions among the Philoſophers and Hiſtorians: One was, that the World had been always juſt as it is; the other, that there was a beginning of Mankind, and of other things. But how? This he undertakes to explain after this manner. At firſt there was a Chaos, or a confus'd Mixture of Heaven and Earth and all together; then follow'd a Separation of Bodies from each other, and thence came the preſent Frame of the World. The lighter Bodies mov'd forward, *Plato de LL. l. 10.* *Marmor. Arundell.* *Pauſan. in Atticis.*

ward, as the Air and Fire, by which Motion came the Sun, Moon and Stars. But the groſſer and more heavy parts ſubſided together; the moiſter made the Sea, and the dry the Earth: which was very moiſt, but being quicken'd by the heat of the Sun, ſwell'd up in ſeveral Tumors with thin Skins containing the Materials of living Creatures; which having ſtrength brake thro' thoſe Skins; and thence came all ſorts of Animals. But the heat of the Sun and the Winds hardening the ſurface of the Earth, no more of ſuch ſwellings appear'd; and ſo the Animals are ſince continued by Propagation. But the Men which were thus born were very wild at firſt, but by degrees they came to underſtand one another, and to find out the conveniences of Living. This is the ſhort Abſtract of the Account he gives: which is juſt the *Epicurean Hypotheſis* in other Terms; which was much in vogue in the time of *Diodorus Siculus*, (which, ſaith *Suidas*, was that of *Auguſtus*) eſpecially after *Lucretius* his Poem was in ſuch reputation: For, he ſaith, he very well underſtood the Latin Tongue, and had great helps to his Hiſtory from *Rome:* and whoſoever compares this with *Lucretius*, will ſcarce find any difference. And *Euſebius* obſerves, that he does not ſo much as once mention the Name of God in it, but leaves all to Chance, and a fortuitous concourſe; and as it is expreſs'd in *Plutarch*, where the *Epicurean Opinion* is deliver'd much to the ſame purpoſe, the World is ſaid to have come together at firſt by a motion of Atoms without Providence. Where there muſt be ſomething defective in the beginning, to ſhew this to have been the *Epicurean Hypotheſis*; for as it ſtands, it ſeems to be *Plutarch*'s own opinion; which is directly contrary to what he had ſaid before in the foregoing Chapter, where he blames *Anaximander*, for leaving out the Efficient Cauſe; for, ſaith he, Matter alone can do nothing without it. And the ſame he repeats againſt *Anaximenes*; and ſaith plainly, * That it is impoſſible that Matter alone ſhould be the Cauſe of Things; as it is for Metals to form themſelves into Pots and Cups without an Artiſt. So that *Plutarch* muſt be clear'd from that opinion, which he ſo juſtly oppoſes; and he commends *Anaxagoras* in a particular manner, for adding Mind as the Efficient Cauſe to Matter; which brought it out of confuſion into that order that appears in the World. *Pliny* ſaith of *Diodorus*, *Apud Græcos deſiit nugari*; but he only applies it to the Title of his Book; and it is not true of the Beginning of it: *Pliny* himſelf took the World to be an Eternal Being, which he calls *God*; and ſo was againſt *Diodorus* his Making of the World. But *Diodorus* quotes *Euripides* the Scholar of *Anaxagoras* for his Chaos: but that is not the point, whether there were ſuch Confuſion at firſt, but how the World came out of it. It's certain that *Anaxagoras* did not only hold a *Chaos* at firſt, but an *Eternal Mind*, which order'd the World, and brought things into that beauty and uſefulneſs which they have. *Diogenes Laertius* ſaith, that *Anaxagoras* follow'd *Linus*, and he was before *Orpheus:* If it were only in that of *the Chaos*, there was nothing extraordinary in that; for all that ſuppoſed the World to be made, aſſerted it; but if it were of the Mind as the Efficient Cauſe, that is a conſiderable teſtimony of the antiquity of that Opinion among the *old Greeks*. And *Orpheus*,

Euſeb. Pr. Evang. l. 1. c. 7.

Plutarch. de Placit. Phil. l. 1. c. 4.

* Ἀδύνατον ἐξ ἀρχῆς μόνην τὴν ὕλην τῶν ὄντων, ἐξ ἧς ἅπαντα γέγονε γεγενῆσθαι· ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν αἴτιον λεκτέον γεγενῆσθαι. *Plutar. de Plac. Phil. l. 1. c. 3.*

Plin. N. H. l. 1. c. 1.

Lib. 2. c. 1.

Laert. in Proëm.

pheus, as *Suidas* gives an account of his Doctrine, ſaith *That he held a Chaos, and before that an Æther of* God's *making, which was the great Inſtrument in framing the World.*

But *Euſebius* charges *the moſt part of the Greek Philoſophers with being of* Diodorus *his mind in this Matter:* but I hope to make it appear otherwiſe in the progreſs of this Diſcourſe; being now only to conſider this Aſſertion as we find it in him. And I cannot but take notice of the unfairneſs of it; for he repreſents it, as if there had been but two Opinions among the Philoſophers, that *of the Eternity of the World*, and its *being made by Chance*; as if he had never heard of an *Eternal Mind* among them: which it is impoſſible ſo inquiſitive and learned a Man ſhould be ignorant of. But he offers no kind of proof of the truth of what he lays down; not ſo much as the Inſcriptions of *Hermes*, or the *Commentaries* of *Taautus*, which *Sanchoniathon* and *Philo Byblius* pretended to. He gave no manner of Reaſon how the confus'd Matter was put into motion; or how the ſeparation of the lighter and heavier Bodies was effected; How the heavenly Bodies came to have diſtinct *Vortices*, without interfering with each other; How the moiſter and heavier parts came to be divided, ſo as to make two ſuch great Bodies, as the Earth and Sea to be ſo diſtinguiſh'd and parted from one another: which are conſiderable difficulties, and ought to have been clear'd. It may be ſaid, *That he writes not like a Philoſopher, but as an Hiſtorian, and only in general lays down the principles that had been receiv'd by Philoſophers.* But this doth not vindicate him. For then he ſhould have ſet down all their Opinions, which he doth not; but purpoſely avoids that which would have reſolv'd theſe difficulties. For if an Eternal Mind be ſuppos'd to give and direct the motion of Matter, then we may eaſily conceive, not only whence Motion it ſelf came; but whence Gravitation, or the tendency of Bodies towards their center; whence the ſeveral great Bodies of the Heavens came to have their diſtinct circumvolations; and whence the Earth and Sea came to be ſo divided, and parted from one another.

Euſeb. de Prep. Ev. l. 1. c. 8.

But *Diodorus* was ſenſible that there would be great objections made againſt *the production of Animals out of the Earth*, without any other Cauſe than *the heat of the Sun, and moiſture and putrefaction of the ſlimy ſubſtance of the Earth.* And therefore to anſwer them, *the Egyptians*, he ſaith, *produce this Experiment among them, that about* Thebes, *when the Earth is moiſtened by the* Nile, *by the intenſe heat of the Sun falling upon it, an innumerable multitude of Mice do ſpring out; which being done after the Earth was ſo much hardened, and the firſt influences abated, much more might all kind of Animals come out of the Earth at firſt.*

1. But in the firſt place, we have nothing but the teſtimony of theſe *Egyptians* for the original truth of this, who brought it as an Argument to juſtify their own *Hypotheſis*. And from them other Writers have taken it, without examining the truth of it, as *Ovid*, *Mela*, *Pliny*, &c. *Ælian* goes farther (who liv'd in *Hadrian*'s time) for he ſaith, *in his way between* Naples *and* Puteoli, *he ſaw ſuch imperfect Animals, half Mud, and half living Creatures; Altera pars vivit, rudis eſt pars altera tellus*; as *Ovid* deſcribes them.

Ovid. Metamorph. l. 15. Plin. l. 9. 58.

But this is very far from making any tolerable proof; for they might be perfect Animals, and only one part appear out of the mud or dirt, and the other be cover'd over with it. And this in all probability was the case in *Egypt*. For these were seen only *in the Mud*, after the *Nile* was return'd into its Channel, as *Mela* affirms, *Ubi sedavit diluvia & se sibi reddidit, per humentes campos quædam nondum perfecta animalia*, &c. Now this was a very ill time for any Persons to go farther than as to what appear'd to them at a distance: and because they saw but some parts, they concluded the rest to be nothing but slime. But this is a very slight and imperfect way of making *Experiments*. Did any of the *Egyptians* take and dissect any of these *Imperfect Animals*, and shew how it was possible in the formation of them, for one part of them to be nothing but mud, when the rest had all the proper Organs belonging to such Animals.? If the internal and vital parts be first form'd (as no doubt they are) and the Blood passing thro' the Heart into the outward parts, be the great instrument of perfecting the *Organs* of sense and motion; how is it possible to conceive that where the inward parts are perfect in their kind; one main part of an Animal should have nothing like Organs, but merely be a mass of Dirt? And by what means could that afterwards be joyn'd with the other to make up one perfect Animal? It is agreed among the best Observers and most curious Inquirers into these things, that the Heart is the first of the solid parts, and the Blood of the Fluid; but whether it be by a dilatation of the *Punctum saliens*, or red beating speck, into several parts, whereof one is for the upper, and the other for the lower and remoter parts; or it be by extention of the several parts in little, as an *Embryo*, (as it is in Plants) or by a fermentation raised in the fluid matter by an active fluid convey'd into it, upon the conjunction of male and female; (which are the several *Hypotheses* of the most inquisitive Persons in this Philosophical Age) which way soever we take it, this *Egyptian Hypothesis* of *Imperfect Animals*, is repugnant to the most accurate Observations, which have been made about the Generations of Animals. And however such things might then pass among such who take all upon trust from the *Egyptians* or others who never examin'd them; yet it would be the only proof of *Imperfect Animals*, to find any in our Age to defend those crude and absurd Opinions. As tho' any thing were to be believ'd rather than the most reasonable things in the World, *viz.* God and Providence; which appear most conspicuously in the production of Animals. Insomuch that our sagacious Dr. * *Harvey* after all his diligent and exact Inquiries, confesses *that the power and presence of the* Deity *is no where more observable than in the Formation of Animals*. And he could find no satisfaction in any *Hypotheses* of the greatest Naturalists, without taking in *the immediate Power and Providence of* God. And even Mr. *Hobbes* himself, who was as unwilling to call in the help of Providence, as another; yet is forc'd to give up the Cause in this matter; and freely confesses, † *That if Men examin the several Machines in order to Generation and Nutrition, and think they were not order'd by an intelligent Being to*

* Neq; sane uspiam alibi, quam in Animalis fabrica, Omnipotens Creator in operibus suis aut manifestius conspicitur, aut præsentius ejus Numen adest. *Exercitat.* 49. Quapropter rem recte pieq; (mea quidem sententia) reputaverit, qui rerum omnium Generationes, ab eodem illo æterno atq; omnipotente Numine deduxerit, à cujus nutu rerum ipsarum Universitas dependet. *Exercitat.* 50. Quod ubique præsens, singulis rerum naturalium operibus non minus adsit, quam toti Universo, quod Numine suo sive Providentia, arte ac mente Divina cuncta animalia procreet. *Ibid.*

† Qui si machinas omnes, tum Generationis tum Nutritionis satis perspexerint, nec tamen eas a mente aliqua conditas ordinatasque sua quasque officia viderint, ipsi profecto sine mente esse censendi sunt. *Hobb. de Homine l.* 1. *c.* 1. *ad fin.*

their

their ſeveral offices, muſt be ſaid to be without Underſtanding themſelves. And yet he ſets down the words of *Diodorus Siculus* in the beginning of that Chapter; and thinks *that is as far as Men can go by Philoſophy, without Revelation.* How can theſe things conſiſt? For Men *without Revelation* may find out all the *Machines in the Body*; and therefore may be convinc'd that there was an Eternal Mind which gave a Being to theſe things; which is more than *Diodorus Siculus* or *his Philoſophers* could find: For they affirm'd, *That Animals were form'd by Chance, out of mud and putrefaction without any Mind*; and therefore according to him they had none themſelves. And ſome of our moſt experienc'd and skilful *Anatomiſts*, after all their debates about the ſeveral *Mechanical Hypotheſes* concerning the Production of Animals, have concluded that * *it is impoſſible that mere Matter and Motion, of whatſoever figure the particles of Matter be, ſhould make up the Body of an Animal; but that we muſt have recourſe to a moſt Wiſe and Omnipotent Agent, which alone is able to do it.*

* Interea ratum maneat juxta normam optimæ Philoſophiæ fieri non poſſe, ut Particulæ ſive Corpuſcula quomodocunque figurata ſolo motu fortuito in corpus humanam aut belluinum ſponte coaleſcant: Sed neceſſario ad hoc opus omnino ſapientiſſimum potentiſſimumque Architectam requiri, qui Animalium Machinas tam affabre & artificioſe componat. Adeoque Deum ſolum formare cuncta animalia, & fœcunditatem ovis addere. *Exercit. Anatomica & Medica Peteri & Hardeci, p.* 126.

And thoſe who plead moſt for the Motion of the particles of Matter in forming the Body, yet confeſs, That it is hardly poſſible to conceive how the kinds of Animals can be preſerv'd, unleſs there be ſomething beyond that, to regulate and determin that Motion; but what that is, they are not able to explain. Let now any Perſons that have the uſe of Underſtanding, conſider whether this *Egyptian Hypotheſis* have the leaſt credibility in it; ſince it is grounded on ſo little Authority.

Etmulleri Inſtit. Medica, c. 23.

II. But that is not all. For we ſhall prove it to be repugnant to the moſt certain accounts we have of the *Nature*, as well as the *Production of Animals*; both which are impoſſible to be conceiv'd to be the mere reſult of a fortuitous Motion of Matter, by the heat of the Sun upon the ſlime of the Earth. As will appear by conſidering the moſt neceſſary and vital parts of Animals themſelves, and what relates to the ſeveral kinds and the preſervation of them: For the *Egyptians* argued from their Mice to all other Animals. The moſt neceſſary and vital parts of *Animals*, are ſuch as the *courſe of the Blood* and *Reſpiration* depend upon, without which it is impoſſible for them *to live.* The *Courſe of the Blood* ſuppoſes *the Heart*, as the great Machine in the Body; and the ſeveral Arteries are as ſo many veſſels to convey the Blood into the ſeveral parts. But here is ſo much wiſdom and contrivance in this, that unleſs the Heart had been fram'd in ſuch a manner, and the Blood put into ſuch a Motion as it is, the preſervation of Life had been impoſſible. And Life it ſelf is ſomething beyond the mere Coalition of the particles of Matter: For if that were ſufficient, then there muſt be Life in all parts of Matter united together; (but neither Stones nor Plants are *Animals*) and they become *Animals* by that which makes the difference between them and inanimated things; which are the conſtant courſe of the Blood, and the diſtribution of Nouriſhment to the ſeveral parts of the Body in order to their ſupport; and when theſe are at an end, the Life

of an Animal is gone. Now in order to this courſe of the Blood, the Heart hath its peculiar and wonderful frame and motion; for therein is the chief ſeat of that which is called *the Flame of Life*; which is nothing elſe but that briſk and vigorous motion of the Blood, which actuates and enlivens the whole Body. But both the natural heat and motion of the Blood are unaccountable in the Mechanical way. To ſay the natural heat is caus'd by fermentation, can give no manner of ſatisfaction; for from whence comes this fermentation, but from heat? And ſo heat muſt be ſuppos'd in order to the producing heat; and there can be no end in ſuch kind of Suppoſitions. And if the particles did of themſelves give it, then it muſt be diſcern'd as much at firſt as afterwards; but the contrary is obſerv'd in Animals: For the Blood is more fixed at firſt, and its heat riſes by degrees, as the parts are forming. If it be ſaid, *There is a Spiritus Genitalis which cauſes all that heat and motion*; I ask, Whence that ariſes? Not from mere matter and motion. But it muſt be ſomething of a higher nature, and from a ſuperior cauſe. But if heat and mud can produce Animals, there is no need of any ſuch *Spiritus Genitalis* in Nature, but all muſt ariſe from mere motion, and the continuation of Animals might as well have been without any diſtinction of ſexes. But how came Matter of it ſelf to form ſuch a diſtinction, with parts ſutable to ſuch a deſign? How come the Inſtincts of Nature in *Animals* to be ſo violent to ſuch an end; when if there be nothing but *Matter*, there can be no ſuch end deſign'd? How come ſome *Animals* (as *Mules*) not capable of propagating their kind, when upon Anatomical ſearches no kind of defect hath been found in them, as ſome imagin'd? How come the *Species* of *Animals* to be ſo determined and limited, that in the revolution of ſo many Ages no new *Species* have appear'd, altho' they are ſo different in ſome Countries from others? How comes the number of ſome *Animals* ſo very much to exceed others? i. e. How come the *Beaſts of prey* to fall ſo much ſhort of the moſt tractable and *uſeful Animals* to Mankind, as *Sheep* and *Oxen?* And thoſe are obſerv'd to be moſt fruitful, which afford the beſt Food for them. Can we ſuppoſe *the heat of the Sun and ſlime of the Earth* ſhould regard ſo much the benefit of Mankind? How comes the difference of *Animals* as to the manner of their production? i. e. How come ſome to hatch their young ones within their own Bodies, and others to bring forth eggs, and ſo to bring them to maturity by incubation? And how comes this difference to have always continu'd without alteration? Whence comes that difference in Animals, that ſome do *Ruminate*, and others do not? Did mud quicken'd by the Sun deſign to ſupply the want of teeth for *Maſtication* by thoſe ſeveral ventricles, and the muſcles belonging to them? How come ſome Animals to have their ſenſes more exquiſite than others, according to the nature of their food; as ſight in ſome, and ſmelling in others? How come Birds and Fiſhes ſo very much to exceed Mankind in the frame of thoſe nerves, which ſerve for ſmelling? Whence comes that wonderful ſagacity in ſome Animals to purſue others merely from the ſcent left upon the ground at ſome diſtance of time, and to diſtinguiſh it from all others of the ſame kind? Whence comes that wonderful care and tender-

Unde autem aliter calor hic perennis enaſcatur, haud facilè dixerim, ſiquidem ad fermentationis operam recurrere inane auxilium eſt, quoniam ipſamet ſine calore nihil egerit. *Ent. Apologia, p.* 204.

Cicer. de N. Deor. l. 2.

neſs

neſs of their young ones in the moſt cruel and fierceſt Animals? If heat and mud could produce the Beaſts themſelves, yet what influence could they have upon their Brood? How comes the change of the paſſage between the lungs and the heart, when a young Animal is come into the open Air, from what it had in the Womb? What particles of matter cloſe up the *Foramen Ovale*, and direct the paſſage of the Blood another way? What makes the milk to come into the proper veſſels of the breeding Animal juſt at ſuch a time, and to decay when there is no farther occaſion for it? Whence came the wonderful contrivance of Birds in making their neſts, and feeding and preſerving their young? What particles of Matter diſpos'd them to find out their proper food and phyſic? How come the ſeaſons of bringing forth to be ſo ſetled, that there is a ſufficient proviſion to ſupport the young Animals when they come into the World, by the milk ready prepar'd for them, and ſuch conveniences for the young to ſuck it? How come they to run ſo naturally to their dams without any director, and to avoid ſuch as would deſtroy them? What had the particles of Matter to do in all this? If we go to *Inſects*; How came the Silk-worms to hatch their eggs when the Mulberry-trees are ready for their food? The Bees to come forth in May, when there is moſt plenty of dew? The Waſps near Autumn, when the fruit is grown ripe to ſupport them? How come the ſeveral Inſects by that ſagacity to find out the moſt proper places to lay their eggs in? It being obſerv'd of them, by thoſe who have moſt curiouſly inquir'd about theſe matters, *That all the ſeveral ſorts of Inſects lay their eggs in places moſt ſafe and agreeable to them, where they are ſeldom loſt or miſtarry, and where they have a ſupply of nouriſhment for their young, ſo ſoon as they are hatched and need it.*

Neque alia parte ingenia avium magis admiranda ſunt. *Plin. N. H. l.* 10. *c.* 33.

Mr. Ray *of the Creation, p.* 115.

But there are ſome things yet further to be conſider'd in the neceſſary vital parts of Animals, which ſhew that they could not be the reſult of a fortuitous motion of Matter. The main vitals of Animals are the ſame; and where there is any obſervable difference, theſe two things are remarkable: 1. That they are alike in the ſame kind. 2. That it is for the greater conveniency of thoſe kinds. As the poſition of the heart is higher in Mankind, than in creatures that put their heads down to eat; becauſe if the heart of Mankind were in the center of the Body, and not in the upper part, there could not be ſo eaſy a paſſage of the Blood from the heart to the head, which is ſo neceſſary for the ſupport of life; but in thoſe creatures which hold their heads downwards, altho' the paſſage may be longer in ſuch which have long necks, yet no inconvenience comes by it, becauſe of the eaſineſs of the deſcent in holding down their heads. But how comes a fortuitous production of Animals to cauſe ſuch an agreement in the ſeveral parts of living Creatures? That all have the ſame vitals, *Inſects* excepted (in which the heart is the whole Body) none wanting the heart with its arteries carrying out the Blood, and the veins returning it; nor the lungs for reſpiration, nor the brain for ſenſe and motion (to name no more;) How comes a blind motion of Matter to hit ſo exactly on all theſe, and to put them into ſuch a convenient ſituation for the preſervation of Life? How comes the heart to be endued with ſuch ſtrong fibres, unleſs it were intended not merely

Tota Cor ſunt. *Harv.*

to receive the Blood in its paſſage, but to diſperſe it again by its contraction of it ſelf? How come the coats of the arteries about the heart to be ſo much ſtronger than in the outward parts, but that there is the greateſt neceſſity of their being ſo, to receive the Blood in its firſt heat and quickeſt motion? How come the veins to be ſo diſpers'd in all parts of the Body, but to receive the Blood in its return; and ſo to keep up the life and warmth of all parts? What motion of Matter could frame the *Valves* in the *Veins*, ſo as to give free paſſage of the Blood towards the heart, but oppoſe the paſſage of the Venal-blood the other way? (which gave the firſt occaſion to the diſcovery of the Circulation of the Blood, as Mr. *Boyle* tells us from Dr. *Harvey* himſelf.) What is it which keeps the Blood in its conſtant courſe for ſo many years, as ſome Animals live to? And what makes the very different periods of their lives, when we can ſee no reaſon from their mechanical frame, why one ſhould in an ordinary courſe ſurvive another, for ſo great a compaſs of years? What is there in the texture and coalition of the parts of a Stag, to make it outlive an Ox or a Horſe ſo many years; when *Ariſtotle* ſaith, *They ſeem to be leſs made for long life than other Animals, as far as he could judge by their bearing and growth:* but *Pliny* ſo long after him ſaith, *Vita Cervis in confeſſo longa eſt; It was a thing taken for granted that they lived long.* But I meddle not with any improbable Stories about it; for my argument depends not upon any thing but what all grant to be true, *viz.* That there is a great diverſity in the Lives of *Animals*; of which I ſay no account can be given from mere Matter and Motion.

Boyle *of Final Cauſes, p.* 157.

Ariſt. Hiſt. Anim. l. 6. *c.* 29.

Plin. N. H. l. 8. *c.* 32.

III. There is no probability of any kind of *Animals* ariſing from *Putrefaction*, which the *Egyptians* and *Diodorus Siculus* make their foundation. *After the inundation of the* Nile, *a ſudden heat of the Sun falling on the ſlime, cauſes a putrefaction, and from thence an innumerable company of Mice came.* But *Theophraſtus*, a very great Philoſopher, in a Fragment preſerv'd in *Photius*, ſaith, *That the great number of Mice is to be found in dry ſoils, and not in moiſt; for water is a great enemy to them, and they are certainly deſtroy'd by it.* How comes *Theophraſtus* to differ ſo much herein from *Diodorus Siculus* and the *Egyptians?* Or muſt we ſuppoſe, that the water of *Nile* was quite of a different nature from all other waters to them? *Proventus eorum in ſiccitatibus*, ſaith *Pliny*; where he ſpeaks of the great increaſe of them. How then came they to multiply in ſuch moiſt places, where the *Nile* hath overflow'd? *Rain-water kills them*, ſaith *Ariſtotle*; how then comes the *Nile* to produce them? If it be ſaid, *that Ariſtotle ſpeaks of great ſhowers which drown them*; it is eaſily anſwer'd, That at their going off upon theſe principles, they produce more, and ſo the greateſt numbers would be after great Rains. But what *Theophraſtus* ſaith before of *ſmall Frogs* will hold of theſe *Mice* too, *they do not come from the water, but that diſcovers them, and brings them out of the places where they were before.* And *Pliny*'s words are remarkable, when he ſpeaks of this matter, *Detegente eo* (Nilo) *muſculi repe-riuntur*, &c. And ſo the late Editor confeſſes it was in the beſt MSS. So that the going off of the *Nile*, is that only which brings them to light. And before, *Pliny* ſaith, the *Gyrini* (the Name

Diod. Sic. l. 1. *p.* 8.

Phot. Bibl. Cod. 278.

Plin. N. H. l. 10. *c.* 65.

Ariſt. Hiſt. Anim. l. 6. *c.* 29.

Plin. N. H. l. 9. *c.* 58.

Cap. 51.

given

given to these small Frogs) do come from other Frogs, and not from *putrefaction*; *Pariunt minimas carnes nigras, quas Gyrinos vocant, oculis tantum & cauda insignes; mox pedes figurantur*, &c. These are called *Tadpoles*, and seem imperfect at first, but by degrees do come to all their parts. But as to *Animals* arising from *putrefaction*, learned and inquisitive Persons of our Age have taken great pains to discover the truth of it in several Countries, but with no success. In *Italy*, *Franc. Redi* undertook the Discovery of this matter with incredible diligence, and great variety of Experiments; but after all, could not find *that any putrified Flesh would produce Animals*, much less putrified water or slime; *but that lesser Animals hide themselves under dirt and slime, and therefore have been suspected to have come out of it; and if those who first broached this opinion had examined this matter more strictly, they would have found them only covered over, or at least some part of them with that earth which they thought had brought them forth.* And *for the little frogs*, he saith, *that they are so much of the colour of the earth, that they might easily be mistaken for parts of it; but upon opening of them, their stomachs and intestines are full of food and excrements.* Which is a plain demonstration against their original from the earth; and he concludes it a thing *impossible for any such creatures that are part mud and part animals, to be produced by the inundation of the* Nile. There is a remarkable passage in *Olaus Wormius* concerning the *Norway* mice, which seem to come out of the Clouds; *that assoon as they are fallen, they have found green herbs in their bowels*; (and I do not think any grass grows in the Clouds:) But he thinks *Scaliger*'s opinion not improbable, *that they come from putrified water in the clouds*; and he saith, *The Seamen have found them fallen into their Vessels, and that the Clouds stink and hinder their breathing*; but at last he thinks *they may be only carried by some violent storms from the Mountains and Islands where they breed in great abundance.* And *Etmullerus* a *German* Physician concludes all *Æquivocal Generation to be impossible.* Some of our own most diligent Inquirers, after all their searches, declare that they can find no such thing as a *Spontaneous Generation of Animals*; and I remember I have formerly read a Discourse in MS. of Mr. *Boyle*'s to that purpose. Our ingenious and learned Mr. *Ray* positively affirms, *That there is no such thing in nature, as Æquivocal or Spontaneous Generation, but that all Animals as well small as great, are generated by animal Parents of the same species with themselves.* And because some were offended at it, he goes about to justify his Assertion, not only *from Reason*, but from the *Authority* of *Malpighius* as well as *Redi*, *Swammerdam*, and *Lewenhoek*, and many others, who have examin'd this matter *carefully and circumspectly; and therefore their Authority sways more with him, than the concurrent suffrages of a thousand others*; as he saith.

Fr. Redi de Gen. Insect. p. 195, &c.

p. 208.

p. 209.

Museum Wormian. l. 3. c. 23. p. 326.

Exercit. 192. 3.

Etmuller. Instit. Medic. c. 23.

Lister in Goedart. de Insect. p. 47.

Ray of the Creation, part. 2. p. 71.

But there are somethings not yet sufficiently clear'd as to this matter, especially as to Animals breeding in human Bodies, of particular times, and in some diseases: but as to Plants and some Insects about them, in which *Redi* himself gives up the cause, *Malpighius* contradicts him, and so do *Swammerdam*, and others; particularly Mr. *Hook* saith, *He observ'd little eggs in the protuberancies*

Micrograp. p. 189.

cies of plants, which became worms with legs, which eat through the womb which inclos'd them. And in all Galls, he ſaith, *there be either holes where the worm hath eat out its paſſage; or a place where it had been.* All which he attributes to the particular deſign of Providence, in taking care for the conveniencies of the meaneſt Animals. But there ſeems to be more difficulty in the *Apiarium marinum* mention'd by *Piſo*; for it is hard to underſtand how *thoſe blue worms* came to the bottom of the Sea, *which coming up with a ſpungy ſort of ſhrub growing upon the Rocks, and being expos'd to the heat, turn'd to little Animals like Bees.* But this matter is not deliver'd diſtinctly enough to form any Argument upon; as Mr. *Hook* hath well obſerv'd. I ſee no difficulty in the *Ephemeron* or *Hemerobion*, as it is deſcrib'd by the Authors at the end of *Goedart*, who give the beſt account of it; for it ſeems to be of the nature of other Inſects; and the only difficulty is, why ſo much pains for ſo ſhort a life? for it is produc'd by ſuch changes as other Inſects are. But it cannot be deny'd, that there have been among us two very learned Men, who have aſſerted a kind of Spontaneous Generation of Animals; I mean Dr. *Harvey* and his *Apologiſt*. For Dr. *Harvey*, *Redi* obſerves *That altho' he aſſerts every Animal to come of an egg proper to its kind, yet he was of opinion that theſe eggs are not always contain'd in the bodies of Animals, but are diſpers'd up and down by the Air, and after become Animals in an equivocal manner:* but he ſaith, *he hath not clear'd the grounds of his opinion*; ſave only *that it comes from the Omnipotent hand of God.* So that Dr. *Harvey* held a true Spontaneous Generation from mere Matter and Motion to have been impoſſible; as appears by what is ſaid of him before. And ſo his *Apologiſt* ſuppoſes *a ſaline Spirit to be diſpers'd in Nature, which meeting with proper matter and a moderate heat, may produce Inſects, and ſuch kind of Animals:* but he was very far from thinking this could be done without a Power far above Matter and Motion; which at firſt order'd the World, and all things in it. But he thinks *ſuch Inſects come nearer to the nature of Plants than Animals, and live chiefly by the heat of the Sun; and therefore in the winter, they are torpid and without motion, aud are reviv'd at Spring when the heat increaſes.*

Piſo Hiſt. Nat. Braſil. l. 4. c. 2.

Micrograa. c. 43.

Redi p. 19.

Ent. Apol. c. 17. p. 379.

p. 245.

IV. Suppoſing it to be granted that there were ſuch an Æquivocal Generation of Mice and Frogs on the Bank of the *Nile*, how doth it from thence follow that Mankind had the ſame kind of Original? It is a ſaying of *Pliny*, which hath been carry'd too far, *Quam Natura rerum nuſquam magis quam in minimis tota ſit*; where he compares Inſects with the greater Animals; and ſeems to admire the workmanſhip of one far beyond the other: his words are, *Nuſquam alibi ſpectatiore naturæ rerum Artificio.* And ſo he falls into admiration of the perfections of ſome Inſects, as to the quickneſs of ſenſe and motion; and of others as to their peculiar properties. I think *Ariſtotle* was very much in the right when he held, *they were to be blam'd who deſpiſed the leaſt things in Nature; for in all of them* ἔνεστί τι θαυμαστόν; *there is ſomething which deſerves admiration:* And particularly in *Inſects*, the contexture of their parts, the manner of their transformations, the difference of their kinds, the variety of their food, and their time of taking it, have ſomething in them, which

Plin. N. H. l. 11. c. 1.

Ariſt. de par. Anim. l. 1. c. 1.

which cannot be accounted for by mere Matter and Motion: But yet, there is a great difference in the inward make of these Creatures from more perfect Animals. For *Redi* affirms, that *Steno* and he opening some Insects together, they could find no other inward parts, *but one long channel thro' the whole Body, about which there were filaments in a confus'd series, which they thought might be instead of Veins and Arteries.* When all their inward parts were taken out, and the Head taken off, *they still lived and moved as other Insects do; and laid their eggs.* By which we see what a vast difference there is between the principles of Life in Mankind from those in these admirable Insects. *Jul. Scaliger* extremely despises *Cardan*'s way of reasoning; *Mus e putredine potest nasci, ergo & homo potest:* and saith, *That the woman in* Esop's *Fables, who was asked by her husband how the child came without him, and she answered, Out of the snow; might have made a better answer from* Cardan's *Philosophy,* viz. *out of the mud.* And it is wittily said by *Scaliger* of him in another place, *They who stick in the dirt, while they lift up one foot to get out, set the other faster, and therefore it is best to keep out of it altogether.* But *Cardan* seem'd to be so little concern'd to get out of it, that he asserts *that every putrefaction produces some Animal or other; and that all Animals come out of it: which,* saith *Scaliger, is a wicked and profane speech.* And yet *Andr. Cæsalpinus* undertakes to defend *Cardan,* chiefly from the Generation of Insects; without regarding the difference between them and more perfect Animals, if his supposition had been true. *Aristotle,* who had all possible advantages for writing his *Books of Animals,* by the bounty of *Philip* or *Alexander,* or both, coming to speak of such *as had no Blood,* (among which are all Insects) he saith, *They have no Veins, nor Bladder, nor Respiration; but something that serves in stead of a Heart, without which they could have no Life; but they have the parts which serve for Nutrition:* and therefore their Life differs little, according to *Pliny* himself, from that of *Plants* and *Fruits;* but he would have them *Spirare sine Visceribus,* breath without Lungs; and he grants they have neither them, *nor Heart, nor Liver.* And altho' there be some higher degree of Life in such *Animals* as *Diodorus Siculus* speaks of, yet those fall so far short of Mankind, that it is a wonder Men of sense could imagin the production of one could be an Argument for the other. For, if we go no farther than *Nutrition, Mice* and *Frogs* are easily provided for; but how should Mankind live that were produc'd out of slime and Mud? But nothing can be more absurd and ridiculous than the accounts given of the several ways of producing Mankind by a Spontaneous Generation, as will appear by a particular examination of them.

Redi de Gen. Insect. p. 218. Nihil intus, nisi admodum paucis. Intestinum implicatum. *Plin. l.* 11. *c.* 4. *Arist. Hist. Anim. l.* 4. *c.* 6. *Scaliger. Exercit.* 193. *Exercit.* 180. 2. *Exercit.* 190. 193. *Andr. Cæsalpin. Qu. Peripat. l.* 5. *c.* 1. *De partib. Anim. l.* 4. *c.* 5.

Franc. Redi hath reckon'd up the several *Hypotheses* to our hands: The first is, that of *Democritus, That Mankind came into the world like worms, which by degrees grew up to the figure and shape of Men.* I wish we had more of *Democritus* his own Writings left, that we might better judg what his true opinion was; but by what remains it doth not appear that herein he differ'd from *Epicurus.* It's certain he did, as to the first Principles of all things being made of Atoms; but whether he did, as to the immediate production of Animals is not so clear. For they did not imagin that Animals were form'd immediately by Atoms; which was too general and indefinite

Redi de Gen. Insect. p. 14.

finite a Principle; but that the Atoms firſt came together in one form, and then another, till they came to the perfection of Animals. And ſo 'tis ſaid, that *Democritus* held Mankind to have appear'd firſt in the faſhion of worms. *Petronius Arbiter* ſaith, that *Democritus* ſpent his days in making Experiments; *Ætatem inter Experimenta conſumpſit*; and *Columella* particularly takes notice of his Experiments *about Inſects*; and it is not improbable that from his Obſervations about their Transformations he might form his *Hypotheſis* about Mankind. His original Notion was, as appears by *Plutarch*, *That there were infinite Atoms diſpers'd in a void ſpace, which had no kind of Qualities inherent in them; but as they caſually hit upon each other, they produc'd Water, and Fire, and Plants, and Men; which were nothing but a congeries of Atoms*; which, ſaith *Plutarch*, he called *Ideas*. And it appears by another place in him, that *Democritus* only held *Bulk* and *Figure* in his Atoms; but *Epicurus* added *Gravity*; without which he found *his Atoms could not move*. And altho' *Epicurus* deriv'd the main of his Principles from *Democritus*; yet it is plain by *Plutarch*, that his followers ſet themſelves to leſſen the credit of *Democritus*, as one that overthrew the certainty of our Senſes, and reſolv'd all into Reaſon. To which purpoſe there are ſeveral paſſages, in *Sextus Empiricus*, of *Democritus* himſelf. Wherein he affirms, *That the things we call Qualities, are only names impos'd upon Opinions* (which he calls Law) *and ſo bitter and ſweet, and hot and cold, are only Fancies and no Realities; and that there is nothing real but what is not ſeen but only apprehended by the Mind*, as *Atoms and Vacuity*; and in ſeveral other places, that there is no *Certain Knowledg*, but *only Opinion by our Senſes*. And he quotes *Democritus* his own words to prove *that the knowledg we have by our ſenſes is dark and obſcure; but that which is genuine depends only upon Reaſon*. The *Epicureans*, who follow'd their Maſter, as to the certainty of Senſe, could by no means brook this Doctrine of *Democritus*, who ſaw far beyond *Epicurus*, and knew what blunders he muſt fall into by the judgment of Senſe, as about the bigneſs of the Sun; which he poſitively ſaid, was *no greater than appear'd to our ſenſes*, i. e. *two foot over*, ſaith *Cicero*, or *a little more or leſs*; which was ſo notorious a blunder, that *Democritus*, he ſaith, *could not fall into, being skill'd in Geometry; but Epicurus not only deſpis'd it, but perſuaded Polyænus it was falſe*. And his late great Defender hath little to ſay for him, but that *Socrates* underſtood as little *Geometry* as he; but *Socrates* was far enough from aſſerting ſuch ſtupid *Paradoxes*, and making *Geometry* nothing but a piece of *Sophiſtry*; as *Epicurus* did, and made a Mathematician think ſo too. Which ſhew'd his Authority ſway'd more than his Reaſon. But the *Epicurean* in *Plutarch* rejects *Democritus* his Doctrine, for that which *Plutarch* ſaith, *doth as well follow from that of Epicurus*; for, if there be nothing but Atoms, then Qualities are only appearances; and when we judg by our ſenſes, we cannot judg truly of things but of what they appear to us. But if nothing, ſaith he, can be produc'd out of nothing; and no Generation can be of that which already is; how can indiviſible Atoms, which cannot be chang'd, produce Plants or Animals? Either therefore *Democritus* ſhould not have aſſerted ſuch immutable Prin-

Columel. l. 11. ult.

Plutarch. adv. Col.

De Placit. Philoſ. l. 1. c. 3.

Sext. Emp. p. 163.

p. 164.

Cicero de Fin l. 1. c. 6.

Acad. Qu. l. 4. c. 33.

Principles, or he ſhould not have overlook'd the Conſequence, *i. e.* that there can be no Generation. But *Epicurus* impudently holds the ſame Principles, and yet would deny the Conſequence, and aſſert true Generation; juſt as he deny'd Providence, and yet aſſerted Piety; held Friendſhip to be only for Pleaſure, and yet that a Man muſt undergo any hardſhip for his friends; made an infinite ſpace, and yet placed an upper and lower Region in it. But he declares he can by no means underſtand, how Bodies indu'd with Qualities, ſhould be produc'd by Atoms that have none. There can be no Generation without Heat; how comes there to be heat, when the Atoms themſelves have no heat in them, nor become hot when they are joyn'd together? for if they are capable of heat, then they are not impaſſible, nor without Qualities. So that according to the general Principles of *Democritus* and *Epicurus*, there can be no ſuch thing as a Generation of Animals.

But Democritus *obſerv'd ſtrange alterations in the Bodies of Inſects from Worms to flying Animals; and why might not Mankind have come into the world after the ſame manner?* If this were his opinion, it is one of the wildeſt and moſt extravagant opinions that could have enter'd into the head of ſuch a Man, and would make one think that the People of *Abdera* were not out in their judgment of him; if thoſe *Epiſtles* about him were genuine between *Hippocrates* and them.

There are wonderful alterations in the Bodies of *Inſects*, as appear beyond all contradiction by the many Experiments of thoſe, who have apply'd themſelves for many years to obſerve them. But what then? Do not all theſe *Inſects* come out of Eggs, which have been laid by other *Inſects* before them? and therefore Mankind could not be *Worms* firſt, but there muſt have been Eggs before. And how ſhould theſe Eggs be transform'd into the Worms? What force was there in Nature to make ſo ſtrange a Transformation as is continually obſerv'd in them? And the very ſame Perſons, who have obſerv'd their *Transformations*, have as well obſerv'd the incredible number of Eggs that are laid by them, and the great and ſudden increaſe of them from thoſe Eggs. Even in the *Ephemeron*, which was ſo great a rarity taken notice of by *Ariſtotle*, upon the River *Hypanon*, (but is ſo frequent upon ſome Rivers in *France* and the *Low Countries*, as is obſerv'd by *Scaliger*, *Auger*. *Clutius* and others) it is agreed, *That they come out of ſuch a Transformation, as other Inſects do, with four wings and ſix feet; and are very careful where they lay their Eggs, to keep them from the water; in which they die, after they have ſpent their ſhort life in flying in great numbers together, at Sun-ſetting*; ſaith one from his own Obſervation: *Scaliger* ſaith, thoſe he obſerv'd *began to live at night, and dy'd by morning.*

Ariſt. Hiſt. Anim. l. 5. c. 19. Scaliger. Exercit. 194. 5. Aug. Clut. de Hemerobio. Joh. de Mey Append. ad Goedart. Swammerdam Anatom. de Ephem. apud Thevenot Amer. Sept.

But there are ſome things which deſerve a particular obſervation about Inſects, which plainly ſhew that they were not form'd by a caſual Coalition of Atoms, but by a wiſe Providence. As, that thoſe that have wings have them ſtronger or weaker, more or leſs, according to their buſineſs and occaſion for uſing them; thoſe that have feet, have an equal number on both ſides, altho' the numbers differ ſo much according to their kinds; thoſe which have neither wings nor feet, have repoſitories made for them with

proper food in the Leaves of Trees or Plants. Concerning which there are ſeveral things very obſervable. (1.) Their great niceneſs as to their food. *Goedart* who made it his buſineſs to obſerve them 40 years, (as *Ariſtomachus Solenſis* did *Bees* for 58 years, ſaith *Pliny*) found it very difficult ſometimes to find the proper food for them; for they would eat no other, and expreſs'd their joy when they had it. Dr. *Liſter* adds, *That Inſects would rather die than eat any thing elſe, not from want of Organs, but from a natural accuracy of Taſt.* And he ingeniouſly obſerves, that from hence may be found the beſt way of keeping Ships from worms, by finding out that ſort of Wood which thoſe worms will not touch. (2.) The different ſorts of food in their different ſtates. While they are mere *Erucæ*, they eat a hard ſort of food, as the Leaves of Plants; but when they come to have their wings and to fly abroad, they live only on Honey and liquid things: which is very different from ſuch Animals as have Blood; for when they are *Embryo's* they live on liquids; but as they grow up they like harder food. (3.) That thoſe which feed on Leaves of Plants growing, will not touch them when they are taken off or decaying: which *Goedart* ſaith, he obſerv'd both as to Garden-herbs and Graſs. (4.) That thoſe flying Inſects which have very ſhort feet, take their food out of Flowers by the help of their tongues as they fly. (5.) That thoſe which are moſt afraid of Birds, eat only in the night, when they are moſt ſecure from them; which argued a wonderful care of their own ſafety. There are many other Obſervations to be made uſe of concerning the manner of their Transformations; the change made by them in the very Bodies of theſe Inſects; and the different times of continuance under them; and the ways to ſecure themſelves from injuries of the Weather in cold Seaſons: but theſe are ſufficient to my purpoſe, which was to ſhew that *Democritus* made a very ill choice of Worms, as the inſtance of a fortuitous Production. But if they had been ſo, it was a very extravagant fancy to think that Mankind ſhould undergo ſuch transformations as Worms do, before they come to their perfection. For theſe changes are evident to Senſe to all that obſerve no more than Silk-worms; but Mankind continue in one uniform ſtate from an Embryo, to a perfect Man; and while he is an Embryo hath one ſort of nouriſhment from the Mother, which is wholly different from what all ſorts of Worms do live upon; and the parts of Mankind are extremely remote from the ſhape, number and uſe of all ſorts of Worms. In ſo much that *Democritus* might much better have fanſy'd, that Mankind were at firſt a ſort of Trees ſet with their Roots upwards: for the Head to Man is what the Root is to the Tree; and Trees come from an Embryo in the Seed, and are preſerv'd in the Womb of the Earth, and are fed with a dew from above, and have paſſages like *Lymphæducts* in their ſeveral parts; only they happen to want the inſtruments of Senſe and Motion; which are needleſs to them, ſince their food is brought home to them, and they grow up in the ſame uniform manner without Transformations, as Mankind do.

Plin. N. H. l. 11. c. 9. *Goedart de Inſectis. N. 5.* *Ed. Liſter. p. 13. 33.* *N. 14.* *N. 14.* *N. 15.*

The next *Hypotheſis* was that of *Anaximander*; and he makes them *to be bred up as Embryo's in the Bowels of other Creatures.* Of which **Plutarch* gives the fulleſt account: In one place he only ſaith,

**Plutarch. de Placit. Philoſ. l. 5. c. 19.*

ſaith, *That the firſt Animals were produc'd in moiſture, cover'd over with a certain Bark*, like the rind of a Cheſtnut, ſaith *Redi*; *and when it grew dry it crackt, and the Animals ſtarted out, but liv'd not long*. Was not this a hopeful Beginning in the early days of Philoſophy? For *Anaximander* ſucceeded *Thales*, who was the firſt Philoſopher of *Greece*; and a much wiſer Man than his Scholar, as will afterwards appear. But we muſt now purſue *Anaximander*: and *Plutarch* in another place tells us, *That he was of opinion that Mankind were firſt bred in the Bellies of Fiſhes; and when they were ſtrong enough to help themſelves, they very fairly caſt them upon dry ground and left them to ſhift for themſelves.* Is not this a very good philoſophical account of this matter? And he was in the right, when upon this ground *he diſſuaded Men from eating of Fiſh*, leſt they ſhould be like *Cannibals*. It is a known ſaying, *That there is nothing ſo abſurd, but it was ſaid by one Philoſopher or other*. I think *Anaximander* may put in for the firſt, who broach'd his own dreams and idle fancies under the name of Philoſophy. And yet *Empedocles* in this matter, rather outwent him. For he ſaith, *Animals were not intire at firſt; but came into the world by pieces*; and ſo arms and legs, and all other parts happening to joyn together, made up one perfect Animal. *Hæc non ſunt Philoſophorum judicia, ſed delirantium ſomnia*, may be much better apply'd here, than it is by the *Epicurean* in *Cicero* to their opinions of the Gods. But I rather think *Empedocles* his opinion is miſ-repreſented; ſince the Author of the Book *De Mundo* (which is very ancient, if not *Ariſtotle*'s) gives another account of him; and ſaith, *He deriv'd the forming of Animals from* God; and his *Verſes*, as they are in *Simplicius*, do not deny it; but only ſhew, *that all things except* God, *came from different principles.*

Plutarch. Sympoſ. l. 8. c. 9.

Plutarch. de Placit. l. 5. c. 19.

Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. 1.

But we are not deceiv'd in the third *Hypotheſis* of *Epicurus* and his followers; which as *Redi* repreſents it is, *That Mankind and other Animals were inclos'd in certain Coats and Membranes in the womb of the Earth, which being broken in due time, they were all expos'd naked, without any ſenſe of heat or cold, and ſucked the Earth for nouriſhment; but the Earth grew too old for ſuch births; and therefore was contented ever ſince to bring forth nothing but Inſects.* This is ſo well known to be the *Epicurean Hypotheſis* from *Lucretius*, *Cenſorinus*, &c. that there needs no farther proof of it. But whether it can be thought reaſonable, is the thing now to be conſider'd. And herein theſe two things are ſuppos'd: (1.) That there was a fit diſpoſition of the Earth to produce them; and a capacity in it to form Wombs and Bags to preſerve them till they were able to take nouriſhment; and that the Earth did afford a ſort of Milk to ſupport them. (2.) That the uſe of all the parts of human Bodies came only by chance, and were not form'd with any deſign. Both which are very unreaſonable ſuppoſitions.

How can they make it appear that there ever was any ſuch diſpoſition of the Heavens and Earth to produce Animals more than there is ſtill? When they were told *that if the Earth could at firſt produce Animals, why not ſtill?* Their anſwer was, *The Seaſons are changed, the Heavens were more benign, and the Earth more fruitful than they have been ſince.* (1.)

At novitas Mundi nec frigora dura ciebat,
Nec nimios æstus, nec magnis viribus auras;
Omnia enim pariter crescunt & robora sumunt.

Lucret. l. 5.

Lactant. l. 2. c. 12. And *Lactantius* sets down their opinion more distinctly, *That certain motions of the Heavens are necessary to this production of Animals, as well as the freshness of the Earth; and that then there was no Winter nor Summer, but a perpetual Spring.* But how came such a *Proper Season* for this purpose at that time; and never since? *Animals*, say they, *can never since propagate themselves:* But what is this to the *Season?* Do the *Seasons* alter, as there is occasion? Then there is a Superior Mind to direct them. If there be a natural course of the Heavens, which caus'd the Earth to be then prolifical; that must return and put a new vigor into the Earth, and make it young again. And this our modern Atheistical Philosophers in *Italy*, such as *Cardan*, *Pomponatius* and others, saw very well; and therefore asserted *that upon certain Conjunctions of the Heavens, the same effects would follow.* So *Berigardus*; who *Berigard. Circul. 10. p. 636. part. 5.* saith, that *Cardan* and *Pomponatius* laid much weight on this Story in *Diodorus Siculus* about *Animals produc'd by the Nile*; and he adds another very ridiculous, as he pretends out of *Camerarius*, *of several parts of human Bodies, which are seen to appear every year rising out of the Earth about Grand Cairo:* and he thinks *they were like the Egyptian Mice, part Earth and part Animals.* What will not such Men be inclin'd to believe rather than the truth! As when he adds, *of the two Green Boys in* England, *which came out of a Wolf's den 500 years since; and the Blew and Red Men out of the Mountains of* Armenia. Which are such incredible Fictions, that it is a wonder any one that pretends to Common sense could repeat them. But as to the Egyptian Story in *Camerarius*, it relates not at all to the first making of Bodies; but *to the Resurrection from the dead. Camerarius* neither pretends to have seen it himself, nor that his Friend did; but that his Friend heard one that had been a great Traveller say, *That in a certain place* *Camerar. Opera subcis. Cent. 1. c. 73.* *not far from the Pyramids, at a certain time of the year, a great multitude met to see the Resurrection of the Dead, as they call'd it; and then he said some part of the Body seem'd to come out of the Earth, sometimes the Head, sometimes the Feet, and sometimes the greater part of the Body; which were afterwards hid under the Earth again.* And another Friend of his shew'd him an old *Itinerary* to the same purpose; *and that the place was two Miles from the* Nile, *in an old Burying-place; and that it lasted three days, and then no more were seen that year.* But he added, That *they weer not seen rising up or walking*; and he saith, *That he saw it not himself.* But *Camerarius* himself censures it as a *superstitious folly*. *Martinus à Baumgarten* saith, *That at* Cairo *it was believ'd in his* *Martin. à Baumgart. Peregrin. l. 1. c. 18.* *time, that at a certain Mosque near the* Nile, *the Bodies of the dead do arise out of their Graves at the time of Prayers, and there stand, and disappear when they are over*; which he calls a *Diabolical Illusion.* But when our Ingenious Mr. *Sandys* was in *Egypt*, Sandys's *Travels, p. 99.* the story was chang'd; for then it was affirm'd, *That not far from the* Nilus, *upon Good-Friday, the Arms and Legs of a Numbers of Men did appear stretch'd forth of the Earth, to the astonishment*

of

of the multitude. Which he not improbably conjectures *to have been taken out of the Mummies not far off by the Watermen, (who gain very much by it) and plac'd conveniently in the Sand to be ſeen,* as they thought would raiſe the greateſt admiration. Since his time Monſ. *Thevenot*, who was upon the place ſaith, *That at Grand Cairo it is generally believ'd that on three days in Paſſion-week, ſome part of the dead Bodies lie out of the graves, and then return into the Earth. He had the curioſity to go and ſee, and there found ſome skulls and bones, which they ſay confidently came out of the Earth; but he looked on it as a contrivance of the Santons.* But if this prove any thing, it is not what *Berigardus* brings it for, that Mankind came firſt out of the Earth, but that there ſhall be a Reſurrection of the Dead: for he ſaith, *It was in a place where many dead Bodies did lie buried*; and not far from the *Mummies*; which was the moſt famous place for Burials in all *Egypt:* an account whereof is given by *Bellonius*, *Peter della Valle*, *Buratine* in *Thevenot's Collection*, Prince *Radzivil* and ſeveral others: Prince *Radzivil* obſerv'd, *That there were vaſt numbers of skulls and bones ſcatter'd up and down, where the fleſh had been taken off, and ſold away for Mummy.* But beſides theſe *Mummies* (as they are call'd) there was continu'd a place of ſolemn Burial near to *Grand Cairo* by the *Turks*; ſo that there were always Bodies ready that were not proper *Mummies*, to make this annual ſhew with, to deceive the ſimple. But *Berigardus* is aware of the difficulty *of aſſigning the manner how Animals come out of the Earth*; and therefore he thinks it ſufficient to ſhew that the Earth can produce them one way or other, and afford them *Nouriſhment* when they are produc'd; this he thinks *abſolutely neceſſary*, and he ſuſpects that *Lucretius* his *Folliculi* will not do the buſineſs; *becauſe it is impoſſible for Children to ſubſiſt, if they did break the bags they were inclos'd in, which were faſtened to the Earth:* But if there were ſuch a *Milky Subſtance* in the Earth for new born Children to ſuck, is that all that is neceſſary for their ſupport, when they are ſo unable to help themſelves? Of all things one would not expect to find Milk in the breaſts of the Earth; and it muſt be ſome very happy Conjunction of the Planets to make the Earth to give ſuck. How much would thoſe who are friends to Religion have been deſpis'd and laugh'd at, if they had made ſuch abſurd and ridiculous *Hypotheſes* as theſe? If ſuch a thing did ariſe from natural and neceſſary Cauſes, it muſt continue; and ſince we are certain it hath never been ſince, we have no reaſon to think it ever was. If it were by chance; what hinders the ſame effect, unleſs Chance were ty'd up to one certain time? and by what Laws can Chance be bounded? If it were by particular deſign at that time for the ſupport of new born Animals, then there muſt be a Providence owned; and yet all this was invented on purpoſe to exclude Providence: which ſhews how weak and inconſiſtent this *Hypotheſis* is.

Thevenot Voyage de Levant, part 2. ch. 12.

Bellon. l. 2. c. 47. Pietr. della Valle Vol. 1. Lett. 11. §. 8. Thevenot Relat. part. 1. ad fin. Peregrin. Principis Radzivil, p. 187.

We account it a wonderful work of Providence, that at the ſame time the Child is form'd in the womb of its Mother, there ſhould be ſo ample and ſutable proviſion made for its nouriſhment in the Mother's breaſts againſt its coming into the World. Whether it be by turning the Blood into Milk, as was generally thought, or by a paſſage of the Chyle from the Ventricle thither, as ſome of late think;

think; it cannot but be look'd on as a work of Deſign, to turn the nouriſhment another way on purpoſe to ſerve the neceſſities of the new born Child. But this is not all; but continual care and watchfulneſs of the Nurſe is neceſſary to preſerve it, otherways, as well as by feeding it. But theſe unadvis'd and fanciful makers of Mankind think they have done their buſineſs, if they can but imagin the Earth to afford ſome *Milky Subſtance*, to ſupport the poor helpleſs Infants to a little ſuck from the Earth: why did they not as eaſily find out all other conveniencies for them? But there is ſo much abſurdity in the whole Suppoſition, that *Berigardus* concludes, *That Mankind muſt come full grown out of the Earth, and able to ſhift for themſelves; or elſe that ſome other Animals muſt come out before them to afford Milk for them, as the Wolf did to* Romulus *and* Remus. Such miſerable ſhifts muſt thoſe run into, who will not allow a wiſe Providence to have brought Mankind into the World.

II. But how came Mankind, if they came into the World ſo by chance, to be ſo admirably provided in all parts of their Bodies of ſuch inſtruments of ſenſe and motion, that look as like a deſign as any thing can poſſibly do? The Bodies of Men are not like mere lumps of dirt and water put together, for there is not the leaſt part about them, but is made up of ſuch a *Wonderful Mechaniſm*, that there cannot be a diſcompoſure in it without a diſorder in the whole. But, ſuppoſe the fleſhly and bony parts could be made by the mixing and tempering ſeveral particles of Matter together; yet what can be imagin'd as to the *Muſcles* and *Nerves* and *Fibres*, which are ſo conveniently diſpers'd over the Body? The Heart it ſelf is found to be a very ſtrong Muſcle, conſiſting of abundance of Nerves, and all kind of Fibres complicated within each other, and a ſtrong Tendon at the Baſis of it; by virtue whereof it is able to contract it ſelf, and ſo makes the Blood to paſs into the Arteries, which convey it to all parts of the Body. Now let any one think with himſelf how it is poſſible for a mere Lump of Earth made in ſuch a form as the Heart is, to have ſuch a force and power to contract it ſelf to ſuch a degree as to ſend out ſo much Blood continually, and to receive it in again by the relaxation of it ſelf. How comes this Motion to begin in ſuch a piece of Clay made with a Baſis and a Cone? How came the inward cavities to be form'd, and kept ſo diſtinct from each other? For, if there were any ſtop of the paſſage, Life is at an end. How comes ſuch a Motion to continue ſo long and ſo uniform? Thoſe who have moſt narrowly ſearch'd into it, have found that no other account can be given of it, but that the Wiſe Creator that form'd the Heart, doth both give and continue its motion. And as to all the other Muſcles of the Body, if we conſider their number, their poſition, the contexture of their parts, and their continual uſefulneſs; we can never imagin that all theſe things could be the reſult of Heat and Mud, or a caſual conflux of the dull particles of Matter. Every Muſcle hath its proper Fibres laid upon one another, and its oppoſite Tendons, with an inward cavity, and the Artery, Veins and Nerves belonging to it, and a Membrane to cover all; and all parts capable of motion have ſeveral Muſcles peculiar to themſelves, for diſtinct uſes and different

Lower *de Corde, p.* 85.

ſort

ſort of motions; as may be ſeen at large in all that treat of theſe matters. Who tell us generally that the Eyes have ſix, the Noſe four pair, the Cheeks two pair, the Lips four Muſcles, the nether Mandible five, the Ears ſix, the Tongue ſeven, &c. I need go no further: and altho' there be ſome difference in the way of numbring them, yet they all agree, there are ſo many as are impoſſible to be made out by heat and mud, or any force of the Sun or Earth. And what is it which makes all theſe Muſcles ſo ſerviceable to Mankind, that upon the leaſt command they move the parts they ſerve in what manner we direct them? The reaſon of *Muſcular Motion* is a thing as much out of our reach as that of the *Heart:* Some talk of *Elaſtic Spirits*; others of *the weight of the Blood*; others of *a nervous liquor diſtending the carnous Fibres*; others of *a Succus nutritius from the Nerves meeting with the Animal Spirits, and fermenting together, which being thruſt into the carnous Fibres, ſwells and dilates them ſo as to make them contract themſelves; from whence*, they ſay, *Local Motion proceeds.* But all theſe are but mere conjectures, and hardly anſwer to the moſt common appearances of Muſcular motion. And the Mechaniſm of our own Bodies, both as to Senſe and Motion, baffles all the attempts of the moſt ingenious and ſubtle Philoſophers; who may eaſier teach us the ways to talk about it, than to underſtand it. But there is one thing yet farther fit to be obſerv'd in this place concerning the Muſcles; which is the different Figure of them, according to the uſe they ſerve for; as the Muſcle called *Deltoides* on the Shoulder, the Circular Muſcles, where their uſe is to open and ſhut; if ſuch things do not argue contrivance and deſign, it is not eaſy to imagin what doth. What can thoſe who follow *Diodorus Siculus* make of the whole *Syſtem of Nerves*, which are in the Body of Man? Did theſe come out of ſlime with *the heat of the Sun?* How came the different Riſe of the *Nerves*, ſome within and others without the Brain? What reaſon is there in the bulk, and figure, and texture of that ſame Subſtance, that it comes to be ſo divided, ſo as part of it to continue within the Brain, and the other to be continued down to the loweſt part of the Back, by ſeveral diſtinct *Vertebræ?* How came Matter of it ſelf to form ſuch a paſſage down from the Brain, and to ſecure it in ſuch a manner; and to compact the ſeveral parts together, ſo firmly as if they were but one bone, and yet ſo flexibly as to ſerve beſt for motion? What made the *Perforation* for the *Spinal Marrow* to paſs in the middle and on the ſides, for the ſeveral *Nerves* to go from thence to the ſeveral parts of the Body? Whence came that *Ligament*, which joyns the *Vertebræ* of the Back together, and covers the other Membranes of the *Spina Dorſi?* There is a wonderful curioſity obſerved by our greateſt *Anatomiſts*, in the order and placing of the *Nerves*, the *Arteries*, *the Veins* and the *hollow places* belonging to it: which they found by opening the *Verbetræ* in *Embryos*, and taking out the ſpinal Marrow, and injecting liquors into the ſeveral veſſels. And ſtill the farther any have gone in theſe ſearches, the more reaſon they have ſeen to admire the wiſdom of Providence: and ſo it hath been in other parts. *Ariſtotle* mentions a ſtrange ſaying of *Empedocles*, *That the reaſon why the Back-bone appears as if it were made up of ſeveral pieces, was*

Willis de Cerebro, c. 29.

Ariſt. de Partib. Anim. l. 1. c. 1.

that it was at first broken, and then put together; and ever since it hath so continued. But how came the *Vertebræ* then to be so well fastened together, and to be so much more convenient for motion than an intire bone would have been? Besides in an *Embryo* that which is properly the *Spina*, doth not then appear, as being inconvenient for its posture in the womb; which shews both the intention of Nature, and the design of Providence. How came the *Vertebræ* to be in other Animals as well as Mankind? And even *Aristotle* himself was therein mistaken, for he affirms, *That a Lion hath no* Vertebræ *in his Neck-bone, but that it is all one continued bone:* But *Borrichius* in his Anatomy of one, declares *that he found the several* Vertebræ *in the Neck plain and distinct.* And the same learned Person observes, *That in a Crocodile, which he dissected, he found in four foot length of the Back sixty* Vertebræ; *which were of a spongy nature, fit to receive nourishment*; and from *the different formation of some parts of them*, he concludes it most probable that they grow so much longer than other Animals. But *Aristotle*'s mistakes, about *the Lion's having no* Vertebræ *in his Neck*, had been discover'd by *Scaliger*, and confirm'd by several Dissections since: So that the *Vertebræ* are of the original design of Nature. But to proceed: What made the several passages out of the Skull, for the Nerves which serve for the several Senses of *Smelling*, *Seeing*, *Hearing* and *Tasting?* How come the several branches of the *Par Vagum* to be so dispers'd, and to make such knots with the *Intercostal Nerves?* These, and many more such Questions might be asked relating to the wonderful *System* of *Nerves*, but these are sufficient to my purpose, to shew that these wonderful contrivances for Sense and Motion, could not come from mere fortuitous and unthinking Causes. But let us look now upon the most obvious parts of the Body, which lie to the view of all Men, the *Eye*, the *Ear*, the *Mouth*, and the *Hand*; one would think it hardly possible for any Men pretending to Reason, to think these to be the result of Chance. Let us well consider the structure of *the Eye*, and we may well think *Lucretius* had no lucid interval when he wrote,

Aristot. Hist. Anim. l. 4. c. 10.

Hermet. Sapient. vindic. c. 10. p. 245. p. 272.

Exercit. 208.

Illud in his rebus vitium vehementer & istam
Effugere errorem, vitareque præmeditator,
Lumina ne facias oculorum clara creata,
Prospicere ut possimus.

Lucret. l. 4.

That we must have a great care to avoid the mistake of those that say, that Eyes were made for Seeing. For could any Man in his right Senses think the Eye could be form'd for any other use but to see with? *But the use is after the thing is form'd.* What then? May it not be design'd for such a use by him that form'd it? *But that which is form'd for a particular use, must be later than that for whose use it is form'd, as a Bed for a Man to sleep on, a Cup to drink out of, Armor to defend himself; but a Man might sleep, and drink, and defend himself, before those things were found out.* What is the meaning of all this? No one is so senseless to question, Whether Men be not before they find some coveniencies for their particular uses;

uſes; but the Queſtion here is, Whether when a thing is ſo form'd as to ſerve only for ſuch a uſe, it be not reaſonable to conclude that it was made on purpoſe for that uſe? But ſaith *Lucretius*,

Nil ideo quoniam natum'ſt in corpore ut uti
Poſſemus, ſed, quod natum'ſt id procreat uſum.

Nothing is made in the Body that we might uſe it, but when it is made we find out the uſe of it. As tho' it had been poſſible for Mankind to have found ſuch an uſe of the Eye, unleſs it had been purpoſely made for it. The act of Seeing is no doubt ſubſequent to the making of the Eye; for we cannot ſee without Eyes; but if we could make no other uſe of Eyes but to ſee with, is not this a plain evidence they were made for us to that end? This is not like a uſe we make of things which we alter the faſhion of for our conveniencies. For, we do not make our own Eyes; they are very early form'd in the Body, and therefore were within the primary intention of Nature; and aſſoon as we come into the World, we do not deliberate whether we ſhould uſe Eyes or not, for we preſently ſee with them. And how can the Eye being made teach us the uſe of it, when we preſently make uſe of our Eyes without any previous deliberation? We may hinder the uſe of them, if we pleaſe, by blinding our ſelves, but we cannot turn them to any other uſe. If *Lucretius* in the extravagancy of his imagination, might fancy the uſe was arbitrary, then Men might have heard with their Eyes, or have ſeen with their Ears, or have taſted with their Noſes, or ſmelt with their Tongues: But this I ſuppoſe none can think that he meant. What was it then? that Men could not uſe them till they were made? We grant it. But doth it follow thence that they were not made deſignedly for ſuch a uſe? How can we judg of that, but by examining the ſeveral parts? and if they were fitted for ſuch a uſe and no other, we have reaſon to conclude they were ſo intended. Now what could the *Muſcles*, and *Tunicles*, and *ſeveral Humors* of the Eye be made for, but for Sight? How came that *Cavity* to be form'd in the Forehead in which the Eyes are plac'd? What motion of the particles of Matter made two ſuch hollow places in the Skull? How came one not to be ſufficient? How come the *Eye-lids* to be ſo plac'd? Could they be deſign'd for any other uſe? How come the *Glands* to be fix'd in the corners of the Eyes, and with the *Lymphatic Veſſels* belonging to them? Could they have ſerv'd for other uſes? How comes the *Optic Nerve* to be continued to the three Tunicles of the Eyes? and that which partakes moſt of the ſubſtance of the Brain to be the chief organ of Sight, as fitteſt to tranſmit the images to the Brain? What was the *Chryſtallin Humor* deſign'd for, but to receive the impreſſions of outward objects? How comes the *Optic Nerve* to be ſo inſerted into the Eye, not directly behind, but on one ſide, but only for the more intire tranſmitting the images receiv'd by the Eye? Can now any one think that the Eye could be ever made for any other uſe, but for ſight? And we do not therefore uſe it, becauſe we find it ready prepar'd; but it was therefore ſo prepar'd, that we might uſe it to ſuch a purpoſe.

And as to his general saying, *That nothing in the Body is made for use, but that the use follows the making of it*; let us apply it to other Animals, and it will appear ridiculous. What could any Man answer seriously to one that should say, that four-footed Animals had not Feet given them to go with; but that finding so many Feet, they did go with them? And so for the Wings of Birds, and the Fins of Fishes; and the particular shapes of some Animals for their particular use: As, the long Neck of the Swan, for going deeper in the water for his food; will any one say, that the Swan finding his Neck so long, us'd it for that purpose? Or that *Shell-fish* finding their hard Shells ready made as a defence against the Rocks, crept into them for that end? Whereas all the Muscles they move by, are cover'd over with a hard bony substance; and so they are the necessary parts belonging to them. What can be said to the thick horny substance of an Eagle's Eye, which makes it bear the strongest beams of the Sun; was this only us'd for that purpose, but not intended by Nature? Whence came that outward covering of the Eye, not only in Eagles but in other greater Birds, which they can draw over it as they please, and is so strong a defence against light, that Anatomists tell us, by the help of it put to their open Eyes, they could look on the Sun without trouble, as *Borrichius* informs us? *Steno*, upon the observation of the wonderful Mechanism of the Eye both in Mankind, and Beasts, and Birds, saith, *That if a Man first understands Mechanics, and then curiously examins the fabric of Animals, he must either put off his Reason, or he must admire the wisdom and contrivance of Providence.* And he understood the frame of these things far beyond what either *Lucretius* or *Epicurus* did.

Borrich. Hermet. sap. p. 259. Act. Dan. l. 2. Obs. 127.

And so for the Ear; *that was made*, saith *Lucretius*, *long before any Sound was heard.*

Multoque creatæ sunt prius Aures,
Quam sonus est auditus.

No doubt of it. For how should we hear without Ears? But can any Man imagin they could be made for any other use but to hear with? How came they be to be plac'd in the Head and not in any other part of the Body? Were there any form'd before with Ears in other parts, which did not do so well? In other cases they say, *Nature was put to try divers Experiments, because the imperfect Animals could not subsist*; but this cannot hold here: For Mankind might have lived without Ears in other places, but the Head is certainly the best for Sounds being receiv'd and transmitted to the Brain. How comes the outward part of the Ear to be so fram'd as it is, but for the better gathering and more distinct conveyance of the Sounds, as appears by the confus'd noise which those have who have lost that part? What made the inward passage so winding, and such an exquisite Membrane at the end of it, and a Cord behind it, but for the advantage of the Sound? How come the three cavities behind, the first with little bones of an extraordinary figure, whereof one triangular, the better to give passage to the Air; the second called *the Labyrinth*, and the third with *Spiral Windings* and *an Internal Air*, and all particularly serving the purpose of Hearing, by the Sound passing from one to another?

another? Whence came all theſe ſubtle and intricate paſſages, if our Bodies were made by chance? And yet, if any of them be not in their due order, our ſenſe of Hearing is prejudiced; which ſhews that this contrivance was neceſſary in order to it. And which is again obſervable, the greater diſcoveries have been made in theſe matters, the more reaſon we have to admire the contrivance of them. As in this ſenſe of Hearing, the lateſt diſcoveries about the ſmall bones of the firſt cavity, call'd *the Hammer*, *the Anvil*, and *the Stirrup*, and another in the joyning the two laſt, acquaint us with more than what the Ancients knew; ſince there are two things remarkable about them. 1. *That they do move each other*; the Drum moves the Hammer, the Hammer the Anvil, that the Stirrup, which opens the paſſage into the ſecond cavity. 2. *That theſe bones are as big in an Infant, as in grown Perſons.* Now how comes this to paſs in a way of *Mechaniſm?* How come theſe bones not to increaſe as the other parts of the Body do; ſince the moſt ſolid of them, *the Hammer* and *Anvil*, as well as the *Stirrup*, have manifeſt Pores in them to receive nouriſhment? But not only theſe, but the other ſmall bones in the inner cavities, the *Semicircular paſſages* and the *Cochlea* only receive a greater *firmneſs* and *hardneſs* by Age. Theſe things I can only mention, and refer the Reader to Mr. *Du Verney* and others, who have treated moſt exactly of them.

The frame of the Mouth as it is, is neceſſary for *Reſpiration*, and *Nouriſhment*, and *Speech*. For *Reſpiration*, the Mouth opened affords a paſſage to the Air, and there are inward veſſels fitted to convey it to the Lungs; and without breathing it is impoſſible to live. But how came the two different paſſages for the *Air* and *Food?* How came the *Valve* to ſecure the paſſage to the Lungs from ſuch things which may prejudice it, and paſs the other way? As to *Nouriſhment*, the Mouth not only takes in the Food, but the Teeth are conveniently plac'd for the preparing it for its farther paſſage and alteration in the Stomach, in order to Nutrition; for which end there are veſſels prepar'd with wonderful variety and contrivance. How come thoſe *Channels* into thoſe hard bones in the Mouth, which we call *Teeth*, by which an Artery, a Vein and a Nerve ſpread themſelves in branches to each particular Tooth? How come the figures of them to vary according to their uſe, and to have ſtronger Roots where the work is harder? And becauſe *Speech* is one of the peculiar excellencies of Mankind, there is an Inſtrument fram'd on purpoſe for it in the Mouth (which ſerves for *Taſting* likewiſe) and without this, all the communication of Mankind with each other by words had been loſt. And I cannot ſee how mere Matter and Motion could help Mankind either to frame words, or to utter them to others without a *Tongue*; nor, how it could be fram'd by it.

The *Hand* is ſo provided with *Joynts*, *Muſcles* and *Tendons*, for the great variety of neceſſary uſes it ſerves Mankind for, that he that can think it could be ſo contriv'd by chance, doth thereby ſhew that ſome can think only by Chance without any Reaſon; and it is a vain thing to hope to convince them. I ſhall not need to inſiſt on the curioſity of the contrivance of all the Muſcles of the Hand, but it is impoſſible for any Man to give an account of the *Perfo-*

ration of thoſe Muſcles, which ſerve for the uſe of ſome of the Fingers and Toes, from mere Matter and Motion; nor the Ligaments about the Tendons of thoſe Muſcles, for the greater eaſineſs of their motion. *Ariſtotle* hath a Diſcourſe about the great uſe of a Hand to Mankind; *Anaxagoras*, he ſaith, *ſaid that Man was the wiſeſt Animal, becauſe he alone had Hands*; but, ſaith he, *therefore Man had Hands, becauſe he was the wiſeſt: being beſt able to make uſe of ſuch an excellent Inſtrument. For that is the wiſdom of Nature to do as a wiſe Man would do*, i. e. *to give the beſt inſtruments to the beſt workman. Now*, ſaith he, *the Hand is the moſt uſeful Inſtrument to him that is capable of making a good uſe of it.* And therefore he blames thoſe that ſaid, *Man was the worſt provided for of any Animals; for they have but one help afforded them by Nature, but the Hand is inſtead of all, for it can make uſe of all.* And for that reaſon he ſhews how very convenient the make and faſhion of the Hand is, and the diviſion of it into five parts, on which he inſiſts at large. So that *Ariſtotle* was fully ſatisfy'd that the production of Mankind was no caſual or ſpontaneous thing, but the effect of Wiſdom and Underſtanding.

Riolan. Anatom. l. 5. c. 28.

Ariſtot. de Part. Anim. l. 4. c. 10.

Theſe things I have here laid together at firſt, becauſe this *Hypotheſis* of *Diodorus Siculus* hath been thought by ſome in our Age to be *The natural ſenſe of Mankind without Revelation*; whereas in truth it is the foundation of Irreligion, and the reproach of Mankind; but not the ſenſe of the wiſeſt part of them. And to make out this more effectually, I ſhall now proceed to conſider and compare the ſenſe of the moſt *Ancient Philoſophers* on both ſides, as to this point, whether the World was the effect of Chance, or of a wiſe Providence. For if the World were made by a wiſe and intelligent Being, it can never be ſuſpected that Religion is an impoſture, or a contrivance of Politicians; for then it will appear to be built upon the trueſt Reaſon. And I ſhall the more carefully inquire into the opinions of the eldeſt Philoſophers; becauſe they were neither *Prieſts* nor *Politicians*, having no intereſt to carry on by the practice of Religion. And ſome of them were born in a very good condition, and quitted their Eſtates, or neglected other buſineſs, the more freely to attend on their philoſophical Inquiries. And therefore we have the more reaſon to ſearch into their Opinions, ſo far as relates to theſe matters.

It cannot be deny'd that after Men began to be inquiſitive into the philoſophical Reaſons of Things, there were ſome who ſet up for material Cauſes only, without an Efficient. And there were two different ſorts of theſe, and the other Schemes may be well reduced to them.

The firſt was of thoſe who were the immediate Succeſſors of *Thales*. For I ſee no reaſon to put him in the head of them, if what *Cicero*, *Diogenes Laertius* and *Plutarch* report of him be true. For it is ſaid in *Cicero*, *That* Thales *made* God *to be the Mind that form'd all things*. And to what purpoſe ſhould *Velleius* ſay this, if this had not been then known to have been his opinion? For it had been better for his deſign to have made ſo great a Man as *Thales* was eſteem'd, to have excluded God and Providence. *Diogenes Laertius* ſaith, *That he not only made* God *an Eternal Being, but that the World was of his making*. And he was no more partial

Cicer. de Nat. Deor. l. 1. 25.

tial in this caſe, than the *Epicurean* in *Tully*. It is obſervable, that when *Plutarch* blames *Anaximander* and *Anaximenes* for *leaving out the Efficient Cauſe*, he takes no notice of *Thales* on that account; which he ought to have done, as being the Head of that Sect of Philoſophers called the *Ionic*; as himſelf acknowledges in that place. And *Stobæus* ſaith, *That* Thales *own'd a Divine Power, which paſs'd thro' and gave motion to the fluid Matter, out of which he ſuppos'd all things to be made.* The great Objection againſt this, is, that ſeveral of the ancient Writers ſay, *That* Anaxagoras *was the firſt Philoſopher, who attributed the making of the World to an Infinite Mind*; and that *Plutarch* himſelf, in the Life of *Pericles*, ſaith the ſame. But the true anſwer to this, is, that *Anaxagoras* was the firſt who own'd this in writing; whoſe words are produc'd by ſo many; but *Thales* wrote nothing about it that appear'd, and therefore his Scholars going another way, there might be ſome preſumption againſt him. For, it is too evident that *Anaximander*, his Diſciple, did never mention a God in the making of the World; *but he mentions ſeveral Gods made out of the World, Dii nativi*; a ſort of *Phœnician Gods*, which roſe out of Matter; and ſuch as the *Poets* had poſſeſs'd the People with among the *Greeks*. I have already obſerv'd from *Plato, That the old Greeks worſhip'd the Sun, Moon and Stars, &c. as other barbarous Nations did:* Now herein lay the artifice of *Anaximander*, that he took care to aſſert the *Popular Deities*, and ſo avoided the imputation of *Atheiſm* among the People; who look'd no farther, than whether Men own'd the Religion in vogue: But whether there were an Infinite Mind ſuperior to thoſe Gods they worſhip'd, they look'd on as a Speculation too deep for them; and therefore they let thoſe alone, who ſpake nothing againſt the Gods they ſolemnly worſhip'd. And this was the true reaſon of the different uſage of *Anaximander* and *Anaxagoras*. The former aſſerted the Beginning of all things to have been from Infinite Matter, without an Efficient Cauſe; the latter ſaid, this was impoſſible; but there muſt be an Eternal Mind to give motion to Matter, and to direct it. Now one would have thought that *Anaxagoras* ſhould have been in favor with the People, who hated *Atheiſm*, and *Anaximander* puniſhed: But on the contrary *Anaximander* kept up his Intereſt among the People where he liv'd, at *Miletus* in *Aſia*, and at laſt carry'd a Colony along with him to *Apollonia*. The reaſon was, the People of *Miletus* had a wonderful veneration for *the Sun and Moon*, under the names of *Apollo* and *Diana*; and as long as *Anaximander* comply'd with them, as to theſe *Dii nativi*, they let him alone in his Philoſophy. But *Anaxagoras* coming to *Athens*, and being there in favor with *Pericles*, a leading Man in the City, but oppos'd violently by a different Faction of *Thucydides Mileſius*, who took all advantages they could againſt *Pericles* his Party: They finding that *Anaxagoras* had ſhew'd too much of his Philoſophy, when he call'd the Sun a *Maſs of Fire*; this ſet them all in a flame, and made ſuch a diſturbance about it, that *Anaxagoras* was accus'd of *Atheiſm*; and *Pericles* with all his Intereſt and Eloquence, could not ſave him from Baniſhment, in which he died, as appears by *Laertius* and *Ælian*. *Anaxagoras* was very clear as to the main point of *Atheiſm*, for he aſſerted an Eternal Mind

Plutar. de Plac. Phil. l. 1. c. 3.

Stob. Eclog. Phyſ. c. 1.

Ælian. l. 3. c. 17.

Strab. l. 14.

Mind which made the World; this *Anaximander* deny'd, but he asserted the Common Deities: and altho' the *Epicurean* in *Tully* argues well against *Anaximander*'s Opinion, *Sed nos Deum nisi sempiternum intelligere quî possumus?* We can have no true Notion of God not eternal; yet such philosophical Reasons signified little; he allow'd the same worship which they practis'd, and this was enough to satisfy them.

I am not ignorant, that some have gone about to excuse *Anaximander*, as tho' he were so intent upon the Material Causes, that thro' *Incogitancy* only *he left out the Efficient*. A strange piece of *Incogitancy* in a Philosopher to leave out the main point. For the just fault which *Anaxagoras* found, was that he went about to make a World without an Eternal Mind before Matter; and he knew very well what the sense of *Anaximander*, and his Scholar *Anaximenes* were, by whom he was instructed. And why should *Socrates*, *Plato*, *Aristotle*, *Theophrastus*, &c. look on it as so extraordinary a thing in *Anaxagoras* to assert an Eternal Mind, as the first Cause, if his predecessors meant the same thing? But there is a passage in *Aristotle* which seems most to favor *Anaximander*; viz. *That he own'd an Infinite first Principle, which did contain and govern all things, and was Immortal and Incorruptible.* And this *Aug. Steuchus Eugubinus* in his learned Book *De perenni Philosophia*, insists much upon. (A Book written with so good a design, and bating some suppositious Authorities, so well manag'd, that the Elder *Scaliger*, as his Son tells us, commended it particularly to a great Friend of his, too inclinable to *Atheism* (as was too much the fashion then, as well as since, among some who would seem to have more wit than others) and it had so great success therein, that he utterly renounc'd all Principles tending that way.) The passage which he produces is certainly in *Aristotle*, and it seems so capable of a good meaning, that *Clemens Alexandrinus joyn'd him with Anaxagoras in supposing an Infinite Being above the Elements*; and it cannot be deny'd that the Author of the Book *de Mundo* (who, as I before observ'd, was very ancient, if not *Aristotle*) doth use the same Expression concerning God, *that he doth contain and govern all things:* but yet laying the passages in *Aristotle* together, there is too great reason to suspect that *Anaximander* did not assert an Eternal Mind, as *Anaxagoras* did. He is there giving an account of the different Notions Philosophers had concerning *the first Principle; some asserted it to be Infinite, as* Anaxagoras *and* Democritus; *the former held things to be made out of one another, and that there was one first Principle of all, which he called Mind; the latter held no Generation of things out of another; but that one Common Matter or Body was the only Principle of all things; and that the parts differ'd only by bulk and figure.* Thus far *Aristotle* is clear; then he goes on to shew, *that the first Principle must be Ingenite and Incorruptible*; and then it *must contain and govern all things; as all do hold, who do not assert* other Causes *as Mind* (as *Anaxagoras*) *or Friendship* (as *Empedocles.*) *And this is* the τὸ θεῖον *the Divine Being, which is immortal and incorruptible,* as was asserted by *Anaximander* and *the most of those* he calls *Physiologists, i.e.* who went no farther than the bare Nature of things. Now here it is plain, that he doth distinguish *Anaximander* and his

De Perenni Philos. l. 11. 5.

Jos. Scalig. de vit. Julii Scaligeri p. 50.

Clem. Alexandr. Protrept. p. 43.

Nat. Ausc. l. 3. *c.* 4.

his followers from *Anaxagoras*, who aſſerted an Eternal Mind: and he diſtinguiſhes his opinion both from that of *Democritus* and *Anaximander*. It may be ſaid, *that it is plain from hence, that* Anaximander *did aſſert a Divine Being*; but at laſt it came to nothing but *Infinite Matter*: which was the Original and Mother-God to his *Dii geniti*, as he called them. In another place he ſpeaks yet more plainly; *viz. that thoſe Philoſophers before* Anaxagoras, *went no farther than Matter, and made all things to come out of it, and to be diſſolv'd into it again; being it ſelf one and immutable under all the variety of changes.* He ſaith, *They differ'd about the firſt Material Principle; Thales*, and one *Hippon* called *the Atheiſt* (the firſt of that order that we read of) *held it to be Water*: but *Ariſtotle* beſtows a very ſevere character upon him, viz. *that he did not deſerve to be mention'd for the meanneſs of his capacity.* (It ſeems *Wit* and *Atheiſm* did not begin together.) *Anaximander* would go no farther than Infinite Matter in general; but *Anaximenes* was for *Air*; and ſo was *Diogenes Apolloniates*, who liv'd in the time of *Anaxagoras*; but it ſeems by *Demetrius Phalereus* his Apology for *Socrates* (now loſt) *that he fell into ſome danger at* Athens: (poſſibly for being againſt the worſhip of Fire, as *Anaxagoras* was) But upon the whole matter, I do not ſee how *Anaximander* can be excus'd, altho' he left the *Popular Gods*, and beſtow'd the name of *Divinity* upon his *Infinite Matter*.

Metaphyſ. l. 1. c. 3.

Διὰ τὴν ἀτέλειαν αὐτοῦ τῆς διανοίας.

But there was another *Succeſſion* of *Philoſophers* deriv'd from *Xenophanes*, who liv'd in *Sicily*, ſaith *Laertius*, and was contemporary with *Anaximander*: and he was neither a follower of *Thales* nor of *Pythagoras*; but from a Town near the Sea in *Italy*, whence his chief followers came, it was called the *Eleatic Sect*. He was a great enemy to *the Poetical fictions about the Gods*; as he had reaſon; for they ſtrangely corrupted the minds of the People, and took away all inward Reverence towards the Deity. And altho' *Ariſtotle* ſpeaks with ſome contempt of him; yet others have ſhew'd that he miſ-underſtood him, and that he aſſerted *One Infinite and Eternal Mind*: and the ſame *Simplicius* ſaith of *Parmenides* and *Meliſſus*: But ſince the learned Author of the *Intellectual Syſtem of the Univerſe*, hath very well clear'd that matter, I intend not to tranſcribe him, but to refer my Reader to him; and proceed to thoſe who changed the firſt Notions of the *Eleatic Sect*, and ſet up for the making a World without a Deity. And thoſe were *Leucippus* and *Democritus*; and yet *Stobæus* ſaith, *that* Leucippus *wrote a Book about Mind*; wherein he hath this ſaying, *That nothing is done in vain, but all things are done from Reaſon and Neceſſity.* How theſe two things came to be ſo put together is hard for us now to conjecture, unleſs that Book of his had been preſerv'd. *Plutarch* ſaith, That *Democritus* held that GOD *was an Intellectual Fire, and the Soul of the World.* But it appears by *Cicero*, that *Democritus* did not ſtick at making ſome very ſubtle *Effluvia* of his Atoms to be Gods, both thoſe without us, and thoſe within us, *viz.* thoſe which make up our intellectual Faculties. It is very hard to ſay what his true Notion of *Divinity* was, unleſs we could have ſeen his Books about *Mind* and *Providence*, which *Laertius* ſaith *that he wrote*. But whatever he might write for the amuſing the World, (as *Epicurus* did afterwards) if he made the origin of

Beſſario c. Calumnia. Plat. lib. 2. c. 10. 11.

Stob. Eclog. Phyſ. c. 8.

Plutarch. de Placit. Philoſ. l. 1. c. 7.

Cicer. de N. Deor. l. 1.

all things to have been *without Mind or Providence*, no Titles of Books will be a ſufficient Excuſe for him.

And I confeſs it is all one to me, whether thoſe who fram'd the *Atheiſtical Hypotheſes* proceeded in the way of *Forms* and *Qualities*, or of *Atoms* and *Vacuity*; becauſe I think the one way as impoſſible as the other. For as *Ariſtotle* hath well obſerved, the great difficulties as to the firſt Principles lay in two things; *The beginning of Motion, and the Order of the World:* and in both theſe the different *Hypotheſes* of *Anaximander* and *Democritus*, were equally defective. But whether the World were made by *the Circumvolution of Infinite Matter, endued with contrary Qualities*; or *by the motion of Atoms, which had nothing but Bulk and Figure*, ſignifies nothing as to the main point. I do not deny but one *Hypotheſis* may in ſome reſpects be more intelligible than the other, and tend more to explain the difference of Body and Mind: but there are ſtill difficulties on both ſides: ſome things may be taken for *Real Qualities*, which are not; and the many Experiments of this Age have fully prov'd it: but then there are other things, eſpecially relating to *Animals*, which can never be explain'd in the Mechanical way, to the ſatisfaction of any reaſonable Man.

But altho' *Anaximander* and *Democritus* ſtarted theſe two different *Hypotheſes* about the Origin of the World; yet thoſe who aſſerted an Eternal Mind to be the firſt Cauſe, had in common Reaſon very much the advantage of either; ſince it was impoſſible for them to give an account how the motion of Matter began, or how it fell into that order, and beauty and uſefulneſs which we find in thoſe parts which make up the viſible World. All that we can learn of *Anaximander's Hypotheſis* is, *That the Heavens and Infinite Worlds* (for why ſhould they ſtop, when they could make Worlds ſo eaſily) *were produced by an Infinite circumvolution of all things; that theſe had in them very different Qualities from each other, ſome hot ſome cold, ſome dry ſome moiſt, &c. that theſe being in continual motion, a mixture of them happened, and according to the different mixtures of Qualities, the ſeveral ſorts of things did ariſe.* This, as far as I can apprehend, was his ſcheme of the Production of things.

Plutarch. apud Euſ. Præp. Ev. l. 1. 8.

There is little difference between the two *Hypotheſes* of *Anaximander* and *Democritus*, but only in the point of Mixture, which one attributes to Qualities, and the other to the Bulk and Figure of Atoms. They both aſſert the Production of things by the circumvolution of the parts of Matter; both held infinite Worlds; and that the things of this World came together of themſelves, without any ſuperior Cauſe.

But were not all the Philoſophers of their Mind? No; ſo far from it, that the beſt and greateſt of them utterly rejected this Doctrine, as unſatisfactory to human Reaſon. Of which we have an evident proof from *Ariſtotle*, who cannot be ſuſpected of any partiality in this matter. In the beginning of his *Metaphyſics* he gives an account of the Opinions of *Philoſophers before him about the firſt Principles of things*. I know that he is hardly thought of by many for miſ-repreſenting the Opinions of thoſe before him, and that he endeavor'd to leſſen their reputation to advance his own; but I can ſee no manner of reaſon for it in this caſe. 'Tis

poſſible

poſſible as to the *Pythagorean* and *Eleatic ſect*, he might not repreſent their Opinions ſo fairly as they were capable of: but as to theſe *Phyſiologiſts*, as he calls them, he charges nothing upon them, but what they own'd; only he makes *Thales the Head of them*; for which I have offer'd Reaſons to the contrary. But in general he ſaith, *That thoſe who began firſt to philoſophize, look'd upon Matter as the only Principle, out of which all things came, and to which they did return; the Subſtance remaining the ſame, and the Affections only chang'd. As* Socrates *is the ſame Man, altho' his inward habits were chang'd.* But what this Material principle was, they were not agreed. Thales, *the firſt of them, thought it to be Water*; Anaximenes *and* Diogenes *Air*; Hippaſus *and* Heraclitus *Fire*; Empedocles *to them added Earth.* Hitherto, ſaith he, we find nothing but the Material Cauſe; but, ſaith he, when they had gone ſo far, the very Nature of things carried them farther in their Inquiries. For whatever change be made in Generation and Corruption, there muſt be ſome Cauſe why it ſo happened. For mere Matter doth not change it ſelf. As Wood doth not make it ſelf into a Bed, nor Braſs into a Statue; but ſome Artificer doth it. *But the ſeeking this, is looking after another Principle*, which he calls, *the Principle of Motion. Which thoſe who aſſerted from the beginning, ran themſelves into difficulties, altho' they aſſerted Matter to be one; but thoſe who went no farther than Matter, whether Water, or Fire, or Earth, were never able to clear the Production of things; and therefore were forc'd by Truth it ſelf,* (ὑπ' αὐτῆς τῆς ἀληθείας) *to ſeek for another Principle.* Where it is very conſiderable that *Ariſtotle* ſaith, That there were ſome from the beginning who aſſerted both Principles; and that thoſe who aſſerted only a Material Principle, ran themſelves into ſuch difficulties which they could never ſee their way through; but were forc'd at laſt by the mere power of Truth to ſeek for another Principle. Which not only ſhews his own Opinion, but that others upon conſideration, were fain to ſet up a new *Hypotheſis* againſt theſe Materialiſts; not wholly new, as he ſhews, but new in oppoſition to them, who thought at firſt by pretending to skill in Philoſophy, to have run down the ancient Opinion of Mankind, founded on ſuch a Tradition of which none could trace the Original. Of which I have already produced the teſtimonies of *Plato* and *Plutarch*. But now the humor of philoſophizing coming among the *Greeks*, the firſt ſetters up of this were very apt to contemn any thing that was built on Tradition; for that gave no Reaſon of things; which it was their buſineſs to do. In ſome things then unknown as to the natural cauſes of them, they wonderfully ſupriſed the common ſort, who thereupon admired them as Men that could do any thing. Being thus puffed up with a vain opinion of their own skill, they attempted to give an account of the very beginning of the World; and finding out what they thought the main Principle of which things were compoſed, they had no more to do, but to ſuppoſe them all reduced to a Maſs or Chaos; and then they fancied that by the motion of theſe ſeveral parts of Matter, things would fall into that ſtate, we now ſee them in the World. But as much as they pleas'd themſelves with theſe Speculations, thoſe who came after them, found them extremely defective, both in the beginning of this Mo-

Metaphyſ. 1. §. 3.

Προϊόντων δ' ὕτως αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα ὡδηγήσεν αὐθις καὶ συνλαμβάνει ζητεῖν

tion, and the Order of it. For they found Matter to be a dull unactive thing of it ſelf; and that no Matter could form it ſelf without an Agent; and therefore they ſaw it neceſſary to add a Supreme Efficient Cauſe, which ſhould both put the parts of Matter, however qualified, into motion, and direct and regulate the courſe of it. For otherwiſe it was impoſſible to conceive, that there ſhould be ſuch diſtinct Syſtems or Bodies of Matter, as there are in the World. For how come the ſeveral *Vortices* not to interfere with each other? What made the Centers of them to be diſtinct from one another; ſo as that the Matter within ſuch circumference ſhould move about that alone? And without this it is impoſſible to conceive there ſhould be ſuch Bodies as the Sun, Moon, and Stars are; ſo great, and yet ſo diſtinct from each other. But what Cauſe then was found ſo neceſſary to be ſuperadded? *Ariſtotle* ſaith, That the order and fitneſs of things, which he calls Εὖ ἐ Καλῶς, muſt proceed from an Intelligent Cauſe; for theſe things could never come either from mere Material Cauſes, as Fire, Earth, &c. or only by Chance. And therefore he ſaith, *Anaxagoras* wrote like a Man in his ſenſes, in compariſon of thoſe before him; which ſhews that he look'd on the others Speculations as dreams and idle fancies. And he will not allow *Anaxagoras* to have been the firſt that aſſerted this; but he did it φανερῶς, openly and plainly, in oppoſition to ſuch as had ſet up another *Hypotheſis*. For before him, he ſaith, *Hermotinus Clazomenius* had ſaid the ſame thing, as to a ſuperior Cauſe. And ſo no doubt had many others; but he mentions him as a Philoſopher of the ſame City from whence *Anaxagoras* came. But it ſeems the reputation of *Thales* and his Scholars had obtain'd ſo much in the *Greek* Colonies where they inhabited, that they buried the name of others, altho' *Clazomenæ* were a City of *Ionia* too.

Τοῦτον ὑπερφυῶς τὸν ἄνδρα θαυμάσας ὁ Περικλῆς. *Plutarch. in Pericle.*

But that *Anaxagoras* was a Perſon of a juſt eſteem, appears by the great value which *Pericles* ſet upon him; who not only had him for his Counſellor, but ventur'd his intereſt to preſerve him: and altho' he was over-rul'd by the contrary Faction, as to his Baniſhment; yet he took care of him in it. And as *Plutarch* ſaith, he obtain'd the name of Νοῦς; he cannot tell, whether it was for his Opinion, or the reputation of his Wiſdom. And after he was buried at *Lampſacus*, a City of *Aſia Minor* near the *Helleſpont*, there were two Inſcriptions on the Altar erected to his Memory, which teſtify'd the very great Eſteem of him in two words, the one was Νοῦς, and the other Ἀλήθεια. And what can be ſaid greater of a Philoſopher, than that *Underſtanding* and *Truth* belong'd to him? *Timon*, who was not very civil to the memories of moſt Philoſophers, gives him a high character in *Laertius*: who ſaith likewiſe, *That he was born to a conſiderable Eſtate; but he had a Mind above Riches.* And *Sextus Empiricus* ſaith, *he was the moſt skilful in Natural Philoſophy*; and he was blam'd both by *Socrates* and *Ariſtotle*, for running too far into Natural Cauſes, as tho' he made uſe of his Supreme Mind only to help him out, when nothing elſe would. But therein he ſhew'd that it was not for want of Underſtanding Natural Cauſes, that he aſſerted *an Eternal Mind, pure and unmix'd*, which was the firſt Cauſe of things; but it was his true skill in Philoſophy, which brought him to it. For he fix'd on the Principle of *Gravitation*, as the main foundation of

Ælian. l. 8. c. 19.

Sext. Empir. p. 153.

Plato in Phædr.

Ariſt. Metaph. l. 4.

Plutarch. in Pericle.

Union

Union and Compoſition; but the other *Hypotheſes* of *Vortices*, or *Circumlations* without it, he look'd on as weak and inſufficient. So vain is that ſaying of *Lucretius* and a modern Philoſopher, that *Ignorance of Cauſes inclined Men to Religion*; eſpecially as to the Heavenly Bodies: *Leviathan ch.* 12.

Præterea cœli rationes ordine certo,
Et varia annorum cernebant tempora verti,
Nec poterant quibus id fieret cognoſcere cauſis;
Ergo perfugium ſibi habebant omnia Divis
Tradere, & illorum nutu facere omnia flecti.

Lucret. l. 5.

For the trueſt and exacteſt ſearcher into Natural Cauſes, we ſee, was the moſt firm and ſteady aſſerter of a God. *Lucretius* magnifies his Heroe, *that neither the common Fame, nor the Thunder and Lightning had frighted him into any ſenſe of Religion; but that he had gone beyond the Clouds by the ſtrength of his Wit, and had ſettled all the bounds of Nature.*

Quem nec fama Deûm, nec fulmina, nec minitanti
Murmure compreſſit cœlum, &c.

Which was all becoming the more than Poetic fury of *Lucretius* to ſay. But *Plutarch* in the Life of *Pericles* ſaith, That *Anaxagoras* explain'd to him the Natural Cauſes of thoſe Meteors which are ſo apt to terrify Mankind; and thereby took away an ignorant Superſtition; but inſtead of that he ſetled in his Mind τὴν ἀσφαλῆ μετ' ἐλπίδων ἀγαθῶν ὑπόθεσιν, *a firm Devotion accompany'd with good Hopes.* And is not this far beyond the utmoſt *Lucretius* attributes to his *Hero?* ſuppoſing he had ſuch ſucceſs, as he imagin'd; which we have only the Poet's word for.

Quare Relligio pedibus ſubjecta viciſſim
Obteritur, nos exæquat victoria cœlo.

But we can find no ſuch victory that he ever obtain'd over Religion, by his fooliſh and precarious *Hypotheſis*, which the more learned pretenders to *Atheiſm* in our Age are aſham'd of, becauſe of its vanity and inconſiſtency; and therefore there is now leſs need of inſiſting upon it. But what reaſon had *Lucretius* to make ſuch extravagant boaſting of *Epicurus* his ſucceſs againſt the Principles of Religion; when *Cicero* of the ſame age and time, and a friend to *Lucretius*, had ſo very mean an opinion of it, and hath expos'd it ſo much to contempt in more places than one? But poſſibly he may mean, *it had ſo at Athens:* nothing like it. For it was obſerv'd, that none were more forward to comply with the *popular ſuperſtitions*, none more reſerv'd as to their real opinions about the *Deity*, than *Epicurus* and his followers. What need all this mean complyance, this caution and reſerve, if they were ſuch Conquerers, as he repreſents them? They never oppos'd the common ſentiments, as *Anaxagoras* did, and ſuffer'd for it; but inſtead of it, they induſtriouſly labor'd to perſuade the People, that they were *for Piety and Veneration of the Gods; and Epicurus* wrote *Plut. adv. Colot.*

about it: whether in earneſt or not, I diſpute not; but he was in earneſt concern'd for his own ſecurity. Are theſe the marks of a *Conqueror?* And yet in his time the *fear of the Areopagus*, after the time of *Ephialtes* was in great meaſure removed. It is obſerved by *Joſephus*, *That by the Laws of* Athens, *it was death without mercy, to ſpeak againſt the eſtabliſhed Religion*; and we find with what difficulty *Anaxagoras* eſcaped: But in *Epicurus* his time the Government was ſunk, and the *Macedonian* Empire was continually growing upon them; and all People took greater liberty to ſpeak their Minds, and without any ſuch oppoſition as the Philoſophers before him met with, when their Laws were obſerved more ſtrictly; as when *Protagoras* and *Diagoras* were forced to abſcond for fear of their lives; and *Ariſtotle* upon a ſuſpicion of a profane *Hymn* to withdraw to *Chalcis*. But in the time of *Epicurus*, the ſtate of the City was altered, and the Government was in the hands of *Alexander*'s Succeſſors; for *Epicurus* lived with his Scholars in *Athens*, when it was ſo cloſely beſieged by *Demetrius*, as *Plutarch* informs us, who ſoon after had the poſſeſſion of it delivered to him. Now in buſy and diſordered times, ſuch as *Epicurus* might be far more ſecure than at another time; and yet even then he was afraid of giving any diſtaſt, as to his opinions about Religion; and ſtill aſſerted his owning *the Anticipation of a Deity*, altho' not conſiſtent with his own grounds of certainty. But where was *the victory the mean while over Religion*, which *Lucretius* boaſts of? His Defenders ſay, *It was over the ill effects of Superſtition*; but we find nothing like that effected by him. The World was not made one jot the better, but a great deal the worſe for his Principles; for the very name of a Philoſopher went a great way with Perſons of bad inclinations: and they do not govern themſelves by any Reaſon; but when they can bring an Authority of a Perſon of any reputation, they inquire no farther, but go on with greater confidence in their former practices; and then they charge *Ignorance* and *Superſtition* on thoſe that contradict them. I do not deny but ſome of the Defenders of *Epicurus* in our Age, have been Perſons of Wit and Learning, and they have uttterly diſown'd his irreligious Principles: but yet the very undertaking to defend the Author of ſo much impiety, hath done unſpeakable miſchief to the Age we live in; and all the diſcoveries of Natural Philoſophy can never make amends for it. We are now comparing the Notions of *Epicurus* and *Anaxagoras* as to Religion; and that method which *Plutarch* tells us *Anaxagoras* took, as to the freeing the Mind of *Pericles* from *Superſtition*, was far better than that of *Epicurus*. For *Anaxagoras* ſatisfy'd him, that there were natural cauſes of Thunder and Lightning, but theſe were the effects of a Divine Providence, which order'd the affairs of Mankind for the beſt, as well as the Meteors in the Air; and therefore there was no reaſon why any wiſe and good Man ſhould not entertain a comfortable Hope of Divine Protection: but in the way of *Epicurus* there is a bare account of Natural Cauſes, which whether true or falſe, can give no ſatisfaction to a thinking Man. For the utmoſt comes to this; Such and ſuch Effects do naturally follow ſuch Cauſes. And what then? *Then if ſuch things happen, we cannot help it*. And what follows? Nothing more. And is this all the comfort of *Epicurus* his

Joſ. contr. Ap ion. l. 2

Plut. vit. Demetrii.

his Inquiry into Cauſes? To underſtand this better, I will put a Caſe, which lately happened in the place where I live at preſent, to a Man working in his Garden near a great River: while he was there buſy, a violent ſhower of Rain fell of a ſudden; and the Man thinking to divert it, the Rain beat down a great heap of earth above him, and carried it through his Garden, and took away the Man with its force into a precipice hard by, and with great violence hurried him down into the River, which made him ſtupid and ſenſeleſs; but it pleas'd God he was taken up, and recover'd. Now let us conſider what would tend moſt to the ſatisfaction of this Man's Mind, when he was in that deplorable ſtate, if he had been then ſenſible of his caſe: What comfort would it have been to him to have been told, that as things were, the earth above him falling down, and there being ſuch a precipice below him, there was no help for him, and he muſt be contented to ſuffer? But would it not be far greater ſatisfaction to be told, there were thoſe above who ſaw him fall, and pitied his caſe, and would be ſure to help him out, and give him what was neceſſary for his relief and remedy? Now this is the caſe of *Neceſſity* and *Providence*: the one gives only that heavy comfort, *Things muſt be ſo, and we cannot help it*; the other ſtill keeps up reaſonable hope, and the expectation of ſomething better. So that no one can deny, that upon mere Principles of Natural Reaſon, this is the more deſirable *Hypotheſis*; and nothing but invincible arguments ſhould remove Mankind from it: but neither *Democritus* nor *Epicurus* could offer any thing but a very precarious *Hypotheſis* againſt it.

From *Anaxagoras* I now come to *Socrates* (for *Achelõus* purſued his Principles at *Athens*, where *Socrates* was his Diſciple.) He was a Perſon of great vogue at *Athens*, for the *Natural ſharpneſs of his Wit*, and *the freedom he us'd in converſation with all ſorts*, without regard to his own intereſt. And for this he appealed to his Judges, and to the whole City, that he was far from any deſign to enrich himſelf, as they all knew: he did not deny but that he had great preſents offer'd him; but he took no more than to keep him from poverty, as in the caſes of the King of *Macedonia* and *Alcibiades*: and none could blame him for being refractory to their Laws about Religion; for he declar'd that to be his Principle, *That* God *ought to be worſhip'd according to the Laws of the City where a Man liv'd*. And for this, *Xenophon* ſaith, *he truſted to the* Pythian *Oracle*; which was thought of good Authority among them: however ſome in our time have repreſented it as *ſo groſs an impoſture*, that is hardly credible any Men of common ſenſe could be deceiv'd by it, much leſs the *Athenians*; who for all that we can perceive had as good an opinion of it, as the *Bœotians* themſelves.

Plato in Apol. Socr.

Xenoph. Mem. l. 1. c. 3.

Van Dalen Diſſert. de Orac. Ethn.

This was a very hard point at that time among Men of better underſtanding, and who had a true ſenſe of God and Providence, how they ſhould behave themſelves with reſpect to the Popular Superſtitions. There was no difficulty, as to ſuch as had no Religion at all; for their Principle was to keep fair and to ſecure themſelves; and they look'd on ſuch as *Protagoras* and *Diagoras*, as Perſons who deſerved be puniſhed for their folly. But for Men who truly believ'd a wiſe God to govern the World, as *Socrates* and

and his two excellent Scholars *Plato* and *Xenophon* did, the caſe was very difficult: For, if they did not comply, they were ſure to be proſecuted as guilty of impiety; if they did, this ſeem'd to juſtify all their Superſtition.

The way which *Socrates* took was this: He avoided giving any offence as to the contempt of their public worſhip. Nay, *Xenophon* ſaith, he was ſo far from any impiety that way, that he was rather more remarkable for his diligence therein; and that no Man ever heard him ſay or do any thing that tended to the diſhonor of Religion; ſo that from the whole courſe of his life, he might be well concluded to be Εὐσεβέστατος, *a very devout Man.* *Cicero* had a very particular eſteem of *Socrates*, not only for *the greatneſs of his Wit, but for his Wiſdom and Goodneſs*; and from him we learn what the grounds were which ſuch Men went upon. They found the World horribly corrupted with Superſtition, which was to be remov'd in the beſt way they could; but there was great danger, leaſt under that pretenſe, all Religion ſhould be deſtroy'd. And they ſaw an abſolute neceſſity of keeping up that, ſince *the Beauty and Order of the World, was ſufficient to convince Mankind that there was an Excellent and Eternal Being, which was to be adored and worſhiped by Mankind.* This was their fundamental Principle; and they rather choſe to comply with the follies of their Superſtitions, than not keep the ſolemn worſhip of the *Deity*. And to ſatisfy themſelves, they put ſuch interpretations upon the public Rites, as made them ſerve to ſome part or other of natural worſhip, with reſpect to the benefits God beſtows on the World; and thus, even the *Eleuſinian* Myſteries were underſtood by them.

Propter ejus magnitudinem Ingenii. *De Orat.* 1. 54. Qui quum omnium ſapientiſſimus eſſet, ſanctiſſimeque vixiſſet. *Ib.*

Eſſe præſtantem aliquam æternamque Naturam, & eam ſuſpiciendam admirandamq; hominum generi, pulchritudo Mundi, ordoque rerum cœleſtium cogit confiteri. *Cic. de Div. l.* 2. *c.* 72.

But how then came *Socrates* to be ſo ſeverely proſecuted at *Athens?* 'Tis true, that his enemies charg'd him with *Impiety* and *Atheiſm*, as appears both by *Plato* and *Xenophon*. In *Plato*'s *Apology* we find that *Melitus* downright accus'd him *that he thought there were no Gods.* *Socrates* being much ſurpriz'd at this charge, ask'd him what ground he had for it; and all the proof he offer'd was, that he was of *Anaxagoras*'s opinion that the Sun and Moon were not Gods: which *Socrates* deny'd; and ſaid his charge was inconſiſtent, for he both accus'd him of bringing in new *Deities*, and aſſerting that there were none at all. But in the concluſion of his Apology, he fully own'd *a Divine Providence taking care of good Men living or dying; but whether of the two were better for a Man, he thought* God *alone knew.*

But to ſhew more plainly what *Socrates* his judgment was as to the Production of the World: *Xenophon* gives this account of it. *That he look'd on it as a great piece of folly in Mankind to attempt it from Material Cauſes; and he wonder'd that they did not find out, that theſe things were above their reach.* And he thinks thoſe * *Philoſophers argued like mad Men; neither agreeing with one another, nor with the nature of things: for ſome ſaid, that it conſiſted of One thing; others, of Infinite: ſome ſaid, all things were in motion; others ſaid, there was no motion at all: ſome ſaid, that all things were generated and cor-*

Ἐθαύμαζε δ' εἰ μὴ φανερὸν αὐτοῖς ἐστιν, ὅτι πάλαι ἀδύνατον ἐστιν ἀνθρώποις εὑρεῖν. *Xenoph. Mem. l.* 1. *c.* 1.

* Ἐπεὶ τὰς μέγιστον φρονοῦντας ἐπὶ τῷ περὶ τούτου λέγειν ἀδύνατα δοξάζειν ἀλλήλοις, ἀλλὰ τοῖς μαινομένοις ὁμοίως ἀλλήλους. *Ibid.*

corrupted; and others, that nothing at all was. Plato in his *Phædo* let us know how he came to be unſatisfy'd even with *Anaxagoras* himſelf, altho' he mightily approv'd his fundamental Notion of *all things being produc'd by an Eternal Mind.* When he was a young Man, he ſaith, he was a great admirer of Natural Philoſophy, and endeavored to find out the Cauſes of things; but at laſt *he found they were too hard for him,* and ſo fell into a kind of *Scepticiſm:* but he had heard of a Book of *Anaxagoras,* wherein he aſſerted, that *Mind* order'd all things; this pleas'd him well: but he expected that from hence he would have ſhew'd how that Eternal Mind did frame every thing for the beſt, τὸ ἐκάστῳ βέλτιστον; but finding him to falter there, and to run to mere Natural Cauſes as others had done, he gave over his purſuit of Natural Philoſophy, and applied himſelf to matters of Morality; as more certainly known, and of greater uſe to Mankind.

But as to Providence, *Xenophon* is very particular in it, *That it extended to all things ſaid or done, altho' in never ſo great ſilence; and that* God *was preſent in all places.* To the ſame purpoſe *Diogenes Laertius* mentions a ſaying of *Thales; Being asked, whether a man could do an unjuſt action without* God's *knowing it: No,* ſaith he, *not if he only thinks to do it.* Which, ſaith *Valerius Maximus,* was intended to keep Mens Minds clean and pure, as well as their hands. But the Atheiſtical Club at *Athens* in *Socrates* his time, turn'd this another way. For they ſaid, *This was only a contrivance of ſome cunning man, to keep Mankind more in awe.* And that this was their ſenſe, appears by the Verſes ſtill preſerv'd in *Sextus Empiricus;* and part in *Plutarch* and others; but by the former they are attributed to *Critias,* and by the latter to *Euripides,* both of *Socrates* his time. But there ſeems to be far greater probability as to the former, becauſe ſuch a ſaying was very agreeable to the Character of the Man. For *Critias* was one of the *thirty Tyrants* ſet up by *Lyſander* at *Athens;* a Man of wit, and addicted to Poetry; as *Socrates* himſelf owns in *Plato*'s *Charmides,* that he deriv'd it from *Solon:* He and *Alcibiades* had been both under *Socrates* his care, as *Xenophon* tells us, but they both forſook him, and changed their Manners upon it. *Critias* went into *Theſſaly,* and there fell into lewd and debauched company; and from thence came to hate *Socrates,* whom he had admir'd before: and when he was one of the *thirty Tyrants,* he and *Charicles* ſhew'd a particular diſpleaſure againſt him; for *Socrates* had ſpoken too freely againſt their Government. He was the head of the number, as appear'd by *Theramenes* drinking a Health to *Critias,* when he took off his Poiſon; and when *Thraſybulus* came to deliver *Athens,* upon his being kill'd, the whole Faction ſunk. Nothing can be more agreeable to the Character of ſuch a Man, than to make him look on all Religion as an impoſture and contrivance of ſome crafty Politician. But nothing of it agrees with that of *Euripides,* who was Scholar to *Anaxagoras,* a friend to *Socrates;* and on all occaſions wrote decently with reſpect to Piety and Virtue. But *Plutarch* ſaith, *He wrote the Verſes in the name of* Siſyphus *for fear of the* Areopagus. It cannot be deny'd, that Author (whether *Plutarch* or not, for ſome queſtion it) doth ſay ſo. But if *Plutarch* had ſaid it on good ground, how came *Sextus* after him, ſo

Xenoph. l. 1. c. 1. ad fin. & c. 4. ad fin.

Valer. Max. l. 7. 2. §. 8.

Sext. Emp. p. 310. Poeſis Phil. p. 75.

P. Petit. Miſcell. l. 1. c. 1.

poſitively to give them to *Critias?* And which is more to the purpoſe, the ſame Author had but a little before quoted a paſſage of *Euripides* very agreeable to a Scholar of *Anaxagoras*, *That the Heavens were* Καλὸν ποίκιλμα τέχνης σοφῆς, *The beautiful workmanſhip of a wiſe Architect*; and from thence we come to the Notion of God. How different is this from the ſenſe of thoſe Atheiſtical Verſes! But it is no eaſy matter to judg what the true ſenſe of a Poet is, when it is his deſign to perſonate others. And ſo *Euripides* might introduce *Siſyphus* as ſpeaking agreeable to his own Character, who is repreſented as *an ill man, and given to fraud*; and therefore it is no wonder ſuch a Man ſhould look on Religion as ſuch a contrivance. For either *Siſyphus* or *Critias* might be well ſuppos'd to utter ſuch things, but the queſtion is, how far *Euripides* is to be charg'd with them; and whether he ſpoke his own ſenſe under the name of *Siſyphus*, for fear of the *Areopagus*. This ought certainly to be prov'd ſome other way: and if not, it ſeems to be a very unjuſt imputation; eſpecially ſince *Socrates* expreſs'd ſuch an eſteem for *Euripides*; which he would never have done, if he had ſuſpected that under the Perſon of *Siſyphus* he had overthrown the foundations of Religion.

Plutarch. de Placit. Philoſ. l. 1. c. 6.

Ælian. l. 2. c. 13.

But what the true ſenſe of *Socrates* was, may be ſeen by his Diſcourſe with *Ariſtodemus*, of which *Xenophon* hath preſerv'd the remembrance. This *Ariſtodemus* was one of thoſe that not only neglected Religion himſelf, but deſpis'd and laugh'd at thoſe that regarded it. *Socrates* finding what ſort of man he was, takes him to task after his dry manner. And are there no Perſons, *Ariſtodemus*, ſaid he, that you have any eſteem of for being wiſer than others? Yes, ſaid he briskly and like a Man of Wit, *I admire* Homer *for an Epic Poem*, Melanippides *in Dithyrambics*, Sophocles *in Tragedy*, Polycletus *in the Art of making Statues, and* Phidias *in Painting*. The Man we ſee was a kind of *Virtuoſo* in other things, but without any ſenſe of God or Religion. Well! ſaid *Socrates, and would you not admire thoſe more who make living and moving Statues, than ſuch only as have neither ſenſe nor motion?* No doubt the former, *Ariſtodemus* reply'd, if they are made by Deſign, and not by Chance. Of that, ſaid *Socrates*, we may beſt judg by the uſe they are intended for. For thoſe things which are for a manifeſt uſe, are moſt agreeable to Deſign. As for inſtance, the Senſes of Men are ſo plainly given them for particular uſes, that we cannot reaſonably think, but that he that made Mankind at firſt, gave them them for that purpoſe; as he particularly inſtances in the fabric of the Eye, and the care of Nature to preſerve it, (which he calls a work of Providence) and ſo for the Ears, Noſe and Mouth, which are ſo fram'd, as to be προνοητικῶς πεποιημένα, done by a wiſe Deſign, and not by Chance. And I cannot, ſaith *Socrates*, look upon them otherwiſe than as the workmanſhip σοφοῦ τινος δημιουργοῦ καὶ φιλοζώου, of a wiſe contriver, and a lover of his own Workmanſhip. The ſame he ſhews in the propagation of Animals, and the love and care of their young, &c. but as to Mankind, he ſaith, there is φρονήσεως τι, a reach beyond other Animals; and they have not only a Body made out of Earth, but a Mind which we perceive within our ſelves. And can theſe great and wonderful things come to paſs δι' ἀφροσύνης τινὰς, without Mind or Underſtanding?

Xenoph. Mem. l. 1. c. 4.

ing? To which our *Virtuoſo* had nothing to ſay, *but that he could not ſee the Artificer here, as he did in other caſes.* Well! And do not you contrive and deſign things in your own Mind? And yet you can no more ſee that, than the wiſe contriver of theſe things. All that *Ariſtodemus* had to ſay, was that he did not diſown or deſpiſe a Divine Being, but he thought it too great to regard his Service. Hold a little, ſaid *Socrates*, for the greater he is, the more he ought to be honor'd by Mankind. Then he queſtion'd, whether there were ſuch a thing as Providence, with reſpect to human affairs. For that, *Socrates* again bad him look to the frame of Human Nature, and the ſeveral parts of Man's Body, and he could not but ſee a Providence in the contrivance of the ſeveral parts of the Body; but eſpecially the Mind, which he hath inſpir'd into Men. Τῲ ψυχὴν κεφλίσην τῳ̃ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐνέφυσε, Not *blowing ſome ſubtile Air into Man*, as ſome modern Philoſophers would tranſlate it; or giving *a mere Vital motion.* But *Socrates* was far from thinking *an Incorporeal Subſtance* within us to be *a Contradiction*; nor that it was any abſurdity to take a Metaphor from *Air*, to expreſs the infuſion of an Immaterial Soul. And he ſhews the excellency of the human Soul above others, becauſe it alone apprehends the being of God, who made and contriv'd the greateſt beſt things; and alone is capable of doing him ſervice. Beſides, that it hath Prudence and Memory above all others. So that Mankind are as ſo many Gods among inferior Creatures. If a Man had the body of an Ox and the Mind of Man together, he could not do what he would; nor if Brutes had Hands and wanted Minds, could they do much with them. But you, ſaid he to *Ariſtodemus*, have both, and can you think there is no care of Providence about you? Can you think, ſaid he, that the Gods (as he ſpeaks) ſhould plant in Mens Minds an opinion that they are able both to reward and puniſh, if it were not ſo? And that Mankind ſhould be always deceiv'd in this Matter, and not be ſenſible of it? Do not you ſee, ſaith *Socrates*, *that the moſt ancient and wiſeſt Cities, and Nations, and Ages, have always ſhew'd the greateſt regard to Religion?* This is a very remarkable teſtimony of *Socrates* concerning the ſenſe of former Ages about the foundations of Religion; and that the Atheiſtical temper ſome were then fallen into, was a late Innovation, and in probability occaſion'd by that ſmattering in Philoſophy, which was crept in among the *Greeks* from the Principles of *Anaximander* and *Democritus*. But *Socrates* aſſures us *the beſt and wiſeſt Ages* had a very different ſenſe of theſe matters. And this *Xenophon* tells us he had from *Socrates his own Mouth; and that he heard this Diſcourſe between them.*

And what now is to be ſaid to ſuch a Teſtimony as this, concerning the ſenſe of Mankind about Religion? Have we any reaſon to miſtruſt ſuch a Teſtimony as that of *Socrates*, who was ſo much valu'd for his integrity; and loſt his life, becauſe he could not flatter nor diſſemble? For any one that will carefully examin the circumſtances of his Trial will find, the true reaſon of his proſecution was, that he had diſobliged ſo many ſorts of People by his plain dealing. For, as he told his Judges, his way was when he heard any Man had a great opinion for his own wiſdom and skill above other Men, to talk with him on purpoſe, to ſee whether *Platon. Apolog. Socr.*

there were any ſufficient ground for ſuch an opinion: which was one of the moſt diſobliging courſes in the world; conſidering how fond Men are apt to be of themſelves, and to think themſelves wiſer than others; at leaſt in that which they moſt pretend to. By which means he diſobliged the *Politicians*, who hate any Man that would pretend to find them out; the Sophiſts, whom on all occaſions he expos'd, and in the moſt public manner: And the Men of Wit and the Poets were enrag'd againſt him, becauſe he ſlighted their way, as tending only to entertain the fancy, and not to make Men wiſer; and in their happieſt ſtrains, there wasonly a *Natural Enthuſiaſm*; and altho' they ſaid many fine things, yet they were not one jot the wiſer men. The Artificers he found had many pretty knacks, but becauſe of their Skill in ſuch little things, they preſum'd wonderfully at *Athens* upon their Underſtandings, and would never bear long any Great Men among them, when things went by majority of Votes. As *Socrates* found, when ſentence came to be paſt; for altho' he had many good Friends, yet when it came to the numbring of Votes, he was caſt by a great Majority. But as the People of *Athens* were ſo opinionated of themſelves, that they could not bear any Man, whoſe reputation leſſen'd theirs: So when they had done ſuch things which made them ill ſpoken of abroad, then they were for redeeming their own honor; either by recalling them from Baniſhment, if living; or if dead, by puniſhing the inſtruments made uſe of in the proſecution. So it happened in the caſe of *Socrates:* when they found his death brought an *Odium* upon the City, one of his Accuſers was *put to death*, another *baniſhed*; and *Plutarch* ſaith, *ſome of the reſt were ſo weary of their lives, that they put an end to them by hanging themſelves.* And to ſhew their great eſteem of him, they caus'd a Statue made by *Lyſippus*, to be ſet up in a public place in the City, as a perpetual Monument of his wiſdom, and their own folly. And his carriage at his death was with ſo much courage, and conſtancy, and evenneſs of Mind, that they were all ſatisfy'd as to his integrity and freedom from any ill deſign. What reaſon can there be then to ſuſpect his Teſtimony in this point of Religion, when there was not the leaſt conſtraint or byaſs upon him, and this atteſted by ſo unexceptionable a witneſs as *Xenophon:* A Perſon of great honor and judgment; and whoſe Writings are ſuch, as could hardly be counterfeited by any ſince him, by reaſon of their *unaffected ſweetneſs*; for which the ancient Critics ſo much admired him; even *Cicero*, as well as *Dionyſius Halycarnaſſeus*, and *Quintilian*.

Plutarch. de Odio & Invid.

Cicero de Orat. l. 2. Dionyſ. Halycarn. ad Pomp. Quint. X. Cicero ad Quint. I. 1.

From *Socrates* I go on to *Plato*, who in *Cicero*'s opinion (and he was a very good judge) was *Princeps Ingenii & Doctrinæ*, the *Top of ancient Wit and Learning*; and to the ſame purpoſe *Quintilian*, whom *Valla* eſteem'd above all other Critics. But I need not go about to ſet up the Reputation of *Plato*. He was deſcended from *Solon* by his Mother, and by his Father from *Codrus*; he was nearly related to *Critias*, the firſt of the *thirty Tyrants*, and head of the Atheiſtical Club at *Athens*; and therefore it will be worth our while to find out his true ſenſe and opinion about theſe matters. To which I ſhall confine my Diſcourſe concerning him. And in his *tenth Book of Laws* he gives an account of three Opinions then in vogue among the looſer ſort of People at *Athens*.

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One was, that there was no God *at all; the 2d, that tho' there was a* God, *yet there was no Providence; the 3d. that if both were allow'd, yet that* God *would accept of gifts and ſacrifices, as a compenſation for their faults.*

As to the *Atheiſtical Hypotheſis* it is obſervable, what character he gives of the Perſons who were for it, *that they were the looſer and more diſſolute ſort of Men among them; and eſpecially in the heat of their youth. And that he never knew any Man who continued in it from his youth to his old age*; and he calls it *the plague of young Men.* The *Hypotheſis*, as he lays it down, is much the ſame with *Anaximander*'s, viz. *That Nature and Chance produced all things out of a ſtrange Chaos, wherein were all ſorts of Qualities, jumbled and confounded together, and at laſt by mixture came to that we call the World. But that Religion and the differences of juſt and unjuſt depended upon human Laws and Contrivances, for the better Government of Mankind.*

This is the ſubſtance of their *Hypotheſis*, which *Plato* in a long Diſcourſe ſets himſelf to refute; by ſhewing that theſe things could not come together by mere Nature and Chance; but were according to *right Reaſon, the product of a Superior Mind.* And whatever they pretended, as to skill in Natural Cauſes, this opinion did proceed from *great Ignorance about them*, and that their Reaſonings were both *Impious and Incoherent.* That their fundamental Miſtake lay in ſuppoſing ſuch Motion and Mixtures in Matter, before any Principle to begin or to direct it. For the firſt Motion muſt be from that which hath a power to move it ſelf, as well as other things; and therefore there muſt be a Mind antecedent to matter in order to the Production of things. This is the force of his Reaſoning. Then he ſhews how unreaſonable it is to ſuppoſe a God without Providence; becauſe it muſt argue either *Weakneſs* or *Neglect*; which were both inconſiſtent with *the Divine Perfections:* and ſo he proves was the laſt Opinion, and that it tended to overthrow *the practice of Virtue.*

In his *Epinomis* (which I ſee no reaſon to miſtruſt) he undertakes to prove *Religion to be the trueſt wiſdom of Mankind*; the firſt Principle whereof is, *that there is an Eternal Mind before all Matter*; and then ſaith, *That there is no greater Virtue belonging to Mankind than Piety, or a due regard to the Divine Being.* So far was he from looking on Religion as an impoſture, or trick put upon Mankind in order to their better Government. *Epinom. p. 989.*

But *Ariſtotle* may be more ſuſpected for this, who wanted no Wit, but is generally thought to have been of no Religion; and he was by no means fond of *Plato*'s *Notions*, eſpecially thoſe he took from the *Pythagoric School:* but yet I hope to ſhew, that in the main foundation of all, as to the Being of God, and the happineſs of Mankind he agreed with him at laſt: I do not mean at his death, according to the ſtory in *Cælius Rhodiginus*, that then he ſaid, *Cauſa Cauſarum miſerere mei*; and which *Suarez* quotes *Laertius* for; but there is nothing like it in him; and *Cælius* had it out of a trifling Book *De Pomo*; But I go upon the Principles deliver'd by him in his beſt conſider'd Books. In his *Politics* indeed he recommends Religion to a Prince, *in order to his eſteem among the People, that they may look on him as under the particular care of Providence.* *Cæl. Rhod. l. 17. c. 34.* *Ariſt. Polit. l. 5. c. 11.*

Now this *Ariſtotle* is charg'd to have utterly deny'd himſelf; and *Atticus* the *Platoniſt* in *Euſebius* makes him worſe than *Epicurus*; *becauſe he put his Gods quite out of the World, which* Ariſtotle *did not; but*, ſaid he, *he overthrew all Religion by denying Providence.* And *Lactantius* is very ſharp upon him, and makes him *a contemner of* God *and Religion:* but to do him right, he ſaith at other times, *That he plac'd one Mind over the World*; and *that* Ariſtotle *and his followers were of the ſame mind with* Antiſthenes, *that there was but One* God *in Nature, and many popular Gods. But was not* Ariſtotle *charg'd with Impiety at* Athens, *and forc'd on that account to withdraw to* Chalcis, *where he died; or as ſome ſay, was poiſoned?* So *Eumelus* and the anonymous Author of his Life, pubbliſh'd by *Menagius*. It cannot be deny'd that there was a proſecution againſt him by *Eurymedon* and *Demophilus*; but ſo there was againſt *Anaxagoras* and *Socrates*; but the pretence againſt *Ariſtotle*, was not for *Impiety in his Doctrine*, but for a *profane Hymn* which he was ſaid to have made on his Friend *Hermias*; ſuch as were wont to be made to *Apollo*. This *Athenæus* denies; and *Ariſtotle* ſent an Apology for himſelf to *Athens*, but it was not receiv'd. The truth was, *Ariſtotle* found it was time for him to be gone; leſt, as he told his Friends, *that City ſhould offend twice againſt Philoſophy:* For, as he ſaid in his Letter to *Antipater, He found the City abounded with Sycophants*; and he was fallen under *Alexander*'s diſpleaſure, on the account of *Caliſthenes* his Kinſman; and in a Letter of his to *Antipater* he had ſaid, *he would be reveng'd on the Sophiſter*; and he publicly affronted him by the great Preſent he ſent to *Xenocrates*, and none to him: which was ſufficient intimation to his Enemies, which he never wanted, ſaith *Ariſtocles*, *becauſe of the intereſt he had in Princes*. And if *Pliny*'s Story be true, (which *Plutarch* and *Appian* intimate too) as to *Antipater*'s deſign, *Alexander* had cauſe for his diſpleaſure. But *Ariſtocles* ſaith, *That* Apellicon (*to whom his Books came*) *wrote ſo full a Vindication of him, that thoſe who read that need no more.* But they are his Principles which we inquire after, and not his Practices. *Alexander Aphrodiſienſis*, who is thought to have underſtood *Ariſtotle*'s Mind as well as any Commentator, owns *that* Ariſtotle *without doubt aſſerted, that there was one Eternal Mind, which gave the firſt motion to Matter; and that thereby things were put into ſuch an order, not by Chance, but from the firſt Mover, ſo as to produce the variety of ſpecies in the World, and to make them uſeful to each other, and for the good of the whole; and ſuch an univerſal Providence*, he ſaith, Ariſtotle *did hold*. So much then is confeſs'd by one who was thought his moſt judicious Interpreter. But let us ſee, whether *Ariſtotle* may not be reaſonably preſum'd to go beyond this: For (1.) he blam'd *Anaxagoras* for making *no more uſe of his Eternal Mind, than merely to ſet things in order at firſt.* Then it follows, that according to him, God muſt be more than a mere *Firſt Mover*. (2.) He makes this famous concluſion of his *Metaphyſics, That things are beſt governed by one head*; which ſignified nothing, if there be no Providence. *Clauſulam hanc tam inſignem amplector & laudo*, ſaid one of his moſt bitter Enemies; and it cannot be denied, that he there compares *the Government of the World*, with *that of an Army or Family, wherein are there ſeveral Ranks*

Euſeb. Prap. Ev. l. 15. c. 5. *Lactant. de Ira Dei, c. 19.* *De falſ. Rel. l. 5.* *De Ira Dei c. 11.* *Beſſario c. Calumn.* *Athen. l. 15.* *Suid. in Ariſt.* *Ælian. 3. 36.* *Euſeb. Prap. Ev. l. 15. c. 2.* *Plin. N. H. l. 30. c. 16.* *l. 2. c. 8. Alexand. Aphrodiſ. in Ariſt. Phyſic.* *Met. 1. 4.* *Metaphyſ. l. 14. ult.* *P. Rami Schol. Metaphyſ. l. 12. c. 10.*

Ranks and Orders of Men for different purpoſes; which muſt ſuppoſe a particular inſpection and care. (3.) He makes the complete Happineſs of Mankind to be θεῖόν τι, *a Divine thing*; and muſt ſuppoſe *Providence*, as I ſhall now make it to appear. He affirms that a Man's complete happineſs depends *upon ſomething Divine in him, in the exerciſe whereof his happineſs conſiſts.* And therefore he adviſes thoſe that ſtudy to be happy Ἀναφαυλίζειν, *to draw themſelves off from mortal things, and to live according to that which is the beſt thing in us*, viz. *our Minds. Which altho' they do not ſo appear in bulk, yet in reality are far greater and of more value than other things.* By which he plainly owns ſuch a Principle in Mankind as is capable of a greater happineſs than the things of this World can give him; becauſe his Mind is of a higher Nature than they. But then the Queſtion ariſes, whether Mankind can make themſelves happy by this Divine Principle within them? He grants in one place, *That if there be any gift from* GOD, *it is moſt reaſonable it ſhould be that which is beſt for them*; but he avoids *the diſpute there*, becauſe his buſineſs was to put men upon uſing their own endeavors to be happy: but in his laſt Book, where he ſpeaks of this Divine happineſs, he ſaith, *That he that acts according to his mind, and is diſpos'd to do the beſt things, is the moſt likely to be beloved of* GOD: *for, if there be any care above of human affairs, as there ſeems to be, it is moſt reaſonable to ſuppoſe that the Gods love what is beſt and neareſt to them; which is our Mind.* But doth he not ſeem to ſpeak very doubtfully in this matter? It is obſerv'd by his Commentator, that his manner of expreſſion is ſuch as he uſes when there is no manner of doubt. But we muſt take *Ariſtotle*, as a Philoſopher; and conſider on what grounds he went. He had no Revelation to direct him, and ſo was to judge according to what he thought *moſt reaſonable*; and this he declares he took to be ſo. And in his following words he ſaith, **That thoſe who did moſt eſteem and value their own minds, the Gods did regard as their friends, and ſuch as did the beſt actions.* That word Ἀντιδιδόναι is very emphatical in this caſe; for it implies a *Retribution of a Reward* for doing good. So that here we have the complacency, which GOD takes in thoſe that are good, and do good; and the reaſonableneſs of expecting a recompenſe for it. *Ariſtotle* was no fool, but was eſpecially admired by very great Men, particularly by *Cicero*, and *Quintilian*, and *Pliny*, for *the greatneſs of his Wit and Subtilty:* and ſuch a Perſon would never have been guilty of ſo great impertinency to ſet down ſuch Expreſſions as theſe, if he had not thought them fit to be believ'd; but he would have ſet ſome mark upon them, that they were the opinions of other men, and not his own. And in this caſe he had more particular reaſon to have done it. For any one that compares theſe expreſſions with thoſe in *Plato*, 10 *de Rep.* would think that *Ariſtotle* had taken them from thence. For *Plato* there ſaith the ſame thing; *That a good man is* θεοφιλής, *one in favor with* GOD; *and whoſoever is ſo, ſhall receive the beſt things from him. And we cannot ſuppoſe, that he that deſigns to be good, and minds the practice of vertue, will be neglected above, when he makes it*

Eth. l. 1. c. 10.

Eth. l. 10. c. 7.

Eth. l. 1. c. 10.

Ὁ δὲ καλῶς τοῦ εὐεργῶν ἕξιν τοῦτον ἡγεμονεύειν ἕ ἀφελείμθον. ἄελτα, καὶ θεοφιλέσταθος ἔοικεν εἶναι. Εἰ γάρ τις ἐπιμέλεια τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ὑπὸ θεῶν γίνεται, ὥσπερ δοκεῖ ἕ εἰκὸς ἂν εὔλογον χαίρειν τε αὐτὸς τῷ ἀρίστῳ καὶ συσχυστάτῳ. τοῦτο δ' ἂν εἴη ὁ Νοῦς. Eth. l. 10. c. 9.

* Καὶ θεὸς ἀγαπῶν μάλιστα τοῦτο ἕ τιμῶν ἂν ἀντιδιδοίη ἕ ὀρθῶς τε ἕ καλῶς πραττόντας.

Ariſtoteles vir ſummo ingenio, ſcientiæ copia. *Tuſc.* 1. 4. 10. *Acad.* 1. 4. Singulari vir ingenio Ariſtoteles, & pene Divino. *De Div.* 1. 25. *Quint. X.* 1. *Plin. N. H.* l. 8. 16. 18. 34.

it his buſineſs to be as like God *as he can.* And *Plato*, who was far from being uncertain as to Providence, makes uſe of the ſame kind of expreſſion. *It is not probable that he ſhould be neglected of one ſo like him.* And *Ariſtotle* in the foregoing Chapter ſaith, *The Gods are in a ſtate of perpetual bliſs, and Mankind are capable of happineſs, as they come nearer to a reſemblance of them.* Can any Expreſſions come nearer than theſe do? We find *Ariſtotle* on other occaſions not very ſhy of expreſſing his diſſent from *Plato*, even in theſe Books of Morals. How warmly doth he diſpute againſt *Plato*'s notion of *Ideas?* He ſaith, *there are three kinds of Men pretend to happineſs; the ſenſual and voluptuous*; which he ſaith, *is the happineſs of Slaves and Brutes: the buſy and active Men place it in Honor; which is not in their power.* But beſides theſe, *there are thoſe who place it in Contemplation; which is moſt agreeable to the moſt perfect faculty we have:* but then he ſaith, *Some Friends of his had introduced Ideas to this purpoſe; however he was reſolved to prefer truth before them.* Here we ſee he ſticks not at contradicting *Plato, as to his Ideas*; but is ſo far from doing it in the preſent caſe, that he takes his very Expreſſions as his own; which he would never have done, if he had not thought them agreeable to Truth and Reaſon. He did not like *Plato's Ideas*, nor his *Poetical Fictions* about a future State; which made him more reſerved in diſcourſing about it; but he was ſatisfy'd in theſe three things. 1. That the Mind of Man was capable of a real happineſs diſtinct from the Body. 2. That this Happineſs lies in a ſimilitude to God, as the moſt perfect Being. 3. That it was reaſonable to ſuppoſe God ſhould make the beſt to be moſt happy.

Εἰκὸς γ' ἴφη τὸν ὅμοιον μὴ ἀμελεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίου.

Ἐφ' ὅσον ὁμοίωμά τι τῆς τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας ὑπάρχῃ.

Eth. 1. 34.

Mag. Mor. 1. 5. In his *Great Morals*, he declares it *not to be Courage but Madneſs not to be afraid of the Gods.* And if there be no Providence, what reaſon can there be for Fear?

Eudem. l. 7. *c.* 15. In the concluſion of his *Eudemian Morals*, he makes it *the beſt end of a man to contemplate* God; *and ſaid that it argues a very ill mind to hinder his worſhip and ſervice, and the beſt temper of mind to be little affected with ſenſual inclinations; and this*, ſaith he, *is the great end of Virtue and Goodneſs.*

Theſe are not the Expreſſions of a Man that deſpis'd God and Providence; and we are as certain theſe were his, as we are, that we have any Books of his. For even *Fr. Patritius* himſelf makes very ſlight objections againſt them; and the Author of the Ancient *Paraphraſe* upon his *Ethics ad Nicomachum* (ſuppos'd to be *Andronicus Rhodius*) is a far better evidence for them; who is ſaid to have *paraphraſed upon Ariſtotle's Writings*, and not upon any other Man's. And he puts this matter out of doubt; for he thus *paraphraſes* his words, *If* God *doth take care of Mankind,* καθάπερ πᾶσι δοκεῖ καὶ ἔστιν γε, *as it ſeems to all and is true.* And not only *Plutarch* in the Life of *Sylla*, but *Porphyry* in that of *Plotinus* ſay, *that* Andronicus Rhodius *took great care in digeſting and explaining* Ariſtotle's Works.

Diſcuſſ. Peripatet. To. 1. *l.* 3.

Paraphr. Ethic. l. 10. *c.* 10.

Let us now compare theſe Sayings with the Objections taken out of him againſt Providence. *Alex. Aphrodiſienſis* is of opinion that *Ariſtotle* meant no more by *Providence*, but *an Univerſal Care*

to

to preſerve the ſpecies of things, and the Order of the World; but he doth not deny that ſo far it extends even to ſublunary things. But if he did allow ſuch an univerſal Providence as to the good of the World; I ask then, Whether God did know and intend this good and order that is in the World? If he did, then his great Argument againſt particular Providence is taken off; which was, *That it was below the Divine Perfections to take notice of ſuch mean things.* For if it were not below it at firſt to appoint and order theſe things, then it cannot be below it to mind or regard them. And ſince they cannot deny ſuch an *Univerſal Providence*, they cannot for this reaſon reject a Particular; for it is no more unbecoming God to regard the good of his Creatures, than it was at firſt to make them. But *Ariſtotle* utterly rejects their Opinion, that attributed the making of things, or the order that appears in them, to blind Neceſſity or Chance; and then God muſt have a Power and Will to make and order theſe things as they are, and with a deſign for the good of the whole. Then it follows, that a Providence that regards the good of the whole, is agreeable to the Divine Nature; and why not then a Particular Providence for the ſame end? If the ſame Power and Wiſdom can manage the whole for that end, with regard to Particular Events, why ſhould that be rejected, and the other allowed?

All that is pleaded from *Ariſtotle* is this, *That the knowledg and care of particular things is troubleſom and uneaſy; that the Eternal Being is happy in it ſelf; and it's better not to ſee and know ſome things, than to ſee and know them.* But I urge from *Ariſtotle* himſelf, that he yields, that the Divine Happineſs doth not lie in *an Unactive ſtate*, or ſuch *a perpetual ſleep, as they fancied of* Endymion. And what can be more agreeable to Infinite Goodneſs, than ſuch an Activity as imploys it ſelf in the care of his Creatures?

Metaphyſ. l. 14. 6.

Moral. l. 10. c. 8.

But ſaith *Ariſtotle*, *How can* God *underſtand any thing below himſelf? He is a perfect object, and fit for his own contemplation, and all other things are infinitely below him.* If any made the Divine happineſs to conſiſt in the knowledg of his Creatures, they were extremely miſtaken; but I do not find that *Socrates* or *Plato*, who were hearty Aſſertors of Providence, ſay any thing like it: All that they ſay, is, That God being infinitely good and wiſe, takes care of the good of the whole, and eſpecially of thoſe that are good; and if he did not, it muſt be either from want of Power or Will, neither of which can be ſuppos'd in the Divine Nature. And if he wants neither of theſe, why is it not done? It cannot be ſaid, *That* Ariſtotle *abſolutely denied* God's *knowledg of all things*; for in one place he ſaith, *It is the Character of a bad man to ſuppoſe any thing hidden from* God; and in another, *That we attribute to* God *the knowledg of all things.* But 'tis poſſible he might be to ſeek as to the manner of God's kowing all things, as who is not? But if he could not comprehend it, it doth not therefore follow, that he denied it. *If* God, ſaith he, *underſtands nothing, then he is like one that ſleeps, which is not conſiſtent with that veneration which we owe to* God. *If he doth underſtand, and the principal object be without himſelf, then he is not the beſt Subſtance himſelf.* But none ever thought, that if there were a God, the principal object of his Underſtanding could be without himſelf.

Metaphyſ. l. 13. c. 5.

Rhet. ad Alex. c. 18.

De Poet. c. 15.

But what repugnancy is there for Infinite Knowledg to comprehend all things? And ſo if there be things without himſelf, he muſt know them, or his Knowledg cannot be infinite. Could *Ariſtotle* imagin that the World and the order of it were of his making and contriving; and yet he know nothing beyond himſelf? Are the ſeveral *ſpecies of things* of his ordering and appointing, and yet he not know them? This is impoſſible. But *Ariſtotle* ſaith, *That his Eſſence, as moſt perfect, is the moſt proper object of Divine Contemplation; and his Underſtanding is nothing but the underſtanding of himſelf:* and ſo, as he expreſſes it, *his Underſtanding is the underſtanding of his Underſtanding.* Wherein, as *Scaliger* ſaith, he did apprehend things *ſupra humanum captum*; and I am apt to think ſo too. But our buſineſs is not to unfold the Myſtery of Divine Knowledg with reſpect to it ſelf, but to conſider whether it be repugnant to it to know other things? *If ſo*, ſaith *Ariſtotle*, *there muſt be a change and motion, but the Divine Eſſence is always the ſame.* As tho' an Infinite Mind could not comprehend all things without a change in it ſelf, or ſuch trouble as we find in our gradual perceptions of things, which ariſes from our weakneſs and imperfection. The Objection from *the meanneſs of things* is very inconſiderable. For, if they were fit to make up a part of the Order of the World, why are they below Divine Knowledg and Providence? If God thought fit to make them, why not to preſerve them?

Scaliger. Exercit. 365. n. 5.

Yes, ſay they, *as to the ſpecies he doth, but not as to all the little accidents about them.* The Schoolmen diſtinguiſh in Providence the *Ratio Ordinis* from the *Executio Ordinis*; the firſt they ſay, is wholly immediate, the other is by ſubordinate Cauſes, which we call the Courſe of Nature; which is no more than the common Order which God hath appointed in the World; which generally obtains, but yet ſo as that there muſt be a due ſubordination to the firſt Agent; if he ſees cauſe for particular ends to order things otherwiſe. And I cannot ſee any kind of incongruity or repugnancy in ſuch a Suppoſition, becauſe it anſwers the ſame ends, which the original intention and deſign of Univerſal Providence doth. As that in the ordinary courſe of Nature, Fire burns, *i. e.* diſſolves that contexture of Bodies which it meets with; and this it doth by virtue of that order of Cauſes and Effects, which is eſtabliſhed by Univerſal Providence: but ſuppoſe that there be a ſtop put to this method by an extraordinary act for great and wiſe ends becoming the ſupreme Governor of the World, why ſhould not this be as agreeable to the deſign of Providence, as the firſt appointment of things in the common order was? Why not as well to work miraculous cures at ſome times, as to leave things to the ordinary methods at other times? But we muſt ſtill ſuppoſe the ends to be wiſe, and great, and good; for otherwiſe they do not reach the general deſign of Providence; and we mean no other particular Providence, but ſuch as anſwers the ſame general ends which an Univerſal Providence is deſigned for.

Magn. Moral. l. 2. c. 4.

But, ſaith *Ariſtotle*, *If we ſuppoſe a particular Providence with reſpect to Mankind, then he muſt give to Men here according to their deſerts; which cannot be, ſince bad men often meet with good fortune; and therefore* God *being Lord over theſe things would deal unjuſtly*

unjuſtly as a Judg, which is not becoming him to do. Here it cannot be deny'd that *Ariſtotle* doth exclude a *Judicial Diſpoſal* of theſe things; for if it were ſuch, his Argument muſt hold; but we diſtinguiſh between that and a *Providential management*, in order to the real good of Mankind. And I need no other than *Ariſtotle*'s own Arguments in this caſe: for if a Man's real happineſs lies in *a ſimilitude of the mind to* God, how can that be inconſiſtent with Divine Juſtice to exerciſe good Men here in ſuch a manner, as tends moſt to draw off their Minds from theſe tranſitory and decaying pleaſures? And if theſe things cannot make a Man really happy without virtue, which is the great deſign of his *Morals* to prove; how is it inconſiſtent with his Juſtice to let bad Men meet with good fortune? For theſe things can be no demonſtrations of the favor or diſpleaſure of God, which himſelf grants relates moſt to the inward temper of Mens Minds. But the real difficulty in this caſe, is a ſuppoſition that there is no future ſtate. I confeſs that *Plato* clears this matter eaſily and plainly; *A good man*, ſaith he, *if he be under poverty, diſeaſes, or other difficulties here, will find theſe things end in good to him, living or dying; and he makes no queſtion of ſuch a one's happineſs in another ſtate.* But *Ariſtotle* is upon a great reſerve, as to a future ſtate; and altho' he aſſerts the poſſibility of it ſufficiently, from what he ſaith of the Nature of the Mind of Man, as diſtinct from the principle of Life; yet I am afraid *Plato*'s giving too much way to ſuch *Poetical Fictions*, as that of *Herus Pamphilius*, made *Ariſtotle* more cautious as to what he ſaid concerning it, unleſs he could go upon ſurer grounds. He grants, That *the Mind is of a nature diſtinct from the Body, and ſeparable from it*; that *it comes from without*; that *it is capable of pleaſures more Divine* than the Body can enjoy or apprehend: But when he had gone thus far, the mere light of Reaſon would carry him no farther; and therefore he rather forbore to ſay any thing, than affirm what he could not prove. As *Socrates* ſaid in the caſe of Prayer, in the ſecond *Alcibiades*; *They muſt ſtay till they were better inform'd.* Which is a mighty advantage in behalf of Divine Revelation. But of that afterwards.

Plato de Rep. l. 10.

Ariſtot. de Anim. l. 1. c. 5. L. 3. c. 5. De Part. Anim. l. 1. c. 1. De Gen. Anim. l. 2. c. 3. De Part. Anim. l. 4. c. 10. Eth. l. 10 c. 7, 8, 9.

Thus far I have conſider'd the Perſons of greateſt Reputation in *Greece*, and compar'd their Opinions and the grounds they went upon; and I ſhall proceed no farther there, becauſe the following Sects were deriv'd from theſe, and they fell into quarrels and contentions with one another, which I have no occaſion at preſent to conſider. And therefore I ſhall now give an Account of another ſet of Philoſophers, who ſetled in that part of *Italy*, which lay towards *Sicily*, and was called *Magna Græcia*; and this was called the *Pythagorean Sect:* which I ſhall inquire into, with reſpect to the preſent ſubject. *Pythagoras* was a Man of wonderful eſteem for his wiſdom, not only in thoſe parts, but at *Rome* too. For *Pliny* and *Plutarch* tell us, *That the Roman Senate erected a Statue to him, as to the wiſeſt Man:* but *Pliny* wonders that *Socrates was not preferr'd before him.* But the *Romans* had a particular veneration for *Pythagoras*; from the Tradition that *Numa* the wiſeſt of their Kings was inſtructed by him. It's true that this is contradicted by *Cicero* and *Livy*, (two great Men) but *Plutarch* thinks, *that they had no certain meaſure of times to direct them to judg by*;

Plin. N. H. l. 34. c. 6. Plutarch. in Numâ.

Tuſc. l. 1. 16. IV. 1.

Plut. Num. as he ſhews from *Clodius his Index*. And there are other odd circumſtances, as to *Numa*, which favor the correſpondence; as his Laws about *Worſhip* and *Sacrifices*, mention'd by *Plutarch*; and eſpecially the *Greek Books* found in his Tomb, diſtinct from thoſe of the Plin. N. H. l. 13. c. 13. Liv. l. 40. *Pontifical Rites*; for which *Pliny* produces unexceptionable Authorities. Even *Livy* himſelf, who thought it a miſtake about *Pythagoras*, yet confeſſes *the Books contain'd the wiſdom of the* Greeks *at that time*. If *Pythagoras* was contemporary with *Thales* (as we are told he took his advice about going into *Egypt*) what *Wiſdom of the Greeks* was there before *Thales?* But *Varro*'s teſtimony is plain as well as the reſt, *that theſe Books contain'd the Greek Philoſophy*. And what *Greek Philoſophy* could come to *Numa*, Ovid. Met. l. 15. but that of *Pythagoras?* And therefore *Ovid* makes no ſcruple of ſaying, *That* Numa *did conſult him*. But if *Pythagoras* was in ſuch eſteem at *Rome*, *how came theſe Books to be ſo ſolemnly burnt by order of the Senate, after they were diſcover'd?* *Livy* ſaith, *be-* Lact. 1. 22. *cauſe they tended to diſſolve their Religion:* which *Lactantius* carries too far, when he ſaith, *That they tended to overthrow all Religion*. A moſt improbable ſtory! That *Numa* ſhould take ſuch care that poſterity ſhould believe him to have been a notorious impoſtor. Do Men that deceive the World, write Books on purpoſe to let others ſee they have deceiv'd Mankind? No; they take all poſſible care to prevent any ſuſpicion of that kind. But *Numa* could not think otherwiſe, but theſe Books would in time come to light? And it is a wonder that they were ſo long concealed; and ſo *Pliny* ſaith; for they lay there 535 years: *Plutarch* ſaith, *but about* 400 years, which others ſay is a great miſtake. However, it was a long time before they were diſcover'd; *by a great ſhower*, ſaith *Plutarch*; by *plowing*, ſaith *Pliny* and others.

But ſtill, why were theſe Books burnt? The true account I take to be this. *Numa*'s Religion was very different from what then obtain'd among them. And *Q. Petilius* the *Prætor*, having got a ſight of them, ſaith *Livy*, *from his Kinſman* L. Petilius, in *whoſe Ground they were found*, very officiouſly inform'd the Senate that they were Books of dangerous conſequence to their Religion; and upon his Oath, they order'd the burning of them. Now *Numa*, as *Plutarch* ſaith, had expreſly forbidden any Images in Divine worſhip, which he ſaith continued for 160 years among the *Romans*; and the reaſon he gives was, *that the firſt or ſupreme Being, according to* Numa, *was not ſenſible or viſible, but was inviſible, pure, and only to be apprehended by the Mind*; which, ſaith he, was very agreeable to the Doctrine of *Pythagoras:* and the Sacrifices he appointed were unbloody, *of meal and wine, and other eaſy things*. But theſe things were ſoon chang'd; for *Plutarch* ſaith that *Tullus Hoſtilius*, his immediate ſucceſſor, *chang'd the Devotion which* Numa *had ſet up into great Superſtition*; which daily increaſing, it was no wonder that they ſhould then order *Numa*'s *Books* to be burnt, which upbraided them with their ſuperſtitious folly. But by this we ſee what *Pythagoras* his notion of God and his worſhip was. *Ovid* admires him *for his skill in Divinity and Philoſophy; for his giving an account of the beginning and nature of things*.

Iſque

——Iſque licet cæli regione remotos
Mente Deos adiit, & quæ natura negabat
Viſibus humanis, oculis ea pectoris hauſit.

So that, if we may truſt a Poet (and ſurely his Authority is as good as that of *Lucretius*) *Pythagoras* aſſerted *the being of* God, *and the beginning of the World.*

——Magni primordia Mundi,
Et rerum cauſas, & quid natura docebat;
Quid Deus, unde Nives, quæ fulminis eſſet origo.

There is a large deſcription of God extant in St. *Cyril* againſt *Julian*, according to *Pythagoras*; wherein God is ſaid to be *intimately preſent in the World, the beginning of all things, the mind, and ſoul, and motion of the Univerſe.* And ſo *Velleius* in *Cicero*, ſaith that according to *Pythagoras*, God *was a Mind diffus'd thro' the World.* Which is likewiſe expreſs'd by *Virgil* in his known Verſes, *Mens agitat molem*, &c. *Philoaus*, a noted Scholar of *Pythagoras*, (whoſe Books brought the *Pythagorean Learning* into eſteem in *Greece*) gives this deſcription of God, **That he is the eternal Governor and Ruler over all, being one and the ſame always, and different from all others.* Which we find in *Philo*, and have no reaſon to miſtruſt his Teſtimony; conſidering what the other *Pythagoreans* ſaid concerning the Divine Nature. They made God to be *one Eternal, perfect Being, and that the happineſs of Mankind lay in a ſimilitude to him*; as appears by the *Pythagorean Fragments* in *Stobæus*, and elſewhere, which I need not repeat; but I ſhall only ſet down the paſſages of *Zaleucus* and *Charondas*, who were known *Pythagoreans* as appears by *Porphyry*, *Iamblichus*, *Laertius*, &c. in the excellent Prefaces to their Laws. *Zaleucus* ſaith, *That in the firſt place all perſons ought to own and acknowledg the Gods; which*, ſaith he, *is manifeſt by ſeeing the Heaven and the World, and the order that is therein; for theſe are not the work of Fortune, or of Mens hands; and they ought to be worſhip'd and honour'd as the Author of all good things to us. And to that end they ought to keep their Souls pure from evil; for* God *is not honour'd by bad men, nor by coſtly ſacrifices, but by virtue, and the choice of good and juſt actions.* *Charondas* ſaith, *That men ought to begin their actions with piety. For* God *is the cauſe of all: and they muſt abſtain from evil actions, for the ſake of their reſpect to to* God. *For* God *hath no regard to wicked perſons.* Theſe were Men of great and juſt eſteem in their Cities, and their memory is preſerv'd by all that ſpeak of them with great veneration.

Cyrill. contra Jul. l. 1.

Cicer. de Nat. Deor. l. 1. c. 27.

*Ἐσὶ γὰρ φησὶν, Ἡγεμὼν καὶ Ἀρχων ἁπάντων θεὸς, εἷς ἐσὶν ὢν, μόνιμος, ἀκίνητος, αὐτὸς αὑτῷ ὁμοῖος, ἕτερος τῶν ἄλλων. *Philo de Mundi Opific. p. 23.*

Stob. Serm. 42. p. 279.

p. 289.

I might purſue this matter much farther; but if this be not ſufficient to my purpoſe, more will be leſs regarded: for Mankind are better pleas'd with *Choice*, than *a Heap*; and I have only pitch'd upon Perſons of great eſteem in the World. Only *Pythagoras* did not go down well with ſome of the *Greeks*, becauſe of his *Myſtical* and *Symbolical ways* of Inſtruction; which the *Greeks* were by no means fond of; as appears by *Xenophon*'s Epiſtle to *Æſchines* (if it be genuine, and I ſee little reaſon to queſtion it) for he upbraids

braids *Plato* with mixing *the Pythagoric Extravagancies* with the plain Doctrine of *Socrates*, which *Xenophon* kept ſtrictly to. But as to *Pythagoras* himſelf, *Cicero* extols him *him for his wiſdom* and *Quality*; and he ſaith, *The Pythagoreans for a great while were accounted the only Learned men.* *Pliny* admires him for *his ſagacity*; *Apuleius* for *the greatneſs of his Wit*; and the People of *Crotone* and *Metapontum, as more than a Man.* His greateſt fault was that he was too wiſe; for he lock'd up his Secrets ſo cloſe, that the greateſt part of Mankind were not much the better for them; only the Cities of *Magna Græcia* were wonderfully reform'd by his means (if the *Pythagoreans* may be believ'd) but at laſt the prevalent Faction of *Cylon* and his brutiſh Party at *Crotone* deſtroy'd many of the Diſciples of *Pythagoras*, and diſperſed the reſt. And *Pythagoras* himſelf ended his days either by violence, or the diſcontent he had to find his good deſigns diſappointed in ſuch a manner. The reputation of his School was for ſome time kept up by *Archytas* and *Philolaus*; and ſome that eſcaped the common danger, as *Lyſis* (who went to *Epaminondas* in *Greece*, and is ſuppos'd to have publiſh'd the *Golden Verſes*) and ſeveral others are mention'd by *Porphyry* and *Iamblichus*. But *Porphyry* obſerves, That *they only preſerv'd ſome dark and obſcure notions of the* Pythagoric *Doctrine, and made wonderful ſecrets of them*; which he thinks did not contain the true Doctrine of *Pythagoras*; but only *ſome ſparks of it*, which were far from being clear. And the decay of the *Pythagorean Doctrine*, he doth not only impute to the violence of the Faction rais'd againſt the *Pythagorean Society* in thoſe Cities of *Italy* where they flouriſh'd; but to their *Enigmatical* way of expreſſing their minds by *Numbers* and *Figures*; and to the *Doric Dialect*, which was almoſt ſacred among them: and after their Books were come into *Greece*, he ſaith, Plato *and others took out the beſt, and put it into ſmoother Language*, which made the reſt be ſlighted. And he thinks ſome *invented things on purpoſe in their names to expoſe them the more.* So that it is no eaſy matter to judg now what was the genuine *Pythagorean Doctrine*, except what we find mix'd with *Plato*; who had the beſt opportunities of underſtanding their Doctrine by going among them himſelf, and afterwards getting the Books of *Philolaus* into his hands. And *Porphyry* in the Life of *Photinus* doth particularly commend him, for *joyning the Doctrines of* Pythagoras *and* Plato *together, beyond any that had gone before him.* From whence it appears, that there was no difference between them, as to the firſt Cauſe and the Production of things.

Tuſc. 4. 1. *De Leg.* 2. 9. *Tuſc.* I. 16. *Plin. N. H.* 2. 21. *Apul. Flor. Iambl. vit. Pyth. c.* 6. 10.

But what ſhall we ſay to *Ocellus Lucanus*, who is mention'd as a Diſciple of *Pythagoras* by *Iamblichus*; and *Archytas* in his Epiſtle to *Plato* mentions a Book of his of *the Generation of things*; which hath been often publiſh'd out of MSS. and doth plainly aſſert the *World's Eternity, and being from it ſelf*; and ſo overthrows the *Pythagorean Doctrine* of God's being the Beginning of all?

In anſwer. That there is ſomething genuine of *Ocellus* extant, I do not queſtion. For *Stobæus* produces a Fragment out of his *Book of Law*, written in the *Doric Dialect*, according to their cuſtom, and the precept of *Pythagoras*; wherein he doth poſi-

Stob. Eclog. Phyſ. c. 16. *p.* 32.

tively

tively assert, *That* God *was the cause of the World* αἰτίας ἢ αἰτιᾶται ὁ Θεός: but that is not all; for he saith, *The World consists of two parts, of that which governs, and is the principle of motion; and that which is called passive, and is governed; the first* he saith, *is Active and Divine, having Reason and Understanding; the other is made, unreasonable, and liable to changes.* How can this be reconciled to the Principles of the other Book? And yet *Vizzanius* who compared it with several MSS. and publish'd it, hath printed this Fragment at the end of the other. As to *the different Dialect*, he supposes *it was first written in* Doric, *but after turn'd into the* Attic: but of this he offers no proof; only he saith, *It was done as words are translated out of* Portugueſe *into* Castilian; or which answers more to the *Doric*, out of *Scotch* into *English*. No one questions but such things have been done, and may be so again. But how doth it appear that the whole Book was so? For there are some Fragments of this very piece in *Stobæus* in the *Doric Dialect*, which is the conclusion of the first Chapter, and some parts of the second and third; which I suppose to have been genuine, and the groundwork of the rest; which some unknown Philosopher built more upon, and turn'd these Fragments into the *Attic Greek*, to make them all of a piece. The *Pythagoreans* did assert, that the World was incorruptible, as appears by the Fragments of *Philolaus* and others in *Stobæus*; but that which is asserted in this Piece is, That the World was self-originated, which was contrary to their Doctrine, and of *Ocellus Lucanus* himself. There can be no dispute about the Fragment of the Book of Law, where his opinion is plain and clear, *That* God *is the cause of all*, and that *the first Cause is a wise and intelligent Being*: let us now compare this with the Doctrine of this Book, wherein he asserts, * *That the World is the cause of perfection to other things, and therefore is perfect from it self. Vizzanius* would have it believ'd that this was *the Peripatetic Doctrine:* If he means that *of Aristotle*, I have already shew'd how false it is; since he so plainly derives the being and perfection of the World *from* God, and not *from it self.* But that which will give the greatest light into this matter is, that *Nogarola*, who publish'd *Ocellus* in *Italy* with Notes, observes, that *Critolaus* the *Peripatetic* in *Philo*, us'd the same Argument, *That the World must be eternal, because it is the cause of its own being, and of other things in it.* Now this *Critolaus* succeeded in the *Peripatetic* School at *Athens*, after the Doctrine of it about the beginning of things had been alter'd by *Strato Lampsacenus*, who, as *Cicero* tells us, *attributed all to Nature, and nothing to* God; *supposing that Nature had all Causes within it self.* And so *Plutarch* saith, that *Strato* the *Peripatetic supposed Nature alone to give a being to all things from it self.* Here we have found the very Principle of this Book, which goes under the name of *Ocellus Lucanus*, which is repugnant to what himself had expresly declar'd; but some one of these *Atheistic Peripatetics* at *Athens*, finding that *Ocellus Lucanus* had said something that might be turn'd to their purpose, takes what was ancient of *Ocellus*, and puts it out of the *Doric* into the *Attic Dialect*, and makes a short *System of the Universe*; which they thought would better pass in the World, under the name of ancient *Pythagorean.* And this seems to me the truest

Stob. Eclog. Phys. c. 24. p. 44.

* Οὕτως ἔν τε τοῖς ἄλλοις αἴτιον γενόμενον τὸ αὐτὸ τελείας, αὐτὸ ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ αὐτοτελές. *Ocell. Lucan. c. 1.*

Phil. Oper. p. 946.

Acad. Qu. l. 4. c. 38. Cicer. de N. D. l. 1. Plut. adv. Colot.

truest account of this matter. As for the Arguments themselves, such as they are, I shall consider them in a more proper place.

Thus I have gone thro' the Opinions of the eldest Philosophers of greatest esteem about God *and Providence, and the production of the World.* But before I proceed farther, it will be necessary to make some Reflections on the foregoing Discourse, which may be very serviceable to my following Designs.

1. That those Philosophers who asserted *the being of* God *and Providence*, were Persons of the greatest reputation for Wisdom and Knowledg, and did not hold these things merely from Tradition, but from the strongest evidence of Reason: which appear'd by this, that after the Atheistical Hypotheses of *Anaximander* and *Democritus* were started, they were not in the least mov'd by them; but saw an absolute necessity in point of Reason of holding a First Cause, which not only gave a beginning to the World, but continued to govern it. Even *Aristotle* owning an Universal Providence from such Reasons, as will hold much farther.

2. That these Philosophers who follow'd their Natural Reason, were very far from looking on *the Universe* as made up *only of Bodies*, or that *an Incorporeal Substance imply'd a Contradiction.* These were Persons who understood very well what a *Contradiction* meant; and if there had been any such Repugnancy in the notion of *Mind* or *Siprit* as distinct from Body, they would have found it out. But *Anaxagoras* asserted a *Superior Mind* antecedent to Matter or Body; so did *Socrates* and *Plato*, and *Aristotle* too; who expresly asserts God to be *an Essence without bulk and indivisible, or without any parts*; but this can never agree to a Body, altho' never so *fine and subtle.*

Metaphys. l. 14. *c.* 7.

Nec vero Deus ipse qui intelligitur a nobis, alio modo intelligi potest, nisi mens soluta quædam & libera, segregata ab omni concretione mortali, omnia sentiens & movens, ipsaq; prædicta motu sempiterno. *Tusc. l.* 26.

And *Cicero* tells us, That *they could have no other notion of* God, *but as a free Mind, remote from any composition, knowing and perceiving, and moving all things.* Even the *Stoics* who blunder'd most in this matter, yet yielded God to be *Numen præstantissimæ mentis*; as *Balbus* in **Tully* calls him; and † *Zeno* in *Laertius* describes God *to be an Immortal, Rational and most happy Being, uncapable of evil, and taking care of the World.* ‡ *Seneca* saith, *The World was framed by* God, *or by Incorporeal Reason.* If at other times they seem to contradict this, we are not here concern'd to clear or vindicate them; because my Inquiry is confin'd to those who were elder, and not so given to Paradoxes and innovation in Terms, as the *Stoics* were.

* *Cicero de Nat. Deor. l.* 2.
† *Laert. vit. Zenon.*
‡ *Seneca Consol. ad Hel. c.* 8.

3. That the true and complete happiness of Mankind lay in a similitude to God; herein *Socrates* and *Pythagoras*, and their Scholars agreed, as abundantly appears in the *Pythagorean Fragments*; and that the way to be like God, is to be *virtuous and good, and wise*; and that all other things, which Mankind are apt to value so much, fall infinitely short of this. And I have show'd that *Aristotle* himself came to this at last, for which I have produc'd unquestionable Authorities from his Works.

4. That Religion and Piety are very great and commendable Virtues in Mankind. *Plato* said *the greatest. Pythagoras* gave very good Rules about Divine worship; that it should be perform'd *seriously and with great attention of Mind*; and not by *the By, and by Chance.* That *our Minds were most affected with Religion and*

Plut. in Num. *Cicero de Leg. l.* 2.

Piety

Piety in the due worſhip of God; that we ſhould undertake nothing without prayer; wherein *Socrates* and *Plato* agree with him. And *Ariſtotle* look'd on it as *Madneſs to deſpiſe God and Religion.* *Aur. Carm.* 49.

5. That good Men are to bear the troubles of this World as well as they can, and to look for happineſs in a future ſtate. This appear'd by the carriage of *Socrates* at his death, and his Diſcourſes then; and the Courage and Conſtancy of *Pythagoras* and his *Diſciples*, when they were ſo miſerably handled by their inveterate Enemies; ſetting fire in the Houſe where they met, baniſhing ſome and famiſhing others, and diſperſing the reſt.

6. That there was a common conſent of Mankind, as to the Being God, and Immortality of Souls. Which appears not only by expreſs teſtimonies of Philoſophers, but by their appeals to the ſenſe of former Ages and Diſtant Nations about them.

7. That, notwithſtanding that light of Reaſon, which they had, yet they found it ſo defective in many things, that they thought nothing more deſirable than a clear Revelation about ſuch things, which were of great importance to Mankind, but they found to be out of their reach to recover; as appear'd by the Confeſſion of *Socrates*; and the Silence of *Ariſtotle* about a future ſtate, when his Reaſon could only go to the poſſibility, and not to the undoubted certainty of it. For I have ſhew'd that *Ariſtotle* hath aſſerted ſo much concerning the Nature and Properties of the Soul, or rather the Mind of Man, that it cannot be deſtroy'd by death; but yet he was ſo far to ſeek concerning a future ſtate after death, by reaſon of the Poetical fictions about it, that he rather choſe to ſay nothing, than what might be thought fabulous or uncertain.

And now, I hope, I have ſufficiently clear'd the firſt thing which I undertook, which was to ſhew, That it was a moſt unreaſonable prejudice againſt Religion, *that it was only a contrivance of Prieſts and Politicians for their own ends.*

11. I come now to conſider in the next place, what account is given by ſuch Men of that impreſſion of Religion, which hath been upon the Minds of Men in all Ages. And the Cauſe muſt be as general as the Effect: ſince then we find this Effect of Religion in all kinds of Men, ſome univerſal and common Reaſon muſt be aſſign'd for it: which is the thing I am now to conſider. And ſince no Perſon hath undertaken this Matter in ſuch a manner, as Mr. *Hobbes* hath done; I ſhall particularly examin what he hath ſaid concerning it. *Seeing there are no ſigns, nor fruit of Religion but in Man only, there is no cauſe to doubt, but that the ſeed of Religion is alſo only in Man; and conſiſteth in ſome peculiar quality, or at leaſt in ſome eminent degree thereof not to be found in other living Creatures.* *Leviathan ch.* 12.

But what is this *Peculiar Quality in Mankind?* For, therein the difficulty lies. How come Men of all ſorts to be poſſeſs'd with it? Not merely the unthinking multitude, but Men of the deepeſt Senſe and greateſt Capacity, and who have taken the moſt pains to inquire into theſe matters.

And firſt, ſaith he, *it is peculiar to the Nature of Man to be inquiſitive into Cauſes of the Events they ſee, ſome more ſome leſs; but all Men ſo much as to be curious in the ſearch of the Cauſes of their own good and evil Fortune. To be inquiſitive into the*

Cauſes of Events is very proper for Rational Beings; but we do not mean ſuch as relate merely *to their own good or evil Fortune*, which is no commendable curioſity; but into the nature and reaſon of things, which they ſee in the World; and this we ſay leads Men to a firſt Cauſe, which is God. This he mentions in the next words.

Secondly, upon the ſight of any thing that hath a beginning to think alſo it had a Cauſe, to determin the ſame to begin when it did, rather than ſooner or later.

And was not this a very reaſonable thought? For *what hath a Beginning* muſt certainly *have a Cauſe* which produced it; which determined its being at that time. And if this be ſuch a *Peculiar Quality in Mankind*, then there is ſomething in Reaſon which carries them to the owning a God, which gave a Being to the World, and to the things in it.

Thirdly, Man obſerveth how one event hath been produced by another, and remembreth in them Antecedence and Conſequence; and if he cannot find out the true Cauſes of things, he ſuppoſes Cauſes of them rather from his own fancy, or Authority of others whom he eſteems.

But how come Mankind not *to find out the true Cauſes of things?* For this is here very ſlily ſuppos'd, without giving the leaſt reaſon for it; and withal the things that Men ſearch for *the Cauſes* of, are ſuppos'd to be *only* ſuch as relate *to their good and evil Fortune*; (which are ſaid to be *for the moſt part inviſible*) but is it not poſſible for Men to inquire into the Cauſes of other things, which we plainly ſee? Do we not ſee our own Bodies, and thoſe of other Animals, as well as the Heavens and Earth; and is it not as proper and reaſonable for Mankind to inquire into the Cauſes of theſe, as well as into their *good and evil Fortune?* What ſtrange ſtuff is this to ſuppoſe all Mankind only to run after *Fortune-tellers*; and never to concern themſelves about the Cauſes of the viſible World? Could any one that in the leaſt pretended to *Philoſophy*, ever think ſo meanly of the reſt of Mankind? But theſe are *the Cauſes* which we ſearch for; and we hope Natural Reaſon will conduct Men in this inquiry to their ſatisfaction; ſo that they need not to have recourſe to *Fancy* or *Authority*.

But he goes on: *The two firſt make anxiety*; i. e. a Man's *Inquiſitiveneſs into Cauſes* in general, and *thinking what that had a Being muſt have a Cauſe.* For *being aſſur'd that there be Cauſes of all things, this fills him with ſolicitude for the time to come; and ſo his heart is gnaw'd on perpetually by fear of death, poverty or other Calamity; and hath no repoſe or pauſe of his anxiety but in ſleep.* What? Do Men think of nothing but what Calamities may befal them? And muſt they needs perpetually perplex themſelves with the fear of future Evils? Thoſe who were called *Philoſophers* in former times, thought it poſſible for ſuch who believed God and Providence, not to live under ſuch *perpetual anxiety*. But what follows? *This perpetual fear always accompanying Mankind in the ignorance of Cauſes, as it were in the dark, muſt needs have for object ſomething; and therefore when there is nothing to be ſeen, there is nothing to accuſe, either of their good or evil Fortune, but ſome power or agent inviſible. Thence the Poets ſaid, that the Gods were firſt created by human Fear; which being ſpoken of*

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the many Gods of the Gentiles, is very true. But how come we from the *Qualities* of Human Nature to fall upon *the Gods of the Gentiles?* The Queſtion was, What it is in Mankind which inclines them to believe a God? the Anſwer is, *That Fear made the Gods of the Gentiles.* What is that to *all Mankind?* Suppoſe there had been no ſuch ſaying among the *Poets*, nor ſuch *Gods among the Gentiles*, the Queſtion ſtill remains, whence comes Mankind to apprehend a *Deity?* Doth it all come from a vain ſuperſtitious Fear, ſuch as Men have in the dark of they know not what; And becauſe they ſee nothing, they imagin ſome *Inviſible Power?* Is this the true ground of the Seed of Religion in Mens Minds? If ſo, then there is no ground in Reaſon to believe a God, but only an ignorant ſuperſtitious Fear.

Not ſo, ſaith Mr. *Hobbes. But the acknowledgment of one God, Eternal, Infinite and Omnipotent, may more eaſily be derived from the deſire Men have to know the Cauſes of Natural Bodies, and their ſeveral virtues and operations, than from the fear of what was to befall them in time to come.* What is the meaning of this? *The acknowledgment of one God may be more eaſily derived*, &c. If he had meant ſincerely, he would not have ſaid, *That it may be more eaſily derived*, but that no tolerable account can be given of thoſe things any other way. But we are to obſerve, That he makes *Ignorance* and *Fear* to be *the general Seeds of Religion in Mankind:* ſo that this *Acknowledgment of one God* doth not come from *the Seed of Religion*, but only from Mens being puzzled about a ſeries of Cauſes. *For*, as he goes on, *he that from any Effect he ſees come to paſs, ſhould reaſon to the next and immediate Cauſe thereof, and from thence to the Cauſe of that Cauſe, and plunge himſelf profoundly in the purſuit of Cauſes, ſhall at laſt come to this (even as the Heathen Philoſophers confeſs'd) one firſt Mover; that is a Firſt and an Eternal Cauſe of all things, which is that which Men mean by the name of* God. This ſeems a plain confeſſion that *Reaſon* muſt carry Men to the owning *a Firſt and an Eternal Cauſe of all things.* And is not Reaſon a *Peculiar Quality in Mankind?* How then comes *the Seeds of Religion* not to be plac'd therein, but *in Ignorance and Fear?* And he after ſaith, *That the Natural Seed of Religion lies in theſe four things; Opinion of Ghoſts, Ignorance of ſecond Cauſes, Devotion towards what Men fear, and taking things caſual for prognoſtics.* How comes the *Natural Reaſon* of Mankind to be left out? If by that Men may be convinc'd of a *Firſt and Eternal Cauſe of things*, doth not that diſpoſe Men to a fear and reverence towards a Divine Majeſty? And is not that *Religion?* Then the beſt and trueſt Seed of Religion lies in that which moſt diſpoſeth the Mind to fear God. What is the meaning then, that *the Seed of Religion* is plac'd by him in things without Reaſon? If Men by Reaſon are brought to own or *acknowledg one God Eternal, Infinite, Omnipotent;* doth not the ſame Reaſon oblige them to pay him that Reverence, and Fear, and Duty, which is owing to him? Therefore by this *Seed of Religion*, he really can mean nothing but an inclination to *Superſtition.* And to this purpoſe he ſpeaks in the concluſion of the foregoing Chapter. *And this Fear of things inviſible, is the Natural Seed of that which every one in himſelf calleth Religion; and in them that fear or worſhip that power otherwiſe than they do, Superſtition.* Here is

a notable distinction found out between *Religion* and *Superstition*; the former is the good word a Man gives to himself; the other the Nickname he bestows on those who differ from him. But in general, *Religion* and *Superstition* are the same thing to him. Unless a difference be found out from the *allowance* of one, and not of the other. So he saith in another place: *Fear of power invisible feign'd by the Mind, or imagin'd from tales publicly allow'd, is Religion; not allow'd, Superstition.* So that what is feign'd and allow'd is *Religion*; and what is not allow'd is *Superstition.* So that the worship of the Heathen Gods, being from *Tales publicly allow'd*, was *Religion* and not *Superstition*: and the *Christian worship* under the Persecution, was *Superstition* and not *Religion.* No, saith Mr. *Hobbes*. *When the power imagin'd is such as we imagin, that is true Religion.* How can it be *true Religion*, if Religion be *a fear of a power imagined by the Mind, or from tales publicly allow'd?* For if this be Religion in general, *true Religion* must be a *true Fiction*, a real *Chimæra*, an allow'd piece of Nonsense. *But when the power is such as we imagin it, then*, saith he, *it is true Religion.* But if it were *a power imagined to be such as the Law makes it*, is not that *true Religion?* And if it contradicts what is so establish'd, can this be according to Mr. *Hobbes*'s *true Religion?* Then it follows, that the distinction doth not arise from the *Public Allowance* or *Disallowance.* For if it be possible for the Civil Power to *disallow* the worship of the true God, (as we know it hath too frequently happen'd) is such worship being disallow'd *true Religion?* If it be, then it is impossible the other should be true, that *Religion* is taken from the *Public Allowance*, and *Superstition* from the *Disallowance.* But they who put in some expressions only for a disguise and concealment, know well enough that they contradict themselves; and they know their friends will allow them in it, as long as the true meaning may be understood by them: and the safest way of instilling Atheism is by writing contradictions, i. e. by seeming at some times to own a God, but by the whole series of the Discourse to overthrow his Being; as a mere fancy of an invisible Power rais'd by a predominant fear. But hereby we see that *Fear* prevails so much on such Men, that they dare not speak consistently; which is very unbecoming *Philosophers.* As the gross *Hypocrisy* of *Vaninus* before his discovery, and the most servile *Flatteries* and *Importunities* of *Theophile* in *France*, did shew how much the power of Fear may sway in those who have no Religion, (which may be allow'd in them.) But how comes Fear to be made out to be *the seed of Religion in Mankind?* This a true Disciple to the *Leviathan*, in the Preface to his Book, hath undertaken to make out more fully than Mr. *Hobbes* had done; and therefore ought to be consider'd in this place. *When Men*, saith he, *are under any great distress, and see not the way out of it, their anxiety and fear makes them act like Men distracted, and ask any one's help, which at another time they would despise: so we find it as to Religion; when they are in great trouble, they run to their prayers; and when they are over, their devotion is soon cool'd; as he instances in* Alexander, *and might have done in many others.* But what is all this to the proof of the main Point? That Men are too prone to *Superstition*, especially under calamities, there is no question. But

Leviathan, ch. 6. p. 26.

Lescaloper in Cicer. de N. D. I p. 127.

Tract. Theolog. Polit.

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it is a moſt unreaſonable ſuppoſition, that all *Religion* is nothing elſe but *Superſtition*, which Men take up only when they are at their wits end. But if there be a God and Providence, as we find both the beſt *Philoſophers* aſſerted, and the ſtrongeſt Reaſon prove it; then whatever Mens condition be as to this World, there is the ſame ground in Reaſon for a due reverence and worſhip to be pay'd to him. But it is a very bad way of arguing againſt all Religion, becauſe of ſome Mens extravagant Superſtition. *Some Men have run mad with Superſtition.* What follows? Therefore all *Religion* is *madneſs?* Where lies any color in the Argument? Some have been mad through an exceſs of Love; therefore all Love is Madneſs? No; but we muſt inquire into the proper objects and degrees of Love; whereof ſome are allowable, and ſome not. So here in the paſſion of Fear; there is a violent, fooliſh, ungovernable Fear; but may there not be a prudent, wiſe and reaſonable Fear? It is madneſs and folly in great diſtreſſes to run to what cannot help us; but is it ſo to make our addreſſes to a Being infinitely wiſe and powerful, who alone can do it? Here lies the fundamental miſtake of theſe Men, they would have it taken for granted, that there is no God nor Providence, and then they cry out upon the fooliſh Fear and Superſtition of Mankind: but they cannot deny that if our foundations be true, Religion is a wiſe and reaſonable thing in Mankind; as it is an owning our Creator by a ſolemn ſubmiſſion to him, and invocation of his help, and dependence upon his Providence. Let any Man in his wits (let his condition as to this World be what it will) deny that it is reaſonable for him to be govern'd by one infinitely wiſer and better than himſelf. If his condition be proſperous, he hath more reaſon to be thankful; if it be troubleſome, he hath more reaſon to be patient, becauſe God knows beſt both how to ſupport him under it, and to deliver him out of it. But if there be no God nor Providence, he hath nothing but the miſerable comfort of neceſſity. *But, did not the multitude of Gods in the Gentile World come from their ignorant and ſuperſtitious Fear, as Mr.* Hobbes *hath at large ſhew'd?* Truly he needed not to have taken ſo much pains to prove a thing which no body denies. But what then? The Gentiles feign'd a great many Gods from their ſuperſtitious Fear, therefore there is no God but what is the effect of Fear. Is this good arguing? *But they fancied powers inviſible which were only in their own imaginations.* Therefore there is *no Inviſible power* but what depends upon Imation. Can ſuch Men pretend to Reaſon, who talk at this rate? *But thoſe inviſible powers they took to be Spirits, and that they were incorporeal, or immaterial, which are words of a contradictory ſignification.* This is news, and ought to have been prov'd in ſome meaſure, ſince the beſt Philoſophers who underſtood contradictions never thought ſo, as I have ſhew'd already. *But thoſe who by their meditation arrive to the ackowledgment of one Infinite, Omnipotent, Eternal* God, *choſe rather to confeſs he is incomprehenſible and above their Underſtanding, than to define his Nature by Spirit incorporeal, and then confeſs their definition to be unintelligible.* Do any that believe God to be *an Immaterial Subſtance,* confeſs this to be *unintelligible?* I rather believe that they think a *Material God* to be *unintelligible;* as being inconſiſtent with the

Divine Perfections. And altho' they acknowledg that what is *Infinite*, is ſo far incomprehenſible; yet they may have clear and diſtinct conceptions of *a Firſt and Eternal Cauſe*, which is endued with Infinite Perfections. And this is not only attributed to him *as a Title of Honor with a pious intention:* but from the true ſenſe of their Minds, as to ſuch Attributes which are proper to God.

Mr. Hobbes conſider'd, &c. p. 30. When Mr. *Hobbes* was charg'd with introducing *Atheiſm by denying Immaterial or Incorporeal Subſtances*, he undertook to defend himſelf; not only becauſe we ſay *God is incomprehenſible, but*

p. 32. *becauſe the notion of an Incorporeal Subſtance came from* Plato *and* Ariſtotle, *who miſtook thoſe thin inhabitants of the Brain they ſee in ſleep for ſo many incorporeal Men; and yet allow them motion, which is proper only to things Corporeal.* Before he ſeem'd only to ſay, That the ignorant ſuperſtitious People entertain'd this notion of *Spirits or inviſible powers being only Creatures of the Brain like the images in ſleep:* but now it ſeems *Plato* and *Ariſtotle* were no wiſer, and that we receive it from them. But I have made it appear that the difference of Mind and Matter was before them; and that not by mere fancy, but by invincible Reaſon: becauſe otherwiſe there could be no ſuch thing as the Motion and Diſpoſition of Matter in ſuch a manner, as we ſee it in the World. And this was the ground which thoſe Philoſophers went upon; who were as little given to be impos'd upon by their dreams, as any before or ſince their time. And it is a ſtrange confidence in any Man to think to bear down the general ſenſe of the moſt Philoſophical part of Mankind, with bare ſaying, that an Immaterial Subſtance implies a contradiction.

p. 33. But he offers to prove it, after an extraordinary manner; *For*, ſaith he, *it is in* Engliſh, *ſomething that without a body ſtands under—— Stands under what? Will you ſay, under Accidents?* Ridiculous! did *Plato* or *Ariſtotle* uſe the word Subſtance? And when it came to be us'd, the word ſignify'd the ſame with *Being*; and ſo the jeſt is quite loſt. Such pitiful things as theſe muſt paſs for Wit and Philoſophy with ſome Men.

But to proceed with Mr. *Hobbes*; After he hath reckon'd up the many follies which the Gentiles fell into by their ſuperſtitious Fear, he concludes in this manner. *So eaſy are Men to be drawn to believe any thing from ſuch as have got credit with them, and can with gentleneſs and dexterity take hold of their Ignorance and Fear.* Still we meet with nothing but the reſult of *Ignorance* and *Fear* in the *Gentile World*. We do not deny that Religion was exceedingly corrupted among them; but we affirm, that the true foundations of Religion were kept up among Men of Underſtanding; as fully appears by the Diſcourſes of *Socrates*, *Plato*, *Xenophon*, *Ariſtotle*, *Cicero*, &c. Why are their Reaſons never ſo much as mention'd, and nothing thought worth inſiſting upon, but only the groſs ſuperſtitions and follies of the People? This doth not look like fair dealing with Mankind; to repreſent only the meaneſt

Cicero de Nat. Deor. and moſt deform'd parts, and to conceal what any ways tended to the honor of them, and of Religion. *Cicero* dealt with Mankind in this matter in a much more ingenuous and candid manner. He doth not conceal the follies either of the *People* or of the *Philoſophers* about their Gods; but then he ſets down all the Arguments for God and Providence, and urges them with all his force.

And

And in other places he owns the *general conſent of Mankind*, as to the eſteem and worſhip of a Divine Nature: which he is far from imputing to *Mens Ignorance and Fear*; but he ſaith, *it is the voice of Nature it ſelf.* Nay he goes ſo far as to ſay, * *that there is nothing more evident to any one that looks up to the Heavens, than that there is a moſt excellent Mind, by which theſe things are govern'd.* † *And he queſtions, whether it be more evident that the Sun ſhines.* At what another rate doth that excellent Orator ſpeak of *Human Nature*, with reſpect to Religion, than our modern pretenders to Philoſophy? Nay ‡ *Sextus Empiricus* himſelf ſets down the Arguments fairly which prove the Being of God: *viz. The Conſent of Mankind; the Order of the World; the abſurdities of Atheiſm, and the weakneſs of the Arguments for it.* Which he doth largely inſiſt upon; and diſtinguiſhes between the *common errors of the people*, and the *Natural Arguments of Mankind*, with the conſent of the wiſeſt and ſharpeſt Men among them; as *Pythagoras*, *Empodocles*, the *Ionic Philoſophers* (from *Anaxagoras*) *Socrates*, *Plato*, *Ariſtotle*, and the *Stoics*. And, ſaith he, *if we inquired after an object of ſight, we would rely moſt on thoſe who ſaw beſt; or after a ſound, on thoſe of the quickeſt hearing: ſo in matters of ſpeculation, the opinion of Philoſophers ought moſt to be regarded.* Which he never anſwers when he ſets down the Arguments on the other ſide; which are chiefly thoſe of *Carneades* againſt the *Stoics*, who laid themſelves open by ſome *Hypotheſes* of their own.

Cic. de Leg. I. 8. Tuſc. I. 13, 15.

* Quid enim poteſt eſſe tam apertum, tamq; perſpicuum, cum cœlum ſuſpeximus, cœleſtiaque contemplati ſumus, quam eſſe aliquod Numen præſtantiſſimæ mentis quo hæc regantur. *De Nat. Deor. l. 2.*

† Quod qui dubitet, haud ſane intelligo, cur non idem Sol ſit an nullus ſit dubitare poſſit. Quid enim eſt hoc illo evidentius? *Ibid.*

‡ *Sextus Empir. ad Mathem. p. 139.*

But Mr. *Hobbes* tells us, *That the firſt Founders and Legiſlators of Common-wealths among the Gentiles took great care to keep the People in obedience and peace; and to that end pretended to Revelation for their Laws: and preſcrib'd Ceremonies, and Supplications, and Sacrifices, &c. by which they were to believe the anger of the Gods might be appeas'd. And thus the Religion of the Gentiles was a part of their Policy.* Who goes about to deny this? or to juſtify the vain pretenſes to Revelation among ſome of the ancient Legiſlators, beſides *Numa Pompilius*, whom *Diodorus Siculus* takes care to preſerve the memory of; as of *Mnenis*, as he calls him, the firſt Legiſlator in *Egypt*; who pretended to have his Laws from the God *Hermes*: but this ſeems to have been a miſtake for *Menes*, whoſe Counſellor *Hermes* was: his others are, *Minos* of *Creet*, *Lycurgus* at *Sparta*, *Zathamuſtes* (as he calls him) among the *Arimaſpi*, *Zamolxis* among the *Getæ*; and among the reſt he reckons *Moſes*, who had his Laws from the God *Iäo*. No queſtion *Diodorus Siculus* believ'd all alike; but I hope to ſhew the mighty difference between *Moſes* and the reſt in the following Diſcourſes. But here I am only to conſider the force of the Argument. *Theſe Gentile Legiſlators did pretend Revelation when they had it not, only with a deſign to deceive the People.* Doth it hence follow, that there is no ſuch thing as *Religion*; but that it is only a Trick made uſe of by cunning Legiſlators to draw the People the better to Obedience? Now I think the Argument holds the other way. For, if the People were not before well perſuaded of the truth of *Religion* in general, this Argument would have no force at all upon them. For, let us ſuppoſe a People altogether unacquainted with Religion, or uncertain of the truth of it, to be dealt with, by ſome cunning Legiſlator; and he comes

Diod. Sic. l. 1. p. 59.

and

and tells them, he had brought them an excellent Body of Laws, which he had by Revelation from God; what would this ſignify to a People that were poſſeſs'd with Mr. *Hobbes*'s Notion of *Inviſible Powers* that were only *Fancies, ſuch as appear in a Dream or a Glaſs*; would they be at all perſuaded by ſuch an Argument to obedience? No; but they would rather look on him as an Impoſtor, that went about to deceive them in the groſſeſt manner; which would raiſe an invincible prejudice againſt them. But, ſaith Mr. *Hobbes, they had the Original ſeeds of Religion*, viz. *Ignorance and Fear, and upon theſe ſuch Legiſlators did work.* But he can never make it out, that ever there was a People poſſeſs'd with ſuch *Ignorance and Fear*, but they had a notion of a Deity among them before ſuch Legiſlators appearing; and all the advantage they had, was from ſuch an antecedent Belief of a God; then indeed it was no hard matter for ſuch Legiſlators to impoſe upon them; but without it, the ſuppoſition is unreaſonable. But Mr. *Hobbes* ſaith, *that Men in the dark are afraid of Inviſible Powers.* As tho' there were no more to be ſaid for the Being of God and Providence, than for ſtories of *Hob-goblins*; and this lies at the bottom of all his Diſcourſe. Wherein he contradicts the common Senſe and Reaſon of Mankind, who have agreed in the Notion and belief of a Deity, and that as I have ſhew'd from *Socrates* and *Xenophon*, as well as others in *the eldeſt and beſt Ages*, even of the *Gentile World.*

Phyſ. c. 26. n. 1. But Mr. *Hobbes* ſaith, where he ſpeaks his Mind more freely, *that there is no Argument from Natural Reaſon doth prove that the World had its beginning from God*; and yet he ſaith, *there is no Argument to prove a Deity but from the Creation.* So that all proof of a God in point of Reaſon, muſt be deſtroy'd by him. This he knew was objected againſt him; and the Anſwer he gives

Mr. Hobbes conſider'd, p. 34. is, *That there are no Arguments from Natural Reaſon, except the Creation, that have not made it more doubtful to many than it was before:* and therefore his opinion is, *that this matter is to be left to the Law to determin.* A very philoſophical Anſwer! But why doth not the Argument from the Creation hold, when himſelf had ſaid, *that from the ſeries of Cauſes there muſt be one firſt Mover*, i. e. *a Firſt and an Eternal Cauſe of all things?* But that came in by the by, to avoid *odium* in a Book for all Perſons reading; but in his *Philoſophical Diſcourſes*, he doth not allow this Argument to hold. For what reaſon? *Becauſe*, ſaith he, *it only proves, that a Man's Mind cannot go on in infinitum, but he muſt ſtop ſomewhere; and at laſt he grows weary, and knows not whether he ſhould go on farther or not.* And is this all the force of the Argument from the Creation? What becomes now of the Argument from the *Mechanical Contrivance of the Human Body, which* he ſaid, *was ſo clear a proof of a wiſe Maker, that he muſt be ſaid to be without a Mind, that did not aſſert that it was made by one?* And this is in one of his *Philoſophical Treatiſes*, publiſhed after the other; but in his Vindication of himſelf, he juſtifies the former paſſage; only he ſaith, *except the Creation.* So that he knew not well what to ſay in this matter, but only to keep himſelf out of danger, he was reſov'd to ſubmit to the Law. But that is not our Point: and why did he not go about to take off the Argument from *the wiſe Contrivance of things*, which ought

to

to go along with the other? But he knew it was far eaſier to darken an Argument, wherein *Eternity* and *Infinity* is concern'd; and ſo from thence would infer that in the ſeries of Cauſes Man-Mind are only puzzled and not convinced. But why, I pray, muſt a Man's Mind *give over in the ſearch of Cauſes, as not knowing whether he may go on or not?* Can any thing be plainer in common reaſon, than that in the order of Cauſes a Man muſt go on till he arrive at a firſt Cauſe? What ſhould make a Man to ſtop here; for he ſees he muſt go on till he comes at a firſt? No; ſaith Mr. *Hobbes, A firſt Cauſe is infinite, and whatever is infinite is above our conception, and ſo we are loſt.* But that is running from the order of Cauſes to the nature of the object, which is a thing of another conſideration.

But he ſaith yet farther, *That the Argument from motion doth only prove an eternity of motion, and not an eternal firſt Mover;* becauſe as nothing can be mov'd from it ſelf, ſo whatſoever gives motion muſt be firſt mov'd. But all this depends upon the ſuppoſition that there is nothing in the Univerſe but Body; and if that be granted, his Argument holds: but if there be Mind diſtinct from Body, and can give motion to it, there is not ſo much as the color of reaſon in this Argument. And ſo much in anſwer to the Second Atheiſtical Pretenſe.

The Third *Atheiſtical Pretenſe* to be conſider'd, is, *That there is no ſuch common conſent of Mankind, as to God and Providence, as was aſſerted by the Ancients, and is ſtill by the defenders of Religion; for upon the late Diſcoveries whole Nations have been found without any ſenſe of God or Religion.* This is a thing very fit to be inquir'd into, with more care than hath been yet us'd about it: for, altho' we do not ground the truth of Religion merely upon ſuch a general conſent; but upon thoſe Arguments which the wiſer part of Mankind hath inſiſted upon; of which I have given ſome account in the foregoing Diſcourſe: yet ſuch an univerſal conſent doth manifeſtly ſhew that there is nothing repugnant to the common ſenſe of Mankind in it; nothing that looks like a Trick or Impoſture, which could never ſo univerſally prevail as this hath done; eſpecially among the more ſenſible and civiliz'd part of Mankind.

But for our better underſtanding this Matter, it will be neceſſary to lay down ſome general Obſervations.

That we have reaſon to diſtinguiſh the more *Brutiſh* and *Savage* People, from the more *Tractable* and *Reaſonable*; becauſe it is poſſible for Mankind by an affected and univerſal neglect of all kind of Inſtruction, to degenerate almoſt to the nature of Brutes. But ſurely ſuch are not fit to be brought in for the inſtances of what naturally belongs to Mankind: which we ought to judge of by a due meaſure, *i. e.* by ſuch as neither want natural capacity, nor are profeſs'd Savages, nor have the improvements of the moſt civilized People. There are two ſorts of brutiſh People in the World, whoſe ſenſe in theſe matters is not much to be regarded. (1.) Such as have very little of common Humanity left among them; ſuch as *Acoſta* deſcribes the *Uros*, who were ſuch *dull and brutiſh People, that they did not think themſelves Men*; and ſuch are the *Caffres* or *Hottentots*, at the *Cape of Good hope*, who by the laſt Account we 1. Acoſta *of the Indies, l. 2. c. 6.*

have of them remain as *Beſtial* and *Sordid* as ever; inſomuch that the Author who was among them, ſaith, *That if there be any medium between Men and Beaſts, they lay in the faireſt claim to that ſpecies.* And ſuch are the *Caiguæ* of *Paraguaria* (of whom afterwards.) (2.) Such as expreſs open contempt and defiance of *Laws* as well as *Religion*, as the *Chichimecæ* in the Northern part of *America*, who are ſaid *to have lived without any Government as well as Religion*; (*unleſs that they offer the firſt wild Beaſt they catch to the Sun*) and ſo *Acoſta* deſcribes ſome other *Savages* among them; viz. *without King, Law, God, or Reaſon:* Thoſe of *Braſil* are ſaid to be *without Faith, without Law, without a King*; and the Savages of *Canada* are deſcrib'd after the ſame manner. So that if any Argument can be drawn from ſuch againſt Religion, it will as well hold againſt *Law* and *Civil Government*.

Voyage to Surat, *An.* 1689. *p.* 489.

De Laet *Deſcript. Ind. Occid. l.* 5. *c.* 25.

De Orig. Gent. Am. p. 27.

Acoſta *of the Weſt-Indies, l.* 7. *ch.* 3.

DuVal *Obſervations ſur le Voyage de* Pirard, *p.* 132.

De Laet *Ind. Occid. l.* 2. *c.* 12.

2. We muſt not judg by light informations of mere Strangers, and Perſons look'd on as Enemies; which is the caſe of the Inhabitants of the *Southern Iſlands*, which we have only from *Seamen* who landed upon them, and were ſuppos'd to come with an ill deſign; whoſe Accounts muſt be very imperfect and partial. But in *Le Mair*'s Account we only read, *that they could obſerve no Offices of Religion among them:* And *Schouten* to the ſame purpoſe of the Inhabitants of *Horn Iſland* (as they call it) not far from *New Guinea*; *but they ſeem'd*, he ſaith, *to live like the Birds of the Air, without any care, upon the fruits of the Earth.* But no certainty can be grounded upon ſuch Obſervations. Nor can we build any thing upon the *Want of Religion* in places not yet fully diſcover'd; as what is ſaid by ſome of the People of *Yedſo* or *Jeſſo*: For the firſt Account given of it was from the Jeſuit *Fronius*, who liv'd long in *Japan*; and he deſcribes it as a Country of Savages; and he ſaith, *that they have no other Religion but the worſhip of the Heavens.* And ſo *Diodorus Siculus* ſaith, *the ſight of the Heavens, was that which brought Men firſt to Divine worſhip*; and he doth not attribute it to *Ignorance and Fear*, but *to Admiration*; and therefore fix'd *on the Sun and Moon as their chief Gods*; which was the moſt prevailing Idolatry in the world. But from hence we are not to infer that they believ'd no God above them; but they thought he that was above them was above their ſervice: but their viſible worſhip they thought ought to be pay'd to theſe viſible Gods, as hath been already obſerv'd of the old *Greeks*; and *Diodorus Siculus* ſaith the ſame of the *Egyptians*. But as to theſe People of *Yedſo* we find the firſt Account of them was, that they were a very *Savage People*, but had ſuch kind of Religion as moſt ancient Idolaters had: ſince that time, there hath been no exact Account given of them; the beſt we have is from the *Dutch*. *Caron*, who was Reſident in *Japan*, ſaith only *that this People are brutiſh; and that the* Japoneſe *could never make a full diſcovery of the Country; which is parted from* Japan *by an Arm of the Sea, where it bounds on vaſt Mountains and Deſerts, ſo that the common paſſage is by ferrying over.* If this be true, there is a paſſage by Land beyond that Arm of the Sea, and ſo *Japan* is one *Continent* with it, which extends in probability to the Northern parts of *America:* For in the Account of the *Dutch Embaſſy* to

Diarium Schouten. *p.* 47.

Deſcript. Navig. Jac. Le Mair, 31 *Maii.*

Maff. Epiſt. l. 4. *Apr.* 28. 1565.

Diod. Sic. l. 1. *p.* 7.

Japan

Japan, *A. D.* 1641. we are told, That in the Treaty between the *Japoneſe Agent Syvoan* and the *Dutch*, he produc'd a *Map* of thoſe parts agreeable to what *Caron* had ſaid; and they obſerve *that* Jeſſo *was in it of a vaſt extent, and reach'd to North* America, *without any Streight of* Anian. *Martinius* makes no doubt, that Japan *was inhabited from Eaſt* Tartary, *as well as by a Colony from* China; which he proves from their *Cuſtoms* and *Language*; but he thinks *they came over the Water, or at leaſt over the Ice, for he ſaith, there are ſevere Winters there.* But he ſaith withal, *that the* Chineſe *do make* Jeſſo *a part of* Tartary, *and that it is joyn'd with the* Province *of* Niuthan *and* Yupi. *F. Couplet* agrees with *Martinius*, that *Japan* was peopled from *Tartary*; and he ſaith, they have a Chronology of their Kings for 660 years before *Chriſt*; and long before that the Northern *Tartars* took poſſeſſion of *Japan*. So that the People of *Yeſſo* and *Japan* are of the ſame Original. In the *Dutch* Account of *Yedſo* printed by *Thevenot*, in the ſecond Part of his Collections, (which was taken from a Ship which went upon the Coaſts of that Country and People) we have a more favorable Deſcription both of the *Country* and *People*; only it is ſaid, *that they do not love to take pains, have little Government or Religion*; but they obſerv'd ſome *Superſtitious Practices* among them. And what exact Account could be expected from ſuch, who went not thither to acquaint themſelves either with the Country or their Religion, but to find a paſſage farther that way?

Ambaſſade Memorable, &c. p. 27.

Martin. *Atlas Extrem. Aſiæ. p. 170.*

Martin. *Atlas p. 21*

Couplet *Diſſert. Proœm. ad* Confuc. *Oper. p. 81.*

3. That it is no certain rule that the People have no Religion, becauſe Strangers cannot find any ſet times and places of worſhip among them. For this was a Principle among many Nations, that the *Supreme God* was to be worſhip'd only by acts of the Mind; and that external worſhip was only for leſſer Deities. And *Trigatius* (or rather *Riccius*, who lived a long time in *China*) gives this Account of the Religion of that ancient and famous Kingdom, *That at firſt they own'd the Supreme God, Lord of Heaven; but afterwards they came to worſhip inferior Deities; and this*, he ſaith, *he took out of their moſt ancient Annals and Books of Wiſdom, which* he ſaith, *did not in reſpect to Religion and Morality, come ſhort of the beſt Philoſophers of* Greece. He affirms, *that the Sect of the Learned*, as he calls them, *did ſtill worſhip one God, becauſe all inferior things are preſerved and governed by him; but that they gave an inferior worſhip to Spirits under him. They are ſilent about the beginning of things, as out of their knowledg; but there are ſome of no ſuch reputation, that talk their own vain Dreams, to which little regard is given.* But *Martinius* hath given ſome account of theſe Notions among them; *ſome would have all by chance, others held the eternity of the World.* He ſaith, *that their ancient Books ſpeak of the ſupreme Governor of Heaven and Earth*; and altho' they have not *a proper name for God*, yet he confeſſes *they have ſuch as expreſs his Authority and Government of the World.* *Bartoli* ſaith, they are extremely miſtaken who charge this Learned Sect with *Atheiſm, becauſe they have no Temples, nor public ceremonies of worſhip for him; becauſe they apprehend that the ſupreme God is to be ſolemnly worſhip'd only by him that is ſupreme among them.* And *Magaillans* who was well acquainted with the Court of *China*, and died there about 20 years ſince, gives this account of Divine worſhip,

Trigaut. *de Chriſtian. Exped. ap. Sinas, c. 10.*

Martin. *Hiſt. Sinic. init.*

Bartoli *Hiſt. Aſiat. part. 3. l. 1. p. 73.*

Magaillans *Novel. Rel. de la Chine ch. 21.*

ſhip, *that at* Pekim *there is a Temple, called the Temple of Heaven, wherein there is a very large Cupolo ſupported by* 82 *pillars, wherein the Emperor himſelf offers ſacrifice on the day of the Winter Solſtice, with great ſolemnity and humility; and another wherein he doth the ſame at the Summer Solſtice: Before which,* he ſaith, *they obſerve a ſtrict Faſt for three days. He inquired of one of their learned Men, what they meant by this ſolemn worſhip of Heaven; whether it was directed to the material Heaven? He anſwer'd that they took Heaven not only for the viſible Heaven, but for the Creator and Governor of all things; and that at the four ſeaſons of the year their Emperor did offer ſacrifice in Temples on purpoſe, not to the Creatures, but to the ſpiritual Heaven. F. Couplet* ſaith, *That by the ancient cuſtom of* China, *the Emperor only ſacrificed to the King of Heaven, as often as there was great occaſion for it. And that if he were in a progreſs, he did it upon the Hills and Mountains.* And by the laſt account we have from *China*, we find *the ſame cuſtom is kept up at* Pekim *by the preſent Emperors, ſince the conqueſt of* China. Now it were very unreaſonable to infer, that there is no Religion or Worſhip of the Supreme Being in *China*, becauſe it is not commonly practis'd; ſince according to their Notion of Ceremonies, wherein they are the niceſt People in the World, they think none ought to perform Worſhip to the Supreme in Heaven, but he who is their Supreme upon Earth.

Couplet *Decl. Proœm. ad* Confuc. *p.* 83.

Le Compte *part.* 2. *Lett.* 2.

4. Another thing we are to obſerve in paſſing our judgment, whether Nations have any Religion among them, is to have a care of truſting too much to the Sayings of known and profeſs'd Enemies; but as much as may be we ought to take the Opinion of the moſt free and diſintereſs'd Perſons, who have convers'd among them on the account of Religion. This I intend chiefly with reſpect to the *Spaniards* accounts of the *Weſt-Indies*, when their deſign was to enſlave the poor *Indians*; for then they made it their buſineſs to blacken them as much as poſſible, by repreſenting them as a People without any *ſenſe of* God *or Religion, or any Virtues belonging to Human Nature.* But the contrary appears from the firſt, the moſt impartial and the lateſt Accounts we have of them, from ſuch as have been converſant among them, upon the account of Religion.

In the firſt Account we have of the Diſcoveries of the *Weſt-Indies*, we find that when *Columbus* came to the *Iſlands* of *Hiſpaniola* and *Cuba*, he ſoon found *that they worſhip'd the Sun and Moon, and the Heavens, but could not then diſcover what other Deities they worſhip'd:* which *Peter Martyr Anglerius* underſtands both of *the Natives* and of the *Caribbians*, who were *Savages* and very troubleſom to them. And he tells a remarkable Story of one of the Natives coming to *Columbus* at *Cuba*, being a Man of 80 years of age, and deſir'd to diſcourſe with him by an Interpreter. The ſubſtance of it was, That he underſtood *that he with his ſhip had given a great diſturbance to the Natives, and bad him to conſider, that after death there were two paſſages for ſouls; the one dark and dreadful for thoſe who were troubleſom to Mankind, the other pleaſant and delightful for thoſe who promote the peace and welfare of People; and if he conſider'd that every Man was to receive according to his actions after death, he would give over being ſo uneaſy to them.* *Columbus* took the Advice very well, and pretended that they only came

Columbi *Navigat. c.* 5.

Pet. Mart. *Dec. I. c.* 1.

came to assist them against the *Savages* and *Cannibals*, *and would hurt none of them*; which the old Man was so pleas'd with, that as old as he was, he said he was ready to go with him in so good a design. Was there any thing that savor'd of *Barbarism* or *Irreligion* in this Discourse, or what would not become a good *Christian* to say? Besides, the same Author commends their way of living far beyond what the *Spaniards* brought among them (as appear'd by *Columbus* his own suffering for checking their enormities.) *They enjoy'd the profits of the Earth in common without any division or property, having enough for every family; and none suffer'd but such as injur'd others; and without Laws and Judges, they did what was right.* This was a great Character from one who was particularly intrusted in the Affairs and Council of the *Indies*, and had all the Accounts sent to him, out of which he fram'd his *Decades*. *They thought*, as he saith, *that contentment lay in a little compass; and they had more than they knew what to do with.* To the same purpose *Lerius* gives an account of a Conference he had with a *Brasilian* old Man about Trade. *I pray*, said he, *why do your Countrymen take so much pains to come hither for our Wood? Have they not enough for fuel?* Yes, said *Lerius*, *but your Brasil-wood is of great advantage to them in Trade, by which they grow very rich.* Very well, saith he, *and when they are so rich do they not die as other Men do? And whither then go all these riches? To their Children or Relations.* Then said the poor *Brasilian*, *your Countrymen are a company of great fools* (*insigniter fatui.*) *For why should they undergo so much toil and danger by sea and land, to get that which they must part with when they die; and for the sake of those Children, who might live as contentedly without those riches? Do not you think that we love our Children as well as you, but we are contented that the same Earth which nourish'd us, will do as much for them? These barbarous* Brasilians, saith *Lerius*, *will rise up in judgment against too many* Christians. To the same purpose, he saith, one of the Natives of *Peru* discours'd the *Spaniards* who took so much pains to get their Gold; and said, *They were the froth of the sea, restless and uneasy; who might with far less trouble get a subsistence at home.* These things I mention to shew, that these People were far enough from wanting Sense and Capacity when the *Spaniards* came among them; and seem'd to have a much truer notion of the happiness of human Life than they had.

Ler. *Hist. Navig. in Brasil. c.* 53.

But to shew how far they were from being *without Religion* at that time, we have an Account by *Benzo* (who liv'd a great while in the *West-Indies*, upon their first Discovery) of an *Oracle* among them, which foretold the *Spaniards* a considerable time before. For the *Cachiqui* and *Bohitii*, (*i. e.* their *Great Men and Priests*) told *Columbus*, *That in the time of the Father of their present King, he and another King had a great Mind to understand what would happen after their time; and to that end resolv'd to apply themselves to their Zemes* (the Gods they worship'd) *in an extraordinary manner, by fasting 5 days together in a most sad and mournful condition.* And then they receiv'd that *Oracle*; upon which they made a *most doleful Song*, which they repeated at certain times; but now they found things happen'd to them just as they were foretold. The same *Benzo* informs us, that after *Columbus* discover'd the Conti-

Benzo *Hist. Novi Orbis l.* 1. *c.* 8. *Cap.* 17.

nent, the Iſlands were ſoon left by the *Spaniards* in hopes of greater gains; and finding they could not manage the Nations as they deſired, the ſent Perſons on purpoſe to make the worſt repreſentation poſſible of them, that they might have *an Edict* to condemn them to *perpetual ſlavery*. And therein they charge them with all manner of vices; but as to Religion, they only accuſe them of *Idolatry*. But, if they had found any ſuch thing as *Atheiſm* and *Irreligion* among them, they would have been ſure not to have conceal'd that.

Deſcript. Ind. Occid. l. 1. c. 10. *Joh. de Laet* in his Deſcription of the Iſle of *Cuba*, ſaith, *That the Inhabitants there had no Temple, no Sacrifices, no Religion.* Which I could not but wonder at; the account being ſo different from that of the firſt Diſcoverers, who muſt certainly know beſt what Religion they had among them: but in probability he followed the later *Spaniards*, who give the worſt accounts of them, to juſtify the moſt inhuman cruelties which were us'd againſt them.

Benzo l. 1. c. 25. For *Benzo* ſaith, *That of two millions of Natives in* Hiſpaniola, *there were left not above* 150 *in his time*; and the like deſolation was made *in Cuba, Jamaica, Porto-Rico and other places*; and *de Laet* confeſſes *that they were all long ſince deſtroy'd.* But if we take the Account given of theſe People upon the firſt Diſcovery, we ſhall find it was very different. For *Peter Martyr*, who was imployed by the King of *Spain*, as himſelf tells us, to take the beſt intelligence he could meet with from the *Indies*, ſaith, *That at firſt they could find no other worſhip among them but that of the Sun, and Moon, and the Heavens; but upon further acquaintance with them, they found out a great deal more, which related to their Religion*; which he ſaid, *he receiv'd from one who was imploy'd by* Columbus *himſelf in inſtructing them. They had little Images, which they call'd* Zemes; which they ſuppos'd to be inhabited by Spirits, which gave anſwers to them; but which is conſiderable, he ſaith, *That they look'd on them only as a kind of Meſſengers between them and the Only Eternal, Omnipotent, Inviſible* God: This was extant long before *De Laet* wrote his pompous Deſcription of the *Weſt-Indies*; was *Peter Martyr* unknown to him? So far from it, that he mentions and commends him for his diligence: How then comes he to differ ſo much from him in his Account of their Religion? And he there mentions the ſame *Oracle* which *Benzo* had done; and adds, *That the Natives underſtood it at firſt of the* Caribbians *or* Cannibals; *but at laſt found it too true of the* Spaniards. In another place he gives an Account of *Hiſpaniola* from *Andreas Morales* his own Mouth, who was imploy'd by the Governor to ſearch out what he could find concerning the Iſland and the Natives. *And he found that they came from another Iſland, and built a Houſe at the place of their landing, which they after conſecrated and enriched, and reverenced to the time of the* Spaniards *coming: and he makes it to have been in as much eſteem among them, as* Jeruſalem *to the* Chriſtians, Mecca *to the* Mahumetans, *and* Tyrena *in the Grand* Canaries; which he ſaith, *was in ſuch eſteem among the Natives, that Perſons would with ſinging leap off from that Holy Rock, in hopes their Souls ſhould be made happy by it.* But altho' this were a great Argument of *ſuperſtitious folly* in them, yet it ſhews the falſeneſs of that ſaying in the firſt Re-

Pet. Mart. Dec. 1. c. 9.

Decad. 3. c. 9.

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lation of *Columbus* his Voyage, *That there was no ſuch thing as Religion in the Canaries:* but thoſe who pretend to give a more exact Account ſay, *That the Natives did believe one God, who puniſhed the evil, and rewarded the good.* Columbi *Navigat. c.* 2. *Conqueſt de Canaries, par. II. p.* 208.

The next we are to conſider, are the *Savages* which diſturbed the Natives, before the *Spaniards*; who were call'd the *Caribbians*, or the inhabitants of the *Caribbe Iſlands:* Theſe were a wild ſort of People, and a great terror to their Neighbors, whom they were wont to eat in triumph, after they had taken them; which was not the general practice of the *Indians*, but only of the moſt *Brutiſh* and *Savage* People among them, as the *Caribbians* and thoſe of *Braſil*; but the other Natives both of the Iſlands and Continent abhorr'd it, as is found by the lateſt Diſcoveries. This appears by *Chriſt. d'Acunna*, who was imploy'd *A. D.* 1659. to diſcover the People about the River of *Amazons*; and there he found a conſiderable People call'd *Aguæ* (the *Spaniards* call them *Omaguæ*) and they were repreſented to be *Eaters of the fleſh of their Enemies*; but he ſaith that it was very falſe, and only a malicious calumny of the *Portugueſe*; and there he ſaith, *It was a particular cuſtom of the* Caribbes, *and not us'd by other* Indians. And *Dampier* ſaith, *That in all his Adventures among the* Indians *both Eaſt and Weſt, he never met with any ſuch People as eat Man's fleſh, and that he knew ſome of the Cannibal ſtories to be falſe.* But on the other ſide, it cannot be deny'd that there had been ſuch a barbarous practice not only among the *Caribbians*, but the Savages of *Braſil* and elſewhere; as appears by the particular Accounts of ſuch as liv'd among them, and ſaw their manner of doing it; as in *Joh. Lerius*, *Pet. Carder*, *Ant. Knivet*; but eſpecially in *Claud. d'Abbeville* his Relation of *Maragnan*, who is moſt particular in it; and he ſaith, that it aroſe from the hatred and revenge they expreſs thereby to their greateſt Enemies; and he adds, that their Stomachs cannot bear or digeſt it; but notwithſtanding it had been continu'd among them, becauſe their Enemies did ſo by them; but they confeſs'd it to be cruel and barbarous, but having been long us'd, they could not lay it aſide, without a general conſent. Some ſay, that the *Tapuiæ* eat the Bodies of their Friends; but thoſe who have liv'd moſt among them, ſay nothing about it: which they would not have omitted; and they are moſt to be rely'd upon. The *Caribbe Iſlands* were diſcover'd by *Columbus* in his ſecond Voyage: but the *Caribbians* would have no communication with them, *flying into their Woods. De Laet* ſaith only, *that they are a very brutiſh ſort of People, of no ſhame or fidelity.* Not a word of their *Religion*; and it was not to be expected among them, who had very little regard to any thing but the ſatisfying their brutiſh paſſions of *Cruelty* and *Revenge*; which were the only things they were then remarkable for. Since that time, they have liv'd more quietly, being ſo much over-power'd by the Plantations upon the *Caribbe Iſlands*; by which means they have been brought to ſome kind of Humanity and Converſation. And there have been two underſtanding Perſons converſant among them, who have given the beſt Account we have of them; and thoſe are *Monſ. Rochefort* and *F. Du Tertre*; who both agree, that they have ſome knowledg of One Supreme God in Heaven, who is of infinite Goodneſs,

Relation de la Riviere des Amazons, *c.* 52. Dampier's *Voyage, p.* 485. Let. *Hiſt. Navig. in* Braſil. *c.* 15. Pilgrims, *part.* 4. *p.* 1188, 1217. *Hiſt. de la Miſſion en l'Iſle de* Maragnan *ch.* 49. Barlæ. *Hiſt.* Braſil. Piſo *Hiſt.* Braſil. *L.* 1. *c.* 17. Rochefort *Hiſtoire de* Caribb. *l.* 4. *c.* 13.

Du Tertre *Hiſt. Nat. de* Antilles *par.* 7. §. 3.

neſs, and hurts no body; but as *Du Tertre*, who liv'd longer among them, ſaith, they account the ſervice of him a needleſs thing, being ſo far above them; but they are mightily afraid of the *Mabogas* or evil Spirits, which they think deſign to do them miſchief: and to appeaſe them they have their *Boyez*, who are a kind of Sorcerers among them. They both agree, that they believe the immortality of the Soul; and that the principal Soul, which is that in the Heart, goes to Heaven. And *Rochefort* from hence concludes the truth of *Cicero*'s ſaying, *That the knowledg of a Divinity is planted in the Hearts of Men.*

Laet. *Deſc. l.* 2. *c.* 2. 12. 16.

But *De Laet* repreſents the Northern *Indians* to have been as much without Religion, as the Natives of *Cuba* and *Hiſpaniola*; and from no good grounds, altho' herein he did not rely upon the *Spaniſh* Reports. So he ſaith of the Natives of *New-found Land*, of *New-France*, of the *Souriquoſii*, and other People of *Canada*, and the parts thereabouts, and of *Virginia*, &c. But I ſhall make it appear, that he took up with very ſlight Informations in this matter; which are contradicted by thoſe who liv'd longer among them, and underſtood their Senſe and Language better. 'Tis true, which I ſuppoſe gave occaſion to the miſtake, that the Savages had no ſet and conſtant ways of Devotion; but at certain Seaſons of the year, or in time of War and Calamities they had; or however, to Perſons that diſcourſed with them, they did by no means deny a God, but thought it was no great matter whether they ſerv'd him or not in ſuch a manner; ſo that their chief fault lay in a groſs neglect of Religion, and not in any ſetled Principles of Irreligion. So the *Sieur de Champlain* ſaith, He diſcours'd with the Savages of *Canada*, and found they wanted no Capacity; and he asked one of them, why they did not pray to God; he anſwer'd, that every one was left to pray as he thought fit in his own Mind. So, ſaith he, for want of a Law for Divine Worſhip, they liv'd like Brutes: and he imputes a great deal to their Savage way of living upon Hunting; whereas if the Land were cultivated, it might be much eaſier to reduce them to Civility and Religion. Mr. *Winſlow* one of the firſt Planters in *New-England*, had ſome diſcourſe with the *Indian Savages* about Religion, and God's being the Author of all our Bleſſings, which they agreed to, and ſaid, *That they own'd* God, *and call'd him* Kirtitan: upon which I obſerve, that he ingenuouſly retracts the Accounts he had given before of the Natives; *viz. That they had no Religion or Knowledg of* God; for, ſaith he, *we find that they do own one ſupreme Being, who was creator of Heaven and Earth; but they likewiſe own'd many Divine Powers under him.* Therefore *Acoſta*, ſpeaking of the *Indian Savages*, ſaith, *It is no hard matter to perſuade them of a ſupreme* God, *be they never ſo barbarous and brutiſh.*

Les Voyages du Sieur de Champlain, *l.* 3. *ch.* 5.

Purchas *To.* 4. *l.* 10. *ch.* 5.

Acoſta *Hiſt. of the* Indies, *l.* 5. *c.* 2.

But I muſt do that right to *Joh. de Laet*, as to ſhew that after he had receiv'd better Information, he did ſpeak more favorably of the *Religion* of the *Indians*: For in his Book againſt *Grotius*, ten years after the other, he hath an *Obſervation* on purpoſe to clear this matter. Father *Sagard* had publiſh'd an Account of his Voyage to the *Hurons*, a People of *New-France*, or *Canada*, near the Lake call'd *Mare dulce*, where he learnt their Language, and ſo was better able to judg of their Opinions; and he ſaith, Their general

Jo. de Laet *de Origin. Gent.* American. *p.* 187.

Le Grand *Voyage du Pays de* Hurons, *c.* 18.

general Senſe was, that there was one Creator, who made the World; and that in their Language he was call'd *Ataouacan*. Which is ſince confirm'd by the Account of the *French Miſſions* into thoſe parts; eſpecially of *Paulus Juvenæus*, who ſpent a Winter among them, to converſe with them in their own Language. And when he preach'd to them about God, they all asked him, what he meant by it; he told them he meant ſuch a Being who had infinite Power, and made Heaven and Earth: upon which they looked upon one another, and cried out *Ataouacan*. *Sagard* ſaith, *They believe the Immortality of the Soul*; and the later Accounts ſay, *That he was told that the* Souriquoſii *did truly believe one* God *that created all things*. Which is very different from *de Laet*'s former Account of them. But *de Laet* goes on, that he underſtood by *Davis* and *Baffin*, that *the Natives of thoſe parts where they had been, i. e.* (about *Fretum Davis* and *Groen-land*) were *Idolaters, and worſhip'd the Sun*. *Davis* in the Account of his Voyage ſaith, *That they were a very tractable People, void of craft or double dealings, and eaſy to be brought to any Civility or good Order; but they judg'd them to be Idolaters and to worſhip the Sun*. This is quite another thing from being mere *Savages, and having no Religion among them*. Farther he owns *Hariot*'s Account of the People of *Virginia, that they believ'd many Gods of different degrees, but one ſupreme God who was from eternity*. But he had publiſh'd to the World in his *Deſcription, that their only Religion was to worſhip every thing they were afraid of, as Fire, Water, Thunder, Guns, Horſes*, &c. *and the Devil, whom they called* Okie. *Hariot*, who converſed among them, ſaith no ſuch thing; but he ſaith expreſly, *That they own'd that* God *made the World, and that Souls are immortal, and that they ſhall receive in another World according to their actions in this*. What a different Account is this concerning the ſame People? And if *Lederer* may be believ'd, who went among the *Indian Natives*, not far from *Virginia*, he ſaith, Okæe *was the name of the Creator of all things among them; to him the high Prieſt alone offers ſacrifice; but their ordinary Devotion is perform'd to leſſer Deities, to whom they ſuppoſe ſublunary affairs are committed*. *Denton*, who liv'd among the *Indian Savages* about *New-York*, ſaith, *That their ſolemn worſhip was not above once or twice a year; unleſs upon extraordinary occaſions, as making War*, &c.

Hiſt. Canada, l. 1. p. 78.

P. 87.

Hackluit, *To.* 3. *p.* 100.

Hariot *of* Virginia, 25, 26.

Lederer's *Diſcovery, p.* 4.

Denton *of* New York *p.* 8.

I ſhall not need to purſue this matter any farther; ſince he owns the Religion that was practis'd not only in *Peru* and *Mexico*, but in other parts of the *Weſt-Indies*. Only as to *Chili* he ſaith, *that we have no certainty, but only that they have ſolemn Oaths by one they call* Enonamon. But *Marcgravius* in the account he gives of *Chili*, ſaith at firſt, *That they know not* God, *nor his worſhip*, &c. but this muſt be underſtood of a clear and diſtinct knowledg of him; for he ſaith afterwards, *That they have ſome knowledg of a ſupreme Being, by whom all earthly things and human affairs are governed; whom they call* Pillan.

G. Marcgravius *de Regione* Chili, *c.* 3.

The only difficulty then remaining as to the *Weſt-Indies*, is as to the People of *Paraquaria* and *Braſil*. For it is affirm'd, *That there are whole Nations there who know nothing of* God, *or Religion*. Which muſt be more ſtrictly inquir'd into.

As to *Paraquaria*, it is ſaid, that *Nicholas del Techo in his Letters from thence, ſaith that the Caiguæ*, (a People of that Country) *had no name for* God, *or the Soul of Man; and no public worſhip, nor Idols.* But the ſame *Nicholas del Techo* hath publiſh'd a full Relation of all the Proceedings in *Paraquaria* and thereabouts, on the account of Religion, and therein he hath acquainted the World with the ſeveral Nations that inhabit thoſe parts between *Braſil* and *Peru*, &c. which were ſcarce heard of before. The *Diaigritæ*, (who rather belong to *Tucumania*, between *Paraquaria* and *Chili*) he ſaith, *were worſhipers of the Sun, after a particular manner; and they believ'd the immortality of Souls, and that the Souls of their great Men went into the greater Stars, and of ordinary People into the leſſer.* The *Guaicuræi worſhiped the Moon and Bootes.* The *Guarani* were *a very ſuperſtitious People, but they could not tell what God they worſhiped; but they were mightily addicted to Sorcery.* The *Calchaquini worſhiped the Sun, and Thunder, and Lightning.* In the Plains between *Rio del Plata* and *Tucumania*, he ſaith, *are a very large People, who have little regard to Religion; but they believe that after death, their Souls return to their Creator.* In *Chili*, he ſaith, *when one* God *the Creator was preach'd to them, one of their* Caſiques (*or great Men*) *ſtood up and ſaid, that they would not bear that the power of creating ſhould belong to any but their God* Pillan; *and that he plac'd the Souls of their great Men after death about the Sun.* After all theſe he mentions the *Caaiguæ, as the ſmalleſt and moſt inconſiderable and brutiſh People among them:* They were a moſt ſavage ſort of Creatures, that could hardly ſpeak ſo as to be underſtood; he ſaith, *They were much more like to Apes than Men, and liv'd upon Mice, and Ants, and Vipers*, &c. *utrique ſexui*, ſaith he, *tenuiſſimus rationis uſus eſt:* they are harder to be tamed than wild Beaſts; and if they are put in chains, they ſtarve themſelves. And this is all the account he there gives of them, and ſaith not a word of their Religion; and it were very unreaſonable to expect any from them. It is not improbable that others could not find a word for God or the Soul among them; for they were not able to ſpeak ſenſe, at leaſt ſo as to be underſtood by Strangers.

Hiſt. Prov. Paraquar. Auth. Nicolao del Techo, *Leodii* 1673.

L. 2. *c.* 18.

L. 4. *c.* 16.

L. 5. *c.* 7. *Cap.* 23.

L. 3. *c.* 12.

L. 2. *c.* 26.

L. 9. *c.* 24.

Come we now to the People of *Braſil, who are ſaid to be without any notion of* God. But thoſe who have been beſt acquainted among them aſſure us, that they believe the immortality of Souls, and rewards and puniſhments after death. And from hence *Lerius* himſelf argues againſt the Atheiſtical Perſons of his time; and that altho' they will not in words own God, yet he ſaith, they ſhew the inward conviction they have of him; eſpecially when it thunders; which *de Laet* confeſſes they call *Tupâ cunanga*, a noiſe made by the Supreme Excellence: for *Tupâ* he ſaith ſignifies ſo much in their Language. And he adds, *That they are very apprehenſive of evil Spirits; that they do own a God of the Mountains, and of the Highways; and altho' they differ in their idolatry and ſuperſtition, yet* he confeſſes *it generally prevails among them, and the other innumerable People who live on both ſides the vaſt River* de la Plata. *Marcgravius*, a Learned Man, who liv'd in *Braſil*, and underſtood their Language ſo far as to write a Grammar of it, ſaith expreſly, *That they call* God *Tupa* and *Tupana*;

Hiſt. Navi. in Braſil, *c.* 16. *p.* 223, 224.

Laet. *de Orig. Gen.* Americ. *p.* 193.

Marcgrav. *de* Braſil. *Reg. c.* 9.

and

and in the ſhort Dictionary of *Emmanuel Moraes*, *Tupana* is rendred *Deus*. But the great Argument to *Lerius* was, *that they had no public exerciſe of Religion*; which was the common caſe of the *Savages* in all parts, who liv'd under no Laws; not that they believ'd no God, but they would not be at the trouble to ſerve him. *Ludolphus* ſaith of the *Gallani*, a ſavage People who had almoſt over-run *Abiſſinia*, that they had no public worſhip, but if any asked them about a Supreme God, they would anſwer, *Heaven*. So *Dellon* ſaith of the Inhabitants of *Madagaſcar*, *that they did not queſtion a Supreme Being that governs all; but with a ſtrange obſtinacy denied that there was any neceſſity of praying to him*. *Francis Cauche*, who ſojourned a long time among them, ſaith, *he could obſerve no public exerciſe of Religion among them; but they did not deny a* God *to be the Creator of all, and aſſerted the immortality of the Soul, but good and bad went to Heaven*. *Flacurt* liv'd five years among them, and he agrees in the ſame, as to *no public exerciſe of Religion*; but he ſaith, *They believe one God, of whom they ſpeak with honor and reſpect*. *P. Gillet* in the Account of his Voyage to *Goyane* 1674, ſaith, That the *Nouragues*, and *Acoquas*, and *Galibis*, *all agree in owning one God in Heaven, but they give no worſhip to him*.

Ludolph. *Hiſt. Æthiopiæ, l.* 1.

Dellon *Relation d'un Voyage, To.* 1. *c.* 8.

Relation du Voyage de F. Cauche, *p.* 119.

Hiſtoire de l'Iſle de Madagaſcar, *ch.* 17.

Journal du Voyage dans la Goyane, *p.* 81.

Joh. dos Santos ſaith of ſome of the *Caffres* (with whom he convers'd) *That they are the moſt brutiſh and barbarous People in the World; but they hold the immortality of the Soul, and have a confus'd knowledg that there is a Great God from a Natural Inſtinct; but they pray not to him*. But for thoſe *Caffres* at the *Cape of good Hope*, they may vye with any for *Brutiſhneſs*; but by the laſt Accounts given of them, by thoſe who liv'd among them, and publiſh'd by *F. Tachard*, we find *that they do worſhip one God, altho' they have a confus'd knowledg of him; but they ſeem to have little regard to another Life, but ſacrifice for rain and good Seaſons*. By which it appears that the Account given of them in *Thevenot's* Collections is not true, *viz. That they have no knowledg of* God, altho' it were not much to be wonder'd at, ſince the ſame Author ſaith, *they are the moſt barbarous People in the World*. But that was a haſty Obſervation by Strangers, who could not underſtand one word they ſpake: For Sir *James Lancaſter* ſaid, *That in ſeven weeks time, the ſharpeſt Wit among them could not learn one word of their Language; their Speech being uttered only in the Throat*, like the *Caaiguæ* in *Paraquaria*. And ſo * *Pliny* mentions a People of *Africa*, who *made a noiſe without any articulate pronunciation*; who were ſurely the Anceſtors of thoſe *Hotentots*, concerning whom it is hard to affirm any thing, unleſs they have learnt lately to expreſs themſelves better. As it ſeems they have done by Monſ. *de la Loubere's* Account of them; for he ſaith, *That they have ſome kind of worſhip at new and full Moons; and he thinks they own a good God, to whom they need not to pray; but that there is a bad one, to whom they pray not to hurt them*. And in the *Journal* of Monſ. *de Chaumont*, we read, *That they have no great regard to Religion; but when they want rain, they pray to a certain Being, whom they know not, but that lives above; and offer milk, the beſt thing they have; and that the* Dutch *Secretary had ſeen them at this Sacrifice with Eyes lifted up to Heaven, and in a profound ſilence*.

*Hiſtoire de l'*Ethiopie *Orientale, ch.* 7. Purchas *To.* II. *p.* 1639.

Voyage de Siam, *l.* 2. *p.* 84.

Thevenot *Roe, p.* 2.

Purchas *To.* I. *l.* 3. *ch.* 3. §. 1.

* Stridorq; non vox; adeo Sermonis commercio carent. *Plin. N. H. l.* 5. *c.* 8.

Du Royaume de Siam, *To.* 2. *p.* 112.

Journal du Voyage de Siam, *p.* 78.

Thus I have gone thro' all the Nations I have met with, who have been ſaid to be *without any notion of* God *or Religion*; there remains only one Objection to be taken off, which relates to a Sect in the *Eaſt-Indies* which is ſaid to be *Atheiſtical* in their *Principles*, having an *External Doctrine* for the People, and an *Internal*, which they keep from them.

To give the beſt Account I can of this matter; All the late Writers of *China* do agree, That beſides the original Doctrine of the Country, there was brought in long ſince, (they generally ſay 65 *years after* Chriſt) a new *Sect* from *Indoſthan*, which they call *Xekiao*. The Author is ſuppos'd to be one *Xekia*, or *Xaca* (as the *Japoneſe* call him) who liv'd long before. *Matt. Riccius*, (or *Trigautius*) ſaith, *This Sect was at firſt receiv'd with great applauſe, becauſe it ſet forth the Immortality of the Soul, and the Rewards and Puniſhments of another Life; but not eternal*; becauſe it introduc'd the Doctrine of *Tranſmigration of Souls*. In order to the happineſs after death, it requir'd *Particular Devotions to Idols*, which by that means ſpread over all *China* and *Japan*, as well as other parts of the *Indies*; and *Abſtinence from fleſh*, as well as *from murder, ſtealing*, &c. And Auſterities, Celibate, Retirement from the World, and great Liberalities to the *Tapoins* and *Bonzes*. Wherein *Bertoli*, *Marini*, and the reſt agree. But there was a ſecret under all this; viz. *That this was but an external Doctrine for the People, but the internal Doctrine was another thing, that the ſupreme Felicity lay in eternal Nothing*; or as they rather called it, *an Eternal Quiet, and that Souls are to paſs from Body to Body*, ſaith *Martinius*, *till they are fit for it*. *F. Couplet*, who hath given the fulleſt Account of this matter, ſaith, *That when* Xaca *came to die, he ſent for ſome of his choiceſt Diſciples, and told them, that the Doctrine he had hitherto declared to them was only a ſhew, and not the truth; and that all things came out of nothing, and would end in nothing*; as the late Author *Le Compte* expreſſes it; *and that is the Abyſs where all our hopes muſt end.* But *Couplet* ſaith, *That his Diſciples take great care, that this come not among the People; and only thoſe*, he ſaith, *even among the* Bonzes *and others are admitted to it, who are thought capable of ſuch a ſecret. The Eternal Doctrine they look on*, as he ſaith, *as the wooden Account which is raiſed to ſupport the other; but they are by all means for keeping that up among the People.* But it is not clear what they underſtand by *Returning to Nothing*; for Monſ. *De la Loubere* ſaith, *They do not underſtand proper Annihilation by it, but in a Myſtical ſenſe*; and two things are imply'd by it, 1. *That ſuch Souls as arrive to it, are paſt all fears of returning to the Body*: 2. *That they live in perfect eaſe and quiet, without any kind of action.* And ſo *Couplet* explains it, *by Acting, Underſtanding, and deſiring nothing*; ſo that this is the higheſt degree of *Quietiſm*; and ſo Monſ. *Gervaiſe*, who was among thoſe of *Siam*, and endeavor'd to underſtand their Doctrine, ſaith, *That Annihilation is to be myſtically underſtood, and not in a Phyſical ſenſe.* As appears by what *Couplet* ſaith, *That one of* Xaca's *poſterity ſpent nine years with his face to the wall thinking of nothing, and ſo became perfect.* But from hence he ſadly laments the ſpreading of *Atheiſm* among the *Chineſe*, who were willing to underſtand it in the groſſeſt ſenſe.

Trigaut. *l.* 1. *c.* 10.

Martin. *Atlas*, *p.* 7. Couplet. *Procem. Declar. ad* Confuc. *paragr.* 4. LeCompte *Memoires Part. II. Let.* 2.

Loubere *du Royaume de* Siam, *To. I. c.* 22.

Hiſt. Nat. & Polit. du Siam, *Part.* 3. *c. p.* 162.

And

And ſuppoſe it be ſo taken, what imaginable ground can it be for Men of ſenſe, (as the *Chineſe* would be thought above others) to take this for granted, becauſe ſuch an Impoſtor ſaid it; concerning whom ſo many incredible things are ſaid by them, that ſome have queſtion'd whether there ever were ſuch a Perſon or not: and *Loubere* ſeems to think this ſtory *a Fiction of the Chineſe*, for he can find nothing of him among the *Talapoins* of *Siam*, with whoſe Traditions he was very converſant. But what reaſon or demonſtration did he offer? What ground could they have to believe one who had been an Impoſtor all his days, ſhould ſpeak truth at laſt?

But all this ſignifies nothing to the conſent of Mankind. *For this was to be kept up as a ſecret:* and only to be communicated to ſuch as were thought capable of it. If they thought this to be the truth, why was it not to be diſcover'd? Was it becauſe the Pople were ſtill to be kept up in the common perſuaſion about Religion? And was this for the ſake of the *Bonzes?* of whom the wiſe People of *China* had a very mean opinion, as they all agree. Therefore it could not be for their ſakes. *But the People might grow more unruly, if this were known.* If the *Bonzes* were ſo bad as they make them, they might rather think the People would be better without them; and the beſt ſervice they could do, was to lay open the fraud and impoſture of theſe Men, as thoſe who preach'd *Chriſtianity* in *China* and *Japan* after they underſtood their Languages, did very freely. And yet they did aſſert God *and Providence*, and the *Rewards and Puniſhments of another Life*, againſt all the Doctrines of *Xaca*, both as to the *External* and *Internal part*. *Matth. Riccius* having attain'd to good skill in the Language of *China*, publiſh'd an account of the *Chriſtian Doctrine* at *Pekim*, *A. D.* 1603. wherein he aſſerted the Being of God, not only from Natural Reaſon, but from their own *moſt Ancient Books*; of which *Couplet* gives a large account, and how the Interpreters of latter times had perverted the Senſe of them. We have in *Kircher* a *Summary of the* Chriſtian *Faith*, as it was publiſh'd in *China*; and therein we find on what grounds they aſſerted the Being of God, againſt the *Atheiſtical ſenſe* of *Xaca*'s Doctrine, *That all things came out of nothing:* For, *if nothing were firſt, how came things into Being? therefore to bring them into Being, there muſt be a Creator before them; and this Creator is he whom we call* God. This was plain and true Reaſoning, and impoſſible to be anſwer'd by the ſubtileſt of thoſe *Atheiſtical* Wits of *China*. For nothing can produce *Nothing*. So, that if *Xaca*'s interior Doctrine were true, *That all things came out of Nothing*, it muſt neceſſary follow, that there muſt be *Nothing* before *any thing*; and what poſſible imagination can any Man of ſenſe have, how any thing ſhould by it ſelf come out of Nothing? There is no repugnancy at all in conceiving that an Infinite Power ſhould give a Being to that which had it not before; for altho' the difference between *not being and being* be ſo great, yet where we ſuppoſe a Power Infinite in the Cauſe, that may command the terms of that diſtance, by giving a Being to that which had it not before. To ſay that *Nothing can be produced out of nothing*, implies that nothing can of it ſelf reſult out of nothing, where there is no ſuperior Cauſe; but to ſay

Couplet *Declar. Procem.* Kircher China *illuſtrata. Part.* 2. *c.* 10.

that by no Cauſe whatſoever any thing can be put into Being which had it not before, is to take away all poſſibility of an Infinite Power, without any reaſon, when the very Being of things is an impregnable reaſon for it. For ſince we are certain things are, we muſt be certain that they came into Being; and that muſt be either out of nothing by themſelves, which is impoſſible; or it muſt be from ſuch a Power which can give Being where it was not, which muſt be infinite.

Thus far I have conſidered the General Prejudices againſt Religion, and the *Atheiſtical* Pretenſes of this Age; and have ſhew'd how very little they ſignify to any Perſons that will take the pains to examin them.

DISCOURSE II.

The Modern Atheiſtical Hypotheſes *examin'd, and the Unreaſonableneſs of them ſhew'd.*

I Now come to conſider the *Atheiſtical Hypotheſes* of this Age, which I ſhall rank under theſe two Heads:

1. Such as have a *Tendency* towards *Atheiſm.*
2. Such as are *plainly Atheiſtical.*

As to the former, I ſhall inſiſt upon theſe two:

(1.) Such as weaken the known and generally receiv'd Proofs of God and Providence.

(2.) Such as attribute too much to the *Mechanical Powers* of *Matter* and *Motion.*

I begin with thoſe who have gone about to weaken the known and generally received Arguments for God and Providence; which I have at large ſhew'd, were thoſe taken from the manifeſt effects of Wiſdom and Deſign in the parts of Animals, and in the frame of the World. I am far from intending to lay the *charge* of *Atheiſm* on any who have weakned ſome Arguments to prove a God, when they have induſtriouſly ſet themſelves to do it from any other, altho' not ſo firm, nor ſo generally receiv'd. For I conſider the fondneſs Men have for their own Inventions, and how apt therefore they are to ſlight other Arguments in compariſon with them. And this I take to have been the caſe of a Modern Philoſopher of great and deſerved Reputation: For he deſigning to to do ſomething beyond other Men, thought he did nothing unleſs he produced Arguments which he thought had not been purſued by others. To this end he ſet aſide the Argument from *Final Cauſes*, for two Reaſons. 1. *Becauſe in Phyſical Inquiries we ought to make uſe of none but the ſtrongeſt Reaſons.* 2. *Becauſe all* God's *ends are unſearchable by us, being kept cloſe in the Abyſs of his infinite Wiſdom.* But when he was ſmartly urged by his learned Adverſary, That altho' upon another occaſion he might ſet aſide Final Cauſes, yet he ought not when the Honor of God as the Maker of the Soul is concerned; for by theſe means the Argument from the light of Nature, as to the Wiſdom, Providence, Power and

Des Cartes *Medit.* 4. *Princip. Phil. Part.* 1. *p.* 22.

Reſp. ad 5. *Object.*

and existence of God would be cast off; which he looks on as the chief Argument (which is taken from the parts of the visible World, the Heavens, Earth, Plants, Animals, and especially Mankind;) He had no other answer to make, *But that what was brought for a Final Cause, ought to be referred to the Efficient; i. e. that from those things we ought to know and honor* God, *as the Maker, but not to guess for what end he made them.* Which is a strange answer to be made by one of so much sagacity. For, as *Gassendus* well urges, how can we honor God for the excellent use of these things, and not know for what end they were made? Wherein lies the difference between *the Use*, and *the End* in this case. For he that adores God for the Use, must do it for the End he designed those things for.

But, saith *Des Cartes*, *In Moral considerations, wherein it is a pious thing to make use of Conjectures, we may consider* God's *End; but not in Physical speculations, wherein we must only make use of the strongest Reasons.*

To which *Gassendus* very well answers, That if he takes away the Final Cause, he weakens the Argument for the Efficient: for that leads us to him. And it is not the bare sight of the visible World which makes us own God to be the Maker of it; because it is possible for Men to think that these things were so from Eternity, or came by Chance: but when we observe the Wisdom of God in the design and contrivance, then we come upon good grounds to own the Efficient Cause, and to adore him for the Workmanship of his hands. As, saith he, if a Man sees a passage for water, between Stones on each side with an Arch over, that doth not presently convince him that it is a *Bridge*; because pieces of Rocks might happen so, as to afford such a passage: but when he comes to consider the order in which they are framed and hold together, and the conveniency of Mankind for passing over, he cannot then but acknowledg there was a skilful Artificer who managed it, and that it could not be done by Chance.

To the other Argument, *That* God's *ends are unsearchable*, he answers, That it is not to be denied that God may have ends above our reach; but on the other side, there are ends which lie open to our view; as, saith he, particularly in the Body of Man, as the frame of the Mouth for respiration and nourishment, and all other passages so exactly fitted for those ends; and so the Bones, Muscles, Nerves, and other parts of the Body: but there are three especially which strike him with admiration. 1. The umbilical Vessels, the fitness of them for distribution of nourishment to the *Embryo*, and the alteration after the Child is born. 2. The Valves of the Heart, and the several Vessels for receiving and distributing the Blood. 3. The Perforation of the Tendons which serve to draw the Fingers into the hollow of the Hand. These were close and pressing Instances, of which *Gassendus* professeth, *that neither himself nor any of his acquaintance, who had made it their business to search into the Causes of things, were able to give any other Account of them, but from the Wisdom and Power of* God. And he challenges *Des Cartes* to shew him, *what Mechanical Cause could produce such Valves about the Heart; out of what matter, and in what manner they were made; how they came to have such a temper, consistence,*

ſiſtence, flexibility, bigneſs, figure, ſituation, &c. But I do not find that he ever undertook to give any anſwer to it; but by a Letter to *Merſennus*, it ſeems he was of opinion, *that he could give an account of the formation of the ſeveral parts of Animals in a Mechanical way, ſuppoſing* God *to have eſtabliſhed thoſe Laws of Mechaniſm, which he ſuppoſes in the ſame manner as he had explained the grains of Salt, and figures of Snow in his Meteors.* But however he might pleaſe himſelf in his opinion, he hath given the World no manner of ſatisfaction about it; inſomuch that his poſthumous piece to that purpoſe, is charged with great and fundamental Miſtakes. However his Diſciples run on upon the ſame ground, that *Final Cauſes are to be conſidered only in Morals*; and they muſt overthrow the Argument to prove a Deity, from the wiſdom and contrivance in the works of Creation; which according to them are only occaſion of our Meditation and Praiſe. But how can Men of ſenſe ſatisfy themſelves with this Anſwer? For can we give thanks to God for the uſe of our Senſes, without knowing that God gave us Eyes to ſee with, with ſuch admirable contrivance for that purpoſe; and ſo for all the variety of organs for our Hearing, unleſs we are ſatisfied that God did really give them for thoſe ends? Otherwiſe all that we have to do, is to thank God for putting Matter into Motion, and for eſtabliſhing thoſe Laws of Mechaniſm from whence theſe Organs reſulted. With what Devotion can we praiſe God for the Benefits we have from the Influences of Heaven and the Fruits of the Earth, if theſe things were not intended for our good; but it fell out by the Laws of Mechaniſm, that we have theſe advantages by them? So that all Natural Religion, according to this *Hypotheſis*, comes to no more than an acknowledgment of God to be the Efficient Cauſe of the World, altho' we have no reaſon from his Works to conclude him to be ſo. *Yes*, ſay they, *from them as the effects of a Firſt Cauſe, which put Matter into motion, we may; but not from the ends which* God *intended by them, which are above our capacity.* But this falls ſhort of *Ariſtotle's Divinity*; for he aſſerted, that not only the firſt Motion was from God, but the order of the Univerſe; and that God did deſign the mutual Benefits which one part of it hath from others: but according to theſe Laws of Mechaniſm, God only put the Matter into motion with ſuch Laws, and then every thing came into the order it is in, without any deſign of Providence. Which takes away all *life* and *ſpirit in Religion*, which depends upon God's managing the affairs of the World; and without that Men may own a *Firſt mover*, and yet live as *without God in the World.* What reaſon can we imagin, why we ought to give God thanks for *fruitful Seaſons*, or to pray to him in time of Drought and Scarcity, if he hath left all theſe things to the natural courſe, which he hath eſtabliſhed in the World? But it is not denied by *Des Cartes, That God may reveal to us his own Ends, and then we are to believe them, and to ſerve him accordingly; but that without ſuch Revelation, we cannot find them out.* Now this I ſay is contrary to the general ſenſe of Mankind, where there hath been the moſt confuſed Notion of a God. For I have already obſerved, that even the *Caffres* of *Soldania* (or at the *Cape of good Hope*) do pray ſolemnly to God in their diſtreſſes for want of Rain; and the

Epiſt. Part. 2. ep. 98.

Regis Metaphyſ. l. 2. Part. 1. Nittich. in Meditat. Metaph. 4. p. 97.

the *Savages* of the Northern parts of *America* do the ſame at ſome Seaſons of the year above others; ſo that if the conſent of Mankind ſignify any thing as to the Being of God, it will do as much as to his Providential care of the World. And if ſuch a confuſed Idea did carry along with it the Notion of his Providence, much more the clear and diſtinct *Idea* of him. For *Des Cartes* proves the Being of God from the *Idea* of him in our Minds; now what is there in that *Idea*, which doth not equally imply *Providence*, as well as his *Exiſtence?* For, why ſhould not a *Being abſolutely perfect* as well regard the *Well-being* as *the Being* of his Creatures? *By the name of* God in this *Idea*, he ſaith he underſtands *a certain Subſtance, infinite, independent, moſt intelligent and moſt powerful; by which himſelf and all other things were created.* But this is not all; for he acknowledges ſoon after and in other places, *that becauſe there is no neceſſary connexion between the ſeveral moments of Exiſtence in a contingent Being, we moſt evidently know our dependence on this ſuperior Being for our conſervation*; which he therefore owns to be *a continued Creation.* From hence I infer, that *Des Cartes* his own Idea of God doth imply a particular Providence. For, if we depend upon him for every moment of our Subſiſtence, and Conſervation differ only by an act of our Mind from Creation, as he affirms; then there is as immediate an act of Providence in our daily Subſiſtence, as in our firſt Being. But how is this conſiſtent with leaving all to the Mechanical Laws of Motion? If it be ſaid, *That this is only a general act of Providence in preſerving things in that ſtate he hath put them into*; I demand farther, Whether thoſe very Laws of Motion, be not the Effect of a wiſe Providence? And whether we cannot from them infer, that theſe Laws were directed for very good ends? I do not think this can be denied. And if it cannot, then I am ſure it certainly follows, that we may know ſome ends which God hath; whereas *Des Cartes* ſaid, *That all God's ends are unknown to us, being kept ſecret in the Abyſs of his infinite Wiſdom.* But the ends of appointing the Laws of Motion may be known; and if theſe, why not as well the particular ends of thoſe works of his which we find ſo uſeful to Mankind? Eſpecially when his Providence is imply'd in that very Idea from whence he infers his Exiſtence.

Medit. 3.

Princip. P. I. n. 21.

I can by no means ſuſpect that *Des Cartes* deſigned to take away the force of other Arguments for a Deity, that he might ſecretly undermine the belief of a God, by introducing his Argument from the Idea, which he knew would not hold; (as ſome have ſuggeſted) for I am ſatisfy'd, that he thought this Argument beyond any other: For, in a Letter to a Friend, he ſaith, *He had found out ſuch an Argument as gave him full ſatisfaction; and by which he more certainly knew that there was a God, than the truth of any Geometrical Propoſition; but he doubted, whether he could make others underſtand it ſo well as he himſelf did.* To the ſame purpoſe he ſpeaks in a Letter to *Merſennus.* And in another Letter to *Merſennus*, he ſaith, *That he thought himſelf bound in conſcience to publiſh his Arguments to prove the Exiſtence of God.* Which being written to his intimate Friends, ſhew ſufficiently his own apprehenſion of the ſtrength of them. But what opinion ſoever he had of it himſelf, they have not met with ſuch a reception among

Ren. Des Cartes *Ep. Part* 2. *Ep.* 103.

Ep. 104. *Epiſt. P. II. Ep.* 37.

among thinking Men, as a Geometrical Demonſtration would have done; altho' he hath endeavor'd to put them into that form. For, after all, they cannot conceive how an objective reality of an Idea in the Mind, can prove the real exiſtence of that object out of the Mind. He grants, That it doth not hold in other Ideas; but that there is ſome thing ſo peculiar to this Idea that the Mind could not frame it, if it had not a real Exiſtence: now here lies the main difficulty, what that is in this Idea, diſtinct from all others, which ſo exceeds the capacity of human Underſtanding, that we could not have ſuch an Idea, unleſs the object were in being.

Poſt Reſp. ad 2as Object. p. 85.

The force of his Argument, as himſelf hath put it in the Mathematical way, Prop. 2. lies here.

The objective reality in our Ideas muſt have ſome Cauſe in which it is either formally, or eminently: but we have ſuch an Idea within us, which is not within us either of thoſe ways; and therefore there muſt be ſome other Cauſe of it, which can be none but God; and therefore he is. Now here the difficulty returns, *viz.* to ſhew what neceſſary Connexion there is between the *Objective Reality* in the *Idea*, and the real Exiſtence of the thing out of the *Idea*. For that he ſaith, by *Axiom* 5. *That this is the true Principle of Knowledg; for*, ſaith he, *we do not know that there is ſuch a thing as the viſible Heaven, barely becauſe we ſee it; for that goes no farther than our ſenſe: but our knowledg is an act of the Mind from the Idea, which ariſes from hence that the Objective Reality of the Idea in our Minds doth come from the thing it ſelf as the true Cauſe; and the more of Objective Reality there is, by* Axiom 6. *in Subſtance than Accident, and in an Infinite Subſtance than a Finite, ſo much more doth it prove the Exiſtence of the thing repreſented by the Idea.*

But the caſe ſtill ſeems different between an Idea raiſed in our Minds from an object of Senſe; and that which the Mind raiſes within it ſelf about an infinite Subſtance. For, altho' it be impoſſible for the Mind to make an Objective Reality, which is infinite, by its own power; yet it doth not appear, but that it may frame an Idea within it ſelf to which it ſets no bounds, and ſo is infinite to it. And here lies the main ground of the Miſtake: If our Idea were infinitely perfect as God himſelf is, no doubt it were wholly out of our power to make it; but then it would follow, that Idea with its Objective Reality muſt be God: if it be not God, it muſt be finite; and if it be finite, it is within the power of our Minds to frame it. For, altho' our conceptions of God be not *merely Negative*, yet whatſoever conceptions we have, they are not adequate; and if not, they are imperfect; and ſo come within the reach of our capacities.

Cenſur. Philoſoph. Carteſ. c. 4. §. 3.

Réponſe à la Cenſure de Monſ. Huet, p. 192.

P. 198.

When the Learned Monſ. *Huet* urged this Argument againſt *Des Cartes*, *That the Idea in us muſt be finite, becauſe it wants ſomething to make it perfect, being not adequate:* Monſ. *Regis*, who undertook to defend *Des Cartes*, anſwers, *That if the Idea be taken formally as it is in us, ſo it is finite; but if we take it with its objective Reality, ſo it is infinite, and above our power: And as to its not being adequate, he ſaith, it doth not follow that it is finite objectively, but only formally;* becauſe *it repreſents an infinite object, and it is ſufficient to make it infinite becauſe it repreſents as much as we can apprehend.* I grant, that if it reaches as far

as our capacity will go, it may be ſaid to be infinite in regard of its object, altho' it be finite as to our manner of apprehending it; but ſtill the main difficulty returns, *viz.* how a finite Idea in us can prove the Exiſtence of an infinite Object. For the Queſtion is not barely about our manner of conception of an infinite Being, which muſt be according to our capacities; but whether ſuch a finite Idea, as we are capable of, can prove an infinite Being: for our Idea can repreſent to us an object to which we can ſet no bounds; but how doth it hence appear that it muſt be an infinite object really exiſting, and that ſuch an Idea muſt proceed from an infinite Cauſe? Altho' theſe things be not ſo clear as were to be wiſh'd, yet we muſt not diſſemble the force of this Argument ſo far as it goes, *viz.* That we cannot form an Idea of Nothing, and that we have no Ideas in our Minds, but what have a proper Cauſe for them; either from without us by *Senſe*, or from within by the acts of our own Minds. As if a Man hath an *Idea* of a rare piece of workmanſhip, either he hath ſeen it, or elſe hath been told it, or was able to invent it. But here can be no evidence from Senſe, and no Man can find within himſelf a power to frame ſuch an object as God; therefore either he muſt have it from others, or elſe God himſelf hath imprinted it in our Minds. Now if the *Idea* of *God* had been alike in all, *viz.* of a Being infinitely wiſe, powerful and good, there might have been great reaſon to have believ'd it to have been planted in our Minds; but the general Idea of God among Mankind was too dark and confus'd to form any Argument from it; and it related chiefly to his power, and ſome kind of goodneſs; but not ſo as to exclude any other Beings from being honored as Gods. So that the force of it cannot be taken from the conſent of Mankind in this Idea; but if it be only ſaid, *That this is a true and juſt Idea of him*; and that there are other Arguments to prove it from his Works; ſo far it may and ought to be allow'd. But the *Metaphyſical Subtilty* of this Argument, as it was managed by *Des Cartes*, was ſo great, that not merely Perſons of common Capacities could not comprehend it; but he complains himſelf, *That the Mathematicians would not be convinced of the demonſtrative force of it.* Upon which he makes a ſharp Reflection, *That the Mathematics did rather hinder than further Men in Metaphyſical Speculations.* Des Cartes *Epiſt. To.* 2. *Ep.* 33.

But my buſineſs is not to lay open the weakneſs of theſe Arguments, but only to ſhew, that there is no cauſe to lay aſide thoſe which have been always uſed, and approved by the moſt ſincere and intelligent Perſons in all Ages. And this I ſhall make appear from his ſecond Argument in his *Meditations*, but the firſt in his *Principles*, where he briefly lays it down after this manner. That among the ſeveral Ideas of our Minds, we find one of a Being infinitely perfect in Wiſdom and power, which hath not a contingent, but a neceſſary exiſtence; which being contained in the Idea, it follows that ſuch a Being actually exiſts. *Des Cartes* in his 5th Meditation confeſſes, That at firſt appearance this looks like a piece of *Sophiſtry*; but he ſaith, that upon conſideration, neceſſary Exiſtence doth as much belong to an infinite perfect Being, as three Angles do to a Triangle. But he objects againſt his own Argument, that our thoughts put no neceſſity upon things; as if I conceive a *Princip. Part. I. n.* 14.

Mountain, I must likewise conceive a Valley, but it doth not follow that there is a Mountain existing: But, saith he, the difference is, that in this case there is no necessity of a Mountain's existing, but only that a Mountain and Valley cannot be separated; but in the other, it is not our Thought makes necessary existence to belong to God, but the nature of the thing makes that Thought necessary. For, saith he, I can frame no other Idea that hath necessary existence besides, nor can I make more than one God who hath it; which shews that it is no arbitrary or fictitious Idea. But *Gassendus* and others say, That all this *is a Paralogism*; because it supposes that which it should prove, *viz.* that God exists, which was the thing in question; and withal they say, It is a piece of *Sophistry* to argue from the Idea in the Mind to the existence of the thing out of the Mind. And this is the main thing which Monsr. *Huet* insists upon; for he saith, *This Argument proves no more, than that a most perfect Being must necessarily exist in that way in which it doth exist; if it relates to the Idea, then it necessarily exists only in the Mind; if it relates to the thing, then it really exists out of the Mind; but the Argument doth not hold from one to the other.* To this Monsr. *Regis* answers, That those things which are said only to exist in the Mind, have their foundation out of the Mind; as a Syren, from the Ideas of a Fish and a Woman joyn'd together: and so other *Chimæras* are form'd from joyning things in the Mind, which nature hath not joyn'd; for a Man cannot have an Idea of nothing. But in the Idea of a perfect Being he cannot distinguish that which is in the Mind, and that which is out of the Mind. And that here is no taking that for granted which ought to be proved; but it is only arguing from the nature of the thing; and not first supposing it to be, and thence proving that it is. For it is as much of the nature of a perfect Being to have necessary existence, as of the nature of a Triangle to have three Angles.

Censur. Philosoph. Cartes. *c.* 4. *n.* 8.

Réponse à la Cens. ch. 4. *p.* 233, &c.

And thus the matter stands as to this Argument, so that whatsoever force there is in it, we plainly see that Persons of great Sagacity and Judgment, suspect that there is something in it of the nature of a *Paralogism*. And therefore there can be no reason why we should quit the former Arguments, which were plain and obvious to all capacities, for such a *Metaphysical Demonstration*, which those who are most versed in *Demonstrations* will not allow. Let the followers of *Des Cartes* magnify and defend this Argument as well as they can; but let them not despise and reject all others, which have had the approbation of all Ages, and the wisest Persons in them; and that upon such frivolous pretenses, *that we cannot comprehend all the ends of Divine Wisdom.*

Boyle *of Final Causes, p.* 36.

But *Des Cartes* in an Epistle mention'd by Mr. *Boyle*, saith, *That it is a childish and absurd thing to affirm in* Metaphysics, *that God like a proud Man, had no other end in building the World but to be praised by Men; or in making the Sun, which is so much bigger than the Earth, but only to give light to Mankind, who take up so small a part of it.* Which is an Expression not at all becoming the reverence due to the great Creator of the World, from any one that doth acknowledg him truly to be so. For the objection, if it be any, lies against his making the World at all: since it may as well be said, to be *like a proud Prince, only to shew the great-*

greatneſs of his Power and Wiſdom. But what is it which ſuch Men would have? Can they imagin the World ſhould be made without *any ends* at all? Is that becoming the wiſdom of the Maker? Or would they not have theſe ends to be known? To what purpoſe are great and noble ends deſign'd, if they are not to be underſtood? And by whom can they be underſtood, but by rational and intelligent Beings? It is a great preſumption in Mankind to pretend to know all the ends which the wiſe Creator had in the vaſt Fabric of the Univerſe; for ſome of the great parts of it are almoſt wholly unknown to us; I mean as to the fix'd Stars, every one of which of the firſt magnitude, is ſaid to be above a hundred times in bigneſs beyond the Globe of the Earth; and yet how ſmall do they appear to us? And in thoſe other Celeſtial Bodies, which we can hardly diſcern without the help of Glaſſes of a late invention: and we are told by skilful *Aſtronomers*, that there are many Stars not viſible, even with the help of Teleſcopes; and that they rather leſſen than add to the greatneſs of the fix'd Stars. But if they had given us a fuller view of them, we cannot imagin, that God's great ends could depend upon ſuch way of diſcovery: If all his deſign had been to be admir'd by Mankind for the greatneſs of his work, it would have been plac'd more within our reach; and the Earth we live upon would have born ſome bigger proportion to the Celeſtial Bodies, which is concluded to be but a Point in compariſon of the Starry Heaven; and the very Orb of the Sun is thought to be no more in reſpect of the whole Firmament. So that the main parts of the Univerſe cannot be ſaid to be made for our view. We grant therefore that the infinitely wiſe and powerful Creator hath great and glorious ends, which are above our reach; but how doth it follow from hence, that he hath no ends which we can judg of? For even in thoſe things which we diſcern at ſo great a diſtance, we ſee enough to admire the infinite Majeſty of him that made them; and conſequently to adore, and fear him: And whatever other other ends he may have which we cannot ſee into; yet this is the beſt and moſt proper end for us with reſpect to him. Other ends might ſatisfy our curioſity more, but this tends moſt to promote our true happineſs. As I have ſhew'd in the precedent Diſcourſe that the wiſeſt Philoſophers, *Socrates*, *Plato*, *Ariſtotle*, and the *Pythagoreans* all agreed upon Principles of Natural Reaſon, that the true happineſs of Mankind lay in being made like to God, not in an affectation of greatneſs and power, but in goodneſs and true wiſdom; which lay in the knowledg of God, and a temper of Mind ſutable to our apprehenſions of him. Now if thoſe ends be attainable by ſuch Diſcoveries, which God hath made of himſelf in the works of Creation, it is to little purpoſe for any to pretend that we cannot know the particular ends which he had in making ſuch a number of vaſt Bodies of Light in the Heavens, nor why they are placed in ſuch a manner, and at ſo great a diſtance from us; nor whether the ſpace betwwen be wholly void, or filled up with an Ethereal Matter; nor of what uſe thoſe ſeveral Bodies of the Stars are with reſpect to themſelves, or the reſt of the Univerſe. Suppoſing that we are to ſeek as to theſe, and many other things relating to the viſible Frame of the World, muſt we therefore ceaſe to admire and praiſe the great God, the Maker of all, leaſt we

ſhould ſeem to flatter him for his Greatneſs and Power? There is doubtleſs a juſt veneration due to an infinite Majeſty, in what way ſoever he ſhews himſelf; but it is too mean a thing to imagin that theſe things were done by him only to be admir'd and prais'd by his own Creatures: But if ſuch an Admiration tends to beget in them a greater and deeper ſenſe of his Wiſdom, power and Goodneſs; and that be the beſt and moſt effectual means to bring Mankind to a conſtant fear and love of him, and thereby to fit them for a future Happineſs; can any Man of ſenſe think this to be an end unbecoming the Creator of the World?

But theſe are ſaid *to be good Moral ends, but not proper for Phyſical Speculations.* I anſwer, That thoſe are truly the moſt *Philoſophical Contemplations*, which lead us to the beſt and moſt noble ends of our Beings; for this was of old look'd on as the trueſt end of *Philoſophy*, and the firſt occaſion of it. For, it is agreed on all hands, that it had its name from *Pythagoras:* And it is very well obſerv'd by S. *Auguſtin, that the Doctrine of the Soul's immortality gave the firſt occaſion to the Greeks to apply themſelves to Philoſophy; and from hence* Pythagoras *began it:* Who was inſtructed therein by his Maſters *Thales* and *Pherecydes*; and after long Travels into ſeveral Countries for his own ſatisfaction, he at laſt fix'd at *Crotone* in *Italy*, and there took upon him to inſtruct others in the way to *Immortality:* but finding great reaſon to miſtruſt many who came to be his Scholars, he ſet up a very ſevere Diſcipline in his School (which prov'd his ruin at laſt) and would admit none but ſuch as he had ſufficiently tried. But when he was ask'd by one of the Great Men of thoſe parts, *What it was he profeſs'd,* he ſaid nothing but *Philoſophy*, or a *Love of Wiſdom*; which he made to conſiſt in two things, *A ſearch after Truth, and a purſuit of Virtue.* But by *Truth* he did not underſtand the *Phyſical Cauſes* of things, but *Abſtracted and Metaphyſical Speculations*; for his Notion was, that there was no certainty to be had from mere ſenſible things, which rather perplexed and confounded Mens Minds, which were apt to judg by the impreſſions of Senſe; (and his opinion was that the Senſe only tranſmitted the Objects, but *it was the Mind which ſaw and heard*, &c.) therefore to prevent falſe judgments, he thought it neceſſary to draw off their Minds from ſenſible Objects; to this end he bethought himſelf of the way of reaſoning by *Figures* and *Numbers* is before obſerv'd) which were ſo ſoon and ſo groſly miſunderſtood. *He had learnt*, ſaith *Porphyry*, *from the Eaſtern Magi, that God was Light and Truth*; and therefore he look'd on a ſearch after Truth as one way of aſſimilation to God. But the main thing was in the practice of Virtue; of which there is a ſhort Abſtract in the *Golden Verſes*, and *Hierocles* declares in the beginning, *The deſign of them all was to bring Mankind to a likeneſs to the Divine Nature.* And in this, ſaith *Eudorus* in *Stobæus*, *Socrates* and *Plato agreed with Pythagoras, That this was the chief end of Philoſophy*; but *Plato* added καθ' ὅσον δυνατὸν, *as far as Mankind could attain to it.* And ſo *Alcinous* expreſſes the ſenſe of *Plato:* but he tells us, *That* Plato *ſometimes ſet it forth by being Wiſe, and Juſt, and Holy; ſometimes by following God; becauſe according to the ancient Saying God is the beginning and end of all things. This*, ſaith *Hierocles, is the end of the Pythagorean*

Aug. *ad* Voluſ. *Ep.* 3.

Stob. Eclog. c. 3.

Alcin. c. 27.

gorean Philoſophy, to give wings to our Souls, that when death comes, we may leave a mortal Body behind us, and fly to the immortal Manſions above, and partake of a Divine Nature, as far as we are capable of it. And *Simplicius* in the beginning of his Commentaries on *Ariſtotle* ſaith, *The end of Philoſophy is to attain to our moſt perfect Happineſs; and if a Man arriv'd to the top of Philoſophy, he might be a God, and not a Man.* Theſe things I mention to ſhew, that *Philoſophy* as it was underſtood by the Ancients was far from excluding *Final Cauſes*, or *Moral Conſiderations* of things; ſince its great end was to bring Men to a likeneſs to God. *Simplic. in Categor.*

This being then the true original end of *Philoſophy*, to improve Mens Minds in order to their Happineſs, how came the conſideration of the great ends of God in the World, to be thought unbecoming Philoſophical Speculations? The reaſon was, that the immortality of the Soul hath been excluded too. For, altho' according to the Doctrin of *Des Cartes* its diſtinction from the Body be aſſerted and proved, yet its immortality is paſs'd over; under this pretenſe, *that God may fix its duration by his Will*; and therefore unleſs we know the Will of God in it, we can determin nothing in *Philoſophy* about it. But the Ancient *Philoſophers* made the immortality of the Soul the foundation of all their Inquiries, and therefore took in all ſuch conſiderations as tended to improve, and refine, and purify the Minds of Men. For which end *Moral Conſiderations* are moſt proper. And therefore it cannot but ſeem ſtrange to any thinking Man, to obſerve theſe to be ſo induſtriouſly ſet aſide, on pretenſe *that we cannot find out the ends that God had in framing the World, and the ſeveral parts of it:* and yet at the ſame time they pretend to have found all the Mechanical Powers of Matter, which is much more difficult to comprehend. But of that afterwards: we now conſider Final Cauſes. And have we not reaſon to conclude from the preſent Frame of the World with reſpect to Mankind, that the Maker of it intended to diſpoſe things for their advantage? Let Men conſider the Faculties of their Minds together with the Materials about them, and the Organs God hath given them to make uſe of them; and can they think otherwiſe, but that God hath abundantly made up to them, what other Creatures ſeem to exceed them in? Their Underſtanding, and Contrivance, and artificial Inventions go far beyond the natural ſtrength and ſagacity of Brutes, as to the comfortable way of ſubſiſtence. They can make the Brutes to be very ſerviceable to them, as to Diet, Clothing, Journeying, Habitations, &c. They can find out ways to communicate their Thoughts to each other at a great diſtance, and entertain commerce in the remoteſt parts, by the help of their own Inventions as to Navigation. So that if one Country be not ſufficiently furniſhed, they can bring home the products of others. And ſo, all the benefit of Trading (which in theſe later Ages is grown to ſo mighty a reputation above what it had in elder Ages) is owing to the happy Invention of the uſe of the *Magnet*. But ſet aſide theſe modern Improvements, and conſider Mankind as mere Natives of their ſeveral Countries, take all together, and the Inhabitants of the Earth have no cauſe to complain of Providence, which makes up what

is wanting in one thing by ſuch advantages another way, that moſt Nations are fond of their own Countries, and would not change them. The ancient Geographers indeed mention People *who curſed the riſing and ſetting Sun, becauſe his heat was intolerable to them*; and the *Philoſophers* thought they had great reaſon to conclude the *Torrid Zone* uninhabitable. But the experience of theſe latter times have found it quite otherwiſe, and that the places there were fully peopled, and their condition tolerable enough, and in ſome reſpects pleaſant to them: as to the fruitfulneſs of Land, and numbers of Rivers and plenty of commodities. And as to Heat, that is very much qualify'd, by the conſtant breezes in the Day-time, and coolneſs of the Nights; and the particular ſituation of ſome places, at a very little diſtance have Winter and Summer; which ſhews that the Seaſons do not merely depend upon the Sun, but upon the motion of the Air; for where that is ſtopt by the height of Mountains, there is Winter on one ſide, and Summer on the other; as *If. Voſſius* obſerves on the coaſt of *Malabar*; and about the *Mountains* of *Arabia*, *Congo* and *Bengala*, and other places: And *Ludolphus* confirms it concerning the Mountains of of *Malabar*; inſomuch, that he ſaith, *the King there may keep a perpetual Summer, only by croſſing the Mountains*. Others have given a more particular account of it, and tell us, That the *Cherſoneſe* between the Rivers of *Indus* and *Ganges*, is divided in the middle by a ridge of *High Hills*, which they call the *Gate*; on the one ſide is *Malabar*, and on the other *Coromandel*; and that it is Winter on one ſide from *April* to *September*, and Summer on the other; and that not above 20 Leagues diſtance in croſſing the Mountains. And the ſame is ſaid to be at Cape *Razalgate* in *Arabia*, and in *Jamaica*; which is imputed to the Mountains ſtopping the current of Vapors wherein the particles of them are driven together, and fall down into drops of Rain; and ſo the Seaſons depend upon the *Monſons* or fix'd Winds in thoſe parts; the Northeaſt blowing on one ſide from *November* to *April*, and the Southerly on the other from *April* to *November*. Sir *H. Middleton* ſpeaks of *ſo great cold on the Mountains of* Arabia, *that he could not have believ'd it, unleſs he had felt it himſelf*; for he deſpis'd their information at *Mecca*, who knew the Country far better. But he thought he went according to *Reaſon*, as the Ancients did; but *Experience* hath plainly diſcover'd their miſtakes. For Heat and Cold are found not to depend merely upon the nearneſs or diſtance of the Sun; for other things we find may not only qualify that heat, but produce cold where it was leaſt expected. *Acoſta* tells us that the old Philoſophers went upon Principles of Common Reaſon, when they ſuppoſed *the Torrid Zone was uninhabitable*, but notwithſtanding he found it ſo far from being ſo, that *he thought it pleaſant and agreeable, and ſaw it full of People*: and he ſaith, *that the Air is cleareſt when the Sun is fartheſt off, and fulleſt of Clouds and Rain when the Sun is neareſt*. As he ſhews at large from the experience himſelf had in thoſe parts. Some places of the *Torrid Zone* he obſerves to be *Temperate*, as in *Quitto*, and *the Plains of Peru*; ſome very cold, as at *Potoſi*; ſome very hot, as in ſome parts of *Æthiopia*, *Braſil* and the *Moluccas*. The temperateneſs of it he imputes to the Rains, to the ſhortneſs of

Herod. l. 1. Mela l. 1. c. 8. Plin. l. 5. c. 8.

If. Voſſ. de Nilo, c. 12. Ludolph. Comment. ad Hiſt. Æthiop. p. 101. Philoſoph. Tranſactions, n. 175.

Purchas Pil. To. I. p. 255.

Acoſta of the Indies, l. 2. c. 23.

C. 9.

C. 10.

the

the Days, the nearneſs to the Ocean, the height of Lands and Mountains, but eſpecially to the Winds. For he ſaith, *The Providence of God hath ſo order'd it, that the freſh and cool Winds do qualify the exceſſive heat of the Sun.* But he obſerves, *that beſides the Breezes from the Sea by day, there are Land-winds by night, which ſerve very much to temper the heat of the Air.* C. 13. L. 3. c. 8.

It look'd like an Objection againſt Providence, when Men concluded that by the nearneſs of the Sun within the Tropics, ſo great a part of the Earth as the *Torrid Zone* ſhould be ſcorch'd by the Sun, as not to be capable of habitation by Mankind: but when the contrary is now found moſt certainly true, and ſuch reaſons are given for it, which Mankind could not have thought of, have we not ground to infer that Providence had certainly ſuch an end as the good of Mankind, to order things ſo, as by ſeveral means to make thoſe habitations not only tolerable, but in many places delightful? By this we ſee how vain thoſe old Arguments againſt Providence were, which were grounded on this ſuppoſition, that ſo great a part of the Earth was uſeleſs to Mankind by the intolerable heat of the Sun. Yet how confidently doth *Lucretius* argue upon this ſuppoſition, as tho' he could demonſtrate againſt Providence from Heaven and Earth?

Hoc tamen ex ipſis cœli rationibus auſim
Confirmare, aliiſque ex rebus reddere multis,
Nequaquam nobis divinitus eſſe paratam
Naturam rerum, tanta ſtat prædita culpa.
Principio quantum cœli tegit impetus ingens,
Inde avidam partem montes, ſylvæque ferarum
Poſſedere, tenent rupes, vaſtæque paludes,
Et mare, quod late terrarum diſtinet oras.
Inde duas porro prope parteis fervidus ardor,
Aſſiduuſque geli caſus mortalibus aufert.

Lucret. l. 5.

So much room taken up by the Heavens, ſo much by Mountains, Woods, Rocks, Marſhes and Seas; and two parts of the Earth uſeleſs for Mankind by intolerable Heat and Cold; that he could never imagin this Earth was fram'd with deſign for the good of Mankind. And yet at the ſame time there were *Philoſophers*, who thought the conveniencies for Mankind were ſo great in this World, that from thence they inferr'd that there was a Providence, which had a particular regard to the advantages which they enjoy; and this without any Revelation from God of thoſe ends which he deſign'd. The *Stoics* knew, as well as *Epicurus*, the compaſs of the Heavens, the greatneſs of the Mountains, Woods, Rocks and Seas; and they believ'd as much that ſome parts of the Earth were not to be inhabited; and yet they concluded, that there was a deſign of Providence in all with reſpect to Mankind. For they took notice, not merely of the ſpace which the Heavens took up, but of the great Beauty, and order, and uſefulneſs of the *Celeſtial Bodies*; and particularly the convenient diſtance of the Sun to make the Earth fruitful and pleaſant; and to diſtinguiſh Days and Nights for Works and Reſt; and that the Mountains were large ſtore-houſes for Metals and Rivers, which could not otherwiſe be ſupply'd; and

that the Seas afforded plenty of Fiſh, and large conveniencies for Commerce; and the Woods were furniſh'd with Timber to make Veſſels out of, to paſs over thoſe Seas, and ſo preſerve a correſpondence among Mankind at the greateſt diſtance for their mutual advantage; and if there were uncultivated parts of the Earth, that onle ſhew'd that God did not give theſe things to make Mankind lazy and idle, but to exerciſe thoſe abilities both of Body and Mind, which he had given them.

But as to the two parts of the Earth being wholly unſerviceable to Mankind, by reaſon of exceſſive heat or cold, that is found by experience of later Ages to have been a great miſtake. But *Ariſtotle* is poſitive in it, *That the places near the Sun have no Waters nor Paſtures; and that the remote Northern parts are not to be inhabited for the cold.* But both theſe Aſſertions are found to be falſe; however his Authority was follow'd. In ſo much, that *Pliny* ſaith, *Of five Zones two are uſeleſs by extremity of cold; and that there is nothing but a perpetual Miſt, and a ſhining Froſt; and that within the Tropics all is burnt up by the heat of the Sun, which is ſo intenſe, that*, he ſaith, *there is no paſſage from one Temperate Zone to the other.* This is a ſtrange Account to us now, and given by a Man who had read all Authors then extant about theſe matters; and it is the ſtranger, becauſe in the Chapter before he ſaith, *That* Hanno *paſſed from* Cadiz *to the end of* Arabia, (which is much doubted) *and that* Eudoxus *came to* Cadiz *from the Arabian Gulph; and that another went from* Spain *to* Æthiopia *on the account of Trade; and that ſome* Indians *trading abroad were caſt by ſtorms on the Northern Coaſts, who were preſented to the Proconſul of* Gaul. How could theſe thing be, and yet they ſuch ſtrangers to *the Torrid Zone*, thro' which they muſt paſs? But he ſeem'd to take it for granted, *That thoſe Regions were unpaſſable, and uninhabitable*, altho' himſelf mentions ſeveral Nations which liv'd within *the Torrid Zone*; as the *Negroes* on both ſides the River *Niger*, the *Garamantes*, *Troglodytæ* (whom *Ludolphus* makes to be the ſame with the *Hotentots*) and ſeveral others. Now if all theſe Countries were burnt up, how come ſo many People to be then known to live here; and ſo they were from the time of *Herodotus*, who mentions them? But how different are the beſt Accounts we now have of theſe places from what the Ancients imagin'd? The Country of the *Negroes*, thro' which the *Niger* runs (which is ſuppos'd to be of the ſame *Nature* (if not *Original*) with the *Nile*, and overflows the Country of the *Negro's*, in the ſame manner and at the ſame time that the *Nile* doth *Egypt*) is according to a late Author, *A populous and fertile Country*, who ſaith, *that the Natives endure the heat with eaſe, and are healthful and vigorous.* Another, who ſpent ſome time in that Country, ſaith, *That the heat is more ſupportable by the cool Wind which blows; and that for 6 Months it is as pleaſant as* France. *Andrew Battel*, who liv'd about 18 years in *Angola* and thereabouts, ſpeaks enough of the *Populouſneſs* of thoſe parts; and *Lopez* who was at *Congo*, commends the *temperature of the Air* there. *Ludolphus* in his Account of *Ethiopia*, which he had chiefly from a Native, ſaith, *that it is as temperate as* Portugal. The ſame we have already produc'd from *Acoſta* of *Peru*. Many more ſuch Inſtances might be produc'd, but theſe are ſuffi-

Ariſt. Meteor. l. 2. t. 5.

Plin l. 2. c. 68.

L. 5. c. 8.

Herodot. l. 4. c. 183.
Plin. l. 5. 8.
Solin. c. 43.

Voyage to Surat, *p. 61.*
p. 71.
Relation de la Nigritie, 1689. *p. 85.*
Purchas *II. l. 7. c. 3.*
Id. c. 4.
Ludolph. Comment. l. 1. c. 5. n. 36.

ſufficient to ſhew what a wonderful Miſtake the Ancients were under as to the *Torrid Zone*, and how very weak *Lucretius* his Argument againſt Providence from thence is. But the Argument for it is much ſtronger from theſe diſcoveries; becauſe according to the ordinary effects of the heat of the Sun, they reaſon'd truly; but there is a concurrence of ſeveral other things which temper the Air, which they could not underſtand. It is true, there are ſome things that abate the heat which ariſes from the Sun's nearneſs; as the equality of nights to days, and the abundance of rains which fall at that time; of which the moſt probable account is, That altho' in our parts the diſtance of the Sun cauſes Cold and Rain; and the nearneſs Heat and Drought; yet it is quite otherwiſe there, for the Sun raiſes up the vapors more there by rarifying the Air, and that to a great height; which joyning together, and falling down with greater force, doth thereby produce a Wind as well as Water, both which cool and refreſh the Air; and where the vapors do not produce Rain, yet they make a Dew, as in ſome parts of *Peru*, which falling on the ground makes it fruitful. But theſe things are not ſufficient; for were all the Country in the *Torrid Zone* a flat, with thoſe advantages, it would not be habitable; and therefore the height of the Mountains was neceſſary for this purpoſe. Which ſhews, that theſe are ſo far from being *Botches* or *Ruins*, that they are great inſtances of Divine Providence, if they can be made out to be ſerviceable to this purpoſe. *Scaliger* ſaith, That thoſe do *pie delirare, who impute the Mountains to the fractures made in the Earth by the Flood; and that it is impoſſible that the Earth which fell in, ſhould ever make a ſurface equal with the height of the Mountains:* but he aſſerts them to be a work of Providence in the original frame of the World, and chiefly intended to be a receptacle for Water: and he obſerves that the higheſt Mountains are under the Torrid Zone; where they ſerve likewiſe for tempering the Air. For, *Acoſta* gives that reaſon of the temper of the Air in the *Weſt Indies*, that *it is a high Country, having many Mountains, which afford a great refreſhment to the neighbor-Countries:* and he obſerves, *that the Sea-coaſt in* Peru *and* New Spain *is very hot, being low and flat; but it is otherwiſe in the higher parts. Piſo* a learned Phyſician, who liv'd in *Braſil*, and hath given a *Natural Hiſtory* of that Country, imputes the *healthfulneſs* of the *Maritim Coaſts* there, which he thinks compares with *Europe*, to two things; 1. *The conſtant breeze from the Sea lying on the Eaſt of it, which* he ſaith, *very much defends them from the exceſſive heat of the Sun.* 2. *A ridg of Mountains between that and* Peru, *which keep off the noiſom vapors of the Mooriſh Grounds on the other ſide of them. In the Night*, he ſaith, *the cold is ſo great* (even in the *Torrid Zone*) *that they are forc'd to keep fires to prevent the ill effects of it. Nichol. de Techo*, who was in *Tucumania*, ſaith, *That the part of it which is within the Torrid Zone is very cold, by reaſon of the Mountains there; which* he ſaith, *evidently confutes the Ancients opinion concerning it. Andrew Battel* mentions *the high Mountains* about *Angola, over which he march'd, and found the Air very cold. Ludolphus* ſaith, *The Providence of* God *is much to be admir'd in the Mountains of* Ethiopia; *for the height of their Mountains makes that Country habitable, and their Air more temperate; and affords them Rivers which the flat in the*

Scaliger. Exerc. 43.

Exerc. 42.

Acoſta *Hiſt. of the Indies, l.* 2. *c.* 12.

Piſon. Hiſt. Nat. & Medic. Braſilia, l. 1. *c.* 1.

Hiſt. Paraquar. l. 1. *c.* 19.

Purchas *To.* II. *l.* 7. *c.* 3 §. 3.

Ludolph. *Hiſt. Æthiop. l.* 1. *c.* 6.

Torrid Zone do want; unleſs they be ſuch as come out of the mountainous part. And which ſeems very ſtrange, he affirms from
C. 5. *Tellez, That the heats in ſome parts of* Ethiopia *are more tolerable than in* Portugal, *which lies ſo many degrees more to the North.*

The force of what I have ſaid comes to this. It was ſuppos'd to be an Argument againſt Providence, that ſo great a part of the Earth was uſeleſs to Mankind; which is ſo far from being true, that undoubted experience hath convinc'd the World, that they have been fully inhabited; and that to the comfortable ſubſiſtence of Mankind, there hath been concurrence of ſeveral things, which could not be the reſult of Chance, or of the Mechanical Laws of the motion of Matter: and therefore we ought to conclude theſe things to be ordered by Divine Providence, for the uſe and benefit of Mankind.

There is yet one thing to be obſerv'd, before I end this part of my Diſcourſe; which is to ſhew the pernicious uſe that hath been made of *Des Cartes* his laying aſide the conſideration of *Final Cauſes*. For there was lately a Perſon too well known in the World, (and whom I intend to conſider at large afterwards) who at firſt profeſs'd himſelf a ſtrict follower of *Des Cartes* his *Notions* in his *Metaphyſical Meditations*. But he made uſe of the Argument from the *Idea* to prove *the World to be God*: And *Des Cartes* cannot be excus'd from from giving too great advantage to *Spinoza*, by ſuppoſing *the Idea of extended Matter to be infinite and neceſſary*; which overthrows
Des Cartes *Prin. Part. II. n.* 21. the force of his own Argument from the *Idea*, for if it agrees to Matter, it cannot prove the being of a Subſtance diſtinct from Matter) and gave occaſion to the other to think, that nothing but *Infinite Matter* was imply'd in this *Idea*: And to carry on his deſign the better, he kept cloſe to *Des Cartes* in excluding the *conſideration of Final Cauſes*. For in his *Mathematical Ethics*, (as he calls them) he hath an *Appendix* to his firſt Part, where he doth purpoſely ſet himſelf to overthrow all *Final Cauſes, as meer Fictions of Mens*
B. D. Spinoſ. Opera Poſth. p. 36. *Brains*. But the comfort is, that they are no late *Fictions*, but the wiſeſt Men in all Ages, as I have already ſhew'd, did aſſert them: And it is not a mere *Mathematical Appearance* will fright Men now out of the Principles of Reaſon. But let us examin what the grounds are, on which *Final Cauſes* are thus peremptorily condemned. He ſaith, *That they ariſe from the common prejudice of Mankind, who have ſo much fondneſs for themſelves as to think that all things are done for their ſakes: that God made all things for Man, and Mankind to ſerve him.* But this is not a juſt and fair repreſentation of the matter. We do not ſay, that God had no other end in the frame of the Univerſe, but merely for the ſake of the Inhabitants of the Earth; for we do not pretend to give an account of the great ends which the Almighty had in thoſe vaſt and numerous Bodies of the fix'd Stars, which are ſo very remote from us; but that which we ſay, is, that God hath plac'd Mankind in ſuch a ſtation here upon Earth, that they cannot but look about them; and when they do ſo, they cannot but admire to find ſo great and ſo wiſe a Being order all things ſo, as to ſee not only the Wiſdom but the Goodneſs of their Maker. And how doth this appear to be a *a mere Fiction of Mens Brains?* Are there not ſuch juſt cauſes for our admiration? Are there not ſuch

conve-

conveniences for human Life? Do not all Men ſee the wonderful contrivance and uſefulneſs of the parts of their Bodies? And are there not great diſcoveries of the like wiſdom in Plants and Animals, and the Earth and Sea? Are all theſe mere Phantaſms and Fictions of Mens Brains? Why are not the miſtakes about theſe things diſcover'd in a Mathematical manner? This might have ſignify'd ſomething: But to go about to confute Mankind by telling them, *That Final Cauſes are mere fictions of their Brains*, is far from being a Geometrical way of Demonſtration. Let us examin, however, the method he takes to make it out. (1) In the firſt place, he undertakes to ſhew how Mankind came to think ſo much of *Final Cauſes*; and then (2) how repugnant they are to the nature of things; (3) How Men came to take up the Notions of Good and Evil, and of Rewards and Puniſhments from this Opinion about *Final Cauſes*: all which I ſhall briefly conſider. As to the firſt, He ſuppoſes *that all Men are born ignorant of Cauſes, and look after their own advantage, which they are conſcious to themſelves of.* And what follows? *Firſt, that they ſuppoſe themſelves free, becauſe they know their own deſires.* And why ſhould they not as well as know that they think? For they have the like inward Perception as to both. *But they are ignorant of the Cauſes which determine their deſires.* How doth it appear, that there are ſuch *Cauſes*, which they are thus ignorant of? If any Man undertakes to aſſign Cauſes which Mankind are not at all ſenſible of, he ought not to take it for for granted, that there are ſuch Cauſes, but to prove it in ſuch a manner, as to overballance the evidence of their inward Perceptions. For Mankind are conſcious to themſelves of no ſuch Cauſes; if therefore any one will prove, that however, they are not free, certainly that Evidence ought to be clearer than the Argument from our own Perception to the contrary. I think I move my Eye freely to this or that object, and am fully ſatisfy'd from that inward Perception I have of the voluntary motion of the Muſcles belonging to the Eye: now if any one goes about to tell me that I am deceiv'd herein, and that there were other Cauſes, which determin'd the motion of my Eye; is it not reaſon I ſhould have Evidence greater than what I have from my own Senſation? But here we have no Cauſes at all aſſign'd: therefore we muſt go on. *Secondly*, ſaith he, *Mankind do all things for ſome end*; viz. *for their own profit; and therefore deſire only to know Final Cauſes, and if they find theſe they are ſatisfy'd.* Is not this well ſaid by a Man that pretends to *Demonſtration*, and that in a *Geometrical manner?* Could no other *Ends* be thought of but *Profit?* I begin to be of *Des Cartes* his mind, *That Geometry ſpoils Mens Reaſonings in other matters.* For, how was it poſſible for a Man of common ſenſe to argue in ſuch a manner; *Men aim at their own profit, therefore they deſire only to know Final Cauſes?* What *Profit* was it which this Author aim'd at in making this Work of his? He had without doubt ſome end in it; for I hardly think he could take ſo much pains for no end at all. Was it a *Good* or a *Bad end?* (For Mankind are ſtill apt to be inquiſitive into *Final Cauſes.*) *A Good End*, no doubt his Friends will ſay. What was this *Good End?* was it *mere Profit?* No, certainly, they will ſay, his Mind was above it; *for he devoted himſelf*

ſelf wholly (as they they tell us in the Preface to his Works) *to Philoſophy*; and *retired on purpoſe for the proſecution of his Studies.* It is then more than poſſible for a Man to aim at ſome other end, than mere *Profit*. And what was the End he propos'd in Philoſophy? Still we inquire after *the End*, altho' *Profit* be ſet aſide; and we cannot have a better account of it, than from himſelf. He tells us, *His Mind was ſet upon finding out the true Good of Mankind.* This was a noble End indeed, and fit for a Perſon that deſign'd to improve his Underſtanding. But was this *true Good* nothing but *Profit?* So far from it, that he ſaith, *He was ſoon ſatisfy'd, that what things Mankind generally purſued, were a hindrance to the End he aim'd at: and therefore he ſaw it neceſſary to give over the purſuit of Riches, Honors and ſenſual Pleaſures; and to fix upon an eternal and infinite Good, which alone can give ſatisfaction to the Mind; and therefore ought to be purſued with all our might.* This one would think were ſpoken like a true Chriſtian Philoſopher; but his way is, to uſe our Expreſſions, and to couch his own meaning under very plauſible Terms: but he ſpeaks his Mind more afterwards, when he ſaith, *This chief Good of Man is to underſtand the union between the Mind and Nature.* What that is, will appear more afterwards; but here he ſaith, *That this is the End to which our ſtudies and endeavers are to be directed.* Which is ſufficient to my preſent purpoſe. For here it is confeſs'd, that they are only vulgar Minds that aim at *mere Profit* as their End; but that there is a higher, and more certain, and agreeable end for the Minds of Men to ſearch after; and that their Happineſs lies in the attaining of that End. Which being allow'd, if we ſuppoſe a wiſe and intelligent Being to have created Mankind, there is no incongruity at all in Man's making that infinite and eternal Good to be his chief End, nor in purſuing after it with all his endeavors; nor can there be any in ſuppoſing that this God ſhould order things in this World with that deſign, that they ſhould be ſerviceable to him here, as to his preſent ſubſiſtence, in order to his main End. For he allows his *Philoſopher* to do many things with that deſign to ſerve his End; viz. *To ſpeak as other Men do, whatever he thinks. To uſe ſenſual Pleaſures, as they ſerve for Health. To get as much wealth, as will make his condition eaſy.* Thus far then we find that Mankind may propoſe ends to themſelves; and that there are things which have a tendency to them; and that it is very becoming to them to uſe thoſe means in order to their ends. Why then may not the wiſe Creator of the World appoint proper ends and means to Mankind, as to their conveniencies and future happineſs? what repugnancy is there in this, more than in the former caſe? All that he can ſay is, *That Mankind finding ſomething very uſeful to them, as Eyes for ſeeing, Teeth for eating, Herbs and Animals for nouriſhment, the Sun to give light, the Sea to breed Fiſh, &c. and becauſe they are ſo uſeful to them, conclude that there was a Being above them, which prepar'd all theſe things for them.* And what abſurdity is there in ſo doing? What *Geometrical Demonſtration* is there, that theſe things all came together ſo of themſelves without any intelligent Agent? All that he ſaith is, *That they conſidering them as means, could not believe that they made themſelves; but becauſe they were wont to provide things for their own uſe,*

De Intell. Emend. p. 357.

P. 361.

Ethic. P. I. p. 34.

uſe, they ſuppoſed or believed ſome free Agent which ordered all theſe things for them. And from hence they judging all by themſelves, concluded that God *ordered all theſe things for their uſe; to oblige Mankind to him, that they might honor and ſerve him; and ſo under a pretenſe of doing honor to* God, *they fell into Superſtition; and were ſo bent upon Final Cauſes, till at laſt they made* God *no wiſer than themſelves.* Is not all this *Demonſtration?* They muſt think very meanly indeed of the Underſtandings of Men, that can think they will be ſatisfy'd with ſuch Accounts as theſe. We find he grants *Eyes fitted for Sight, Teeth for Eating,* &c. And why I pray, may we not in reaſon conclude, that they were deſign'd for that uſe? He finds ſome things to cavil at, about *Unſeaſonable Weather, Earthquakes, Diſeaſes,* &c. (which are conſiſtent with the general Ends of Providence) but he hath nothing to ſay, as to his former Inſtances, why we ſhould not believe *we had Eyes to ſee with, or Ears to hear with, or Teeth to eat with:* But if theſe things were given for thoſe uſes and no other, doth not this prove particular ends of Providence with reſpect to Mankind? What, *if Men do provide means for their ends?* Is it an Argument of *Folly*, or *Wiſdom* ſo to do? If it be *Wiſdom* to act for an end, and *Folly* to act for none, why may we not ſuppoſe an infinitely wiſe Being to act for ends agreeable to himſelf? Not for mean, fooliſh, ſordid ends, but ſuch as become the great Creator and wiſe Governor, and bountiful Benefactor to Mankind. And what is there unbecoming our *Idea* of God in theſe relations? Is it then unfit for a wiſe Creator and Governor, and Benefactor, to beſtow on Mankind ſuch things as tend to the uſe and good of his Creatures, or to take care of their welfare? So as to furniſh us with ſuch Organs of our Senſes, ſuch Faculties of our Minds, as may make uſe of the many conveniences which we have about us for our comfortable ſubſiſtence, and our cheerful ſervice of ſo great and ſo good, and ſo liberal a Benefactor. Can this be call'd *Superſtition*, to ſerve and adore him? Is this *making* God *like to our ſelves*, when we acknowledg the infinite diſtance between him and us, and ſerve him with devout reverence and godly fear? Far be it from us to think ſo meanly of him, as to attribute the leaſt degree of our Paſſions and Weakneſſes to him. We know he could not be God, if he were not infinitely above our Thoughts as well as our Services: but if he pleaſe to be ſo kind to us, to give us ſo many reaſons to love and ſerve him, is it fit for his Creatures to deſpiſe his ſervice, on pretenſe that he is above it? *Superſtition* is a fooliſh thing, becauſe it comes from mean apprehenſions of God; but *true Religion* is a wiſe and agreeable thing, becauſe it flows from a due ſenſe of a Divine Majeſty, and a tender regard to his honor. And whatever Men pretend as to *Philoſophy* and *Demonſtration*, there are none that really want ſenſe and underſtanding ſo much, as thoſe who deſpiſe *Religion*, under the name of *Superſtition*. We cannot deny that there is too much of it in the World: but as God remains the ſame notwithſtanding the follies of Mankind, ſo *Religion* is as juſt and reaſonable a thing as ever, altho' *Superſtition* hath brought ſo much diſhonor upon it.

The

The next thing is to ſhew, *That Final Cauſes are repugnant to the Nature of things.* This is to the purpoſe indeed, if he can make it out. As to his Argument *from the neceſſity of all things*, that muſt be referr'd to its due time; becauſe it is not prov'd but ſuppos'd: But here we are to conſider how *Final Cauſes* do ſo lamentably pervert the order of Nature. *They make*, ſaith he, *the Cauſe to be the Effect, and the Effect to be the Cauſe; and that which was firſt in Nature to be the laſt; and make the moſt perfect Being to be the moſt imperfect.* Theſe are ſad conſequences if they hold; the two former he paſſes over, as he had reaſon, and fixes on the laſt, *That they overthrow the Divine Perfection*; and he needs no more, if he can make this out. But how? *If* God *works for an end, then he muſt want that which he works for.* Is this the *Demonſtrating Ethics in a Geometrical way?* A Father out of kindneſs to his Son deſigns to advance him in the World, and furniſhes him with all neceſſary means to that end; doth this argue weakneſs and indigency, or only kindneſs and good-will to his Son? If there may be a deſign of doing good to others, with regard to their welfare, and many means us'd to that end, what want doth this argue? But rather it flows from *abundant Goodneſs*; and the more perfect any being is, the greater is the beneficence and readineſs to do good to others: and one would think Men did not want Geometry to know this. *But*, ſaith he, God *did not do this for their ſakes, but his own; his own glory is the end of all.* But if the *Glory of God* be moſt advanced by the good of his Creatures, how can theſe two be ſeparated from each other? Men may make a diſtinction by Metaphyſical Speculation: but if his glory be advanced by their good, there can be no real diſtinction between them; for both are carried on by the ſame thing.

After theſe faint Attempts, our *Geometrician* falls *to ignorance of Cauſes*, (of which I have ſaid ſo much already) and from thence, he ſaith, *comes Mens admiration of the Fabric of Man's Body, becauſe they know not the Cauſes of it.* And did our Philoſopher know the *Mechanical Cauſes* of all the parts of it? What pity it is we had not ſeen them, inſtead of theſe looſe and idle Diſcourſes; for I can call them no other, when there is ſo much bluſtering talk about *Geometry*, and ſo very little appearance of true Reaſon. But ſaith he, very ſenſibly, *The World looks upon a Man as a very dangerous heretic, and impious Perſon, if he gives an Account of Natural Cauſes, and takes away their ignorance.* I ſee no ſuch great danger from his *Knowledg*, whatever there be from his *Impiety*; for he hath ſhew'd much more cauſe for us to wonder at one, than at the other. But the *Impiety* of his *Syſtem* muſt be conſider'd in its proper place.

The laſt thing he ſaith as to Cauſes is, *That Mankind being perſuaded that all things were made for them; they ſet an eſteem upon ſuch things as they found moſt uſeful, and meaſur'd the value of things by their agreeableneſs to themſelves. From hence came the difference of Good and Evil, Orderly and Confus'd, Hot and Cold, Beautiful and Deform'd; and becauſe they imagin'd themſelves free, thence came Praiſe and Diſhonor, Fault and Merit. And what tended to Health or the Worſhip of* God, *they called Good, and the contrary Evil; what ſuted to their Imagination, they called Order, what did not,*

not, Confuſion. What was agreeable to their Senſes they called Beautiful, Sweet, Pleaſant, and the contrary to what was not, and attributed their Modes of Senſation to the things themſelves: and Men judg of things by their different Imaginations; and from thence come ſuch great differences among Mankind about Good and Evil, Order and Confuſion; all which come from Mens following Imagination, and not Reaſon. This is the ſubſtance of what he ſaith; which in ſhort takes away all the real difference between Good and Evil, and makes *Good* to be a mere effect of Mens Imaginations, from reſpect to their own Conveniency, or what they call *the Honor of God*; and *Evil* what is repugnant to them. But how comes this to follow from *Final Cauſes?* Yes, ſaith he, *ſince all things are made for them, therefore Good and Evil are to be taken with reſpect to them.* This is a very weak foundation to build this Doctrin upon. For things are not therefore ſaid to be *Morally Good*, becauſe they are uſeful to Mankind; but that implies only a *Natural Fitneſs* for ſuch purpoſes, which is quite another thing from Moral Goodneſs; and it is ſtrange our Philoſophers ſhould not diſcern the difference. For, is there no meaſure of Good and Evil among Mankind with reſpect to one another? If the Good and evil of things did depend upon Final Cauſes, with reſpect to Mankind in general, then there could be no ſuch thing in regard to each other; for theſe Final Cauſes do not reach to one individual more than another, for they reſpect the whole kind. But we ſay upon good grounds, that there are things which are good and evil between Man and Man. *Yes*, it may be ſaid, *with reſpect to Society, and the common good of the whole.* If it be ſo, then it follows that it doth not depend upon mere Imagination, but that there is a true and juſt meaſure in things; for if human Society cannot be preſerv'd without Juſtice, and keeping Faith and Obedience to Government, Conjugal Fidelity, &c. then there is a real tendency in theſe things to that end, and a repugnancy in the contrary; and if ſo, then their being good or evil doth not depend upon Mens Fancies or Humors, any more than the taking away fuel doth for leſſening a fire, or the adding it doth to the increaſe of it. For Mens indulging their own Paſſions againſt Reaſon and a common intereſt, doth as much tend to a Civil combuſtion, as the other to a Natural; and Mens due government of themſelves and actions doth as naturally tend to peace and tranquillity, as withdrawing fuel or caſting water doth to quench the violence of fire. From whence it appears, that there are real ends as to Mankind, which are the meaſures of Good and Evil, with reſpect to Society. But beſides this, Mankind cannot be ſuppos'd to ſubſiſt without the Relations of Parents and Children: and can any Man in his right Senſes imagin that the Duties of theſe to each other depend only upon Fancy? Is there no natural regard due from Children to Parents, no natural affection and tenderneſs in Parents to Children? Is all this only the product of Imagination? So as to the difference of Sexes; Chaſtity, Modeſty, and a decent regard to each other are things founded in Nature, and do not ariſe from Cuſtom or Fancy. But in all theſe things, altho' there be a juſt regulation of them by Laws, yet the foundation of them is laid in the nature and reſpects of things to one another. As to our own Bodies,

Health is not the only meaſure of Good and Evil; for it is ſo uncertain, that thoſe exceſſes do little prejudice to ſome, which are miſchievous to others: but there is a juſt proportion of things to be obſerv'd with reſpect to their uſe; and ſo *Intemperance* may be conſiſtent with a healthful Body. As to the condition of others, who by reaſon of poverty or ſickneſs ſtand in need of our help; it is a thing in it ſelf good to afford them our aſſiſtance; and ſo Liberality, Charity and doing good, are ſo far from being good only from Imagination, that no Man can imagin them to be otherwiſe than good. But beſides all theſe, there are duties which are owing to that infinite Being, from whom we derive all that we enjoy or hope for; and can it be any other than good for us to fear, and ſerve, and love, and honor him? He confeſſes Mankind allow *that to be good which reſpects the honor of* God; but he means *that it is becauſe we ſuppoſe that he made all things for Men*. But altho' his Goodneſs and Providence be very great reaſons for our ſerving him; yet if he had been leſs bountiful to Mankind, they had been bound to ſerve him as their Creator. And it is impoſſible to ſuppoſe that he ſhould diſcharge his Creatures from ſo neceſſary a duty, and to make the contrary not to be a Fault. For, it would imply ingratitude and contempt of the beſt Being in the World not to be evil; and that he who is infinitely good, ſhould require what is in it ſelf evil. From all which it appears, that the nature of good and evil doth not depend upon the arbitrary Fancies and Opinions of Men; but upon the Nature of things, the Reaſon of Mankind, and the Reſpects they ſtand in to one another.

And it is a great confirmation of this, that our Philoſopher himſelf makes it the ſame caſe as *to Good and Evil*, as it is with reſpect to *Order* and *Confuſion*, and *Beauty* and *Deformity*, and *Harmony* and *Diſcord*. For altho' there may be a *Variety* of *Fancies*, as to ſome *Degrees* of theſe things; and that may pleaſe ſome which doth not others: yet in the main they all agree in a real difference between them; and none can have ſo little judgment, as to think that there is nothing but Fancy which puts a difference between a well digeſted Diſcourſe, and a confus'd heap of Thoughts; or between an exact Beauty, and the Picture of Deformity; or the moſt raviſhing Muſic, and the noiſe of a pair of Tongs. So that the extremes muſt be allow'd to be really different from one another, what difference ſoever there be in Perſons Fancies, as to what lies between; and yet as to them, when the Idea of the thing it ſelf is agreed upon, then the nearer any approach to it, the more it hath of the reality, and the farther off, it doth ſo much more depend upon Fancy.

But, ſaith he, *in our Objects of Senſe we imagin the Qualities to be real things without us, whereas they are only the different impreſſions made upon our Senſes, and ſo convey'd to our Imaginations*. And is this an Argument that there is no real difference between *Bitter and Sweet*, *Savory and Unſavory*, or *that all Sounds are alike?* Or that becauſe ſome have fancied the Muſic of the Spheres, therefore there is no ſuch thing as Harmony? But ſuch kind of arguing deſerves no farther conſideration.

I now

I now come to the ſecond *Hypotheſis*, which tends towards *Atheiſm*, and that is of thoſe who *attribute too much to the Mechanical Powers of matter and motion.* It cannot be denied by any ingenuous Man, that in our Age a great improvement hath been made in *Natural* and *Experimental Philoſophy*. But there is a great difference to be made between thoſe who have proceeded in the way of *Experiments*, which do great ſervice as they go, and ſuch as have form'd *Mechanical Theories* of the Syſtem of the Univerſe; and have undertaken to give an Account how the World was fram'd, and what the immediate Cauſes are of thoſe things which appear in the World. I do not go about to diſpute, whether many things are not better reſolv'd by the *New* than by the *Old Philoſophy*; I am not concern'd in the Doctrines of *Antiperiſtaſis*, *Fuga vacui*, *Occult Qualities*, *Intentional Species*, and ſuch like: And I confeſs, that the *Particular Hiſtories* and *Experiments* relating to things of Nature, as to the *Bodies* of *Animals*, the *Vegetation* of *Plants*, and *Particular Qualities*, tend much more to the true knowledg of Nature, than the mere nice and dry general Speculations about *Forms* and *Qualities:* which have been handled in ſuch a manner, that they have been like ſome of *Ariſtotle*'s *Books, ſet forth, but not to be underſtood.* If therefore ſeveral *Qualities* of Bodies be explain'd *mechanically*, *i. e.* by virtue of the known Affections of Matter, *viz. Size*, *Figure*, *Motion*, &c. and that new ones can be produc'd by changing the *Texture* or *Motion*, or ſome other *Mechanical Affection* of Matter; it is far from my deſign to oppoſe them, or any ſuch Diſcourſes, which tend only to give us more light into the *Occult Nature* (tho' not *Qualities*) *of things.* For to ſay, that Things proceed from *Occult Qualities*, is in other words to ſay, that they come from we know not what; and none can take that for a good Anſwer from one that pretends to give the reaſon of a thing. II.

But to proceed more diſtinctly, I make no difficulty of allowing theſe following Principles, as to the *Nature* and *Qualities* of Natural Bodies; which are moſt inſiſted upon by a late Excellent Philoſopher, and a truly *Chriſtian Virtuoſo* among us. (1) That there is One Univerſal Matter of Bodies, that is, a Subſtance extended, diviſible, and impenetrable. (2) That there is a diverſity of Motion in ſeveral parts of Matter; ſo it be not ſaid to be in Matter from it ſelf as eſſential to it; for then it muſt always move, and there could be no Reſt, and ſo no Compoſition. (3) That by virtue of this Motion, Matter is divided into greater and leſſer parts, which have their Determination, Size and Figure. (4) That beſides theſe, their Situation is to be conſider'd; that is, their Poſture and order, with reſpect to one another: and when the ſeveral parts joyn together to make up one Body, that is called the *Texture* of them. (5) That there is a different *Texture* both in our *Organs* of Senſe, and in the *Objects* which make impreſſions upon them, with a different Motion, Figure and Size; from whence ariſe our different Senſations, and our Apprehenſions of different ſenſible Qualities in things. (6) That by a Coalition of the ſmaller Particles of Matter into one Body, there are different Subſtances in the World of diſtinct Denominations; but by a change of Texture or Motion, or other Properties of Matter, that compound

Mr. Boyle of the Origin of Forms and Qualities.

Body may be put into a different ſtate, which may be called its Alteration or Corruption; and if the change be ſo made as to offend our Senſes, it is then called *Putrefaction.* (7) That there may be an incomprehenſible variety in the Coalition and Texture of the minute Particles of Matter, which may be ſo different from each other, as to be thought to be endued with diſtinct Qualities. As the 24 Letters make up an inconceivable number of words by the different placing of them.

But when I have allow'd theſe, I can by no means agree, 1. That there are no other Qualities in Bodies, but what relate to our Senſes. It's true we could not be ſenſible of Heat and Cold, but from the impreſſions made on our Senſes: but ſuppoſing we were not ſenſible of the different agitation of Particles without us; it doth not at all follow, that there is not a real Alteration in the objects themſelves, as that the Fire doth not burn, if we do not feel the heat of it; and why that diſpoſition in Matter, which is apt to produce ſuch a ſenſe in us, may not be called an inherent Quality, is not ſo eaſy to apprehend. But if there be ſuch a real difference in Bodies, as that one will make ſuch an impreſſion on our Senſes, and another will not, we cannot in reaſon ſay that there is no Quality in things, but that it wholly depends on our Apprehenſion. It is granted, *That Snow hath a greater diſpoſition to reflect light outwards, than a Coal or Soot, when the Sun ſhines upon all three.* Now why this diſpoſition ſhould be called a diſtinct Quality from what is in the other two, ſeems to me a Diſpute of no conſequence. So, if an Eccho be nothing but the cavity of a place, whereby it is diſpos'd to reflect the ſound back to the place from whence it came, altho' it muſt not be called the Quality of the place which makes the Eccho; yet it cannot be denied to be the peculiar Figure and Diſpoſition of the parts which make it. So that, if Men will allow ſuch inherent Diſpoſitions in things to produce what we call *Qualities* in us, the difference will not be found worth the diſputing. And I have wonder'd Perſons of Judgment and skill in theſe matters lay ſo much weight upon it, as tho' the Quality muſt be ſaid to be only in us, when it is confeſs'd to ariſe from a different Diſpoſition in the parts without us.

2. That there are no other Qualities in Bodies, but ſuch as an account may be given of by the foregoing Principles: For I do not find it poſſible for any Perſon by virtue of theſe Principles to give an account either of the make or compoſition of the Bodies of Animals, or of the diſpoſition and relation of the inward Parts, or of the inſtruments of Nature for preſervation of the Individual or Species; or of the Diſeaſes they are ſubject to, or of the proper methods of cure. And the more any Perſon ſearches into all the Mechanical attempts of this kind, the more unſatisfy'd he will find himſelf about them; and will ſee reaſon to conclude, as a Learned Phyſician hath done, *That we may know enough for our general direction what to do, but that the ſecret Cauſes are ſo hidden from us, as we have reaſon to admire the Supreme Artificer in what we know, and to adore him in what we do not.*

Sydenham *de Hydrope* p. 160.

Theſe things being premis'd, I come to the main point, which is, Whether Matter being put into motion, can in a Mechanical manner produce that frame of the Univerſe which we ſee, and the ſeveral

ſeveral things which are in the Heavens, and in this Globe of Earth and Sea.

To make this Matter as clear as we can, we muſt firſt conſider the *General Principles*; and then proceed to the Account given of the ſeveral *Phænomena*, as they are commonly called.

I begin with the *General Principles*, which are theſe;

That the Matter of the Univerſe is one and the ſame extended Subſtance; and that all the properties we clearly perceive in it, are, that it is diviſible and capable of motion in its parts. I. *Princip. I. 11. n. 23.*

That this matter is without bounds, and that the Idea of Extenſion is the ſame with that of Corporeal Subſtance. II. *N. 21.*

That it is capable of diviſion into ſo many parts, as we cannot comprehend the utmoſt bounds of its diviſibility. III. *N. 34.*

That God alone is the firſt and univerſal Cauſe of the motion of matter, which continues the ſame in the whole, altho' it vary in the ſeveral parts. IV. *N. 36.*

That there are certain Laws of motion, whereof theſe are the chief: V.

1. That every part continues in the ſtate it was in, unleſs mov'd by an External Cauſe. *N. 37.*

2. That all motion of it ſelf is in a right Line, but by other Bodies it becomes oblique, and all matter being in motion it becomes circular. *N. 39.*

3. That when two Bodies meet, the weaker loſes not its motion, but changes its tendency, and the ſtronger loſes ſo much as it gives to the weaker. *N. 40.*

That the parts of matter were at firſt divided into many parcels of an equal and indifferent ſize, and had among them all that motion which is now in the World. VI. *Princip. Part. 3. n. 46.*

That theſe Particles of matter could not at firſt be ſpherical, becauſe then there muſt be a void ſpace between them, but by force of motion and natural attrition they became ſo. VII. *N. 48.*

That thoſe leſſer Particles which came off from the Angles of the bigger, fill up all the empty ſpaces between them, and have a quicker motion. VIII. *N. 49. &c.*

That beſides theſe, there are ſome Particles which are large and ſlower than the reſt, being full of Angles, and ſo more apt to ſtick to one another, which by reaſon of their paſſage thro' the triangular ſpaces between the globular Particles become wreathed. IX. *N. 88.*

And theſe are the three Elements out of which he ſuppoſes all Bodies to be made; and accordingly the Ingenious Author hath framed *a Syſtem of the Univerſe* with great Art and appearance of Reaſon; but at ſometimes he is content to let it paſs as a bare *Hypotheſis, agreeing with the Phænomena of the World*; but withal he ſaith, *That he makes uſe of no Principles but ſuch as are moſt evident, and deduces nothing from them but by Mathematical Conſequences.* And in an *Epiſtle* to *Merſennus*, to whom he opened his Mind more freely, he ſaith, *That he ſhould think he knew nothing in Phyſics, if he could only tell how things might be, if he could not demonſtrate that they could be no otherwiſe.* But to another Perſon he calls it his *Romance of the World; which* he confeſſes *he was very well pleas'd with.* *Part. III. n. 44.* *N. 43, 44.* *Ep. To. II.* *Ep. 37.* *Ep. 103.*

But ſo have not others been, who have taken great pains both in *Philoſophy* and *Mathematics*; and altho' they cannot deny this *Hypotheſis* to be very conſiſtent and well put together, yet they will by no means allow it to be a true and ſatisfactory account of the *Nature* and *Formation* of the World. But it is not my buſineſs to lay together the Objections of others againſt the *Carteſian Hypotheſis*, but to ſhew the tendency of it to *Atheiſm* in theſe two Points.

1. In ſetting up a Notion of *Matter*, or *Corporeal Subſtance* independent upon the Power of God.

2. In undertaking to give an Account of the *Phænomena* of the *Univerſe from the Mechanical Laws of motion without a particular Providence.*

As to the former; His firſt Principle is, *That Matter is one and the ſame thro' the Univerſe; and is every where known by its eſſential property, which is Extenſion:* and therein he places *the Eſſence of a Corporeal Subſtance*; (as will preſently appear.) If then the very Eſſence of Matter be independent upon God's Power, ſo that he can neither create nor annihilate it, what becomes of the Creation of the World according to this *Hypotheſis?*

Princip. Part. 2. n. 23.

Some object againſt his *Notion* of *Matter*, and ſay, that he hath confounded *Mathematical* and *Phyſical Bodies* with one another. For, ſay they, the ſtrength of his whole *Hypotheſis* depends upon the ſuppoſition *that Matter is nothing but Extenſion, and therefore there can be no Vacuity, becauſe all Space is extended, and therefore Matter is Infinite*, or as he calls it *Indefinite*; but ſo, as he poſitively ſaith, *that the Idea of Space is the ſame with that of Corporeal Subſtance, and that we can conceive nothing in it but Extenſion.* Which they ſay, is true, if we ſpeak of *Mathematical Quantity*, but not of *Real and Phyſical.* But, ſaith *Des Cartes*, *Men may pretend to diſtinguiſh Corporeal Subſtance from Quantity; but they utter that in words, which they cannot comprehend in their Minds; for either they mean nothing by Subſtance, or attribute a confus'd notion of an Incorporeal Subſtance to a Corporeal, and leave the true Idea of Corporeal Subſtance to Extenſion.* But this is very far from clearing this matter. For himſelf lays it as a fundamental Principle, *That it is capable of Diviſion into Parts, and was actually divided by God himſelf.* Now I deſire to know what that was which was ſo divided? It muſt be *Something*; and that not *an Incorporeal, but a Corporeal Subſtance:* not *pure Extenſion*, but *a Body that was extended*; and of which the Subſtantial parts of the Univerſe are compos'd. Nay, his whole *Hypotheſis* depends upon *the actual Diviſion of Matter into Parts that are equal, or very* near it; without which his three Elements could not be made; which ariſe from the Motion and mutual attrition of thoſe Particles; and yet he affirms in the Concluſion of the 2d Part of his Principles, *That he owns no other Corporeal Matter, but ſuch as Geometricians call Quantity, and is the thing which their Demonſtrations are converſant about.* But is there no difference between *Geometrical* and *Phyſical Quantity?* It's true that in Mathematical Quantity there is nothing but Extenſion; but doth it therefore follow, that there is nothing more in a Real and Phyſical Body? How can we imagin that God ſhould create mere Extenſion in the

Du Hamel *de conſenſu vet. & nov. Philoſoph. l.* 1. *c* 9. *n.* 9.
P. Petiti *Diſſert. de Principiis* Cart. *p.* 28.
Huet. *Cenſ. Philoſoph.* Carteſ. *c.* 8. *n.* 4.

Part. II. n. 9.

Part. 3. *n.* 46.

Part. II. n. 64.

the World; and that out of that all the Bodies in the Universe are fram'd? Nay, upon *Des Cartes* his *Principles* it is impossible that Matter should either be *created* or *annihilated*. For according to him, *the Idea of Matter and Extension are the same*; but he saith positively, *that the Idea of Extension and Space are the same*; therefore if *Space* can neither be *created* nor *annihilated*, neither can *Matter*. And it seem'd strange to me, that a Person so sagacious, should not lay these things better together; but his *Mathematical Notions* ran so much in his Mind, that his endeavor to accommodate them to the nature of things, was that which led him into such inextricable difficulties. It is well observ'd by Monsr. *Du Hamel*, that the great mistakes in *Natural Philosophy* have risen from Mens applying their *former Notions to it*; *thus*, saith he, *the common Philosophers confounded Natural things with Metaphysical speculations: on the other side*, Des Cartes *being a great Mathematician, endeavor'd to reduce Nature to Geometry, and so consider'd nothing in Body but Extension. Extension*, saith he, *which constitutes Space, is the same which constitutes Bodies; but we consider it more particularly in Bodies, and more generally in Space, which is not chang'd, as the other is.* But is there then nothing to make a *Body*, but mere *Extension?* I mean not *a Mathematical*, but *a real Physical Body*. No, saith he, *in the Idea of a Body, we may cast off other Qualities, as Hardness, Color, Gravity, Heat and Cold, and yet a Body remains; to which then nothing belongs but Extension, which is common to Body and Space.* This is not so deep reasoning, as might have been expected from so great a Master of it. For altho' the particular Qualities may be cast off, yet the Capacity of them can no more than *Extension*; as is plain in *Figure* and *Size*, as well as *Hardness*, &c. any one particular *Figure* and *Size* may be abstracted from Body, but it is impossible to conceive a Body, but it must be capable of one or other. Besides, all this proves no more but that *Extension* is the *Inseparable Property of Body*. And what then? Must the whole Essence of a Body consist in one inseparable Property? *But this is all the Idea we have of Body.* Then I say, our Ideas of things are short and imperfect, and there is no forming Worlds upon such Ideas. And this was the fundamental mistake of *Des Cartes*. He lays this down as his ground of certainty; *or that we cannot take falshood for truth, if we only give assent to such things as we clearly and distinctly perceive.* Then he goes on, *that the things which fall under our perception, are either things and their Properties, or eternal Truths. Of things, the most general are Substance, Duration, Order, Number and such like, which extend to all kinds of things.* And he saith, *they may all be comprehended under those two: Of Intellectual or Thinking Substances; or of Material, i. e. of Bodily and Extended Substances.* Thus far all is clear and distinct. Then, as to the Notion of *Substance*, he saith, *By that we can understand nothing but a thing which so exists, as to need nothing else to support it. There is but one Substance in the World which needs no support, and that is* God. *All created Substances need his support, and the Notion of them is, that they are things which only stand in need of* God's *concourse to support them.* Hitherto we find nothing to stick at. *But how come we to have an Idea of created Substances? Not from the bare Existence, for that doth not affect*

De Consensu vet. & nov. Philosoph. l. I c. 9. n. 8.

Part. 2. n. 10.

N. 11.

Princip. P. I. n. 43.

N. 48.

N. 51.

N. 52.

affect us: but it must be from some Properties, Attributes or Qualities; because Nothing can be attributed to Nothing. From whence we conclude from any Real Attribute, that there must be a thing or Substance to which it belongs. All this appears very well still; only we must take notice, that all Properties do assure us of a *Real Substance* under them: Which is very true, relating to *Physical Bodies.* But it is possible he may from hence aim at proving, *That there must be a Corporeal Substance in Imaginary Space, because there is an Extension there, and nothing cannot be attributed to nothing; therefore there must be a Real Body there.* But I think it may be truly answer'd, That the Extension is no more real than the Space is, and implies no more but a Capacity of having Bodies which it had not; that is, that God might create Bodies beyond this World; and if he did so, then there would be a real Extension; but as we conceive it, the Imaginary Space is no more but a Possibility for Bodies existing out of the compass of this Universe. And therefore I deny this to be any real Extension; and that it can be no *Real Substance,* because *Des Cartes* himself, but just before, owned *that a created Substance was that which stood in need of* God *to support it.* Now is it possible to imagin that *Space* needs *a Divine Concourse?* Therefore he must distinguish it from *Substance:* or else he must affirm it to be an uncreated Substance; which overthrows his distinction here between *Created and Uncreated Substances.* As to his Maxim, that *nothing can have no properties,* it certainly relates to *Substance,* and not to a *mere Space;* which by the common sense of Mankind must be distinguish'd from *Bodily Substance;* and there can be no greater prejudice to Philosophy, than to go against that. Now let us proceed.

N. 53. *From every Attribute a Substance is known; but there is one chief Property which constitutes the Essence and Nature, to which the rest are referr'd. So,* saith he, *Extension makes the Nature of a Corporeal Substance, and Cogitation of a Thinking Substance. For every thing which we attribute to Body, supposes Extension, which is only the Mode of the thing extended; as all things attributed to our Minds, are different Modes of thinking.*

N. 54. *And thus we come to two clear and distinct Notions or Ideas; one of a Thinking Substance, and the other of a Corporeal; if we distinguish between the Attributes of Thinking and Extension.* After this he saith, *That Cogitation and Extension*

N. 63. *may be consider'd, as constituting the Natures of a Thinking and Corporeal Substance; and so their clear Ideas are, a Substance which thinks, and a Substance which is extended: but then these Properties,* he saith, *may be consider'd likewise only as Modes belonging to*

N. 64. *those Substances; and so they make a distinct Idea of themselves, not without the Substances, but as Modes belonging to them.*

Thus I have carefully laid down his own Notions about these matters. And now arises the main difficulty; *viz.* how upon these grounds *the Idea of Space, and of Corporeal Substance should be the same?*

Part. 2. N. 9. All that I can find is, that Extension is really *Corporeal Nature, altho' it be call'd an Accident.* But did not himself distinguish it as *a Mode of Matter,* and as *a Substance extended?* And was not this look'd on *as such a Property of Matter, as Thinking is of a Mind?* But can any Man say, that *Thinking* by it self is *an Intellectual Substance;* now then can *Extension* by it self be *a Corporeal Substance?* And yet, if it be not, as I can see no reason from

from his own grounds why it ſhould be; then his Suppoſition of the *Infiniteneſs of Matter*, of *the Plenarty of the World*, and *the circular motion of his Particles of Matter*, on which his whole *Hypotheſis* depends, comes to nothing. And what a ſtrange foundation is *Des Cartes* his World built upon? I could hardly believe that ſo thinking a Man ſhould not diſcern the Weakneſs of his own Grounds. But inſtead of that, it is plain that he laid great weight upon it: For when a learned Man of our own, and then a great admirer of him, objected to him, *that he extended the notion of Corporeal matter too far; but he thought it of no great conſequence to the main of his Principles*; *Des Cartes* takes him up ſmartly for it, for he ſaith, *he look'd on it, as one of the chief and moſt certain Principles of his Philoſophy*. And in the *Fragment* of his laſt Anſwer, which he liv'd not to finiſh, he perſiſted in his Opinion, *That the empty Space was a real Body, becauſe nothing can have no properties*. But there is a difference between *Real Properties* and *Imaginary*; if there be any Bodies in that Space, there will be *Extenſion*, *Diſtance*, &c. but it is a very unconceivable thing that one of his judgment ſhould ſo much contend to the laſt, *That there was a difference of parts in ſuch a ſpace, where there was nothing but ſpace. i.e.* That there muſt be ſomething, where there is nothing. And therefore *Bernier* obſerves, *That thoſe who confound Space and Body, run themſelves into ſtrange abſurdities by a Corporeal Subſtance to fill all poſſible ſpace, or rather to be ſpace it ſelf; and that God cannot annihilate the leaſt part of it*. And he concludes it to be *neither Subſtance nor Accident, but a mere Capacity*. And it was not an improbable Conjecture of that Learned Perſon who wrote to *Des Cartes* upon this Argument, that this Doctrine of his, as he explain'd it, laid the foundation of *Spinoza*'s opinion of the *Infinite extent* and *power of matter*; but I cannot think that *Des Cartes* himſelf intended it ſo, however the other underſtood it. And it is great pity one of ſo clear a Capacity in other things, ſhould ſo ſtifly adhere to ſo unreaſonable an Opinion. And yet we find his Diſciples go on to defend him in this Matter. For when Monſ. *Huet* had objected, *That* Des Cartes *had made Extenſion, which was an Accident, to be a Subſtance*; Monſ. *Regis* anſwers, *That he confounded Extenſion which was of the eſſence of Body, with the Extenſion which belonged to Quantity; whereof the one is conſidered in it ſelf, and the other with reſpect to Magnitude*. But let it be conſider'd how he pleaſes, it is ſtill but a Mode belonging to a Subſtance, and not the Subſtance it ſelf. However, he refers us to his Book of *Phyſics* for the clearing of this Matter. And there we find indeed, that he diſtinguiſhes three ſorts of Bodies, *Phyſical*, *Mechanical*, and *Mathematical*. *A Phyſical Body is one compos'd of many inſenſible parts in its due order and figure, from whence reſult the Phyſical properties. A Mechanical Body is one compos'd of groſs and ſenſible parts, which by their figure and ſituation are proper for particular motions. A Mathematical Body is a Body conſider'd with its proper extenſion under a regular figure, as a Cube or a Cylinder*. But this doth not ſhew that *Des Cartes* did not confound a *Mathematical* and *Phyſical Body*: For it is an eaſy thing to find out diſtinctions to avoid a difficulty; but then they ought to be

Epiſt. Des Cartes *To.* I. *Ep.* 87. *Ep.* 88.

Ep. 93.

Bernier *Abregé de Gaſſend. To.* I. *p.* 25.

H. Mori *Oper. Phil. To.* 2. *p.* 242.

Cenſur. Carteſ. *l.* 5. *n.* 1. Regis *Réponſe à la Cenſure, ch. V. Art.* I. *p.* 255.

La Phyſiq. Regis *To.* I. *p.* 273.

agreeable to the general ſenſe of thoſe Terms. But here a *Mathematical Body* is confin'd to *Regular Figures*; whereas the general notion of it is ſuch a Body as *Des Cartes* himſelf means, when he calls it, *Geometrical Quantity, ſuch as is the object of Mathematical Demonſtrations: i. e.* of any kind of Figures abſtract from Phyſical Bodies; and *this*, he ſaith, *is that matter he treated of.* And to ſuch a *Body* Extenſion alone belongs, and to none elſe, either *Phyſical* or *Mechanical.*

Here then lies the difficulty as to *Des Cartes* his Principles: he conſiders Matter *Geometrically*, i. e. *Abſtractedly*, with reſpect to bare *Extenſion*, and yet ſuppoſes the effects of *Phyſical Bodies*; ſuch as *Diviſion of parts of matter one from another*, and *a motion of thoſe parts* in order to the compoſition of things. But *Mathematical Extenſion* is capable of no Diviſion but in the Mind; for no Man imagins the Earth really divided by the *Parallels* and *Meridians*, &c. and the Diviſion of the parts of an empty ſpace is nothing but a Mathematical Diviſion, which implies nothing really in that ſpace, but a mere act of the Mind in conceiving the diſtance between the ſeveral parts of it.

Prin. Part. II. n. 16. But *Des Cartes* proves it impoſſible *there ſhould be a vacuum in Nature, becauſe the extenſion of Space and Body are all one.* But may not God *annihilate* that Air which is between the ſides of a Veſſel, and would there not be a *Vacuum* between? No; he ſaith *N. 18. It is impoſſible to conceive ſuch a Cavity without Extenſion, or ſuch an Extenſion without Matter; and if the middle ſubſtance were annihilated, the ſides muſt come together, becauſe there would be nothing between.* By which we ſee, that this Notion of the Identity of *Extenſion* and *Corporeal Subſtance* had ſunk ſo deep into his Mind, that he makes *Annihilation* of the Subſtance of Matter impoſſible to Divine Power: for there can be no ſuch Vacuity, but there muſt remain *Extenſion*, and conſequently *a Corporeal Subſtance.* This hath been objected to the followers of *Des Cartes*, and lately by *Du Hamel*, in his Cenſure of *Regis* his *Carteſian Philoſophy*; and it is worth the while to ſee what anſwer he makes to it. He ſaith, *That his objection about the Annihilation of the Air between the Heaven and Earth, can be of no force to prove a Vacuum; becauſe if there be no ſpace, they muſt touch one another; and if they do not, there muſt be ſpace, and conſequently a Corporeal Subſtance.* But ſaith *Du Hamel*, may not God by the ſame power by which he preſerves the Bodies between Heaven and Earth, deſtroy them, and then there muſt be a Vacuum? He anſwers plainly, *That an Annihilation of the ſubſtance of matter is impoſſible, even to the power of God; becauſe his Will is immutable. He grants that God may deſtroy the Air, and all other Bodies as to their Form, or preſent Modification; but he cannot deſtroy their Matter*, i. e. *their Extenſion, which is a true ſubſtance, and ſubſtances are indefectible.* Where we plainly ſee that the *Carteſians* aſſert the neceſſary Exiſtence of Matter, and that it is not in the power of God to deſtroy it; and whatever they may talk of the Will of God, they deny any power to exerciſe it with reſpect to Matter.

Réponſe aux Reflex. de M. Du Hamel, *Part. 2. ch. 4.*

But *Du Hamel* proceeds. How can thoſe Bodies touch one another, when God can create another Body between? No, ſaith *Regis, That ſtill ſuppoſes a ſpace between; and if there be a ſpace,*

there

there muſt be a body, and ſo a vacuum is a repugnancy in it ſelf. But this Space, ſaith *Du Hamel*, is nothing but imaginary, a fiction of the Mind, and there is no arguing from thence to the Nature of things. *Regis* replies, *that their Ideas depend on the objective realities of things; and that the Idea of ſpace or extenſion is one of their primitive Ideas; and that it repreſents ſubſtance, and all ſubſtance is incorruptible.* Still we ſee the neceſſary exiſtence of Matter is look'd on by them as a fundamental Principle, and depending on primitive Ideas.

Monſ. *Bernier* puts thecaſe of Air being annihilated between two walls; and he deſires to know of the *Carteſians*, whether theſe two walls will come together or not? They ſay, *They muſt, if there be nothing between.* True, ſaith he, there is nothing Corporeal, or that touches our Senſes, no Subſtance or Accidents; but there is a true diſtance remaining. Suppoſe a Chamber 20 foot long, 15 foot bread, and 10 foot high; and theſe dimenſions to be meaſured, and one wall 20 foot diſtant from the other: it cannot be ſaid that it is the Air that makes the diſtance between them; how then comes this diſtance to be quite loſt, if the Air be deſtroy'd? They have no anſwer, he ſaith, but to ſay, It is an impoſſible Suppoſition; and they will rather deny GOD's Omnipotency in annihilating the Air, than let go their Opinion. Monſ. *Regis* in his *Phyſics*, takes notice of *Bernier*'s Doubts, and in anſwer to them he reſolves it at laſt into this, *That it is impoſſible there ſhould be an Annihilation, ſo as to make a Vacuum; becauſe Subſtances cannot ceaſe: not from the Nature of things, but from the immutable Will of God.* And after all poſſible Objections, here they ſtick, and ſeem reſolv'd to maintain, that *Extenſion* and *Matter* are the ſame.

Abregé To. I. p. 13.

Reg. Phyſ. Part. I. ch. 3. n. 3.

Even Monſ. *Rohault* himſelf, altho' in ſome things he ſaw it neceſſary to leave *Des Cartes*, yet in this he perſiſts, *That the Eſſence of Matter conſiſts in Extenſion, and that Space and Matter are the ſame; and therefore a Vacuum is impoſſible.* And to the Objection about the walls of a Chamber ſtanding, when the Air is annihilated, he avoids anſwering *as to God's Omnipotency*; but, he ſaith, *according to our Underſtanding the walls muſt come together.* And to that about the wall's diſtance not depending on the Air, he anſwers, *That the being of the walls do's not depend upon the Air within, but the ſtate or diſpoſition of them doth upon the Extenſion between them.* Which he ſuppoſes impoſſible to be taken away, and that the Subſtance of Matter hath a neceſſary Exiſtence.

Rohault. *Tr. Phyſ. l. 1. c. 7. n. 9. C. 8. 1, 2, 3.*

The ſubſtance of this Argument comes to this. *Des Cartes* makes *all the matter of the World to be one and the ſame:* but he aſſerts *the Eſſence of Matter to be extenſion*; and that Extenſion can neither be created nor annihilated: and therefore it is impoſſible upon his Principles, to make out the dependence of Matter upon an infinite Creator. If it be ſaid, that *Des Cartes* expreſly ſaith, *That it ſeemed manifeſt to him that there is no other General Cauſe which created matter with motion and reſt but God*; And that in the *Fragment* of his laſt Anſwer to Dr. *H. M.* he ſaith, *That if matter were left to it ſelf, it would not move, but that it was firſt moved by God:* I anſwer, That according to his *Principles* the Subſtance of Matter muſt be before, becauſe there muſt be *Space*; and

Prin. P. II. n. 36.

Epiſt. To. I. ep. 93.

Space and Matter are the same. And I can see no possible way of clearing him, but by saying, that he held two sorts of *Matter*; one part is *Physical matter*, which God gave motion to at first when he created it, and out of which the World was fram'd; and the other *Mathematical*, which consists in mere *Extension:* but how to reconcile these two to his asserting *One and the same matter in the World*, is a thing above my Understanding.

II. The next thing to be consider'd, is *Des Cartes* his undertaking to give an Account of the *Phænomena* of the *Universe* from the *Mechanical Laws of motion*, without a particular Providence. We are told by some, who have been very conversant with the Atheistical Persons of our Age, That *they despise the Epicurean Hypothesis of the World's being made by a fortuitous concourse of Atoms, as a ridiculous thing; and think* Moses *his Account more probable than that:* (which is a great favor indeed.) So that it is to little purpose now to spend time in shewing how *precarious* and *unsatisfactory* the *Principles* of *Epicurus* were, who suppos'd motion in matter, without the least ground for it; but *Des Cartes* was a Man of too great sense and judgment to commit such blunders as *Epicurus* was guilty of (whom one of his sharpest Adversaries allows to have been *of a great and searching Wit, well skilled in Geometry, to which he endeavor'd to reduce Natural Philosophy; (altho' he fail'd in his Attempt) That he had a faculty of expressing his mind clearly in few words above any either ancient or modern Writer.*) Therefore it will be necessary to consider what *Des Cartes* yields, that we may not mistake or mis-represent his design.

Fr. Cuperi *Arcan. Atheism. l. 2. c. 3.*

Huet. *Cens. Phil. Cart. c. 8. n. 4.*

1. He grants, that God did at first create Matter, which was capable of rest or motion.

2. That Matter left to it self would be without any motion; and therefore the first motion was from God.

3. That God by his ordinary Providence doth preserve as much motion in the World, as was given at first.

4. That we have no reason to suppose any other alteration in the ordinary course of things, according to the Laws of motion, than what we are certain of by Experience or Revelation.

And now the main point is, Whether matter being thus put into motion, can produce the *Phænomena* of the World, without any farther interposition of Providence, than only to preserve the motion of matter? For which we must consider, That he doth not give a satisfactory account, 1. of the *Nature* and *Laws of motion*; nor 2. of the *Phænomena of the Universe.*

(1.) As to the former, I shall inquire into his *Notion* of *Motion*, and then of the *Laws* of it.

(1) He asserts, That *Motion*, according to his Principles, is barely *a mode of Matter*, without any inward Principle of Motion. For *Motion*, he saith, is the change of the situation of Bodies, with respect to one another; or *a removing a Body from the vicinity of some Bodies to the neighborhood of others*; and he places it in such *a Translation* on purpose, that it may be understood to be only *a Mode of the Matter moved, as Figure is of a thing figured.* But it is not so easy to understand that *Motion*, which imports an Action, should be only *a Mode of the Matter moved*, as it is that Figure belongs only to the thing figured. For it is not possible for

Princ. Part. II. n. 25.

for the Figure to be any where elſe, but in that Body which hath it; but it is poſſible to apprehend Motion to come either from an external Agent, or an internal Principle; and ſo it is not a mere mode of the thing moved. But when the whole weight is laid upon the Nature of *Motion* in this caſe, ſome greater evidence ought to have been given how motion being once given to Matter, as a Mode of it, muſt always continue, when the reſiſtence of Bodies doth certainly weaken it ſo as to need a new force to repair it. For either all motion of matter muſt be by a violent impulſe, without regard to the different force or magnitude of things; (which is to overthrow the due Laws of Motion) or elſe there muſt be a proportion in the force of the mover to the reſiſtence of the Body moved: and if there be a regard to that proportion (or elſe the ſmalleſt Body might move the greateſt) then there muſt be a reſiſtence in that Body which is moved: But every reſiſtence gives a check to the motion of that Body which moved it, and every check leſſens the impulſe; and ſo from a gradual reſiſtence there muſt come a gradual decay, till at laſt all motion muſt ceaſe; as it is in all Machines, whoſe motion depends upon external force. *Des Cartes* indeed ſaith, *That whatever motion is loſt by one Body is communicated to the next, and ſo the firſt motion is ſtill preſerved.* But it is hardly poſſible to make it appear, that Motion is not ſo much weakned by reſiſtence, but that it can preſerve it ſelf in a degree of motion proportionable to that which is not communicated to another. For the frequency of impulſe leſſens the power of reflection; and it appears in Light, and Sounds, and other things, that whatever is reflected grows weaker. So that reſiſtence muſt gradually weaken motion. And in the *motion of projected Bodies*, *Des Cartes* himſelf grants, *That the motion continues till it be hinder'd by the reſiſtence it meets with*; and he ſaith, *It is manifeſt that the motion is retarded by the Air, and other ambient fluids, and ſo it cannot continue long.* But is that an Argument *that Bodies do continue motion, till they be hinder'd, and that motion is only a mode of the Body mov'd?* Whatever *Mode* it is, it comes from the force of the immediate Agent, and not from the motion at firſt given to Matter; and here we ſee the reſiſtence it meets with, ſoon gives a ſtop to it. Therefore it ſeems unconceivable that all the motion in the World, conſidering the continual reſiſtance of Bodies, ſhould be the ſame mode of Matter, which was at firſt given to it. And as to his definition of *Motion*, ſome have undertaken to demonſtrate it to be falſe, by ſhewing how one Body may come nearer to another, without changing the ſituation of the parts next adjoyning to it; and that there is no ſuch reciprocal motion as he aſſerts, altho' there be a reciprocal change of ſituation, which is unavoidable. But Monſ. *Rohault* ſaith, *That motion is to be taken with reſpect to the next, and not to any remote Bodies.* However Monſ. *Regis* thought fit to quit that definition of *Des Cartes* for another, which *Du Hamel* ſaith is not at all better; but he thought it neceſſary to take in *the Efficient Cauſe of motion*, which makes it not to be a mere mode of the matter moved. And but for the Authority of *Mathematicians* and *Philoſophers*, it would be thought ridiculous for a thing not to be ſaid *to be moved, becauſe it doth not change the ſituation as*

Part. II. n. 38.

H. Mori Enchirid. Metaphyſ. Part. I. c. 7.

Rohault. *Tr. Phyſic. c.* 10. *n.* 1.

Regis *Riponſe aux Reflections Critique de M.* Du Hamel. *ch.* 7.

to the next Bodies about it; as that the Kernel of a Nut is not moved, becauſe it is thrown with the Shell upon it; or that the Wine is not moved in a Ship at Sea, becauſe it keeps within the Veſſel. So, if the Earth be carry'd about with the force of the *Vortex* wherein it is, 'tis as certainly moved as a Pendulum is with the motion of the Ship, altho' it hath a proper motion of its own.

Des Cartes *Prin. Part. II. n.* 45, &c.

But *Des Cartes* undertakes to give an account of the Proportion of the increaſe and leſſening of motion, upon the meeting of two hard Bodies, and he lays down *ſeven Rules* to determin it; but it falls out very unhappily, *that ſix of them* are deny'd *to be true, and that the firſt doth not anſwer the end it was brought for.* This was a bold charge on ſo great a Mathematician; but all that *Regis* ſaith in anſwer to it is, *That he did not undertake to defend all* Des Cartes *his Rules of motion, becauſe they did not appear to him exact enough.* But if the Particular Rules of motion be no better fix'd nor underſtood, how come they to be ſo certain, that the ſame quantity of motion is ſtill preſerv'd in the World? For that *Des Cartes* hath recourſe *to the immutable Will of* God, *which hath determin'd it.* No doubt if God hath determin'd it, ſo it muſt be. But from whence comes *Des Cartes* to know this to be the *immutable Will of* God? What antecedent Reaſon is there to ſatisfy any Man's Mind, that God *by his immutable Will* muſt keep up the ſame proportion of motion in the World? Why may not God alter or ſuſpend the Laws of motion, as to the parts of matter, in what way or manner he thinks good? What repugnancy is there to the *Divine Nature* in ſo doing? So that theſe Arguments *à priori*, (as they call them) have no kind of Evidence as to ſuch matters, which may be or not be, as God pleaſes. Beſides, what neceſſity was there that *Motion* muſt be only a *Mode of Matter?* And that Mode to be preſerv'd by ſuch *Laws of Motion*, which are ſo very uncertain? A very Skilful and Ingenious Philoſopher of our own ſaith, *That this Rule, which he ſaith is the moſt uſeful of all* Des Cartes's, *is very metaphyſical, and not very cogent to him. And he doth not ſee how it can be demonſtrated; and he queſtions whether it be agreeable to Experience.* And he was a Perſon very favorable to *Des Cartes*, as far as he could; as appears on all occaſions in his Writings; but here we ſee he gives up his Fundamental Rule. *Du Hamel* ſaith, *The Argument from* God's *Immutability is no force, becauſe it holds not as to Extrinſecal Actions.* *Regis*, to defend this, runs into that Abſurdity to make God a neceſſary Agent, becauſe God's Will and his Eſſence are the ſame; which overthrows all Religion in the Conſequence of it.

Réponſe, &c. Part. 2. ch. 12.

Mr. Boyle *of the high Veneration of Man's Intellect towards God, p.* 41, 42.

Réponſe aux Reflections, part. 2. c. 13.

But *Des Cartes* himſelf excepts *ſuch mutations as are made in Matter, by evident Experience, or Divine Revelation.* What is the meaning of this? Can that be *an Immutable Will of* God, which is contradicted by *Evident Experience*, and *Divine Revelation?* Or were theſe words only put in to avoid Cenſure? As the World was ſaid to be *Indefinite*, leſt he ſhould be charg'd with making the World *Infinite*; and the Definition of *Motion* was altered, to avoid *Galileo*'s fate: But there is no diſſembling in this matter; if it be contradicted by *Evident Experience*, it can be no fix'd and *Immutable Rule*; if it can be alter'd in caſe of Miracles, the Argument from God's Immutability ſignifies nothing. For,

Prin. Part. II. n. 36.

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if it be no repugnancy to the Divine Nature to alter, or ſuſpend the Laws of Motion, as he ſees cauſe; then we can have no aſſurance as to God's Will any farther than himſelf hath declar'd it; and conſequently they muſt prove that God hath manifeſted this to be his Will. But ſaith *Rohault*, *It is unbecoming Philoſophers on all occaſions to run to Miracles and Divine Power.* Who puts them upon it? We may certainly allow an ordinary courſe of Providence, as to Cauſes and Effects, without aſſerting theſe Notions of *Des Cartes*; but this is a pleaſant way of taking it for granted, that none but his Principles are fit for *Philoſophers*. Rohault. *part. I. c. 10. n.* 13.

Come we now to examin his *catholic Laws of Motion:* and of all things, thoſe ought to be very clear and certain, becauſe ſo much depends upon them; and yet I am afraid we ſhall hardly find one of them to be ſo. (II.)

The firſt of them is, *That every thing remains in the ſame ſtate it was in, unleſs it be changed by External Cauſes.* From whence he concludes, *That which is moved always continues to be moved, and that nothing tends to reſt, which is contrary to the Laws of Nature, becauſe Reſt is contrary to Motion: and nothing tends to its contrary, for that would be to tend to its own deſtruction.* The main thing intended by this, is to aſſert the continuance of Motion in the parts of the Univerſe, upon their being once put into it; ſo that Reſt is a ſtate of violence to a Body once moved, becauſe Reſt and Motion are contrary to each other. But this is a very weak Foundation to build ſo much upon: For, we are not to conſider Reſt and Motion Abſtractly, but Phyſically, together with the Bodies in which they are: And I think it will be very hard to perſuade any Body endued with Senſe and Motion, that after weariſome Motion, he doth aim at his own deſtruction by ſeeking for Reſt. This is a ſort of Reaſoning would not be expected from *Philoſophers*; that becauſe Motion and reſt are contrary Motions, therefore no Body in Motion can tend to Reſt. *But every thing continues in the ſtate it was in, till it be put out of it; therefore every thing in motion muſt continue to move.* This is not clearly expreſs'd. For if it be meant, that every thing from it ſelf continues in its original ſtate, then it is not true. For Matter, he confeſſes, would reſt, if God did not give motion to it; and ſo it muſt continue to reſt, and there could be no Motion at all: If it be meant, that every thing continues in the ſtate God put it into, unleſs he appointed ſeveral Cauſes to alter it, then it is true; but it doth not ſerve his purpoſe. For if God hath appointed both Motion and Reſt for ſome Bodies, it can never be ſaid that ſuch tend to their own deſtruction, when they tend to that Reſt which God and Nature appointed for them. If God hath appointed them for continual Motion, as the great Bodies of the Univerſe, then they muſt continue in it, not by virtue of any inherent Law of Motion, but by the immutable Will of God. *Des Cartes* ſaw it neceſſary for God to put Matter into motion, but he would have the framing of the Laws of this motion himſelf; whereas he had acted more reſpectfully towards his Maker, and more like a Philoſopher, *i. e.* more conſonantly to his own Principles, to have left God that made the World and gave motion to Matter, to have ſetled thoſe Laws of Motion, which were (II.) Princip. Part. II. n. 37.

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agreeable to his Infinite Wiſdom. For theſe Notions are unbecoming *Philoſophers*, to make *Motion* a mere *Mode* of *Matter*; and this *Mode* to be ſupported by *Divine Concourſe*; but ſo, that *Motion* and *Reſt* being contraries, whatever is in *Motion* muſt continue in it; becauſe *Motion* and *Reſt* being contraries, nothing can tend to its own deſtruction.

Part. 2. *n.* 39. *Part.* 3. *n.* 55. Beſides, I know not how to reconcile this with another Law of Nature, as he calls it, *That all Bodies in a circular motion endeavor what in them lies to recede from the center of their motion.* Is not a Body put into a *Circular Motion* in a ſtate belonging to it? How comes it then not to continue in that ſtate, but to endeavor all it can to get out of it? And yet all the *Phænomena* of *Light* depends upon this Law: *That the round particles of the ſecond Element endeavor to recede from their centres; not from any cogitation,* (no doubt of it) *but becauſe they are ſo plac'd and incited to that Motion.* Is that poſſible, and yet *all Bodies continue in the ſtate they are in,* when they endeavor what they can to get out of it? Are not theſe more contrary than *Motion* and *Reſt?* I do not meddle with *External Hindrances*, but the *Natural Endeavors* of Bodies. But it may be ſaid, *That* Des Cartes *intends his Rule only of Primary and Simple Motions, and not of Circular, which are violent and unnatural.* So indeed his words ſeem to run at firſt, that this Rule relates to *ſimple and undivided Bodies*; but then I ſay, it is of no uſe, as to the preſent *Phænomena*; and he ſpeaks of *the Laws of ſuch Motion as we may obſerve in Bodies*: which words ſignify nothing, unleſs his Law reaches to the Bodies now in being; and I ſee no reaſon for him to ſuppoſe Circular Motion to be any more repugnant to the Nature of Matter, than any other.

N. 56.

Réponſe, &c. part. 2. *ch.* 10. *Regis* to avoid this, ſaith, *That Circular Motion is not Unnatural, but Accidental; and the ſtate of the Body is to be taken from what it would be, if External Cauſes were removed*; i. e. *in a right Line.* But he doth not attend to the Conſequences of this; for then the Circular Motion of the Heavens muſt be *Accidental*, and not under the care of Providence, or the immutable Will of God. For God's *Will*, he ſaith, is *that every Body be preſerved in its own ſtate; now*, ſaith he, *the ſtate of a Body in motion is in a right line, and the endeavor of Nature is to keep to that.* Then ſay I, whatever Motion is againſt the ſtate wherein Nature deſigns it, muſt be not only *Accidental* but *Violent*, becauſe it is againſt the courſe of Nature. And if it be violent, it cannot be ſuppos'd to be under God's immutable Will; but if it be not *Violent*, then a Body in circular motion muſt endeavor to preſerve it ſelf in that ſtate, and not to recede from it, as *Des Cartes* ſuppoſes.

Monſ. *Du Hamel* objects againſt this Law, that Permanent Beings do indeed endeavor to preſerve themſelves in the ſtate they are in; but it doth not hold in Beings that are ſucceſſive; becauſe the former are in their full ſtate at firſt, but it is otherwiſe in ſucceſſive. But ſaith *Regis*, *This doth not hinder them from not doing any thing to their deſtruction.* So that it is a plain caſe, no Body in *Motion* can tend to *Reſt*, *becauſe Motion and Reſt are contrary*; and this is a Fundamental Law of Nature, for this weighty Reaſon.

Réponſe aux Reflex. part. 2. *c.* 9.

The ſecond Law is, *That all Motion, according to Nature, is in a right line, and that oblique and circular motion ariſes from the mo-*

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tion and interpoſition of other Bodies; and whatever Body is moved circularly, hath a perpetual tendency to recede from the center of the circle it deſcribes.

Now if this Rule had that evidence which is neceſſary to make it a fundamental Law of Motion, it muſt be proved either from the Nature of Matter and Motion, or from the immutable Will of God: The latter is not pretended to be proved, but only *from the immutability and ſimplicity of the operation whereby God doth preſerve motion in matter; which only regards that very moment, without regard to what was before.* But how from hence it follows that *Motion*, which extends to more moments, ſhould be determined one way rather than another, I cannot apprehend. For if the Motion be in a right line, it muſt be in more moments than one, as well as in a circle; and if it prove any thing, it is *that God preſerves motion* only in a point: but *Des Cartes* owns *That it cannot be conceived in an inſtant, altho' in a right line.* How then comes *Motion* in a *Right Line* to come from God's *Immutability*, and not *in a Circle? Becauſe it is determined in every inſtant towards a right line.* This ought to have been made more evident, than from the inſtance of the *Sling:* For the falling down of the Stone to the Earth, is certainly from another cauſe; *viz.* from the Principle of *Gravitation*, and not from the Inclination of matter to move in a right line. Neither can it be ſaid to come from the *Nature* of *Matter*, or *Motion:* For a Circular Motion, hath as much the Nature and Definition of *Motion*, according to *Des Cartes*, as the other: and *Matter* is of it ſelf indifferent, which way it moves; and ſome have thought *Circular Motion* more perfect, becauſe they obſerv'd the motion of the Heavens to be ſo. But if it ariſes from the impediments of other Bodies, they muſt ſhew, that Matter was firſt put into motion in a ſtreight line; and if God put all the parts of Matter at firſt into motion in a right line, how came the impediments to make it circular? For God preſerves motion as he gave it; he firſt gave it in *right lines*, and *his Will is immutable*, therefore it muſt always ſo continue; and ſo *Circular Motion* will be impoſſible.

But let us ſuppoſe *Circular Motion*, how comes it to be ſo evident as to be made a Law of Nature, *That a Body in that motion always endeavors to recede from the center?* How is this conſiſtent with the Principle of *Gravitation and Attraction*, which depends upon Mathematical Demonſtrations? Can it be in the Nature of Bodies to tend to the center, and to recede from it at the ſame time? And it is a very improbable thing, that *Gravity* ſhould be nothing elſe, but ſome Particles being not ſo quick in their motion from the center as others are, theſe being left in the lurch, and preſs'd by the motion of the other, do ſink under them; and ſo come nearer to the center, which is all that *Des Cartes* means by *Gravity*. But of this afterwards.

The laſt Fundamental Law of Motion is, *That when a Body meets another, if it hath not a greater power to proceed in a right line than the other hath to hinder it, then it turns aſide, but loſeth not its motion; if it hath a greater force than the other, then it communicates its motion to the other, and loſeth it ſelf as much as* N. 40.

it gives. The reaſon given of this is, *Becauſe it is the immutable Will of God, that the ſame quantity of motion ſhall be always preſerved:* Of which I have ſpoken already. And as to the whole matter of theſe Laws of Motion, Mr. *Boyle* ſaith, *That they have been receiv'd by Learned Men, rather upon the Authority of ſo famous a* Mathematician, *than upon any convictive evidence which accompanies the Rules themſelves.*

Mr. Boyle of Veneration, &c. p. 41.

The next thing we are to do is, to ſee whether from theſe *Laws of Motion*, he gives a ſatisfactory Account of the making of the Univerſe.

And here we muſt conſider the *Elements* out of which he ſuppoſeth it made, and the account of the things made out of them.

As to the *Elements*, this, in ſhort, is his account of them. *The Particles of matter into which it was firſt divided, could not at firſt be round, becauſe then there muſt be a vacuum between them; but they muſt by ſucceſſion of time become round, becauſe they had various circular motions* (altho' the *Natural Motion* be in *a Right Line*, and *God's immutable Will be that every thing ſhould be preſerved in its Natural ſtate.*) *But that force which put them into theſe Notions, was great enough to wear off their Angles, and ſo they become round. Which being joyn'd together muſt leave ſome intervals, which were filled up by the filings off from the Angles; which were very ſmall and of a figure fit to fill up all interſtices, and were carried about with a very quick motion. So that here we have two Elements, one of the round Particles, and another of the ſubtile Æthereal matter, which came by the attrition of the firſt Particles. But beſides theſe, there are others more groſs and unapt for motion by their figure; and which make the third Element, and out of theſe, all the Bodies of the viſible World are compos'd; the Sun and fixed Stars out of the firſt; the Heavens out of the ſecond; and the Earth, with Comets and Planets out of the laſt.*

Princip. Part. 3. n. 48.

N. 49.

N. 52.

The main thing which makes this *Hypotheſis* unſatisfactory to me is, that it is as precarious and groundleſs as the *Epicurean*, and they differ only as to the beginning of Motion; which the *Epicureans* ſuppoſe to belong to Matter, and *Des Cartes* ſaith, it comes from an infinite Agent diſtinct from it; becauſe he ſuppoſes that it would not move of it ſelf, unleſs it were put into motion. Which being ſet aſide, there is no more of the Wiſdom or Providence of God to be found in His making of the World than the others, nor any more evidence as to the Production of his Elements. For he firſt ſuppoſes, that there can be no *Vacuum* in Nature, which he proves only from his Mathematical Notion of Body conſiſting only in Extenſion; and from hence he undertakes to give an Account, not of God's creating the matter of the World at once, nor of his Production of things within ſix days; but how in proceſs of time Particles of matter being divided would come to make up his ſeveral Elements. And for this, he makes uſe of ſeveral Suppoſitions without any ground of reaſon why it muſt be ſo and no otherwiſe, which was the thing which he undertook to *Merſennus* to do. For what reaſon doth he give that matter muſt be divided at firſt, in order to the production of the Elements? When there can be no *Diviſion*, but there muſt be

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Intervals between the Parts; and if all Matter be *One and the ſame*, and the Space of the Intervals be neceſſarily fill'd up with *Extended Matter*; what diviſion of Parts could there be? And how can that Extenſion be divided into ſolid Bodies? *Des Cartes* grants, *That by Reaſon we cannot find out how big the parts of Matter were at firſt, how quick their motion, nor what kind of Circles they deſcribed.* Then it is impoſſible to find out by Reaſon how the world was made. For, *if God*, as he confeſſes, *might uſe innumerable ways of doing it, and we cannot tell which he pitched upon*; what a vain thing is it in any Man to undertake to give an Account how the World came to be form'd? And therefore *Rohault* with great Judgment, pretends not to give an Account how Matter was form'd by God at the firſt Creation; but only to ſhew a poſſibility how it might be fram'd, ſo as to ſolve the Appearances of the World. But neither he nor *Des Cartes* can reconcile this primitive diviſion of Matter into parts, with their original notion of Matter, which is nothing but *Extenſion. But if Matter be ſo divided*, as *Des Cartes* ſuppoſes, *may we not reaſonably conclude, that there were three ſuch Elements as he ſpeaks of?* The Queſtion is not, Whether there be not a Diſtinction of the Particles of Matter anſwerable to theſe three Elements, *viz.* a more ſubtle and Ethereal Subſtance, as in Fire; a leſs ſubtle and globular, as in Air; a groſſer, as in Earth; which are moſt made according to theſe Principles, out of ſuch different Particles: but the point is, Whether theſe Elements can be produc'd in ſuch a manner by the mere Motion of Matter? And *Des Cartes* will by no means allow them to be made round, for fear of his *Vacuum*, which would ſpoil all, but *that by length of time they would become round; nay they muſt become round; Eas non potuiſſe ſucceſſu temporis non fieri rotundas*, are his words. Now here lies the difficulty, to ſhew how theſe muſt become round by his own Laws of Motion, *i. e.* by a motion in a right line; for he ſaith, *It is done by various circular motions.* But how comes the Original Matter of it ſelf to deviate from the fundamental Law of Motion? That is, from whence came theſe Circular motions, without which the Elements could not be form'd? And if the firſt Particles were ſo ſolid, as is ſuppos'd, how came the Angles to be worn off? For when two ſolid Bodies meet, according to his own Laws of Motion, the one communicates motion to the other, and loſes of its own; which implies nothing but a mutual contact and rebounding upon the colliſion; but this doth by no means ſhew how theſe Bodies come to wear off each others Angles. And therefore this is only a product of fancy, but very neceſſary to his purpoſe. But let us ſuppoſe that by frequent colliſions ſome alterations would be made in the figure of theſe Bodies; what a long time muſt it be before they become ſpherical? Too long to be conſiſtent with ſuch a thing as *Creation*; which at the ſame time is pretended to be believ'd. But the only agreeable Suppoſition to this is, The exiſtence of matter from eternity, which having we know not how many Ages ſince been put into motion, then by a caſual concourſe (for it was not by the Laws of Motion) theſe Particles juſtling one againſt another, at laſt rubb'd off the uneven Particles, ſo as to make them round. But

Part. 3. n. 46.

Tract. Phyſic. c. 21. n. 6.

N. 48.

what quantity was there of ſuch Particles in proportion to what was left? For it may eaſily be too great and ſo the firſt Element be too powerful for the ſecond, as ſome have undertaken to demonſtrate that it muſt be, upon *Des Cartes* his own grounds. And the Anſwer given is inſufficient; becauſe the Proportion of the firſt Element will ſtill be too great, notwithſtanding all the uſes found out for it; and therefore *Rohault* more wiſely avoided theſe attempts of forming the World out of the firſt *Chaos* of confus'd matter, which he found could give no ſatisfaction.

Enchirid. Metaphyſ. c. 16. Huet *Cenſ. Philoſoph.* Cartel. *c.*8. Regis *Reponſe ch.* 6. *Art* .2.

Let us now in the laſt place come to the Account he gives of the *Phænomena of the Univerſe* according to theſe Principles. And becauſe it would be too large a task to run thro' all, I ſhall confine my ſelf to theſe following: (1) The formation of the Sun and Stars. (2) The motion of the Air. (3) The placing of the Earth. (4) The Mechaniſm of Animals.

I. As to the formation of the Sun and Stars: which *Des Cartes* ſaith was in this manner; *That the matter of the firſt Element increas'd by the attrition of the particles of the ſecond, and there being greater quantity of it than was neceſſary to fill up the interſtices between the round particles of the ſecond Element, the remainder went to the centers of the ſeveral Vortices.* But here ariſes a difficulty, which takes away any appearance of ſatisfaction in this matter; which is, That *Des Cartes* owns *that in this matter of the firſt Element there are ſome parcels which are leſs divided and ſlower moved, having many Angles, and therefore unfit for motion.* Now why ſhould not theſe take up the *Center* of the *Vortex*, and not thoſe which have a quicker Motion, and endeavor to recede from it? For we muſt obſerve, that *Des Cartes* ſuppoſes *that theſe bigger fragments are mix'd with the leſſer, and that they tranſfer their motion to them: according to the Laws of Nature* (which ſerve his turn as he pleaſes) *greater Bodies do eaſier tranſfer their motion to leſſer, than receive motion from them.* So that here we have theſe bigger fragments of the firſt Element mix'd with the leſſer, and communicating their motion to them. Now, who could expect any other than that theſe ſhould have fix'd in the centre of the *Vortex?* But if this be ſuppos'd, his whole *Hypotheſis* is loſt; for then the Sun and Stars muſt be *Opaque*, and not *Luminous Bodies*. But *Des Cartes* hath found out a notable Invention to ſend them far enough from the centre; which is, *That they move in the way between the Poles, towards the middle of the Heaven in a right line, and there are gathered into little maſſes, ſome from the North, and others from the South. But when they are in the Body of the Sun or a Star, then they make thoſe ſpots which hinder their Light, and are thrown off like a thick ſcum from heated Liquors.* But when he aſſigns the reaſon of Gravity, he ſaith, *It comes from hence, that thoſe particles which have a quicker motion preſs down thoſe which are not ſo fit for it, and by that means they get nearer to the center.* How comes it then to be ſo much otherwiſe in theſe parts of the third Element; how come they not to be preſs'd down in the ſame *Vortex* towards the center? Eſpecially when himſelf there ſaith, *That the particles of the firſt Element have more power to depreſs the earthy particles*

Princip. Part. 3. N. 54.

N. 88.

N. 89.

N. 91.

N. 94.

Princip. Part. 4. N. 23.

N. 25.

ticles than of the ſecond, becauſe they have more agitation; and here he ſpeaks of the motion within the *Vortex*: So that according to his Principles, the matter of the third Element ought to ſubſide and be near the center, being leaſt apt for motion. But this would overthrow his whole Theory about the Sun and Stars; and about Light, and the ſpots of the Sun, and of Magnetic Particles, &c. ſo that theſe Particles of the third Element muſt be diſpos'd of as he thinks fit, leſt they put all out of order. And it is ſtrange he ſhould parallel the Scum made by the fermenting of Liquors, with the natural Motion of the Matter of his Elements. And if this Principle were true, that the Matter of the third Element might get above, and leave the thinner and more ſubtle Matter neareſt the center, I do not ſee how the Earth could be habitable; for then we could breath nothing but thin and ethereal Air, which we could not bear. As appears by the famous inſtance of *Acoſta*, who ſpeaks by his own ſad experience, as well as of others, that he was in great danger of his Life, by going over one of the higheſt Mountains of *Peru*. From whence it is obſerv'd, that the moſt ſubtle Air is too thin for Reſpiration. But how comes it to paſs, according to theſe Principles, that the heavier part of the Air is moſt towards the center, and the lighter aſcends higheſt? For Air, according to *Des Cartes*, is *a Congeries of the Particles of the third Element very thin and diſ-joyn'd*; and yet we find this come nearer the center according to its Gravity; and the lighter Air goes higher, and hath very different effects on Mens Bodies, tho' the motion of it be not ſtrong nor violent. For *Acoſta* ſaith, That Air which is ſo fatal to paſſengers on thoſe Mountains of *Peru* (which are ſo high, that he ſaith, the *Alps* and *Pyrenees* were but as ordinary Houſes to lofty Towers) is ſo ſtill, that it is but *as a ſmall Breath, neither ſtrong nor violent*; and yet it pierces ſo that it often kills Men without feeling, and makes their Hands and Toes drop off; as he affirms from his own knowledg.

Acoſta *of the Indies, l. 3. c. 9.* Boyle's *Experiments of Air, p.* 182.

Princip. Part. 4. N. 45.

From whence it appears to be a mere fetch in *Des Cartes* to keep theſe Particles of his third Element from being nearer to the center, altho' they are more weighty and indiſpos'd to motion than others are.

But his whole *Hypotheſis* is overturn'd concerning the Celeſtial Bodies, if there be a Principle of *Gravitation* in *Matter*; which makes a Natural tendency towards the *Center*, according to the *Quantity* and *Diſtance* of it. The opinion of *Des Cartes* his great skill in *Geometry*, hath gone much farther towards perſuading the World of the truth of his Theory, than any evidences that appear'd in his Principles themſelves: For Men who are not deeply skill'd in thoſe matters, are very apt to be ſway'd by the Authority of thoſe that are. But as it falls out in this caſe, we have this *Theory* of *Gravitation* fully demonſtrated by a very Learned and Judicious Mathematician of our own, to whom I refer the Reader, who hath given a *Mathematical Account* of the *Celeſtial Bodies*; not only of *the Sun and Stars, but of Comets, and the Moon, from the Principle of Gravitation*; not inherent and eſſential to Mat-

I. Newton *Philoſoph. Natural. Principia Mathem.*

ter, but by a force given and directed by Divine Power and Wisdom. Which being granted, we have no reason to be displeas'd with the clearest Account can be given, in a Mathematical manner, of the chief *Phænomena* of the Universe. And the same Person saith, *He hath many Reasons to suspect that the rest may depend upon some secret Powers, by which the Particles of matter do either cohere or fly from each other; for want of the knowledg whereof, Philosophers have hitherto blunder'd in Natural Philosophy.* But we proceed in *Des Cartes* his Account of his *Cœlestial Vortices.*

Præfat.

FINIS.

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